Chapter II

INDIA AND INDONESIA AT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
Importance of the Belgrade Conference

The importance of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in September 1961 has been variously assessed. Some former Indonesian leaders describe it as "a turning point in Indian-Indonesian relations", others term it as "a starting point", still others "an important development". Most of them, representing a cross-section of political opinion in Indonesia, however, are agreed that the Belgrade Conference was a major landmark in the post-independence history of the two countries' relations. According to Anak Agung Gde Agung, the process of "alienation" which started since the Bandung Conference in April 1955 came to mark a full circle at the Conference in Belgrade. The ideological and personal differences arising from various national and international factors existing generally since independence and particularly since the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, were brought to focus and confirmed. The major significance of the conference lay in the fact that it provided the first ever opportunity to the leaders of the two states to express in open their divergent approach to the issues of war and peace. It was bound to have serious repercussions on future relations between the two countries.

1. This was the impression gathered by the author during interviews with Indonesian political leaders belonging to various political parties in Djakarta between September 1969 and February 1970.

2. Interview with Anak Agung Gde Agung, Djakarta, 17 October 1969. He was Indonesia's Minister of Internal Affairs in Mohammad Hatta's Cabinet (20 December 1949 - 6 September 1950) and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Burhanuddin Harahap's Cabinet (12 August 1955 - 26 March 1956).
Early Attitudes

The idea of the Conference which came to have significant bearing on the future of Indian-Indonesian relations, is said to have emanated from President Josep Broz Tito of Yugoslavia in 1959. It received strength during the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September-October 1960. In what was described as a long "summit meeting" on 30 September 1960, the five non-aligned leaders of India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Ghana, exchanged views on the role of the non-aligned members of the United Nations in relation to the deteriorating international situation. They also examined President Kwame Nkrumah's proposal to establish a "neutralist group" in the General Assembly in order to serve as a strong third force between "East and West". The tangible result of the "summit meeting" at the moment, was a Resolution. It called upon "the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to renew contacts interrupted recently, so that their declared willingness to find solutions of the outstanding problems by negotiations may be


5. The leaders respectively were Prime Minister Nehru, Presidents Sukarno, Nasser, Tito and Kwame Nkrumah.

6. The Hindu, 29 September 1960. The President of Ghana had suggested that the aim of this "neutralist group" was to "exert moral pressure on the two main blocs and prevent them from plunging all of us into the holocaust of a disastrous war".
progressively implemented." This was the first practical step taken by the non-aligned leaders to co-ordinate their approach and demonstrate their willingness to form and exert combined moral pressure on the Great Powers to seek peace through mutual negotiations. The Resolution was important for two reasons. Firstly, it showed the necessity of the non-aligned countries to meet and confer, at the highest level, in order to arrive at a common approach to issues of universal importance; secondly, it set the major objective of those adhering to non-alignment, that is, to seek and promote peace by creating conditions for peaceful negotiations between the two Great Powers.

By virtue of their being the representatives of the two most populous and potentially rich non-aligned nations, and also because of their widely acknowledged role as great personalities among the non-aligned leaderships, both Nehru and Sukarno played a crucial role in the "summit meeting". This was clear from the fact that the Indonesian leader was authorised to introduce the resolution to the UN General Assembly on behalf of the five non-aligned states and the Indian leader was chosen to second it. The joint resolution, no doubt, signified a similar approach on the part of both the leaders. Nevertheless, beneath this similarity lay obvious differences which manifested later at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. In his address before the UN General Assembly on 30 September 1960, "To Build the World Anew", before the Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly, on 30 September 1960. The Resolution was introduced in the UN General Assembly by President Sukarno on behalf of the delegations of Ghana, India, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Indonesia. It, however, failed to carry the requisite two-thirds majority vote, and, thus, caused disappointment to the initiators of the move. See Indonesia, Handbook on the Political Manifesto (Two Executive Directions of the Manipol), Special Issue 73 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961), p. 159. See also The Hindu, 2 October 1960.
President Sukarno attributed the cold war "conflict" to "inequalities" whether within a nation or between nations. And these "inequalities", according to him, resulted from "imperialism and colonialism" which should be eliminated in order to remove exploitation of man by man and nation by nation. From this, Sukarno went on to survey at length the five principles of "Pantja Sila", the philosophical basis of the Indonesian State. Believing them to be "a way out of this confrontation of ideologies", the President of Indonesia urged the world organisation for "universal application" of these principles. Only then, could the prospects "To Build The World Anew" be brightened.

At best, President Sukarno's address was a philosophical search for the basic factors responsible for international tension, which he identified as colonialism and imperialism. Although, while submitting the five non-aligned countries' resolution to the UN General Assembly on 30 September 1960, he considered it "a practical step" in the direction of easing international tension arising out of cold war postures of the two Great Powers, the entire weight of his argument revolved round the question of colonialism and imperialism, which have to be eliminated in order "to build a world sane and secure". But the deteriorating international situation demanded an urgency which Sukarno had ignored.

By contrast, Nehru's address to the UN General Assembly was over-weighted in favour of the resumption of negotiations between the leaders of the Great Powers, the United States and the USSR. For him

10. Ibid., p. 148.
11. Ibid., p. 149.
"the basic problem of all" was the necessity to preserve "peace" in the world. "Without peace", he said, "all our dreams vanish and are reduced to ashes". He believed that the danger to peace arose from the "deadlock" between the two super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, on various issues like disarmament, Germany, West Berlin and the Congo. If the leadership of these two States could be brought round to soften their rigid postures and to enter into negotiations, chances for world peace might be brightened. It is in this field that the non-aligned countries could play a meaningful role.

The five-power draft resolution was significant because it focussed the urgency of this fact. Prime Minister Nehru was fully aware of the continued existence of colonialism in Asia and Africa. But he was not in favour of using strong language against one state or the other as this would only increase bitterness and, consequently, decrease the chances for peace. He believed in eliminating colonialism through the United Nations.

Initial Moves

The prospects of the non-aligned countries' summit conference remained in abeyance until President Tito of Yugoslavia and President Nasser of the United Arab Republic broached the idea still further in the first quarter of 1961. The fill up was given by the joint communiqué issued by the two Presidents in Cairo on 22 April 1961, at the conclusion of President Tito's visit to the United Arab Republic. The two leaders expressed their deep concern over the

13. Ibid.
unfavourable development of international relations and over the
dangerous aggravation of the situation caused by recent developments". They "held the view that consultations between the non-aligned
countries are indispensable for the purpose of consolidating world
peace, safeguarding the independence of all nations and eliminating
the danger of intervention in their affairs". In pursuance of their
common desire, both the Presidents issued joint letters addressed to
the leaders of the non-aligned countries, proposing the idea of a
summit conference and suggesting that it be convened sometime before
the next session of the UN General Assembly. On 16 May 1961, with
President Sukarno having given his concurrence, the three Presidents
made an announcement that a preparatory meeting would be held in Cairo
on 5 June 1961, followed by a conference of leaders of non-aligned
states. The announcement was accompanied with an invitation to
attend the preparatory meeting. There were six following issues to
be discussed and decided upon by the preparatory meeting:

1. desirability of holding a neutral summit as proposed
   by Presidents Tito and Nasser; and in case of agreement,
   to

2. decide on the countries to be invited to the main
   conference;

3. the date on which the conference to be held;

4. the duration of the conference;

5. the agenda, functioning and procedure; and

6. the venue of the conference.

15. Arab Observer (Cairo), vol. 2, no. 20, 14 May 1961, p. 15.
16. Ibid., p. 14. The letters jointly signed by Presidents Tito and
   Nasser were delivered to various Asian, African and Latin
   American countries by the Chiefs of the Yugoslav and the UAR
diplomatic missions, shortly after the signing of the Joint
   Communiqué on 22 April 1961.
17. "The Neutral Summit", Link (Delhi), vol. 3, no. 41, 21 May
18. Ibid.
The underlying idea stated was to hold high-level consultations in order to arrive at a common understanding on the major issues that were due to come up before the sixteenth General Assembly Session of the United Nations. 19

India's Reactions

India's interest in Afro-Asian gatherings had been declining since the First Asian-African Conference in Bandung (Indonesia) in April 1955. 20 Prime Minister Nehru's lukewarm response to President Sukarno's demand for such large gatherings could be attributed to his awareness of disunity existing among the Afro-Asians. These gatherings, in his opinion, would only display the divisions in their ranks and invite big powers to exploit them. Another reason was India's serious preoccupation with economic development at home. But these reasons did not weigh much with President Sukarno. 21

During his short visit to Cairo on 19 March 1961, en route to New Delhi, Nehru had discussed with President Nasser, the advantages and disadvantages of holding a second Afro-Asian Conference. At least he was not in favour of holding such a Conference. It is quite possible that they also might have discussed the prospects of

19. Ibid.
20. Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (Bombay, etc., 1964), p. 70.
23. Mideast Mirror, vol. 13, no. 12, 25 March 1961, p. 10. At a press conference in New Delhi, on return from Cairo, Nehru revealed that prospects of a second Afro-Asian Conference had figured in his talks with President Nasser. But, he categorically said that "it did not mean that such a meeting was going to be held".
a non-aligned conference as proposed by President Tito of Yugoslavia. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that two leaders agreed about convening a second non-aligned gathering in place of a second Asian-African Conference. Within less than two months of Nehru's talks with Nasser, Presidents of Yugoslavia and the UAR issued invitations, stating that "the time is opportune for the heads of non-aligned countries to convene in the greatest possible numbers", and "at the nearest possible time". It became difficult for India to decline the invitation at this stage. Besides being impolitic, it would be taken to mean abandonment of non-alignment policy on the part of India. But the way invitation to attend the preparatory meeting was accepted created the impression that India was not that willing to attend the proposed non-aligned conference. On 18 May 1961, Nehru told the newsmen in New Delhi: "We are attending the preliminary conference and that may lead the way to the other. But there is no question of anticipating the results of the First Conference." Obviously, the Indian Prime Minister entertained certain reservations about the preparatory meeting. Nehru's press conference indicated that India would be willing to join the summit meeting only if certain conditions were fulfilled. The conditions related to the membership of the proposed non-aligned conference and the nature of issues to be discussed. India desired, as it was made known later, by R.K. Nehru, leader of the Indian delegation, that the Summit Conference should be broad-based, including all the countries not committed to either of the two blocs. It also desired that the agenda of the Conference should include for discussion only those

issues having direct or indirect bearing on Big Power conflicts, such as disarmament, banning of nuclear tests, Laos and the Congo. "Bilateral disputes" or regional issues of limited significance should be excluded. It was believed in India that fulfilment of these two conditions would check efforts at building a third bloc, and enable the non-aligned summit conference to make a positive contribution towards promoting peace. The Indian Prime Minister entertained fears that the summit meeting "may encourage the idea of a third bloc...". These fears continued to delay Government of India's decision to join the summit conference even after the two original sponsors, Presidents Tito and Nasser, gave assurances to the contrary. But the words of the invitation, viz., "to convene in the greatest possible numbers" were in accord with the Indian emphasis on broad-basing the conference and, in this sense, might have encouraged India to decide in favour of participating in the preparatory meeting. In fact, these conditions became the two major planks of India's policy in the preparatory conference in Cairo.

Indonesia's Responses

During his visit to Yugoslavia in late May 1960, President Sukarno was reported having discussed with President Tito about the possibilities of holding a meeting of the uncommitted nations. This could be inferred from Subandrio's statement at a press conference on 1 June 1960. The Indonesian Foreign Minister favoured the idea of such a conference. Linking it with the abortive Paris Summit Meeting

27. Link, vol. 4, no. 1, 15 August 1961, p. 22. Nehru said this in an interview with the Link Correspondents in Delhi. See also ibid., vol. 4, no. 4, 3 September 1961, p. 34.
of the leaders of the Big Four, Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union, he observed that by holding such a conference "we will be able to assist the two world giants to find another way out to breakthrough the deadlock in Paris." Ganis Harsono, a spokesman of the Foreign Department of Indonesia, also tended to link his Government's support to this proposal with the failure of the Paris Summit Meeting and declared that the mankind need not lose courage when the non-aligned nations were ready to fill the gap towards preserving world peace. Government of Indonesia's interest in the non-aligned Summit Meeting grew with the passage of time. President Sukarno became co-sponsor of the invitation to the preparatory meeting issued on 18 May 1961 by the Presidents of Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic.

