Chapter IV

INDIA, INDONESIA AND THE SECOND
AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
Another major issue which determined the two countries' reciprocal attitudes and adversely affected their relations was Indonesia's continued insistence on holding a second Asian-African Conference. It has already been examined how, by ignoring President Sukarno's urgent call for holding such a Conference "in the near future", Prime Minister Nehru had cold-shouldered the persistent Indonesian demand in this connection. 1

Indonesia's Motivations and Efforts

There were several reasons for Indonesia's urge to stage another Afro-Asian Conference of the Bandung type. By virtue of its overall emphasis on the Asian and African struggle against colonialism, the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung (West Java) in April 1955, had tended to be seen as marking a continuity with the International Congress against Imperialism, held at Brussels in February 1927. The Indonesian leadership took it as a matter of pride that it is they who had initiated the move for holding an Afro-Asian Conference. Attended by twenty-nine Heads of State and

1. See Chapters on the Background and India and Indonesia at the Belgrade Conference, pp. 79-80 and p. 134 respectively.


3. It was Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Prime Minister of Indonesia, who had, during the First Colombo Conference of the Five Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, in April 1954, mooted the idea of holding an Asian-African Conference. Ali Sastroamidjojo later became the Chairman of the Bandung Conference in April 1955.
or Government in the two continents, representing over half of the world's population, the Bandung Conference became a legend in Indonesia. The success with which it was characterised brought enormous prestige to the Indonesian Government and leadership, especially President Sukarno. Prime Minister Nehru's words that for seven days from 18 April to 24 April 1955, Bandung (capital of Western Java in Indonesia and the venue of the Conference) had become "the capital of Asia and Africa", justified Indonesia's sense of pride in this Conference and its subsequent efforts to stage another one of this kind. The "Dasa Sila" (ten principles) of the Bandung Conference Communique came to symbolise what Indonesian leadership chose to describe as "Bandung Spirit".

The inspiration for this demand came from the constitutional and ideological moorings of Indonesian foreign policy. Constitutionally the Indonesian leadership felt obliged to "contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon independence, abiding peace and social justice" and to "seek and promote friendship especially with the Asian and African countries". Colonialism and imperialism which continued to cling to their varied interests in Asia and Africa, and hindered the promotion of "independence, abiding peace and social justice", were identified as "OLEPOS" resisting the "NEFOs". Sukarno's call "To Build the World Again",

4. India, Foreign Affairs Record (Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs), vol. 2, no. 4, April 1956, p. 53. In his Bandung Conference Anniversary Day Message on 18 April 1956, Prime Minister Nehru recalled having used these words on an earlier occasion.


6. This was the title of President Sukarno's address.
which he initially gave in his address at the UN General Assembly on 30 September 1960 and later explained in his address to the Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Belgrade on 1 September 1961, was for a world in which colonialism and imperialism were eliminated. But achievement of this objective, according to the Indonesian President, necessitated unity and solidarity among the ranks of the "NEFOS" in the world, in general and in Asia and Africa in particular.

Moreover, the Indonesian leadership believed that all the disputes among the Asian and African countries were either leftovers of "OLDEFO" or the out-growth of their constant divisive interference in Asia and Africa. Hence the need to convene a second Asian-African Conference in order to resolve mutual disputes without interference from the colonialist and imperialist forces.

These reasons apart, another Asian and African Conference would provide to Indonesia an opportunity to exert cumulative Afro-Asian pressure against Dutch colonialism in West Irian. It would also enable Indonesia to use this Afro-Asian forum in manifesting its Afro-Asian role. To President Sukarno it could be an occasion to project his own personal image as one of the spokesmen and even leaders of the New Emerging Forces in the world.

Prompted by these considerations, Indonesia reinforced its efforts to hold another 'Bandung' Conference. Its efforts appeared

7. Sukarno, The Indonesian Dawn is Approaching: It is the Dawn of the Victory of Men (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1962), p. 10. While addressing the opening session of the meeting of the delegates of International Union of Students in Djakarta on 15 May 1962, President Sukarno explained the necessity of unity among the ranks of the "NEFOS" in these words:

"Imperialism is a united one. It is an international force. So what do have we to do with this international force? The only thing we have to do is to make also an international contra-force against imperialism."

to succeed when almost a year after the Belgrade Conference, on 23 August 1962, Mrs. Supeni, Indonesia's roving Ambassador, stated in Djakarta that sixteen nations including India had already officially agreed to sit on the Preparatory Committee. Seven more states were expected to join, she added. This statement, showing India's willingness to attend the Preparatory Committee meeting came only eleven days before the anti-India demonstrations arising from "Sondhi Affair" in Djakarta on 3 September 1962 and about two months before the Chinese aggression against India on 20 October 1962.

On 3 October 1962, however, Foreign Minister Subandrio revealed that he had instructed the Indonesian Ambassador in New Delhi, Moekarto Notowidigdo, to approach Prime Minister Nehru and exchange views with him on the Indonesian proposal. Commenting on Nehru's remarks in Cairo on 30 September 1962, that the time for such a Conference was not opportune, he observed: "I know that since the beginning India has been hesitating regarding the second Asian-African meet." A week later there was a change in Subandrio's tone with reference to India. Following a meeting with the Indian Ambassador in Djakarta, Apa B. Pant, on 10 October 1962, he declared: "For me the most important thing is to preserve the relations between Indonesia and India which in this region is an essential requirement of high importance for the two parties."

Replying to a press correspondent on whether the question of the second Asian-African Conference was also discussed in his meeting

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9. *Indonesian Herald*, 4 October 1962. During Nehru's visit to the UAR and his talks with President Nasser on 30 September 1962, the two leaders felt that the time for a second Asian-African Conference was inopportune and that it might lead to the widening of differences particularly if regional disputes were discussed. See *The Statesman* and *Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo), 1 October 1962 and *Harian Rakjat*, 4 October 1962.
with the Indian Ambassador, he stated that "the topic was approached from another angle, namely from the viewpoint of how to restore the erstwhile relations between the two countries."

Taken together, these remarks by Foreign Minister Subandrio, left no one in doubt that if India desired normalisation of relations with Indonesia it must shed its hesitation and agree to the latter's demand for the holding of the second Conference of Asian and African states. By linking prospects of the two countries's relations with India's willingness to concede Indonesia's demand in this regard, Indonesian leadership probably wanted to exert pressure on India and the reluctant Prime Minister Nehru.

**India's Responses**

India, it appears, had been wavering between acceptance and rejection of Indonesia's persistent call for second Asian-African Conference. Anti-India demonstrations and sacking of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta by the National Front of all Indonesian political parties, especially the PKI, the NU and the PNI, and Indonesian Government's unrepentent though regretful attitude, had rather surprised and shocked the Indians. It was certain to have adverse effect on India's attitude towards Indonesia's foreign policy demands.

The Indian press had called for discarding sentimental approach and introducing pragmatism in relations with Indonesia. Writing in an article, Krishna Bhatia, The Statesman's correspondent warned about serious repercussions on India's prestige if Government of India attended the preparatory meeting as already reportedly decided. He wrote that "the Second Bandung, with Dr. Sukarno presiding over it, may well develop into a massive demonstration of

hostility towards India". With China and Pakistan sharpening their anti-India campaign, there was every possibility that "India will ... return bruised in spirit and reputation". In an editorial "Indonesia Now", just two days before China launched its invasion of India, Statesman reviewed the nature of Indian-Indonesian relations to date, pointed out "a difference of tone in the basically similar foreign policies of the two countries...", and urged upon Government of India to see that "a second Bandung can be put safely into cold storage. It should not be taken out again until the political climate all over Asia and Africa is very much more congenial".

Following incidents arising from "Gondhi Affair", Government of India's attitude towards the Indonesian demand for convening a second Bandung Conference stiffened. In the course of their talks in Cairo on 30 September 1962, Prime Minister Nehru and President Nasser reportedly felt that the time was not opportune for such a Conference. It was this which attracted adverse comments from Foreign Minister Subandrio.

It would, however, not be correct to link Nehru's remarks


12. Ibid., 18 October 1962.

13. Ibid., 1 October 1962. See also a despatch in Daily Telegraph (London), 16 October 1962. According to it, the two leaders agreed that the second "Afro-Asian Conference would be a pointless extravagance".

14. See this chapter, p. 257.
in Cairo or those later in Colombo, to the anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta. He had been making similar statements in the past. He was convinced that neither the present international situation nor that prevailing in the two continents of Asia and Africa was conducive to the holding of such a Conference.

In the background of President Sukarno’s emphasis on uniting ‘new emerging forces’ against the ‘old established forces’, Nehru visualised that the Afro-Asian Conference might lead to the emergence of two blocs, with the Afro-Asian nations left with no alternative except either to side with the countries resisting colonialism and imperialism or those backing it up. This would reduce the importance of the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. Apart from accelerating existing tensions among the various Afro-Asian states, it would adversely affect the prospects of international co-operation and world peace. Besides, he was also not unaware of the Chinese and Pakistani machinations, which, by pursuing their avowedly anti-India policies, were trying to alienate Indonesian leadership from India. The Afro-Asian Conference might enable these two countries, with the possible connivance of Indonesia, to create serious embarrassments for India in regard to their dispute with her. The anti-Indian demonstrations in Djakarta had given

15. Reiterating India’s attitude, at a press conference in Colombo on 16 October 1962, Prime Minister Nehru said that the present time was not ripe or feasible for holding another Bandung Conference. See Indonesian Herald, 17 October 1962.

This was during Nehru’s 3-day visit to Ceylon. Nehru visited Ceylon within a fortnight of his talks with President Nasser and at a time of heightening tensions on India’s northern borders. In point of time, Nehru’s visit to Ceylon came about just a few days before China’s attack on India. Although Nehru visited Colombo in connection with the inauguration of an Ayurvedic Institute after the name of the late Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, it showed the importance Nehru attached to his visit.
clear indications of the strength of Indonesian domestic political forces working against India's interests. Prime Minister Nehru's lack of enthusiasm was reinforced by his knowledge that many Asian and African countries were not in favour of holding another Afro-Asian Conference.

The Djakarta incidents thus only went to strengthen India's desire to seek an indefinite postponement of the second Afro-Asian Conference. It did not mean reversing the decision to attend the preparatory meeting, nor that India would not attend the Conference at all. In fact, there is no indication of Government of India having done so. On the contrary, there is a possibility that it had conveyed its reassurances to the Indonesian leaders that it would attend the preparatory meeting.

China's attack on India's northern borders a few days later, further cooled India towards the holding of the second Conference of Asian and African nations. In Prime Minister Nehru's words, it made

16. Among the five sponsoring countries of the first Asian-African Conference, Burma and Ceylon which initially agreed to attend the preliminary meeting, later reportedly declined invitations. The UIR shared India's views on the subject. Turkey, Lebanon and the Sudan had already declined the invitations. See The Statesman, 17 October 1962.

Prime Minister Nehru confirmed this view while replying to a question in the Lok Sabha on 19 November 1962. See India, Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 9, session 3 of 1962, 19 November 1962, col. 2165. See also The Statesman, 20 November 1962.

17. These reassurances were possibly conveyed by the Indian Ambassador in Djakarta, Apa B. Pant, during his half-an-hour meeting with President Sukarno on 7 September 1962 and with Foreign Minister Subandrio on 10 October 1962. See Indonesian Herald, 8 September 1962 and 11 October 1962.

Indonesian leaders' statements, showing eagerness to normalise relations with India, reinforce this belief. For these statements see Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, p. 186.
such a Conference "all the more undesirable". India viewed it as China's deliberate violation of the Panch Sheel agreement, of the ten principles of the Bandung Conference and as its attack on the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. In view of Chinese aggression on India, "Bandung Spirit" and the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity against colonialism and imperialism, had become meaningless. Indonesia's pro-Peking attitude, as evidenced in the Colombo Powers' Conference in December 1962, and, co-incidentally, Pakistan's open sympathy and support for China as well as its readiness to join both China and Indonesia to sponsor the second Afro-Asian Conference, gave indications of the shape of things to come if another Afro-Asian Conference was agreed to. A conference dominated by the three countries, China, Indonesia and Pakistan might work against the vital Indian interests. And yet seeing from long-term prospects of Indian-Indonesian relations, and of its role in Asia and Africa, Government of India could not reject outright the Indonesian demand in this connection.

