Chapter III

BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE MALAYSLA QUESTION
In the period of four years following the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, relations between India and Indonesia came to sustain further strains. With the passage of time, divergence of approach to various issues developed between Prime Minister Nehru and President Sukarno. Nehru's refusal to agree to Sukarno's emphasis on priority for the problem of colonialism tended to be interpreted in Indonesia as a personal affront to the Indonesian leader. In this sense, it marked an end to personal rapport between the two leaders, established since the days of the Indonesian struggle for freedom from the Dutch. It was bound to have serious repercussions on the two countries' relations.

Coolness between Nehru and Sukarno provided an opportunity to the Chinese and Pakistani leaders to exploit the situation in their own favour. Sharing a common hostility towards India, both China and Pakistan pursued certain policies which, ultimately, succeeded, in September 1965, in creating enmity between Indonesia and India. The domestic politics in Indonesia during this period also proved to be advantageous to China and Pakistan in their avowed anti-India policies.

Goa Issue

On 18 December 1961, three and a half months after the Non-Aligned countries' Conference, the Indian Government took military action against Portuguese colonialism in Goa, and within 24 hours, put an end to the last vestiges of Western colonialism in India.  

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India's Goa action had certain profound implications as far as Indonesia was concerned. At Belgrade, Nehru had heard the Indonesian charges of India's earlier "revolutionary spirit" getting "vaporized". India needed to refurbish her image among the ruling Indonesian elite groups. Government of India's action against the Portuguese colonialism demonstrated that despite the fact of India's non-violent struggle against British colonialism, and despite its continued membership of the British Commonwealth, Indian leadership was anti-colonialist by action. It also established that India, if so required, could use force against colonialism and that, its dependence on Western countries for economic aid, did not compromise its independence of action. Besides, it demonstrated to the Indonesians the fact that if they desired to solve the West Irian issue by force, they must be so prepared as to do so in the shortest possible time, in order to avoid international complications.

Not surprisingly, Indonesia's reactions to India's action against the Portuguese in Goa were quite favourable. In conformity with their commitment to anti-colonialism, the Indonesian Government and press hailed India's action. An Indonesian Foreign Office spokesman, in a statement in Djakarta, extended his Government's "every sympathy" to the Indian people and the Government. "We are fully aware", he said, "that India is compelled to use force in spite of the fact that India is a peace-loving nation". He added, "There can be no compromise with colonialism". The Indonesian delegate to the UN Trusteeship Committee, in its meeting in

2. See Chapter on India and Indonesia at the Belgrade Conference, pp. 150.

New York, on 20 December 1961, termed Goa's freedom as "a most joyful occasion". In a statement in the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat-Gotong Rojong - DPR-GR), Foreign Minister Subandrio, while fully supporting India's Goa action, said that "apparently India has now become aware that only force can be understood by the colonialists". Colonel Latief Hendraningrat, Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament, criticised the American attitude on Goa issue as one showing "lack of understanding towards the problem of colonialism and the liberation movements related to it". He also described it as "a liberation movement and not as aggression as propagated by the colonialists and their allies".

The Indonesian Herald (an English daily from Djakarta, close to Indonesian Foreign Office), in an editorial, asked the Western nations not to be shocked by India's action. "They should fully understand that this is only a matter of course, although long overdue", it observed.

West Irian question

India's anti-Portuguese operation in Goa, understandably, had some impact on Indonesia's policy on the West Irian issue, in spite of Prime Minister Nehru's protestations to the contrary.

8. The Hindu, 29 December 1961. Replying to the charge, at a press conference in New Delhi, that Sukarno was on "the verge of doing Goa", Nehru refuted any such link-up between India's action in Goa and Indonesia's stepped up campaign for West Irian, and observed: "... so far Indonesia is concerned, I do not think anything was necessary for incitement by other sources. The Indonesians have been talking of this for months and years past. I do not think that Indian action in Goa had made any difference."
It brought an additional element of militancy and urgency in the tone of Indonesian attitude towards the Dutch. The fact that on 19 December 1961, only a day after the Indian forces entered Goa, President Sukarno announced to the nation "Tri-Command", for the liberation of West Irian, reinforces this contention.

Sukarno's "Tri-Command" was as a reaction to the Dutch policies towards Indonesia's demand for West Irian. Since 1960, the Dutch had been creating additional complications in the dispute. Since their announcement on 30 March 1960, to send aircraft carrier "Karel Doorman" to the West Irian waters, Dutch Government had been rushing reinforcements in men and arms there. This had been one of the major causes of producing further tension in the area. The Indonesian Government interpreted it as a Dutch move to perpetuate their colonial rule in West Irian and as a threat to the security of the Republic. At a press conference in Havana (Cuba) in May

9. Indonesia, Department of Information, The People's Command for the Liberation of West Irian, Special Issue 82 (Djakarta, 1961), p. 16. The announcement came in the course of President Sukarno's address at a mammoth public meeting in Jogjakarta (Central Java) on 19 December 1961. The "Tri-Command" was as follows:
   1. Defeat the formation of the puppet state of Papua of Dutch colonial rule.
   2. Unfurl the Honoured Red and White Flag in West Irian, Indonesian Native land.
   3. Be ready for general mobilisation to defend the independence and unity of country and Nation.

See also Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), 19 December 1961 and Antara, 20 December 1961.

10. Indonesian Observer, 27 April 1960. In a letter to the Secretary-General, the Chief Indonesian delegate at the United Nations, charged that the recent despatch of Dutch air, naval and land forces to reinforce their military defences in West Irian "proves abundantly" that the Dutch Government was determined to perpetuate its colonial rule in that area despite "stronger and stronger resistance" by the people.
1960, Subandrio observed: "If Holland is reinforcing the frontiers of the territory with warships and planes, we cannot remain quiet nor keep our arms crossed in the face of that." He also gave a warning: "If Holland continues to send reinforcements, we will meet force with force." The growing tension on Dutch reinforcements ultimately led President Sukarno to order severance of diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in August 1960.

The second element in Dutch Government policy which complicated the West Irian question was its declaration in April 1960 to establish a central representative council in West Irian. The intention was to prepare the Papuans (West Irianese people) there in the art of self-determination and virtual self-government, within a period of ten years. The Dutch plan, in short, implied the creation of a new independent Papuan State in West Irian, the

11. Ibid., 16 May 1960. See also The Hindu, 18 June 1960. Indonesia's chief delegate at the United Nations, Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, in a letter to the Secretary General, accused the Dutch of following a "belligerent policy" and a "hostile attitude", by which an "explosive" situation had been created. The Indonesian delegate also attached with the letter a supplementary statement entitled "Dutch aggressive provocation in West Irian". The letter pointed to the possibility of the outbreak of a major conflict, endangering peace and security in South-East Asia. It also disclosed that the Indonesian Government had issued strong protests and warnings, denouncing the Dutch action. Despite that, it alleged, the Dutch were apparently "determined to risk an armed conflict with Indonesia."

12. Sukarno, "Like An Angel that Strikes From the Skies - The March of Our Revolution" (Independence Day Address on 17 August 1960), Handbook on the Political Manifesto (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961), pp. 70-71. To this effect, President Sukarno issued instructions to Foreign Affairs Department on 16 August 1960. While explaining the immediate cause, he attributed his decision to Dutch reinforcements to West Irian, including the aircraft carrier "Karel Doorman". Also see Leslie H. Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch (London, 1962), p. 109.
viability of which, apart from the understandable Indonesian hostility it would provoke, was very much in doubt. It represented a Dutch effort to ensure "that Indonesia shall be denied Western New Guinea".

In 1961, side by side with their programme of constitutional reform in West Irian, the Dutch declared their readiness to hand over West Irian to a UN administration, promising continuance of an annual subsidy for development purposes at the present level of about US $30 million. A Dutch resolution submitted to the UN General Assembly, called for the establishment of a UN Commission and through that an international trusteeship over West Irian.

The Dutch scheme on the West Irian was bound to attract strong Indonesian reactions. For twelve years, since 1950, Indonesia had been demanding restoration of this territory to the Republic. Neither bilateral negotiations nor efforts at the United Nations had produced any concrete results. And now the Dutch had proposed to internationalise the issue. Since June 1961, the tone of anti-Dutch statements emanating from Government circles in Djakarta, had been growing sharper. On the basis of accretion to Indonesia's armed strength, augmented through arms purchases from the Soviet Union, President Sukarno said, in a challenging tone, in Tokyo, on 25 June 1961: "Now we can tell the Dutch; here is our breast, where is yours!" He also hinted at a continued policy of confrontation against the Dutch, in all fields, political, economic

15. Ibid.
and military. In his Independence Day Address on 17 August 1961, he expressed his apprehensions about the Dutch reinforcements to West Irian, reiterated his Government's continued "policy of confrontation, in every field", and warned the Dutch that "the people of Indonesia, probably cannot be patient very much longer". As regards the prospects of a negotiated settlement, although President of Indonesia continued to leave the door open for it, he conditioned it to Dutch acquiescence in Indonesia's position on West Irian, that is, negotiations to take place only if "based on the transfer of West Irian to the territory under the authority of the Republic". Relating to the new complications introduced by the Dutch, Foreign Minister Subandrio said: "If the Dutch preparation for cutting West Irian loose are continued by force of arms as at present, there will of course come a time when the Government ... of Indonesia will liberate our brothers in West Irian by force also."

16. Antara, 26 June 1961. President Sukarno made this statement in the course of his address to the Indonesians resident in Tokyo (Japan).

17. Sukarno, Re-So-Pim (Revolution - Indonesian Socialism - National Leadership), 17 TIMES 17th AUGUST (Address on 17 August 1961 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961), pp. 42-47. In the course of Address, the President said: "We are not going to waste any more words with the Dutch now. West Irian must soon be returned to the territory of the Republic."

President Sukarno reiterated this condition for entering negotiations with the Dutch over West Irian, in the course of his address to the Conference of Non-Aligned States in Belgrade on 1 September 1961. He also demanded that this problem be solved within the shortest possible time. See Sukarno, From Non-Alignment to Co-ordinate Accumulation of Moral Force Toward Friendship, Peace and Social Justice Among Nations (Address by President Sukarno to the Conference of Heads of State and/or Government of Non-aligned countries on 1 September 1961), Special Issue 80 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961), p. 17.

In this atmosphere of growing tension, President Sukarno announced his "Tri-Command" on 19 December 1961. India's action in Goa, at this stage, only added militancy to Indonesia's attitude against the Dutch colonialism in West Irian. The announcement was followed by general mobilisation, air-dropping of Indonesian volunteers in the West Irian territory, and clashes with the Dutch.

Sukarno's policy of threats to use force was designed to exert maximum pressure on the Dutch to resile from their position on the West Irian issue. It finally led to a change in the American attitude on this issue in favour of Indonesia. American pressure on the Dutch for a solution of the West Irian question satisfactory to Indonesia became evident by March 1962. On 20 March 1962, the Indonesian and the Dutch representatives met in Washington in the presence of a "third party", an American diplomat, Ellsworth Bunker. The meeting resulted in a compromise solution based on Bunker's proposals. Indonesia announced acceptance of these proposals "in principle" on 9 April 1962. The Dutch expressed their readiness to resume negotiations on the same basis on 26 May 1962. On 12 July 1962, the representatives of the two countries resumed their talks with Bunker present among them. At a meeting in Washington on 30 July 1962, the two sides reached an agreement on "all essential

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19. Justus M. van der Kroef, "The West New Guinea Settlement: Its Origins and Implications", *Orbis*, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 1963, p. 139. The Bunker Plan contained six proposals. The major implications of these proposals were: Netherlands' agreement to transfer administrative authority over West Irian to the United Nations; the United Nations to administer the territory for one year; to arrange replacement of UN officials with the Indonesian officials in the second year; and to revert the administration to Indonesia by the end of the second year; and, finally, Indonesia's agreement to give the people of the territory, after a number of years to be decided upon, the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice between remaining with Indonesia or separating from her. See Link, vol. 4, no. 45, 17 June 1962, p. 22.
India's Attitude

India's attitude towards the West Irian issue until 1961 has already been surveyed elsewhere. It is worth noticing that even after India employed force to remove Portuguese colonialism from Goa, it continued to counsel peaceful solution of the West Irian problem. This was evident from Prime Minister Nehru's statement at a press conference in New Delhi about ten days after India's action in Goa. When asked whether he had suggested to the Indonesian Government that the latter might take military action in case bilateral negotiations did not succeed, Nehru refused "to express any opinion" for other Government's actions, and only said: "I very much hope that this question of West Irian is solved peacefully by negotiations between the two governments concerned". He also refused to agree that India's "action in Goa had made any difference" in Indonesia's attitude towards the West Irian question.

India, however, continued to offer moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia on this issue, both in and out of the United Nations. At a press conference, in New Delhi, just about ten days after the freedom of Goa, Nehru reiterated India's position, thus: "We have always felt and we have been of the opinion that the claim of Indonesia to West Irian was justified...." At the United Nations, India put up a strong fight against the Dutch proposals

20. The Statesman, 1 August 1962. A formal agreement was, however, signed in New York on 15 August 1962.
21. See Chapter on The Background, pp. 76-79.
23. Ibid.
and the Dutch Resolution of 9 October 1961. While speaking in the General Assembly on 20 November 1961, Indian Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, refused to "agree" to the Dutch resolution, urging the United Nations to appoint a Commission for West Irian, because "this means that the question of sovereignty...is in dispute". As to Government of India's attitude towards the question of sovereignty over West Irian, he categorically stated thus: "The position of the Government of India is that West Irian is a colonial territory, having been administered by the Netherlands, and whose sovereignty has been transferred under the terms of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty". It was fully in accord with the Indonesian view that the question of sovereignty over West Irian had been settled since the Hague Agreements of 1949. Reiterating India's position as regards Indonesia's claim on this territory, Krishna Menon stated that "West Irian, so far as the Government of India is concerned, is an integral part of Indonesia". He also submitted a draft resolution, calling upon the Dutch and the Indonesians to "co-operate" and to resume negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute,


The Dutch Resolution of 9 October 1961, in its operative part, suggested the establishment of "a United Nations Commission" for West Irian, in order to investigate and report about the general conditions and opinions of West Irianese. For text of the Resolution see Document A/L354 Netherlands: draft resolution, p. 24.

"under the aegis of the President of the General Assembly...". 26

On 27 November 1961, a week after Krishna Menon's statement in the General Assembly, India's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, C.S. Jha, spoke at some length in support of Indonesia's claim over West Irian, criticised the Dutch Resolution and the one submitted by thirteen African states, and urged for the adoption of the Indian draft resolution, to the terms of which the Indonesian Foreign Minister had agreed. Despite all efforts, however, the Indian draft resolution failed to muster two-thirds majority and was rejected.

A few months later, in May 1962, when, following Dutch delay in accepting Ellsworth Bunker's proposals, the situation became more tense, India, on request, agreed to give small arms aid to Indonesia. According to reports in the press, Prime Minister Nehru, once again, reiterated his Government's full support to Indonesia's claim and rejected the Dutch request not to sell military equipment to Indonesia. Assurances to this effect were given by Nehru in a meeting with Subandrio, in New Delhi, on his (latter's) way back home from Moscow.

26. Ibid., p. 717.
29. The Dutch Government took one and a half months to announce its readiness to enter into negotiations with Indonesia on the basis of Bunker's proposals. See p. 168 of this Chapter.
The Indian press came out in sharp criticism of "Dutch reluctance to accept Bunker's proposals...", charged the Dutch with "bad faith" and "intransigence", and warned against the consequences of "further dilly-dally...".

The National Herald, an English daily from Lucknow, editorially described the "Dutch position" as "in every respect untenable...".

The Hindustan Times, in an editorial "Double Dutch", asked the Dutch Government to realize that so long as it refuses to negotiate with the Indonesian Government on the future of West Irian it cannot expect Indonesia or the UN to halt the liberation moves. This was in reference to air-dropping of Indonesian guerrilla fighters in the territory of West Irian. In an editorial, another English daily from New Delhi, regretted the Dutch attitude towards the Bunker's proposals, and said: "It would be a pity if Dutch intransigence compels a recourse to the arbitrament of war when a peaceful solution is actually within grasp. If that happens, the Dutch must take the blame." The Times of India went a step further and gave a terse warning to the Dutch in these words: "Unless the Dutch wish to be removed as unceremoniously from West Irian as the Portuguese were from Goa, they should resume their talks with the Indonesians before Jakarta is compelled to launch a full-scale liberation campaign.