But Government of Indonesia's favourable attitude produced a controversy in the domestic politics. Since the First Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955, the Indonesian Government had been making efforts towards convening the second Asian-African Conference. Particularly since the beginning of Guided Democracy in

29. Ibid., 2 June 1960 and 17 June 1960. The Big Four Summit Meeting which was scheduled to be held in Paris on 16 May 1960 and was intended to reduce tensions between the two world blocs, proved abortive. The deadlock arose from strong Soviet reactions to the American espionage activities against the Soviet Union. Only a fortnight before the Summit Meeting was scheduled to being, that is, on 1 May 1960, the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 spy aircraft over its territory.

30. Ibid., 17 June 1960.

31. As early as November 1956, Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian Prime Minister, had succeeded in seeking concurrence, in principle, of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon and India, to the holding of the second Asian-African Conference and thought that it would be "held in the second half of next year". This he revealed at a press conference in New Delhi on 14 November 1956. See The Hindu, 15 November 1956. In 1957, Government of Indonesia sounded the five sponsoring countries on the possibility of convening the Conference in that year or the next year. This was disclosed by Foreign Minister Subandrio in the course of his address as Chairman of the preparatory meeting in Djakarta in April 1964. See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, pp. 284-5.
July 1959, the growing influence of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was carrying the country's foreign policy towards increasing identification with the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stance of international Communism. This was reflected in a growing degree of co-ordination with and commitment to Afro-Asian solidarity movement. Although basic aims of Indonesia's foreign policy continued to be active devotion to "world peace and prosperity", to friendship with "all nations", and to abolition of exploitation of man by man, and, finally, active opposition to "all forms of imperialism and colonialism", the last-mentioned aim came to attract priority over others.

The "independent and active" foreign policy of Indonesia showed indications of a shift from the fundamentals of non-alignment. In September 1960, President Sukarno's call "To Build The World Anew" and his explanation of the idea of struggle between the forces of colonialism and imperialism and the forces of freedom and independence, which he later described as the Concept of New Emerging Forces versus Old Established Forces, confirmed these emerging trends. This gave an impetus to the demand for convening the Second Asian-African Conference.

In view of these developments, the Indonesian Government's readiness to attend the preparatory meeting of the non-aligned summit conference seemed to be paradoxical.

The Communists (PKI) and the nationalists (PNI), two


33. This was the title of President Sukarno's address before the UN General Assembly on 30 September 1960.
important elements in the "Nasakom" politics, openly expressed their opposition to the Government's attitude. The Communist Party of Indonesia had expressed its opposition to the idea of the non-aligned conference as early as August 1960. It had noted contradictions between the Yugoslav and Indonesian foreign policies, criticised Foreign Minister Subandrio for his quick agreement to President Tito's proposal and interpreted it as deviation from the "independent and active" principles and those laid down in the Political Manifesto. Stressing that Indonesia's foreign policy was one of active opposition to imperialism and not a neutral posture towards it (like that of Yugoslavia), it had said it "must mean actively striving for world peace and not convene a Little Summit Conference of non-bloc countries".

The Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) was also not in favour of attending the proposed non-aligned summit meeting. The leadership of the Party considered the Government's favourable attitude towards President Tito's proposal as against President Sukarno's concept of "New Emerging Forces" versus "Old Established Forces". In the framework of this concept, Ali Sastroamidjojo, General Chairman of the PNI, told the author in an interview in Djakarta, that non-alignment had become irrelevant. The basis of this concept, he explained, was aligning with all the international forces working actively against colonialism and imperialism anywhere in the world. And the way he suggested was to make incessant efforts towards convening a second

34. The term "Nasakom", representing combination of three forces - nationalism (PNI), religion (NU) and Communism (PKI), was coined by President Sukarno as a symbol of national unity.

Asian-African conference. 36 Ali Sastroamidjojo met President Sukarno, explained the Party’s stand and expressed his anxiety that the Government decision to attend the preparatory meeting might slacken its efforts towards convening the second Asian-African Conference. 37

In order to allay these fears the Government of Indonesia issued a special statement on 26 May 1961, just ten days before the opening of the preparatory meeting. It described the non-aligned summit conference plan as "a concrete implementation of Indonesia’s active and independent foreign policy". It added that the uncommitted countries "together could make important and constructive contributions to the cause of world peace without forming a new bloc". But, at the same time, it assured: "With the holding of this high level meeting we need not worry that our effort to call a second conference of A-A(Afro-Asian) nations will be in any way depreciated". The Government, it assured further, would use the non-aligned preparatory meeting as a "medium" to better the prospects of the second Asian-African Conference and, in this way, continue its endeavours to hold a preparatory meeting thereto "at the end of this year". In a similar vein, Subandrio observed later in the course of his address to the preparatory meeting in Cairo thus:

We regard the positive result of this non-aligned countries Conference as a way to fortify the agreements reached at Bandung, and what is more, this Conference will pave the way to a second Asian and African Conference in the not too distant future.


37. Ibid. Ali Sastroamidjojo could not recall the exact date of his meeting with the President.


He also expressed his hope that this Conference would "strengthen the force of struggle against colonialism and imperialism".

These assurances from the Government appeared to satisfy both the PKI and the PNI. This was evident from their readiness to be represented later in the official Indonesian delegation to the Summit Conference, which came to be known as "Nasakom" delegation.

Attitudes at the Preparatory Meeting

The meeting preparatory to the summit conference of the non-aligned countries took place in Cairo between 5 and 12 June 1961. Besides India and Indonesia, eighteen other countries participated in the meeting. Indian delegation was led by R.K. Nehru, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, whereas Indonesian delegation was headed by Subandrio, Foreign Minister of Indonesia. This revealed that India did not attach as much importance to the

40. Antara, 20 June 1961. The Government continued to give assurances and thus revealed the strength of domestic opposition to its stand on joining the non-aligned conference. On 5 July 1961 Dr. Djuanda Kartawidjaja told the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat - DPR-GR) that Indonesia was continuing its efforts to hold another Asian-African Conference. See ibid., 7 July 1961.

41. Harian Rakjat, 21 August 1961. The "Nasakom" delegation as such included, among others, Ali Sastroamidjojo, representing the PNI, D.N. Aidit, representing the PKI and Sjaifudin Zuhri, representing NU (Nahdatul Ulama Party).

42. Duta Masjarakat (Djakarta), 5 June 1961. See also Suluh Indonesia (Djakarta), 5 June 1961. The meeting fixed from 5 to 10 June 1961 had to be extended for two days in order to enable the participants to overcome differences on the issue of membership of the Conference.

preliminary meeting leading to summit conference as Indonesia.

Besides, Government of Indonesia considered preliminary meeting as a "very important event".

The task of the preparatory meeting was to discuss and decide upon certain issues relating to the summit conference, viz., desirability of holding the conference, its composition, its timing and duration, its agenda, functioning and procedure, and its venue. Besides, it was also called upon to decide about the seating of delegates from the Provisional Government of Algeria and the Antoine Gizenga Government of the Congo based in Stanleyville, in its deliberations. Ghanian delegate proposed that invitations be sent to these two Governments. This brought differences to the fore. During two days of discussions, participants in the preliminary meeting took different positions. India's view was that the membership of the non-aligned conference be confined to the members of the United Nations. Neither the Provisional Government of Algeria nor the Antoine Gizenga Government of the Congo had as yet representation in the United Nations. Besides, India had not yet accorded recognition to either of the two Governments. It was reported that, in the beginning, the Indian delegation was not agreeable to participation by the delegates of the Provisional Government of Algeria; but,

48. Ibid., p. 10.
later, withdrew its objections. India's opposition flowed from the fact that India had not yet established formal diplomatic relations with that Government.

As regards the Congo, India opposed invitation to the delegates of the Antoine Gizenga Government, because it lacked the mandate from the Congolese Parliament. India had, in the recent past, been withholding recognition to any government in the Congo on these grounds. The Indian Prime Minister had during his visit to Cairo in March 1961, stressed the fact that the Congolese Parliament was the only body representing the Congolese people and hence it should meet to elect a legitimate government of the whole country. Moreover, according to R.K. Nehru, inviting the Government of Antoine Gizenga, at this stage, would be prejudicial to the UN resolution, seeking to convene the Parliament in the Congo. Another reason for India's objection was that the United Nations only recognised the Leopoldville Government as the central government of the Congo.

Later in August 1961, the Indian Prime Minister, in an interview with the Link correspondents in New Delhi, referred to this issue as the one on which there was "difference of opinion" between India and other participants in the preliminary meeting.

In contrast, Indonesia expressed itself strongly in support of the Ghanian proposal to send invitations to the two Governments. It was in accord with her attitude of supporting the freedom struggles

49. Suluh Indonesia, 10 June 1961.
50. Ibid., 12 June 1961.
52. Suluh Indonesia, 12 June 1961.
in Asia and Africa. The Indonesian Government had already accorded recognition to the Provisional Algerian Government and the Antoine Gizenga Government of the Congo. Only three weeks before the preparatory meeting, President Sukarno had issued a joint communique with President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, in Accra, on 15 May 1961, reaffirming the two countries' recognition of Antoine Gizenga's government as the only legitimate government in the Congo.

Differences in Indian and Indonesian attitudes towards the issue of invitation to these two Governments had wider implications. The delegation from Indonesia had found itself sharing the views of the majority of the participants. The "Casablanca" group of the countries held strong opinions on this issue. They insisted that Antoine Gizenga Government must be invited along with other governments. Delegate from Morocco even threatened to boycott the meeting if representatives of the Provisional Algerian Government were not invited. Other countries like Cuba, Yugoslavia and even Ceylon had also rallied round to their view. Under pressure of the majority opinion, India had to yield on the question of participation by the Provisional Algerian Government, whose delegation joined the preliminary meeting on the third day. The question of Stanleyville


57. Seven African States, Algeria (Provisional Government of Algeria), Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic, met in a Conference at Casablanca (Morocco) in January 1961. Morocco later dropped out. These states later came to be known as "Casablanca" group of states.


59. Ibid.

60. Ceylonese delegate had seconded the Ghanaian proposal to send invitations to these two Governments. See Arab Observer, vol. 2, no. 24, 11 June 1961, pp. 9-10.
Government's participation was deferred due to the UAR, Sudan and some other countries' reservations on this issue.

By implication whereas India had found herself isolated, Indonesia had demonstrated its identification with the African-Arab sentiments of anti-colonialism. India's refusal to recognise Gizenga Government in the Congo and the Provisional Government of Algeria gave the impression of her "lack of fervour" for African cause of liberation from colonialism.

Following the discussion on the issue of inviting the Gizenga Government and the Provisional Government of Algeria, two major issues on which the Indian and Indonesian delegations came to show opposing attitudes were composition of the conference and its agenda. On the composition issue, India took the position of enlarging the scope of non-alignment. In a press interview in Cairo, R.K. Nehru stressed that the membership of the Conference should be comprehensive rather than restrictive. The idea, as he put it, was to win over "wavering" countries to the side of the non-aligned group of states and, thereby, to strengthen the front working for world peace. In this connection, the Indian delegate had already submitted a list of eighteen countries for consideration as possible invitees. These included Malaya from South-east Asia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia and Upper Volta from Africa, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Norway and Sweden from Europe, Lebanon from West Asia and Argentina, Bolivia, etc.

61. Duta Masjarakat, 9 June 1961. According to this daily, Sudan, the UAR and India were opposed to the representation of the Stanleyville Government. As a result, it guessed that it would not be invited. See also Arab Observer, vol. 2, no. 24, 11 June 1961, pp. 9-10.


Chile and Equador from Latin America.

India's endeavour to broadbase the proposed summit conference was related to its fears that the conference might not degenerate into a bloc-making effort. According to Prime Minister Nehru, non-aligned states should not only be non-aligned with the two power blocs but also be non-aligned among themselves. The Government of India expected that inclusion of countries belonging to the four continents and adhering to a policy of non-alignment of various shades would checkmate efforts at bloc-making and also keep radical anti-colonialist tendencies in reasonable proportions.