Indonesia, on its part, viewed Sino-Indian border hostilities as putting a damper on its efforts towards staging another Bandung Conference. Two great Asian powers, in terms both of numbers and potential resources, were involved in an actual clash of arms along the northern borders of India. By committing aggression against the other, one of them had thrown overboard the principles of non-

18. The Statesman, 20 November 1962. Nehru revealed in the Lok Sabha on 19 November 1962 that he had some discussions with President Nasser on the question of holding the second Asian-African Conference and that the latter also believed that such a Conference would not be desirable at this time. Earlier, Minister of State for External Affairs, Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon, stated that India had suggested that a meeting at the present moment would not be helpful and that "it could be postponed for a more favourable time." See Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 9, session 3 of 1962, 19 November 1962, col. 2164.
aggression and peaceful co-existence. Indonesian leadership must have realised that it would still further strengthen India's reluctance about the second Afro-Asian Conference and thereby dim its prospects. This explains why President Sukarno approached the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai, in the midst of war, to cease hostilities. In this sense, it may be suggested that it was less for his sympathy and support for India that President Sukarno approached the Chinese leaders than for his anxiety about India's hardening attitude against the Afro-Asian Conference. Moreover, since China was in the forefront in offering categorical support to Indonesia in this regard, it explains, at least partly, why Indonesia failed to pass judgment in favour of India in its dispute with China, and merely urged for application of the Bandung spirit for resolving the border dispute between the "two sister nations" as Subandrio put it, and tilted more towards Peking than India.

Efforts for the Second Conference of Non-Aligned States

In the light of Indonesia's pro-Peking attitude as evidenced during the 6-Power Colombo Conference in December 1962, India became still less enthusiastic about the second Asian-African Conference. There is no evidence to suggest that, in the course of talks between Nehru and Nasser in Cairo and between Nehru and Mrs. Bandaranaike in Colombo, these leaders discussed about a second non-aligned meeting. Nevertheless, in view of Nehru's negative remarks about the second Asian-African Conference at both these places, "there is a possibility that they exchanged views on the prospects of a second non-aligned meeting as a substitute for a second Afro-Asian meeting. Especially Nehru might have perceived certain advantages accruing from such a Conference. It would automatically exclude
both China and Pakistan, the two members of the military pacts, as also avoid a discussion of bilateral disputes. Besides, a conference of the non-aligned countries would once again stamp its approval on the principles of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, and hinder the emergence of a third bloc among the Afro-Asians, of which Nehru was quite apprehensive. It would also serve as a substitute for the second Afro-Asian Conference and make it appear superfluous. This required the approval of the five prominent non-aligned countries, the UAR, Ceylon, Yugoslavia, Indonesia and India herself. As an initiator of the move for and as host of the first Conference of the Non-Aligned countries, Yugoslavia was expected to positively welcome this move. If both the UAR and Ceylon could be got round to the idea, even if reluctantly, Indonesia was also likely to join them. President Sukarno, it was realised, could not afford to ignore the value of this forum in as far as it enabled him to canvass for the second Afro-Asian Conference.

It is in this light that Nehru's talks with President Nasser and Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike become quite significant.

Nevertheless, for about a year after the Chinese attack on India's northern borders, efforts at convening a second non-aligned meeting remained in abeyance. The consequences flowing from the Sino-Indian hostilities inevitably effected the prospects of both the second Afro-Asian Conference and the second non-aligned conference at least for the time being. It was in October 1963 that the non-aligned countries revived their efforts in this direction. In the Joint Communique issued in Cairo on 14 October 1963, at the end of talks between Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike of Ceylon and President Nasser of the UAR, the two sides "agreed that another conference of non-aligned countries should be held.
some time next year. Although no date and venue was suggested, it was reported that the two Governments would soon start contacting other non-aligned countries in this connection.

This could be considered the beginning of non-aligned countries' public efforts to hold a second Belgrade-type conference in preference to a second Afro-Asian Conference. The Ceylon-UAR Joint Communique of 14 October 1963, initiated an exchange of views among some of the Asian and African countries at various levels. The Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie's visit to Yugoslavia and meeting with President Tito in Belgrade on 2 November 1963 followed by his three-day unofficial visit to the UAR for talks with President Nasser, were some of the contacts at the highest level. A Times of India despatch from Cairo also reported at the possibility of a recent exchange of views between India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, the UAR, Ghana and Ceylon. Simultaneously went ahead contacts among the non-aligned countries at the diplomatic level. The Indian Ambassador to the UAR, M.A. Husain, conferred with Foreign Minister Mahmood Fawzy on the arrangements for the second non-aligned states' conference. Mahmood Fawzy had already been in touch with the delegates of several non-aligned countries at the United Nations before he returned to Cairo.

Reactions in India

The Indian press and Government reacted favourably to the two countries' agreement on holding such a conference in 1964. The Indian Express called the Ceylon-UAR proposal as "timely" and urged

20. Times of India, 3 November 1963.
upon the Government to "welcome" it too. Among the various reasons why Government should do so, this daily alluded to the "not-too-happy image of India" created during the first Conference of non-aligned states in 1961 and called upon the Government to retrieve it through a purposeful diplomacy. It also referred to the demand for a second Asian-African Conference and said that it should be "resolutely" discouraged. Bitterly criticising this demand, this daily wrote in conclusion that "such a motley jamboree ... with conflicting elements represented on it and the prevailing tensions in South-East Asia and elsewhere, could easily degenerate into a bedlam, doing more harm than good to international peace and understanding."

Government of India's attitude towards the proposal for a second non-aligned meeting was also quite favourable. In an interview published in the Belgrade daily Politika on 29 November 1963, Prime Minister Nehru reiterated his support for such a Conference as it would enable the participants to determine "fundamental principles" of the struggle for world peace. Nehru was also reported as having written to President Nasser and Prime Minister Bandaranaike, indicating his support for their call for the second non-aligned summit meeting. A report in the Hindustan Times also referred to Mrs. Bandaranaike as having stated that Nehru had requested President Nasser and herself to take up the initiative vigorously because there was an urgent need for such a meeting. This was in reference to Nehru's recent message to both these

22. Indian Express, 16 October 1963.
leaders. Significantly, Mrs. Bandaranaike's statement confirmed Nehru's fears, at this stage, about China and Pakistan colluding with Indonesia in a high-level diplomacy to seek concurrence of the African and Asian countries to hold a second Afro-Asian Conference in preference to a second non-aligned meeting. It was, in fact, due to his anxiety about the prospects of the second non-aligned Conference that he sent personal messages to the leaders of Ceylon and the UAR to take vigorous action in this direction. In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 12 December 1963, Minister of State for External Affairs, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, confirmed Nehru's personal contacts with the non-aligned leaders. She stated that India had welcomed the proposal for a non-aligned conference with a view to promote greater international understanding and reduce the present cold war tensions. Clarifying India's attitude further, she said:

"The Government of India would be prepared to give such assistance as may be necessary for the successful implementation of the proposal." For this, she disclosed, Government was engaged in exchange of views with the leaders of the UAR and Ceylon as well as other interested countries.

However, not fully satisfied with the progress of efforts made so far, Prime Minister Nehru once again wrote letters to Presidents Nasser and Tito. This time these letters were carried by Deputy Minister of State for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, and handed over by him to the two leaders on 31 January and 4 February 1964 respectively. It is quite conceivable that, in the course of his

25. Ibid. In this connection, Prime Minister Nehru's communication was handed over to Prime Minister Aly Sabry of the UAR personally on 6 December 1963 by the Indian Ambassador in Cairo.


27. Hindustan Times, 1 February 1964 and The Hindu and Times of India, 5 February 1964.
talks with these leaders, Dinesh Singh emphasised Government of India’s anxiety about the prospects of the second non-aligned conference and urged for still more vigorous action in this direction.

These intensive efforts at various levels succeeded when on 17 February 1964 invitations were reported issued from Cairo to twenty-six non-aligned countries to attend a preparatory meeting, at ambassadorial level, in Colombo on 23 March 1964.

**Indonesians' Attitudes**

In Indonesia, the initial moves for holding a second non-aligned meeting attracted much less notice than expected. Although Government of Indonesia intensified its diplomatic efforts towards preparing the ground for a second Asian-African Conference, it chose to maintain silence over the prospects of a second non-aligned conference. Perhaps its open anti-Malaysia policy, particularly since the Brunei revolt in December 1962, and the prospects of a big-power role in South-East Asia as a back-drop of this policy, attracted much of its attention and energy during 1963. The Indonesian Government also remained pre-occupied with the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), which took place in Djakarta in November 1963.

By the end of 1963, however, the major political parties, such as the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI) and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), came out in sharp criticism of these moves for a second non-aligned gathering. In a speech in Djakarta on 28 December 1963, the Secretary-General of the PNI, Surachman, declared that his party only supported the holding of a second Afro-
Asian Conference and 'disliked' the plan for another non-aligned meeting as proposed by some countries. At its plenary session in Djakarta, on 7-8 February 1964, the Central Board of the PNI passed a resolution, saying that the time was ripe for convening the second Conference of African and Asian States. It was fully in keeping with the Party's earlier record of opposing Government's participation in the first Conference of the Non-Aligned states in September 1961, and could be interpreted to mean its effort to put pressure on the Government against joining the preparatory meeting scheduled to be held in Colombo on 23-27 March 1964. Despite its opposition to the second non-aligned meeting, the PNI did not openly criticise India or any other non-aligned country in name.

Unlike the PNI, however, the PKI did not mince words in criticising India and its leadership. In his Political Report to the Central Committee of the Party on 23 December 1963, Chairman Aidit supported President Sukarno's plea for a "Second Bandung Conference" and denounced the attempt "being inspired by the modern revisionists and Nehru" to convene a "Second 'Non-Aligned' Conference". The PKI leader described these efforts as "criminal" and the ones meant "to murder the Bandung spirit". He also described India as one of the "important weapons being utilised by the US imperialists in the interests of their aggressive policy in

29. Indonesian Herald, 1 January 1964.
30. Ibid., 11 February 1964.
31. See Chapter on India and Indonesia at the Belgrade Conference, pp. 97-98.
Asia" and observed: "The Nehru Government has taken measures that conform with the needs of US imperialism by making islands available for its military bases, such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, by providing its land territory, and sea and air space for use by the USA for its military bases and for its operations in Asia. India has now openly become the US watch-dog in Asia and a fifth column within the ranks of the Asian-African countries.... This then, is 'non-aligned! pro-US Nehru." By seeking Soviet economic and military assistance, Aidit held, neither Nehru could succeed in cleaning "his hands which are dirty with aggression against China" nor absolve him of the charge of being aligned with "US imperialism".

Although both the PNI and the PKI criticised those seeking to convene a second non-aligned meeting, they showed, at least at this stage, a marked difference in approach towards India. Whereas the PKI was openly hostile to India and its leadership, the PNI refrained from criticising them directly. It might be attributed to two possible reasons. Firstly, the PNI still managed to maintain its cohesion and political strength and influence and was capable of withstanding the growing pressures of the PKI in the internal politics. Secondly, the PNI leaders still believed that the concurrence of the five sponsors of the first Asian-African Conference to the holding of another such Conference was necessary. An open criticism of any of the three countries, India, the UAR and Ceylon, would only harden their attitude towards it. On the other hand, the PKI which did not conceal its hostility towards India, especially since the Chinese invasion in October 1962, would be happy to find India continuing to resist Indonesia's demand in this

33. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
connection. It suited the PKI to discredit non-alignment, to bring Indonesian foreign policy in line with that of China and as a result, to damage Indonesia's relations with India.

The Indonesian Herald, usually expressing Foreign Office views, also noted the moves for a second non-aligned states' Conference around the first week of February 1964. In an editorial captioned "Bandung and Beograd", it referred to "two simultaneous efforts" being made in the beginning of 1964 to convene the two conferences. While attributing the initiative for the second Bandung Conference to Indonesia and for the second Belgrade Conference to Ceylon, Yugoslavia and the UAR, it claimed "one Asian country" seeking precedence of the latter over the former. It was an indirect reference to India, which the editorial noted, was supporting the move for the second non-aligned summit meeting.

Although, in the framework of Indonesian foreign policy, the editorial considered both the conferences as "mutually complementary" and hence "welcome" to Indonesia, it emphasised that the Indonesians preferred the second Afro-Asian Conference to the second non-aligned meeting. It justified Indonesia's stand on the ground that whereas, in the changed international situation, tensions have "shown proof of relaxation", problems of colonialism have become "more acute and complex".

By the close of February 1964, Indonesian Herald became a little sharper in its observation. In its "Off the Record" columns, it described efforts for the two conferences as "competition" and, with an obvious reference to India, asked in a sarcastic manner why "Beograd had become suddenly so respectable in her eyes".

34. Indonesian Herald, 3 February 1964.
35. Ibid., 29 February 1964.
Although hesitantly and under obvious pressure from the PNI and the PKI notwithstanding, Government of Indonesia decided to join the preliminary meeting of the non-aligned states' Conference. Indonesia's positive decision in this regard, was based on two major considerations. Firstly, its refusal to attend would lead to Indonesia's isolation from the non-aligned group of states. Secondly, it would mean the loss of an international forum for projecting its image as a chief spokesman of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism and of an opportunity to canvass for the second Afro-Asian Conference.