On conclusion of the Indonesian-Dutch Agreement in New York on 15 August 1962, there was a sense of relief and happiness in India. Both Government and press hailed the Agreement and offered

32. "West Irian", (editorial), National Herald (Lucknow), 23 May 1962.
34. Indian Express, 25 May 1962.
35. "West Irian", (editorial), Times of India, 28 May 1962.
congratulations to the two governments, the Indonesian and the Dutch, for reaching agreement over what Prime Minister Nehru described as "a very difficult and delicate problem...".

While initiating a motion on situation along India-China border, in the Rajya Sabha, on 22 August 1962, the Indian Prime Minister congratulated the two parties on the settlement of the West Irian dispute, considered it "a matter of good augury for the peace of South-East Asia", and expressed the hope "that there will be peace" in the region of which, "in a sense", he said, India is a "part". Earlier, in a statement on 17 August 1962, Krishna Menon welcomed the "New York Agreement" and expressed the hope that this would lead "to fruitful co-operation" between the two countries (Indonesia and Netherlands) which have "many common ties and interests". Speaking at the UN General Assembly four days later, the Defence Minister of India offered his "good wishes" to the two governments and peoples and recalled the last phase of Indonesian struggle for independence and said, "Since then, our position has been that Indonesia is one and sovereign, and we have repeated that year after year in this Assembly". While commenting on the provisions of the Agreement, he asked the United Nations not to treat West Irian as "a trust territory" and itself "as a kind of super authority" during the seven months period of its administration. "There is no question therefore", he observed, "of creating


37. Ibid. See also *Indonesian Herald*, 24 August 1962.


independence in this area. Indonesia is one and independent. He also urged the World Body to ensure that "the period of its stewardship" in the territory of West Irian is "as short as possible."

The press in India viewed with jubilation the encouraging trends emerging from the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations in the United States. Commenting editorially, the Times of India wrote: "Everyone will be happy that Mr. Thant's mediation in the West Irian dispute has borne fruit." In an editorial "Happy Ending?" The Statesman commented: "The West Irian drama seems to be approaching a happy ending; one which should have come months, if not years, ago."

The National Herald, an English daily from Lucknow, expressed its satisfaction over the results achieved through efforts by U Thant and Ellsworth Bunker. Seeing from an historical angle, it blamed the Dutch for their failure to settle the West Irian issue in 1949-50 and observed thus: "The result of Dutch prevarication has been mounting tension between the two countries and a complete dislocation of trade and economic relations between them, without the slightest benefit of any kind to the Dutch."

The Hindustan Times and the Indian Express were the two Indian dailies which attracted favourable comments from the Indonesians. The Indonesian Herald editorially described both these Indian papers as "independent" and quoted excerpts from their editorials.

40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
42. Times of India, 2 August 1962.
43. The Statesman, 10 August 1962.
Although India had, all through, given moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia on the West Irian issue, the latter had not found enough reason to be as much beholden to the former as, for instance, to the Soviet Union and Pakistan, whose support, in various fields, it considered more adequate and forthright. This had inevitable impact on political relations between the two countries, which had been cooling off especially since the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. Two incidents in the following year put additional strains on India's overall relations with Indonesia and revealed that cordiality existing since the days of the freedom struggle had been replaced by a sense of jealousy and rivalry at personal level, and a consequent indifference to each other's national interests. It provided opportunity to certain domestic and external forces to play an active role in damaging the two countries' relations.

Sondhi Episode

The first incident which had brought out to surface the deterioration in the two countries' relations was the so-called "Sondhi-Affair" during the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in September 1962. On 3 September 1962, a mob of 20,000 Indonesians demonstrated at the Indian Embassy, threw stones, broke the furniture, tore down the shutters, trampled plants and destroyed trees. They also tried to haul down the Indian Flag. On 4 September 1962, the closing day of the Games, thousands of Indonesians booed the Indian athletes and continued their hootings.

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46. See Chapter on The Background, pp. 77-78.

47. Hindustan Times, 4 September 1962 and The Hindu, 5 September 1962. See also Indonesian Herald and Asuraya, 4 September 1962. The Indonesian Herald gave the number of demonstrators as 5,000.
even during the singing of India's national anthem. The immediate provocation for this anti-India demonstration arose from a statement issued earlier by G.D. Sondhi, Senior Vice-President of the Asian Games Federation. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Fourth Asian Games, called, on his own, by G.D. Sondhi, in his capacity as Senior Vice-President, it was decided that the Asian Games be stripped of its official name. In a statement issued on 27 August 1962, in pursuance of this decision, G.D. Sondhi suggested, "Another name must be used for the 4th Asian Games now being held in Djakarta". He attributed this to non-participation in Games by the athletes from Israel and Taiwan.

G.D. Sondhi's statement came only three days after President Sukarno had inaugurated the Fourth Asian Games on 24 August 1962. After settlement of the West Irian question, the Indonesians tended to look upon the Games as constituting "the climax of the challenging task" and a "difficult and delicate challenge" to the entire nation. In an editorial "Now, the Asian Games", the Indonesian Herald exhorted the Indonesians to "pledge to ourselves to make these Games a resounding success". Success in the Games was thus an important national issue, "a national obsession with the Indonesians ... next only to the West Irian issue...."  

G.D. Sondhi's statement of 27 August 1962, was hence a subject of bitter criticism. It was immediately linked with the honour of

49. Indonesian Herald, 29 August 1962.
50. Antara, 4 September 1962.
52. The Statesman, 2 September 1962.
the President and people of Indonesia. Incidentally, because Sondhi was an Indian, the Indonesian reactions came to have a significant bearing on the two countries' relations. The fact that Sondhi was in no way representing the Government of India and its views, was simply ignored. A high ranking Indonesian Asian Games official, on 28 August 1962, accused some members of the Asian Games Federation of "blatant interference and political pressure" on the sovereignty of Indonesia, and of an attempt "to discredit" her. In his statement, he avoided making any direct reference to any person or country, except Israel and Taiwan. About Taiwan he said: "We are convinced right from the beginning Taiwan has been wanting to discredit Indonesia and we can see how this has been all planned". He also charged "some officials representing some international sport organizations (of having) come here deliberately determined to see that these games are not held." Obviously, it was "Sondhi of India", the Vice-President of the Asian Games Federation, who was alleged to have been making efforts to seek participation by Israel and Taiwan and, if otherwise, to seek a change in the name of the Games.

53. In a meeting on 1 September 1962, a delegation of the Indonesian National Front told the Indian Ambassador, Apa B. Pant, that G.D. Sondhi's activities, in fact, constituted an "insult to the Head of State and the people of Indonesia as a whole...." See Indonesian Herald, and Hindustan Times, 3 September 1962 and Guardian (Rangoon), 4 September 1962.

54. Indonesian Herald, 30 August 1962. The official, who also held a high post in the Indonesian Government, refused to be quoted by name.

55. These words appeared in an editorial in a Djakarta language daily Berita Indonesia, the English version of which was published in the Indonesian Herald of 3 September 1962. The cue was taken from an article by Mohammad Nahar "If Asian Games IV Is Frustrated" in the Indonesian Herald of 1 September 1962.
The first official reaction came from Dr. Suharto, the Indonesian Trade Minister. In a statement on 31 August 1962, he said that Sondhi's attitude "is deeply hurting our feelings and will immensely affect our stand towards the Indian Government and the people in the future". He also disclosed that he had issued the following instructions to all key Government officials: "Pending further developments around Mr. Sondhi's activities, you are all instructed to refrain from entering into new trade relations with India because such relations will become an object of criticism by society."

The Indonesian press took the cue from this official statement and brought out editorials and comments linking up Sondhi and India in the same breath. The language daily Merdeka, representing the views of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), editorially wrote thus: "Mr. Sondhi wants to discredit President Sukarno and the Indonesian people. He is playing with fire and (wants to) endanger friendship between India and Indonesia. What is more important for Indian Government", it asked, "Indonesia-India friendship or freedom of Mr. Sondhi to destroy the friendly relations?" Sharply bracketing Sondhi with India, Mohammad Nahar of the Indonesian Herald, wrote thus: "... the person who attempted to strip the name 'Asian Games' from the current competitions is Mr. Sondhi of India." Harian Rakjat, the PKI daily, covered the Indonesian press comments criticising G.D. Sondhi. Prominent among the language papers it quoted from were Merdeka, Bintang Timur and Berita Indonesia. A

56. Indonesian Herald, 1 September 1962. See also Indonesian Observer and Harian Rakjat, 1 September 1962 and The Hindu, 1 September 1962.
57. Merdeka (Djakarta), 1 September 1962.
58. Indonesian Herald, 1 September 1962.
correspondent of the Harian Rakjat wrote: "Sondhi's attitude not only shows lack of friendship towards Indonesia, but also is a stab (in) Indonesia's back". Commenting editorially on Sondhi's attitude, this daily wrote: "His attitude is not only in contravention with the decisions of the Bandung Conference but also with the Panch Sheel signed by Premiers Nehru and Chou En-lai". Bintang Timur, a pro-Communist daily, doubted "India's friendliness" in that, despite its "such a nice historical record with Indonesia", it had "now suddenly (allowed) one of her nationals to do everything to defend imperialism, thus destroying good relations between India and Indonesia". It also charged that Sondhi had come to the "Asian Games festival as the faithful defender of an imperialist stooge as Taiwan".

The Indonesian Government and press attitude towards Sondhi as well as towards relations with India caused shock and surprise in the Indian diplomatic and Government circles. The Indian Ambassador Apa B. Pant described the statement by the Indonesian Minister of Trade as "really surprising and shocking". "It will be most surprising and agonizing", (sic) he said, "if the activities of sports associations which have nothing to do with the Government of India and are not getting any financial subsidies from the Government should stand in the way of normal friendly relations between India and Indonesia". Only a day before Trade Minister Suharto's statement, the Indian Embassy in Djakarta, in a statement on 30 August 1962, had clarified Government of India's position

59. Harian Rakjat, 1 September 1962.
60. Ibid., 2 September 1962.
62. Indonesian Herald, 1 September 1962.
vis-a-vis the Indian Olympic Association or any other Sports
Associations and categorically declared that these were neither run
nor subsidised by the Government. It had also expressed the fervent
hope of the Indian contingent that "these Games would be successful".
In a meeting with a National Front delegation on 1 September 1962,
the Indian Ambassador had clarified Government of India's position
as regards "Sondhi affair", and assured the delegation that if their
charges against Sondhi were proved correct, Government of India would
take due action against him.

The Government of India also felt surprised. In order to
pacify the growing anti-Indian sentiment over Sondhi's statement, a
spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi in a
statement, dissociated his Government from the "Sondhi affair" and
said: "India's friendship with Indonesia is not a restricted affair.
India and Indonesia have marched and faced difficulties together in
the past and will continue to do so in future."

But India's attempt to avert any untoward incident, failed to
produce results. This is evident from the anti-Indian demonstration
and sacking of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta on 3 September 1962.
Many factors operating since independence added to Sukarno's sense
of personal grouse against Nehru, particularly since the non-aligned
nations Conference in Belgrade, and worked to reduce the warmth in
the two countries's relations. Although workers of all the major
political parties had participated in the anti-India demonstrations,
it was the Indonesian Communist Party which played the major role.

63. Ibid., 31 August 1962.
64. Ibid., 3 September 1962.
65. Ibid., 1 September 1962.
Some prominent Government leaders including Foreign Minister Subandrio and Trade Minister Suharto, and the Indonesian press, rendered great help in rousing anti-India sentiment among the masses. The main plea they took was Sondhi's "insult" to the President and the people of Indonesia, a plea fully suited to the anti-India propaganda as carried on by China and Pakistan.

Indian Government's reactions to the Djakarta incidents on 3 September 1962, were one of a sad heart. In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 4 September 1962, Prime Minister Nehru narrated the background of developments culminating in attack on the Indian Embassy in Djakarta on 3 September 1962, and said: "It is highly deplorable that this kind of thing should happen". Indirectly charging the Indonesian authorities with complicity in rousing mass resentment against India, he said: "... to encourage the attack on the Indian Embassy in this way is extremely distressing and deplorable as also the statement made by the Trade Minister...." Judged from the nature of severe criticism of Indonesians' action in the Indian press (to follow), Nehru's was a well balanced statement, fully in keeping with the long-term prospects of Indian-Indonesian relations.

67. The Hindu, 5 September 1962. In its editorial, it referred to Foreign Minister Subandrio and Trade Minister Suharto, carrying on anti-India campaign for days on.
68. Hindustan Times, 4 September 1962. The Indian Ambassador had said: "I am profoundly sad.... More than the damage the affair has saddened my heart." In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 4 September 1962, Prime Minister Nehru said: "I feel very sad about this...." See India, Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 8, session 2, 3-8 September 1962, col. 5807.
69. Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 8, session 2, 3-8 September 1962, col. 5807.
70. Indonesian Herald of 7 September 1962 in an editorial "No Hard Feeling" praised Nehru for his open-mindedness and understanding and assured "that whatever may be the case, the Indonesian people would certainly think twice before they harbour any hard feelings against the Indian people...."
He described the incident in Djakarta as "shocking" and "peculiarly surprising and distressing". He also thought "that the Indonesian authorities were actively associated with criticising Mr. Sondhi's stand and its culmination in the incidents" in Djakarta; but he was not ready to concede that it was the outcome of anti-India sentiment among the Indonesians. While speaking before the Congress Party's External Affairs Standing Committee on 4 September 1962, he reportedly commended the Indian Ambassador's reports full of praise for Indonesia, refused to entirely approve of the manner in which Sondhi said certain things and spoke of the friendly feelings of the Indonesian people towards India.

In his reply to a question by a member of the Lok Sabha, Nehru confirmed the apprehension about China's keen interest in exaggerating and, possibly, in instigating the anti-Indian outburst over "Sondhi affair". While replying to another question, he expressed his fears that some people had instigated the Indonesians against India, although he refused to identify them, saying: "These are behind-the-scenes things".

71. Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 8, session 2, 3-8 September 1962, cols 5807-8.
72. Ibid., col. 5805.
73. The Hindu, 5 September 1962 and Indonesian Herald, 7 September 1962.
74. Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 8, session 2, 3-8 September 1962, col. 5808. See also The Hindu and Hindustan Times, 5 September 1962.
75. Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 8, session 2, 3-8 September 1962, col. 5809. See also Hindustan Times, 5 September 1962.

Since it was an indirect reference to Chinese involvement in rousing Indonesians' feelings against India, members of Parliament belonging to Communist Party of India refused to take it lying down. This became thus a matter of keen debate in the Rajya Sabha. Bhupesh Gupta, while referring to Prime Minister's remarks about China's suspected involvement in the Djakarta incidents, criticised Nehru for having committed "an unwise thing", a "kind of indiscretion". He also wanted Government to clarify the matter with the Indonesian authorities as it might be interpreted to mean that Indonesia was a tool...contd. on next page
While Government of India only contented itself with sending 76 a protest note and thought it better not to press for payment of 77 damages caused in the wake of mob attack on the Indian Embassy in Djakarta, the Indian press came out with bitter criticism against the Indonesians and their Government. The Statesman, in an editorial, asked "thousands of Indonesians to feel ashamed of their anti-India activities", considered the sacking of Indian Embassy as "deplorable" and charged the Indonesian Government with their inability "to ensure civilized behaviour in their people...". The Hindu described it as "A Shameful Episode" and wrote editorially (under this title) that "it was a stage-managed affair under official auspices was obvious right from the start". The Times of India termed it as a "disgraceful attack", and "a serious affront to the people of this country...".

The Indian press also brought out a number of editorials and articles, analysing the various causes, forces and factors, operating since the days of the freedom struggle, which had adversely affected relations between the two countries and finally led to the anti-

76. Hindustan Times, 6 September 1962. The Indian Ambassador in Djakarta handed over a formal protest note to Foreign Minister Subandrio on 5 September 1962.