But leader of the Indian delegation had to face stiff opposition from various sides. All the participant countries lay divided into two broad groups, the one seeking to extend the scope of non-alignment by new admissions, the other endeavouring to restrict it. Only Afghanistan, Burma, Ethiopia, Nepal and the Sudan supported India on the basis of a common desire to seek representation of all shades of non-alignment and thus ensure that the non-aligned group did not emerge as a bloc. The rest of the participants found India's policy as opposed to their interests and hence joined to restrict rather than to expand the scope of non-


65. "Neutral Summit", *Link*, vol. 4, no. 4, 3 September 1961, p. 34. In an interview with the *Link* correspondents in New Delhi in August 1961, Nehru had expressed his fears that due to "difference in the thinking of the various non-aligned countries", the summit might lead to the formation of a bloc. "I did not want to go," he had added. "The Conference may encourage the idea of a Third Bloc, although we have made it clear, it should not, and President Tito has also said it should not. President Nasser has also said the same. But in a vague sense it might still encourage that idea." See ibid., vol. 4, no. 1, 15 August 1961, p. 22.


alignment. For instance, Cuba favoured participation by Equador and Bolivia because of their pro-Cuban sentiment and opposed those of pro-United States, like Argentina, Chile and Mexico. The "Casablanca" group of African and Arab states, likewise, successfully prevented participation by the "Monrovia" group of African States. Yugoslavia being the choice of venue, the European countries showed disinclination to join the Conference. On the basis of its radical anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist posture, Indonesia found a common basis with this latter group restricting the scope of non-alignment.

Outnumbered, the group led by India suggested the formation of a sub-committee to evolve a criteria to be applied for selection of the invitees to the proposed summit conference. It was during discussions in this sub-committee that both India and Indonesia came to have a sharp difference of opinion. The Indonesian delegate put forward the formula that only those be considered non-aligned and invited who agreed to "having no foreign military bases on their territories and joining no military blocs". Apart from conforming to its radical anti-colonialist stance, this posture of Indonesia was based on a proper assessment of the strength of opposition to the stand taken by the Indian delegate. In such a situation, R.K. Nehru's

69. Jansen, n. 24, pp. 287 and 289. The "Casablanca" group was comprised of only six states as against the "Monrovia" group comprising about twenty African states. The differences in attitudes towards the Congo prevented the participation by those belonging to the latter group.

Heads of twenty African states participated in a Conference held at Monrovia (Liberia) from 8 to 12 May 1961. These states later came to be known as "Monrovia" group.

70. Ibid.
72. Ibid. While participating in the discussion on the criteria of non-alignment, the leader of the Indian delegation had said that in his Government's opinion, definition of non-alignment should be "elastic" in order to attract the largest number of countries into the non-aligned fold.
persistence on liberal interpretation of non-alignment was bound to isolate and embarrass him. And this is what happened. Most of the participants in the preliminary meeting favoured Indonesian thesis about criteria for invitations to the Summit Conference.

Certain considerations prompted the Indonesian delegation to adopt a stiff attitude on this issue. Firstly, its identification with the strongly anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stance of the "Casablanca" states, the Arabs, the Yugoslavs and the Cubans, would enhance Indonesia's image as a champion of their cause. It would also better the prospects of the second Asian-African Conference.

Seeing from this angle, Foreign Minister Subandrio, leader of the Indonesian delegation to the preparatory meeting, took the position that the urgent need of the time was to consolidate and not to expand the scope of non-alignment. Addressing the preparatory meeting on 6 June 1961, the Indonesian Foreign Minister said: "Now we are engaged in the work of consolidating the ranks of the non-aligned countries, so as to build a compact moral force of compelling

73. Ibid.

74. Criteria evolved by the preparatory meeting were as follows:

1. Each country concerned should follow an independent policy, based on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence with nations of differing social and political structures.

2. It should consistently support popular liberation and independence movements.

3. It should not participate in collective military pacts, nor be involved in East-West cold war disputes.

4. If it were a party to any bilateral agreement with a major power, or a member of a regional defence pact, it should not take sides in the cold war, nor involve itself in East-West disagreements.

5. It should have entered into no agreement to establish military bases on its territory for the benefit of either side in the cold war.

magnitude in the world." He also warned against "trying to compromise on basic principles of non-alignment or by diluting these principles beyond recognition" and suggested that this meeting in Cairo was convened "in order to consolidate this moral force". However, in order to placate the sentiments of those left outside the Conference, Subandrio was quick to assure "that this convention of non-aligned countries should not be construed as antagonizing our other brothers of Asia and Africa". At a press conference in Cairo, on 20 June 1961, Mrs. Supeni, roving Ambassador of Indonesia and the Deputy Leader of the Indonesian delegation, further explained her Government's position. Commenting on the suggestion by the Indian delegate for expanding the area of non-alignment, she said that her Government would prefer consolidation of non-alignment policy rather than attempting right now to extend its scope. She added that Indonesia would agree and support such an expansion of non-aligned policy area, but at this stage it would be more important to consolidate the non-aligned policy itself.

This showed the degree of importance the Indonesian leaders attached to the prospects of the second Asian-African conference, an objective of their foreign policy which they always kept in view. In the course of his speech at the preparatory meeting, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia had stated that "this conference will pave the way to a second Asian and African Conference in the not too distant future". He had added that this "will also encourage people to find

75. Antara, 20 June 1961. This issue gives full text of Subandrio's speech at the preparatory meeting in Cairo on 6 June 1961.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., 21 June 1961.
ways and means to implement the Bandung resolutions ... and (will) strengthen the force of struggle against colonialism and imperialism."

The second major issue which focussed Indian-Indonesian differences related to the agenda of the proposed summit conference. Government of India was of the opinion that only general issues of international character should be included in the agenda. In his press interview in Cairo, R.K. Nehru had stressed that India would like to see the summit conference concentrate on major international problems. India sought to exclude bilateral disputes from the agenda because it believed it would be difficult to achieve unanimity on them. This might lead to the conference getting bogged down on issues on which certain states might adopt rigid positions. This way non-alignment might lose its original purpose of creating conditions for world peace and international co-operation, and the gathering of the non-aligned states, instead of employing its moral strength in the promotion and preservation of peace, might prove harmful. In conformity with its earlier record of anti-colonialism, India was not opposed to discussing the problem of colonialism in general. But it was afraid that discussion on specific bilateral issues between participating states might lead to stiffening of attitudes and prejudicing non-aligned countries' efforts to end colonialism through the United Nations. Hence its stress on inclusion of international issues like disarmament, etc. in the agenda of the summit conference.

In this regard Indonesia's attitude was sharply opposed to that of India. Indonesia had, of late, been losing faith in the

78. Ibid., 20 June 1961.
efficacy of the United Nations as a forum for peaceful solution of colonial disputes. The United Nations had failed to do justice to Indonesia on the issue of West Irian, which still continued to be under the control of the Dutch. The Dutch persistence in declining negotiations on the West Irian issue, on the one hand, and the UN failure in this regard, on the other, had been having serious impact on Indonesia's domestic and foreign policies. One of the profound consequences of Dutch policy on the West Irian issue had been the growing commitment of Indonesia's governing elites to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. In this sense, West Irian was a very live issue which Indonesians would like to be included in the agenda of the summit conference. Likewise, Indonesia would also like to include all other issues of national liberation struggles being waged in Asia and Africa. This fitted well into Indonesia's Afro-Asian policy of seeking to consolidate all the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces in these continents. The joint communique issued and statements and speeches made during President Sukarno's visit to the UAR, Ghana, Soviet Union and China, during May-June 1961, clearly indicated Indonesia's increasing identification with the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggles in Asia and Africa and its stress on their problems, and on rendering all-out assistance to them. In the joint communique issued in Belgrade on 17 June 1961, President Sukarno had joined Presidents Tito (Yugoslavia) and Modibo Keita (Mali) in expressing the hope that the forthcoming "neutral" summit meeting would result in "strong and unanimous" declarations against colonialism and imperialism. It was a clear indication of

81. Ibid., 19 June 1961.
Indonesia's resolve to discuss bilateral anti-colonial issues in the summit conference agenda.

On other issues before the preparatory meeting, like the venue, timing and duration of the conference, neither India nor Indonesia appeared to attach much importance. The Indian delegate suggested Lebanon, but later fell in line with many others who opted for Yugoslavia as the venue of the Summit Conference. The Indonesian delegate also took a favourable position to the choice of Yugoslavia. As regards timing of the Conference, both the Indian and Indonesian delegations agreed to the general trend of fixing the date close to the next session of the UN General Assembly. Finally, in its meeting on 9 June 1961, the preparatory meeting decided Yugoslavia as the venue and 1 September 1961 as the date for the main Conference.

India was not happy with the results of the preparatory meeting, both in regard to composition and agenda of the summit conference. Certain reservations entertained by Prime Minister Nehru before sending an Indian delegation to the preparatory meeting had not been met satisfactorily. This explains why Government of India was as yet hesitant to attend the summit conference. In a statement issued after the meeting in Cairo, R.K. Nehru, leader of the Indian delegation, said that India was not committed to attend the proposed non-aligned nations conference. He clarified his remarks by suggesting that India had associated itself with the states sponsoring the conference and was not among those sending invitations.

82. Jansen, n. 24, p. 289. Yugoslavia was one of the venues suggested by the sub-committee on venue and date of the conference, the other two being Cuba and the UAR.
83. Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), 10 June 1961.
Harian Rakjat, a Communist Party of Indonesia daily, from Djakarta, reported that Prime Minister Nehru was still reluctant to attend the summit meeting.

India was, in fact, not as much bothered about the nature of the criteria of non-alignment as with its application to individual cases. While commenting on the prospects of achieving "greater common understanding between non-aligned countries at Belgrade", Nehru told the Link correspondents, in an interview in New Delhi in August 1961:

I do not think there are any differences of views in regard to broad principles. But in regard to the application of these principles there might be some differences. 86

Actually speaking, difficulties in selection of participants in the proposed non-aligned meeting had arisen at the stage of application of the criteria of non-alignment to individual countries. R.K. Nehru's plea for liberal interpretation of the formula of non-alignment had not convinced the majority of countries which supported Indonesian thesis of uncompromising attitude in this regard. The preparatory meeting had been extended until 12 June 1961, in order to resolve deadlock on this issue; yet it failed to do so and left the question to be settled later by an Ambassadors' Committee comprising of representatives of twenty participating countries. Although Indian delegate had been pressing for sending invitations to various Asian, African, Latin American and European countries without success, the Communique issued by Preparatory Committee in Cairo on 12 June 1961, had not been altogether discouraging to India. The Communique

85. Harian Rakjat, 31 July 1961. It attributed Nehru's unwillingness to the failure of the Indian delegation to the preparatory meeting in broadbasings the proposed non-aligned conference. It said that many countries proposed by the Indian delegate were left out.

had expressed "the opinion" of the participants "that the area of non-alignment has been widened, and could be further widened, in scope and influence, and thus become a fundamental factor in the preservation of international peace and security", and thus left an opening for India in this direction.

Government of India thus continued to make efforts for seeking inclusion of a number of states through the Ambassadors' Committee. Speaking in the first meeting of the Ambassadors' Committee, the Indian Ambassador in Cairo, M.A. Husain, explained India's stand thus:

India is not trying to push any country against the wish of any other. We are interested only in proper application of the criteria adopted by the Preliminary meeting. We want our philosophy of non-alignment to expand to allow more nations to come in. Why be afraid of inviting more countries? Only those countries which like us and follow our line of policy will respond to our invitation.

The Indian representative also hinted that he would suggest a list of new countries to be invited from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, provided they fulfilled the 5-point criteria laid down by the preparatory meeting. As it happened, he suggested nineteen new members and succeeded in seeking invitations for six only. India was reported to be still pressing strong for invitations to Tanganyika and Cyprus.

89. Ibid.
Obviously India's efforts in broadbasing the summit conference had met with stiff opposition. The degree of India's achievement in this direction was variously interpreted as "partial success" and "meagre".

On the whole, India's experiences at the preparatory meeting had not been "wholly happy". India's emphasis on exclusion of bilateral disputes from the agenda of the summit conference had also failed to carry conviction with a majority of participants. Issues of national liberation struggles being still waged in Asia and Africa were too important for Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Cuba and Arab and African states to be excluded from the agenda. The first item on the proposed agenda related to "Respect of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination; the struggle against imperialism; liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism...." Certainly, it was against India's desire to give prominence to issues of world importance.

At least the UAR, one of the original sponsors of the non-aligned summit conference, had officially encouraged India's belief that, in the conference agenda, priority would be given to "global issues". But, in the course of discussions at the preparatory conference will seek to coordinate the stand of the uncommitted nations on major issues involving this planet".
meeting, both the UAR and Yugoslavia had tended to give equal importance to issues of international and regional character. This had circumscribed India's efforts in this direction.