Preparatory Meeting of the Second Non-Aligned Conference

The preparatory meeting for the second non-aligned countries' Conference took place in Colombo from 23 to 27 March 1964. On invitation from the leaders of three non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia, the UAR and Ceylon, representatives from twenty-three countries, and observers from two, attended this meeting. The five-day deliberations which took place in an atmosphere described as "very friendly and very co-operative", showed no major differences among the participants as to the choice of the venue, the timing and composition of the main conference. With the active support of the


It was an ambassadorial level meeting. There were representatives from ten countries from Asia, ten from Africa, two from Europe and three, including two observers, from Latin America. But alphabetically these were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, UAR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Two observers from Latin America were from Bolivia and Brazil.
Indian delegate, B.K. Kapur, Indian High Commissioner to Ceylon, the preparatory meeting "agreed" about Cairo as the venue of the summit meeting. According to the communique issued on the concluding day, that is, 27 March 1964, the participants also registered agreement about the timing that the conference be held "during the first week of October 1964" and about the "countries to be invited to participate in the second conference." 37

The leader of the Indonesian delegation and Deputy Foreign Minister Mrs. Supeni did not express any dissenting opinion on these issues. Her agreeable attitude could be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, dissension would be embarrassing because a majority of participants including India agreed on all these points. Secondly, Government of Indonesia probably did not set much store on this preparatory meeting, because of its preference for and preoccupation with preparatory meeting of the second Afro-Asian meeting scheduled to be held in Djakarta in April 1964.

It did not mean, however, Indonesia's total indifference towards this meeting. In her introductory statement Mrs. Supeni urged upon the non-aligned countries to give constant support to movements for national independence and not to be directly or indirectly associated with any military pacts. In line with Indonesian foreign policy, she also proposed the inclusion in the agenda of the main conference/the possibility of convening a conference of the "new emerging forces". She stressed that it should be considered from the viewpoint of conflict between the

37. Ibid., p.13. See also text of the communique in The Hindu, 30 March 1964. The Indian delegation let it be known at the beginning of the preparatory meeting that, in view of India's friendly relations with the United Arab Republic, it would support Cairo as the venue of the summit conference. See The Hindu, 25 March 1964.
old established forces based on domination and the new emerging forces founded on freedom, equality and social justice".

A sub-committee of eight countries, appointed for the purpose of drawing up the agenda, held a long meeting for several hours on the night of 25 March and in the morning of 26 March. A majority of its members, including India, were opposed to the suggestion by the Indonesian delegation on two grounds. Firstly, they were of the view that the non-aligned conference was neither concerned with nor competent to consider the concept of another conference unrelated to non-alignment. Secondly, they held the opinion that the non-aligned conference itself included all such emerging forces and hence there was no necessity of holding a separate conference. As there was lack of unanimity on this point, the sub-committee left it to be discussed by the preparatory committee in its meeting on the concluding day.

As expected, the Indonesian proposal promoted "a lot of discussion", as a Conference spokesman put it. Mrs. Supeni persisted in her efforts to convince the non-aligned countries' representatives of the need for adoption of the Indonesian proposal. In the face of a substantial opposition, however, she failed to seek inclusion in the agenda of the possibility of holding an Afro-Asian Conference.

40. Ibid., 29 March 1964. According to reports, only one or two delegations supported the Indonesian proposal. The preparatory meeting, nevertheless, agreed to insert in the conference agenda a modified form of the Indonesian proposal. The second item of the agenda explained it as "the safeguarding and strengthening of world peace and security and the promotion of positive trends and new emerging nationalist forces in international affairs..."
The results of the preparatory meeting in Colombo had important bearing on Indonesia's attitude towards India. India, no doubt, had achieved a diplomatic victory over Indonesia in arranging a preparatory meeting of the non-aligned countries before Indonesia could make similar progress in respect of the second Afro-Asian Conference. Besides, by actively participating in the important sub-committees, such as those appointed for drawing up agenda and the communique, India had sought to ensure preparatory meeting's success in deciding about the venue, timing, composition and agenda of the main conference. This, in a way, reduced the possibility of holding the second Conference of Asian and African countries in the near future.

However, therein lay Indonesia's growing sense of disappointment with India. Indonesia was not unaware of the active role India had played in arranging the preparatory meeting in Colombo and in drawing up its agenda and the communique. Mrs. Supeni knew how delegations of India and various other countries had joined to foil her bid to incorporate into the agenda of the non-aligned summit Conference the possibility of holding a conference of "new emerging forces". In this sense, the preparatory meeting in Colombo gave further edge to Indonesia's disillusionment with India. It increased Indonesia's sense of rivalry against the second non-aligned Conference and urgency for holding the second Afro-Asian Conference.

Domestic Pressures in Indonesia Against Participation in the Non-Aligned Conference

This coincided with the growing domestic pressures building up against participation in the second non-aligned states' meeting. Just three weeks before the preparatory meeting for the second Afro-

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41. Ibid., 27 and 28 March 1964.
Asian Conference, scheduled to be held on 10 April 1964, the HSI (Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia - the Political Science and Law Society of the Indonesian Scholars Association) arranged a five-day seminar in Djakarta from 20 to 24 March 1964. The two major subjects on which keynote addresses were made were: (1) "The Role of the Second Bandung Conference in the Struggle of the Peoples of Asia and Africa", and (2) "The Non-Bloc (Non-Aligned) Conference and the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Indonesia". Its importance lay in suggesting five principles on which the Indonesian foreign policy should be based. These were: (1) Principle of NEFO Against OLDEFO; (2) Principle of International Solidarity; (3) Principle of Self-Reliance; (4) Principle of Consultation and Confrontation; and (5) Principle of Inter-State and Inter-Nation Relations. Put together, these principles were explained to mean Indonesia's adherence to the concept of NEFOS versus OLDEFO, its unity and close consultation only with the former and continued opposition to the latter, its conviction "that the real source of international tensions ... is not ... conflict between ideologies, but imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism", its refusal to permit a compromise with its independence, and finally, its belief in the Indian Pancha Sheel, Ten Principles (Dasa Sila) of the First Bandung Conference and Sukarno-Macapagal doctrine of resolution of disputes between Asian, African and Latin American countries by these people themselves.

43. Ibid., pp. 5 and 6. Keynote addresses on these two topics were made by Suwito Kusumowidagdo, First Deputy to the Foreign Minister and A. Karim D.P., General Chairman of the Indonesian Journalists' Association and a member of the Supreme Advisory Council.
44. Ibid., pp. 7-9.
The seminar was also significant in drawing certain conclusions which focussed on differences between non-alignment policy and Indonesian foreign policy and subjected the former to a scathing attack. At first, it explained the bases and principles of non-alignment. It held that non-alignment emphasised that the ideological and other conflicts between two super powers were the main source of international tension. Then it made a frontal attack on this policy. For it, non-alignment was "a Europe-centrist outlook (which) is out of date and must be rejected". It noted that as opposed to "Asian-African revolution (which) is the central core of the revolution of mankind", this policy "leads to much disorder and confusion of understanding and results in many difficulties and setbacks in the struggles of the peoples for national independence, social justice and lasting peace". Further, in the light of Indonesian experiences, it considered non-alignment "neither scientific nor correct", a policy which is harmful to the Indonesian revolution. Hence "the Indonesian people must not pursue such a policy but must reject it". Major grounds for rejection of this policy, according to the conclusions of the Seminar, were that it "creates illusions about imperialism and avoids confrontation with imperialism", that it conceals "the real issue ... that imperialism is the foremost and basic source of international tension" and that it "weakens and waters down the struggle against imperialism and even endeavours to paralyse this struggle, which means that it is a political tool of neo-colonialism on an international scale".

It cannot be said for certain how much influence the PKI exerted in reaching these conclusions in the Seminar. It is, however,

known that the HSI under whose auspices the Seminar took place was largely influenced by the PKI. The conclusions which urged rejection of non-alignment in favour of a policy of total opposition to imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, indicated the degree of PKI's influence in the Seminar. Moreover, it was M.H. Lukman, First Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the PKI, who went the farthest in criticising those who were endeavouring to hold a second non-aligned meeting. He observed:

There are a group of people who do not like the revolutionary unity, solidarity and co-operation of the Asian and African peoples. They do not desire revolution and they do not like the anti-imperialist struggle to be carried on in a revolutionary way. They want to achieve world peace mainly through co-operation with the imperialists as if the imperialists loved peace and no longer threatened world peace. They do not like our national motto which is the real essence of the problem of war and peace, that is, 'we love peace, but we love independence more'.

They are modern revisionists or those influenced by modern revisionism. They are trying to sabotage and slacken the revolutionary struggle to crush imperialism, and old and new colonialism, in various crooked ways, both secret and open, crude and subtle and so on. They are hand-in-glove with the imperialists who are being mercilessly attacked by the people everywhere. See how ugly their faces are! How ugly their deeds are! They are trying by all means to forestall and discredit every effort being made to push ahead the preparations for the Second Bandung Conference.

Not content with this, Lukman described India's emphasis on non-alignment as a mere propaganda to convince the world of its genuineness and said: "India's military alliance with the United States, its readiness to offer its land, sea and air space for use by the United States military operations in South-East Asia and, last but not least, its agreement to give to U.S. Seventh Fleet

46. The HSI, established in 1962, was the Scholars' League of the Indonesian Communist Party. See Herbert Feith, "Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape", Asian Survey, vol. 4, no. 8, August 1964, p. 976.
permission to come up to the Indonesian Ocean and other reactionary actions, all prove that India is no longer non-aligned. . . ."

The Seminar, no doubt, was primarily an unofficial elite gathering. Government's moral sympathy and support to its activities was, however, obvious from the messages of greetings received from the high official dignitaries.

The conclusions reached at the Seminar represented a broad consensus of views among the Indonesians. It is clear from active participation by the leaders of Government and press and from the messages of greetings received from the high personages belonging to various political parties.

During the five-days deliberations, no speaker in the Seminar was on record having made a statement against India or its Prime Minister for their attempts to stage a second non-aligned Conference. But by making non-alignment as the direct subject of its unambiguous criticism, the Seminar left no one in doubt as to the real target of its attack. In an appeal issued "To the Peoples

48. Report and Conclusions of the Seminar, n. 42, p. 4. President Sukarno sent a Message of Counsel. Messages of Greetings were sent by First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Subandrio, Second Deputy Prime Minister J. Leimena, Minister of Information and Secretary General of the first Asian-African Conference, Roeslan Abdulgani, and Minister Co-ordinator for Defence and Security and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General A.H. Nasution.
49. Ibid. First Deputy to the Foreign Minister, Suwito Kusumowidagdo was among the guest speakers. Active participants from the press were A. Karim, D.P., General Chairman of the Indonesian Journalists' Association (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia - PWI) and Djawoto, Secretary-General of the Asian-African Journalists' Association. Prominent political leaders who sent messages of greetings, were Ali Sastroamidjojo (PNI), M.H. Lukman (PKI) and K.H. Dahlan (NU). The Central Boards of Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), Murba Party and Indonesian Party (Partindo) also sent messages of greetings.
of Asia-Africa on 24 March 1964, the concluding day, the Presidium of the Seminar charged that "some individuals in Asia and Africa and elsewhere are busily engaging in splitting activities in order to weaken the feeling of solidarity and the revolutionary spirit of the Asian-African people". It termed these "individuals" as "nothing but puppets and assistants of the imperialist(s)". It was a concealed reference to the leaders of the non-aligned countries, such as India, Ceylon, the UAR and Yugoslavia, who were trying to stage a second non-aligned summit meeting.

The HSI Seminar was as much important for its conclusions as for its timing. It served the purpose of highlighting the differences, visible since the first non-aligned gathering in 1961, between non-alignment to which India and other non-aligned countries scrupulously adhered and the "active and independent" foreign policy which Indonesia followed. Prime Minister Nehru's efforts to seek the convening of another Conference of the non-aligned states at this stage enabled the PKI to use intellectual forums, such as the HSI, in exerting strong pressures on the Government to reject non-

50. Ibid., p. 14. In another "Appeal to the Governments of the Countries of Asia and Africa", the Presidium of the Seminar urged them "to give top priority to the question of building up Asian-African solidarity" and "to do everything in their power to make the Preparatory Conference ... a great success and to bring about the convening of the Second Bandung Conference within the shortest possible time."

51. The Indonesians were possibly afraid that an adverse reference to the leaders of these countries in name would jeopardise whatever chances were there for staging the second Asian-African Conference. The fact that, except Yugoslavia, these states were the same as sponsored the first Bandung Conference and that their concurrence would be necessary to hold another conference of this type, could not be easily ignored.