77. The total damages, according to Prime Minister Nehru, came to between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 20,000. In his statement to the Lok Sabha on 3 September 1962, Nehru said: "It is a small matter. We are not going to press it." See India, Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 8, session 2, 3-8 September 1962, co. 5811.

78. The Statesman, 4 September 1962.


80. Times of India, 4 September 1962.
Indian demonstrations. The Statesman described the Djakarta incident as "a shocking climax" to those who had witnessed both the present episode and the 1947 and 1949 Asian Conferences in New Delhi.

Government of Indonesia's reactions to mob attack on the Indian Embassy in Djakarta, were one of immediate regret. But it always continued to colour their attitudes that "Sondhi of India" had, by his statement and other activities, shown disrespect to the Indonesian President and the people. This was the case even with the most well-meaning and pro-India Indonesian diplomats and political leaders. It appears they have not forgiven Sondhi to this day. President Sukarno did not say a word about it. His silence rather lent some credibility to the charge, made by Nehru, of Indonesian Government's complicity in the anti-Indian happenings in Djakarta. Foreign Minister Subandrio, in a talk with the reporters on the day following the Djakarta incident, regretted the attack on the "Embassy of our close friend India" and stressed that "Our friendship with India is very important". However, he hastened to add: "I can understand the reaction of the Indonesian people towards Sondhi's statement, which actually hurt the Indonesian


82. Interview with Moekarto Notowidiggo (former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to India between October 1960 and February 1964) and A. Soebardjo (former Foreign Minister), Djakarta, 11 October 1969 and 23 September 1969 respectively. Moekarto told the author that Sondhi's behaviour had so much injured his feelings that he refused to see Sondhi when the latter paid a courtesy visit to him in New Delhi. Moekarto is among the Indonesians with abundant friendliness and respect for India, its leadership and its past cultural heritage.

83. Indonesian Observer, 5 September 1962. See also The Statesman, 5 September 1962. It quoted Subandrio as having said: "Our friendship with the Afro-Asian countries and particularly with India is of the greatest importance". See also Hindustan Times, 4 September 1962.
President and people. Giving his personal reactions, he said: "Personally, however, I am also offended by Mr. Sondhi's statement and I can understand that the reaction given by the people was to defend the honour of the President as the Great Leader of the Revolution whom we all love." Commenting on Indonesia's pioneering efforts towards Afro-Asian solidarity, Subandrio pleaded thus: "If sometimes we are made to face difficulties among ourselves, don't ever forget the main objective, namely, by solidarity fighting colonialism and imperialism which are still at large in Asia and Africa." After a meeting with the Indian Ambassador, eight days later, Indonesia's First Minister, Djuanda Kartawidjaja, observed that the Sondhi incident should be a lesson for both the countries. He added, however: "But it is all over now and our relations will develop. Both countries will become closer neighbours."

The Indonesian reactions carry two implications. Firstly, although Government of Indonesia regretted the anti-India incidents, it did not consider mob action as unjustified. Secondly, it tended to condition Indonesia's continued friendship with India on latter's readiness to actively join the former in "the struggle against imperialism and colonialism ... in Africa and Asia", in the framework of Afro-Asian solidarity, and also to agree to the convening of a second Afro-Asian Conference.

Notwithstanding these implications, the Indonesian Government and press showed eagerness to straighten out relations with India.

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84. **Indonesian Observer**, 4 and 5 September 1962.
85. **Straits Times** (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore), 14 September 1962. See also **Indonesian Herald**, 13 September 1962.
86. S. Nihal Singh, "Indonesia Desires India's Friendship, But She Wants It on Her Own Terms", **The Statesman**, 17 September 1962.
Probably what mainly prompted them to do so was their awareness of the importance of India's concurrence to the holding of a second Afro-Asian Conference. While speaking to pressmen in Djakarta on 10 September 1962, Foreign Minister of Indonesia once again regretted the incidents on 3-4 September 1962, disclosed that he had instructed the Indonesian Ambassador in New Delhi to the effect that bilateral relations in the fields of politics, economy and culture, remained as usual, and declared that "we have closed this incident and issue". This was subsequent to India's reported willingness to attend the preparatory meeting of the second Asian-African Conference. There is a possibility that the Indian Ambassador, Apa B. Pant conveyed Government of India's decision to this effect during his half-hour meeting with President Sukarno on 7 September 1962. This is clear from the increasing sense of urgency shown in the subsequent official statements in Indonesia about preserving and strengthening Indian-Indonesian relations. Obviously, prospects


89. *Indonesian Herald*, 8 September 1962. Apa B. Pant did not disclose anything to the gathered journalists about his meeting with the Indonesian President except saying: "We talked about Mahabharata".

90. For instance, following Apa B. Pant's meeting with Subandrio, in Djakarta on 10 October 1962, the latter declared to the newsmen thus: "For me the most important thing is to preserve the relations between Indonesia and India which in this region is an essential requirement of high importance for the two parties." See *Indonesian Herald*, 11 October 1962. Speaking about the developments in the two countries' relations, the Indonesian Ambassador to India, Moekarto Notowidigdo, told pressmen in Djakarta on 21 October 1962, that "the things were returning to normal. This affair between Indonesia and India was like a quarrel between husband and wife. The two countries are approaching each other again and expect there will even be a strengthening of good relations." See *The Hindu*, 22 October 1962 and *Asian Recorder*, 19-25 November 1962, p. 4900.
of the two countries' relations were hinged on India's preparedness to join Indonesia in convening the second Asian-African Conference.91

In the days following the "Sondhi affair", both India and Indonesia showed eagerness to bring normalcy in their relations. Nevertheless, the basis on which they desired to do so was distinctly divergent. Whereas India wanted to give priority to relations in the trade, economic and cultural fields, Indonesia preferred bilateral co-operation in the political and foreign policy field. The major condition that found mention in various official statements emanating from Djakarta was Indonesia's emphasis on India's concurrence to the former's demand for convening a second Asian-African Conference. In view of Prime Minister Nehru's lukewarm attitude towards this Indonesian demand, and in the light of coolness in personal relations between him and President Sukarno, developing since the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, there was little, if any, possibility of bringing Indian-Indonesian relations on a satisfactory level.

China's Attack on India

It was in this atmosphere of diminishing goodwill between the two countries that China launched an attack on India's northern borders on 20 October 1962. Coming as it did, only less than seven weeks after the sacking of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta, the event proved to be of a significant, although indirect, bearing on relations between India and Indonesia.

India viewed China's invasion with a sense of shock and bewilderment. Prime Minister of India had expected that anti-

91. Singh, n. 86.
imperialist states could not commit aggression against other states. He was disappointed to find China, an avowedly anti-imperialist state, invading the borders of a non-aligned state. His sense of disillusionment with China was all the more bitter because it was he who had proposed to invite China to attend the first Asian-African Conference in April 1955, and thereby, helped China to develop its contacts with the Afro-Asian nations. Since then India had been pursuing a policy of peace and friendship towards China, in the framework of the five principles of the Panchsheel Agreement. China's attack on India's northern borders, following its official claims on large chunks of Indian territory since September 1959, showed its disregard of the Panchsheel Agreement, of the ten Bandung principles and of the policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. In his interview with Italo Pietra, Editor of the Milan daily *Il Giorno*, in New Delhi, in June 1963, the Prime Minister of India said:

China praises peace and co-existence in words but leaves no room for non-alignment. She considers the world essentially split in two between Communists and imperialists. India constitutes a real ideological obstacle in the way of China. Hence the need of

92. See Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on 8 November 1962 in *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 8, no. 11, November 1962, pp. 278-86.


94. It was in his letter dated 8 September 1959, addressed to Prime Minister Nehru, that Chou En-lai, for the first time, laid claim to 12,000 square miles of territory in the western sector of the Indian border (in the Ladakh region) and 30,000 square miles in the eastern sector (McMahon Line area). Chou's letter was in response to Nehru's letter of 22 March 1959, written, almost over five months earlier in order to seek China's official agreement to the Indian frontier alignment. See V.P. Dutt, *China's Foreign Policy* (Bombay, etc., 1964), pp. 201-2.
removing that obstacle and lowering it in the eyes of other Asian countries inclined towards non-alignment.

Moreover, in the framework of ever deeper differences between China and the Soviet Union, to attack India means to demonstrate that non-alignment has no basis and that therefore the policy of the Soviet Union towards non-aligned countries is wrong. 95

**Indonesia's Reactions**

Whereas India became a victim of Chinese aggression and hence undertook a serious appraisal of its earlier view of China, Indonesia, at this very stage, found itself in the process of consolidating its friendship with China. Indonesia's growing contacts with China have been surveyed elsewhere. Suffice it to say here that, in view of developing coolness between India and Indonesia, to expect Indonesia to come out openly in support of India and against China was just out of question. And yet India had reasons to believe and hope that Indonesian leadership would show a correct understanding of the Indian position in the Sino-Indian border dispute and demonstrate impartiality of judgment. But this did not happen. Indonesia remained neutral on the question of Chinese aggression on India, chose not to go into the merit of the case and only concentrated on efforts to restore peaceful relations between China and India.

Immediately after the Chinese invasion, Government of India approached the Indonesian Government. Along with his letters addressed to Heads of Government of other States, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a letter to President Sukarno. Following the Ceylonese


Premier Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike's proposal to hold a 6-power summit conference to find ways of solving Sino-Indian border dispute, the Indian Government decided to send special emissaries to participating countries. While announcing this decision in the Lok Sabha on 26 November 1962, Prime Minister Nehru stated that the purpose of these missions was "to explain more thoroughly our position and what we think about the situation".

Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon, leader of the Indian mission to South-East Asian countries, reached Indonesia on 30 November 1962 and had a 20-minute meeting with President Sukarno and a 3-hour meeting with Foreign Minister Subandrio, in Jogjakarta, the next day. In a statement to the press, after these meetings, she expressed her satisfaction "with the discussions". "We are pleased", she said, "that the Indonesian Government had studied the situation with great care and concern". Obviously, the Indonesian leaders had only displayed keen interest in discussing the pros and cons of the dispute with Indian emissary and shown reluctance to pass any judgment on the rightness or wrongness of India's cause. This was confirmed later by the leader of the Indian mission. On arrival in the Indonesian capital (Djakarta), back from Jogjakarta, she told

98. The six countries invited to the Conference in Colombo were Ghana and the United Arab Republic from Africa, Ceylon (the host country) from South Asia and Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia from South-East Asia. The Conference was scheduled for 10 December 1962. See Indonesian Observer, 8 December 1962.

99. Two separate missions were decided upon. One, led by R.K. Nehru, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, was to visit Ghana and the UAR, and the other, headed by Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs, was to visit Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia. Mrs. Menon was accompanied by Dr. S. Gopal, Director of Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs.


newsmen: "I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic". While commenting on Indonesia's and other South-East Asian countries' reactions, in Singapore, enroute to Ceylon, Mrs. Menon shed all hopes of their sympathy and support for India and merely contented herself by saying: "They all appreciate our stand. We do not urge any of the leaders to take sides in our fight with Communist China. We are interested to explain and convince the leaders of our views and the correctness and righteousness of our stand."

This statement of hers, when compared to the one made by R.K. Nehru, leader of the Indian Mission to the UAR and Ghana, was nothing short of an admission of failure of her mission to elicit Indonesians' and other countries' support. On 27 November 1962 in Cairo, R.K. Nehru outlined "China's aim" as domination of Asia and said: "India is resisting this expansionist policy, thus it is serving world peace. We hope to be able to make this clear to the six countries and rally them to our side in the dispute." If anything, it showed that the UAR leaders were more sympathetic to India's cause than the Indonesians. In order to ensure that her statements in and out of Indonesia, did not allow an impression to grow that her mission was returning empty-handed, she told newsmen at Madras airport on 3 December 1962, that she had found "a great deal of understanding in Rangoon, Djakarta and Phnom Penh about India's case in the Sino-Indian conflict". She also said that there was confusion among the Indonesians and other South-East Asians about the Indian and Chinese position. They, she said, appear to think that the 1959 line to which the Chinese had said

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102. Ibid., 4 December 1962.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid., 29 November 1962.
they would withdraw was more advantageous to India than the line of September 1962, on which India had insisted.

In fact, from the very beginning, the Indonesian Government showed lack of enthusiasm towards India's fate. It maintained silence for over two weeks, following the Chinese aggression on 20 October 1962. Foreign Minister Subandrio gave his reactions after his meeting with the Indian Ambassador in Djakarta on 5 November 1962. He told the press that Indonesia "stands firm" on the principle that Sino-Indian border dispute should be settled through peaceful negotiations. He declared that Indonesia had no desire to become mediator in the border dispute between India and China. "Of course we will have to see first whether there is any concurrence of views between India and People's China before trying to find basic points for a meeting", he said. It was a clear indication that Indonesia wished to avoid taking sides, lest her growing relations with Peking should cool off. It also implied Indonesia's readiness to offer its services as a mediator, provided there was "any concurrence of views" between the two parties. President Sukarno made his first comments on 21 November 1962, exactly thirty-two days after the Chinese launched their attack, the day when Peking declared its unilateral ceasefire. In a statement to the newsmen in Manila, the Indonesian President remarked: "I am working hard to bring peace" in the Chinese-Indian border war. When pressed further, he said only "wait and see, wait and see". Although it is known

105. Indonesian Observer, 4 December 1962. In its issue of 5 December 1962, the Indonesian Observer reported that at Madras Mrs. Menon had said that of all the countries she visited, only Indonesia had been able to clearly understand India's position vis-a-vis China's aggression.

106. Indonesian Herald, 6 November 1962.

that President Sukarno made personal approaches to the Chinese leaders in this direction, it is difficult to believe it had much impact on the Chinese who were acting according to set calculations. And yet it is worth-noticing that both the Chinese unilateral ceasefire declaration and Sukarno's statement came on the same day, that is, 21 November 1962.

When China declared unilateral ceasefire on 21 November 1962, there was a sense of relief in Indonesia. Foreign Minister Subandrio felt relieved at China's declaration. "Now", he observed, "a basis acceptable to both sides must be sought in order that negotiations could be started immediately on the dispute". Ali Sastroamidjojo, Chairman of the FNI, considered it an inspiring news. "It goes without saying", he observed, that "in every conflict like the one under discussion, there are always two parties directly involved and it would therefore become all the more cheerful when the unilateral gesture of People's China would be a basis for India to likewise call out a ceasefire."

108. Interviews with Sukarni Kartodiwirjo (former Indonesian Ambassador to China and leader of the Murba Party), Djakarta, 26 and 30 January 1970. The author is tempted to co-relate this brief statement by Sukarno to an observation made by Sukarni, in the course of the interview. Sukarni disclosed that he carried a verbal message from President Sukarno to Prime Minister Chou En-lai, asking the latter to order a ceasefire, in order to help arrange a negotiated settlement between India and China. In this connection, Sukarni met Chen Yi on 17 November 1962. See Indonesian Herald, 20 November 1962.


Indonesia maintained its attitude of treating both India and China at par, or refusing to pass judgment on the rightness or wrongness of China's armed action on Indian borders, and of seeking points of concurrence between the two parties in order to arrange a peaceful settlement of the dispute. This was evident from the three days deliberations of the six-power Conference in Colombo on 10-12 December 1962. The leader of the Indonesian delegation, Foreign Minister Subandrio, set himself against the stand taken by Ali Sabry of the UAR. In his speech in the Colombo Conference, the representative of the UAR had said: "There must not be any territorial gain on account of military operations. This principle is in conformity with the spirit of Bandung Conference." It was, no doubt, a shrewd move by Ali Sabry to prompt Subandrio to come out openly on the aggression issue and show sympathy towards India, which had lost territory as a result of Chinese "military operations.