Unlike India, Indonesia was satisfied with the results of the preparatory meeting in June 1961. As regards criteria of non-alignment, the Indonesian delegation's thesis of considering those as non-aligned who agree to "having no foreign military bases on their territories and joining no military blocs", had found favour with a majority of participants. By offering ready support to Ghana's proposal to admit the Congo (Stanleyville) Government of Antoine Gizenga and the Provisional Government of Algeria, and to the national liberation struggles in Asia and Africa, Indonesia had successfully attempted to establish its anti-colonial image in African and the Arab circles. Indonesian contention of consolidating non-alignment at that time also complemented the restrictive efforts of the "Casablanca" group of African and Arab States, of Yugoslavia from Europe and of Cuba from Latin America. A co-relation of policy with these states, on the composition issue, had enabled Indonesian delegate to block Indian efforts at seeking expansion of non-alignment.

The sense of India's disappointment at the outcome of the preparatory meeting in Cairo in June 1961 was very acute. This explains why India was still reluctant about attending the main Conference in the following September. The final decision about India's participation and representation through the Prime Minister, came only on 9 August 1961, barely three weeks before the Conference was scheduled to begin.

For Nehru, the decision to participate was not an easy one.
He had to weigh the likely outcome of the conference in case India joined as also in case it did not, and its bearing on the national and international objectives of India's foreign policy. Participation would bring India into conflict with majority of those attending it on most of the issues. Nevertheless, if India participated, the non-aligned meeting would prove to be a substitute for a second Afro-Asian gathering and Indonesia's persistent demand for the second "Bandung" Conference would lose much of its appeal, a calculation which the later events proved to be wrong. But in case of India's non-participation in the Belgrade summit conference, non-alignment would be twisted to serve as an instrument of the cold war. Moreover, it would not be in the best interests of India to displease the Afro-Asians as such. It was felt that there would be more advantages in participation than disadvantages; hence the decision to participate.

India's Preparations

Nehru's decision to participate in the Conference was finally announced on 9 August 1961. He had taken this decision in full awareness of the enormity of difficulties ahead. The restricted group of non-aligned participants had limited the scope of India's manoeuvrability against those whose feelings against Western colonialism and imperialism were still very high. And among the participants a majority, comprising the Casablanca group of seven African states including the UAR, Cuba from Latin America, Yugoslavia from Eastern Europe, Indonesia from South East Asia, the Arab states like Yemen and Iraq, and the Congo, were expected to oppose India's objectives. In this light it was rather necessary for Indian diplomacy to prepare the ground properly. Obviously, not much was done to popularise India's views in this regard. In the absence of clear directions from New Delhi on the issues of
importance to India at Belgrade, the Indian diplomats had been puzzled. Confusion grew from the Government's acceptance of the invitation to attend. Through continued reluctance, an impression had been allowed to gather in the Indian diplomatic circles that despite all sorts of compulsions India might not attend the conference. A period of three weeks was certainly not enough to counter the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist propaganda that had been carried on consistently by China, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. One of the major lessons of the Cairo preparatory meetings had been ignored through a belated decision. It could be said that India attended the Belgrade Conference without having fully prepared the ground for it.

**Indonesia's Preparations**

After having decided to participate in the Conference, Indonesia had intensified its efforts to strengthen its position vis-a-vis India. The Indonesian diplomacy was geared to identify Indonesia fully with the Afro-Asian aspirations for national liberation from European colonialism. The objective of Afro-Asian solidarity and of convening the second Asian-African conference could be realised only by sharing and intensifying their feelings against colonialism and imperialism. President Sukarno's regular world tours had been of enormous diplomatic use. His annual visits had enabled the President to strengthen personal contacts with the leaderships in Asia and Africa. His frequent anti-colonial observations were sure to find applause among the Africans still fighting for national freedom.

The most recent of President Sukarno's world tours was well through when the preparatory meeting was being held in Cairo in June 1961. Only eighteen days before the preparatory meeting, the
President was in Cairo, discussing with President Nasser of the UAR and President Sekou Toure of Guinea, the problems of national movements for freedom in Africa and thinking about concrete ways on how to help those fighting against colonialism. In the joint communique issued at the end of his 3-day visit to the UAR, apart from reviewing international situation, bilateral relations, and expressing agreement on questions relating to proposed non-aligned conference, the major stress had been put on the problems of anti-colonial movements and on rendering all-out assistance necessary for achieving independence. Almost similar had been the communique issued at Accra at the end of President Sukarno's visit to Ghana, on 15 May 1961. What had figured prominently was their condemnation of Portuguese repression against Angolan freedom fighters and reaffirmation of the recognition of Antoine Gizenga's Government as the only legitimate government in the Congo.

During June 1961 President Sukarno had paid visits (among other countries) to Soviet Russia, People's Republic of China and Yugoslavia. A review of his speeches and those in his welcome as also of joint communiques issued at the end of his visits, shows a close similarity between Indonesian objectives and those of Soviet Union and China. Besides getting unreserved support on the issue of West Irian, the President of Indonesia received wide applause wherever he went as a consistent fighter for freedom in Asia and Africa. Speaking at a luncheon given in his honour by Admiral Baikov in Kronshtadt, President Sukarno had expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for its unselfish assistance, and said: "Thanks to

100. Ibid., 18 May 1961.
our common goals, our hearts are merged with yours." On this occasion, President Sukarno was in the company of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikita Khrushchev. Addressing the students of the Lomonosov University, he had said inter alia that imperialism and colonialism for the time being are not yet dead. This is much in evidence in Laos, Angola, Cuba, Congo and also in West Irian. "Therefore the Indonesian people is (sic) resolute to liberate West Irian until it is entirely free", the President added, in a thunderous applause. Speaking at a reception given in honour of the visiting President in the Kremlin on 10 June 1961, Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev had stated that the USSR and Indonesia "have identical views on many international problems, notably general and total disarmament, the liquidation of colonialism, and the struggle against imperialism". He had also praised President Sukarno for his "struggle for his people and for peace against colonialism and imperialism".

Similar was the approach of the Chinese leaders when the President of the Indonesian Republic visited China later. The Peking People's Daily described growing friendship between China and Indonesia as "a powerful force in defence of peace in Asia". It quoted President Sukarno as having said that "the friendship between the peoples of our two countries should be increasingly strengthened and consolidated with each passing day till we attain our common objects, and we will continue to be friends after we attain the

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101. Ibid., 11 June 1961. Kronshtadt is a town in the Leningrad region of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic of the USSR.


103. Ibid. The reception had been arranged in the Kremlin by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
common objects." It also quoted Chairman Liu Shao Chi as having confirmed that the basic interests of the two peoples "are identical. Our friendship has a bright future".

President Sukarno's visit to China was followed by his visit to Yugoslavia. In a joint communiqué issued at Belgrade, the three Presidents - Sukarno, Tito and Keita of Mali, had expressed the hope that the forthcoming "neutral" summit meeting would result in "strong and unanimous" declarations against colonialism and imperialism.

So in the light of President Sukarno's efforts abroad just three months before the non-aligned conference, it could be fairly correct to say that Indonesia had been fully preparing the ground in her favour before her leaders met other members of the non-aligned group at Belgrade on 1 September 1961.

International Situation on the Eve of the Belgrade Conference

The USSR announced resumption of nuclear tests on 30 August 1961, just a day before the opening of the non-aligned countries' Conference. It marked the beginning of a series of such tests. The Soviet decision, in a sense, represented a new high in the international tension which had been building up over the Berlin issue since the beginning of 1961. The summit meeting in Vienna in May 1961, between President Kennedy of the United States and Premier Khrushchev of the USSR, had failed to produce the desired results. The Soviet threat to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany with the implied right to control or deny Western access to West Berlin, had resulted in a great influx of refugees from East Germany. East Germany's decision to halt the exodus by creating a

104. Ibid., 17 June 1961.
105. Ibid., 19 June 1961.
wall in the centre of the city of Berlin was accompanied by Western Powers' refusal to recognise this right. This had led to the heightening of tension and increased mobilisation in both the blocs. By August, the tension had risen to enormous proportions and there was every possibility of an open military clash. If the situation was allowed to deteriorate still further, a resort to nuclear warfare would not be a distant possibility. An armed confrontation involving nuclear weapons would not be confined only to the United States and its NATO allies and the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. It would involve the whole world including nations both aligned or non-aligned. This was the situation when the Soviet Union carried out its first nuclear test on 30 August 1961. Thus the moratorium on nuclear tests operative since December 1958 lay broken, with serious repercussions in the whole world.

Parallel to the aggravation of international tension, some serious developments were taking place in Africa. The French Government had asserted its title to the military base at Bizerta in Tunisia. President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia had challenged the French claim in July 1961. This had resulted in an armed clash between the French paratroopers and the Tunisian soldiers, leading to a large number of Tunisian casualties and damage to property. If for the French, it was an attempt to re-impose their colonial rule over recently free Tunisia, for the Tunisians, it was an attempt to complete their independence. The French action had created an impression that Western colonialism and imperialism had no intention to withdraw, that, for this purpose, it had no scruples even in killing the civilians. A similar attitude had been shown by the French against the Algerians and by the Portuguese against the peoples of Angola and Mozambique.
These two developments, one in Western Europe and the other in Africa, came to have different impact on Prime Minister Nehru and President Sukarno, who led their countries' delegations to the Conference in Belgrade. Nehru's response to Soviet resumption of nuclear tests was the most forthright of all other non-aligned leaders. On the day of the Soviet nuclear test itself, on reaching Belgrade, the Indian Prime Minister had said: "I am against nuclear tests at any time in any place." Later, in his speech to the Conference on 2 September 1961, Nehru regretted it "deeply", and felt convinced that the danger of war has been "enhanced", "perhaps, by the recent decision of the Soviet Government to start nuclear tests." In contrast, President Sukarno did not give any reaction. He merely "dodged the issue" as New York Times editorially put it. The opening speech of the Indonesian President on 1 September 1961 did not contain any reference whatsoever to the Soviet decision.

It was feared that the Soviet initiative might lead, as it virtually did, a couple of days later, to the American resumption of similar tests. This would threaten world peace, the preservation and promotion of which had always been the basis of India's foreign policy. In a way, Soviet test rather made it easier for Jawaharlal Nehru to pin-point the urgency of the matter and to carry conviction with all the participating leaders of giving the highest priority to the problem of war and peace. One of the major aims of India's


policy towards the non-aligned summit meeting, as has been surveyed above, was to seek discussion only on issues of global importance, like peace, disarmament, international co-operation, and to exclude those of regional or local importance. By exploding a nuclear bomb on the eve of the Conference, the Soviet Union enabled Nehru to emphatically focus the attention of the non-aligned meeting on the prospects of war and peace and on the possible role of peace-making by the non-aligned leaders.

**Introducing Belgrade Conference**

The Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Nations took place in Belgrade as scheduled. In all there were delegates from twenty-five countries and observers from three. There were thirteen Asian and ten African countries. Europe was represented by Yugoslavia and Latin America by Cuba. Apart from official observers, there were representatives from various African nationalist movements and from socialist or leftist groups. These came from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America.

Among all the participants in the Conference India and Indonesia were the most populous states. India with its 438 million people and Indonesia with its 90 million people, constituted over 58 per cent and 12 per cent respectively of the total number of people represented in the Conference. The Indian delegation headed

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110. Alphabetically, the countries were Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, the UAR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. The three Latin American countries which sent observers were Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador.

111. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95. These percentages have been worked out on the basis of information given at pp. 273-322. The total number of people represented at the Conference were 74,85,23,000. The people represented by Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador, which sent observers, are excluded from these figures.
by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru comprised of six members and was among the smallest. Besides the Prime Minister, it included V.K. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister, two Indian Ambassadors, and two high officials of the Ministry of External Affairs. By way of contrast Indonesian delegation, led by President Sukarno, had eighteen members and was the largest, with the sole exception of Ethiopia having nineteen members in its delegation. Besides Subandrio, Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, it included six ministers, Acting Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen of the Provisional People's Congress (MPRS), two Members of the Supreme Advisory Council, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, and Deputy Chief of the Army Staff and some other top officials and diplomats. In political terms, the Indonesian delegation gave a fair representation of the "Nasakom" concept as being applied in the domestic politics. Nationalism was represented by Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Chairman of the PNI (Nationalist Party of Indonesia), religion (agama), by Saifuddin Zuhri, the General Secretary of the NU (Nahdatul Ulama - Moslem Scholars Party), and communism by D.N.Aidit, the Chairman of the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia).

