Chapter I

THE BACKGROUND
Centuries before the British and the Dutch imposed their colonial rule over India and Indonesia, the two countries had been enjoying mutually beneficial trade and cultural relations. Colonialism only tended to create barriers between them. About two decades before the struggle against colonialism ushered the two peoples into independence, their leaders revived their age-old contacts at the Bierville Congress in August 1926 and the Brussels Conference in February 1927. During the mid nineteen-forties, when India appeared to be on the threshold of independence, the nationalist leadership in India became a source of inspiration and encouragement to its counterpart in Indonesia. India's spontaneous and ungrudging moral and political support to the Indonesian Republic before and during the Dutch "police actions" in July 1947 and December 1948, created among the Indonesians a reservoir of goodwill for India and its leaders. It roused expectations that after regaining independence from the British and the Dutch, the two countries would resume their ancient commercial and cultural ties snapped during the colonial period.

But in about ten to fifteen years of their independence, the top leaders of India and Indonesia came to show divergent approaches to issues of national and international importance. Certain factors led to mutual prejudices even at personal level, and ultimately to the hardening of attitudes at the first Conference of Non-Aligned states in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in September 1961. A survey of such factors as well as those on the credit side would be meaningful if seen in the context of India's overall contribution to the cause of Indonesia's independence. But since India's moral, diplomatic and
even material support to Indonesia in the late nineteen-forties was, at least partly, a product of warmth existing in the pre-colonial era, an examination of age-old relationships between the two countries would be relevant. In this connection, it would be useful to examine the impact of geography on their relationships.

Geographical Aspects

In the history of relations between India and Indonesia, geography has played an important role. Indonesia, an Archipelago with over three thousand islands, has a population of about 113 million and an area of 735,865 square miles. In Asia it is the third largest nation after China and India. Lying across the Bay of Bengal, the Indonesian Archipelago provides a natural link between the two oceans, the Indian and the Pacific, and between two continents, Asia and Australia. By virtue of its geographical situation on the ancient Asian sea trade route joining China in the north with India in the west and lands beyond it, Indonesia, since the beginning of the Christian Era, came to form an important link in the eastern chain of "the powerful, wealthy extensive overseas trade of the Indian coastal towns". The rich potential resources of Indonesian Islands provided a strong incentive to the Indian merchants and the proximity of the two countries facilitated links between their peoples. The highly developed shipping industry and navigational skills in India coupled with the sea-faring traditions of both the coastal Indians and Indonesians, facilitated the commercial links. Hippalus's discovery


of the regular action of Trade winds, the "Monsoons" in 79 A.D. gave a push to the sea trade through the Bay of Bengal across the Straits of Malacca and Sunda. For the major part the trade was through the sea, the voyage being shorter from the Coromandel Coast to the Straits of Malacca and safer following the regular timings of the South-west Monsoons. With trade and commerce had spread India's culture and civilisation, and this could be attributed to the impact of the geographical setting of Indonesia. The domestic pressures, a spirit of adventure and lure of wealth might have rendered the flow of Indian traders, settlers and missionaries into the Archipelago easier. But one of the major contributory factors to the development of at least two thousand years of contacts between the two peoples, remained the short and easily navigable sea.

Strategically also Indonesia occupies an important position. It lies on the world trade routes. The Malacca and the Sunda Straits, the major sea-lanes of the Indonesian Islands, form the life-lines of India's sea-borne trade and commerce with the East. Even looked at from the defence angle, security of the entire eastern sea-board of


4. It is well established that even before the Hippalus' discovery, the Indians thoroughly navigated the Bay of Bengal and knew trade routes in the east. Sylvain Levi has remarked in his The Pre-Aryan and Pre-Dravidian in India, thus: "The movement which carried Indian civilisation towards different parts of the globe about the beginning of the Christian Era was far from inaugurating any new route. Adventurers, traffickers and missionaries profited by the technical progress of navigation which had already become familiar." quoted in Panikkar, n. 3, pp. 26-27.
India can be threatened in case Indonesia takes a hostile posture. The developments during the Second World War are a pointer in this direction.

**Historical Contacts**

Obviously, the civilisation and culture that the Indonesians have inherited from their past carry the imprint of rich ancient Indian culture. In fact, pre-colonial Indonesian history, like that of the whole of South-East Asia, is an unbroken story of the inflow of religious and cultural influences from India. Though all the peoples across the Bay of Bengal have received varying degrees of the impress of Indian culture and civilisation, the one received by Indonesia is the most profound. Java, one of the five largest islands, the most fertile and populous, witnessed what H.G. Quaritch Wales describes as "the heaviest Indianization". This did not, however, mean that Indonesia was always at the receiving end. Palembang, the capital of the Sumatran State of Srivijaya, which became a famous centre of Mahayana Buddhism, attracted scholars from far and wide. The renowned Atisha who reformed Tibetan Buddhism, is said to have studied there from 1011 to 1023 A.D. under Dharmakirti, the head of the Buddhist clergy in Sumatra. In the long historical process of commercial and cultural exchange, Indonesia came to share with India her religions, her language, art and architecture. Before this process was interrupted by the arrival of the Portuguese during the first quarter of the sixteenth century, prolonged contacts with India


6. The Tibetan biography of Atisha calls Sumatra the chief centre of Buddhism and Dharmakirti the greatest scholar of his time. See D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (London, etc., 1964), edn 2, p. 58.
and her culture and civilisation had already enriched Indonesian languages, art and literature, architecture and its concepts of law and government. Commercial relations had a longer history than cultural contacts between the two nations. Brian Harrison is "certain that from at least the sixth century B.C. onwards Indian traders were sailing to those lands, and down through the islands, in search of gold and tin". Indonesia's position as an important link in the Asian trade route has already been described. The Indian trade settlements lying mostly on the fringes of Indonesian territory bordering on the main seaways might have grown out of requirements of the monsoons and business necessities.

The merchants were followed by political adventurers and religious missionaries. It was the religious missionaries, the Brahmins of India, however, who spread the various forms and cults of Hinduism and Buddhism. But the Indonesians they originally met were certainly "not uncultivated savages but organised societies endowed with a civilization ... that had some traits in common with their


8. R.C. Majumdar, Ancient Indian Colonization in South-East Asia (The Maharaja Sayajirao Gaekwad Honorarium Lecture, 1953-1954), (Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1963), edn 2, pp. 8-9. Majumdar describes his "imaginary picture" of how Hindu cultural influences spread in South-East Asia. In his opinion, these were the pioneers of the Hindu Colonization in South-East Asia.

9. van Leur, n. 2, p. 99. van Leur rejects Krom's thesis of traders being the disseminators of Indian culture as "inaccurate to the core". He concedes that "large amount of cultural influence will have been transmitted by trade and the traders...". But in the field of specific facets of Indian culture, he refuses to give as large a role to the trader as Krom gives in his Geschiedenis (pp. 67-81).
G. Coedes describes this position as Indian superstructure upon an indigenous sub-stratum, whereas van den Bosch refers to it as the product of the fecundation of the living matter of Indonesian society by the Indian spirit, procreating and allowing to develop an independent organism.

The process of intermingling continued for centuries and ultimately resulted in the evolution of a sort of composite culture and civilisation. In due course, the Indonesians came to share with the Indians their traditions, cultural values, ways of worship, patterns of social and political behaviour and organisation. With the continuance of trade and spread of the Indian culture, the earlier trade settlements came to be converted into various "Hinduized" kingdoms. The Western as well as Indian historians on South-East Asia and especially on Indonesia are convinced that the Hindu-Buddhist

10. G. Coedes, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, Walter F. vella ed. and Susan Brown Cowing tr., (Honolulu, 1968), p. 9. Both Majumdar and K.A. Nilakanta Sastr! the two noted Indian writers on South-East Asia, broadly agree with this contention. Majumdar is, however, critical of Western writers such as Quaritch Wales and "others who think like him" for their conscious or unconscious attempt to exaggerate the local factor and belittle the importance of Hindu element and thereby change the entire conception of the value and importance of Hindu culture in South-East Asia...." See Majumdar, n. 8, pp. 14-15 and K.A. Nilakanta Sastr!, South Indian Influences in the Far East (Bombay, 1949), pp. 4-5.

11. Hall, n. 6, pp. 21-22. See also B.R. Chatterji, History of Indonesia (Meerut, Delhi, Calcutta, 1967), edn 3, pp. 1-2. Professor Chatterji stresses the point "that it was on soil, holding great promise as regards its richness, that the seeds of Indian culture were sown. It was to bear a wonderfully fine harvest and each people in this region - the Khmers, the Chams, the Mons, the Javanese, was to develop and mould this culture according to its own traditions".

12. Coedes, n. 10, p. 24. Coedes mentions here two different ways in which a simple commercial settlement was transformed into an organised political entity.
kingdoms existed in the Indonesian Islands of Java and Sumatra as far back as the beginning of the Christian era. The names of the empires of Srivijaya, Kalinga and Mataram, of Singhasari and Majapahit are the most prominent. Those Hindu-Buddhist empires in the Indonesian Archipelago constitute a significant epoch in its pre-colonial history, and are, even, today, looked upon as a source of unity and a symbol of national pride and identity.)

Their major importance lies in the rich contribution made by their rulers in the fields of art, literature and architecture. The eighth century Buddhist monument of Borobudur, with three miles of galleries and four hundred statues of the Buddha, and the ninth century Hindu temple at Prambanan (both near Jogjakarta in Central Java), are the mute and magnificent testimony of Indo-Indonesian cultural relations in ancient times. The other living signs of it today are the Indonesian names, their languages and script, the shadow plays based on the Ramayana and the Mahabharata.

The period of Hindu-Buddhist religious and cultural influences came to an end with the fall of the Majapahit empire. This was followed by two important events in Indonesian history - the spread of Islam and the capture of Malacca by the Portuguese. In the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the coastal regions of Java had come under Muslim rule. By then Goa, a port on the western coast of India, had also been occupied by the Portuguese. The following period saw the eclipse of Indonesian Muslim as well as Arab control

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13. According to the Javanese tradition, Majapahit was conquered by a coalition of Mohammedan states in 1478 A.D. In fact, as Hall asserts, there is a clear evidence that a 'Hindu' king, Ranvijaya, was reigning there in 1486 A.D. See Hall, n. 6, p. 89.

14. Hall, n. 6, p. 89. This is evident from a report sent in January 1514 to the King of Portugal by di Brito, the Portuguese Governor of Malacca.
over the Ocean trade routes and growing political hegemony of the Portuguese. In due course, India became a part of the British overseas empire and Indonesia was controlled by the Dutch, the latter having ousted the Portuguese from Malacca in 1641.

It is, however, surprising that India whose religions, culture and civilisation spread far and wide and left its lasting impressions on the peoples to the east, does not find any record of its achievements in ancient and medieval history. A few names like "Suvarna-dvipa", "Yava-dvipa", and "Malaya-dvipa" appear in the Indian epics, the Ramayana and the Puranas, centuries before the first Indian kingdoms were established in the Indonesian Archipelago. In fact the credit of restoring the Indonesian history and India's contribution in its making in the historic past goes exclusively to the Dutch scholars. Thanks to their spirit of enquiry and their hard and consistent labour, in their famous works, they restructured the rich and glorious cultural past of India and consciousness began to dawn about the centuries old Indian-Indonesian give and take. But since what they wrote was in the Dutch language, for Indian scholars it remained unknown for a long time. Some knowledge of the Dutch works on South-East Asia induced the Indian scholars to peep through their nation's past. This led in 1926 to the establishment of Greater India Society in Calcutta. The next year saw the publication by the Society of India and Java, which gave a well-documented history of the two nations' relations, and, as such, it represented the first ever scholarly attempt by the Indians themselves towards rehabilitating their ancient history of cultural expansion across the Bay of Bengal.

15. B.R. Chatterji, India and Java, Part I (History), Greater India Society, Bulletin 5, (Calcutta, 1933), edn 2, pp. 86.
In 1927 Rabindra Nath Tagore visited Java. He was the first prominent Indian to have visited Indonesia after the British and the Dutch had occupied India and Indonesia and imposed barriers between the two peoples. Pride of India's past reveals itself in Tagore's words which read: "To know my country, one has to travel to that age, when she realized her soul and thus transcended her physical boundaries, when she revealed her being in a radiant magnanimity which illumined the eastern horizon, making her recognized as their own by those in alien shores who were awakened to the surprise of life...." Commenting on the first impressions he had gathered from reading a detailed account of the history of South-East Asia, Jawaharlal Nehru said: "... how amazed I was and excited I became. New panoramas opened out before me, new perspectives of history, new conceptions of India's past, and I had to adjust all my thinking and previous notions to them. Champa, Cambodia and Angkor, Sri Vijaya and Majapahit suddenly rose out of the void, vibrant with

16. Quoted in Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Calcutta, 1946), p. 227 and in J. D. Casparis, "Historical Writings of Indonesia (Early Period)" in Hall, ed., *Historians of Southeast Asia* (London, 1961), p. 129. Casparis considers it "a part of the national revival of India." The quotation formed part of preface to the journal of the Greater India Society (1934) as written by Rabindranath Tagore. See also Sylvain Levi's remarks about India's glory in his *L'Inde Civilisatrice; Aperçu historique* (Paris, 1938), p. 136. "Mother of wisdom," he says, "India gave her mythology to her neighbours who went to teach it to the whole world. Mother of law and philosophy, she gave to three-quarters of Asia, a god, a religion, a doctrine, an art. She carried her sacred language, her literature, her institutions into Indonesia, to the limits of the known world, and from there they spread back to Madagascar and perhaps to the Coast of Africa, where the present flow of Indian immigrants seems to follow the faint traces of the past." Quoted in Coedes, n. 10, p. xvi.
that instinctive feeling which makes the past touch the present."

Contacts During the Colonial Period

During two hundred years of British rule in India and three hundred and fifty years of Dutch rule in Indonesia, contacts between the two countries were snapped. For their own reasons, the respective colonial authorities imposed stringent barriers. Bound to the mother countries in Europe, their trade and economy were channelled through their capitals in Europe.

"While under the colonial rule, Indian and Indonesian delegates met in the Bierville Congress for Peace in Europe in August 1926 and in the Brussels Congress against Imperialism in February 1927. These Conferences provided the opportunity to the leaders of the two countries to revive their centuries' old acquaintances. At Bierville Congress, K. M. Panikkar of India joined Mohammad Hatta of Indonesia in voicing his opposition to the "unholy race for the imperialistic exploitation of weaker peoples". They shared each other's views on the issues of world peace, European rivalry in Asia and the subjection of the Asiatic people. The "Manifest" of the Asian delegates, including those from India and Indonesia, pleaded for

17. Nehru, n. 16, p. 228. Jawaharlal Nehru also quoted M. Rene Grousset who commented, in Civilizations of the East, on the impact of India's culture on the whole of Asia, thus: "In the high plateau of Eastern Iran, in the oases of Serindia, in the arid wastes of Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria, in the ancient civilized lands of China and Japan, in the lands of the primitive Mons and Kmers and other tribes in Indo-China, in the countries of the Malayo-Polynesians, in Indonesia and Malaya, India left the indelible impress of her high culture not only upon religion, but also upon art and literature, in a word, all the higher things of spirit." See p. 236.

removing "the causes which make Asia hostile towards Europe" and for dissolving "this vast accumulation of hatred", by giving freedom to Asian countries. "Let China, India and the rest of Asia be free" was its slogan. Commenting on India's geo-political position, having a direct bearing on the entire continent, the "Manifest" declared "that in the freedom of India lies the keystone of world peace".

