Chapter VIII

CONCLUSIONS
The centuries' old contacts between India and Indonesia got strengthened during the last phase of Indonesia's struggle for independence against the Dutch. India's spontaneous moral, political and even material support increased manifold the fund of mutual goodwill bequeathed by history. In this connection, the Asian Relations Conference and the 18-nation Conference on Indonesia, both held in New Delhi in March-April 1947 and January 1949 respectively, provided major landmarks in the two countries' relations. The Indian-Indonesian Treaty of Friendship of March 1951 was a natural consequence of this mutual goodwill. Subsequently, the two countries signed a number of agreements in the fields of trade and culture and between the three services of their Armed Forces.

A survey of these agreements shows that whereas India did contribute substantially in the field of co-operation between the Armed Forces of the two countries, quite a lot was left to be desired in the field of trade and cultural relations. For their own reasons, they failed to evolve an institutional framework in which their economies could meaningfully co-operate. Besides, various factors impeded the growth of cordial relations between them. These were the contrasting elements present in the personalities of Nehru and Sukarno, differences in the nature of the two countries' freedom struggles, geo-politics, the question of "Big-Brother" attitude and the role of Indians in Indonesia.

Even the pattern of domestic politics as it evolved in India and Indonesia following independence, did not prove to be conducive to good relations between them. During the nineteen-fifties, unlike
in Indonesia, India achieved a measure of political stability which permitted its leadership to pursue policies of planned economic development. Although, with Goa remaining under the Portuguese and West Irian under the Dutch, the two countries faced similar tasks of completing their independence, whereas India concentrated its efforts to give economic content to political freedom, Indonesia chose to give priority to removing Dutch colonialism from West Irian. Sukarno's emphasis on liberation of West Irian, which grew with the growing internal threats to his own position, led to radicalisation of politics in Indonesia. Dutch intransigence on the West Irian issue had much to do with it. Political instability and mounting security threat enabled Sukarno to discredit democracy and assume full executive powers under the old 1945 Constitution. The Indonesian Communist Party which, since the general elections in 1955, was emerging as a strong power factor in Indonesian politics, fully supported Sukarno's policies. Thus in the process of evolution of "Guided Democracy", the forces and factors which emerged stronger, such as Sukarno himself, the PKI and the Indonesian Army, did not have any commitment to economic development under a democratic framework as understood in India. This was bound to have an unfavourable impact on Indian-Indonesian relations.

By 1961, the two countries' foreign policies also showed indications of divergence in approach if not in fundamentals. India was apprehensive that the radical anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist group among the Afro-Asian non-aligned states, including Indonesia, might contrive at the formation of a third bloc, something unacceptable to Nehru's line of thinking. It
induced India, at the non-aligned preparatory meeting in Cairo in June 1961, to propose expansion of the area of non-alignment by including border-line cases into the non-aligned group of states. Indonesia, however, opposed the Indian thesis and identified itself with a majority Afro-Asian opinion favouring restrictive approach in the matter. Sukarno's explanation of his concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFO" at the Belgrade Conference only confirmed India's fears in this regard. The objectives of India's non-alignment, namely, avoidance of confrontation, nuclear or otherwise, between two Big Powers and, thereby, promoting chances of world peace and international co-operation, so necessary for economic and industrial development of the newly-free Asian and African countries, seemed to be losing their relevance in Sukarno's view of the world.

India's attitude towards the West Irian issue and the Indonesian demand for the second Afro-Asian Conference strengthened this divergence. India's continued emphasis on using peaceful means for elimination of Dutch colonialism from West Irian, even after it expelled the Portuguese from Goa with force, created an impression among the Indonesians that India was not enthusiastic about liberation of West Irian and that it was keeping double standards. Evidently, when West Irian dispute was resolved in August 1962, Indonesia, ignoring India's moral and diplomatic support to her on this issue, preferred to choose Pakistan for sending a military contingent to West Irian during the administration of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority.

As regards the Second Afro-Asian Conference, the fall-out from the "Gondhi Affair" in September 1962 and Indonesia's pro-China attitude in the Sino-Indian border dispute, made India all the more hesitant towards it. Indonesia's growing intimacy with
China and Pakistan, two hostile neighbours of India, created fears in India that these three might join and create embarrassing moments for her at such a gathering. During 1963, India joined the UAR and Ceylon in making concerted efforts to stage a second Belgrade-type Conference as a rival to the efforts of Indonesia, China and Pakistan to convene a second Afro-Asian Conference. It was because India believed that this type of Conference would automatically keep both China and Pakistan out and that it would make Indonesian demand for the second Bandung-type Conference more or less superfluous. The successful convening of the preparatory meeting of the second non-aligned Conference in Colombo in March 1964 left a trail of bitterness in Indonesia's attitude towards India. The PKI's openly hostile attitude towards the Indian leadership and its foreign policy contributed significantly to it. It used its intellectual forums, such as the HSI (Indonesian Scholars' Association), to launch a strong attack on the concept of non-alignment as well as on its relevance in the present world situation.