The Conference was declared open by the host President Josep Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, in Belgrade, on 1 September 1961. In his

112. Ibid. The Indian delegation had six members including its leader. Other three members of the Indian delegation, P. Dasgupta, S.H. Desai and Mrs. Usha Nath, were picked up from the staff of the Indian Embassy in Belgrade (p.295). Only three other countries, Cyprus, Nepal and Saudi Arabia had five members, one less than India (pp. 287, 307 and 309).

113. Ibid., pp. 297 and 289.

114. The Indonesian contingent for the Belgrade Conference, in fact, had 46 members including, among others, Special Assistants to the President and his ministers, a Cameraman and also an assistant of the President's daughter. See Suluh Indonesia, 26 August 1961.

opening statement, the Yugoslav President set the tone of the Conference, by suggesting various broad issues to be discussed. These covered both the Indian and Indonesian viewpoints which were expected to dominate the Conference. In an effort to allay Nehru's fears about bloc formation, President Tito categorically said that the Conference "did not intend to establish any kind of bloc" and that fears about it "are groundless". He also stressed that the non-aligned forum will not be used for attacking one country or other, as this would increase tension rather than decrease it.

Major source of threat to world peace, in his opinion, was the cold war resulting from the division of the world into two military blocs. And therein lay the significant role the non-aligned countries could play in the promotion and preservation of international peace. Thus far the statement of President Tito corroborated Nehru's views.

While discussing the nature of Non-aligned nations' role, he echoed President Sukarno's oft-repeated opinion. He considered the problem of peace as universally important, and especially for the Afro-Asian and non-aligned group of countries. By virtue of this, he emphasised, it could not be left in the hands of the Great Powers alone. The uncommitted countries, therefore, held the opinion that, in their own interest as well as those of entire humanity, they have the right to participate in the solving of problems, particularly of those which endanger the peace and the fate of the world at the present moment. President Sukarno had been calling for assertion

116. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, pp. 18 and 20.
117. Ibid., p. 21.
118. Ibid., p. 19.
119. Ibid.
of such a right since the abortive summit meeting in Vienna between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Khrushchev, in May 1961. President Tito's suggestion that the major purpose of the Conference was to pave the way "towards a relaxation of world tensions and to the freedom, equality and peaceful cooperation of all nations", appeared to give more weight to Nehru's contention. But his approach to the problems relating to the issue of colonialism seemed to be more pro-Sukarno. It would be examined, he was certain, "in a consistent and serious manner; we shall pose this question in a clear form and insist on the final and early eradication of colonialism." In short, President Tito's opening statement was a well-balanced exposition of the divergent contentions held by Nehru and Sukarno.

**President Sukarno's Views**

After Tito's statement, inaugurating the Conference, President Sukarno was the first non-aligned leader to address the gathering. His speech covered a wide range of subjects of national and international importance. According to him, the basis of all the present difficulties besetting the world was the continuance of Western colonialism and imperialism in Asia and Africa. It conflicted with the growing Afro-Asian demand for freedom and hence produced tension. The President of Indonesia refused to "believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the great Powers". The tension grew, he believed, from "the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination". He did not deny that "there is an

120. Ibid., p. 21.
121. Ibid., p. 27.
ideological conflict between the great Powers". He was, however, convinced that, except when thrust upon other nations, it "must not lead to tension". The President exhorted others not to be "obsessed by the conflict of ideologies. This is a matter which must be left to each nation itself". Continuing his argument about possibility of co-existence between different social systems professing and practising different ideologies, President Sukarno said: "In every single case, the cause, the root of international tension, is imperialism and colonialism and the forcible division of nations! For him "different social systems can co-exist, but there can be no co-existence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other side". In an attack on the West, the President said that colonialism and imperialism were "the present cancers rankling our bodies" and called for ridding "the world of these fostering sores - Algeria, West Irian, Angola, Bizerta...." Feeling convinced of the correctness of his stand on this issue, to which he returned repeatedly and throughout his speech, the President of the Indonesian Republic called for imposition of a time-limit, not exceeding "two years" in each individual case, "for the complete removal of all forms of colonial subjugation of one nation by another". He recognised the enormity of threat to the world emanating from Great Powers' conflict and conceded that the non-aligned nations should jointly direct their efforts towards East-West negotiations leading towards peace. But

122. Ibid., p. 28.
123. Ibid., p. 29.
124. Ibid., p. 31.
125. Ibid., p. 32.
126. Ibid., p. 33. See also The Statesman, 2 September 1961.
he was against a perpetual status quo of this type because it would impede the development of every nation "as it sees fit".

In the course of his address, President Sukarno made specific reference to Germany and Berlin issue, to restructuring of the United Nations, to disarmament, and finally, to his plea for convening a second Asian-African Conference.

His stand on the problem of Germany amounted to according "recognition (to) the temporary de facto sovereignty of two Germanys". He believed that non-interference by the Big Powers in the affairs of the two states would lead to unity. He also favoured the idea of the Soviet Union entering into a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The President also acceded to the demand of the West Berliners to have "free access to the other parts of the world" and vice-versa. But, at the same time, he linked it with the question of de facto recognition of both the German states. By implication, thus, President Sukarno supported the East German view that access should be subject to check by the "sovereign East German Government".

As regards the United Nations, President Sukarno, in view of developments since its inception in 1945, pleaded for overhauling the structure of its various organs to suit the present-day realities. To ensure that the United Nations did not "become the instrument of any power bloc", he urged "that the new, emergent forces find adequate recognition there and can exert a rightful influence in the

127. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 36.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid. See also The Hindu, 4 September 1961.
world councils where major world problems are considered”. His argument on disarmament boiled down to his plea for “first disarming mistrust, disarming fear, disarming men’s suspicions of one another”, because these are the root cause of rearmaments. As the non-aligned countries could, by virtue of their non-alignment, bring an element of moderation, the President urged that they “must be given an active role ... in the task of finding a solution to this complicated problem”. Finally, while tracing the history of Afro-Asian nations’ gatherings, President Sukarno, considering colonialism and imperialism as the sources of all world conflicts, attempted to show that the present Conference was “complementary to”, and “a joining brother” of the second Afro-Asian Conference; and hence the “necessity” for holding it “in the near future”.

The President’s speech as a whole revolved round a single argument that colonialism and imperialism must be eradicated early from Asia and Africa as these were the only impediments in the way of realising a new world of peace and social justice as conceived by him. The rest were only side issues not as important and as relevant to the realities of the present international situation as that. They could be settled if the two power blocs gave due consideration to the views and proposals of the non-aligned leaders, allowed them adequate representation in the United Nations and active participation in the disarmament negotiations.

130. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 37. Indonesia’s delegation was also reported as having suggested that the posts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and of Assistant Secretaries and Advisers should be exclusively held by the people from the non-aligned countries. See The Hindu, 5 September 1961.

131. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 3.

132. Ibid.
There were two serious omissions in President Sukarno's speech. There was no reference to the plight of the Arabs against Israel. Not a word was uttered about the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests. Nothing could be said about the first except that it might be through oversight. Moreover, it would not cause any repercussions because the Arabs were fully assured of Indonesian sympathy with them against Israel. The second which was probably deliberate, had its own justification. By saying anything against the Soviet Union the President did not desire to lose his prestige in their eyes that his extremely leftist views on colonialism and imperialism and also on Afro-Asian solidarity, had gained him. If the West came to criticise him as it happened later, it would be all the more better, because in that case, he would be able to enhance his prestige in Afro-Asia as also in the Communist world.

Prime Minister Nehru's Views

But President Sukarno's speech had serious implications for the general stand Prime Minister of India was expected to take at Belgrade. The former appeared to have set the tone for the seven heads of delegates following him. Before his turn came to address the Conference on 2 September 1961, Nehru had heard eight speeches including those by President Sukarno, President Nasser and President Habib Bourguiba. The last speaker preceding him was President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Most of the speeches had shown a similar tendency, as exhibited by President Sukarno, to put the major blame on Western colonialism and imperialism. Moreover, all these speakers had put greater emphasis on issues of local and regional importance, ignoring the urgency of world peace which lay threatened by the prospects of nuclear confrontation. It embarrassed him much and prompted him to make a speech that shifted the emphasis from
colonialism and imperialism to the prospects of war and peace in the world.

To have a free hand, Nehru discarded the written speech and chose to speak extempore. He devoted first ten minutes of his speech to "imperialism, colonialism, racialism and the rest...." In the rest of his speech, he attempted to bring home to all the urgency of the present international crisis which overshadowed all other issues. He urged all to recognise that "if war comes all else for the moment goes. Therefore it becomes inevitable for us to pay attention to, and not only to pay attention to but to make sure that the dominant note of our thinking and action and what we say and put down is this crisis that confronts humanity." It was as much an attempt to control the "harsher tones" of the participants as to suggest to President Sukarno that the present moment demanded constructive action and not condemnation on any issues confronting the Conference. For him, not seeing "the things in the proper perspective" and relegating the present international crisis into the background, would be "little short of tragedy". "First things must come first, and nothing is more important or has more priority than this world situation of war and peace. Everything else, however vital to us - and other things are vital to us - has a secondary place", he contended. Moreover, viewing from a "historical perspective", Nehru believed that "the era of classical colonialism is gone and is dead, though of course it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet; but essentially it is over". In his endeavour to convince

133. Ibid., p. 107. See text of Prime Minister Nehru's speech at pp. 107-17.
134. Ibid., p. 108.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid., p. 107.
others of the desirability of putting more emphasis on "the present situation (which) is by far the most dangerous that has arisen in the last fifteen years or so since the last war ended...", he pleaded for keeping in view "first things first". Like President Sukarno, in order to make his point more convincing, Prime Minister Nehru repeated his argument several times. While recollecting parallel situations before the Second World War, he invited reference to a particular incident relating to the League of Nations. When the whole of Europe was facing the threat of war and aggression from Germany's Hitler, the League of Nations was discussing "the opium traffic". The major issue of war was simply being ignored. A similar situation might arise now. Issues of lesser importance might get priority, he feared, and a war, more disastrous than the Second World War, might result.

His stress on the issue of war and peace did not mean to suggest that he had lost sympathy with the National Liberation struggles still being waged in Asia and Africa. He was also fully aware of the difficulties that the colonial powers were creating in the way of independence there. When he put more and more stress on East-West negotiations for peace, he had in his mind Algeria, "which has paid a fantastic price in human life and suffering..."; Bizerta, where he failed to understand how the existence of a foreign military base can "be tolerated by anybody"; the Congo, whose Premier and Vice-Premier, he would be glad to welcome; Angola, "which really has a kind of horror which one hardly associates with the modern world - massacres, genocide, and so on". He was simply asking for more

137. Ibid., p. 109.
138. Ibid., p. 112.
pointed attention towards the issue that deserved it. "We can deal with other things more effectively and more strongly after we have dealt with this". In the face of imminent threat to the whole world, he was rather averse to discussing any other issue except that of war and peace. "What is the use of discussing Bizerta, Algeria, Angola, etc. if neither the colonies nor the imperialists would any longer exist", the Indian Prime Minister had pointedly asked.

Apart from this argument seeking priority for the issue of war and peace over others including colonialism and imperialism, the Indian Prime Minister also dealt with the issues of disarmament, Germany and West Berlin. His general approach towards all these problems was that, understanding their limitations of power, the non-aligned countries should not make specific proposals for certain solutions. He called upon his fellow participants to "realize" that "our mandate does not run all over the place". So the best course would be to appeal for resumption of talks between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. The deteriorating international situation also demanded a restraint on the non-aligned nations and their leaders whose fate would be no different from others once the war broke out. Hence, a language of condemnation of countries of this or that bloc, not being conducive to meaningful negotiations, might have to be toned down.