The next year saw a meeting at Brussels between Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Hatta, and their exchange of views on various issues of importance. Though it came to be generally recognised that the enemy was one and the same, viz., European colonialism, and employed almost similar instruments to perpetuate its rule, the geographic difficulties and lack of communications between the nationalist struggles for freedom inhibited joint co-operation in opposing and resisting and ultimately eliminating it. The Brussels Conference was expected to "constitute a turning point in the history of the struggle for colonial emancipation". It led to the creation of the "League Against Imperialism and for National Independence". It declined in importance because of the stigma of Communism carried by it as also because of conflict between Communists and nationalist leaderships. It, however, provided an opportunity to revive contacts between Indians and Indonesians, who were destined to be among the greatest leaders of their respective countries. Nehru evinced keen interest in the Indonesian representatives to the Brussels Conference and in the understanding of the Indonesian people, their names, their


religion and culture.

These early contacts, at a later stage, rendered the freedom struggles in both the countries mutually complementary. India's struggle for independence became a source of inspiration to the freedom fighters of Indonesia. The thoughts and deeds of the Indian leaders like Rabindra Nath Tagore, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and Mahatma Gandhi left deep impress on the minds of Indonesian leaders including Sukarno.

The Brussels Conference had greatly influenced Nehru and through him the Indian National Congress. Since then the Indian National Congress's attitude towards foreign policy issues had grown quite assertive. With the contacts with the Asians and Africans established in Brussels, its interest in their nationalist

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22. Recalling his entry into politics in the 1920s, President Sukarno once said: "The great Poet Tagore inspired me as a beginner in the national movement; later Mahatma Gandhi electrified me with courage of conviction to carry the struggle to its logical end." See Indonesia, Friendly Relations: Indonesia-India, Special Issue 27 (Djakarta, Ministry of Information, 1958), pp. 7-8.

23. Bimla Prasad, n. 21, pp. 79-80. Nehru had participated in the Brussels Conference as the Secretary-General of the Indian National Congress and as its accredited representative. He was asked to deliver one of the opening addresses on the first day, and had been one of the five honorary presidents of the League Council. He was also made a member of the Executive Committee of the Council. Hence his importance.

24. Ibid., p. 71. However, assertion of an independent role in India's foreign policy had already been indicated in the draft submitted by Mahatma Gandhi to the All India Congress Committee in November 1921.
movements had increased. By 1942, the year of Quit India Resolution, the Indian struggle for freedom from British colonialism became a symbol of the struggle of the people of Asia and Africa. Yet India's direct support to Indonesia's cause for freedom had to wait until the end of the Second World War. The inter-war period only saw intensification of the struggle for freedom in both the countries. Whereas India continued her march towards independence under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, in her own non-violent way, the Japanese occupation of Indonesia gave a different, rather violent, turn to its nationalist struggle.

Subsequently, under the leadership of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia declared her independence on 17 August 1945, more than two years before India achieved her independence from the British.

**India and the Indonesian Freedom Struggle**

The following month, the British Indian troops, following the British policy as directed from London, landed in Djakarta, with the specific objective of disarming the Japanese forces. Finding the newly-established Indonesian Republic threatened with extinction and that too at the hands of British forces composed mostly of Indian soldiers, India, still in bondage, responded actively and positively to forestall the re-imposition of the Dutch rule. The Dutch effort to re-establish their rule over the Archipelago with the help of the British, was natural to provoke strong reactions

25. Ibid., p. 80. This became evident from the May 1927 declaration of the All India Congress Committee in Madras, supporting the anti-colonial struggles in China, Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt, Syria and Palestine, and demanding of withdrawal of Indian troops from these and all other British and other European colonies.

26. Ibid., p. 231.
from the Indian nationalists.

Reacting sharply, the All India Congress Committee, on 23 September 1945, expressed its "anxiety" at the developments in Indonesia and other countries in South-East Asia and categorically stated that India would "deeply resent the continuation of an imperialist policy" in the region. It also took "strong objection to the use of Indian troops in maintaining imperialist domination over any of these countries...." In a statement on 19 October 1945, the President of the Indian National Congress, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, said: "The events in Java and Indo-China have caused no surprise to Indian nationalists, but the use of Indian troops to suppress the aspirations of Nationalists there, have caused deep resentment. Things have now come to such a point when the Indian National Congress will have to consider seriously what steps to adopt to prevent the use of Indian men and materials against Asiatic peoples fighting for their freedom." Nehru pointed out the gap between professions and actions of the Western leaders and statesmen in as far as the freedom struggles in Asia were concerned. In an interview with an

27. Indian National Congress, March 1940 to September 1946 (Being the resolutions passed by the Congress, the All-India Congress Committee and the Working Committee) (Allahabad, General Secretary, A.I.C.C., n.d.), pp. 45-46. The AICC declared, inter alia that free India would seek close and friendly relations with her neighbours in all fields, especially with China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Ceylon and the countries of the Middle East.

28. The Hindu (Madras), 21 October 1945. The Congress President had also joined V.K. Krishna Menon (then Secretary, India League) in despatching a strong letter of protest to the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, against the pro-Dutch British colonial policy in Indonesia. This resulted in two hundred Labour Members of British Parliament expressing their support to the Indian protest. See ibid., 22 October 1945. Others who criticised the British attitude towards Indonesia's freedom struggle included the Birmingham India League and Pandit Hridayanath Kunzru, President of the Servants of India Society. The former passed

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Associated Press of India correspondent in Ajmer, Nehru said: "It is fantastic to talk of freedom, democracy and of the San Francisco Charter and at the same time to suppress by force the independence movement in Java." He also described the "far-reaching consequences" of "extreme bitterness" and "large-scale racial and continental conflicts", this colonial policy might lead to, and declared: "The struggle in Java is becoming more intense and it has become the acid test of the policy of the United Nations, more especially of that of England, and the U.S.A...." Only two days before, Nehru had demanded withdrawal of "the British troops that are in effective occupation of Java". He had also openly supported "Gukarno's Government" and felt that the Republic should be accorded immediate international recognition. In December 1945, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress pledged its support to the struggle for freedom in Indonesia and Indo-China and declared that any support given to the designs of the imperialist powers in those countries was resented throughout Asia. It also showed special distress and anger at the British use of Indian soldiers in support of colonialism in these countries.

Side by side, the Congress members of the new Legislative Assembly, which met for the first time in January 1946, started a resolution condemning the use of Indian troops against nationalists in Indo-China and Indonesia, while the latter described the British attitude as "An Act of Moral Injustice." See ibid., 24 and 23 October 1945.


30. Ibid., 23 October 1945. Nehru made this observation in response to a query about the Indonesian Vice-President Mohammad Hatta's demand for withdrawal of Dutch troops and for the British troops to concern themselves with the preservation of law and order. He was talking to the Associated Press of India correspondent in Jaipur.

31. Bimla Prasad, n. 21, p. 28.
building pressures to compel the British Indian Government to withdraw Indian soldiers from Indonesia and to stop further aid of any sort to the Dutch. Various participants in the debate on an adjournment motion relating to the Government permitting the use of Indian troops in Indonesia, strongly denounced the British policy. Another such debate took place on 12 February 1946. The Government was censured for its "failure to instruct its delegate to the U.N.O. to convey to the Security Council ... the strong views of the elected members of the Assembly on the subject of Anglo-Dutch operations against the Nationalist Forces of Indonesia."

The sympathy and support the Indian National Congress and its leaders showed to the cause of Indonesian independence was reminiscent of the centuries' old fellow feeling between the Indians and Indonesians. This process continued with the passage of time.

32. The strong critics of the British policy included Professor N.G. Ranga, Dewan Chaman Lal, Abdur Rahman Siddiqi and Sarat Chandra Bose. N.G. Ranga criticised the British Government for their anxiety to "prop up Dutch imperialism", and the Indian Government for their decision "to toe this line with British imperialism in order to play the game of the imperialists". Dewan Chaman Lal described the Government policy "to permit Indian troops to be utilised for this purpose", as the most "shameful and disgraceful in the history of this country". For Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, using Indian soldiers as "mercenary marauders" was "disgraceful to last degree". Sarat Chandra Bose expressed his indignation on the use of Indian soldiers against the freedom fighters in Indonesia and declared that "India today does not want to dip her hands in her neighbour's blood". He also urged the Government to withdraw every Indian soldier and seaman from Indonesia. Legislative Assembly Debates, vol. 1, no. 1, 21 January 1946, pp. 68-82.

33. The Hindu, 14 February 1946. An adjournment motion to this effect was passed by the Central Assembly without a division. The type of assurances the Indian National Congress gave to the "sister Asiatic nations" at this stage, could be seen from a statement in the debate by one of its members, Sekhar Sanyal. He said: "We want it to be known to our sister Asiatic nations that we are of them and with them and whatever has been done by irresponsible Government has been done without our knowledge and consent."
India's moral and diplomatic support increased to suit the change in conditions in Indonesia. In a statement issued at Wardha on 10 August 1946, Nehru, the President of the Indian National Congress, called upon his countrymen to remember "that while we are inevitably concerned with our own struggles for independence, our brothers and sisters in Indonesia are fighting to retain their independence and to protect their new-born Republic". He also expressed his conviction that on 17 August 1946, the Independence Day of Indonesia, "the people of India would like to send their greetings and good wishes to the people of Indonesia and express their solidarity in the cause of Asian freedom".

The Indonesian leaders wanted, at this stage, a breathing time so as to consolidate their political-military position against the combined Anglo-Dutch action. If the Indian leaders and people could force the Indian Government to withdraw the Indian soldiers in Indonesia, it would be a great service to the cause of Indonesian freedom. The Indian leaders and people, thus, directed their energies to this noble end. India was not yet in a position to give all-out support to the strengthening of her neighbour's independence. The leaders of the Indian National Congress were still engrossed in the issues of Indian independence and the future of the sub-continent.

With the establishment in India of an Interim Government in the first week of September 1946, the position changed considerably. Now the Interim Government under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru could take steps unfettered by the directions from London. In a radio broadcast on 7 September 1946, Nehru said, among other things: "India has followed with anxious interest the struggle of the Indonesians for freedom and to them we send our good wishes." On

34. Ibid., 12 August 1946.
35. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961) (Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), p. 3.
26 September, he made a major policy statement clarifying India's attitude towards issues of regional and international importance. In this statement Nehru emphasised four essential tenets of free India's foreign policy, viz., non-involvement in other people's quarrels, opposition to policing other countries and to the use of any Indian resources, men or money, against the freedom struggle in any country, elimination of colonialism from all over Asia and Africa, and, finally, the establishment of racial equality.

Within three months of the formation of the Interim Government, that is, in November 1946, all the Indian troops had been ordered out of Indonesia. This was the first major and practical step India took to strengthen Indonesian freedom before she was herself fully independent. This also served to convince all the countries, east and west of India, of India's genuine desire to strengthen freedom movements against colonialism.

**Asian Relations Conference**

The Asian Relations Conference, which took place in New Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947, was an important landmark in the history of India and all other nations in Asia. Of all the countries, however, it had special significance for Indonesia. For the first time after three hundred and fifty years of Dutch rule, a large number of Indonesians had found their way out of their country.

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36. See Bimla Prasad, n. 21, p. 249.
37. *Asian Relations*, being Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April 1947 (New Delhi, Asian Relations Organisation, 1948), p. 77. This information was given by Nehru, while clarifying the Indian position regarding several points raised during the discussions on the topic "National Movements for Freedom". It related to the use of Indian soldiers and arms in certain countries of South-East Asia.
into a gathering of representatives from all over Asia. There was a great jubilation among the Indonesians on the prospect of going to New Delhi and meeting their fellow Indians and Asians after a long spell of Dutch rule. Moreover, apart from getting a chance to renew their age-old contacts, it enabled them to come to the Conference and "participate unaccompanied by alien advisers".

From Indian point of view, the Conference provided Nehru with an important occasion to set down in clearer terms the basic objectives of free India's foreign policy. The "answering echo" and the "magnificent response" that India's invitation evoked from all over Asia, enabled him to hark back to the past when all the Asian nations enjoyed mutually beneficial contacts. Forging links broken during the colonial period appeared to be top-most in Nehru's mind. Besides, the Conference provided a forum for discussing mutual problems and prospects of Asia's recovery from the political, social, economic and cultural backlog of the era of European domination. The major objectives appeared to be political freedom to be followed by social and economic regeneration.

To Nehru, it represented "the end of an era" and "the threshold of a new period of history". Nehru's inaugural address to the Conference marked a call for reassertion of Asia's role in

38. Personal impressions gathered during an interview with Mrs. Sutan Sjahrir, Djakarta, 6 October 1969. She was among the large Indonesian contingent participating in the Conference.


40. Ibid., p. 23. As Nehru himself put it in his inaugural address, "one of the notable consequences of the European domination of Asia has been the isolation of the countries of Asia from one another." And this "isolation" needed to be removed.

41. Ibid., p. 21.
the world politics and economy. "... Asia is again finding herself", he declared. In this role of Asia, India occupied a pivotal position. Although Nehru declared that "there are no leaders and no followers", he stressed the strategic importance of India's role. A free India, he viewed as "the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia". Commenting on India's geographical location, he said it was "the meeting point of western and northern and eastern and southeast Asia. Because of this, the history of India is a long history of her relations with the other countries of Asia. Streams of culture have come to India from the west and the east and been absorbed in India, producing the rich and varied culture which India is today. At the same time, streams of culture have flowed from India to distant parts of Asia. If you would know India you have to go to Afghanistan, and western Asia, to Central Asia, to China and Japan and to the countries of Southeast Asia. There you will find magnificent evidence of the vitality of India's culture which spread out and influenced vast numbers of people." 42

In this framework of Nehru's Asia policy, the situation in Indonesia came to be the first serious case. Centuries of relations with the Indonesians beckoned the Indian leaders to do everything possible to prevent the Dutch from re-establishing their colonial rule over Indonesia. Besides, in the light of the objectives of Nehru's Asia policy, India could not compromise with European colonialism. Also, with the strengthening of Indonesia's independence was attached the question of India's own freedom. Dutch control over Indonesia, lying at a sea distance of about a hundred miles, could always pose a

42. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
threat to the security and territorial integrity of India. Moreover, Dutch rule in Indonesia would also imperil India's sea-borne trade in and across the Bay of Bengal. All considerations pointed in the direction of blocking the Dutch from re-establishing their colonial rule over the Indonesian Archipelago. Many steps were thus taken to consolidate Indonesia's freedom. One of the major contributions was to enable the Indonesian delegation, including Sutan Sjahrir, to participate in the First Asian Relations Conference. This coupled with Nehru's espousal of Indonesia's case, made the Indonesian problem an Asian problem. Thus the entire Asia came to have stakes in Indonesia's independence.