Indian efforts in this direction created an impression in Indonesia that India was resistant to her role in South-East Asia as well as in Afro-Asia. Indian proposals about composition, timing and venue of the Conference, made at the Preparatory Meeting of the second Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta in April 1964, only strengthened this Indonesian impression.

About five months later, at the second Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964, Sukarno made a blistering attack on the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. For him non-alignment which did not oppose "OPEC", 
meaning thereby, colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism, was already aligned with these forces. He ruled out peaceful co-existence between "NEFOS" and "OLDEFOCS". In the light of India's attitude of moral sympathy and support to Malaysia (a project which Indonesia considered to be neo-colonialist and imperialist), and her negative attitude towards the second Afro-Asian Conference, it was natural for India to lose its image in Indonesia.

By the close of 1964 and the beginning of 1965, anti-India feeling in Indonesia rose to a high pitch. On account of India's insistence on seeking Soviet and Malaysian participation in the second Afro-Asian Conference, an issue left unsettled by the Preparatory Meeting in April 1964, the Indonesian press portrayed Indian foreign policy as neo-colonialist and pro-imperialist. This was as a reaction to India's diplomatic assistance to Malaysia in getting her a non-permanent seat in the Security Council. It was also meant to exert pressures on Lal Bahadur Shastri's Government to give up its insistence on Malaysia's representation at the Afro-Asian Conference. By April 1965, even Sukarno discarded his earlier restraint and openly criticised India and its leadership for its pro-Malaysia policy. He even bracketed India with the "OLDEFOCS". This led in June 1965 to repetition of anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta and elsewhere in Indonesia.

Divergence of the two countries' foreign policies during 1961-65 related to their different approaches to the issue of colonialism in general. Whereas India preferred and even counselled a peaceful, negotiated approach towards eliminating colonialism from Asia and Africa, Indonesia refused to believe in the efficacy of it and instead suggested employment of all means including force to
do so. Besides, if Nehru sought priority for preservation of world peace through big-power negotiations, Sukarno refused to give importance to big-power conflicts and emphasised on considering colonialism as the major single source of international tension. He also wanted to create a new international force described by him as "NEFECS" in which China would play a significant role. This could not be supported by India.

In line with their divergent attitudes, the Indian and Indonesian delegations to the preparatory meeting of the Belgrade Conference in Cairo in June 1961, held different opinions on the question of participation by the Stanleyville Government of Antoine Gizenga and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Algeria. Whereas India resisted their participation, Indonesia came out with enthusiastic support for their representation. By implication, whereas Indonesia identified itself with the anti-colonialist sentiment in Africa, India, for its own reasons, failed to do so and created an impression that it had lost its earlier enthusiasm for anti-colonial struggles. The two delegations also registered disagreement on the nature of topics to be included in the Conference agenda. The Indian delegation stressed that only issues of international importance, having a direct bearing on world peace, be given priority; the Indonesian side opposed it and urged the inclusion of specific issues of colonialism in Asia and Africa.

Later, at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, Sukarno's emphasis on seeking priority for the problems of colonialism and imperialism in Asia and Africa conflicted directly with Nehru's view of treating everything including problems of colonialism as "secondary" to the urgency of maintaining world peace. The Indian delegation no doubt succeeded in its major
objectives of getting issued an appeal for peace to the heads of Governments of the two Big Powers and of avoiding the use of condemnatory language against colonialism and imperialism. India's success was despite the fact that the majority of participants did not share its views. It showed the degree to which Premier Nehru, the leader of the Indian delegation to the Belgrade Conference, was going out of step with Asian-African opinion on colonialism.

The Indonesian leaders on their part were not duly satisfied with the results of the Conference. Indonesia had failed in getting a specific reference of Conference support on the West Irian issue as well as on its demand for the second Afro-Asian Conference. As it was more than what they could swallow, the Indonesian leaders put the blame for this on India and its Prime Minister.

In the period of four years following the Belgrade Conference, India's friendly attitude towards the Federation of Malaysia, its efforts to link the Malaysia issue with the prospects of the second Afro-Asian Conference, and finally, to seek postponement of this Conference itself, were interpreted in Indonesia as pro-colonialist and pro-imperialist. It was on this basis that the PKI and People's China worked for distorting India's image in Indonesia. On the other hand, it was on this basis of uncompromising attitude of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, that Indonesia developed a policy of "axis" with China and a few other pro-China states in East and South-East Asia. This remained the corner-stone of Indonesian foreign policy as based on Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS" and, as such, a major source of conflict between India and Indonesia until the coup in September 1965.

The nature of personal relationship between Nehru and Sukarno proved to be an important factor determining relations
between India and Indonesia during the period of study. The fund of mutual goodwill between them created during Indonesia's struggle for freedom against the Dutch showed signs of diminishing by the close of nineteen-fifties. So much so that on the eve of the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, Sukarno even declined Nehru's invitation to visit New Delhi on way to Belgrade. The Belgrade Conference provided to the two leaders the first ever opportunity to express their differences openly on the issues of war and peace and on the question of colonialism. This showed the degree of conviction with which each held his views on these issues. Verbal exchanges between Nehru and Sukarno at the secret session and between their deputies, Krishna Menon and Subandrio, at the drafting committee meetings, left a feeling of bitterness between them. Nehru's refusal to give priority to the issues of colonialism over and above the issue of world peace was interpreted in Indonesia as a personal affront to Sukarno. Marking as it did an end to personal rapport between the top leaders of the two countries, established since Indonesia's struggle against the Dutch, it was bound to have serious repercussions on the two countries' relations.