111. On more than one occasion the Indonesian Government and leaders issued statements purporting to treat both China and India as two friendly Asian nations and urging to seek ways for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. See, for instance, Subandrio's talk, in Bangkok, with a reporter of Radio Republic Indonesia, revealing that Indonesia was actively trying, behind the scene, to find a way out of deadlock on border issue between the two countries, friendly to Indonesia. Indonesian Herald, 24 November 1962. In the Joint Communique issued in Djakarta on 5 December 1962, President Sukarno joined Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia in expressing the "hope that India and China as two sister nations of Asia will solve peacefully their present differences at the conference table to achieve a negotiated settlement of their borders, satisfactory and honourable for both." Ibid., 6 December 1962. In a statement on 14 December 1962, two days after the six-power Colombo Conference came out with its proposals for a peaceful settlement, Government of Indonesia appealed to both India and China to settle their outstanding disputes peacefully in compliance with the proposals of the Colombo Conference. Ibid., 17 December 1962.

in the name of the Bandung spirit. But Subandrio opposed this clear-cut attitude and suggested a face-saving formula for the Colombo Conference, which meant making proposals for settlement "without touching on the substance of the conflict, who is the aggressor and who is the expansionist". This way he lent strength to the views of the other participants and, thereby, isolated the UAR representative who had to yield in view of the consensus against him, and caused disappointment to India.

India's official reactions to Indonesian attitude towards the Chinese attack on the former's territorial integrity were those of a friend let down. Expressing his sense of disappointment at Indonesia's neutral posture, the Indian Ambassador, Apa B. Pant said, in the course of his Republic Day Address on 27 January 1963, that "if a friend does not help you when you are in danger what is the worth of such a friendship." Apart from reminding the Indonesian of their obligations towards India, it was an attempt to arouse in their minds latent feelings of friendship for India, by suggesting to them the worth of a friend in need. Whatever other implications of Indonesia's attitude, there is reason to believe that every step that took Indonesia nearer to China was taking it away from India.

116. Interview with Moechtar Lubis, Editor of Indonesia Raya, Djakarta, 23 January 1970. Moechtar Lubis confirmed this view in the course of the interview with the author.
After the Chinese invasion of India in October 1962, the Malaysia question and Indonesia's demand for the convening of a second Asian-African Conference proved to be factors of major significance in India's relations with Indonesia. For various reasons, the two countries came to have divergent attitudes on both these issues. During the period of three years following the "Sondhi Affair" in September 1962, these two questions dominated Indonesia's domestic politics and determined its foreign policy attitudes. Their major importance, however, lay in the fact that they revealed the basic motivations of Indonesian policy towards South-East Asia as well as Afro-Asia. Since both the problems represented Indonesia's aspirations of a regional and Afro-Asian role, the breadth of domestic support the Government policy on these two issues came to receive, made them into a test case for Indonesia's friendship with India. Various internal and external forces and factors, often working at cross-purposes, contributed to the strengthening of Indonesia's commitment in this regard and, ultimately, led to realignments in Asia, with Indonesia, China and Pakistan on one side and India on the other.

It would be interesting to note that at least until April 1964, Indonesia's hostile attitude towards Malaysia and its persistent call for a second Conference of Asian and African countries, continued to operate and receive India's responses on separate wave-lengths. Thereafter, on India's initiative, the two issues tended to be linked up.

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117. It refers to Indian External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh's proposal, at the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta in April 1964, to invite among others, Malaysia to the Second Afro-Asian Conference. See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, pp. 287-90.
Indonesia's Initial Reactions to Malaysia Proposal

In the beginning, Indonesia did not react unfavourably to the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman’s proposal for the formation of a new Federation of Malaysia. In a letter to the New York Times on 13 November 1961, Foreign Minister Subandrio wrote that Indonesia did not object to the Malaysia scheme. He pointed to the ethnological and geographical closeness of the people of North Borneo to the Indonesians and "still", he declared, "we do not show any objection towards Malayan policy of merger. On the contrary we wish the Malayan Government well if it can succeed with the plan". The Indonesian Foreign Minister reiterated his views about Malaysia in the course of his speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1961. While denying the Dutch delegate’s charge of territorial expansion against Indonesian leadership, he referred to his Government’s attitude towards Malaysia proposal as a case in point and said that Indonesia had told Malaya "that we had no objection to such a merger based upon

118. The Tunku made this proposal on 27 May 1961. The new Federation was proposed to include Malaya, the British South-East Asian colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo territories) and the British Protected State of Brunei.

As early as 2 August 1961, Foreign Minister Subandrio commented that he could not say in favour or against the "Greater Malaysia" proposal. He emphasised, however, that it was up to the peoples concerned. See Antara, 3 August 1961. See also van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership", Orbis, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1964, p. 334. van der Kroef interprets Indonesia’s initial reactions as "benevolently indifferent". Even official circles in Malaya interpreted Indonesia’s early responses to the Malaysia proposal as "not unfriendly". See Muhammad Gazali Bin Shafie, "Malaysia and Indonesian Confrontation", United Asia (Bombay), vol. 17, no. 3, May-June 1965, p. 221.

The will for freedom of the peoples concerned...

It is interesting to note that although Indonesia's initial reaction to Malaysia proposal was one of "no objection", it was not without caution as Subandrio's words "will for freedom of the peoples concerned" implied. It was just this caution which, at the time of the Brunei revolt in December 1962, provided a justification for Indonesian policy of confrontation against Malaysia. In this sense it is not correct to say that a policy of confrontation adopted later was a reversal of Indonesia's earlier stand. Government of Indonesia perhaps wanted to watch the developments carefully for some time before taking a definite stand on the issue of Malaysia.

Indonesia's cautious approach, at this stage, could be attributed to three other reasons. Firstly, it was pre-occupied with the West Irian issue. Secondly, it feared that any adverse reactions in Djakarta against Malaysia would prejudice efforts to secure Western (particularly, United States) backing in negotiating a favourable settlement of this question. Thirdly, it desired to keep up with the general expectations in the United States that after West Irian issue was resolved to Indonesia's satisfaction,


121. Indonesia had been engaged in an all-out confrontation against the Dutch. President Sukarno's "Triple Command" on 19 December 1961, for national mobilisation in the struggle for West Irian, added further militancy in Indonesia's attitude towards the Dutch and entailed more financial burdens. In his Independence Day Address on 17 August 1962, Sukarno revealed that Indonesia had been spending nearly three-fourths of its national energies on security and on restoration of West Irian to its fold. See Sukarno, A Year of Triumph (Address on 17 August 1962), Special Issue 225, (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1962), p. 37. See also van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership", Orbis, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1964, p. 334.

would it give priority to economic development.

However, as soon as Indonesian-Dutch Agreement on West Irian was signed in New York on 15 August 1962, Indonesia's attitude towards Malaysia's proposal showed definite signs of change. On 26 September 1962, Subandrio declared, in an exclusive interview with the *Straits Times*, in Singapore, that Indonesia could not remain "indifferent" to a situation where the proposed Federation would have "common borders" with it. He held out the threat of a "counter action", should Malaysia "permit a military base to be established" on its territory and warned that "if things go wrong then we must take notice to protect our own interests".

Among the political parties, at this stage only the PKI manifested its clear opposition to the scheme of Malaysia. In fact, the PKI was the first Indonesian political party to do so. As early as August 1961, the PKI criticised the concept of Malaysia and considered that it was "neo-colonialist". In a formal

123. van der Kroef, n. 19, p. 139 and the same author's "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 4, Winter 1964-65, p. 363. In view of the "unsettling political consequences" of an expected shift in Indonesian Government's emphasis from politics to economic development, van der Kroef considered this expectation as "quite unrealistic".

124. *Antara*, 28 September 1962. Subandrio's statement came just five days after the UN General Assembly adopted a joint Indonesian-Dutch Resolution, authorising Secretary-General U Thant to implement the West Irian Agreement of August 1962.

125. Among the major non-Communist parties, the Nationalist Party (PNI) leadership expressed its fears about the proposed Federation of Malaysia. While addressing the open session of the Party Congress Executive Body in Semarang (Capital of Central Java) on 12 September 1962, Chairman of the PNI, Ali Sastroamidjojo said: "We may not remain indifferent towards this problem. On the contrary, we must follow developments closely in order to determine whether Malaysia is an advantage or disadvantage to us." *Indonesian Herald*, 15 September 1962. See also *The Statesman*, 27 September 1962.

resolution passed at the Third Plenum of its Central Committee on 30 and 31 December 1961, the Party described Malaysia plan as an "instrument to safeguard Britain's position" in South-East Asia and dubbed it as "an unacceptable colonial intrigue". It observed: "The Federation of Malaysia will strengthen the position of the imperialists in South-East Asia in implementing their SEATO activities which are also aimed against Indonesia, a country that does not like SEATO and that wages a resolute struggle against imperialism." Alleging that Malaysia would be "smuggled into SEATO", it declared in conclusion: "The Indonesian people will certainly support the righteous, patriotic and just resistance of the people of North Borneo, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Brunei against the efforts for the establishment of this Federation of Malaysia." It would thus be correct to say that the PKI contributed substantially to the growth of anti-Malaysia sentiment in Indonesia. It exercised great influence in a switch over from a permissive to a hostile posture of the Government of Indonesia.

India's Initial Responses

While Indonesia showed signs of a shift from a permissive to a hostile posture towards the project of Malaysia, India viewed the formation of Malaysia as a welcome development in South-East Asia. India's favourable attitude towards the proposed federation became manifest as early as December 1961. During a visit to India by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaya, Vice-President Radhakrishnan was stated to have offered his blessings for the Malaysia plan. India's

127. Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity (Djakarta, Pembaruan, 1962), pp. 60-61. This was a manifesto of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the PKI. See also Straits Times, 2 January 1962.

128. Straits Times, 21 May 1962. This was disclosed by Lee Kuan Yew in the course of his talk recorded by BBC and broadcast over Radio Singapore on 20 May 1962.
attitude got further clarified during Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew's three-day visit to India in April 1962. Since Tunku Abdul Rahman's proposal was yet to get under way and it needed a policy decision with regard to the region, at least for the time being, Government of India chose to maintain near silence on the issue. The only public occasion when it made its attitude known was at the dinner given by Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister and Madame Lee Kuan Yew. In her speech, Mrs. Menon observed that Malaysia was a good idea and expressed the hope that endeavours to form this unit would be crowned with success.

During his talks with Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister Nehru seems to have indicated that India supported the establishment of the proposed Federation of Malaysia. This was evident from Lee Kuan Yew's press conference in New Delhi on 25 April 1962. The Singapore leader observed that Nehru was "remarkably well-informed on all matters connected with South-East Asia" and that he "understood my point of view very well and expressed sympathy with my view that this (Malaysia) is a logical way of liquidating the British Empire in South-East Asia". The Malaysia scheme, in fact, evoked appreciation in official circles in New Delhi. In his talks with Lee Kuan Yew on 23 April 1962, Nehru showed keen interest in the Malaysia plan. Being inconclusive, the talks were resumed on the next day and covered various aspects of the scheme and its regional implications. Nehru also gave an impression to the

132. *Straits Times*, 25 April 1962. The talks on 24 April 1962 were reported to be on Prime Minister Nehru's initiative.
Singapore leader that he was not particularly concerned by the
resolution of the Cairo Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee, which had described the proposal for Malaysia as a form
of "neo-colonialism".

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's visit to India was important in
as much as it enabled Prime Minister Nehru to exchange views on the
Malaysia proposal with the leader of one of the prospective consti-
tuents of the proposed Federation. In the context of racial over-
tones of the Malaysia scheme, the fact that Lee Kuan Yew represented
the Government of predominantly Chinese Singapore and had come to
India to canvass support for the scheme, made the occasion all the
more important. Since it represented the Singapore Chinese willing-
ness to join the new federation, discussions with Lee Kuan Yew
induced Nehru to believe in the viability of the Malaysia plan.

Major significance of Lee Kuan Yew's visit, however, lay in
the fact that it clarified certain grounds on which India's pro-
Malaysia attitude would be based. India welcomed Malaysia because
it marked an end to the remnants of British colonialism in the
region. India also welcomed the scheme because it offered a sound
and politically and economically viable alternative to instability
in insular South-East Asia. In India, in fact, it was believed that
Malaysia "will be a factor for political stability" in the region.

Besides, during his talks in New Delhi, Lee Kuan Yew was reported to
have put major emphasis on the anti-Communist content of the

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133. *The Times* (London), and *Times of India*, 26 April 1962. About
a month later, Lee Kuan Yew himself confirmed the veracity of
this impression. In the course of his talk recorded by the
BBC on 20 May 1962, he said: "Mr. Nehru told me that the
Afro-Asian Secretariat, to which India has sent no official
delegate, does not represent the views of the Indian

Malaysia proposal and suggested that viewing from this angle the proposed Federation of Malaysia would be in India's interest. In view of the fact that Nehru agreed with Lee Kuan Yew on the various implications of the Malaysia scheme, it meant Government of India's concurrence to Malaysia emerging as a stabilising factor in the region.

Following Lee Kuan Yew's visit, Government of India came out openly in offering its support to the formation of the new Federation. In September 1962, India joined other states in the Commonwealth in expressing its satisfaction with "great progress made towards the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia by 31st August 1963". But since Indonesia was as yet not actively hostile in its attitude towards the Malaysia proposal, it was not yet an issue in relations between India and Indonesia.

Indonesia Changes Its Attitude

The revolt in Brunei in December 1962 provided the occasion for a marked change in Indonesia's attitude towards the Malaysia question. Government of Indonesia expressed its support to the Brunei rebels led by A.M. Azahari, leader of Party Ra'ayat, soon after the news of the uprising became known on 10 December 1962. President Sukarno linked the Brunei revolt with the 'new emerging forces' and declared that it would triumph. Five days later, Subandrio criticised Tunku Abdul Rahman for bracketing Indonesia

137. Brunei, the British-Protected State on the north-west of Indonesian Borneo, was one of the prospective constituents of the proposed Federation of Malaysia.
with the rebellion in Brunei and accused him for his persistence in maintaining a "hostile" attitude towards Indonesia. On 21 December 1962, President Sukarno declared that the Indonesians' sympathy for the freedom struggle of the North Borneo people is "a matter of principle". On 20 January 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that his government now "cannot but adopt a policy of confrontation against Malaya because at present they represent themselves as accomplices of the neo-colonialists and the neo-imperialists pursuing a hostile policy towards Indonesia". And thus the ground was prepared for launching a policy of 'confrontation' against Malaysia Federation well eight months before it was formally inaugurated on 16 September 1963.

The Indonesian leadership attributed its policy of supporting the Brunei revolt and of opposing the scheme of Malaysia to two ideological and strategic reasons. Ideologically, Indonesia saw the revolt in Brunei as a people's struggle against colonialism. The British suppression of the revolt by force strengthened the

139. Indonesian Herald, 17 December 1962.
140. Ibid., 23 December 1962.
141. Ibid., 22 January 1963. The fact that Subandrio made this announcement about three months and ten days before the UN Temporary Executive Authority handed over its mandate over West Irian administration to Indonesia, showed growing impatience in Indonesia about developments regarding the proposed Federation of Malaysia.

Two days after Subandrio's announcement, a Foreign Ministry spokesman in Djakarta was stated to have said that Indonesia's policy of 'confrontation' against Malaysia amounted to a "direct offensive". When asked to explain the term 'confrontation', he replied that, except for military activity, it was the same policy as that used by Indonesia against the Dutch on the West Irian issue. See Indonesian Intentions Towards Malaysia (a Government of Malaysia publication), (Kuala Lumpur, 1964), pp. 26-27. Interestingly, the Indonesian leadership used the term 'confrontation' against Malaysia for the first time.
Indonesian view that Malaysia proposal was being imposed upon the people of its prospective constituent territories without due ascertainment of their wishes. Under the obligations arising from the 1945 Constitution and the Political Manifesto, Government of Indonesia felt it as a "moral duty" and "a matter of principle" to give all kind of support to "the independence struggle of the Kalimantan Utara (North Borneo) people" against British colonialism.

Strategically, Indonesia viewed the merger of Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah, the North Borneo territories, with Malaya, as a threat to its security. Indonesia's fears arose from the fact that according to the British-Malayan Defence Agreement of 9 July 1963 (Agreement Relating to Malaysia), Britain would continue to have its bases in Singapore and to assume defence and peace responsibilities in South-East Asia. Indonesia thus could not remain indifferent to a

142. Indonesia, Why Indonesia Opposes British Made "Malaysia" (Djakarta, Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 1964), pp. 57-58. The first sentence of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution read: "... Whereas independence is the natural right of all nations and that, therefore, colonialism on earth must be eradicated as it is in violation of humanism and justice...."