52. In point of time, the five-day Seminar coincided with the preliminary meeting for the second non-aligned states' conference and preceded the preparatory meeting for the second Afro-Asian Conference scheduled to be held in Djakarta on 5 April 1964, just by a fortnight.
alignment outright and to adopt a Peking-oriented policy of total opposition to colonialism and imperialism. This stance of the PKI had a strong appeal to the Indonesian elite because of its congruence with President Sukarno's concept of NSF versus OLDEFC.

Preparatory Meeting of the Second Afro-Asian Conference

It is in the light of these growing foreign policy differences between India and Indonesia that developments at the Preparatory Meeting for the second Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta in April 1964, should be seen. The Meeting of Ministers took place in Djakarta from 10 to 15 April 1964. Representatives from twenty-two Afro-Asian countries attended the meeting. Interestingly, thirteen countries out of twenty-two were the same as represented at the preparatory meeting of the second non-aligned countries held in Colombo in March 1964. Their agreement to participate in second non-aligned summit meeting in Cairo in October 1964 was enough indication of their unwillingness to attend another Afro-Asian Conference during this year.

The Indonesian leadership had, however, reason to be happy that four of the five sponsors of the first Asian-African Conference had agreed to attend this meeting. But in doing so, Indonesia

yika, (21) Turkey and (22) the United Arab Republic.

54. The thirteen countries represented at Colombo preparatory meeting were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal and the United Arab Republic.

55. The five sponsors of the first Asian-African Conference were Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Burma reportedly declined the invitation to attend the Preparatory Meeting. Since the Bandung Conference, on one pretext or another, both India and Ceylon had been less than enthusiastic about the prospects of the second Conference. The UAR, another prominent non-aligned country, had shown itself to be in agreement with them on this issue. Their hesitation to join had been the major hindrance in Indonesia's efforts in this direction.
had to make a compromise with its then foreign police stance of
growing intimacy with China. According to reports in a section
of the Indian press, Government of Indonesia initially invited
twenty countries to participate in the Preparatory Meeting.
According to a report, those invited did not include China. In
view of China's categorical and active moral and diplomatic support
to Indonesia in the latter's efforts to convene the second Afro-
Asian Conference, it could only be considered surprising. The
official sources reportedly admitted that Indonesia ignored sending
invitation to China in order to placate both India and the
Philippines.

Although there is no evidence to prove that India conditioned
its participation on China's exclusion from the Preparatory Meeting,
there is reason to believe that, at this stage, Government of India
was not willing to face China at an international gathering of this
type. Probably Indonesia had to make a compromise because it
realised that India was one of the five sponsors of the first
Conference in Bandung and that without its participation the
prospects of the second Conference might not be very encouraging.
Anyway, on insistence from Algeria and Guinea, that all those who
participated in the first Conference be invited, China was included
in the list of invitees.

56. The Hindu, 7 April 1964.
57. "Confrontation at Bandung" (By a Special Correspondent),
Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 44, no. 6, 7 May 1964,
p. 293. The author of this article, who wants to remain
unidentified, has told this author that, by keeping China out
of the list of invitees to the Preparatory Meeting, Indonesia
wanted to skirt India's objections with regard to China's
participation. He believes that it was a shrewd Indonesian
move to seek India's concurrence to participate on this basis.
In his opinion, although India never publicly conditioned its
participation in the Preparatory Meeting on China's exclusion,
yet it might have suggested so to Indonesia secretly.

58. The Hindu, 7 April 1964.
Although Government of Indonesia was happy with its success in holding the Preparatory Meeting, it was not oblivious of the difficulties in the way of convening the main Conference. For one thing, Afro-Asian response to its invitation had not been very encouraging. Only twenty-two Asian and African countries had agreed to attend the Preparatory Meeting. Moreover, merely attending the preliminary meeting did not mean a commitment to attend the main Conference. Even a majority of the sponsors of the first Bandung meeting, such as India, Burma, and Ceylon, had been persistently non-committal until that time. Besides, Government of Indonesia was fully aware of the efforts, being made by these three countries to put off the second Afro-Asian Conference, at least for the time being, by convening the second non-aligned states' Conference. In fact, a preliminary meeting held in Colombo a few days earlier, had already fixed a second non-aligned summit meeting to take place in Cairo on 4 October 1964. Indonesian leadership believed that failure to hold a second Afro-Asian Conference before the non-aligned summit meeting would be prejudicial to its prestige. Hence it was necessary to seek concurrence of the participants in the Preparatory Meeting to a timing earlier than October 1964.

59. It was rather a reflection on Indonesia that whereas the preliminary meeting for the second non-aligned Conference held in Colombo in March 1964, was attended by twenty-three countries, the Preparatory Meeting for the second Afro-Asian Conference was attended by twenty-two countries.

Out of the thirty-seven countries approached for the meeting preparatory to the second Afro-Asian Conference, ten countries which were represented at the first Asian-African Conference reportedly rejected the feelers. Of the remaining twenty-seven countries which actually received invitations, Burma and Japan definitely declined and four other invitees failed to attend. So only twenty-two countries, including Indonesia, participated in the preparatory meeting. See Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Second Asian-African Conference: Preliminary Bouts", *Asian Survey*, vol. 5, no. 7, July 1965, p. 361.
In his inaugural address to the Preparatory Meeting President Sukarno argued about the need for Afro-Asian solidarity in the face of "OLD Egos". He also underlined the aim of holding the main Afro-Asian Conference in these words:

Let us convene a Second Asian-African Conference to decide ourselves what our new world is to be. Let us pool our ideas, let us outline our thoughts and in harmony build up our concepts for the good of all mankind. 60

This exhortation by President Sukarno showed the degree of importance he attached to the development of concepts over and above the development of national economy and industry. In fact, he believed that there was no other way than "Asian-African solidarity", not even economic development, which could be effective in dealing with the "Old Established Forces". At this stage, he considered economic and industrial development both ineffective and unnecessary. He asserted that "we can afford to wait for that ... there are other more important things". Those "important things", he added, are "the development of the new political concepts ... the new economic concepts ... the new social concepts". This was, in a way, President Sukarno's veiled criticism of Prime Minister Nehru and other non-aligned leaders who put emphasis on a foreign policy conducive to the development of economy and industry at home. Hence the need to arrange a get-together of Afro-Asian nations at an early date.

Foreign Minister Subandrio, in his welcome speech, following President Sukarno's inaugural address, traced the efforts, made to-date by Indonesia, in arranging the second Asian-African


61. Ibid., p. 38.
Conference. He invited reference to approaches at governmental level made by Indonesia as early as 1957, within two years of the First Conference in Bandung, and said: "At that time we were advised by friends that we should wait a while, for some practical reasons". Since then, he disclosed, "many countries, including Indonesia" had been "consistently" proposing such a conference, "in order to safeguard and consolidate our achievements...." In this connection, he stressed that his country's consistent support had been for the "immediate" holding of it. The Indonesian Foreign Minister also listed several reasons for holding the Conference immediately, namely, safeguarding and consolidation of national independence, heightening of vigilance against foreign interference, solution of disputes among the Afro-Asian nations and pooling of wisdom to create new political, economic and social concepts. Considering Afro-Asian disputes as "realities", he described them as "the negative sides of the achievement of national independence" and stressed that "the second Asia-African Conference and the revitalisation of the Bandung spirit is a conditio sine qua non" of their solution. He expressed his conviction that "through coming together we can localise the areas of difference between us".

In his General Statement to the Preparatory Meeting of Ministers, Ali Sastroamidjojo, leader of the Indonesian delegation and Chairman of the first Bandung Conference, suggested a set of justifications similar to those of Subandrio for "the early convening of the Second Asian-African Conference", which, according

62. Ibid., pp. 48-51.
63. Ibid., pp. 49-52.
64. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
to him, was "actually already long overdue". Major emphasis of the Indonesian delegation, as underlined in the working paper submitted by it was to discuss and to "even emphasise problems which are nearer to our heart, practical in our countries in Africa and Asia, which need our direct and common attention, to seek the possibility of their solution by way of our co-operation and solidarity". It did not favour discussion on "merely subjects of general international concern...".

Indian Proposals at the Preparatory Meeting

Obviously, Indonesia's justification for holding the Conference early could hardly be acceptable to India. To the Indian leadership, which, since independence, had been devoting its energies to economic and industrial development at home, Indonesian emphasis on development of ideas and concepts, even at the expense of development in the economic field, had little meaning. Neither could India agree to Indonesian priority for discussing Afro-Asian disputes in the Conference. India's objection to discussing bilateral disputes at the Afro-Asian Conference had been well-known. In fact, one of the reasons prompting India to actively support the idea of a second non-aligned summit meeting, was to avoid this eventuality. The situation in the world as well as in Asia, where both China and Pakistan were attempting to woo Indonesia into an anti-India combination, could hardly be considered congenial for such a Conference. It was keeping these developments in view that India had decided to attend the preparatory meeting.

Nevertheless, on reaching Djakarta on 8 April 1964, Swaran Singh, Minister for Food and Agriculture and leader of the Indian

65. Ibid., pp. 112-15.
66. Ibid., p. 115.
delegation, told the newsmen that his instructions were to "endeavour in this preparatory conference to make it a success in every way so that the second Afro-Asian Conference may take place and may carry forward the work initiated at the first conference (held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955). This was stated to be in order to dispel the impression in Djakarta that India was not interested in holding this Conference."

In his General Statement to the Preparatory Meeting on 11 April 1964, however, Swaran Singh made a set of three proposals regarding the composition, timing and venue of the main conference. In short, these were proposing an invitation to Malaysia and the Soviet Union for participation in the second Afro-Asian Conference, to suggesting that the Conference be held on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the first 'Bandung' meeting, that is, in April 1965, and at a place in Africa. These proposals implied India's effort to wrest diplomatic initiative from the three countries, Indonesia, China and Pakistan and, thereby, to neutralise their combined hostility towards her.

Swaran Singh's proposal regarding invitation to Malaysia was contained in a Working Paper submitted to the Preparatory Meeting. It was entitled "Composition of the Second Asian-African Conference". The leader of the Indian delegation justified Malaysia's participation on three grounds, namely, Malaysia's Asian situation, its


69. Ibid., p. 71.
membership of the United Nations and its recognition by over a hundred countries. He expected that, on the basis of these justifications, many Asian and African countries would support his proposal.

This proposal had serious implications for India as well as for Indonesia and Pakistan. India, no doubt, must have anticipated that, in view of Indonesia's growing commitment to a "Ganjang" (Crush) Malaysia policy, it would exacerbate anti-India sentiment in Indonesia and bring to it the charge of aiding and abetting British colonialism in the region. Nevertheless, it believed that the advantages accruing from such a policy would be more than the disadvantages. The political situation in Indonesia indicated that even if India stopped pursuing a pro-Malaysia policy, it would make little difference.

Apart from strengthening Indian-Malaysian relations, this policy would force Pakistan to discard its ambiguous attitude towards Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy and to come out openly either in favour of India's proposal and incur Indonesia's displeasure or against it and incur loss of friendship with Malaysia. In view of Pakistan's all-out effort at this stage, to seek Indonesia's

70. Ibid., p. 41.

71. Ibid. Swaran Singh noted that none except China rejected the Indian proposal on Malaysia outright. Five countries whose delegations spoke in favour of Malaysia's representation were Ceylon (pp. 35 and 43), Nepal (p.44), Iran (p.37), Tanganyika and Cameroon (p.36). Only Indonesian delegate, as expected, expressed his reservations on account of Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy (p.34). Even the Philippine delegate, which called for deferment of the question of invitation to Malaysia, expressed the hope that the dispute between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines would be resolved in time to extend invitation to Malaysia (p.40). Leaders of various other delegations opted for resolving the controversy through discussions at a sub-committee level. The Pakistani delegation, led by Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, chose to keep silent on the Indian proposal. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, however, offered his resolute support to the objections raised by Indonesia about the proposed invitation to Malaysia (p.35).
categorical support on Kashmir issue and to woo her into an anti-
India combination in the continent, Pakistan's negative attitude
to Indian proposal might lead to hard feelings against Pakistan in
the elite group in Malaysia, a decisive diplomatic gain to India.

With these calculations in mind, the Indian delegate
insistently called for sending, among others, an invitation to
Malaysia. Finding it difficult to resolve the deadlock, the
Preparatory Meeting decided, by consensus, to discuss it at a sub-
committee level. The sub-committee, finally, decided to postpone
the problem, thus leaving an important issue unresolved. Although
India did not succeed in seeking an invitation for Malaysia, with
the active help of Ceylon, it succeeded in barring Indonesia from
seeking invitation for the Government of the Unitary State of North
Kalimantan even as an observer. Lest it should put India's bona-
fides as regards the second Asian-African Conference in doubt,
Swaran Singh accepted the draft submitted by the sub-committee,
suggesting postponement of the question of invitation to Malaysia.