Nehru's attitude on the issue of Germany and West Berlin was, to a degree, different from that of Sukarno. The former agreed with

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140. Ibid., p. 113.
142. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 113.
the latter to the extent of considering the existence of two German
States as "facts of life", which have "to be recognized". But he
was not agreeable to the signing of a peace treaty or exchange of
diplomats with East Germany at present, as suggested by President
Sukarno. India's views, in this regard, were shared by many
participants. A majority of delegations in the Drafting Committee
were later reported to have rejected de facto recognition of the
existence of two German states. As regards access to West Berlin,
Nehru wanted guarantees "by all concerned", which meant that he was
not ready to leave it to the discretion of the East German Government.

Nehru also differed with Sukarno in his (latter's) views on
the reorganisation of the United Nations. The Prime Minister of
India showed his awareness of the considerable changes which had
taken place since the establishment of the United Nations. On this
basis, he shared Sukarno's view of the urgency of "a change in the
structure" of the world organization. But he was not prepared to
ignore the "balance of power" on which the United Nations was based.
Reminding Sukarno indirectly, who had urged for "adequate recognition"
to the new emerging forces in all the UN bodies including the Security
Council, Nehru said that "the United Nations cannot easily ignore
the balance of power in the world. It has to keep that in view."

In his speech, Nehru also touched upon the question of
disarmament. He considered it "a vital matter" and "an absolute
necessity for the peace of the world in the future"; but he also

143. Ibid., p. 36.
144. The Hindu, 4 September 1961.
146. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of
Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 112. See also The Hindu,
4 September 1961.
147. Ibid., p. 37.
148. Ibid., p. 113.
felt that in the present context of international tension, solution of this problem had become "rather out of reach today". Commenting on President Sukarno's demand for "active" participation by the non-aligned countries, in the solution of this problem, Prime Minister Nehru only reminded the participant states of their limitations. He told them that armament race would not disappear merely "because this Conference wants it" and that "we do not control the strings of the world, not only in the military sense but in other senses also".

The Prime Minister of India made no reference to President Sukarno's urgent call for convening the second Asian-African Conference. This, in a way, showed India's "coolness" towards the Indonesian demand. It was fully in keeping with Nehru's earlier attitude, considering the idea of such a Conference as "premature".

149. Ibid., pp. 111 and 116.
150. Ibid., p. 38.
151. Ibid., pp. 111 and 113.
153. The Hindu, 1 July 1961. Talking to pressmen in New Delhi on 30 June 1961, Prime Minister Nehru said: "We have not been convinced yet of its necessity. Anyhow when a conference, not exactly that but rather similar in essence, is being held in Belgrade, to talk of yet another conference seems at least premature." He was giving his reactions to a special message received from Indonesia personally through Mrs. Supeni, the roving Ambassador of Indonesia. The special message delivered by Mrs. Supeni, during her two-day visit to New Delhi on 20-21 June 1961, related to Indonesia's proposal for holding a second Asian-African Conference. Nehru's negative attitude was confirmed by Mrs. Supeni, in the course of her press conference in Djakarta on 6 July 1961, after her visit to some Asian and African countries including Pakistan, the UAR and India. She had told pressmen that all countries so far approached had agreed to be present at the Conference, except Prime Minister Nehru who had until then not indicated confirmation of his position. See Harian Rakjat, 7 July 1961.
With all the persuasive power at his command, Nehru had endeavoured to counter President Sukarno's arguments. With increase in the number of new states coming up in the process of decolonisation that began after the end of the First World War, colonialism for him was withdrawing. With only a few colonial pockets left here and there in Asia and Africa, he considered it just a spent force. Hence there was no use condemning those who still refused to see the march of historical forces. Rather it would be better to remove the factors which enabled the French, the Portuguese and the Dutch to cling to their colonies. And the factors, for him, were different from the sources of present international conflict as put forth by President Sukarno. By arguing that it "is war or the fear of war that has led to the cold war", and that it is "the cold war which has resulted and is resulting in the old imperialism and the old colonialism hanging on wherever they exist because they deem it advantageous", the Indian Prime Minister simply put President Sukarno's argument upside down. If the latter had contended that colonialism and imperialism were the root of all world tension and hence they should first be eliminated to make the world safe for peace and socio-economic progress, the former countered it by suggesting that once the war or the fear of war which is "advantageous" to colonialism, is removed, colonialism and imperialism would not be able to survive for long. Lest his moderate tone should create an impression that he or India had lost interest and enthusiasm for freedom in Asia and Africa, Prime Minister Nehru stressed that "we stand for anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism, and all that".


155. Ibid., p. 108.
But by putting the argument straight, Nehru more than annoyed the Indonesian President. The former's refusal to agree with the latter on the question of priority to the issue of colonialism and imperialism, became a major source of irritation between the two countries. The omission of a reference on West Irian in Nehru's speech was equally matched by President Sukarno's omission of reference on Goa.

There were other reasons also which provoked President Sukarno's ire. On disarmament, on the plea that the issue affected the Great Powers as much as the rest of the world including both the aligned and the non-aligned nations, the Indonesian President had suggested active participation by the non-aligned countries, in the disarmament negotiations. But India took the stand that because the issue of war and peace could be settled only by those who had the arms to wage the destructive war and power to ensure peace, it would be better to leave this issue to them. The non-aligned states could only direct their efforts towards the creation of a peaceful atmosphere conducive for Big Powers' negotiations. President Sukarno's proposals on Germany and West Berlin had also not found favour with Prime Minister Nehru.

Finally, the Indonesian President had pleaded for the convening of the second Asian and African Conference "in the near future". Omission of any reference on the prospects of such a conference in Prime Minister Nehru's speech, could only be displeasing to President Sukarno.

**Behind the Scenes Developments**

Divergence of views expressed by Nehru and Sukarno in the open plenary sessions of the Conference came to be crystallised at the Drafting Committee stage. Simultaneously with the address to
the Conference by various heads of delegations, the Drafting Committee had started its work on the communique since 2 September 1961. Two sub-groups had been formed, the one to deal with the threat of nuclear war arising out of conflict between two Super Powers and the other with various other issues in the Conference agenda. In actual terms, the first was to concern itself with Nehru's three-para draft urging negotiations for peace between President Kennedy of the United States and Prime Minister Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, and the second with the issues of colonialism in Asia and Africa. The first controversy that arose was whether conclusions of the two Drafting Committees should be represented separately or embodied in a single document. Nehru had already suggested that such an appeal "should be put foremost and topmost, and perhaps be isolated to show that it is the main thing, that other things may be very important but they are secondary". Working on these guidelines at the Drafting Committee, the Indian delegation put emphasis on keeping the appeal for peace separate from the main body of the Conference communique. But this was opposed by Indonesian delegation along with many other delegations including that of Yugoslavia. Three reasons may be suggested for their opposition to the stand taken by Indian delegate. Firstly, Prime Minister Nehru being the initiator of the peace proposal, would get the entire credit.

157. Ibid.
159. In the Drafting Committee, India was represented by Krishna Menon and Indonesia by Subandrio.
Secondly, there was a fear that this special procedure would attract all attention to itself. Thirdly, giving importance to the peace appeal would imply that other subjects like colonialism and imperialism were not as much important as it was. They demanded, therefore, that the projected appeal should be included in the final document of the Conference.

After a long session the Drafting Committee accepted the idea of issuing a separate appeal. But it had witnessed a lively argument between India and Indonesia, the latter having been satisfied that a majority of the participants shared its opposition to the former's stand. In a meeting with the press reporters, on the night of 3 September 1961, Krishna Menon indicated that there had been a sharp clash in the Committee over separating the war threat from colonialism, in the Conference communique. In the plenary session on 3 September 1961, the heads of delegations ratified the Drafting Committee's decision to issue a separate appeal after a hot debate. The non-aligned nations lay divided along lines of the Cairo meetings in June and July 1961, with India finding itself in a minority. President Nasser's suggestion in a public speech earlier that "a mere appeal" would not do and that it would be better to evolve "a plan which can drive the negotiations between the two blocs into the domain of practical application", ultimately resulted into an agreement to issue two identical letters addressed and to be delivered personally to President Kennedy and Prime Minister

164. Hindustan Times, 5 September 1961. See also The Statesman, 5 September 1961. It reported that Nehru's appeal for peace had not been accepted without some sharp exchanges in the Drafting Committee.
Bitterness generated in the Drafting Committee meeting on 2 September 1961, was further strengthened in its next meeting on 4 September 1961. Indian and Indonesian attitudes fell along the lines noted earlier, that is, the Indian delegation stressing priority for world peace through conciliatory approach to the two great Powers and the Indonesian delegation seeking prominence for issue of colonialism and imperialism over and above the threat of world war arising from Big Power conflict.

The differences related to the type of issues to be included in the Conference Declaration, to the nature of the language used and to the length of the Declaration. India was opposed to the inclusion of bilateral colonial issues in the Declaration. This was in accord with Nehru’s attitude of considering colonial issues as secondary to the issue of world peace which had assumed overriding importance in his mind. If at all these were to be included in the Conference Declaration, these should be couched in brief and non-condemnatory language. In his address to the Conference on 2 September 1961, the Indian Prime Minister had emphasised the importance of avoiding condemnations of one side or other in order to promote an atmosphere conducive to peaceful negotiations between great Powers. "It will do us no good, I think, if we start condemning this country or that country", he had said and added that "if we want to help in the cause of peace it does not help to start by condemnations." He had also suggested that the non-aligned countries' influence would be meaningful if they adopted "friendly" approach.


166. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 115. See also The Statesman, 3 September 1961.
In short India desired that, in order to be effective in its influence, the Declaration of the Conference should be brief and generally worded. Besides, the Indian delegation stressed that the non-aligned nations should avoid making specific proposals on issues of global importance like Germany, "west Berlin and disarmament.

This was in accordance with Nehru's plea to the non-aligned nations for understanding their limitations, and realising that "our capacity is limited". His emphasis was on creating conditions conducive to great Powers' negotiations for peace and only exhorting them to enter into such negotiations.

But the Indonesian delegation led by subandrio, was not prepared to agree to the Indian contention on all these points. It insisted that the Conference Declaration should condemn Western colonialism and imperialism in forthright terms, that it should include all the issues relating to the struggle for freedom from colonialism in Asia and Africa. Indonesia was worried that acceptance of India's position would exclude "west Irian from the Conference Declaration, an eventuality it endeavoured to avert.

The Indonesian delegation was encouraged by the fact that the African (Casablanca Group including the UAR) and Arab States, Yugoslavia and Cuba, shared the former's emphasis on condemnation of colonialism and on inclusion of these issues in the Conference communique.


168. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 118. Nehru was aware of difference of outlook on this point between India and other participants. This he revealed in the course of an informal talk with the Indian correspondents in Belgrade. India, he said, had broad suggestions whereas other countries wanted to make special proposals on questions like Germany, Berlin and disarmament. See The Statesman, 4 September 1961.
In a situation of deadlock, both the groups, supporting India and Indonesia, resorted to bargaining. The majority which had acquiesced in India's demand for issuing a separate peace appeal earlier adopted a stiffer attitude in demanding inclusion of strongly worded anti-colonial resolutions into the final communique. India's persistence led to a highly tense atmosphere and the Indian delegation was reported to be "obstructive" in the Drafting Committee deliberations. Indonesia, West African States, Yugoslavia and Cuba were determined to go ahead with their idea to condemn Western colonialism and imperialism. They were against exclusion of issues directly related to their national interests from the communique. What face would, for instance, President Sukarno show to his people if Indonesia did not receive a direct reference of support on the "West Irian issue? It also hurt their national pride and personal ego if their specific proposals for solution of international problems were omitted from the Conference communique.

Apart from controversy over these issues, one of the particular issues which figured prominently in the Drafting Committee meeting related to fixation of time limit for the elimination of colonialism. In the course of his address to the Conference on 1 September 1961, President Sukarno had urged for fixing a period not exceeding "two years" in each individual case of colonialism. Indonesian stand was, as expected, backed by a majority of

169. The Statesman, 7 September 1961. In an article in The Statesman of 8 September 1961, "Nehru's Independence Among the Non-Aligned Countries", Mahesh Chandra described the situation as follows: "much manoeuvring went on behind the scenes and there was considerable display of cross purposes."

170. Ibid., 7 September 1961.

171. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 33.
participants who wanted to fix some time-limit for this. The
Indonesian delegation thus made a determined bid to see that the
Final Communique embodied a provision to that end. But India was
opposed to such a move. Ultimately, Krishna Menon suggested a way
out of the impasse. He proposed a small change in the UN "Declara-
tion" of 14 December 1960, which carried conviction with the
majority of participants. When the Drafting Committee ended its
long session, on the morning of 5 September 1961, this was the only
important point on which it registered agreement.