President Sukarno's Independence Day Address on 17 August 1959, which was adopted as "Political Manifesto" (Manipol), explained the third objective of Indonesian foreign policy in these words: "The establishment of good friendship between the Republic of Indonesia and all the states in the world, in the very first place of all with the states of Asia-Africa, upon the basis of mutual respect, and upon the basis of co-operation to create a New World free from imperialism and colonialism, marching toward perfect World Peace." See Indonesia, Handbook on the Political Manifesto (Two Executive Directions of Manipol), (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961), p. 88.

143. According to the provisions of the Agreement, Britain reserved "the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at present occupied by their service authorities within the state of Singapore and ... to make such use of these bases and facilities as that Government may consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia...." See ibid., pp. 58-59.
situation when it would have to share common borders with a state which allowed British colonialism to continue to maintain its military bases on its territory, thereby threatening Indonesian security and peace in the region. So the primary reason as given out by Government of Indonesia for its anti-Malaysia policy, was its opposition to the continued existence of British political, military and economic interests in South-East Asia. It was not directed against the people of these territories whom Indonesia considered as "racial brothers" and "cultural cousins". Indonesia could not view with equanimity the prospect of allowing British colonialism to carry out its anti-Indonesian policies just across the borders in North Borneo. Leadership in Malaya became a subject of severe criticism because Indonesia felt it was politically, economically and militarily "subservient" to British colonialism.

Besides, the Indonesians were apprehensive that once Malaysia was formed it "would promote Chinese influence rather than

144. During interview with Cindy Adams, President Sukarno expressed himself bitterly on the continued threat of British colonialism on Indonesia's borders and asked: "Is that not ground for us to be on guard, particularly when these colonies which ring us have been hastily and hostiley cemented together by steamroller tactics? Particularly when British military installations on that soil make it clear Malaysia isn't truly a sovereign, fully independent Asian nation but, in reality, the result of the brain of the British? Their 'gift' of independence was wrapped in a form of new colonialism. Colonialism wasn't retreating in my backyard, just changing shape." See Cindy Adams, Sukarno: An Autobiography (New York, 1965), p. 302.

145. "British-Made 'Malaysia' - Barrier to International Peace and Progress", Indonesia (Djakarta, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1964), vol. 4, p. 66. This is an annual publication of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Indonesia. This 27-page article in Indonesia gives a clear exposition of the reasons for Indonesia's official anti-Malaysia policy.

146. Ibid.
stem it. For understandable reasons, however, no Indonesian
Government leader is on record having expressed his anti-Chinese
apprehensions in public. The Indonesians presented this argument
only in their behind-the-scenes briefings in world capitals. While
explaining reasons for Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy, Kahin
attributed it to their "fear of the political potential of what is
by far the world's largest concentration of overseas Chinese". He
believed "that fear of China and Peking-backed overseas Chinese is ...
of major concern to Indonesia's top civilian and military leaders
and a factor of outstanding importance in their attitude towards
Malaysia". In this connection, Kahin mentioned Subandrio among
the top civilian leadership, having a sense of ill-will towards the
Chinese. According to him, it was the rough treatment meted out
by the Chinese leaders to Subandrio, during his visit to Peking in
1959, that led to the exodus of over 100,000 Chinese from Indonesia.
Besides, Kahin was convinced that the Indonesians would not forget the
reported threat by Foreign Minister Chen Yi to him that if Indonesia
did not rescind its anti-Chinese measures, Peking would call on the
Singapore Chinese to launch a trade boycott in order to bring

148. Outside the Government, an authentic view emphasizing anti-
Chinese and anti-China basis of Indonesia's policy of
opposition to Malaysia, is given by Mohammad Hatta, former
Vice-President of Indonesia. He observes thus: "The creation
of a 'Malaysia' is nothing but the creation of a second China
using the mask of 'Malay', a new colony dominated by Chinese
capitalists, oppressing the Malay nation." See Mohammad
Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysia Issue", Asian
149. Singh, n. 147.
Indonesia to its knees.

Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy, in this sense, could be interpreted as an effort on her part to ensure that the anticipated threat of a Chinese-dominated Malaysia, pliable to Peking, "must be under-cut now...". While analysing Indonesia's hostile attitude towards Malaysia in contradistinction with its simultaneously growing friendly posture towards the Philippines, an Indian journalist, G.M. Telang, corroborated Kahin's views in this connection. He attributed Indonesia's growing intimacy with the Philippines to a common conviction in the two countries that the proposed Federation of Malaysia, when formed, would be dominated by the Chinese and would pose a threat to their security. According to Telang, President Sukarno could afford to be friendly to China and the Chinese Communist leaders because of large sea-distances separating the two countries; but he could not ignore the prospect of a Chinese-dominated Malaysia, sharing a common border with Indonesia.

During the period between the Brunei revolt in December 1962 and the inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963, Indonesia's commitment to anti-Malaysia policy got strengthened. Various domestic political forces and factors, working very often at cross-purposes with each other, contributed wholesomely to it. These included the PKI, the President and the Armed Forces leadership. Among them, the PKI made major contribution to Indonesia's 'confrontation' policy against Malaysia. When the Brunei revolt

151. Ibid., p. 265.

152. Ibid.

took place, the PKI immediately declared its support to the rebels. It was in accord with the Party's anti-Malaysia posture adopted since August 1961. On 13 December 1962, Chairman Aidit of the Party exhorted the Indonesians to offer every assistance to the "revolutionary struggle of the people of North Borneo" and to oppose any effort at breaking the North Borneo people's struggle. Simultaneously, communist-led organizations for labour (SOBSI), peasantry (BTI), women (Gerwani) and youth (Pemuda Rakjat), voiced similar expressions of support to the rebels' cause.

Finding the Government and the Indonesian Communist Party coming out openly against the proposal for Malaysia, other major political parties and groups such as the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), the NU (Nahdatul Ulama - Indonesian Muslim Scholars' Party), and Partindo (Indonesian Party - an off-shoot of the PNI and closer to the PKI), followed suit. A political group of veterans called "Angakatan '45" (Generation of 1945) arranged a conference in Djakarta on 17 December 1962, under the direction of Chaerul Saleh, the third Deputy Prime Minister and one among the close circle of President Sukarno. Representatives of forty-three political parties and mass organizations attended the conference. Chaerul Saleh urged the people to "take immediate positive steps" in order to help the "North Kalimantan people now fighting for independence against British colonial oppression". As a concrete manifestation of its support, the conference set up on 19 December 1962, a "National Committee for Solidarity with the North Kalimantan people". Representing a wide range of public opinion, the National Committee, later, urged the Government to recognize A.M. Azahari's Unitary

State of North Borneo, called for demonstrations at the British and Malayan embassies in Djakarta and for the raising of an expeditionary force and "volunteers" for the "Liberation" of North Borneo.

Attitude of the Army Leadership

The Army leadership also interpreted the Brunei revolt as a struggle for freedom from British colonialism and gave prompt support to the rebels. With an obvious reference to the British Gurkha troops quelling the rebellion in Brunei, General A.H. Nasution, Indonesia's Minister for Defence and Security, observed that colonialism was still not dead and was encircling and threatening Indonesia. In a message to a gathering in Djakarta on 11 December 1962, he denied that his Government harboured any territorial ambitions outside Indonesia and declared that "we shall oppose colonialism wherever it is. And we shall assist independence wherever it is being fought for." Making his attitude still clearer, he declared a week later: "We do not claim the North Kalimantan (North Borneo territories) but we do give our support and endorsement to the struggle of the people of North Kalimantan." According to Nasution, this was "also the voice of the Indonesian people."

Referring to "Portuguese colonialism which has already turned into

155. Ibid. and Djakarta Mail, 20 December 1962. The members of the National Committee included among others, important leaders such as Chaerul Saleh, Ali Jastroamidjojo (PNI) and D.N. Aidit (PKI).

Demand for recognition was based, among others, on grounds of A.M. Azahari's statement in Manila on 8 December 1962, proclaiming "the absolute and complete independence of Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (The Unitary State of North Borneo)...", comprising "the people of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo...". See Brackman, South-East Asia's Second Front (London, 1968), p. 142.

156. Indonesian Herald, 13 December 1962.
enslavement", he asserted that "Indonesia is still surrounded by colonialism and neo-colonialism".

It is clear from the above that the Government, political parties and the Army leadership had, by the time of Subandrio's announcement of a policy of 'confrontation' on 20 January 1963, adopted a similar posture of opposition to Malaysia. The broad consensus as it emerged on the question of Malaysia represented very often conflicting motivations of various factors in Indonesian politics, such as the President, the Indonesian Communist Party and the Army leadership. One common feature in their attitudes, however, was their agreement on the "neo-colonialist" nature of the proposed Malaysia Federation. Being congruent to President Sukarno's concept of "New Emerging Forces" versus "Old Established Order Forces", the Malaysia issue provided a framework in which a broad national consensus could work itself out.

157. Ibid., 26 December 1962. This was in keeping with General Nasution's idea of threat to Indonesia posed by colonialism in South-East Asia, after the conclusion of the Dutch-Indonesian Agreement on West Irian on 15 August 1962. Addressing the military and civil authorities of South Sumatra, he had said that "our struggle has not yet ended, for the aim of the revolution that is to wipe out colonialism, has not yet been entirely completed; colonialism still exists around us in the form of neo-colonialism." See ibid., 29 August 1962.

Indonesia's Aspirations of a Regional Role

The Indonesian leadership also saw in the Malaysia issue a possibility of realising their dream of a Greater Indonesia. Restoration of West Irian encouraged them in this direction. President Sukarno viewed it as fulfilment of his concept of Indonesian unity "From Sabang to Merauke". Thus he titled his Independence Day Speech on 17 August 1962 as "A Year of Triumph". In a jubilant mood, he said: "Who does not feel proud that he is an Indonesian ... a member of a nation that is no longer the laughing stock of the world, but a Nation that people respect and admire." Some came to believe that Indonesia had achieved great-power status, and was therefore, entitled to a sphere of influence in the region. Professor Mohammad Yamin, whom Brackman describes as "an architect of Sukarno's present-day expansionist policies", went to the extent of asserting that "when the national flag flies over Kotabaru, Indonesia will be the chief guardian of the Pacific Ocean." It was, if anything, a clear indication of Indonesia's ambitions in the region, and an assertion of a "role ... of

159. Curtis, n. 158, p. 26. Robert Curtis mentions the "historical memory and legend of a Java-based Greater Malay Empire in South-East Asia" as one of the seven "key elements" determining Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy. p. 23.


161. Quoted in Brackman, South-East Asia's Second Front; The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago (London, 1966), p. 114. Kotabaru was the Indonesian name given to Hollandia, the capital of Dutch New Guinea (West Irian). After the restoration of West Irian to Indonesia, Government of Indonesia renamed it Sukarnapura. Djaya Pura is the latest name of this city.
hegemony, especially in those areas populated by peoples of Malay stock. Concealed in it was, of course, a dormant tendency to incorporate into Indonesian territory the Malay states of Malaya and the Philippines.

As early as 1945, Mohammad Yamin held the view that Indonesia included Malaya, Timor and North Borneo. At a plenary session of the Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence, he suggested that a "People's State of Indonesia" should include territories which have given birth to the Indonesian people. It was a plea to form an Indonesian state on the basis of a common Malay race and culture. Even on geo-political grounds, he said: "To separate Malaya from Indonesia amounts to deliberately weakening from the outset the position of the People's State of Indonesia in her international relations." Contrary-wise, unity of Malaya with Indonesia, he held, would "strengthen our position and complete our entity and accord with our (i.e., Indonesian) national aspirations and be consistent with the interests of geo-politics of air, land and sea.

Sukarno was among the 39 out of a total of 66 members of the Investigating Committee who shared Yamin's thesis. He expressed himself "in full agreement with the stand taken by my colleague, Mr. Yamin". He also recalled the glory of the Madjapahit empire and the dream of a "pan-Indonesia embracing Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines". Although, for fear of reactions from the

163. During the period of Guided Democracy, until his death in 1963, Professor Mohammad Yamin was Minister of Social and Cultural Affairs and Chairman of the National Planning Council. Being an old friend, Yamin was a close adviser to President Sukarno.
164. Quoted in Brackman, n. 161, p. 122.
Japanese, Sukarno considered the Philippines independent and said that its sovereignty should be respected, about Malaya he was frank enough to assert that "Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands". "God has determined", he added, "that certain parts of the world should form single units ... when I look at the islands situated between Asia and Australia as between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans I understand that they are meant to form a single entity."

Mohammad Hatta, who became the first and last Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia after proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945, held a different conception of the Indonesian state. At a meeting of the Investigating Committee, he opposed the "imperialistic" content of Yamin's race and culture thesis and described it as "a most dangerous view". Inviting a specific reference to Malaya, he said: "Let us leave it to the people of Malaya to decide whether they want to stand on their own feet or join with Indonesia, but let us not claim it for ourselves". In conclusion, he observed: "Let us live within our own country - let us not encourage our youths towards imperialism."

It is interesting to note that in the process of Guided Democracy as it evolved, the Indonesian elite group which shared Mohammad Hatta's views was gradually eliminated from politics.

166. Ibid., p. 2. On the Philippines, adverse Japanese reactions could be expected because they had already declared the independence of the Philippines on 14 October 1943. See Brackman, n. 161, pp. 123-4.

167. Indonesian Intentions Towards Malaysia, n. 141, p. 3.

168. The process started with Mohammad Hatta's exit from the Government on 1 December 1956. He resigned from Vice-Presidency due to differences with President Sukarno's policies and especially because of Sukarno's tendency to disregard democratic methods and constitutional procedures.
Thus the leadership which succeeded in restoring West Irian to the State in August 1962, was the same as shared Yamin's conception of Indonesia's place in the Malay world.

Since the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, however, the Indonesian leadership emphasised the fact that the independent state of Indonesia was heir only to the territories previously under the Dutch colonialism, a view which, as noted above, a substantial majority of them had opposed before proclamation of independence in August 1945. It was, of course, necessitated by the struggle for restoration of West Irian. The Indonesians must have realised that any claims on territories other than those under the Dutch might create international complications further delaying the solution of the West Irian issue itself. Hence, once the question of West Irian was resolved to the Indonesians' satisfaction, the elite group with Sukarno at the top tended to switch over to Yamin's conception of Greater Indonesia State. Indonesia's reactions to Brunei rebellion in December 1962, its full moral and political support to A.M. Azahari's Government of North Kalimantan and its subsequent anti-Malaysia policy, should be seen in this background.

Apart from enormous political prestige flowing from the return of West Irian to the Republic, what sharpened Indonesia's tendency to establish its major power role in South-East Asia was the massive arms build-up with the help of the Soviet Union. By

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Interview with Mohammad Hatta, Djakarta, 15 October 1969.
For various reasons, the Masjumi (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia - Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party), the two political parties which represented liberal, democratic and socialist elements in Indonesian politics, were banned in August 1960, and their prominent leaders, including former Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers such as Mohammad Natsir, Sjarifudin Prawiranegara, Burhanuddin Harahap, Sutan Sjahrir, Subadio Sastrosatomo, Mohammad Roem, were imprisoned.
the end of 1960, Indonesia had received from the Soviet Union two modern destroyers, several torpedo boats and two submarines, as well as 60 MIG fighters and 20 Ilyushin twin-jet bombers. In addition, Indonesia concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union in January 1961, for the supply of mostly high-calibre arms worth US $400 million from the latter. According to General Nasution, Indonesia's Minister of Defence and Security, who concluded the agreement on his Government's behalf during his visit to the Soviet Union in January 1961, this would double the size of Indonesia's armoury.

Nevertheless, the Indonesian leadership was aware of the fact that for an adventurist policy of territorial expansion mere arms build-up and armed strength were not enough. It needed a highly advanced economic and industrial base to carry it out. The position in which Indonesia found itself, in these fields in 1962, was far from encouraging. Their limitations thus prompted the Indonesian leaders to moderate their ambitions to a sphere of influence in the Malay world in the region in which their voice carried weight. This meant pursuance of a policy of limited hostilities against Malaysia, a policy of 'confrontation' short of war, and, to keep open various options which satisfied the Indonesians' regional ambitions.