The First Asian Relations Conference thus provided to India an excellent opportunity to internationalise the question of Indonesian independence. In his inaugural address on 23 March 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, among other participating delegates, welcomed the representatives from Indonesia, "whose history", he recalled, "is intertwined with India's culture..." Welcoming Sutan Sjahrir to the Conference on 1 April 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru commended the "important part" Indonesia had been playing "in Asian and world events in recent years" and said that the Indonesian leader's participation was "of considerable significance for our Conference and for us in

43. Two years later, in his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi on 22 March 1949, Nehru said that "the problem of Indonesia is more important to us than many European problems. Geography, perhaps, is responsible, if you like. Whatever the reason may be, the real reason ultimately is not merely geography, but a feeling deep down in our minds that if some kind of colonial domination continues in Indonesia, and is permitted to continue, it will be a danger to the whole of Asia, to us in India as well as to other countries. See Nehru, n. 35, p. 262.

44. Asian Relations, Report, n. 37, p. 22. The Indonesian delegation comprising 25 members and six observers was led by Dr. Abu Hanifa; Sutan Sjahrir, the then Prime Minister of Indonesia, joined the Conference at a later stage. See ibid., pp. 271-2.
On their part, the Indonesians expressed their gratitude for all that India had been doing. Dr. Abu Hanifa, the leader of the Indonesian delegation to the Asian Relations Conference, recalled how in contrast to the "Dutch imperialists" and the "Japanese fascists", the Indians in the centuries past, had visited Indonesia "with good intentions". Addressing the closing Plenary (Public) Session of the Conference on 2 April 1947, Sutan Sjahrir described his visit to India as "brief but memorable", and concluded his speech by extending "warm thanks" to "India in particular", "for the great moral and material support you have given us in our struggle". "Many as our faults are", he continued, "we Indonesians have never been and never will be guilty of ingratitude".

India and the First Dutch Police Action

The spontaneous flow of India's diplomatic support was yet to await the developments that led to the launching of the "police action" by the Dutch on 21 July 1947. Both the Indian and Soviet pressure had forced the Dutch to enter into negotiations with the Republic of Indonesia in October 1946. Linggadjati Agreement signed on 25 March 1947, was the result of these negotiations. Within less than four months after the conclusion of this Agreement, the Dutch, unreconciled to the prospect of losing their colonial empire in the east, resorted to armed repression of the Indonesian Republic. This "police action" put their sincerity in doubt. Not surprisingly, it aroused strong emotions in India. A sister nation's freedom was in

45. Ibid., p. 79.
46. Ibid., p. 48.
47. Ibid., pp. 241-2.
peril. India simply could not view with equanimity the Dutch effort at reimposing their rule.

Reacting sharply to the Dutch attack on the Indonesian Republic, Nehru said on 24 July 1947: "Apart from the merits of the case, no European country, whatever it might be, has any business to use its army in Asia. Foreign armies functioning on Asian soil are themselves an outrage to Asian sentiment. The fact that they are bombing defenceless people is a scandalous thing. If other members of the United Nations tolerate this or remain inactive, then the United Nations Organisation ceases to be." The Indian leader (then Nehru was Vice-President of the Interim Government and Member of Foreign Affairs) described the Dutch action as an "astounding thing" which "the new spirit of Asia will not tolerate". Expressing India's attitude on the issue, he declared: "We will give every possible help." Four days later, on 28 July 1947, he repeated his warning against the use of foreign troops in Asia in these words: "The mere presence of a colonial regime or of foreign troops in any Asian country is an insult and challenge to Asia.... The Government of India have followed with the closest interest events in Indonesia." The same day Government of India announced its decision to terminate Dutch air services flying over India.

By now Government of India had decided to raise the issue of Indonesia's freedom in the United Nations. In a letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General and delivered on 30 July 1947, Nehru charged

48. The Hindu, 26 July 1947. He made this statement to pressmen when they were emerging from his house after meeting Sutan Sjahrir, then adviser to the President of Indonesia.

49. Ibid., 30 July 1947.

50. Ibid. At a press conference in New Delhi on 28 July 1947, Nehru announced that Government of India had decided to terminate almost immediately the Dutch air services flying over India.
the Dutch with bad faith. He expressed his Government's opinion that "this situation endangers the maintenance of international peace" and requested the Security Council "to take the necessary measures" in the framework of the UN Charter, to ease the present situation. India had taken up the cudgels in the UN Security Council on behalf of Indonesia. After having sought permission to participate in the debates of the Security Council, in its 171st meeting, B.R. Sen, India's representative, raised the Indonesian question and called upon the Security Council to ask both the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia "to revert to the original positions which they held when hostilities broke out". He also asked for a hearing of the case from an Indonesian delegate himself. He warned that "the dispute with which we are dealing today threatens the peace and security of the whole of South-east Asia." The joint efforts of India and Australia bore fruit when, on 1 August 1947, the Security Council adopted a resolution, calling on both parties (a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and (b) to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement. Participating in the Security Council debate on 22 August 1947, the Indian representative, Pillai, rebutted the Dutch attempt to raise the question of Council's competence to deal with the Indonesian question, and described the Dutch tactics "as a prelude for a renewed offensive" against the Republic. Expressing the general feeling in the entire continent of Asia, he declared "that no European country, whatever it may be, has any

52. Ibid., pp. 1621, 1628.
business to use its army in Asia. The fact that foreign armies are functioning on Asian soil is itself an outrage against Asian sentiment. The fact that they are bombing defenceless people is scandalous. If other members of the United Nations tolerate this or remain inactive, then the United Nations Organization ceases to exist."

Elsewhere in the same debate, Pillai expressed the anxiety among all the Asians and said: "Events in Indonesia, which is in the heart of South-East Asia, are being scrutinized with anxious eyes by the rest of Asia and one of the surest ways of defeating the objectives of the United Nations ... would be the refusal of justice to Indonesia."

The Indonesian leaders were, in the meantime, becoming increasingly worried due to two factors - refusal of the Dutch forces to go back to their previous positions, and the prospects of a Dutch-sponsored Federal Government of Indonesia. In view of large areas of the Republic of Indonesia having fallen to the Dutch troops since the beginning of armed hostilities, the prospects of negotiated settlement with an adversary talking from a position of strength could not be very encouraging. The Dutch decision to establish, by the end of 1948, a Federal Government of Indonesia without the Indonesian Republic, was also causing a lot of anxiety. Indian delegates to the United Nations gave unreserved support to the Republic on both these points. It was clear from the attitude taken up by Pillai, India's delegate to the United Nations. Intervening in the debate at the 208th meeting of the Security Council, Pillai called upon the Council to insist on withdrawal of forces to their previous positions.

55. Ibid., p. 2157.
Unless this was done, he stressed, the Dutch would be gaining further vantage points, and "these gains would give it an unfair advantage over the Indonesian Government when and if the belligerents restart negotiations". At the Security Council meeting on 27 October 1947, he complained that Security Council resolution calling for cessation of hostilities was being observed only by the Indonesians and not by the Dutch. On another occasion, Pillai contended: "The formation of an interim federal government now without the Republic will greatly complicate a negotiated settlement of the Indonesian dispute and could create serious unrest in Indonesia."

**India and the Second Dutch "Police Action"**

In the meantime, negotiations had been broken on 23 July 1948. With the Dutch resolve to set up a Federal Government of Indonesia by 1 January 1949, the political situation in Indonesia was becoming serious. The Dutch re-started armed action on 18 December 1948, when their one-day ultimatum was ignored by the Republican leaders. The next day, all the Indonesian leaders were detained by the Dutch Army. There was resentment and shock in India. Chances for negotiated settlement had been thrown overboard. Prime Minister Nehru gave vent to his feeling just after the Dutch had resumed the second "police action". Speaking at the closing session of the Indian National Congress at Gandhinagar (Jaipur) on 19 December 1948, he said: "The action has been started by the Dutch, but I may warn them that they will not be able to achieve their object. The day of Imperialism is over, because no Imperialist power can stay in

He continued: "The police action of the Dutch will have serious repercussions in India, in Asia and perhaps in some other countries too. Though we cannot give the Indonesian Republic effective aid now, we cannot remain idle spectators.... The reaction to the Dutch action will be heard soon all over the Asiatic countries and we will have to consider what we will have to do under the circumstances."

The convening of the eighteen-nation Conference on Indonesia in New Delhi on 20 January 1949, was a sequel to the serious developments in Indonesia. Through this Conference, Nehru successfully sought to turn the Indonesian issue into an all-Asian issue. The inaugural speech that the Indian Prime Minister made on the first day of Conference, as its President, will ever be remembered for its feelings of sympathy for the Indonesian people. In this speech, he took the Dutch action as a "challenge to a newly awakened Asia". Describing the history of the past three years in Indonesia, he said: "It is a long story of broken pledges and continuous attempts to undermine and break the Republic of Indonesia." Commenting on the rough treatment meted out to Indonesian leaders, who were made prisoners and separated from each other on the first day of the second Dutch "police action", Nehru said: "Even the dulled and jaded conscience of the world reacted to this with shock and amazement." He pointed out the urgency of the matter and stressed: "The situation

59. The Hindu, 21 December 1948.

60. This was the first official Asian Governments Conference, hence its importance. The first Asian Relations Conference was unofficial in character, although it had the inspiration and guidance of Nehru.

in Indonesia is full of dangerous possibilities and requires urgent action."

Developments in the UN Security Council, on the other hand, appeared to be promising. There was, for the first time, a perceptible change in the US attitude towards the fate of the Republic. This had resulted from their appreciation of the stern action taken by the Indonesian nationalist leadership against the Communist (Madiun) rebellion from September 1948 to December 1948. Economic pressures were brought to bear upon the Dutch to force them into negotiations with the Republican leaders. On American Government request, an urgent Security Council meeting was held on 22 December 1948. Taking the floor, the Indian delegate, M.J. Desai expressed his Government's concern at the developments in Indonesia and stressed "that a just, honourable and peaceful settlement of the Indonesian question was necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquility not only in Indonesia but in the whole of South East Asia." He charged that the attack launched by the Dutch was "entirely unprovoked and uncalled for", and was "a flagrant breach of the truce agreement". He also commended the conciliatory attitude adopted in the negotiations by the Indonesian leaders, and said that "throughout the negotiations the Republican Government has tried its utmost to appreciate the point of view of the other side and to meet it, if it was possible to do consistently with honour and justice and the legitimate aspirations of its people. More than this, no Government could be expected to do." He urged the Security Council to act "immediately, decisively and effectively", called for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of Dutch forces to the positions as fixed by

62. Ibid.
the true agreement, and the release of the leaders of the Indonesian Republic.

Deprived of diplomatic support from and subjected to strong economic pressures, by her allies, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and under heavy moral and diplomatic pressures exerted by the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia, the Dutch yielded ground, ceased military action and resumed negotiations with the Indonesian leaders in April 1949. The Round Table Conference at the Hague in August 1949 resulted in the conclusion of the Dutch-Indonesian Agreement on 1 November 1949, and to the subsequent transfer of sovereignty to the Government of Indonesia on 29 December 1949.

The Government of India and especially Nehru's support to the cause of Indonesian independence, thus became a major source of inspiration for continued mutual understanding and friendly relations between the two nations.

**Developments During 1950-1961**

It is with the background of this old and recent past relationships, that the developments in the following years should be viewed. Whatever had been said and done in support of the cause of Indonesia's freedom, had the definite imprint of the ancient past. Co-operation during the freedom struggle had laid the foundations for

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63. **SCOR** yr 3, mtg. 388, 22 December 1948, pp. 24-29.

64. Speaking at a banquet given by him in honour of Indonesia's Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, during his visit to New Delhi on 23 September 1954, Nehru had commented thus: "While thinking of Indonesia our minds go back to ages past, to times which are celebrated in epics, in traditions, and in stories when we lived together, the people of Indonesia and our people, in many ways, and they were always the ways of peace." See The Hindu, 24 September 1954.
future relationships. These were strengthened by exchange of visits by their leaders in 1950 itself. President Sukarno paid a visit to India in January 1950 to take part in the first Republic Day Celebrations in New Delhi. This was reciprocated by Prime Minister Nehru in June 1950. These visits brought the two leaders and the two peoples nearer to each other. Speaking in Parliament on 17 March 1950, Nehru alluded to this growing intimacy and said that this was due to "not formal treaties and alliances and pacts but by bonds which are much more secure, much more binding - the bonds of mutual understanding and interest and, if I may say so, even of mutual affection." The Treaty pledging "perpetual peace and unalterable friendship" signed by the two Governments in Djakarta on 3 March 1951, was a logical result of the reservoir of goodwill created during the freedom struggle. A survey of the various provisions of the Treaty shows that after having done away with the colonial barriers, the two countries had embarked on, as President Sukarno

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66. The Treaty was signed by Mohammed Roem, the Indonesian Foreign Minister and Subbarooyan, the Indian Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia. See full text of the Friendship Treaty in Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1964 (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966), pp. 40-41.

In an interview with the author in Djakarta on 6 October 1969, Mohammed Roem recalled how, at the time of signing the Friendship Treaty, the Pakistani representative had exerted pressure on him to sign the Treaty with Pakistan before signing with India. This caused, he said, embarrassment to him and he ultimately yielded to the Pakistani plea that the Treaty be signed with India in the morning and with Pakistan in the evening. With a clever move, the Pakistani representative forced a claim to parity with India, as Indonesia agreeing to sign the Treaty with India in the morning and with Pakistan in the evening virtually meant signing the Treaty with both the countries on the same day. From this date Pakistan became a factor in Indian-Indonesian relations.
put it, the policy of intensifying "the cordial relations of the past for the benefit of both India and Indonesia". The Treaty as such represented a major landmark in the Indian-Indonesian relations. Being a confirmation of the expectations aroused during the struggle for freedom, it provided a framework in which these would be fulfilled.

In certain fields, growth of bilateral relations between the two nations was quite healthy and in accord with the hopes thus generated. These included co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries. A survey of co-operation between the various services follows.

Co-operation between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indonesian Air Force (AURI-Angkatan Udara Republic Indonesia)

India's interest in the growth and development of the AURI became evident during 1954-55, when an Indian Air Force goodwill mission led by the then Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Vice Marshal A.M. Engineer, visited Indonesia. This visit resulted in the establishment of a bi-monthly courier service between the two countries. Desire on the part of both the countries, for mutual co-operation in this field, led in 1955 to the forging of certain links between the two Air Forces. Some measure of co-operation and mutual assistance in the form of exchange of officers, equipment and courier service, had thus been instituted a year before the two Governments entered into an Agreement on Mutual Aid between the IAF and AURI.

67. Ibid., p. 41.
The Agreement was signed in Djakarta on 28 February 1956. It was valid for five years and provided for the exchange of pilots and officers, the training of Indonesian Air Force Officers in India, the sale, loan or exchange of equipment by the two Governments and the maintenance of courier air communications. Under the terms of this Agreement, an IAF mission under Wing Commander H.S. Bakshi, was sent to Indonesia to assist the AURI in various ways. He stayed there for a period of five years. Before his departure from Indonesia on 5 January 1961, the Indian Wing Commander had completed several assignments entrusted to him in connection with administrative reforms and reorganization schemes undertaken by the AURI during 1959 and 1960. Another Indian Wing Commander T. Basu, who was in the Indian Advisory Group attached to the AURI, had already completed three years of service in Indonesia and left for home on 23 June 1960.