He, however, wished to have it placed on record India's feeling that

72. Proceedings of the Meeting of Ministers, n. 68, pp. 41-43.
Countering Indonesian delegate's emphasis on invitation to
the Government of the Unitary State of North Kalimantan, at
least as an observer, even after a consensus to postpone
decision on the issue of Malaysia had been reached, the
Ceylonese delegate stressed that if Indonesia insisted upon
this matter, it would demand re-opening of discussion on the
question of Malaysia. The Indian delegate, later, expressed
full agreement with the view held by the Ceylonese delegate.

73. Ibid., p. 88. The sub-committee draft as decided upon by the
Preparatory Meeting noted the proposal for extending an
invitation to Malaysia. It also expressed the hope "that the
obstacles which prevented reaching a consensus on the invita-
tion would be eliminated. In this case, an invitation should
be extended as soon as possible. Some countries that recogni-
sed Malaysia stated their position that Malaysia was fully
entitled to an invitation and should be invited."
Malaysia was fully entitled to be invited to the main Conference.

India's proposal for Soviet participation in the second Asian-African Conference was in full awareness of the growing Sino-Soviet schism and their rivalry in the meetings of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation. Besides China, it was designed to embarrass Indonesia as well. It was known in India that, under growing pressures from the PKI and for some other reasons, the Indonesian leadership was toeing the Peking line in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The proposal as such would force upon Indonesia a clear-cut choice between the USSR and People's China. It would also show the degree of success the PKI had achieved in its effort to bring Indonesian foreign policy in line with that of China and hence its growing political influence on President Sukarno's Government. Besides, it implied a difficulty of choice for the various Afro-Asian nations between the Soviet Union and China, which might ultimately tend to delay the convening of the main Conference, something suitable to India's interests at this stage. In case India succeeded in getting the Soviet Union into the main Conference, it would ensure Soviet support to India on her border disputes with China and Pakistan as

74. Ibid., p. 47.

75. India knew, how, in the preliminary meeting of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (AAJA) in Djakarta on 15 February 1963 Indonesia had opposed the UAR delegation's move to seek Soviet Union's full participation in the main Conference. The Indian delegation, along with those from Ghana and Lebanon, had then given full support to the UAR move. See The Statesman, 17 February 1963.

Later, during the first five days of the AAJA Conference in Djakarta from 24 to 30 April 1963, the Indian delegation had taken the initiative to insist on full-fledged participation by the Soviet Union rather than as an observer as agreed to earlier. Although the Presidium of the AAJA, dominated by China and Indonesia, had finally rejected the Indian move on 28 April 1963, it had seriously embarrassed Indonesia whose delegate had continued to support China in its opposition to full participation by the Soviet Union.
also against the combined hostility from China, Indonesia and Pakistan.

Indian delegate's proposal about timing of the main Conference also had serious implications for these three countries. At least, since the end of 1963, they had been making co-ordinated diplomatic efforts to convene the second Asian-African Conference as early as possible. The Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai, had made a long, two-and-a-half-month tour of Africa and Asia between December 1963 and February 1964, in order, among other things, to canvass for the early convening of the second Asian-African Conference. Responses to the Chinese and Indonesian overtures in this connection had not been very encouraging. The Africans were generally in favour of holding a second Conference of the non-aligned states before a second Asian-African Conference was convened. This was confirmed by the outcome of the preparatory meeting of the second Non-Aligned States' Conference, held in Colombo in March 1964.

Swaran Singh's proposal was hence an additional source of embarrassment. None of the three countries was prepared to take the things lying down. To accept the Indian proposal would be tantamount to accepting diplomatic defeat at the hands of India and other non-aligned group of Asian and African states. Both Indonesia and Pakistan desired to hold the second Asian-African Conference in August 1964. Although they justified it on the ground that it should be held before the session of the UN General Assembly, their aim was to take the wind out of the sails of the second non-aligned summit meeting scheduled for Cairo in the first week of October 1964. The Indian proposal, however, was well-conceived for the psychological

and historical appeal. The occasion of the tenth anniversary of first Asian-African Conference was acceptable to a majority of the participants in the Preparatory Meeting. Even though Indonesia, China and Pakistan desired otherwise, in the face of a majority favouring the Indian proposal, they had been left with no choice except to accept it.

The Indian delegate's suggestion about shift in venue from Asia to Africa was also equally significant in so far as its appeal to the African States was concerned. Neither China nor Indonesia were disposed to holding the main Asian-African Conference in Africa. It was particularly irritating to Indonesia because it amounted to India's objection to another Asian-African Conference being held in Indonesia. Usefulness of such a Conference to Indonesia was primarily if it was held in Indonesia itself. This alone would perpetuate the memory of "the Bandung Dasa Sila" (Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference) and the "Bandung Spirit". But Swaran Singh's proposal to hold the second Asian-African Conference in Africa had a justification and an appeal which could be resisted only at the expense of African sympathies, which neither Indonesia nor China could afford.

Besides these proposals, leader of the Indian delegation squarely denounced "the uncivilised and inhuman regime in South Africa" for its continued policy of racial discrimination and mentioned that in response to the UN resolution, India had discontinued diplomatic, commercial, trade and air relations with that Government. He also proposed among others, the participation in the main Conference of the Provisional Government of Angola.

77. The Hindu, 12 April 1964 (dispatch by K. Rangaswami).
78. Ibid.
India had reason to be satisfied with the results of the Preparatory Meeting. By seeking acceptance of his proposal about holding the main Afro-Asian Conference on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the First Asian-African Conference, in April 1965, Swaran Singh had succeeded in blocking it, at least until after the second non-aligned gathering. In this the Ceylonese delegate had given full support to India's suggestion for holding it on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the first Conference. Refusing to see any justification in calling the second Afro-Asian Conference immediately, merely because the 'Bandung' Conference Communiqué had mentioned it, leader of the Ceylonese delegation observed: "We have allowed nine years to elapse already. The cause of Asian-African solidarity has not suffered in the interval." In view of "our other commitments" also, he urged that the main Conference be held "some time early in 1965..."

With the general support of a majority of the participants, India had also succeeded in shifting the venue of the Summit Conference from Asia to Africa. The only proposal which had not been accepted was about sending invitations to the Soviet Union and Malaysia. But non-acceptance of it could not be interpreted as total rejection. The issue of participation by both the Soviet Union and Malaysia had been left to be settled by a meeting of Foreign Ministers immediately preceding the main Conference. Although India did not tie up its own participation with the question of sending invitations to these two countries, its delegation left no

79. Meeting of Ministers, n. 60, p. 78.
80. The Hindu, 12 April 1964. Besides Ceylon, other countries which fully supported Indian proposal in this regard were Ghana, Ethiopia, Iraq, the United Arab Republic and Tanganyika.
one in doubt about India's strong feelings in this regard. China's and Indonesia's continued opposition to Soviet and Malaysian participation, as India must have anticipated, would only tend to delay the convening of the Conference. By its consistent support to both the USSR and Malaysia, India wanted to use this question as a trump card, as it was to this aim of putting off the second Afro-Asian Conference that India had been directing its efforts.

No doubt, Swaran Singh's proposals at the Preparatory Meeting represented a "striking diplomatic initiative" on the part of India, as The Hindu correspondent from Djakarta described it. Besides serious implications these proposals had for Indonesia as well as for China and Pakistan, their major significance lay in India's successful bid to tie up Malaysia question with the prospects of the second Afro-Asian Conference. It meant that if India persisted in seeking Malaysia's participation in it, (which was indicated by her policy so far) it might successfully forestall the possibility of holding it for an indefinite period. The same could be said about the significance to India of the question of Soviet participation in the Conference.

Reactions in Indonesia

Government of Indonesia maintained near silence. Without mentioning India by name, Foreign Minister Subandrio observed that the Preparatory Meeting had succeeded in the face of opposition and challenges by certain forces which tried to torpedo the meeting. Nevertheless, it must have been embarrassed by Swaran Singh's

81. Ibid.

82. Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), FE/1541/A3/7-8, 30 April 1964.
proposals. Despite the Chinese and Pakistani support, it had failed both on the question of timing and venue of the second Afro-Asian Conference. Its only success was in seeking postponement of the question of Malaysia's participation. The Indonesian leadership was disappointed to find that it was the Indian delegation which had created all sorts of complications in the way of their foreign policy objectives. In India's effort to link Malaysia issue with the prospects of the second Afro-Asian Conference, Indonesia saw India obstructing its role in the region as well as in Afro-Asia.

The Indonesian press, however, did not take kindly to India's role at the Preparatory Meeting. Avoiding a direct reference to India and China, Indonesian Herald editorially charged that India's move to invite the Soviet Union to the main Conference was intended only "to embarrass another delegation with which it has a violent conflict at the moment" and held that it would not be "really wise" on the part of India to produce "an unnecessary confrontation" between the Afro-Asian countries and the Soviet Union. Indonesian Observer referred to Swaran Singh's proposal to invite Malaysia to the second Asian-African Conference and castigated it as "a deliberate attempt by India to wreck AA (Afro-Asian) solidarity, and the solidarity of those countries with the Indonesian people". In its news coverage later, Indonesian Herald described Swaran Singh as "Malaysia' Singh".

The Indonesian Communist Party sharply criticised India for its attitude at the Preparatory Meeting. At a press conference on

83. Indonesian Herald, 14 April 1964 and Dawn (Karachi), 15 April 1964.
84. Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), 15 April 1964.
85. Indonesian Herald, 20 April 1964.
15 April 1964, Chairman Aidit of the Party commented that the success of the Preparatory Meeting demonstrated the failure of the hopes of the "imperialists, colonialists, the Indian monopoly capitalists and the revisionists" that the meeting would end in failure. He called for vigilance, because, he believed, "they will continue to make mischief". In his address to a mass rally in Djakarta, six days later, the PKI leader referred to the progress achieved by the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism and imperialism since the first "Bandung" Conference. In this connection, he observed: "There is indeed nothing that can hold back the course of history. Even though at the non-bloc conference held in Belgrade in 1961 the revisionists and the Right-wing nationalists like Nehru tried to divert the struggle of the Asian-African people against imperialism from its course, their efforts came to nought...."

In the period of five and a half months between the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta in April 1964 and the second Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964, the tension in the two countries' relations continued to grow. The reason of course remained India's pro-Malaysia policy. In the light of Indonesia's continued anti-Malaysia stance and its intensive efforts towards the convening of the second Conference of the African and Asian countries, Indian policies only added to Indonesia's embarrassment. In ideological terms, the Indonesian leadership tended to interpret India's attitude as one of aiding and abetting British colonialist policies in South-East Asia and hindering unity among the Afro-Asian ranks in their struggle against the forces of colonialism and imperialism. Cast in the framework of President Sukarno's concept.

86. SWB, FE/1532/C/5, 20 April 1964.
87. Ibid., FE/1549/C/3, 9 May 1964.
of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS", it meant India leaving its earlier policy of non-alignment and of active opposition to colonialism and imperialism.

Indonesia and India at the second Non-Aligned Conference

It was with this immediate background that the two countries attended the second Conference of the Non-Aligned states, held in Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964. After the first such Conference in Belgrade three years ago, it provided another occasion to their leaders to express their differences openly in a large gathering attended by Heads of State or Government of forty-seven countries.

In the course of his address to the Conference on 6 October 1964, President Sukarno took up two major themes, namely, the increasing need for Afro-Asian solidarity and the growing irrelevance of the policy of peaceful co-existence in the context of present international situation. Taking up the first theme, he stated that, although since the first Conference of the non-aligned countries, many Asian and African people had achieved independence, the power of the "OLDEFOS" had "not yet been broken in the substance

88. Only twenty-five countries excluding three observers, participated in the first Conference. The forty-seven countries which attended the second Conference belonged to Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. These were alphabetically Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Geylon, Chad, Congo (Brazaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malai, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia. Besides there were observers from ten countries, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. See United Arab Republic, Conference of Heads of State and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 5-10 October 1964 (Cairo, Ministry of National Guidance (Information Administration), n.d.), p. 334.
of their domination. Their power is still felt everywhere. The "OLDEFOs", he asserted, continued to interfere in the affairs of the newly-free countries and, thereby, hindered the process of their social, economic and political regeneration. They also posed a constant danger to the freedom and security of these nations. He was convinced that because of a sharp conflict of interests between the Afro-Asian countries and those highly developed and industrialised in the West, the former could not easily and speedily catch up with the standards of the latter. Hence they continued to be the subject of both political and economic exploitation. Therefore, the only alternative open to the "NEFOs", according to President Sukarno, was to "build the huge political power of solidarity among states that face a common foe". This the Indonesian leader described as the sole "end" of all their conferences including the present one.