Other specific issues which brought Indian-Indonesian
differences to the fore in the Drafting Committee meeting were
related to Germany, West Berlin and disarmament. The position taken
by the two countries' delegations was in line with that suggested by
their Heads earlier.

The issue of Palestine also registered divergence between the
two countries. Conforming to its traditional stand of unequivocal
support to the Arabs on this issue, the Indonesian delegation
supported them and the West Africans in their square condemnation of
Israel. But the Indian delegation opposed this move for two reasons.
Firstly, using condemnatory language would be against the general
stand taken by Prime Minister Nehru. Secondly, it would displease
Burmese delegation which was opposed to strong condemnation of

173. The United Nations' "Declaration on the granting of
independence to colonial countries and peoples" made a solemn
proclamation about "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifesta-
tions". See A/4OR, session 15, Supplements 7-16A,
UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), p. 66.
of the word "speedy" in the Declaration by another word
"immediate" and his suggestion was later accepted.
israel. Consequently, krishna menon urged for a moderate approach which was not acceptable to the majority.

Anticipating difficulties in the Drafting Committee meeting, the Heads of the delegations had, in the meanwhile met in a closed session in the evening of 4 September 1961. Both krishna menon and subandrio accompanied their leaders as advisers. The session being secret, it provided the participants with the first opportunity to have an open and frank discussion on the various issues referred to in the open plenary speeches. The aim was to reconcile divergent attitudes and varying interests present at the Conference. The discussions were reported to be "fairly lively though not polemical". It was in this meeting that nehru and sukarno, for the first time, had exchanged divergent views on all general and specific issues in the presence of other heads of delegations in the Conference. Having formed their respective attitudes on the basis of discussions in this closed meeting, both krishna menon and subandrio had attended the Drafting Committee meeting and found themselves opposed to each other on all the issues. The net result of the night long session of the Drafting Committee meeting was increased bitterness between the Indian and Indonesian delegations. krishna menon's over-bearing

175. Burma was one of the few countries which supported India's overall position in the non-aligned summit conference. India could, thus, ill-afford to lose Burmese support.

176. This was the first closed session of the Heads of delegations at the Conference. The meeting continued for three hours and forty minutes (from 4.50 p.m. to 8.30 p.m.). The Drafting Committee meeting started at 10.00 p.m. and ended at 5 a.m. on 5 September. See The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 295, p. 14.


attitude towards Subandrio had contributed to it in no small m
The latter was among many others who had been "irked" and "ang
by the former's lessons on English grammar.

Differences in the Open

It was expected that the participants in the closed ses
and Drafting Committee meeting would restrain themselves from
out the details of their deliberations. But the secrets leake
to press. The initiative for doing so was taken by a member c
Indonesian delegation, Ruslan Abdulgani. He was the first t
on the differences that had arisen in the closed meetings betw
Indian and Indonesian approach to various issues. Commenting
statement, he said:

Here lies the difference. We (Indonesia) ... and our
view is shared by Ghana, Cuba, Iraq and Ethiopia ... 
believe that actually at this very moment there is no
nuclear war as yet. However, in a colonial war, like
in Angola, Algeria, Tunisia, etc., ordinary bombs alone
can kill numerous Asians and Africans. Obviously, we
cannot wait until settlement is attained over a nuclear
war that has not come yet, while actually we ourselves
are already under the threat of a blazing war. For us,
to be killed by an ordinary bomb or by an atom bomb,
there is no difference. As from the start, Indonesia
holds that security and freedom are inseparable. If
we want to talk about security, there must first be
freedom. Of course, we do not close our eyes to the
danger of a nuclear war, but neither could it be
accepted that colonialism is not a major issue. I
can understand the Indian frame of mind. India has
developed within her relations with Britain and the
Commonwealth, in a different way from the experiences
Indonesia, Indo-China, Tunisia, Algeria, Angola, etc.,
have experienced or are experiencing in a struggle
against Dutch, French and Portuguese colonialism. 181

179. The Statesman, 7 September 1961. See also Jansen,
n. 24, p. 302.

180. Ruslan Abdulgani was Minister and Vice-Chairman of the
Supreme Advisory Council of Indonesia.

181. Antara, 4 September 1961. See also Harian Rakjat,
The author has found it necessary to quote at length from
Ruslan Abdulgani's statement, because it was this statement of his
that became the basis of wild speculations, among journalists
gathered in Belgrade, about the differences between Prime Minister
Nehru and President Sukarno. The official Yugoslav news-agency in
Djakarta picked it up and reported back home. A bulletin based on
Tanjug reports was distributed among the pressmen in Belgrade and
different stories started circulating. Rumours were afloat that
Nehru had come to sabotage the Conference, that he was threatening
to walk out if he did not get his way, that he was leaving for
Moscow a day earlier, and that he was obstructive.

It was with all the embarrassments arising out of such
rumours that Prime Minister Nehru attended the second and the last
closed session of the heads of delegations. As many of the chief
delegates had their programmes already set, there was no possibility
of extending the Conference beyond the limit already fixed, so their
impatience to finish it in time which led to a longer session. It
was in this session that the final communique of the Conference was
drawn up and approved.

India's Achievements

In the light of differences arising from the previous
meetings, it was quite expected that there would be a lot of give
and take in order to remove the deadlock on most of the issues.
And this was what happened. In order to have his say, in the face of

182. Jansen, "Another Look At India At the Belgrade 'Summit':
A Degree of Isolation was Inevitable", The Statesman,
16 September 1961.

183. It started at 5 p.m. on 5 September 1961 and continued for a
length of eight hours and fifteen minutes until late at
1.15 a.m. See The Conference of Heads of State or
the opposing majority, the Indian Premier had to yield on certain matters of importance. The inclusion of direct reference to three colonial issues - Bizerta, Angola and Algeria, was certainly against the Indian stand. But a survey of the Conference documents as emerged out of eight hours of discussion on top level, would show that India had succeeded on most of the points. The persistent efforts of the Indian delegation had led to the issuance of a separate "Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace". Nehru had successfully led the Conference to focus its attention on the urgent need for international peace. He had also succeeded in toning down the condemnatory language of the Conference "Declaration". A remark in the British weekly The Economist that Nehru had come to assume "the thankless role of the regulator of the Belgrade Conference's harsher impulses", was quite appropriate. On the issue of colonialism, the Conference was content to provide encouragement and support to all peoples fighting for their independence and equality. Instead of fixing any time-limit as insisted upon by the Indonesians and others, it considered adequate to "solemnly reaffirm their support to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", as adopted at the 15th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. So the Conference's recommendation for "the immediate unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and its resolve "to make a concerted effort to put an end to all of new colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations", was not materially different from the Final


Communique of the first Asian-African Conference in this connection. Three colonial issues — Algeria, Angola and Tunisia, had managed to attract a direct reference in the "Declaration". All others including the West Irian and Goa, had been omitted, and lumped together under article 5 of the Declaration, demanding "the immediate termination of all colonial occupation and the restoration of the territorial integrity to the rightful people in countries in which it has been violated in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the withdrawal of foreign forces from their national soil".

As regards Germany and West Berlin, the Conference Declaration simply made a call "upon all parties concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force ... in accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of State or Government on 5th September, 1961". All the proposals submitted on this issue by various delegations had cancelled each other out and ultimately led the Conference to a position quite similar to Nehru's view of avoiding to make any specific proposal to the Great Powers.

Even on the problem of disarmament, the Conference had been led to take up a similar position. Although India had to compromise on this issue in as much as it had allowed the Indonesian demand for non-aligned nations' representation to prevail, there had been

186. Ibid. The Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference had declared "that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end." See "Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung from 18 to 24 April 1955", Documents for the Meeting of Ministers in preparation of the Second Asian-African Conference (Djakarta, Organizing Committee, 1964), p.9.


188. Ibid., p. 261.

189. Ibid., p. 259. The Conference Declaration had provided that the non-aligned nations should be given representation "at all further world conferences on disarmament".
no specific proposals for its solution.

There is no doubt that India had achieved success on most of the points, but she had to pay a price for it. Nehru's appeal for moderation, his emphasis on granting priority to East-West negotiations for mitigating cold war tension and his attempt to relegate the issue of colonialism into the background, had not carried conviction with Indonesia and West African states. His refusal to agree to strong condemnation of the West had earned him more criticism than approbation. Describing the Prime Minister's predicament, Hella Pick commented in a despatch to the Spectator in its issue of 8 September 1961, thus:

Mr. Nehru (was) trying to convince the other delegates that attention should be given to first things first ... but few of the delegations were impressed. Representatives of the radical African countries even condemned Nehru as 'vieux jeu'; it is far more important, they consider, to concentrate on fighting colonialism and on stopping the loss of lives in Algeria and Angola than on trying to prevent a world war. 190

Commenting editorially in a similar vein, the Times said:

Reaction to colonialism, though it has lost a certain amount of momentum, is still there, and Mr. Nehru conspicuously failed to persuade the majority that it was a dead issue. 191

Finding itself in a position of minority, India had adopted at Belgrade a posture similar to that in the Cairo preparatory meeting. There were two factors which had contributed to its success - Nehru's individual personality and his position as the Prime Minister of India and representative of its over four hundred million people. But out of these two the latter came to have more significant impact than the former. The population of India as

190. "From Neutralism to Non-Aligment", (Hella Pick), The Spectator, no. 6950, 8 September 1961, p. 310. Also quoted in Gupta, n. 20, p. 71.
represented by the Indian Premier exceeded the total population of all the countries assembled at Belgrade. As Nehru was not prepared to concede the demands of the radical majority, he simply refused to budge from his position. He had grown impatient with his more parochially minded colleagues' resentment over his demands that they should take a broader view.  

Indonesian Reactions to the Outcome of the Conference

With the results of the non-aligned countries' Conference, Indonesia was not satisfied either. The Indonesian leaders had failed to seek direct support on the issue of West Irian. Giving a combined interview to Antara, Jumuh Indonesia and Warte Bhakti, and commenting on the gains from the Belgrade Conference, Ali Sastroamidjojo said:

"Whether I am satisfied or not, depends from which angle you envisage the question. If you envisage it from the point of view of (Indonesian) national interest, we cannot be satisfied, because in its decision there was no clear-cut support of the conference in regard to Indonesia's national claim to West Irian unlike the case with the 1955 Bandung Conference."

Expressing his disappointment at the omission of specific Conference support to Indonesia on this issue, Ruslan Abdulgani, another member of the delegation, declared in a press statement:

The most important lesson we drew from experiences in the Belgrade Conference was that Indonesia should always base its struggle on its

192. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 87.
194. Antara, 7 September 1961 and Harian Rakjat, 8 September 1961. Ali Sastroamidjojo, former Prime Minister of Indonesia, was a member of the Indonesian delegation to the non-aligned countries' Conference at Belgrade.
own strength with the aid of real progressive countries as had been repeatedly stressed by President Sukarno. The term "real progressive countries" was a hint towards countries of the Communist bloc, which had condemned colonialism and imperialism in unambiguous terms, aided national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and supported the Bandung spirit and its concomitant, the concept of Afro-Asian solidarity. At Belgrade India had shown reluctance to openly condemn Western imperialism. Her non-alignment, the Indonesian leaders believed, had sought only compromises between the two power blocs in order to preserve world peace. Her attitude at the Conference had displayed her decreasing interest in and enthusiasm for national liberation movements in Asia and Africa. In a bitter comment on India's present posture of moderation, Chaerul Jaleh, the then Indonesian Minister for Basic Industry and Mining and a member of the delegation, had said: "The revolutionary spirit of the nations who won their independence without bloodshed has vaporized." India had only contented herself with offering diplomatic support on the issue of West Irian in and outside the United Nations. But according to some Indonesian leaders, this had proved inadequate. Neither had Nehru supported Sukarno's suggestion for the convening of the second Afro-Asian Conference. Hence India could no longer be considered one of the "real progressive countries." She had, the Indonesian leaders came to believe, lost her revolutionary temper which had characterised India's non-

198. See Chapter on The Background, pp. 77-79.
alignment until the First Asian-African Conference and the Suez crisis.

But how to satisfy the Indonesian masses? They had come to presume that the non-aligned Conference would give direct support to Indonesia on the West Irian issue. The Indonesians were disappointed by the fact that the Belgrade "Declaration" did not include any specific reference on West Irian. In explaining this omission, Ali Sastroamidjojo, in an interview with the press, had to quote the operative part of Article 5 of the "Declaration" under which all the colonial issues had been grouped together. Another member of the Indonesian delegation, Kusumowidagdo, had to attribute it to the limitation of time appropriated for the Conference. But such explanations had little to satisfy the masses who had for long been fed on the politics of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The only alternative for the leadership was to step up this propaganda, and to find the scapegoat on which the entire blame could be put. Although it was President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who had prevented President Sukarno from seeking West Irian's inclusion into the Declaration, it was India that was chosen as the whipping boy. It was suggested that it was the Indian Prime Minister who had refused to agree with President Sukarno on the latter's thesis that colonialism was the basic issue and that it was he who had blocked Indonesian attempts at making specific proposals on certain issues of global importance.