With the expansion in the training facilities in the Air Force establishments in India, there was an increase in the number of Indonesians receiving training in various courses. By the end of 1960, their number had risen to eight hundred. Usefulness of the Air Forces' Agreement was well recognized in Indonesia. This is evident from the interview with Antara News Agency given by the Indonesian Air Chief shortly before his departure for India on 15 February 1961. He had told News Agency that the existing agreement

69. Ibid., 1956-1957, p. 18.
70. Antara, 3 January 1961.
71. Ibid., 26 June 1960.
72. Ibid., 6 March 1961. This was revealed by the Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Vice Marshal S. Suryadarma, in Djakarta on 4 March 1961. He had just been back after a ten-day visit to India, undertaken in reciprocation of the one to Indonesia in 1959 by the Indian Chief of Air Staff, late Air Marshal Subroto Mukerjee.
with India would be prolonged after some minor administrative changes. Acknowledging its usefulness he had added that the Air Forces' Agreement had substantially contributed to the strengthening of relations between the two Air Forces. The benefit to Indonesia was clearly evident in the results achieved so far by the Indonesian Air Force in the field of training. Air Marshal S. Suryadarma's visit was used as an opportunity to seek an extension of the existing agreement due to expire on 28 February 1961. India raised no objection and the agreement was extended. On his arrival back to Djakarta, the Indonesian Air Chief told the newsmen at Kemajoran Airport on 4 March 1961, that both the Air Forces had agreed in principle to extend the existing co-operation agreement between them. He added that he and his party had been accorded a warm welcome by the President and Prime Minister of India. Referring to the training of Indonesian Air Force personnel, the Indonesian Air Marshal expressed his satisfaction at the AURI's achievements. He also revealed that in addition to about 800 Indonesian airmen pursuing various courses in India at present, around 360 more would be sent during 1961. During his visit, the Indonesian Air Force Chief 'had' on behalf of President Sukarno, presented to Mrs. Subroto Mukerjee the Indonesian "Bintang Darma" (Order of Darma). It was a fitting tribute to the contribution made by her late husband Air Marshal Subroto Mukerjee, to the development of the AURI.

The year 1961 also saw attempts being made for paving the way for bilateral negotiations on an air agreement regarding commercial aviation traffic between the two countries. An Indonesian Government mission led by Engineer Soetomo Adisasmito, Civil Aviation Chief of

73. Ibid., 15 February 1961.
74. Ibid., 6 March 1961.
Indonesia, visited New Delhi in the last week of March. The objective was to resume negotiations, already started in Djakarta, regarding the opening of a regular Garuda Indonesian Airways (GIA) service between 75 Djakarta and New Delhi. A few days before the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, Ing. Karto Bakh, Head of the Air Traffic Control Service of the Civil Aviation Sub-Department, paid a visit to India. He came with a scheme to seek technical assistance from the Hindustan Aircraft Factory (Bangalore) in modifying the Dakota Aircraft into a flying classroom plane for training the Indonesian navigators at the Indonesian Aviation Academy at Tjurug to the west of Djakarta.76

During September 1961, a batch of 328 non-commissioned officers of the AURI completed training courses in various Air Force Engineering subjects and left for home.7 An impressive parade was held by the whole batch at Halim Pardanakusuma Air Base, on their arrival in Djakarta. After taking the salute, Air Force Commodore Dr. S. Hardjolukito, Deputy II to the Minister/Air Force Chief of Staff, complimented the Indian trained officers for their smart turnout, which, according to him, reflected an aspect of their training. He also expressed his thanks to India and in particular to the IAF for the assistance it had rendered for the development and expansion of the AURI. Group Captain K. Chand, Chief of the IAF Mission in Indonesia, was among those present in the welcoming ceremony.77

Obviously, co-operation in various activities between the two Air Forces had been, since 1954-1955, growing satisfactorily. By 1961, it had brought the two closer to each other and created a fund of goodwill and understanding between the officers and cadres. In

75. Ibid., 25 March 1961.
76. Ibid., 30 August 1961.
77. Ibid., 30 September 1961.
view of her limited resources, the degree of co-operation India offered to Indonesia in this field, was adequate to promote a sense of fellow feeling. Exchange of goodwill missions and the reciprocation of official visits by the Air Chiefs of the two countries cemented the bonds of friendship between them. Stationing of special IAF missions in Indonesia for the purpose of improving and reorganizing the AURI, had still further strengthened it. It was a manifestation of fellow feeling inherited from history and could well be counted upon as an element in the continuing friendship between the two countries in future.

Co-operation between the Indian Navy and the Indonesian Navy (ALRI-Angkatan Laut Republic Indonesia)

A similar pattern of friendly co-operation between the two countries existed in the naval field. Even before the naval agreement was signed by the two Governments on 3 December 1958, the naval ships had exchanged goodwill visits. During the summer of 1952, several Indian naval ships had visited Indonesia, Thailand and Malaya, which "not only conveyed India's goodwill to her neighbouring countries, but also formed an integral part of her sea training". This was reciprocated by a four-day goodwill visit to Cochin (India) of two Indonesian naval ships Enam Bondjol and Surapati in the first half of October 1958. An Indonesian Naval Mission led by Rear Admiral R. Subijakto, Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Navy, had already visited India in October 1955. This was the first Indonesian Naval Mission to visit India. It had called on various Indian Naval

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Establishments and had seen a number of historical places. By 1956-1957, with the expansion in the opportunities for naval training, the Indian Navy found itself in a position to offer a limited number of training seats to cadets from three countries including Indonesia. Naval officers from Indonesia were also being offered a few seats at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. The number of trainees from abroad increased corresponding to growth in the Indian Navy during 1958-1959. At the request of the Indonesian Government, a short attachment was arranged for a team of Indonesian officers to Indian Naval Establishments with a view to enabling them to reorganize their own Naval Establishments.

Thus when the Navies of the two countries signed an agreement on 3 December 1958, the process of co-operation in this field had already been initiated. The agreement as such provided for three types of co-operation - attachment of officers and training of selected naval personnel of the Navy of one country with the Navy of the other, combined naval training exercises, and finally, visits to one country by the ships of the other. It, however, excluded activities in the operational field. The agreement was to remain in force for a period of five years in the first instance.

As regards training facilities provided to Indonesian Naval officers and other ranks in the Naval Establishments in India, the year 1959 saw the training of eight sailors from Indonesia. Besides,

80. Ibid., Brief Statement of Activities of the Ministry During 1955-56, p. 11.
81. The other two countries which were offered such facilities were Egypt and Ethiopia.
82. India, Ministry of Defence, n. 80, 1956-57, p. 12.
84. Ibid., p. 17.
few officers from Indonesia, twenty-three sailors from that country were said to be under training. This number continued to grow with growth in the training opportunities. In 1961, a total of twenty-eight Indonesian Navy Officers and seventy-nine other ranks, came to India to receive training in different courses at different centres. Out of twenty-eight naval officers, fifteen came after the Belgrade Conference in September 1961.

An exchange of visit by Naval Chiefs of Staff of the two countries during 1960 and 1961 further strengthened the ties between the Indian Navy and the ALRI and proved useful in bringing about better understanding between them. The Indian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral R.D. Katari, paid a goodwill visit to Indonesia in July 1960. His visit coincided with the programme of carrying out joint naval exercises with the Indonesian naval fleet. The Indian ships which participated in the joint exercises were I.N.S. Mysore, and the 14th Frigate Squadron (I.N.S. Brahmaputra, Kuthar, and Khukri). The Indonesian Naval Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Martadinata, paid a return visit to New Delhi in March 1961.

As to the provision regarding the visit by ships of one country to the other, the years 1959 and 1960 saw further consolidation of relationships between the two Navies. Six Indonesian Patrol Boats and one ship R.I. Sambu visited Bombay from 12-14 April 1959 and from 12-13 April 1959 respectively. Next year three Indonesian ships Surapati, Pattimura, and Hasanuddin visited Bombay and Cochin during the last week of April and the first week of May.

Within two years of its being in operation, the implementation of the Agreement had shown quite encouraging prospects for future co-operation in this field. The Agreement which was to last up to December 1963, was found to be mutually advantageous. It had created a type of friendly understanding between the officers and men of the two Navies which augured well for future relations between the two countries.

Co-operation in the Military Field

Satisfactory implementation of the agreements between the Air Forces and Navies of the two countries prompted the two Governments to conclude a similar type of agreement between their Armies. Major-General Gatot Soebroto, Deputy Chief of Staff, Indonesian Army (Angkatan Darat Republic Indonesia - ADRI) paid an eight-day official visit to India from 29 April to 6 May 1960. He was accompanied by five Indonesian Army Officers. He entered into consultations with the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army and other officers on the subject of an agreement between the two Armies. Major-General Gatot Soebroto seemed to be satisfied with the outcome of his talks. While giving his impressions about his visit to India, on his return to Djakarta, on 17 May 1960, the Indonesian Army leader said that his mission had gained satisfactory results particularly in the field of fostering relations of friendship with India. Consultations in New Delhi eventually led to the signing in Djakarta, on 3 June 1960, of a bilateral co-operation agreement between the two countries' Armies.

Seven months later, in January 1961, General A.H. Nasution, Minister

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89. Antara, 18 May 1960.
for National Security and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, paid a four-day visit to India. He was on way back home from a visit to Moscow, where he had signed an arms-purchase agreement with the Soviet Government. When asked whether he had discussed the possibility of purchasing small arms from India, General Nasution had said: "I did not discuss it specifically, but that is within the scope of our technical co-operation agreement." It showed that besides offer of training places and services, the Agreement covered supply of small arms from one country to the other as well.

Unlike in the field of Armed Forces, bilateral relations in trade and cultural fields did not develop as satisfactorily as expected. A survey of developments in these fields follows:

Trade Relations

The basis for trade relations was laid as early as 1946. Apprehending the prospects of large-scale famine resulting from failure of rains in India during that year, Sutan Sjahrir, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, made on 12 April 1946, what Nehru called as a "generous offer" of half-a-million tons of rice in order to alleviate the sufferings of the famine-stricken people of India. In his telegram to Nehru, the Indonesian leader wrote: "We assure you that our people have given enthusiastic adhesion to the plan (of sending rice to India in exchange of requisite goods if available), mainly because we want to show our sympathy with your country." Nehru expressed India's deep sense of gratitude to the Indonesian leader's gesture of goodwill, in these words:


I am sure everybody in India will appreciate and feel deeply grateful for the very generous offer that Dr. Sjahrir (Sjahrir) has made on behalf of the Indonesian people. That offer came from him unsolicited and he persisted on it, in spite of all manner of discouragement. The terms of the offer and language that Dr. Sjahrir has used will go to the heart of the Indian people.

It is the language of a friend and comrade, not out to bargain, but to help in the time of need, even though he has to face a mountain of troubles in his own land. It is by such acts that nations and peoples are bound together. The Indian people will not only feel grateful but will remember this in the days to come.

I hope and trust that it will be the precursor of a closer friendship between the two nations advantageous to both. 93

Besides being a help to India "in the time of need", Sutan Sjahrir's offer of rice served a useful purpose. It enabled the leaders of the new Republic to break the blockade imposed by the Dutch in order "to isolate" and cripple the Republic. Since it was the first trade deal entered into by the Indonesian Republic with a foreign country, the Dutch could not keep silent. Successful implementation of the rice deal with India would go a long way in qualifying the Republic for staking claim to international recognition. In order, therefore, to prevent this eventuality, the Dutch shelled, among other places, the rice stores at Banjuwangi (East Java) and destroyed the greater part of the rice stocks there. In spite of all obstructions, however, Government of Indonesia succeeded in sending in August 1946 at least one steamship Empire Favour, carrying a rice load of 6,000 tons. The Empire Favour successfully broke the Dutch blockade and reached Cochin port (India) to deliver its cargo, thus initiating the process of trade relations between Indonesia and

93. Ibid.
India.

As a follow-up action, the two countries signed a Trade Agreement on 20 January 1951, about seven months after Jawaharlal Nehru's first visit to the Republic of Indonesia as Prime Minister of free India. It came into effect from 1 November 1951 and was valid until 30 June 1952. It was the first agreement signed by the two Governments for mutual advantage after the barriers imposed by the Western Colonial rule had been removed. The Agreement was, in a way, designed to revive the ancient trade and commercial contacts between the two nations.

Dealing comprehensively with the needed items of export and import and their corresponding values in two schedules, the Agreement envisaged a three-fold increase in trade. It also aimed at balancing the bilateral trade at a fixed level of Rs. 4.62 crores per annum on either side. The items included in Schedule 'A' (India's Exports) and Schedule 'B' (India's Imports) indicated a wider basis of trade than had been hitherto. It also provided for India a direct access to the Indonesian market for sale of textiles. Singapore as a go-between was proposed to be by-passed. Finally, it served the useful purpose of introducing many of the Indian goods which were, during the colonial period, unknown to Indonesia and to South-East Asia.

It would be interesting to examine the actual implementation of the bilateral trade agreement. The first two years were quite


95. 10 lakh = 1 million
    1 crore = 10 million.


97. Ibid., p. 125.
encouraging; though three-fold increase in the total volume of trade was yet to be realised, about two-fold increase actually registered was a good achievement. Total trade value of Rs. 4.2 crores during 1949-50 had climbed to an impressive figure of Rs. 7.58 crores in 1951-52.

The balance of trade also showed a shifting trend. From an adverse balance of Rs. 1.6 crores during 1949-50, India achieved a favourable balance of Rs. 44 lakhs during 1951-52. This trend continued apace in the following years. India's trade with Indonesia had a surplus balance of Rs. 471,14,000 during 1953-54, Rs. 472,77,000 during 1954-55, and Rs. 10,14,16,000 during 1955-56. The Indian exports to Indonesia in 1955 registered an almost double increase from the level of 1953. It was said to be "an all-time record". The reason was obvious. In 1955, Indian ‘cambrics’ had found an entirely new and potentially large market in Indonesia.

Besides, Indonesia's continuing and increasingly adverse balance of trade could be attributed to two factors. Firstly, certain traditional Indian imports like copra, rubber and palm oil being competitive in nature, could be had at cheaper rates and lesser costs, in other markets like Ceylon and Singapore. Secondly, the economic and trade relations of both the countries continued to be heavily dependent upon areas outside the region. None of them showed readiness to seek out new markets or sources of imports, for fear that

98. Ibid., p. 126.
99. Statistics of Foreign Trade of India By Countries and Currency Areas for February 1954 (Delhi, 1954), p. 8. These figures are for eleven months from April 1953 to February 1954.
100. Ibid., March 1955, p. 7.
these might prove to be less dependable. Consequences could be anything but encouraging. Whereas Indonesian imports from India during the three years starting from 1953 constituted only 2.5, 2.2 and 4.7 per cent of her total world imports, her exports to India represented even less than 1 per cent of her total world exports, viz., 0.7, 0.1 and 0.3 per cent. Almost similar was the case with India. Both her imports from and exports to Indonesia, had been far below even 1 per cent vis-a-vis her total world imports and exports.