In this connection, the Indonesian President criticised certain countries which put priority on economic development through co-operation with the "OLDEFOs", instead of uniting to oppose them, and, as a result, allowed their independence to be compromised. He observed: "Even nations with great potential wealth have won national independence, yet have never laid even the foundations of their own social, economic, political and cultural consolidation based upon their own national identities, simply because they did not first move to eradicate the forces of imperialism which, in disguised form continue to exercise their domination from without and from within even after they lost the

89. Sukarno, Address to the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 6 October 1964, The Era of Confrontation (Djakarta, Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.), p. 11.

90. Ibid., p. 13.
power to rule that nation." He was "well aware" of the need for economic and industrial development in order to alleviate the miseries of the people; but, he asserted that "our attention to economic development and social welfare" alone "will not work...." He declared thus: "We must understand that economic development will bring benefits to our people only when we have torn up by their roots all the institutions, all the links that make us subservient in any way, in any fashion, to the old order of domination."

"... We cannot develop economically, nor socially, nor culturally, until we have removed those forces of domination which seek to divide us," he added.

President Sukarno thus strongly criticised the policy of non-alignment and international co-operation for socio-economic development. Ideologically, it meant Sukarno's taking up a foreign policy line more or less similar to China's view of the world in which "third road" did not exist. More than that it was a bitter though indirect charge against India for preferring economic and industrial development through co-operation with the West to laying "even the foundations of their own social, economic, political and cultural consolidation, based upon their own national identities", and thus allowing its freedom to be compromised.

The second major theme of President Sukarno's speech at the Cairo Conference was concerned with an appraisal of the policy of peaceful co-existence. While analysing the then international situation, President Sukarno believed that the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had "reached a condition of some balance" of power which would deter them from unleashing of war. He

92. Ibid., p. 20.
observed: "They are equally strong and will not wage war against one another, since war to them means total annihilation in which they would lose everything.... The risk of losing all they have is too great." So he argued, the threat to security and international peace at present arose not as much from the mutual antagonisms of the two super Powers as from the "OLDEFOS" efforts at subversion and interference of all kinds, meant to undermine the independence of the newly independent countries. In this connection, he referred to "outside imperialist forces" disturbing the security of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia and the surrounding areas, and asked the non-aligned gathering: "How can peaceful co-existence be applied in cases such as these?"

The Indonesian President also expressed his view that even for economic development, peaceful co-existence between the "NEFOS" and "OLDEFOS" could not be feasible, as it would be certainly at the risk of a country's freedom and independence. He stressed that there could be no peaceful co-existence between unequals, none of the Afro-Asian countries being individually at par in economic and political strength with the "OLDEFOS". Hence the need to unite. He declared his conviction thus: "There will be peaceful co-existence between the developing countries and the imperialist states, only when we can face them with equal strength. And that equal strength we can obtain only through solidarity among us. Let there be no mistake about that! We have no alternative to solidarity."

93. Ibid., p. 15.  
94. Ibid., pp. 16-21.  
95. Ibid., p. 21.
It was a subtle move on the part of Sukarno to deflect non-alignment and peaceful co-existence from their original course and bring them in line with his concept of struggle between the "MFOS" and the "OLDEFOS", a concept which grew more and more congruent to China's foreign policy objectives in the region as well as in Afro-Asia. Viewed from a historical angle, his arguments for Afro-Asian solidarity against the colonialist and imperialist forces were not different from those used at the Belgrade Conference three years earlier. However, what made his argument look more credible than it was at that time was relaxation perceptible in the international tension since then.

Indonesia's attacks on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence did not go unchallenged. In the course of his address on 7 October 1964, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, leader of the Indian delegation to the Conference, stressed priority for "peace" above everything else. Stating India's stand in this regard, he observed: "First and foremost we believe in peace, in the settlement of all disputes through peaceful means, in the abolition of war and more particularly nuclear war. Secondly, we believe in freedom, freedom for the people of each country to follow their destiny without external interference." It was, in fact, a restatement of the position Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had taken at the Belgrade Conference. Even in the five-point

96. United Arab Republic, Conference of Heads of State and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, October 5-10, 1964 (Cairo, Ministry of National Guidance (Information Administration), n.d.), p. 104.
programme, which he suggested for adoption by the Conference, the Indian Prime Minister gave top priority to world peace through nuclear disarmament.

While explaining the first three points of his five-point programme, Lal Bahadur Shastri urged upon the Conference to "consider the recent disturbing indications which suggest that China is about to explode a nuclear device." In this connection, he outlined the urgency of "total nuclear disarmament" and proposed the despatch of "a special mission to persuade China to desist from developing nuclear weapons".

Suggesting solution of border disputes through peaceful means, the Indian Prime Minister called for acceptance of "customary or traditional boundaries" as the "basis" of these negotiations. He pleaded: "The non-aligned nations should declare their strong opposition to any changes brought about by the open use of force as well as by quiet penetration of borders or subversion of one kind or another." To strengthen his point, he cited Prime Minister Nehru's remarks made during the second Dutch action against the Indonesian Republic in 1948, which read:

97. Ibid. The order of priority of the five-point programme as suggested by Lal Bahadur Shastri was as under:—

1. Nuclear disarmament.
2. Peaceful settlement of border disputes.
3. Freedom from foreign domination, aggression, subversion and racial discrimination.
4. Acceleration of economic development through international co-operation.
5. Full support for the United Nations and its programmes for peace and development.

98. Ibid., p. 105.
Where freedom is menaced or justice is threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral. 99

This had the advantage of reminding Sukarno of the extent of India's moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia during the Dutch aggression against it. It also meant to highlight both the Chinese and Indonesians' attitude of changing borders by the aggressive use of force against India and Malaysia respectively and to seek the non-aligned countries' support against such activities.

As regards colonialism, he voiced India's categorical support for the peoples still struggling for freedom. In this connection, he expressed his anxiety over the continued existence of colonial oppression in colonies such as Angola, Mozambique and the so-called Portuguese Guinea. He also condemned both the white minority governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the former for its "imposing its will on the majority" and the latter for its "illegal and alien rule", over South-West Africa as well as its racial policies. 100

Besides, while defining his last two points about accelerating "economic development through international co-operation", and seeking full "support for the United Nations and its programmes for peace and development:", Prime Minister Shastri came out with strong defence of the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence.

In the address by the Indian Prime Minister, the Indonesian delegation came to perceive three major points of difference, namely, India's emphasis on priority for "peace" and "peaceful co-existence" over all other issues including freedom from colonialism, its

99. Ibid., p. 106.
100. Ibid., pp. 106-7.
position on border disputes and its call for approach to China to
desist from manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The differences aired by the leaders of the two countries' de
elegations were carried into the discussions of the Political Com
mittee. On 7 October 1964, at a meeting of the Political Com
mittee formed to draft the Conference Communique, Indonesia, with
the support of Algeria, Guinea, Mali and Tanganyika, resisted India's
effort to seek priority for the word "peace" and "peaceful co-
existence". The Indonesian delegation insisted on the insertion of
a sentence declaring that peaceful co-existence was impossible until
colonialism was liquidated. Finding itself in minority, however, it
put up another fight to relegate the word "peace" to the end of the
sentence on peaceful co-existence. K. Rangaswami, The Hindu
correspondent, reported in a despatch from Cairo that there was a
sharp conflict of opinion and repeated exchanges between the two
delegations. The Political Committee continued its discussions for
six long hours when it broke up after a complete stalemate was
reached. India was reported to have won the point when the Political Com
mittee agreed to the formula that "the Conference reaffirms its
deep conviction that in the present circumstances mankind must rec
recognise peaceful co-existence as the only way to strengthen un
universal peace based on national freedom, equality and justice".

India also proposed that "the States shall refrain in their in
international relations from threat or use of force inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations; and any situation brought
about by such threat or use of force shall not be recognised".
Indonesia saw in it an implied reference to the Chinese occupation

101. The Hindu, 9 October 1964.
of vast Indian territories following the Chinese invasion of India in October 1962. In line with its pro-China policy, thus, the Indonesian delegation opposed the inclusion of latter half of the sentence. With the two countries insistent on holding conflicting positions, the Political Committee could not come to any decision and left the issue to be resolved by the Foreign Ministers.

Still another proposal by the Indian delegation called for the inclusion in the Conference Communique of a paragraph suggesting the deputation of a mission to Peking to persuade China to refrain from producing nuclear weapons. This was supported by the delegations of Ceylon, Yugoslavia and the UAR. Perceiving in it an Indian effort to seek the non-aligned countries' support to keep China out of the Nuclear Club, the Indonesian delegation, with the help of delegations from Algeria and Cuba, opposed the Indian proposal. Indonesia was not ready to see the non-aligned gathering naming "China as the only bad guy" in this connection and desired instead a resolution in general terms. As the Political Committee failed to iron out the differences, it left this question also to be decided upon by the Foreign Ministers.

President Sukarno did not attend the final session and left it for Foreign Minister Subandrio to sign the Conference Communique. In India it was interpreted as indicative of his dissatisfaction with the final draft communique.

Fall in Indonesia's Image of India

By the end of 1964, it led to a sharp fall in Indonesia's image of India. Although Government leaders yet maintained restraint in their direct references towards India, the press came

102. Ibid., and Indonesian Herald, 12 October 1964.
103. Hindustan Times, 12 October 1964.
to level open charges of "revisionism" of India going out of step with the Afro-Asian struggle against Western colonialism and imperialism and of its siding with the latter. The major reasons were, of course, India's open pro-Malaysia posture and its insistence on seeking Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-Asian Conference.

The Indonesian Herald, usually expressing Foreign Ministry views, played an important role in the anti-India campaign. In an editorial captioned "India's Revisionism", towards the close of the year 1964, it analysed both India's political situation and the nature of leadership after the death of Prime Minister Nehru. It noticed "a tendency (in India) to move further from the established Nehru's line of active neutrality into a policy of neo-alignment; from a policy of co-operation with Afro-Asian countries to a policy of reliance on necolim powers". It voiced concern at the "growing influence of the revisionist group within the Shastri Government" and surmised that it did not "augur well for the future of Asia. Especially, when it seeks protection from and cooperation with necolim powers which have always sought to undermine Afro-Asian solidarity and the march of national liberation everywhere".

104. Indonesian Herald, 23 December 1964. This editorial was a sharp rejoinder to an article which appeared in a recent issue of The Statesman from New Delhi. Referring to The Statesman's charge of Indonesia joining hands with China in "endangering India's security", the Indonesian Herald saw indications of an "openly declared hostility towards Indonesia". It criticised The Statesman's perception of threat to India from the Indonesian side and observed that India "cannot use the threat from the North as an excuse to enlarge her navy. Consequently, she has to play up the bogey of the 'threat' from Indonesia."

It was a clear support to Pakistan's view that India used the Chinese threat to augment its armed strength in order to brow-beat its small neighbours including Pakistan.

As the term "Revisionism" has an ideological implication and could not appropriately be used for India, the Indonesian Herald, choosing this word for Indian policy in its editorial, showed the growing degree of influence the PKI had come to enjoy in its editorial board.
It was, if anything, a clear indication of the growing receptivity in Indonesia of the anti-Indian propaganda line emanating from Peking. A week later, in its "The year 1964 in Review", the Indonesian Herald criticised India for giving up its traditional "neutral" posture and policy of opposition to colonialism and imperialism and for practically supporting and identifying "herself with certain manifestations of Western policy in Asia and Africa". Commenting on "increasing indications of neo-alignment" in India's foreign policy, it wrote thus: "The irony of 1964 then lies in the fact that if in the early years of Afro-Asian awakening, it was India which elected herself to champion the cause of freedom from colonialism against the hands of the status quo of Washington, now India has voluntarily chosen the role of preaching 'sweatness and reasonableness' to the same Afro-Asian world in dealing with neocolonial (imperialist, colonialist and neo-colonialist) policies."

In the following days, India's prestige continued to suffer among the Indonesians. Commenting sharply on a news report, emanating from New Delhi, about India's alleged acquiescence in the US scheme to station submarines armed with nuclear missiles in the Asian waters, the Indonesian Herald editorially charged that "India had indeed switched from non-alignment to neo-alignment". It observed in conclusion: "India seems to be moving further and further away from the general trend of Afro-Asian aspirations. At a time when the entire Afro-Asians are clamouring for the withdrawal of foreign bases and to solution of regional problems among the countries of the region concerned, India has invited foreign powers to saturate Asian areas with military bases."