200. Ibid., 18 September 1961.
As regards intensifying the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, President Sukarno himself set the tone. While addressing the workers of the Belgrade Shipyard "Tito" on 7 September 1961, the President said: "There are two things the Conference have decided upon. These are the struggle against colonialism and the struggle against imperialism.... This is the most important struggle imposing itself now, and therefore we work on doing away with colonialism and imperialism immediately." His tone became sharper on return to Djakarta after completing his mission to Washington. While addressing thousands of Indonesians at Kemajoran airport on 21 September 1961, President Sukarno said: The threat of extinction to humanity by a nuclear confrontation "is only a possibility ... which we are trying hard to prevent from breaking out." "Another question", he pointed out, "is the oppression being practised in Algeria, Angola, West Irian. These instances are not just a possibility but facts, facts of life and death." He warned:

As long as the desire of the new forces for freedom, justice and welfare is not recognized by those old forces, as long as there is colonialism and imperialism on the face of the earth and although we can settle the Berlin, Angola, Bizerta questions now, we can expect that sooner or later a second Berlin issue, a second Bizerta question, a second Angola problem will arise. 203

Ali Sastroamidjojo was more forthright in criticising Nehru's views. In an interview in Belgrade with the Hsinhue (New China) news agency, he said that "the question of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism is of first importance today". He stressed that a mere statement on the danger of war and an appeal for peace, taken out of context, "is floating in the air. It has no meaning unless

203. Ibid., 22 September 1961.
you give an analysis of the source of war, that is, colonialism-imperialism." He added: "World crisis has its sources. It does not come from heaven. It is only logical to analyse the source of the crisis. Crying for peace alone is nothing. You must analyse the source."

Expressing his dissatisfaction, D.N. Aidit, General Chairman of the PKI, said that the Declaration of the Conference was less firm as compared to President Sukarno's speech, both in regard to contents and spirit. "This is not surprising", he remarked, "because the Declaration is the outcome of negotiation where a rather sufficient number of non-bloc powers are not as firm as Indonesia in opposing imperialism and colonialism."

The other Indonesian objective was to convene the second Asian and African Conference. Before participating in the non-aligned countries conference, the Indonesian leaders had created an impression that this would pave the way for the second Asian-African Conference. The conference parleys had demonstrated Indonesia as a consistent advocate of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism and India as out of step with this general trend. The Indonesians had also witnessed how a somewhat favourable atmosphere had been created at Belgrade for realising their objective of the second Asian-African Conference. But a follow-up action was necessary in order to consolidate the Afro-Asian unity. Ali Sastroamidjojo had already emphasised at Belgrade that to promote this struggle we must now concentrate our efforts on convening the second Afro-Asian Conference.

204. Ibid., 9 September 1961.

205. Ibid., 8 September 1961. See also Harian Rakjat, 8 September 1961, p. 1.
and sooner the better"). "All the Asian and African forces", he had added, "have to be united to deal with the tense situation, particularly the trouble spots in Asia and Africa ... to face imperialism and colonialism, our common enemy." Such a line of propaganda was all the more necessary in view of the fact that President Sukarno had failed in his bid to seek concurrence of the non-aligned nations assembled at Belgrade to the convening of such a Conference.

**Impact on Indian-Indonesian Relations**

When the Indonesian leadership decided to intensify their struggle against colonialism and to direct their efforts towards materialising the second Asian-African Conference, India was in a mood of serious reappraisal of her relations with the non-aligned group of states as also with the rest in Asia and Africa. In view of the developments at Belgrade, it had become "real and urgent" for India to start a "quest for reality in her relations with the countries of this area..." generally and with Indonesia particularly. It was realised that sentiment which had so far characterised Indian-Indonesian relations will have to be replaced by a policy of pragmatism.

The reasons which had impelled India to adopt a moderate posture at the Conference were quite obvious. Her bigness in size and population and continuing stress on economic development contrasted sharply with the Indonesian emphasis on political slogans and symbols. With a stake in stability and world peace, India could not afford to be as sentimental as Indonesia on the issue of

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207. Ibid.

208. Jansen, n. 182.
colonialism. The differences had widened because Indonesia, having given prominence to politics over economics at home, had its emotional attitude fixed up. For ensuring success of her objectives, India had to pursue certain "policies and attitudes which earned her unpopularity, hostility and a degree of isolation". 209

India's stance at the Belgrade Conference had cast reflections on Indian-Indonesian relations. Exchange of divergent views in an open gathering of the leaders of twenty-five countries was not conducive to maintaining cordial relations between the two countries. One of the major consequences was the cooling off of relations at personal level. As Nehru's opposition to Sukarno's views on various international issues was interpreted in Indonesia as personal insult to the latter, this tended to bring personal rapport between the two leaders under strains. Similar was the case in relations at lower level of leadership.

It is correct, as Indian Express editorially commented that "India's presence (had) undoubtedly invested this heady gathering with a sense of proportion..." 211 It is also correct to assert that Nehru's presence had successfully managed to steer non-alignment to its original course. But to suggest that it had "enhanced its influence and prestige" would be far from correct. A section of the press tended to play down India's differences with Indonesia and other participants in the non-aligned Conference. Commenting editorially on these differences, The Hindu wrote thus: "The two

209. Ibid.

210. As a result of Krishna Menon's attitude towards Subandrio in the Drafting Committee meetings, the two leaders could only be expected to have less than friendly attitude towards each other in future.

211. Indian Express (Delhi), 6 September 1961.

212. Ibid.
points of view are not necessarily contradictory. It seems to be a difference of approach and emphasis rather than a fundamental disagreement." In the course of time, however, it is this "difference of approach and emphasis" which changed into "a fundamental difference", and tended to adversely effect Indian-Indonesian relations.

The three conceivable factors which had added to India's embarrassment were India's weakness in the diplomatic field; the smallness of India's delegation and the personal role of Krishna Menon.

The weakness in the diplomatic field told heavily on India's role at Belgrade. The Indian diplomats had been confused by the vacillating attitude of the Government. In order to ensure the Indian viewpoint to prevail, a vigorous diplomatic drive with clear-cut directions of policy was essential. Commenting in a despatch in the Hindustan Times, V.R. Bhatt pointed to this deficiency and urged upon the need to tone it up. He said:

... the fact that it can be suggested that India was not fully understood at a gathering like the one at Belgrade points to the need of more vigorous Indian diplomacy in Africa where the Chinese, for example, are active and where the Yugoslavs have established themselves rather well. 214

The smallness of the Indian delegation also accounted for much of India's predicament. Nehru's views on all the major issues remained, for the most part, confined to the exclusive Indian circle. Although Prime Minister Nehru was able to have fairly frequent contacts with the chiefs of the Afro-Asian delegations,


their other members never got the opportunity to hear him or know his mind. As for press correspondents, no arrangements were made to meet those from Africa and West Asia, although some Western news men accidentally met him. So there was a general lack of appreciation of Nehru's relative stress on the crisis of war and peace. To those not fully informed, Prime Minister Nehru's attitude was at least "obstructionist" to their demand for intensifying the struggle against colonialism.

Krishna Menon, second only to Prime Minister Nehru in the delegation, also added to India's difficulties at Belgrade. His attitude created an impression that India and her leaders were rather disrespectful to other non-aligned chiefs of State or Government. With his habit of picking others' mistakes in English grammar, Krishna Menon created more ill-will than goodwill towards himself and towards India. The night of 4 September had witnessed exchanges between Krishna Menon and Subandrio, the latter probably having felt irritated over lessons in English grammar.

Western Assessments

It would be interesting to see the Indonesian and Indian attitudes in the light of reactions in the Western countries and the United States. A section of the Western press attempted to focus the differences in attitudes taken by Nehru and Sukarno. The New Statesman wrote thus:

215. Ibid.
216. See pp. 143-4 of the Chapter.
Nehru's speech was a wonderful relief after what seemed the endless succession of set documents read out by earlier speakers, mainly written for home consumption. He brushed aside the colonial issue because victory in this field was now certain. . . . 217

In a bid to play up Nehru's role, the New Statesman added: "If Nehru had not brought urgency and reality into the Belgrade Conference, it would have ended in a long and irrelevant manifesto about Bizerta, the Congo, Angola, Cuba and other colonial issues." By implication it was a severe criticism of Sukarno and others strongly opposed to colonialism.

But Nehru's praise in the Western press had created a feeling of loneliness for him. Sitting among the non-aligned leaders he had discovered he was almost different from others in many respects. His belief in individual liberty and his mode of parliamentary and democratic behaviour were little shared by others. As the head of a government which had been seriously pre-occupied with the task of planned economic and industrial development for the last ten years, Nehru could ill-afford to be anything but rational on the question of colonialism, which according to his understanding was on retreat. He refused to share President Sukarno's emotionalism which is evident from a following excerpts from the latter's speech.

Warning the "West against continued exploitation of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the Indonesian President had said:

... they cannot go on living at the expense of millions of poverty-stricken peoples. Their affluent societies are built upon the sweat and toil and tears of millions who spend their evenings

218. Ibid.
not with eyes glued upon television sets but in
a darkness pierced by the flame of a single
 candle.... 219

Nehru believed that harping on the past deeds of the West
European nations would only create bitterness and hinder the growth
of mutually beneficial co-operation between the developed and
developing nations of the world. Describing the reasons for Nehru's
feeling of loneliness at Belgrade, A.M. Rosenthal, a *New York Times*
correspondent, wrote thus:

Almost alone in the world, Jawaharlal Nehru has
struggled against allowing the people in their
ignorance and poverty to be caught in the trap
of the easy way out. The others - the Nasser, the
Titos, the Nkrumahs, the Toures, the Castros,
the Sukarnos - have built their pedestals on their
people's despair and strivings. At Belgrade, Nehru
sat among men he must have despised.... He is no
longer the automatic leader of the non-aligned
nations.

The correspondent added:

There are some interesting reasons why this happened
(the bypassing of Nehru at Belgrade) and they bear on
Mr. Nehru's future influence among the uncommitted
nations. He found himself among many leaders with
whom he had absolutely nothing in common and small-
time dictators who are contemptuous of the methods
by which he lives and governs. Beyond tactics, how
much influence can a man like Nehru have on a man
like Sukarno? They live in different political and
moral worlds. 220

This probably focussed in the sharpest way the nature of differences
that arose, on personal level, between the Indian Prime Minister and
the Indonesian President.

219. The Conference of **Heads of State** or **Governments of**
Non-Aligned Countries, n. 95, p. 31. Also quoted in
Walter Z. Laqueur and Alfred Sherman, "The Meaning of

220. *New York Times*, 24 September 1961. Also quoted in Gupta,
n. 20, pp. 71-72.
Role of China and Pakistan

China and Pakistan were the two Asian countries which took keen interest in the Indian-Indonesian differences as manifested at the Belgrade Conference. Sensing relevance of conflict of opinion between Nehru and Sukarno to their own national interests, both China and Pakistan sought to exploit the Indian-Indonesian differences and to promote ill-will between their leaders. The role of the two countries in this connection has been examined elsewhere in the thesis. China, in particular, made a deliberate attempt to play up Sukarno and to play down Nehru, a scheme of things which fitted well into the overall Chinese objectives in South and South-East Asia. It was a pat on Sukarno's back to encourage him in his posture of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. No less was it a Chinese reminder to Nehru that the era of "Panch Sheel" and "peaceful co-existence" was over and had yielded ground to active rivalry between the two big Asian countries for leadership in the continent.

221. See Chapters on China's Role, pp. 325-412 and Pakistan's Role, pp. 413-79.