**Reactions in India**

It is not certain how far Government of India realised these domestic pulls and pressures tilting Indonesia towards a policy of 'confrontation' against the proposed Federation of Malaysia. In fact, when a broad consensus against the Malaysia scheme was emerging in Indonesia, India was pre-occupied with the problems arising from the Chinese invasion on her northern borders in October

169. Palmier, n. 12, p. 130.
1962. This restricted, to a certain degree, India's initiatives concerning developments in South-East Asia. This was evident from omission of any official statement in New Delhi on the revolt in Brunei and its subsequent quelling by the British Gurkha troops. It was in marked contrast to India's attitude of active opposition to British Indian soldiers fighting a Dutch colonial war against the Indonesians during 1945-48 and showed the extent to which the Chinese aggression had restricted Indian policy initiatives towards the region.

Besides, sensing Indonesia's growing hostility towards Malaysia at this stage, Government of India, it seems, did not deem it desirable to make any comment on the question. In view of anti-Indian developments in Djakarta in September 1962, an open pro-Malaysia stance in New Delhi would only strengthen Indonesians' feelings against India. India's silence on the Malaysia issue was all the more required when seen in the background of China's efforts to woo Indonesia and create misunderstanding between Indonesia and India. In the light of China's vocal moral support to the cause of the Brunei rebels and to Indonesia's policy in this regard, India's open support to Malaysia would provide China with an opportunity to distort India's image among the Indonesian leadership. This might lead to losing Indonesian sympathy altogether against China in the forthcoming Colombo Conference on the Sino-Indian border dispute.

It did not mean, however, totally ignoring the issue. A month after Subandrio's announcement of "a policy of confrontation" against Malaysia, Prime Minister Nehru explained why India had welcomed the Malaysia proposal. In line with India's record of opposition to colonialism, he considered the freedom of British
colonies as "the first thing". In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1963, Nehru observed: "The major thing it seemed to us, was that the colonies should cease to be colonies, the rest, it was for them to decide."

This was in accord with India's policy towards the region before and since its independence. The major components of this policy, were elimination of colonialism, strengthening of nationalism and independence, fostering of democracy, promotion of bilateral or multi-lateral co-operation and of peace and stability.

It may be noted that India's initiatives towards establishing institutional framework of bilateral and or multi-lateral co-operation with the states in South-East Asia in the field of trade and economic relations, had only been marginal. This is evident from Indonesia's volume of trade with South-East Asia. Between the years from 1950-51 to 1962-63, India's trade with the region ranged between 3 per cent and 9 per cent of its total world trade, 9.7 per cent being the highest registered in 1956-57. Perhaps its own


171. For the fourteen years since 1950-51, India's trade with South-East Asia constituted 9.3, 6.5, 7.1, 7.5, 9.2, 5.3, 9.7, 4.6, 6.7, 5.3, 3.9, 3.9, 3.2 and 3.6 per cent of its total world trade. These percentages are derived from calculation of figures taken from several Indian official sources such as The Journal of Industry and Trade, vol. 7, no. 7, July 1957, and vol. 13, no. 6, June 1963 (New Delhi, Ministry of Commerce and Industry), pp. 1192-3 and pp. 1112-13 respectively; Accounts Relating to the Foreign Sea and Airborne Trade and Navigation of India (Calcutta, Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics), March 1952, March 1953, March 1954, March 1955 and March 1956; India: A Reference Annual, 1960, 1961 and 1963 (New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), p. 334, p. 333 and p. 281 respectively and Brochure of Foreign Trade Statistics of India: Third Five Year Plan (New Delhi, Directorate of Research and Statistics, Office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, 1967). For the first seven years, figures of South-East Asia represent the import and export trade of Indonesia, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore and Thailand. For the remaining seven years, these figures include the import and export trade between the Philippines and India as well.
limitations and lack of capacity to compete with advanced and better-equipped sources of aid and trade available to the nations in the region, were partly responsible for it. It did not mean, however, that India was unaware of the potentialities of regional co-operation in these fields. While commenting on India's approach in this connection, the Prime Minister, at a press conference in New Delhi on 11 August 1960, stated: "Inevitably we have to move in the direction of more regional co-operation. It is not particularly easy to have economic bonds with the other side of the globe. Broadly speaking, it has to be regional - South-East Asia region, which is a definite region." India wanted to gain time to carry out its five year plans in order to reach the stage of self-sustained growth in economy and industry, thus increasing its capacity to compete with those at a higher stage of development. In fact, Nehru's policy of non-alignment and of a "peace area" in South-East Asia, was suited to serve, among others, these ends. In the meantime, India desired to carry on its policy of friendship, peace and stability in the region.

Pursuing this policy, India welcomed the Indonesian-Dutch Agreement on West Irian in August 1962. In a statement in the Rajya Sabha on 22 August 1962, Prime Minister Nehru expressed his satisfaction over the removal of "one source of conflict in South-East Asia." Besides West Irian, he referred to recent settlement in Laos, considered it "a matter of good augury for the peace of South-East Asia" and said that "we are particularly happy not only because of our intimate contacts with the countries concerned but also because, in a sense, we are part of South-East Asia, and we earnestly

hope that there will be peace there”.

Later, in May 1963, after Indonesia started a policy of confrontation against Malaysia, Nehru reiterated India’s approach to the region. In his address to the members of the Executive Board of the Organization of Asian News Agencies, in New Delhi, on 15 May 1963, he underlined India’s objectives in the region thus: “We want peace and progress in South-East Asia. We are friends of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines and we hope that they will come to an agreement among themselves”. He also emphasised that India was not prepared to get “entangled” in this issue because, he said, “we have enough problems of our own”.

A fortnight later when Indonesia showed inclination to resolve the Malaysia dispute and both President Sukarno and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya met in a “little Summit” in Tokyo on 30 May - 1 June 1963, there was a feeling of relief in India. A section of the Indian press felt encouraged to hope that Indonesia might end its anti-Malaysia policy. The Joint Statement in which the two leaders agreed to end “acrimonious attacks and disparaging references to each other” and “reaffirmed their faith in the Treaty of Friendship between Indonesia and Malaya in 1959”, was seen as conducive to easing tension between the two countries. In an editorial, the Hindustan Times described the outcome of talks between Sukarno and the Tunku as “a happy turn in Indonesia’s policy

173. Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 8, no. 8, August 1962, p. 163.
174. The Statesman, 16 May 1963. Those present included the Japanese, the Filipinos and the Indonesians.
175. "Indonesia May End Policy of 'Confrontation' on Malaysia" (despatch by Sudhakar Bhat), Times of India, 2 June 1963.
of confrontation with Malaya". It concluded with the observation that the Tunku could now hopefully secure "Indonesia's acceptance of Malaysia as a bulwark against Communist expansionism in South-East Asia".177

Indonesia and the 'Maphilindo' Scheme

The process of talks initiated at the highest level in Tokyo in May-June 1963, led to a meeting of Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines in Manila between 7 and 11 June 1963 and subsequently to a summit meeting of the three countries there between 30 July and 5 August 1963. These meetings resulted in the signing of three documents, the Manila Accord, as reached at the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers, the Manila Declaration and the Joint Statement. Some of the stipulations contained in these documents showed willingness of the three countries to "share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation", and their agreement to take "initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah (Consultation) Maphilindo". The Manila Accord also contained assurances from Indonesia and the Philippines that "they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative...."


178. See texts of "Manila Accord" and "Manila Declaration" in Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made "Malaysia", n. 142, p.121 and 129 respectively.

179. Ibid., p. 123.
The Maphilindo proposal as initiated by President Macapagal of the Philippines and agreed to at the three Foreign Ministers' meeting in Manila in June 1963, was based on the principle of common "ties of race and culture" and envisaged "the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin (Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines) working together in closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty". Agreement on this proposal had certain important implications. The Maphilindo scheme provided a regional framework in which Indonesia, the largest and biggest of the three countries, would be able to play a dominant role. In fact, this is how President Sukarno interpreted it. Viewing the outcome of the Manila summit meeting as a step towards realising his ambitions of a regional power role for Indonesia, President said:

Whatever may happen ... two things become clear: (a) Indonesia is no longer treated like a dummy 'Togog' and allowed just to look on alone at alterations to the status quo in the region around it, especially if those alterations concern its safety; (b) Indonesia is recognized as having the right and primary responsibility to guard security and peace in the region together with its neighbouring states, the Philippines and Malaya. 181

Besides, the Maphilindo scheme as based on pan-Malay sentiment was conceived to be both anti-Chinese and anti-Communist. It is quite interesting that, in signing the Manila agreements both Sukarno and the Tunku ignored the domestic pressures opposed to the idea of the Maphilindo. Sensing dangers to its vital interests, the Indonesian Communist Party expressed its opposition to the scheme. It showed, if anything, at least as far as Indonesia was concerned, that Sukarno was willing to resist the Communist pressures if a

180. Ibid., p. 122.
181. quoted in Brackman, n. 161, p. 187. A 'Tagog' is a silent figure in the Indonesian Wajang Orang theatre.
182. See this Chapter, pp. 224-5.
suitable framework for Indonesia's role in the region was provided. India, whose interest lay in the promotion of friendship, peace and stability in the region, was expected to welcome the Manila Agreements. But Government of India chose to maintain silence. It could be ascribed to three possible reasons, namely, Indonesia's growing relations with China, increasing pressures of the PKI on the Government and Sukarno's unpredictability. It was difficult to envisage how long Sukarno, even if willing to, would be able to stand up to continuing anti-Malaysia and anti-Maphilindo stance of both the PKI and China.

A section of the Indian press, however, perceived a lot of "romanticism" in the Philippine proposal for the Maphilindo. Following the Manila Accord, produced by the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, in their meeting between 7 and 11 June, 1963, S. Nihal Singh of The Statesman analysed motivations of the three countries in coming closer to one another. He interpreted it as a new mood of co-operation in South-East Asia. According to him, Indonesia viewed the Maphilindo scheme as an instrument to checkmate Chinese aggressive expansionism. He believed that the "anti-Chinese riots in Java in April 1963 only intensified interest in the confederation". Two weeks after the summit conference of the three Malay leaders in Manila from 30 July to 5 August 1963, the same correspondent hailed the Manila agreements as marking a new era in the history of Asia and visualised that Maphilindo scheme might thwart the Chinese aims in the region. He was quite sure that the "new concept of the coming together of the Malay race will work to the disadvantage of the Chinese" in the

region. Hence, it was in the interest of India to encourage this scheme. Moreover from the Indian point of view, S. Nihal Singh believed that the "most encouraging aspect of the agreement" was "the emphasis placed on the right of the three countries to maintain their national identity." This was some thing India should be fully satisfied to note.

The Manila agreements which roused hopes of a peaceful solution of the Malaysia dispute and of peace and stability in the framework of Maphilindo scheme, lost their appeal in a period of six weeks from the day these were signed. In Indonesia, major opposition to the Maphilindo scheme came from the PKI. Speaking at the Bandung Military Academy on 29 June 1963, Chairman Aaidit of the PKI expressed fears entertained by "some people in Indonesia" that "Maphilindo (Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia) would become a son of SEATO or a nephew of A.S.A. (Association of Southeast Asia)." He considered these fears reasonable because, among the three partners of the Maphilindo scheme, "Malaya adheres completely to Britain's policy, and another, the Philippines, is well known as a member of SEATO." He observed:

The strongest basis for our (Indonesia's) co-operation with other countries is anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Designs intended to drag our country through the front door into the imperialist bloc met with failure. Consciously or unconsciously, we should refrain from entering it through the back door. If imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism which has become enemy No. 1 of the Indonesian people, succeeds in its attempt to encircle our country through the establishment of the Malaysian Federation and the Maphilindo confederation, our country's national defence, the task of defending

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ourselves against the imperialists' attacks, will be more difficult. 185

Later, in his Political Report to the Seventh Central Committee of the Party, in December 1963, Aidit stressed that the Manila Conference of three Malay leaders, Sukarno, Macapagal and the Tunku, took place "without the wishes" and approval of the PKI. He also gave two reasons for his Party's opposition to Maphilindo, namely, its racial overtones and differences in the domestic and foreign policies of the three countries, Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia. Commenting on the American complicity behind the scheme of Maphilindo, the Communist leader said: "The US imperialists are striving hard to get Indonesia to enter the Maphilindo trap because other traps such as SEATO and the ASA have all failed." 187

Besides the PKI's opposition to the Maphilindo scheme, there were three other reasons which created enough provocation in Indonesia. These were difficulties over the number of Indonesian and Filipino observers to be attached to the UN Mission, instituted to ascertain the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak, British delay in granting visas to them and Tunku Abdul Rahman's "not very diplomatic" statement on 29 August 1963 announcing the date of inauguration of Malaysia, that is, 16 September 1963, well before 


187. Ibid., p. 34. Although the PKI opposed the Maphilindo scheme, its criticism was quite guarded. Knowing that "Sukarno and his assistants" had stamped their approval of the decisions of the Manila summit meeting, and that any direct criticism would be irritating to the President, PKI's caution in the matter was quite understandable.
the UN Investigation team completed ascertainment of wishes of the people of British North Borneo territories, and made its report known.

As the date of inauguration of Malaysia drew nearer, Indonesian Government's strong reactions to these developments and PKI's continuing anti-Malaysia and anti-Maphilindo posture, roused anti-Malaysia sentiments in Indonesia still further. On 16 September 1963, when Malaysia was inaugurated, there were huge anti-Malaysian and anti-British demonstrations everywhere in Indonesia. British Embassy in Djakarta was stormed and Malaysian and British Consulates in Medan (North Sumatra) were sacked.

A Government statement issued the next day said that it "greatly deplores" these happenings and assured action against "those guilty". It, however, added, that the Government "appreciates the militant attitude of various groups of our society and the fact that our people have shown their indignation about the formation of Malaysia which is not in accordance with the Manila Summit Conference". On 21 September 1963, Sukarno announced rupture of trade and economic relations with Malaysia. It was exactly eight months earlier that a policy of 'confrontation' against the project of Malaysia had been announced by Subandrio on 20 January 1963.


190. Ibid., 18 September 1963.

191. Ibid., 22 September 1963.

192. Both the PKI and the army leadership, for their own interests, wanted the anti-Malaysia policy to continue. For a detailed analysis of the motivations of various factors in the domestic politics behind the anti-Malaysia policy, see articles and studies listed at n. 188.
It showed that either Sukarno was not seriously interested in the Maphilindo scheme and only wanted to use it to delay inauguration of Malaysia or he was no longer capable of resisting the domestic Communist pressures to continue the anti-Malaysia policy.

India's Attitude on the Inauguration of Malaysia

India, no doubt, shared the Indonesian view that the new Federation of Malaysia should come about after due ascertainment of the wishes of the peoples of the territories concerned. UN Secretary-General U Thant's report on 14 September 1963, satisfied this desire and India accepted the report. Nehru told the Lok Sabha on 16 September 1963, that "we accept the report of the U.N." and he also wished Malaysia "a good start".

India also welcomed the inauguration of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. The President of India, in an official message to H.M. The Yang Di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia, sent "to the Government and people of Malaysia the most cordial congratulations of the Government and the people of India" and "sincere good wishes for the prosperity and well-being of the new state and for the welfare and advancement of the Malaysian people". Prime Minister Nehru also sent to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, his "warm felicitations and greetings on the happy occasion of the inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia". Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs, participated in the

193. See Prime Minister Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1963 in which he put emphasis on freedom of British colonies in South-East Asia and said that "the rest, it was for them to decide".


celebrations marking the occasion as India's representative. Besides welcoming Malaysia, India also expected that Indonesia would accept the UN Enquiry Report and recognise the new Federation. But the reverse happened. Indonesia's reactions to the inauguration of Malaysia have already been surveyed.

Following anti-Malaysia and anti-British disturbances in Djakarta, the Indian Ambassador to Indonesia, Apa B. Pant, played an important role in sheltering the former Malayan Ambassador, in his house for a night. He also gave moral support to the British diplomatic staff in their hour of difficulty.