105. Ibid., 30 December 1964.
106. Ibid., 11 January 1965.
The **Indonesian Herald** also entered into polemics with the two Indian national dailies, the **Indian Express** and the **Hindustan Times** for their comments against Indonesia on her decision to quit the United Nations. It quoted the **Indian Express** to have observed that Indonesia "once outside the United Nations ... would be even less inclined to be influenced by the international code of ethics which theoretically prevents aggression by one country against another." Reacting to this "constant preaching about noble principles and moralism", the **Indonesian Herald** made the allegation thus: "If there is any country in Asia today which has been guilty of a series of aggression and complete disregard of what has been termed as an 'international code of ethics', it is no other than India. In fact what has made it more repulsive is the fact that India had been hiding behind high moral principles to carry out acts of naked aggression." Tersely reminding it of Indian "military invasion of Hyderabad", its "annexation by force of Junagarh", and its "flouting of Security Council's resolution on Kashmir", the Indonesian daily advised the editorial staff of the **Indian Express** "rather to try to convince their own government for a need of translating this moralism into deeds". "India", it added, "would free herself from charges of hypocrisy if she only cared to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council to which she herself had turned for peaceful solution".

The **Indonesian Herald** also gave a sharp rejoinder to the **Hindustan Times**' thesis that Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations was "indistinguishable from blackmail" and its contention "that if other nations had acted on this principle some 16 years ago, Indonesia would have remained a Dutch colony". It wrote thus: "Indonesia had won her independence with the sweat, blood and tears of the Indonesian people. They had won freedom with their own
strength. The United Nations came only "to help formulate the procedure of transfer of authority, after the real battles had been won by Indonesia and Indonesia alone! Not more and Not less!"

Fall in Indonesia's image of India coincided with the growing strength and influence of the PKI at the expense of other political parties in the domestic politics. Simultaneously, there was an increase in Indonesia's intimacy with China and Pakistan and its active co-ordination of effort with them on the issues of Malaysia and the second Afro-Asian Conference. The Indonesian Herald gave the impression of following the guidelines of anti-India policy coming from Peking and Rawalpindi. A few days after Foreign Minister Subandrio's visit to China in January 1965, it commented on the "possibilities" of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism in India going "in the reverse direction". "Here is a country", it wrote, "in trouble with almost all her neighbours, has gradually been seeking friendship among neocolonial powers. More than that, she has even invited return to Asian soil and waters the very neocolonial forces which had been forcibly ousted from Asia through bloody and bitter struggles of the Asian peoples." The Indonesian Herald saw the danger of India transforming itself "into a gigantic "Malaysia" - complete with neocolonial nuclear umbrella and submarine fleet" and serving "as a serious threat to the peace and security as well as independence of the entire Afro-Asian continents". It charged post-Nehru leadership in India with going "further out of step with the national aspirations of Asia and of Africa", called India "a nation isolated and pitied", an "outstanding apologist and collaborator for neocolonial dominion" over the two continents, and urged upon the Asian and African countries to adopt a "concerted

approach" in order "to prevent India, in her act of desperation from sinking further deeper into the arms of reactionary necolim forces".

108. Ibid., 10 February 1965.

These allegations made by the Indonesian Herald, in its editorial "Challenge to Afro-Asian Diplomacy", did not go unchallenged. In a letter to the Editor of this paper, T. Pande, First Secretary, Information, Indian Embassy in Djakarta, charged that the editorial in question was "full of mis-statements and inaccuracies", and described it "as an instance of editorial imagination running riot". He rebutted the allegation of India's "isolation" and that it (India) was "in trouble with almost all her neighbours". In this connection, he invited a reference to a recent visit to India by General Ne Win of Burma and to his statements about warm relations with India. Pointing an accusing finger towards Pakistan and China, he wrote that only Pakistan was an exception which pursued "opportunistic policy, (and) has decided to flirt and collaborate with an aggressor nation whose expansionist approach in world affairs is not only a menace to India but to the entire world."

Describing the charge of India having invited "necolim forces" back to "Asian soil and waters" as "blatantly inaccurate and baseless", the Indian Embassy official reminded the Indonesian Herald "that India is not a member of any military pact, SEATO or CENTO". It was an attempt to underline contradictions in Indonesian foreign policy, according to which Pakistan, still a member of these Western military pacts, had come to be seen by Indonesia as a member of the "new emerging forces". T. Pande considered the Indonesian Herald's policy of persistence in "underlining a traversity of truth" as "unfortunate" and stressed that India's "consistent approach to the maintenance of peace in South-East Asia and elsewhere is well-known". He asserted that "India continues to have a warm feeling of friendship for Indonesia", and assured his Government's continued effort "to develop that friendship to even closer relationship, on basis of genuine understanding...".

This letter by the Indian Embassy official was published in full in the Indonesian Herald of 13 February 1965. Along with this letter to the Editor, the Editor of the Indonesian daily wrote a short reply in which he termed certain words used as "immature outbursts", which, according to him, did not merit any reply. He, however, published a small news item, appearing in the Overseas Hindustan Times of 31 December 1964, in which C.B. Gupta, former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, had urged the Central Government to change its foreign policy. This, the Editor of the Indonesian Herald thought, would substantiate his charges against India and its post-Nehru leadership.
The anti-India trends as evident in the Indonesian press continued unabated in the following months. The major provocation arose from India's persistence in seeking Malaysia's representation at the second African-Asian Conference. The meetings of the Standing Committee of Fifteen Countries (at ambassadorial level) as appointed by the preparatory meeting in April 1964, provided to India important occasions to do so. In the five meetings of the Standing Committee, which took place in Algiers between October 1964 and March 1965, the Indian Ambassador to Algeria, R. Goburdhun, had persistently supported Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-Asian Conference. Two of these meetings in December 1964 and March 1965 proved to be quite significant. The two countries' representatives openly clashed on this issue. In the course of the meeting in December 1964, the Indian delegate had forcefully pleaded that the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government and or State, had the right to add to the list of invitees as decided upon by the Preparatory Meeting in April 1964. He had also asserted that, as participant, India had the right to propose an invitation to Malaysia, and urged that a decision on this question should be taken by the Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled to be held just before the main Conference. This was to counter the argument of the Indonesian delegate that as no new developments had taken place since the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta, there was no need to rake up the issue of Malaysia's participation.

109. The five meetings of the Standing Committee took place in Algiers on 21-22 October, 12-13 November and 17-19 December 1964, and 8-9 February and 29 March 1965. Indonesia, China, Pakistan and India were among the fifteen Afro-Asian countries represented on the Standing Committee. India was represented by her Ambassador in Algiers, R. Goburdhun.

110. "India Wins First Round Against Jakarta: Inviting Malaysia to Algiers Meet" (despatch by Sudhakar Bhat), Times of India (Delhi), 6 January 1965.
Hopefully for India, according to a Times of India despatch from Cairo, but for Indonesia's objections, the Standing Committee as a whole had supported the contention of the Indian delegate in this matter.

Similarly, during the Standing Committee meeting in March 1965, the Indian delegate once again pleaded for Malaysia's representation in the Afro-Asian Conference. He also took up his earlier demand that the Foreign Ministers and Heads of State and or Government had the right to increase the number of participants in the main Conference. As before, the Indonesian delegate, this time actively helped by the Chinese delegate, tried to block the discussion on the issue. Both the Indonesian and the Chinese representatives claimed that the list of invitees to the Conference had already been settled at the preliminary talks in Djakarta last year. Finally, however, as reported in an Indian daily, it was the Indian delegate's suggestion that the question of participation by Malaysia be left to be decided by the Foreign Ministers' meeting, that was agreed to by most of the members of the Standing Committee.

The fact that a majority of the members of the Standing Committee of Fifteen Countries supported India's viewpoint on this issue, was greatly embarrassing to the Indonesian Government. The Indonesian leadership feared that India's success in seeking Malaysia's representation at the Afro-Asian Conference would be highly prejudicial to its prestige. In order, therefore, to avoid this predicament, the Indonesian press and Government sought to build up pressures on India to stop its pro-Malaysia policy.

111. Ibid.
112. The Hindu, 15 April 1965.
Suluh Indonesia, a language daily close to the PNI, saw in India and her foreign policy indications of moving towards the right. In an editorial "India's attitude", it invited reference to an announcement, emanating from the Indian Information Service in Djakarta, that the Malaysian army and navy staff were preparing for training in Indian army and naval establishments. Reacting sharply, it wrote that this attitude of the Indian Government had "obviously hurt the feeling of the Indonesian people who are waging a struggle to crush the neo-colonialist project of 'Malaysia'." It regretted that India which once "belonged to the progressive front, the front of fighters against imperialism and colonialism, has now definitely degraded its own prestige by supporting the neo-colonialist project."

These seriously condemnatory charges in the Indonesian press against India echoed the Chinese and Pakistani image of India. It inevitably led to Indonesian leadership's growing disenchantment with India. This became evident during the Tenth Anniversary (Dasa Warsa) celebrations of the first Asian-African Conference, in Djakarta, on 18-19 April 1965. India's lack of enthusiasm displayed in the despatch of a representative enjoying a status lower than that of Foreign Minister was equally matched by Indonesia's cool reception accorded to the Indian delegation. Indian Embassy's request to arrange a meeting between C. Subramaniam, the Indian Food Minister and the leader of the Indian delegation to the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations and President Sukarno, was simply ignored. The

113. Suluh Indonesia (Djakarta), 7 April 1965.

114. Indian Express, 21 April 1965. The only reply the Indian Embassy had elicited from Government of Indonesia was that its request had been registered.

Government of Indonesia demonstrated its coolness towards the Indian delegation in yet another way. The highest among the officials of the Indonesian Foreign

...contd. on next page
mysterious missing of the Indian flag from the Flag Parade and the unceremonious way in which the Indian delegation was treated was in sharp contrast to the warm reception accorded to the Chinese and Pakistani delegations. It showed the degree of coolness which had developed between the two countries since the signing of Friendship Treaty in March 1951.

In the course of his inaugural speech on 18 April 1965, President Sukarno also chose to discard his earlier restraint in criticising India publicly. Before a gathering of representatives of thirty-five Asian and African states, assembled to participate in the Tenth Anniversary celebrations of the first Asian-African Conference, he bracketed India along with Formosa, South Korea, South Vietnam and the Arabian Federation and called her a "non-Asian country in Asia". This was in line with his earlier charge

Ministry, who participated in the reception held by the Indian Ambassador, Peralta Ratnam, in honour of the Indian delegation and its leader, was the Indonesian Minister for Labour, Sutomo, stated to be the Third Assistant to the Deputy Foreign Minister Madame Supeni. See Indonesian Herald, 19 April 1965.

Ibid. It came to light when the Indian Embassy issued a statement that "it appears that the Indian flag was missing from the flag parade. The Ambassador of India in Indonesia immediately brought this to the notice of the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who has sent a reply which is under study".

B.K. Tiwari of the Indian Express commented on the Indian delegation's lack of vigil as well as on Indian mission's low posture in seeking immediate redress of its grievance. He held that it was in contrast with the Nepalese delegation whose complaint regarding a similar flag missing incident elicited quick written response from the Indonesian Foreign Minister.
that India belonged to the "old established forces".

Following the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations, relations between India and Indonesia still further deteriorated. The major reason continued to be India's insistence on Malaysia's representation at the second Asian-African Conference.

While addressing a mammoth rally assembled to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the Indonesian Communist Party in Djakarta on 23 May 1965, Sukarno claimed that majority of the Afro-Asian nations opposed Malaysia's participation. To those who still "remain stubborn in supporting the case", he warned: "We will go on without them." He rejected India's plea that it sought Malaysia's participation on grounds of geography and explained that the "principal reason" for his rejection of Malaysia's entry into the forthcoming Algiers Conference was that it had been established against the principles agreed upon in the Manila Agreement and with the aim of preserving the life-line of imperialism.

Less than three weeks after, on 11 June 1965, Sukarno made a direct attack on India. Speaking at an official ceremony in his palace in Djakarta, he commented on India's pro-Malaysia stance and levelled serious accusations against it for having befriended evil contrary to Gandhism and for having forgotten the meaning of "ahimsa" (non-violence) by wounding Indonesia in its heart.

116. The Hindu, 20 April 1965. In his despatch titled "Sukarno's Tirade Against India", the South-East Asia correspondent of The Hindu observed that according to diplomatic circles, Indonesia's anger at India was mainly because of India's support for Malaysia and that if Malaysia was admitted to the forthcoming Algiers Conference, relations between the two countries might be further strained.

There were thirty-five full delegates and three non-full delegates. See Indonesian Herald, 19 April 1965.


118. Ibid., 12 June 1965.
Repeating these charges, Subandrio told newsmen later that some
countries sometimes ignored Indonesia's fight for ideals and
suspected motives of self-interest.

It was Indonesian leaders' warning to India that if it
continued to insist on Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-
Asian Conference, scheduled to be held in Algiers on 29 June 1965, it
would have to contend with Indonesia's growing hostility.