So by 1955, trade relations between the two countries failed to show any encouraging prospects. India, no doubt, could boast of her seventh position in the list of suppliers of Indonesia's import needs, the other six being the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, West Germany, the United Kingdom and Hongkong. But the actual position was not very satisfactory for the two countries. Although India participated in the Djakarta Third International Fair, held in August-September 1955, and the various types of traditional and non-traditional goods exhibited by the Indian delegation attracted large crowds, no follow-up action seemed to have been taken to utilise its results to boost bilateral trade. The absence of high-powered publicity for Indian goods and properly-managed, prompt and regular salesmanship, were the two important factors that kept India's trade with Indonesia at a level lower than the other competitors. Moreover, since the Bandung Conference in April 1955, there had emerged another rival in this field. The People's Republic

103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
of China was entering the South-East Asian markets in a big way. Potential threat posed to India’s trade prospects by China’s growing commercial rivalry, added upon the already existing Japanese competition, was becoming more and more obvious.

The performance during the succeeding years upto 1961-62 can be assessed from the following figures:

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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>1,46</td>
<td>2,08</td>
<td>4,13</td>
<td>3,65</td>
<td>3,97</td>
<td>3,57</td>
<td>1,77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>11,66</td>
<td>7,70</td>
<td>4,18</td>
<td>2,98</td>
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<td>Balance of Trade</td>
<td>(+) 10,20 (+) 5,62 (+) 5 (-) 67 (+) 87 (-) 46 (+) 5,23</td>
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It would be clear from the above figures that taking 1949-50 as the base year, three-fold increase in total bilateral trade as envisaged in the Trade Agreement of January 1951, had been registered only in one year, viz. 1955-56. It also showed that India’s highest favourable trade balance of Rs. 10,20 lakhs in 1955-56 had declined to Rs. 5 lakhs in 1957-58, though from an adverse balance of Rs. 67 lakhs in 1958-59, it had registered an appreciable increase in its favourable balance in 1961-62, which stood at Rs. 5,23 lakhs. But one glaring fact remained. India’s exports to and imports from Indonesia reached only once or twice the level of one per cent of her total world trade. Her exports to Indonesia during the period

106. These figures have been taken from The Journal of Industry and Trade, vol. 12, no. 11, November 1962, p. 1967. The import figures during 1960-61 are 3,57 and not 2,57 as given here. For this, see p. 1259 and p. 1453.

107. Total bilateral trade value which stood at Rs. 4.02 crores during 1949-50, reached the level of Rs. 13.12 crores during 1955-56.
from 1957-58 to 1961-62 constituted merely .74, .52, .7, .48 and 1.05 per cent respectively of her total world exports. Similarly her imports from Indonesia during the same period represented .4, .4, .4, .25 and .17 per cent of her total world imports.

This was the state of affairs until and including the year of the Belgrade Conference, that is 1961. By 1960, both the countries had started feeling the necessity of revising the decade old Trade Agreement. An Indian trade delegation visited Indonesia during 1960 to explore the possibilities of expansion in trade relations. During November of the following year, a five-man Indonesian fact-finding mission came to India with a similar objective. They fully realised that despite the Trade Agreement of 1951, the volume of transactions between the two countries so far had not reached a high mark. Speaking to newsmen at Madras Airport, the leader of the Indonesian delegation, Haroon al Rashid Saleh of the International Trade Relations Directorate of the Foreign Department, emphasised that the time had come for redrafting the old trade agreement which was being extended year after year. He asserted that this could be done on a mutually advantageous basis. There was vast scope for Indonesian import of non-traditional consumer goods like electric fans, sewing machines, and bicycles, he said, while his country could export crude oil and various other items of Indian imports.

The Indonesian delegation's visit almost coincided with the time when Indonesia was embarking on an ambitious eight-year plan

108. The Journal of Industry and Trade, n. 106. These percentages have been calculated on the basis of data given at p. 1963 and p. 1967.


110. Ibid., 18 November 1961.
for economic development. It had fixed substantial amounts to be spent on various non-traditional goods like several types of machine tools for capital and other industries. For India, which had by then almost completed her first two Five Year Plans and made good progress in industrial output, Indonesia's Plan provided a fairly large scope for expansion in her trade. Inviting a reference to this fact and to the necessity of venturing into joint collaboration in certain industrial projects, K.C. Sehgal, India's First Secretary (Commercial) in Djakarta, exhorted India's "private entrepreneurs (to) seize this opportunity and seriously consider coming into this market". "In this scheme", he assured, "there appears to be no danger to their capital investment". But this exhortation did not produce any good results. The Indian capital was as shy as any other in the world owing to the absence in the Indonesian Archipelago of political stability, security of capital return with reasonable interests and the growing political influence of the leftist forces, especially the Indonesian Communist Party.

Cultural Relations

Even before the Treaty of Friendship had been signed in 1951 between the two countries, Government of India had initiated the process of co-operation in various fields. Cultural co-operation was, at least in the initial stages, very much pronounced. After gaining independence, both the nations were eager to renew the centuries old cultural links.

The first move by the Indian Government in this direction was to offer a limited number of scholarships to Indonesian students.

Under an ad hoc scheme commencing in 1948, seven scholarships were offered to the Indonesian students. The amount of stipend per scholar came to Rs. 200 per month. It did not include capitation, tuition and examination charges which were required to be paid by the Government direct to the various host institutions. The total budget provision made for the prosecution of their studies, was Rs. 60,000. As all the scholars were likely to complete their studies by 1951-52, no provision was made for expenses during 1952-53.

In the meantime, a Treaty of Friendship had been signed by the two Governments in Djakarta on 3 March 1951. The Treaty, which was intended to be one of "perpetual peace and unalterable friendship", expressed the desire of both parties to consolidate "the bonds of peace and friendship, which have ever existed between the two states and of developing peaceful and friendly relations between them...." This was how President Sukarno expressed such a desire on 1 July 1950:

The friendship and co-operation are of ancient origin and date back to the beginning of the Christian era. The more than 1,000 years' old relations of commerce and common culture were disrupted when other people made it impossible for our two countries to continue their relations. But now that both peoples have regained their freedom and independence, our peoples are free again to intensify the cordial relations of the past for the benefit of both India and Indonesia.

The ad hoc scheme of scholarships to Indonesian students for studies in various Indian institutions, was conceived to be a part of

114. Foreign Policy of India, n. 66, p. 40.
115. Ibid., p. 41.
the overall objective of promoting cultural relations with all the neighbouring countries. A comprehensive scheme for the award of 70 scholarships every year to students of Indian origin domiciled abroad and to indigenous students of certain Asian, African and other Commonwealth countries, had already been initiated in 1949-50. The sole aim was to develop cultural relations and foster better understanding between the governments and the peoples. With the increase in the number of opportunities and the encouraging response evidenced by the recipient nations, the number of scholarships was increased. The total number of scholarships rose from 70 to 100 in 1952-53 and to 140 in 1956-57. The number of foreigners holding the Government of India scholarships rose from 260 in 1954-55 to 301 in 1955-56 to 431 in 1960-61 and to an impressive figure of 484 in 1961-62. The total number of Indonesian students holding these scholarships is not known.

Besides, certain efforts were being made to conclude bilateral cultural agreements with certain neighbouring states. One such cultural agreement was signed by Indian and Indonesian Governments on 29 December 1955. The Agreement aimed at encouraging and facilitating "co-operation in all fields of science, literature and art". Specifically, it provided for the exchange of University teachers and members of scientific and cultural institutions; the institution of scholarship schemes for students of one...

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117. On behalf of the Government of India, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad signed the Agreement; the Government of Indonesia was represented by Dr. L.N. Palar, the Indonesian Ambassador to India. The Agreement was ratified later on 8 February 1958. See text of the Cultural Agreement in Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 1, no. 12, December 1955, pp. 246-7.
country studying in the other; and the training of nationals of one
country in scientific, technical, and industrial institutions main-
tained by the Government of the other. The Agreement was to
remain in force for a period of ten years. 118

It was a comprehensive agreement, consisting of twelve
articles and covering a wide range of activities in the cultural and
educational field. Representing the urge of the two countries to
intensify co-operation in this field, the agreement aimed at bringing
the two peoples closer in the sphere of art, literature and science.

But as friendly relations depend more on implementation than
on mere profession, it would be worthwhile to examine the results it
produced in the succeeding years. On the basis of information
available from the Indian side in the Ministry of Education Reports,
the annual reports of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations, the
Ministry of External Affairs Reports and the Foreign Affairs Record
of the Government of India, it could be contended that many of the
provisions under the various articles of the Agreement remained
unimplemented. During the first five years of its being in operation,
S.L.H. Nainar was the only Indian scholar who visited Indonesia for
research on the subject of the influence of Indian culture on the
people of Indonesia. Neither any educational centre, scientific
or otherwise, nor any art or cultural society was established. Both
the Governments, for reasons of their own, failed to establish Chairs

118. Ibid.

119. Sponsored by the Indian Council of Cultural Relations, Nainar's
two-year period of deputation in Indonesia ended in July 1955.
Interestingly enough, he decided to stay on for few more months
at his own expenses in order to collect more data for his work.
See The Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Report for
1951-56.

120. The Tagore Society existed in Indonesia prior to the
conclusion of the Cultural Agreement.
in Universities or other Institutions of higher learning. Government of India, however, had on certain occasions sent a number of books on various subjects as a gift to certain Universities in Indonesia. Finally, Article X of the Agreement called upon the two Governments to set up a special commission for "supervising the work of the Agreement", for "advising the Governments concerned on details of implementing the Agreement", and for suggesting "possible improvements". The two Governments were also to hold joint consultations in not less than once in three years "to co-ordinate the working of the Agreement". On the basis of available records, it could be contended that neither any such machinery was brought into existence nor any triennial consultations were ever held.

Besides the various scholarship schemes, Government of India also offered to the foreigners a large number of training places within the country and services of Indian experts abroad, under the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia. During the decade following the inception of the Colombo Plan in 1950, India's contribution both in offering training places and in sending experts had been quite impressive. With 1,545 training places, she had the pride of fifth place among all the donor countries and first place among the Asians. The other four countries were the United States with 7,112, United Kingdom with 3,880, Australia with 3,530, and Canada with 1,617, all outside Asia. In the matter of providing services of experts, India with 169 was

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121. *Antara*, 15 April 1961. An assortment of 74 books on literature, philosophy and religion, politics, arts, culture, economics and education, was presented, on 15 April 1961, by the Indian Ambassador Dr. J.N. Khosla, to the Indonesian Religious Affairs Minister Wahid Wahab, as a gift from the Government of India to the Government of Indonesia. This was stated to be the second gift; the first included 38 books on history and interpretation of Islam.
the sixth among the donor nations, others being the United States
with 1,333, United Kingdom with 446, Australia with 441, Japan with
347, and Canada with 259. By the time of the publication of the
Colombo Plan report in 1961, the total number of training seats and
experts provided by India had risen to 1,694 and over 200
respectively.

The break-up of these impressive figures may now be examined.
Out of the total of 1,694 training places, Nepal received the largest
number of 1,144, while Indonesia got only 51. As to the number of
experts, against 200 sent to Nepal, only 3 were sent to Indonesia.
Indonesia, during the same period, contributed 124 training places
and 1 expert. She also offered 17 scholarships to Colombo Plan
countries. Of these India received two Indonesian scholarships for
her students.

Another officially-sponsored Indian agency which was entrusted,
at least partly, with the task of promoting and strengthening
cultural relations with the neighbouring countries, is the Indian
Council of Cultural Relations. During five years preceding the
conclusion of the Cultural Agreement, deputing in 1953 Dr. S.M.H. Nainar
to Indonesia for a period of two years, was an outstanding activity
performed by the ICCR. Besides, the ICCR also held a reception
in honour of Mohammad Hatta, the then Vice-President of Indonesia

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122. The Tenth Annual Report of the Consultative Committee of the
Colombo Plan (Kuala Lumpur, November 1961), pp. 269-70.
123. Ibid., pp. 221-2.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid., pp. 269-70.
during his visit to India in September 1955. A survey of the ICCR Reports for 1951-56 also reveals that for promoting cultural relations with Indonesia, the Council had presented some books on various subjects and Indian classics to certain libraries and educational institutions in Indonesia.

During five years after the Cultural Agreement had been in operation, the only other activities of the ICCR concerned presentation, on 19 June 1960, to the President of the University of Airlangga in Surabaya, Professor A.G. Pringgodigdo, of a typewriter machine with Devanagari letters for printing Sanskrit letters. The handing-over ceremony was attended among others by the Indian Consul in Surabaya, Sampuran Singh. The ICCR also awarded scholarship to an Indonesian student during 1958-59 in order to enable him to complete his studies at an Indian University.

It has been stated that certain factors impeded the growth of healthy relations between India and Indonesia since 1950 itself. An examination of the most pronounced among them follows.

I. Distinct Personalities: Nehru and Sukarno

Both Nehru and Sukarno, after leading their respective countries to freedom, became the top leaders after independence. The two had a long tradition of suffering at the hands of the British and the Dutch colonial governments. Their views on European colonialism and imperialism in Asia and Africa, and on the necessity of eliminating it and gain freedom, had been similar.

128. Ibid.
Both had received their first lessons in nationalism at a young age, during the nineteen twenties.

But there had been differences in the circumstances and environment in which they had been bred up. Unlike Nehru, who had been born to a very rich lawyer, Sukarno came to the world as the son of a teacher. In their early age, whereas Nehru had never experienced the fear of want, Sukarno had to undergo severe hardships. Substantial riches enabled the former to have his primary and higher education at Harrow and Cambridge in London. This had provided him with an opportunity to see and comprehend the liberal tradition of the Western democratic political system. The latter, on his part, had never had an occasion to see the outside world. Even in their own countries, when the two leaders joined the freedom struggle, the practical opportunities of participation in the democratic system as provided by the British in India were almost lacking in the case of Dutch East Indies.

In view of these and other reasons, both Nehru and Sukarno came to have dissimilar elements in their personalities. During Nehru’s visit to Indonesia in June 1950, when the two leaders met, an impression grew among the high political circles in Indonesia, that the friendship between the two would not last long. In due

131. The first occasion when Sukarno went out of Indonesia was when he visited India in January 1950, immediately after the recognition by the Dutch and the world community of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in December 1949.

132. Interview with Moekarto Notowidigdo (Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Wibowo Cabinet, from 29 April 1952 to 1 August 1953, and Ambassador to India between October 1960 and February 1964), Djakarta, 11 October 1969. Moekarto Notowidigdo told the author that Nehru, according to his temperament, neither liked addressing vast public gatherings which Sukarno considered necessary for projecting his popular image before his guests, nor Sukarno’s love stories. In this connection, he referred to President Sukarno’s remarks he made to him immediately after Nehru’s departure for India. Sukarno had said, recalled Moekarto Notowidigdo, that “Nehru’s is not a happy company.”
course of time, the two leaders came to have dislike for each other. Sukarno's prides and prejudices did not get due respect from Nehru's side. Even India's receptions to Sukarno grew less warm. Sukarno began to nourish a feeling that Nehru was a road-block in the way of his assumption of a big leader's role in South-East Asia, nay, in the whole of Asia and Africa. By the time of the Belgrade Conference in 1961, lack of personal rapport between the two leaders proved to be one of the decisive factors in determining their attitudes towards national and international issues. The Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations thus provided a chance to openly manifest their strong opposition to each other's views. Some of the former Indonesian diplomats have a feeling that personal element was as prominent, if not more, as difference in the world view the two leaders exhibited.