In line with the Government attitude, the Indian press also hailed the inauguration of Malaysia. The Hindu welcomed the "birth of the multi-racial Federation of Malaysia" as "a landmark in the history of post-war Asia...." There were numerous articles and editorials explaining reasons as to why India should welcome Malaysia. In an article contributed to the Indian Express, a day before the inauguration ceremony, one Aruna Mukerji termed "September 16" as "a red letter day in the history of Asia not only because it will witness the birth of a new nation, Malaysia, after prolonged birth-pangs but will also see the virtual end of colonialism on that continent". The author of the article considered it a "Bold Plan" and remarked: "India has from the beginning welcomed the

197. Inviting a reference to Manila Accord of August 1963, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit said that India expected both Indonesia and the Philippines to recognise Malaysia, but the two countries had gone back on their words. See The Statesman, 20 September 1963.
formation of this new nation", because it "promises to be a bulwark against Communism". Aruna Mukerji also referred to the "treacherous" role of the Chinese as manifested in their tactics of "infiltration and subversive" actions in South-East Asia and observed that "if this new country which has come to nationhood is able to prevent this from happening, it will be playing a historic role in preserving the freedom which Asia has won after centuries of bondage."

The view that India should welcome Malaysia because it promised to be a checkmate to Communism as well as Chinese influence in the region, was shared by the other dailies also. The **Hindustan Times** described Malaysia as "a potential bulwark against a common threat, namely, that posed by Communist China's expansionism". The **Indian Express** wrote editorially: "All those who wish the Malay people well and those who are concerned about containing Chinese Communism's southward push in the strategic area of South-East Asia will welcome the birth of Malaysia." It also entertained hopes that Malaysia was "going to be a sound bastion against the new yellow peril that is Peking". The **Indian Express** took note of the anti-Peking and anti-Communist posture of the Malaysian leadership and said that "we in India are happy to wish god-speed to Malaysia".

The press in India also took serious note of the Indonesians' reactions following the inauguration of Malaysia. The **Statesman** criticised Indonesia for her refusal "to acknowledge Malaysia after having agreed to abide by the findings of the U.N. mission to Sarawak and North Borneo...." It observed that the "Indonesian

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Government has done its reputation much harm, and what is perhaps more important, put a spoke in the wheel of Maphilindo, the larger confederation embracing Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia."
The *Times of India* described Indonesia's objections to withhold recognition to Malaysia as "wholly specious". It believed that ascertainment of the wishes of the people of the North Borneo territories as carried out by the UN fact-finding team was "in accordance with the Manila Agreement". It regretted that the Tunku, "aided and abetted" by the British, did not wait for the publication of the UN team's findings and announced that Malaysia would be brought into being on 16 September 1963. Nevertheless, it held the view that "there is not the slightest reason to question its conclusion that the majority of the people fully and voluntarily supported the federation scheme". In a similar vein, the *Hindustan Times* observed that by "questioning the UN verdict Indonesia has proceeded from one blunder to another.... Indonesia has gained nothing by challenging this position in the UN. It has yet to discover how much it is forfeiting in international sympathy by its inexplicable opposition to Malaysia." Still another Indian daily termed UN Report as "unequivocal enough" and described Sukarno's decision "to deny recognition to Malaysia" and his permission to "rioters to attack the Malaysian and British embassies in Jakarta" as "highly regrettable".

As regards Indonesians' mob demonstrations and sacking of the British and Malaysian missions in Indonesia, *The Statesman* described the British demand that the Indonesian Government should "stop such uncivilized behaviour" as "remarkable for its mildness". Convinced of Indonesian Government's hand behind these anti-British and anti-Malaysian mob actions, it observed: "It is difficult not to believe that in Jakarta there was official collusion with the mob."

India's gesture of welcoming Malaysia implied her agreement with the major objectives of forming the new federation, namely, to checkmate both the Chinese and the Communist influence in the region. Indonesia's initially permissive attitude towards the Malaysia scheme and its readiness to sign the Manila Accords later had encouraged the Indians to believe that it (Indonesia) would welcome the formation of the new Federation. But as noted earlier, the reverse happened. Besides, India's reactions to Indonesia's hostile attitude towards Malaysia, after its inauguration, showed India's rejection of Indonesians' allegations that ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak was not proper. India, in fact, accepted the UN Secretary-General U Thant's verdict that the elections preceding the formation of the new Federation were free and indicative of the people's desire to come together into a common political structure. In the following days, India made her position in this regard still more clear. In her speech to the UN General Assembly on 11 October 1963, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit referred to Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak and extended India's "warm welcome to the three colonial territories in South-East Asia which have emerged into independence". She congratulated U Thant for having "carried out ..."

the task of the wishes of the people" (sic) of North Borneo terri-
tories and observed: "After the attainment of independence, the
three territories have freely chosen to join with Malaya to establish
the Federation of Malaysia." She also expressed the hope that
"differences of opinion now existing on this matter will be relaxed
and resolved in an amicable fashion by those directly concerned".

**PKI's Attitude**

Following the formation of Malaysia in September 1963, the
differences shown on this issue by India and Indonesia got further
sharpened. In Indonesia, all the political forces and factors were
seemingly arriving at a consensus with the Indonesian Communist
Party in its continued opposition to Malaysia. These included
President Sukarno, the Army leadership and the elite groups repre-
senting the nationalist (PNI) and religious (NU) elements. PKI's
emphasis on Malaysia's "neo-colonialist" and "imperialist" nature
provided the ideological framework in which, despite conflicting
views and motives, the governing elites with President Sukarno at
the top, could reach overall working agreement on anti-Malaysia
policy.

The PKI, in fact, continued to be in the forefront of the
Indonesian campaign against Malaysia. This was so even when
Government of Indonesia showed encouraging response to any effort
at a negotiated settlement of the problem. PKI's opposition to the
Manila Agreements of August 1963 and to the Maphilindo scheme, have
already been surveyed. Later, when the US Attorney General and

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206. *GAOR*, session 18, plen. mtg. 1239, vol. 1, 11 October
1963, p. 10. See also "Indonesia's Stand Against Malaysia:
Unsympathetic Response in United Nations", (despatch by
Special Representative of President Johnson, Robert Kennedy, visited
Indonesia in January 1964, in order to help resolve the deadlock on
the question of Malaysia, Chairman Aidit of the PKI said that "w...e
need not be afraid of the U.S. imperialist threat" and that "it is
our obligation to avoid efforts which have the nature of compromise..."
"Let us", he added, "continue to crush 'Malaysia' and to drive out
the Seventh Fleet from the Indonesian Ocean". He asserted: "Our
people are fully determined to crush 'Malaysia' completely...."

A week later when, as a result of his talks with Robert
Kennedy, President Sukarno issued a ceasefire order effective from
25 January 1964, the PKI whipped up its propaganda campaign against
Malaysia. Criticising American efforts in this direction, Aidit
stated that "The Indonesian people ... do not have the naive idea
that the U.S. imperialists would engage in 'mediation' which would
really do no harm to the interests of the Indonesian Republic."

The PKI also came out unsparingly against India, its leader-
ship and the policy of non-alignment. Its charges of India, under
Nehru's leadership, having become "the US watch-dog in Asia and a
fifth column within the ranks of the Asian-African countries",
showed how far the PKI had fallen in line with China's posture of
hostility towards India. The PKI's open anti-India tirades thus
contributed to strengthening Indonesians' ill-will towards India.

209. Harian Rakjat, 17 January 1964. Taking it as a green signal,
the labour wing of the PKI (SBSI) took over control of
16 British-owned tea, rubber and coffee plantations. It also
demanded that all British interests in Indonesia be seized.
Interestingly, all these actions were contrary to Government
instructions. See Alex Josey, "Aidit and Malaysia", Far
Eastern Economic Review, vol. 43, no. 8, 20 February 1964,
p. 421-2.

210. Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), pt. 3, The Far East,
no. 1464, 28 January 1964 (FE/1464/13/3).

211. See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian
Conference, p. 270.
India's Later Reactions

India, at this stage, however, found itself engaged in serious efforts, at various levels, to promote the prospects of a second Belgrade-type conference of non-aligned states. It was quite understandable in view of both China and Pakistan (the two countries openly hostile to India) joining Indonesia, at this time, in intense diplomatic activity, at the highest level, to hold the second Asian-African Conference. As a consequence, both in official circles and in the press in India, the question of Malaysia attracted much less attention than the efforts being made (by Indonesia and India) in the direction of these conferences.

As regards the Malaysia issue, the Preparatory Meeting of the second Asian and African Conference in Djakarta in April 1964, provided to India an important opportunity to manifest its open moral and political support to Malaysia. It related to the question of Malaysia's representation at the second Afro-Asian Conference. Swaran Singh, the leader of the Indian delegation, took the initiative to propose, among others, an invitation to Malaysia. It has been examined how, against opposition from Indonesia and China, he succeeded in keeping open the issue of sending an invitation to Malaysia.

212. Ibid., p. 266-8.


215. Reasons and motivations behind Swaran Singh's proposal regarding Malaysia, its implications for Indonesia and Pakistan, and Indonesia's reactions to it, have been surveyed, at some length, in Ibid., pp. 289-90.
It would be worth noticing here that, at least so far as India was concerned, Swaran Singh's proposal regarding Malaysia's representation at the second Afro-Asian Conference tended to link the Malaysia issue with the prospects of holding the Conference itself. This was evident from Indonesia's similar reactions to India's attitude on both these questions.

In the months following the Preparatory Meeting, India also tended to ignore the anti-India sentiment growing in Indonesia as a result of its (India's) pro-Malaysia policy. This was evident from its repeated offers of moral and diplomatic support to Malaysia on various occasions. First such occasion arose when on 15 July 1964, India joined other states of the Commonwealth in expressing "satisfaction at the establishment of Malaysia...", as also in assuring "the Prime Minister of Malaysia" of its "sympathy and support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence and integrity of his country, and to promote a peaceful and honourable settlement of current differences between Malaysia and neighbouring countries".

Second time, India's efforts led to the exclusion of the Malaysia issue from being discussed at the second Conference of Non-Aligned States in Cairo in October 1964. In a statement on 11 October 1964, the day following the close of this Conference, Indian Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, disclosed that India had been successful in keeping the question of Malaysia out of the Conference.

As expected, India's open moral and political support to Malaysia and its insistence on Malaysia's representation at the second Afro-Asian Conference, led to increasing bitterness in


Indonesia's attitude towards her. Although India tended to ignore Indonesians' susceptibilities on the Malaysia issue, India was not unaware of the FKI's growing pressures on the Indonesian leadership against seeking a peaceful solution of this question. There were suggestions in a section of the Indian press that the Indonesian Communist Party was "crying for continuation of the confrontation against Malaysia...". S. Nihal Singh of The Statesman wrote that the FKI was forcing Sukarno's hands against Malaysia, otherwise a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia dispute was quite possible.

India, in fact, was from the beginning in favour of a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia and desired to be neutral in the matter. In view of India having maintained "good relations with Malaysia", however, it considered that it "would be unfortunate if the sovereignty of Malaysia is disturbed by use of force". Reiterating India's attitude towards the question of Malaysia, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri told the Lok Sabha on 18 September 1964 that India had "always supported the idea of Indonesia and Malaysia trying to settle matters between

218. See for instance strongly condemnatory language as used against India by the Indonesian Herald and the language press in Djakarta at the end of 1964 in the Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, pp. 294-7.

219. "Reds Preparing to Seize Power in Indonesia" (South-East Asia correspondent), The Hindu, 30 November 1964.


221. India desired that the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute was "amicably settled" and thought it better to refrain "from taking sides". See Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol.21, session 5 of 1963, 18 September 1963, col. 6280, and Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report (1964-65), p. 48.
themselves." He also agreed to the suggestion made by Krishna Menon, former Defence Minister of India, a day earlier that "the non-aligned nations' Conference should move in this matter and try to settle these differences".

After the second Conference of Non-Aligned States, when Indonesia showed definite signs of adopting the Chinese posture of opposition to the United States, India also took initiative to bring about rapprochement between Indonesia and Malaya. In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 25 November 1964, Swaran Singh, External Affairs Minister, revealed India's continued efforts made in this direction, including those made by his delegation at the second Conference of Non-Aligned States in Cairo in October 1964. Although he was sorry to state that despite efforts by various countries the situation had "not very much improved", he was hopeful of solution through Indian initiative. He also disclosed that he had received invitation from both Malaysia and Indonesia and said that "it is my intention to go into that part of this world and try to do something...".

222. Lok Sabha Debates, series 3, vol. 33, session 9 of 1964, 18 September 1964, cols 2547-8. See also The Hindu, 22 September 1964. During his speech in the Lok Sabha on 17 September 1964, Krishna Menon had expressed his "hope" that "it will be possible for the Government of India to promote by their diplomatic efforts and the good offices of countries like Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia and some others, at Cairo to establish something like a good offices' committee to step in in the differences between Indonesia and Malaysia." He thought it could be possibly done through the Non-Aligned Conference "in the usual procedure of the United Nations to set up some good offices' organisation to bring down the tension as between these people." See ibid., 17 September 1964, col. 2296.

223. See Chapter on China's Role, pp. 385-6.

However meaningful, India's efforts in the direction of a peaceful solution of the Malaysia dispute seemed to be misplaced. Within a month and a half of Swaran Singh's statement in the Lok Sabha on 25 November 1964, anti-India sentiment in Indonesia rose to a pitch. The anti-India sentiment in the Indonesian press coincided with Malaysia's success in getting a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council. This reaction might have been caused by Indonesian ire at India's pro-Malaysia attitude towards the Malaysian candidature for the Security Council.

On 31 December 1964, President Sukarno had repeatedly told newsmen to note that "Indonesia will definitely quit the United Nations if Malaysia becomes a Security Council member." Finding his warning ignored, he carried out his threat of withdrawal from the World Body on 7 January 1965. Explaining his action, in an interview in Tokyo, later, Sukarno remarked: "We cannot bear the fact that Malaysia was elected a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. We cannot remain an idle spectator to the fact that Malaysia which as far as we are concerned does not exist, sits in the U.N. Security Council."

In view of the strong anti-Malaysia posture of the Indonesian leadership, it was quite natural to expect that India, for her pro-Malaysia stance, would face stiff Indonesian hostility. Anyway, Government of India was unhappy over the extreme step taken by Indonesia in quitting the United Nations. On 10 January 1965, Swaran Singh appealed to Indonesia to reconsider its decision about


227. Ibid., 10 January 1965.
the withdrawal. He also appealed to all the countries to persuade Indonesia not to leave the United Nations. He referred to the tension already prevailing in South-East Asia over the questions of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and, in this context, urged that efforts should be made for a peaceful settlement of all these disputes including the one between Malaysia and Indonesia. He added that India would do her best in this direction. The Indian press immediately took note of Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. S. Nihal Singh of The Statesman described Indonesia's withdrawal as a "retrograde step" pulling "Djakarta closer to Peking's policies". He interpreted it as "an indication of how central the 'crush Malaysia' theme was to Indonesia's policy towards the region. According to this correspondent, it would "remove a restraining influence on her (Indonesia's) actions vis-a-vis Malaysia" and "only bring further comfort" to the PKI, "which is witnessing an orientation of the country's foreign policy more in line with its own thinking. Furthermore it would "serve to isolate it (Indonesia) from the mainstream of world opinion...". In an editorial, The Hindu considered Sukarno's decision as "regrettable". It also reminded Indonesia of its obligations to the United Nations Security Council, whose "intervention", it wrote, "speeded up Indonesia's independence" as well as led to the restoration of West Irian to her. Viewing retrospectively Indonesia's actions in the last two years, this daily noted how Sukarno "promptly went back on his word and started his 'confrontation' policy...". It also noted

228. The Hindu, 11 January 1965. Swaran Singh made these observations in the course of his speech at the plenary session of the Congress Party at Durga Pur (West Bengal).