This encouraged Indonesian press in its anti-India writing. All
the papers took up Sukarno's theme of "Gandhism" and "non-
violece" and made strong attacks on India and its Government. In
an editorial "Assassination of Gandhism", Indonesian Herald charged
Lal Bahadur Shastri's Government with "Go to hell with Nehru's
concepts..." attitude and for forgetting Gandhi's "philosophy of
non-cooperation with oppressors and imperialists". It noted India's
support to Malaysia as well as the reports that "India is going to
take the lead in having 'Malaysia' invited to the Algiers Conference".
Expressing Indonesia's determination to "oppose" Malaysia and its
participation, the Indonesian Herald declared: "If India forces a
rupture, let the anti-neocolim (anti-colonialism, neo-colonialism
and imperialism) forces part with those which work in the service of
necolim forces." Berita Yudha, a language daily, editorially
charged India with having "disgraced the 'Bandung Spirit' which is
emphatically anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist" and warned that

119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., 14 June 1965. It was a clear warning that if India
continued to pursue its pro-Malaysia policy, it might lead
to rupture of relations between the two countries.

The Indonesian Herald commented, inter-alia, that "the
present Indian leadership seems determined to assassinate
even Gandhi's teachings in a desperate attempt to score
temporary political gains."
"there is still time for India to take care of its good name in the eyes of the Afro-Asian peoples in particular and the Nefo countries in general". "India's role", wrote Suluh Indonesia, "as a stockbroker of tickets is a challenge towards a friend". Another language daily, Warta Bhakti expressing pro-Communist views, editorially charged that India has "now clearly come forward as the leader of the countries defending 'Malaysia'. Considering Sukarno's criticism of India as right, it concluded saying that effort must be made "to convince the defenders of 'Malaysia' that they are playing a seriously dangerous game". Duta Masjarakat (a language daily of the NU Party) also commented adversely on India's stand on Malaysia and charged it for not being true to Gandhi's teachings, that is, not to side with untruth. It observed: "Algeria is a good place for India to show whether it still respects Gandhi's teachings".

It was a clever move by the Indonesian leadership and press to create pressures on India in order to dissuade it from canvassing for Malaysia's participation in the Algiers' Conference. But as these pressures led to a sharpening of anti-India feeling in Indonesia, it did not augur well for the two countries' relations. In case India continued to pursue its pro-Malaysia policy, it might expect certain untoward incidents happening against it in Indonesia.

As the fixed date of the Algiers Conference, viz., 24 June 1965 came nearer, Indonesia's criticism of India grew more direct and sharp. Making an indirect reference to India, Foreign Minister

121. Berita Yudha (Djakarta), 14 June 1965.
122. In an editorial on 14 June 1965, Suluh Indonesia categorically asserted "that with or without India the Indonesian revolution will march onwards towards its end". See English translation of this editorial in Indonesian Herald, 15 June 1965.
123. Warta Bhakti (Djakarta), 12 June 1965.
124. "Gandhi or no Gandhi" (leading article), Duta Masjarakat (Djakarta), 16 June 1965.
Subandrio told newsmen in Djakarta on 14 June 1965: "We are cognizant of the fact that we have enemies who have been working all this time to obstruct the proceedings of the forthcoming Conference".

In an indoctrination lecture five days later, Roeslan Abdulgani, Minister Co-ordinator for Public Relations, charged India with making efforts to smuggle Malaysia into the Conference.

The press did not lag behind. In an editorial "India's Friendship", Berita Yudha evaluated Indian friendship towards Indonesia and compared it with that of Pakistan, Burma and the Philippines, since the signing of the Friendship Treaty with all these countries in early 1951. Feeling satisfied over the performance on the part of Pakistan, Burma and the Philippines, Berita Yudha wrote that, according to Sukarno, India was the one country which was neither true to its ideals nor to the ten principles of the Bandung Conference. It attributed India's "untruthfulness" to its recognition of Malaysia and to its effort to help Malaysia get into the second Asian-African Conference. Still more bitter comments came from Bintang Timur, a language daily close to the I.k.I. In an editorial on 19 June 1965, it refused to believe that India belonged to the Afro-Asian family of nations which were struggling for freedom. Commenting sharply on India's effort to seek for Malaysia entry into the Conference, it said: "India's subversive action not only betrays the main interests of the people of Indonesia, it has also made India the most humiliating servant of the Imperialists."

126. Ibid., 21 June 1965.
Indian Efforts to Postpone the Algiers Conference and Indonesians’ Reactions

As the anti-India campaign mounted in Indonesia, an event of major importance occurred in Algiers, the Capital of Algeria and the venue of the second Afro-Asian Conference, just five days before the Foreign Ministers meeting was scheduled to take place there. On 19 June 1965, a successful coup led to the overthrow of the government of President Ben Bella and the emergence of a new government headed by Colonel Boumedienne. Political uncertainties and personal security risks arising from events in Algiers were bound to have an adverse impact on the prospects of the Algiers Conference.

There were apprehensions in India that, at the Algiers Conference, Indonesia might join China and Pakistan in their efforts to embarrass her in connection with her disputes with the two countries. Hence Government of India desired that the Summit Conference be postponed until such time as, by its diplomatic efforts or otherwise, it succeeded, to some extent, in neutralising the combined hostility of China, Pakistan and Indonesia. Political developments in Algeria made it easier for India to effectively mobilise the Afro-Asian opinion in favour of its view. Within two days of the coup, thirteen Heads of State or Government, including the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who were attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London and were expected to participate in the Algiers Conference, met to assess the situation arising from political disturbances in Algeria. After deliberations, they issued an appeal saying: "In view of the importance of the Conference and its objectives they are of the opinion that it would be preferable to postpone the Afro-Asian

129. Ibid., 21 June 1965.
Conference for the present."

This appeal for postponement, which the leaders of the thirteen Commonwealth countries renewed two days later on 23 June 1965, was significant in that it had been signed by delegates of nine African and four Asian countries including Pakistan. It has been noted elsewhere how China, the fervent supporter of Indonesia, failed in its efforts to influence the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth against issuing such an appeal.

In the meantime, however, the Indian official delegation, including, among others, four Members of Indian Parliament, left for Algiers on 21 June 1965 to participate in the Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled to be held on 24 June 1965. This was as a sequel to the decision arrived at a meeting of the Standing Committee in Algiers a day earlier. On reaching Algiers, the Indian delegation engaged itself in consultations with the other delegations which had already reached Algiers and impressed upon them the need for postponing the Conference to some other date. Having thus been assured of support from various Asian and African countries, the Indian delegation decided to sponsor a resolution in the Foreign Ministers' meeting, scheduled for 26 June 1965, which asked for postponement of the Summit as well as the Foreign Ministers' Conference. This was in accord with India's earlier efforts in

130. *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 11, no. 9, September 1965, p. 260.
131. *Indonesian Herald*, 25 June 1965. It noted the appeal by thirteen Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth in London on 23 June 1965, saying that "it would not be appropriate" to go to Algiers at this time pending further clarifications of the situation in Algeria. The countries signatory to the appeal were Ceylon, Gambia, Ghana, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
132. *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 11, no. 9, September 1965, p. 260. Ceylon, Japan, Laos and Thailand agreed to be co-sponsors of the resolution on postponement of the Conference.
this direction.

Naturally, Indonesians' feelings against India were bitter. Government of Indonesia was anxious that India and other Commonwealth countries should not take advantage of the coup in Algiers in seeking postponement of the Conference. In order to forestall that possibility, it accorded recognition to the new Government of Colonel Boumedienne immediately the day following the coup and reaffirmed its decision to attend the Algiers Conference.

Government of Indonesia also intensified its diplomatic efforts to ensure that the Afro-Asian Conference took place as scheduled. President Sukarno, at the head of the Indonesian delegation, left Djakarta for Algiers on 26 June 1965, the day fixed for the Foreign Ministers meeting. In Cairo, enroute to Algiers, he entered into long parleys with President Nasser and Prime Minister Chou En-lai who was already there. The three leaders assessed the prospects of the Summit Conference in the light of recent political developments at Algiers on the one hand and the efforts of India and other Commonwealth countries seeking postponement of the Conference on the other. On 27 June 1965, the three leaders approved the Standing Committee's decision to postpone the Foreign Ministers' meeting to 28 October 1965 and the Summit

133. Indonesian Herald, 21 June 1965. All the prominent language dailies like Berita Yudha, Duta Majisarat, Suluh Indonesia, Bintang Timur, Angkatan Bersendiata and Harian Rakjat, in their issues of 21 June 1965, hailed the Government decision. The Indonesian Herald of 22 June 1965, editorially commented thus: "The decision has been fully supported by the Nasakom leaders and may be assumed to have the backing of the whole Indonesian people...."

134. Ibid., 28 June 1965.
Conference to 5 November 1965. The following day President Ayub Khan also joined them. On 30 June 1965, a joint communiqué issued in Cairo by the Heads of Governments of Indonesia, China, Pakistan and the UAR, confirmed the decision for postponement. 137

India had, no doubt, succeeded in mustering enough Afro-Asian support to block the Algiers Conference. Her success, however, could be attributed not so much to her own diplomatic efforts as to the two other mutually complementary reasons, the coup in Algeria on the eve of the Conference and the African States' growing unwillingness to attend it. On 26 June 1965, the day Foreign Ministers' meeting was due to take place, only thirty-five out of a total of sixty-five delegations had come to participate in the meeting. In fact, the public justification for India's plea to postpone the Conference was the absence of many African states as well as reluctance of many of those present in Algiers to participate

135. Ibid., 29 June 1965. The decision to postpone the Summit Conference and the Foreign Ministers meeting to 5 November 1965 and 28 October 1965, respectively had been taken by the Standing Committee of Ambassadors at its extraordinary meeting on 26 June 1965. With the representatives of Indonesia, China and the UAR, having abstained from the meeting, the Standing Committee had arrived at the decision unanimously. The representative of Ethiopia sponsored the resolution and the Pakistani delegate co-sponsored it. See Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 11, no. 9, September 1965, p. 250. This decision was agreed to by the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, the same day, on his arrival in Algiers back from London. See Indonesian Herald, 29 June 1965.

136. Indonesian Herald, 30 June 1965. On way back home from London (where he had gone to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting), on 26 June 1965, President Ayub Khan made a short three-hour halt at Cairo on a special request by Presidents Sukarno and Nasser. He, however, sought their agreement to his Foreign Minister Bhutto joining them in their talks as his special representative.

137. Ibid., 2 July 1965.
in it. India interpreted it as conducive to disunity rather than unity among the Afro-Asian ranks and hence its delegation "worked hard" to seek postponement of the Conference.

To Indonesian leadership, which had been straining its nerves to see that the Algiers Conference took place as scheduled, it was nothing short of a diplomatic rebuff. It came to see clearly how, by insisting on Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-Asian Conference, and later, by openly canvassing for the postponement of the Conference itself, India had been actively impeding Indonesia's aspirations of a regional as well as Afro-Asian role.

It still further hardened Indonesian attitude towards India. The Chinese and Pakistani propaganda against India only added further tension in the two countries' relations. The accumulated mass anger, whipped up by official statements and press editorials, burst out into the open on 23 June 1965, a day on which India and other Commonwealth countries renewed their appeal for postponement of the Conference. For the second time in the last two years and ten months, there were anti-India demonstrations and stoning of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta. A 2,000-strong mob of Indonesians first

138. In a statement to both Houses of Indian Parliament on 8 September 1965, Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, listed two reasons for postponement: "the appeal of the 13 Asian-African Heads of State/Government" issued in London on 21 June 1965, and the absence of a large majority of African States from the Algiers meeting.

India, he observed, was "ready to participate and to make a constructive contribution to the success of the Conference in forging Afro-Asian unity and co-operation...". But, in his view, the absence of a majority of African states made it imperative for India and those desiring Afro-Asian unity, to seek postponement of the Conference. "Our delegation", he asserted, "worked hard to secure agreement among other delegations for the acceptance of this view... In this it was successful". See Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 11, no. 9, September 1965, p. 260.
gathered at the National Front headquarters and later marched on to the Indian Embassy.

The demonstrators included workers from the constituent parties of the National Front, especially, the PKI, the PNI and the NU. They raised slogans calling India an "imperialist stooge". They also carried banners which read: "Shastri and Tengku Abdul Rahman are imperialist henchmen". A delegation of the demonstrators handed over a memorandum to the Indian Ambassador, Perala Ratnam, demanding, among other things, withdrawal of support to Malaysia.

This showed the degree of Indonesia's alienation from India growing since the first Conference of Non-Aligned states in Belgrade in September 1961. Anti-India demonstrations held by the National Front of all the Indonesian political parties in Djakarta in June 1965, second time since the "Sondhi Affair" in September 1962, could be related to India's continued lack of enthusiasm in and, at later stages, to her active efforts to seek postponement of the second Afro-Asian Conference.