II. Difference in the Struggle for National Freedom

The national struggle for freedom which the two leaders had led in their respective countries had also run along different lines. Under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, India had fought its way to independence through non-violence. The Indians had waged civil disobedience movement and the "quit India" movement, and by using the non-violent technique of "Satyagraha", had thronged the British prisons in thousands and suffered long sentences, but there had been no mass military training in arms and armed clashes with the British army. In Indonesia the independence struggle had run a different course. Three and a half years of the Japanese occupation had given a violent twist to it. To execute their own imperialist policies, the Japanese had given to the Indonesians

133. Ibid.
training in the use of arms. On the Japanese surrender, the so-called "police actions" undertaken by the Dutch had compelled the Indonesians to meet force with force in order to resist the reimposition of the colonial rule over the Republic. This fact became a source of pride to them that unlike the Indians they had won their country's freedom by fighting entailing heavy loss of life and that it was not a grant to them by the Dutch Colonialism. This feeling was expressed by the Indonesian leaders on many an occasion. Referring to Indonesians' reactions to her counsels for peaceful solution of the West Irian problem, during her visit to Indonesia in September 1954, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit said that on this question the Indonesians were apt to get excited. While giving her impressions of Indonesians' attitude in this connection, she said: "When I laughingly suggested sometimes to them that non-violence was always a good technique to solve the problem, there were serious faces around me and the answer generally came back: 'We are not a non-violent race. We find it exceedingly difficult to apply the non-violent technique'." So the Indonesian leaders and people had, since the achievement of independence, built up a tradition of violent revolutionary struggle. As it coloured their attitude towards various issues, a stage came when they found themselves comfortable in the company of those who adhered to their view of opposition to colonialism and imperialism and cool in the company of India whose enthusiasm for freedom struggles in Asia and Africa seemed to be diminishing in their eyes. It was certain to mark a point of serious divergence in the two countries' reciprocal attitudes and relations.

134. The Hindu, 13 September 1954.
III. Geo-Politics As a Factor

Geo-politics of the two countries, to which, at least for the major part, twenty centuries of Indian-Indonesian commercial and cultural relations could be safely attributed, had also, since independence, not been a factor conducive to strengthening of mutual relations. They are two out of the four potentially great powers of Asia, the other two being the People's Republic of China and Japan. There could be no competition with China, which, on the basis of increasing political influence and growing industrial and atomic and nuclear power, was seeking the status of the third major world power after the United States and the USSR. The tremendous economic and industrial might of Japan also inhibited Indonesia's claims of a major Asian or at least, South-East Asian power, and excluded the possibility of competition in any field. The only other country thus left out was India. With its teeming millions, its growing unemployment, its social and regional tensions, its linguistic dissensions and communal riots, and its starvations, etc., India appeared to be the only country with whose performance in certain fields of activity, and on more or less equal footing, some sort of competition or rivalry could be established. In this sense, geopolitical situation accentuated rather than diminished the sense of rivalry growing as a result of many other factors.

IV. Big-Brother Attitude

Another factor that made it difficult for the two countries' relations to run smoothly was the so-called "big-brother" attitude. India, her writers, political leaders and diplomats are alleged to have taken the stand in their writings and attitudes that Indonesia had no separate identity of its own, and was merely an extension of
India, at least, in religious and cultural sense. The term "Greater India" so widely used in the Indian writings on pre-colonial history of Indonesia is cited as an instance. The Indian scholars often used in their writings terms like "ancient Indian colonies", the words implying some kind of political domination as well. Prominent among the Indian scholars, who have followed this line of argument are Professors R.C. Majumdar and Neelkanta Sastri. In one of his writings on India's ancient relations with South-East Asian countries, for instance, R.C. Majumdar observes: "The art of Java and Kambuja was no doubt derived from India and fostered by the Indian rulers of these colonies." Following a similar line of historical argument, Professor Kalidas Nag of the Greater India Society has, in his Greater India attempted to show that Indonesia, since the beginning of her history, has been at the receiving end of India's civilisation and culture.

In fact, the Indonesians not only do not deny the degree of India's impact on their culture and civilisation, but are also proud of their cultural heritage. Their art and architecture, their ancient monuments, their religions, languages and culture, their dance, drama and music, all are testimony to this fact. The source of irritation is some Indians' repeated assertion that when the Indians, for the first time, landed in Sumatra and Java, they found "savages" beyond the pale of civilisation, and then carried a civilising mission. The facts established by the Dutch and other


136. Kalidas Nag, "Greater India - III" in Greater India (Calcutta, 1960), p. 144. "In Sumatra," he writes, for instance, "the Malayan races were moulded by Indian influences into a relatively civilised condition before they crossed over to the Archipelago."
Western historians of Indonesia and South-East Asia, the 137
Indonesians assert, do not support this "Indian" thesis.

Some prominent Indonesian political leaders also hold the
view that India's culture was not the only one that came to Indonesia,
since the first century A.D., Indonesia, owing to its geographical
location, has been the recipient of diverse cultures and civilisations.
It has been the meeting ground of the Hindu-Buddhist, Chinese,
Arab, and since the capture of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511, of
European influences. Moreover, the Indian authors have tended to
ignore the impact of the spread of Islam on the Indonesian culture
and civilization.

Like the Indian historians of Indonesia and South-East Asia,
the Indian leaders and diplomats' attitude towards their counterparts
in Indonesia has also been one of below equality. Some of the
earlier Indian diplomats posted in Indonesia, are stated to have
been laying stress on the fact that but for India's moral, material
and diplomatic help, Indonesia's proclaimed independence would have
been thwarted by the Dutch and the British, or, at least, delayed.
M.R.A. Baig, author of In Different Saddles (Bombay, 1967), believes
that this kind of attitude was a projection of the attitude at New
Delhi. He is of the view that "personal, subjective factors were
very prominent" in Indian leaders' and diplomats' attitude towards
Indonesian and other countries' leaders and smacked of a politician's

137. Interview with Professor Soenarjo, former Foreign Minister
and diplomat of Indonesia, Djakarta, 24 September and
1 October 1969. A leader of the Indonesian Nationalist
Party (PNI), Professor Soenarjo gave the impression of being
a strong critic of Indian writers, leaders and diplomats
for this type of attitude.
approach rather than a diplomat's. By tending to ignore the fact that the Indonesians had fought for their freedom and made enormous sacrifices in strengthening their independence, some Indian envoys have thus become the subject of bitter Indonesian criticism.

This tendency on the part of the Indian leaders and diplomats manifested itself in their day-to-day contacts in Indonesia, at the United Nations, during official visits, and in various conferences. The outstanding instance is Nehru's personal attitude towards Indonesian leaders. This came to have, in due course, a very damaging impact on personal relationships. Earlier friendships tended to give way to irritations caused by personal affronts, and with the lapse of time played a significant role in straining relations between the two peoples. A sensitive nation, in the process of establishing its national identity, could hardly be expected to put up with this type of attitude. The fact that it had a highly ambitious and egoistic leadership at the top, rendered it all the more difficult to separate personal dis-respect from national honour. It was bound to have serious effect on overall contacts.

Sometimes "big-brother" attitude is explained in psychological terms. Unlike the Indians, (the Javanese leaders are generally prone to include Pakistanis among the Indians) and even the Sumatrans,

138. Interview with M. R. A. Baig (India's First Secretary and Head of the Chancery in Indonesia between January and November 1950), New Delhi, 19 August 1971.

139. Interview with H. A. Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia in the Sukiman Cabinet, 27 April 1951 - 3 April 1952), Djakarta, 23 September 1969. Subardjo referred to the first Colombo Prime Ministers' Conference in April 1954. On hearing Ali Sastroamidjojo's suggestion and arguments for convening an Asian-African Conference, Nehru passed a loud remark that the Indonesian Premier did not know the fundamentals of international law. This, said Subardjo, was "in bad taste" and certainly irritating to Ali Sastroamidjojo. Later, he said, others present intervened and patched up and restored understanding between the two leaders.
the polite and well-behaved Javanese are characteristically not given to much talking. So when they meet the former, conversation creates an adverse feeling that they are being lectured about.

At least upto the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung, this type of relationship continued without much irritation. This is evident from the fact that Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian Prime Minister, came all the way to New Delhi in September 1954, to seek the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's approval to the holding of the main conference. This position underwent a transformation, however, during the interregnum between the Bandung Conference and the Belgrade Conference. Nehru's invitation to Sukarno to halt at New Delhi enroute to Belgrade was ignored by the Indonesian Government. Obviously, the Indonesians were in no mood to put up with this type of Indian attitude any longer. They had at least once officially expressed themselves against it. Writing in 1960, the Counsellor for Press and Public Relations, Information Service of Indonesia, had expressed the Indonesians' feelings in these words: "Indonesians in general do not appreciate very much an older brother attitude as is sometimes adopted by people who think of themselves as belonging to a bigger or more advanced country."

V. Indians in Indonesia

Indians in Indonesia, running into several thousands, have been another factor in Indian-Indonesian relations. Having gone there, most of them in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties,

140. Antara, 14 August 1961. Talking to newsmen in Djakarta, Subandrio revealed that President Sukarno would not call on any country on way to Belgrade.

141. The Statesman (Delhi), 6 June 1960.
as miners and labourers, they have, by dint of hard labour and business skills, established themselves fairly well. Large number of Indians in Java are the Hindus from the Sindh Province (now in West Pakistan) and deal in textiles. Fewer in number are the Sikhs from Punjab and most of them deal in sports business. There are many Indians in Sumatra also and they originally belonged to Punjab, Sindh, Gujarat, Madras and Malabar. Unlike those in Java, a substantial majority of those in Sumatra are milkmen or daily wage-earners. All the Indians in Indonesia, whose literacy standards do not exceed the knowledge of the three R's, have a split personality; their bodies are in Indonesia but their hearts are in India. Only a few have snapped their family ties in India altogether, the rest continuing their familial links with the mother country. Especially, the Gujarati, Tamil and Malabari Muslims have found little difficulty in mixing with the local Indonesians through marriages. This is not the case with the Sindhis and the Punjabi Sikhs who have tended to maintain their exclusive existence, and have, thus, invited charges of being non-assimilative.

In response to a set of questions to Indonesian leaders, in press, parliament and political parties, in government and campuses, concerning Indians, the author elicited mixed type of responses which can be easily put into two groups. Some among the elite groups were of the view that being smaller in number and less rich than the Overseas Chinese, they have never constituted a factor in relations between the two countries. Always busy with their professions, they are left with little time, less energy and least inclination, to meddle into local politics. They have maintained relations with the Indonesian masses better than the Chinese have done, and hence have never been a source of irritation. Also that, being businessmen,
their extra-legal activities in order to serve their private gain are understandable. Others hold the opinion that the Indians have tended to live in an exclusive circle of their own. Some charge them, as they charge the Chinese, with indulging in illegal activities like smuggling and tax evasion and some even in money-printing. It is said that they have refused to adapt to the new revolutionary environment in the country and to identify themselves with the urges and aspirations, the weal and woe, of the Indonesian masses. In some respects, particularly of making money from the Indonesian people, they have proved, as the allegation goes, no better than the Chinese. Some in high political circles in Indonesia put the blame squarely on the Government of India for this state of affairs and consider it negligence or failure, on India's part, in doing her duty vis-a-vis the Indians in Indonesia.

The Government of India's attitude towards the Indians abroad has always been one of prompting them to readily assimilate themselves with the masses of their country of adoption. The Indians in Indonesia are no exception. Perhaps the Indian Government cannot do much in the matter, except continuing with its policy of persuasion. There is truth in the view that the Indians are not inclined towards assimilation in the mainstream of national life. This is evident

142. Interview with Jamaluddin Malik, Vice-Chairman of the Nahdatul Ulama Party and member of the Supreme Advisory Council (D.P.A.) of Indonesia, Djakarta, 30 December 1969. Jamaluddin Malik told the author about a prominent Sindhi businessman who was caught red-handed while producing fake money and was imprisoned for a number of years.

143. This view is held, among others, by Osep, Secretary-General of the Nationalist Party (P.N.I.) of Indonesia. Impressions gathered during interviews with the P.N.I. leader in Djakarta on 22 and 29 October 1969. Another Indonesian leader who shares this opinion is Soebadio Sastrosatomo of the banned Indonesian Socialist Party (P.S.I.). Interview with Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Djakarta, 25 December 1969.

144. Ibid.
from the fact that they have established their own places of worship and their own educational institutions. Besides, very few Indians allow their children to mix with the Indonesian boys and girls. Inter-marriages are very rare.

Gandhi Memorial School in Djakarta and a couple of other schools in Bandung (West Java) and in Medan (North Sumatra), are the only educational institutions catering to the educational needs of the Indian community. With these schools in existence, very few Indians allow their boys and girls to seek education in the Indonesian schools. Higher education in Indonesian Universities is totally discouraged by the Indians, for fear of losing a helping hand in business which their children are expected to be. These Indian institutions serve a useful and noble purpose in instilling a sense of discipline, of devotion to duty and of their place and role vis-a-vis their country of adoption as well as their country of origin.

Whatever Indonesians' views about Indians in their country, historically speaking, however, the Indonesians continued to have a liking for the Indians living in their midst. Certain factors accounted for this. Firstly, the impact of India's religions and culture on the Indonesians in the pre-colonial era, had left a sense of common identity. Secondly, the distinguished Indians like Rabindra Nath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, had, through their writings and actions, left favourable impressions on their minds. Thirdly, India's unreserved support during the freedom struggle coupled with India's co-operation in the armed forces field, had created and strengthened a sense of fellow feeling between the two communities. Fourthly, the Indian traders' control over the Indonesian economy was minimal. Fifthly, inter-marriages between
the Indian Muslim merchants and Indonesians had led to the emergence of a fairly large group of Peranakans (off-springs of mixed marriages). These type of matrimonial relations, mostly in Sumatra, commented Dr. S.M.H. Nainar in 1957, "contribute to great friendship and cordiality between the two peoples. The Sumatrans appear to be cousins of the Indians to a closer degree than the inhabitants of other parts of Indonesia."

But how long could these factors of goodwill continue on their own? This required certain positive steps which could enable the Indian community to identify their interests with those of the Indonesians. And the Indians there failed to take those steps. What they were expected to do was to march in step with the social, economic and political urges and aspirations of the country of their adoption. Finding this type of adaptation quite at variance with their motives of personal gain, they simply did not do it.

And this state of affairs continues even today. It is the Indian traders who come into contact with the Indonesians in day-to-day life. It is from their attitude that the Indonesians are prone to form their image of India. The Indian community could project a better image of the country of their birth, but they have actually failed to do so. They have rather created a feeling of hostility among the Indonesians and showed that they were, just like the overseas Chinese, the exploiters of Indonesian wealth. They forget

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146. Responding to a questionnaire as submitted by Dr. R.K. Vasil in 1955 to nearly 300 senior students of the University of Indonesia, one of the students complained that the Indian businessmen resident in Indonesia were exploiting their country and, therefore, should be thrown out of Indonesia. See letter to the Editor by R.K. Vasil, The Statesman, 9 December 1961.
that whenever anyone of them is apprehended for any action against the law of the land, it is not his name that is publicized in the press. "Orang India" (Indian) is the invariable term used. This way they have certainly not raised the prestige of their country high. What has added insult to the injury are some overseas Indians' repeated though wrong assertions that it was their forefathers who brought culture to Indonesia.