229. Ibid., 3 January 1965.

that except some Communist countries, the rest of the world had shown no favourable response to Indonesia's decision and was generally in sympathy with Malaysia. In view of this, it observed that withdrawal from the United Nations could "only further isolate Indonesia from the stream of world opinion". It concluded by saying that if Sukarno refused to heed U Thant's appeal, it would not be "helping either his own country's larger interests or the cause of peace". Rakshat Puri of the Hindustan Times saw in the close consultations between Foreign Minister Subandrio and the Chinese Ambassador in Djakarta, following announcement of withdrawal, an indication that the "present informal Peking-Jakarta axis may develop into a regular military arrangement between the two Governments".

A few days later, The Hindu attempted to co-relate Indonesia's internal political situation with its foreign policy goals. It noted how China, which had offered strong support to Indonesia in connection with the second Afro-Asian Conference, had also "characterised the (Indonesian) withdrawal from the U.N. as correct revolutionary action...". It also noted how the Indonesians had seemingly "made themselves politically dependent on Peking and militarily dependent on Moscow which furnishes most of their war material". In this connection, The Hindu observed how Sukarno was "yielding ground to the Communist Party led by Dr. (sic) Aidit, a development not likely to be welcomed by his own Nationalist Party or the Army leaders." In the process of realising his Afro-Asian objectives, it concluded, "Sukarno is likely to find that he will

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have to play second fiddle to China."

It showed an awareness in India that Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy, culminating in its withdrawal from the United Nations, was, at least partly, being continued under the direct pressures of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the indirect pressures of China. It was these two internal and external factors which were egging President Sukarno on to a continuing anti-Malaysia posture. Interestingly, it was these two quarters that India was subjected to an insistently hostile propaganda for her attitude of open sympathy and support to Malaysia as well as lack of enthusiasm for the Second Afro-Asian Conference. But by supporting Malaysia India would earn the sympathies of the ruling elites in that country. Moreover, it would be in reciprocation of Malaya's forthright moral and political support to India during the Chinese aggression in 1962.

Nevertheless, keeping in view long-term prospects of relations with Indonesia, Government of India attempted to make its pro-Malaysia policy as less provocative to Indonesian leadership as possible. Although it continued to give moral and political support to Malaysia, it did not say anything against Indonesia and, instead, only urged for a peaceful solution of the Malaysia-Indonesia dispute bilaterally or through a third-party mediation. On


234. Malaya was the most forthright among the Asian and African countries in offering support to India against China's aggression. Commenting on the Chinese attack, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had said in New Delhi on 28 October 1962: "In your fight, you will have many friends and Malaya will be one of the strongest among them. No matter how grave the situation India's cause is right and India must win."

The Statesman, 29 October 1962.
12 January 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri told a press conference in Calcutta: "... we have always said that we do not believe in any confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. India has recognised the independence and sovereignty of Malaysia and we have always said that the differences between Indonesia and Malaysia should be settled between themselves or through the intervention of a third party." He also expressed his Government's wish "to develop good relations with Indonesia".

One visible effect of the anti-India feeling as evident in the Indonesian press about the beginning of 1965 was postponement of Swaran Singh's visit to Indonesia and some other South-East Asian countries in January 1965. Although it was reported to be due to his pre-occupation with visits to India by a number of foreign dignitaries around this time, it might be related to Government of India's realisation that, in the present Indonesian political situation, Swaran Singh's visit might not serve the purpose of reconciling differences between Indonesia and Malaysia.

In the months following Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, India continued to pursue this policy of supporting Malaysia as well as keeping a posture of neutrality, however tenuous it appeared to be. This was necessary in order to play a mediatory role between Indonesia and Malaysia as and when the occasion arose. While replying to questions in the Rajya Sabha on 9 March 1965, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, showed Government of India's awareness of the "serious situation" in South-East Asia, arising from the "serious dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia". While expressing his Government's "sincere hope for a

235. The Hindu and Times of India (Bombay), 13 January 1965.
236. The Hindu, 13 January 1965.
peaceful settlement" of the Indonesian-Malaysian differences and stressing on the desirability of "peaceful negotiations" between the two parties, Dinesh Singh observed: "Government of India continue to watch the situation carefully and will be glad to offer necessary assistance to bring about rapprochement, if necessary, at the appropriate time." He also revealed that India had made many efforts towards peaceful settlement of this dispute and had been in touch with the two sides. As regards Government of India's attitude, Dinesh Singh stated that India preferred "a peaceful settlement" and hoped "that it will be possible to reach a peaceful solution". Responding to a question whether India had done anything to show its identification with Malaysia, he observed: "Indonesia does not recognise Malaysia and has a policy of confrontation with Malaysia. We recognise Malaysia and it is a friendly country." About five weeks later, on 16 April 1965, C. Subramaniam, leader of the Indian delegation to the tenth anniversary (Dawa Warsa) celebrations of the first Asian-African Conference, told the reporters in Singapore that India was prepared to take part in any Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission to solve the Malaysia dispute, if requested to do so.

It was during the tenth anniversary celebrations, however, that President Sukarno came out with open criticism of India for her pro-Malaysia attitude. This showed how misplaced Indian efforts had

239. Ibid., col. 2555.
240. The Hindu, 17 April 1965. India's Minister for Food and Agriculture, C. Subramaniam, was on way to Djakarta to attend the tenth anniversary celebrations.

The idea of an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission was accepted in principle by Sukarno, Macapagal and Tunku Abdul Rahman, during their meeting in Tokyo on 20 June 1964.
been in the matter of seeking a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia dispute. India's attitude on this question also allowed an impression to grow in Indonesia that India was exerting its influence on Indonesia in favour of Malaysia. Reporting an interview with the Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister, Ganis Harsono, B.K. Tiwari, South-East Asia correspondent of the Indian Express, quoted the Indonesian Minister to have commented thus: "We consider India's attitude towards Indonesia, particularly in regard to Malaysia, as unfriendly and unwise...." "Why should you come out so openly in support of Malaysia?" he asked. Warning about the consequences, Ganis Harsono observed: "You will have to face the problem with Indonesia. Do not pour oil on troubled waters. Problems between Malaysia and Indonesia can be solved (and will be solved). Why should you hurriedly and prematurely throw your weight? This we do not understand." The Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister also advised India to keep "quiet and watch the situation or at the most offer mediation if possible as was done by Thailand", or to adopt the almost neutral posture as was done by Pakistan and Ghana, other members of the Commonwealth.

One of the Indonesian charges against India, at this stage, was India's reported offer of facilities for training of the Malaysian army and navy staff. The PKI was in the forefront of anti-India campaign on this score. Its youth Front (Pemuda Rakjat), Women's Movement (Gerwani), Peasants Front (BTI) and Labour Wing (SBMSI), sent separate cables of protest to Government of India.


242. See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, p. 313.
through the Indian Embassy in Djakarta. All these organizations of the Indonesian Communist Party accused Government of India of "being a mere slave" of the British and the Americans in this connection. They demanded that India stop giving military training to the Malaysians as it was "contrary to the 1955 Bandung spirit and Afro-Asian solidarity". While speaking at a luncheon arranged at the residence of the Indian Press Attache in Djakarta on 25 April 1965, Raj Bahadur, Minister of Transport and a member of the Indian delegation to the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations, discounted reports that a special programme of facilities for training of Malaysian officers had been evolved. He stated that it was being done under a general training programme, which was being used by other Asian countries as well.

Between April and June 1965, India continued to insist on Malaysia's representation at the second Afro-Asian Conference. For this purpose India used the forum provided by the 15-nation ambassadorial Standing Committee meetings. This provoked even Sukarno to openly condemn India and its leadership for its pro-Malaysia policy. It ultimately led to repetition of anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta and elsewhere in Indonesia on 23 June 1965. The immediate provocation arose from India's efforts to seek postponement of the second Afro-Asian Conference scheduled to be held in Algiers.

244. Indonesian Herald, 27 April 1965.
246. Ibid., pp. 319-21.
Impact on Bilateral Relations in the Trade, Cultural and Other Fields

During the period of four years from September 1961 to September 1965 strains in the two countries' political relations had an adverse impact on their trade and cultural relations as well. Indian-Indonesian relations in these fields upto 1961 have already been surveyed. The unfavourable trends emerging in that year got marked in the following years.

Following the "Sondhi Affair" in September 1962, India took initiative to promote and expand trade and economic ties with Indonesia. This was necessary in view of the overall adverse impact the anti-Indian disturbances in Djakarta were expected to have on the two countries' relations in these fields. During his visit to India in connection with the Colombo proposals regarding the Sino-Indian border dispute in January 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio was accompanied by an Indonesian trade delegation led by Umarjadi, the Fourth Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of Foreign Economic Relations. This was at a formal invitation sent by the Indian Minister for Foreign Trade, Manubhai Shah, and showed Government of India's eagerness to restore normalcy in bilateral relations. At the preliminary talks, the two sides, led by Umarjadi and Manubhai Shah, agreed to conclude a trade agreement for a period of three to five years. The protocol signed in this connection was aimed at expansion of bilateral trade and was reported to be in favour of increasing Indonesian exports to India.

247. The Hind!;,, 26 January 1963. It quoted Subandrio to have observed: "In view of the fact that the invitation came from India, I would guess this represents an Indian initiative to re-establish goodwill with South-East Asia's largest country."

Umarjadi revealed in Djakarta on 7 February 1963 that, under the trade expansion programme, the two countries would plan about the volume and range of commodities to be exchanged and set a framework in which they would review each year the flow of trade on a balanced basis. According to him, the two Governments had agreed to exchange technical and scientific information between the industrialists of the two countries. Besides, India had agreed to provide facilities for training Indonesian personnel, to send Indian technicians to Indonesia for this purpose, to help establish industries there and to assist in running and establishing industrial units manufacturing, among other things, diesel, motor and water pumps equipment. There was also a discussion about India supplying capital goods to Indonesia on deferred payment basis. Indonesian side expressed its desire for getting Indian machinery for cement plant, pulp industry, paper factory and other India-made capital goods. Umarjadi further disclosed that during the talks, Indonesia had shown keen interest in the establishment of a nickle factory, paper mill, oil refinery and several other units on production-sharing basis. To this Indonesian offer, he added, the Indian side had felt attracted and promised to study it.

A fortnight later, Manubhai Shah confirmed the correctness of Umarjadi's statement, saying that, at the preliminary talks in January 1963, the trade delegations of India and Indonesia had agreed on a long-term trade agreement. While replying to a question in the Lok Sabha on 22 February 1963, he stated that a delegation of technical experts and trade representatives from Indonesia was expected to come to India soon. After this

249. Ibid., and Indonesian Herald, 8 February 1963.
delegation had explored the shopping lists in details, he said, a Government delegation led by the Indonesian Minister, would be coming to New Delhi to conclude a trade agreement with India.

Manubhai Shah also disclosed that during Foreign Minister Subandrio's visit in January 1963, the two sides had tried to explore other avenues of Indian exports to Indonesia and this had led to the signing of a protocol between the two countries.

The two countries' efforts to consolidate and expand trade and economic relations ultimately led to the signing of a three-year Trade and Commerce Agreement on 24 April 1963. According to a communique issued at the end of the talks, the total bilateral trade in the first year of the Agreement was fixed at Rs. 13 crores (1 crore = 10 million). As it envisaged approximately 139 per cent increase in the two countries' total trade as compared to the level of trade during 1962-63, if achieved, it could be considered a major break-through in Indian-Indonesian relations.

But the hopes created by the Trade Agreement did not materialise. Strains developing in the political relations of the


252. The Hindu, 26 April 1963.

two countries had their inevitable impact on trade relations as well. This was evident from the following trade figures pertaining to the period between 1961-62 and 1965-66:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>+519</td>
<td>+267</td>
<td>+71</td>
<td>-86</td>
<td>-141</td>
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The above figures clearly show a steady decline in India's exports to Indonesia from Rs. 697 lakhs in 1961-62 to Rs. 81 lakhs in 1965-66. India's growing imports during the same period from Rs. 178 lakhs to Rs. 222 lakhs reduced her favourable balance of trade with Indonesia from Rs. 519 lakhs in 1961-62 to Rs. 71 lakhs in 1963-64. In fact, during the two following years, India started having an adverse balance growing from Rs. 86 lakhs in 1964-65 to Rs. 141 lakhs in 1965-66.

Moreover, the total bilateral trade between India and Indonesia during these years never reached the figure of Rs. 13 crores as envisaged in the communique issued after the talks between the two countries' trade delegations. It did not even regain the 1962-63 (the year preceding to the signing of the Agreement) figure.


255. Apart from decrease in Indian exports to Indonesia, India's heavier imports of Indonesian petroleum contributed to India's adverse balance of trade during these years.
of Rs. 545 lakhs and stood at the very low of Rs. 303 lakhs in 1965-66.

Similar was the case in other areas of bilateral co-operation. An important field in which India had made substantial efforts in strengthening its ties with Indonesia before 1960-61, was co-operation between the various services of the two countries' armed forces. This also declined for political reasons. A reference to Indonesia choosing Pakistan for despatch of armed forces contingent to West Irian in 1962 has already been made. The only activity worth-mentioning in the field of co-operation between their air forces during 1962-65, was a four-day visit to India by Air Vice-Marshal Qamar Dhani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Air Force (AURI), in August 1963. Accompanied by his wife and six of his Staff Officers, Qamar Dhani was welcomed by the Indian Minister of Defence Y.B. Chavan, and Air Vice-Marshmal A.M. Engineer of the Indian Air Force (IAF). On his arrival in New Delhi on 20 August 1963, the Indonesian Air Vice-Marshmal referred to the existing cordiality between the air forces of the two countries and expressed his conviction that "this visit ... will further strengthen these friendly relations". He also recalled the AURI's and his own long friendly contacts with the IAF and said that his visit would give him a first-hand opportunity to convey the greetings of the Indonesian people and its Air Force to the Indian people and the IAF.

Co-operation between the two countries' armies was also diminishing, particularly since the "Sondhi Affair" in Djakarta in

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256. See Chapter on Pakistan's Role, p. 435.
September 1962. Since the signing of the Agreement between the Indian and Indonesian armies in December 1960, India had been sending officers to Indonesia to train Indonesian military officers. India had also been offering training facilities to Indonesian military personnel in its military academies. By the end of 1963, no Indian military instructors were reported to have been left in Indonesia, nor any more, it was learnt, would be invited from India. It was also reported that the Indonesian military personnel receiving military training in India would be the last batch. "India's whole-hearted support to Malaysia" was stated to be "one of the reasons for the termination of the training arrangements" by Indonesia.

Indian-Indonesian cultural relations, which had not developed satisfactorily even before 1960-61, witnessed further loss of enthusiasm on both sides. During 1962-65, Government of India offered two scholarships to Indonesian students for 1965-66. These were intended for students at graduate or post-graduate level in Humanities, Arts or Science at any Indian University. Each scholarship provided for maintenance allowance of Rs. 250/- per mensem excluding tuition, examination and other compulsory fees to be paid by the Government of India.

It is not known whether any Indonesian student utilised this Indian offer. One thing, however, which was known to have discouraged the Indonesians from taking advantage of these opportunities was the fact that the cost of passage to and from India had to be borne by the students themselves.

260. Ibid.
India also offered facilities to two Indonesian officials for pursuing advanced training course on research for the production of radioisotopes and activation analysis at the Atomic Energy Establishment in Bombay (Trombay).

Besides, Government of India also sponsored a visit to Indonesia by Swami Ranganathananda of Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Calcutta, on the occasion of Swami Vivekananda's Birth Anniversary celebrations in December 1963. The only activity noticed during this period was the offer of travel grant to one K. Yunus of Indonesia by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations.

Deterioration in the political relations of the two countries also adversely affected their cultural co-operation under the Colombo Plan. This was evident from the decreasing number of training places offered by India to Indonesia out of its total contribution to the Colombo Plan countries. From 42 training places provided by India during 1958-62, it came down to 1 place during 1962-63 and to 2 places during 1963-64. It is worth noting that the one and the two training places that India offered to Indonesia during these two years were out of India's total contribution of 242 and 284 to the Colombo Plan countries for the respective years. Besides, the number of experts India provided

261. Ibid., 18 November 1964.
263. Ibid., p. 129. K. Yunus was stated to be on a study tour of India.
to Indonesia decreased from 4 during 1950-58 to 1 during 1958-62 to nil during 1962-63.