Vociferous demands are rising in the higher political circles that the Indians in Indonesia, for their own better sake, must do something tangible in order to earn the continued goodwill of the Indonesian masses. This may be done by opening a charitable dispensary, and/or by establishing a foundation for awarding scholarships to Indonesian students for higher studies in India, etc. The two Governments and those genuinely interested in promoting better relations between the two countries (and their number is not small) would be glad to encourage and even financially help such mutually beneficial schemes. Moreover, this would ensure continued flow of Indonesian goodwill for them as also for India.

They can also play a useful role in strengthening Indian-Indonesian relations in the field of trade and economy. Apart from competing with the Chinese in earning Indonesian goodwill, they can popularise and push through Indian made goods in the vast Indonesian market.

**Developments in the Domestic Field**

On achieving independence, the two countries came to adopt a democratic parliamentary system of Government. Whereas India under

147. During his meetings with certain Indian businessmen in Djakarta, Semarang, Jogjakarta and Surabaja, the author was embarrassed to note repeated assertions of this type.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru continued to pursue this system, the working of the Provisional Constitution of 1950 of the Republic of Indonesia, by the various Indonesian political parties, underwent severe strains. In the absence of a single political party commanding majority, as in the case of Indian National Congress in India, a number of unstable coalition governments composed of men, groups and parties, professing diametrically opposed ideologies and programmes, came to rule the country. In a country where the parliamentary system of government had yet to take roots, the results could very well be anticipated. In due course, the parliamentary system was discredited and was later replaced by a system which President Sukarno chose to call "Guided Democracy".

One of the two forces which emerged stronger and came to exercise a decisive bearing on Indian-Indonesian relations was President Sukarno himself. As an ambitious, power-seeking man, the president had never reconciled himself to the ambiguous position nearly of a figure-head as provided in the Provisional Constitution of 1950. The failure of the politicians and political parties in working out the constitutional democracy, provided him with a scapegoat for the ills of the country. Western liberal democracy had, in fact, not been to his liking. Now in the concrete situation of Indonesia, this fifty-plus-one democracy had failed to deliver the goods. So he put the blame on the system itself and started a campaign against it. His visits to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China during 1956 impressed upon him the desirability of doing away with this system altogether and replacing it with a new

148. For a detailed analysis of the reasons, factors and forces which led to the fall of parliamentary system of government in Indonesia, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Third Printing, Ithaca, N.Y., 1968), pp. 618.
political system which according to him suited to the traditions and genius of the Indonesian people. On 21 February 1957, Sukarno announced his "Concept". In his Concept, he alluded to eleven years of instability in the Republic, due to the adoption of what he called "a wrong system, a wrong style of government, that is, the style which we call Western democracy". The regional rebellions during 1957-58, which were aided and abetted by two of the prominent Indonesian political parties, viz., the Masjumi and the P.S.I., gave him a further cause to discredit the system. Ultimately, on 5 July 1959, President Sukarno abrogated the 1950 Constitution and decreed a return to the 1945 Constitution. Under this Constitution, Sukarno became both the President and Prime Minister of the Republic. And thus the process of "Guided Democracy" was initiated in all earnest.

The second domestic force that emerged strong during the nineteen fifties and came to have a major say in Indonesia's foreign attitudes, especially towards India, was the Communist Party of Indonesia (P.K.I.). For at least three years after the Madiun Revolt of September-December 1948, it led a precarious existence. Thereafter, it organised its mass base in Central and East Java, under the youthful leadership of D.N. Aidit. The General Elections in September-December 1955 showed it had emerged as one of

149. Sukarno, To Preserve the Republic We Have Proclaimed (Sukarno's message of 21 February 1957, outlining his Concept of Guided Democracy), (Djakarta, Ministry of Information, 1957), pp. 6, 10. The concept as such consisted of two items, (1) the establishment of a "mutual assistance" (Gotong-Rajong) cabinet in which all political parties represented in the Indonesian Parliament, including the P.K.I., would be included, and (2) the institution of a "National Council", which, he said, "God willing ... will be led by me myself." See p. 12.
The four largest national parties in Indonesia. The Constituent Assembly elections held in December 1955, Djakarta Municipal Council elections held in June 1957 and Provincial Legislative Assembly elections (in Central and East Java) held in August 1957, still further increased PKI’s strength and political influence. Apart from the economic causes, one of the most important factors the PKI used to augment its strength was its identification with President Sukarno and the causes he espoused, even if it meant a little deviation from the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. The political stakes involved

150. The other three largest political parties were PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), the Masjumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslems), and NU (Ulama Association). The PKI mustered 6,176,914 votes, representing 16.4 per cent of the total votes polled, and captured 39 seats as against 17 in the Provisional Parliament. In Java as a whole, which contained 66.2 per cent of the entire population of the Republic, the PKI obtained the largest percentage of votes, that is 88.6 per cent. The PNI and the Masjumi had obtained 85.97 per cent and 85.6 per cent votes respectively. See Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957), pp. 53-62.

151. In the Djakarta Municipal Council elections, the PKI had increased its votes from 89,699 (during the Constituent Assembly elections of December 1955), to 135,038, thus registering an almost 50 per cent increase. See D.N. Aidit, “Indonesian People Are Shifting to the Left” (a statement on local elections on 27 June 1957), Review of Indonesia, vol. 4, no. 7, July 1957, p. 7. This performance was still further improved as the results of the Provincial elections showed a further accretion of strength and popularity to the Party. The total votes polled in its favour rose from 1,696,084 in December 1955 Constituent Assembly elections to 2,162,357 in the August 1957 Provincial Legislative Assembly elections.

152. See, for instance, the PKI’s full-throated support to Sukarno’s Concept of February 1957. Replying to a query by “PIA” Indonesian News Agency correspondent, whether Sukarno’s ‘Concept’ conformed to Lenin’s teachings and also whether the CPI (PKI) could accept it for continued application in Indonesia, D.N. Aidit had said: “The Indonesian Communists are not dogmatic in the application of Marxist and Leninist teachings; we are creative. Marxist-Leninist theory is only a guide, the decisive thing in our policy being the concrete situation in Indonesia. The Indonesian people like the “get-together” principle and we must conform with this desire, quite apart from this, Communists like the “get-together” principle or any such system of mutual help.” See “D.N. Aidit Interviewed by ‘PIA’ News Agency Correspondent”, Review of Indonesia, vol. 4, no. 3, March 1957, p. 3.
in this policy were too high to be lightly ignored. Besides securing President's patronage, it would enable to PKI to establish its Indonesian nationalist bonafides, while at the same time, it would be able to isolate the Muslim and the socialist liberal forces by dubbing them as anti-nationalist. The PKI's major attack was towards the Masjumi and the PSI.

Corresponding to the increase in the PKI's popular strength was a decrease registered in the popular appeal of the other political parties.

By arranging mass demonstrations with hundreds of thousands of Indonesians in support of the President's "Concept", the Communist leadership was able to gain political credibility in the eyes of Sukarno. Besides the Darul Islam movement and the 1957-58 regional rebellions, the campaign for eliminating the Dutch colonialism in West Irian also added to their political influence. By 1961, the PKI had managed to establish itself as a strong, organised political force, matched in organised strength with the only other force, that is, the Armed Forces, in the country. Other political parties were just managing to survive against heavy pressures being exerted by the PKI. By a consistent campaign of character assassination of some prominent non-communist Indonesian leaders like Mohammad Hatta, and by discrediting their political opponents like the Masjumi and the PSI, and by promoting divisions in the ranks of the PNI, the PKI was eroding their popularity and nearing a position of domination of the political scene in the Republic. The only force they entertained fears from was the Army and its leadership. It was quite natural to expect that with the lapse of time the PKI would have a larger say in the formulation of the foreign policy of the Republic.
of Indonesia. And India was to become a target of attack by virtue of its border dispute with the People's Republic of China.

**Foreign Policy Attitudes**

In the diplomatic field, the Governments of India and Indonesia managed to establish a basis of close and informal consultations between their leaders and diplomats. This was designed to iron out differences, if any, and to adopt similar postures on various issues relating to world peace, international co-operation, colonialism and apartheid.

In the beginning, India's non-alignment and Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy, adopted in response to the Cold War tensions arising out of bipolar policies of the United States and the USSR, grew to be similar in essence. Refusing to align with either of the two military blocs, reserving the right to judge every issue of global importance on merit, and, thereby, keeping an independent position in order to throw their full weight on the side of peace, when the cold war threatened to be hot, were the basic principles commonly shared by the two countries.

There were a few major planks of this policy. Preservation of world peace appeared to be top-most in the minds of both Nehru and Sukarno. In the absence of peace, all schemes of socio-economic reconstruction programmes would be put to nought. Political independence unaccompanied by social and economic independence would be of little use. For doing so peace in the world was an absolute
necessity. Only in a peaceful atmosphere could the basis of international co-operation be established. This could be ensured through strengthening the United Nations and other allied organizations.

The second was a common belief that peace and freedom were indivisible. Hence it was essential to oppose colonialism and to support national independence movements anywhere in Asia and Africa.

The third was common opposition to racialist policies pursued by some white minority regimes in Africa. There could be no truck with the policies of racial discrimination as these lowered human dignity and also contravened the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

In view of this basically common approach to issues of national and international importance, the leaders of the two countries displayed their opposition to the United States' sponsored military pacts in Asia in general and in South and South-East Asia.

See, for instance, the two countries' approach to the problem of peace in the statements and speeches made during Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo's visit to India in September 1954. While addressing the Indian Parliament on 23 September 1954, Ali Sastroamidjojo said: "We are not seeking peace for ourselves alone. Humanity the world over is crying for peace." He added: "Peace is no luxury for us. It is not just a replacement of war. Peace is for us an absolute value and therefore a necessity. Let us work together shoulder to shoulder paving the way for peace in the world."

Speaking in a similar vein, at the State Banquet in honour of the Indonesian Prime Minister the same day, Prime Minister Nehru invited reference to "similar problems, similar difficulties and similar enthusiasms" and said: "We have reached a stage when we are anxious to have something, to build our countries and to do away with poverty and misery, and it is obvious we cannot do so except in peace and through peace." Echoing similar thoughts, Ali Sastroamidjojo observed: "It is in peace and peace only that the countries of Asia will be able to develop themselves into welfare states." See The Hindu, 24 September 1954.
in particular. Reacting to the SEATO pact, Ali Sastroamidjojo categorically said: "In our way of thinking, and keeping in mind the principles of Pantja Sila, peace in our part of the world cannot be assured by military pacts such as recently concluded in Manila." He added: "There is a better way to the preservation of peace - I mean co-operation and co-existence." Nehru's attitude towards SEATO was one of forthright criticism. According to him, it neither relieved tension in South-East Asia nor enhanced the chances for peace. He told the Lok Sabha on 29 September 1954: "I confess, I see neither any lessening of tension nor any advance towards peace, but in fact, a reverse." He believed "that the whole approach of this Manila Treaty is not only a wrong approach but a dangerous one from the point of view of any Asian country". He further said: "It talks about that area of peace, and converts it into an area of potential war. So all these facts I find disturbing."

In the joint statement issued in New Delhi on 25 September 1954, at the conclusion of Ali Sastroamidjojo's four-day visit to India, the two Prime Ministers expressed their anxiety "to further the cause of peace in the world and more especially in South-East Asia" and displayed a "general agreement about the approach to these problems." The two leaders also agreed on the desirability of holding early "a Conference of representatives of Asian and African countries...", and on the advisability of "the Prime Ministers of the Colombo Conference

154. India, Indonesian Prime Minister's Visit to India (New Delhi, Information Service of India, n.d.), p. 8. See also The Hindu, 24 September 1954. The Prime Minister of Indonesia was addressing the members of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on 23 September 1954.

155. The Hindu, 30 September 1954.

156. "Text of India-Indonesia Joint Statement", Foreign Policy of India, n. 66, p. 314. See also The Hindu, 26 September 1954.
countries to meet together, preferably at Jakarta". Subsequently, at a conference in Bogor (West Java) on 23-29 December 1954, the Prime Ministers of India and Indonesia joined their counterparts from Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, in deciding to hold the first Asian and African Conference "under their joint sponsorship". The Asian-African Conference of representatives of 24 countries, which met in Bandung (West Java) between 18 and 24 April 1955, was thus the result of joint efforts of both India and Indonesia. In this sense, it represented the high water-mark of their relations.

The similarity of approach in the regional and international field was commensurate with the growing degree of mutual understanding. It enabled Ali Sastroamidjojo to say that "in the pursuance of peace and peaceful co-existence of all countries of Asia, India and Indonesia are standing firmly together". Recalling with emotion

157. In an interview in Djakarta on 24 September 1969, Ali Sastroamidjojo told the author that Prime Minister Nehru was hesitant on this issue. It was only after a lot of discussion about the South-East Asian situation and about Afro-Asian role in seeking solution of international issues through peaceful means, that Nehru agreed. In a jubilant mood, Ali Sastroamidjojo observed that by meeting press, people and members of Parliament he had created such a favourable situation that Nehru could not say no to his proposal of holding an Asian-African Conference. See also G.M. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, New York, 1956), p. 2. Kahin notes that although at the first Colombo Conference in April 1954, Prime Minister Nehru politely nodded approval of Ali Sastroamidjojo's proposal to hold an Asian-African Conference, he was "skeptical of the feasibility and value of holding such a conference. Not until his trip to New Delhi in late September 1954 did Sastroamidjojo win Nehru's full acceptance of his proposal".


159. The Hindu, 25 September 1954. While talking to pressmen on arrival at Palam Airport on 22 September 1954, the Indonesian Prime Minister had emphasised that "the bonds of friendship between India and Indonesia ever since the days of 1947 had not been diminishing or decreasing but increasing in every way". See ibid., 23 September 1954.
India's support to Indonesia during her freedom struggle, the Indonesian Prime Minister observed that "the assistance which India has given so fully and wholeheartedly to my people in the struggle for independence will be written in letters of shining gold in the pages of the history of Indonesia". He also alluded to the two conferences in New Delhi in 1947 and 1949 and said: "It was these two conferences which gave us such valuable support at a time when we needed it so badly."

Prime Minister Nehru reciprocated these sentiments with an equal warmth. Welcoming the Indonesian leader, he said: "... I doubt that any one has come from Asia so welcome as you are, Sir, and Madame Ali." He added: "There was commonness in struggle and in our objectives, but it is true to say that nothing aroused the emotions of our people here, so much as the struggle for the independence of Indonesia."

Perceiving "a certain emotional element in our meeting and in our task" and feeling "a sense of happiness with an immemorial past", the Indian Prime Minister recalled the ancient Indian-Indonesian contacts in these words: "Thinking of Indonesia, our minds go back to ages past, to times which are celebrated in epics, in traditions and in stories, when we lived together, the people of Indonesia and our people in many ways, and they were always ways of peace.... So when you come here, immediately a thousand memories buried in our conscious and subconscious cells, come up and we think of hundreds and even thousands of years of contacts...."

Seen in this perspective, both the countries could be expected to pursue similar policies as regards various specific issues of

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160. Ibid., 24 September 1954. The Prime Minister of Indonesia made this observation in the course of his address to the Indian Parliament on 23 September 1954.

161. Ibid. Prime Minister Nehru spoke these words at the state banquet given in honour of the Indonesian Prime Minister in New Delhi on 23 September 1954.
national, regional and international significance as these effected their foreign policy attitudes and mutual relations.

The United Nations provided the forum for both India and Indonesia, together with Burma, to show a remarkable degree of mutual understanding and identity of views. Out of 56 non-official issues taken up in the General Assembly upto 1955, the three countries displayed unanimity on 44 issues. The record on colonial issues was far more impressive. Out of 30 such issues they registered a unanimous approach on 28 issues. According to the voting pattern thus, India and Indonesia shared each other's opposition to Western colonialism in Asia and Africa, to the South African Government's policy of racial discrimination, and to the issues of war and peace. But on certain issues having direct bearing on their national interests, they followed different courses. The survey of various issues and the two countries responses to them follows.

In view of the broad similarity of ideals and outlook in the framework of their foreign policies, the Governments of India and Indonesia followed similar policies in respect to the war in Indo-China and towards the tripartite (Britain, France and Israel) aggression on Egypt and the Soviet armed action in Hungary. But there were certain issues on which the two Governments also exhibited


163. The five Prime Ministers' Conference in Colombo in April 1954, which met to review the situation arising from the war in Indo-China and to discuss ways and means to stop it, revealed a substantial community of outlook among the Premiers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. See India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Report 1954-55*, p. 16.

164. See text of Joint Statement issued by the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India and Indonesia, New Delhi, 14 November 1956, in *Foreign Policy of India*, n. 66, pp. 275-9.
divergence of attitude. Their approach to the Korean issue showed a marked difference when India voted against the resolution branding China as an aggressor. Indonesia voted in favour of it. Another issue that revealed dissimilar attitude was the Japanese Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco in September 1951. India declined the invitation to attend the Conference and signed a separate Peace Treaty with Japan later; Indonesia attended the Conference, and after her demands were duly met, signed it also. What prompted Indonesia to sign the Peace Treaty was their eagerness to create goodwill with the Japanese as also with other participants, especially, the United States. "If Indonesia had followed in the steps of India", wrote the Indonesian Review, "that is, decided to conclude a separate peace treaty, the sphere of goodwill would certainly be absent and Indonesia would certainly not be able to count on any support from the United States."

It would be clear from the above that, in issues directly relevant to Indonesian interests, the Indonesian leaders followed a separate course from that of India. Those issues which had no direct bearing on their interests like the cases of Indo-China war and tripartite aggression on Egypt and Hungary, they sided with India.

West Irian Issue

Then there were certain other issues which had direct relation with their own vital interests. One such issue was the question of


166. Indonesian Review (Djakarta), (an official quarterly journal published by the Indonesia Publishing Institute, "Franpanca"), vol. 1, no. 5, October-December 1951, p. 375.
West Irian. From the very beginning, India gave full moral and
diplomatic support to Indonesia on this question. But her moral and
diplomatic support was also always accompanied with a counsel of
moderation and peaceful, non-violent solution through negotiations
with the Dutch. Nehru had, during his first visit to Indonesia in
June 1950, exhorted the Indonesians to discard violent approach and
solve the issues facing them in a peaceful way. Since September
1954, the West Irian issue was brought before the United Nations for
four times, and each time the Indian delegates to the World Body lent
their diplomatic and moral support to the Indonesian cause. While
speaking in the Rajya Sabha, on 12 December 1957, Nehru considered
the Indonesian claim to West Irian as "right" and "legitimate one".
He regretted the United Nations' failure in carrying the "moderate"
Afro-Asian resolution which called upon the Dutch and the Indonesians
to resume negotiations for a settlement; but he was also sorry for
the use of mob violence against the Dutch and their property in
Indonesia. He suggested the use of "our own approach" that is,
peaceful approach, and stressed that "it is little difficult for us
to understand or to appreciate" the developments in Indonesia.

Certainly, Indonesian leaders had not been satisfied with the
degree of India's support on the issue. A feeling was growing among
them that India had lost her enthusiasm against Western colonialism in

168. India, Rajya Sabha Debates (New Delhi, Rajya Sabha Secretariat,
While speaking in the Lok Sabha on 17 December 1957, Nehru
"viewed with concern" the anti-Dutch happenings in Indonesia and
suggested "that it is always better, it is always desirable
to settle these matters peacefully by negotiation, even though
that might take some considerable time." See Lok Sabha Debates,
Asia and Africa. Nehru's lack of approval for anti-Dutch activities in Indonesia was already evident from his speeches in Parliament.

When Sukarno visited India in January 1958 and met the Indian leaders, he failed to convince them about the desirability of creating forceful pressures in order to see that the Dutch relented from their intransigence on the issue of West Irian. Commenting on his impressions of his tour of India and Pakistan on the way back from Moscow in January, 1961, General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Indonesian Minister of Defence and Security, told the author that "frankly speaking ... President Ayub Khan's support to our struggle (for West Irian) was more spontaneous" than "Jawaharlal Nehru's". He appreciated the diplomatic support given by the non-aligned countries including India and the UAR, but he stressed that the Soviet support was stronger.

Even at the United Nations, India's attitude towards the problem of West Irian had shown a little disinterestedness.

169. Written replies by Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, Chairman of the MPRS (Majelis Farmusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara - Provisional People's Congress), Djakarta, 15 November 1969, in response to a questionnaire submitted by the author during his field study in Indonesia.

170. Interview with Ali Sastroamidjojo, for some time Indonesia's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Djakarta, 24 September 1969. Ali Sastroamidjojo told the author about an incident involving V.K. Krishna Menon, India's Defence Minister and leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in its Fourteenth Session in September-October 1959. The Indonesian Representative had asked Arthur Lall, India's Permanent Representative, to request Krishna Menon to mention the West Irian issue in the course of his speech. Arthur Lall informed him that he had conveyed his request. Finding that his request had been ignored, Ali Sastroamidjojo once again approached the Indian Representative to remind Krishna Menon. Arthur Lall, consequently, sent a small chit to the Indian Defence Minister, in the course of his speech. Ali Sastroamidjojo told the author that Krishna Menon's attitude revealed that India had lost her zeal on the West Irian issue.

Krishna Menon, in fact, made a brief mention of the West Irian issue, and reiterated India's position in these words: "The Government of India considers West Irian as unfinished business, that is, that part of Indonesia which, as is the case of Portuguese Goa, still remains under alien rule." See General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), session 14, plen. mtg. 823, 6 October 1959, p. 422.
This consistency in India's suggestion of a non-violent approach to colonial issues in general and the West Irian question in particular, became, in due course of time, highly embarrassing to the Indonesian leadership. Government of India's action in Goa against the Portuguese in December 1961 added sharpness to criticism against India. If on the one hand, it earned her charge of double standards, on the other, it confirmed Indonesia's thesis that colonialism knew only the language of force.

**Indonesian Demand for the Second Afro-Asian Conference**

Another issue that had its bearing on the two countries' relations was Indonesian leaders' demand for convening a second Afro-Asian Conference. Indian-Indonesian attitudes towards this issue have been examined in a separate chapter. Since the first Asian and African Conference in Bandung (West Java) in April 1955, Indonesia had been making several approaches to India and other Asian and African countries. But Nehru, fully aware of the dissensions among the Afro-Asian countries, had been showing hesitation to agree to the Indonesian overtures in this connection. Rather than bringing unity in the Afro-Asian ranks, he believed, another Conference would still further create, promote and air differences to the advantage of the Big Powers.

Indian-Indonesian differences on these issues got strengthened during the period of study. Two countries, China and Pakistan, played an important role in promoting anti-India sentiment in Indonesia. Sharing an avowed sense of hostility towards India, they adopted certain policies and utilised certain occasions in order to

171. See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, pp. 254-324.
damage India's relations with Indonesia.

China's Role

The two countries' initial responses to the emergence of People's Republic of China in October 1949 were more or less the same. India recognised China on 9 December 1949 and Indonesia did so on 13 April 1950, when she accepted China's offer of establishing diplomatic relations with her. They shared each other's apprehensions of China and agreed as to the manner of dealing with it. This is evident from the two countries' common opposition to the United States' sponsored military pacts, such as SEATO, their decision to enter into Panch Sheel Agreement with China and their agreement to invite her to the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955.

But following the Bandung Conference, the leaderships in India and Indonesia came to have different approaches towards China. Chou En-lai had, by his "reasonableness", carried conviction with many delegates including even those who vehemently criticised International Communism. The conclusion of the nationality treaty between China and Pakistan in Indian-Indonesian relations has been examined in separate chapters. See Chapters on China's Role and Pakistan's Role.

172. The five principles were: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence.

173. Those who had launched a strong attack against international Communism included the Prime Ministers of Ceylon (Sir John Kotelawala) and Pakistan (Mohammed Ali) and leader of the Philippine delegate to the Conference, Carlos P. Romulo. If Sir John Kotelawala described international Communism as "another form of Colonialism" and "Soviet colonialism", Mohammed Ali warned the Asian and African nations to "be careful and not to open the door to new and more insidious forms of imperialism that masquerade in the guise of 'liberation'." Carlos P. Romulo went the farthest when he warned Prime Minister Nehru against believing Chinese intentions of peaceful co-existence. He also expressed his "fear"about "the new empire of Communism on which we know the sun never rises". See contd. on next page
and Indonesia augured well for their mutual relations. The increasingly left-ward trend in Indonesian politics visible since the 1955 elections led to exchange of a number of goodwill visits and delegations. Sukarno's visit to China in October 1956 made a mark on his mind. He was impressed by the degree of progress made in all fields under a Communistic political system. On his return, he warmly praised the Chinese political model and their achievements.

India's relations with China, in the meanwhile, became strained in the wake of China's armed action in Tibet. By 1959, the India-China dispute assumed serious proportions. Nehru's image of China underwent some serious modifications. The period of brotherhood slogans was over. The Chinese action in Tibet and her intransigent attitude on the border dispute with India, convinced Nehru that China had little regard for the Panch Sheel or the ten principles of the Bandung Communique.

Thus, by 1961, whereas India was getting increasingly disillusioned with China's belligerent attitude, Indonesia's cultural and political relations with China were getting more and more intimate. Keeping an eye on the political situation within Indonesia, the Chinese leadership perceived the one major single factor which required to be constantly boosted. And that was Sukarno's personal ego. This being duly satisfied, the trend of political radicalism in Indonesia could be strengthened. It also meant full identification with Sukarno's stance against colonialism and imperialism and with his fight against Dutch colonialism in West Irian. This way

alliance of the PKI with the national bourgeoisie leadership would be strengthened, other religious, socialistic and nationalistic forces eroded and isolated and the way paved for the political preponderance of the PKI in Indonesia.

To serve these major political objectives, China geared its diplomatic and press machinery. The moral and diplomatic support that China gave to Indonesia, being in full conformity with their ideological stance against colonialism and imperialism, was far more radical than that offered by India. China, unlike India, had no inhibitions in giving approval to Indonesia's desire to throw away Dutch colonialism in West Irian by force. It rather suited their own political objectives in the region. Besides, the Chinese leaders also fully agreed with the Indonesian demand for the convening of the second Afro-Asian Conference. Their attitude on this score, was in contrast with India's attitude of caution and hesitation.

Pakistan's Role

Pakistan proved to be another important external factor damaging Indian-Indonesian relations. Indonesia being a Muslim-majority country, Pakistan expected her support against India. But this was not to be. The reservoir of goodwill created during the struggle for Indonesia's independence, proved strongly inhibitive factor in this direction. Another factor that prevented Indonesia from supporting Pakistan was the secularistic tendency of the Indonesian leaders. Their resolve to establish the Indonesian State on the basis of "Pantja Sila" and their bitter fight against the

175. The "Pantja Sila" comprises five principles of (1) Belief in God; (2) Nationalism; (3) Democracy; (4) Internationalism; and (5) Social Justice. The first principle implies full freedom of religious worship and non-discrimination on the basis of religion.
"Darul Islam" movement, tended them to approach the Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir in a secular perspective in which Islamic sentiment did not carry much weight. But after all Pakistan was a Muslim State. Hence it could not be offended. As a result, from the very beginning, Indonesia adopted a posture of more or less equal friendship towards India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Since exclusively pro-India attitude from Indonesia on this question could not be expected, their neutral posture was a decisive gain to India as against Pakistan. Various Indonesian Governments stuck to this position upto and even after 1961.

Indonesian leaders remembered how "Pakistani" soldiers had fought shoulder to shoulder with the Indonesian freedom fighters, during their struggle against the Dutch. The Pakistani diplomats had also given moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia on the West Irian issue, in and out of the United Nations. But the causes of embarrassment to Indonesian leadership on the part of Pakistan had been stronger. Pakistan's military pact with the United States in 1954, her joining of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, her permission to the United States to use her territory for military bases against soviet bloc of states, all these elements in Pakistan foreign policy

176. As early as June 1950, President Sukarno stated in Karachi that the Indonesians were greatly indebted to the "sons of Pakistan" who had fought shoulder to shoulder with the Indonesians in the defence of the Indonesian Republic. See Indonesia, Illustrations of the Revolution, 1945-1950, 1960 (Djakarta, Ministry of Information, 1954), edn 2.

In fact, not all the Indian soldiers who defected to the Indonesian side and rendered active support to Indonesia's struggle for freedom, were Muslims. There were among them, soldiers of other religions as well. See ibid., 1947. Moreover, they were British Indian soldiers sent to Indonesia in order mainly to help restore the Dutch rule there after the surrender of the Japanese. They could not appropriately be called "Pakistani".
had not been favoured in Indonesia. This dis-similarity with Pakistan had been partly responsible for keeping Indonesia away from her and near to India. Besides, Pakistani State as based on religion had not been considered in tune with the Pantja Sila State of the Republic of Indonesia. In this respect also Indonesia had found herself near to democratic and secular India. This goes to explain why the Indonesian delegates to the three Conferences, (1) First Colombo Prime Ministers' Conference in April 1954, (2) Second Colombo Powers' Conference in Bogor in December 1954, and (3) First Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955, found themselves in the role of a peace-maker between India and Pakistan.

Until, and even after, the end of 1961, there was no serious shift perceptible in Indonesia's attitude of equal friendship towards India and Pakistan. During President Ayub Khan's visit to Indonesia in December 1960, the Pakistani leader attempted to sway the Indonesian leaders towards a joint Islamic front against India, and also prompted them to change their neutral attitude towards the Kashmir dispute and of equal friendship towards the two countries in favour of one bending towards Pakistan. But, to his disappointment, Indonesian leadership was not yet in a mood to do so. President Sukarno and all other Indonesian leaders gave a huge welcome to the President of Pakistan. They also expressed their happiness on the two countries having done away with the Western-type parliamentary liberal democracy. But they were less satisfied with the Pakistani President's vacillation on the issue of convening the second Afro-

Asian Conference. If Pakistan had failed to drive a wedge between
India and Indonesia, Indonesia had failed to seek a firm commitment
from the Pakistani President as regards the second Afro-Asian
Conference.