In the following years, the two leaders tended to disregard each other's susceptibilities on the issues of vital interest to them. If Sukarno's Government took a pro-China attitude on the Sino-Indian border dispute, Nehru's Government and later Shastri's Government took stands on the question of Malaysia and on the issue of the second Bandung-type Conference totally opposed to that of Indonesia. Consequently, the Indonesian leadership tended to see Indian leadership as a hindrance to the realisation of Indonesia's regional as well as Afro-Asian objectives.
Although, keeping in view long-term prospects of Indian-Indonesian relations, Nehru made an effort to resume dialogue with Sukarno, it failed to produce any tangible results. The communication gap developing between the two leaders since the Belgrade Conference and strengthened by the "Gondhi Affair" during the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in September 1962, showed no signs of bridging.

Following Prime Minister Nehru's death in May 1964, when the Government of Lal Bahadur Shastri did not indicate any change in its attitude towards the Malaysia issue and the second Afro-Asian Conference, Indonesian leadership felt disappointed. Thus when Sukarno and Shastri met at the second Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964, there was no personal rapport between them.

In the course of time, indifference to each other's vital interests turned into mutual antipathy between the leaders of the two countries. So much so that at the Tenth Anniversary celebrations in Djakarta in April 1965, when India chose to be represented by a person even below the rank of its Minister for External Affairs, Sukarno ignored the presence of the Indian delegation by

1. Interview with Dinesh Singh, New Delhi, 23 February 1972. Dinesh Singh, Deputy Minister for External Affairs (later Minister for External Affairs) revealed to this author that he carried a personal letter of Prime Minister Nehru to President Sukarno in July 1963. When asked about the main purpose of his visit, Dinesh Singh disclosed that it was to facilitate resumption of dialogue between Nehru and Sukarno. He told Sukarno about the declining health of Nehru and extended on behalf of Nehru an invitation to the Indonesian leader, to visit New Delhi. Although Sukarno accepted Nehru's invitation, he left the date to be fixed later. It was, in fact, another way of saying no to Nehru's invitation. In view of personal irritations piling up due to divergence of approach to various issues of vital importance to the two countries, since the Belgrade Conference, it could hardly be expected that Sukarno would visit India at that stage.
refusing to give audience to its leader. In the following days, Sukarno started criticising the Indian leadership directly. This led in June 1965 to strong anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta and elsewhere in Indonesia.

Malaysia issue which came to have a serious impact on Indian-Indonesian relations during the period of study, became a point of conflict between the two countries at the regional level. Particularly after the Brunei revolt in December 1962, Indonesia came out clearly against the proposed Federation of Malaysia. Viewing in the Malaysia scheme a danger to the Communist movement in the region as well to the Chinese interests, the PKI both initiated and strengthened Indonesia's commitment to anti-Malaysia policy. By the time Foreign Minister Subandrio announced a policy of 'confrontation' against Malaysia in January 1963 (about eight months before it came into being), all the forces and factors, including the PKI, the President and the Army leadership, for their own reasons, arrived at a consensus about opposition to the proposed scheme of Malaysia.

An important implication of Indonesia's policy of 'confrontation' was Indonesia's ambition of a power role in South-East Asia. In the process of evolution of Malaysia, however, the Indonesian Government and the PKI showed a difference of approach to the issue. Whereas Sukarno, the Army leadership and all other non-Communist groups opted for "Maphilindo" (a concept of a loose confederation of three states, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia), a scheme based on racial feelings of Malay unity and providing a framework in which Indonesia could play a regional power role, the PKI viewed it as dangerous to its own interests as well as those of the Chinese in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region and came out
in open although guarded criticism of this scheme. The PKI, in line with China's policy, continued to be in the forefront of Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy and always egged Sukarno on to opposing Malaysia as well as those who supported Malaysia.

India, from the beginning, welcomed the formation of the proposed Federation. Finding Indonesia, however, becoming hostile to it, India became cautious in its approach to the issue. In the background of diminishing Indonesian goodwill towards her (as demonstrated during the Fourth Asian Games in September 1962) and in the light of Indonesia's growing cordiality with China, it was not desirable to provoke Indonesian leadership on the Malaysia issue. There were apprehensions in India that in the 6-power Colombo Conference in December 1962, Indonesia might openly go against India and in favour of China on the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Later, however, India openly welcomed inauguration of Malaysia in September 1963. Still later, at the Preparatory Meeting of the second Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta in April 1964, the Indian delegate succeeded in linking the issue of Malaysia with the prospects of the Conference itself. This was the net result of an Indian proposal at the Preparatory Meeting to invite Malaysia to the Conference.

Thereafter, India, on various occasions, offered moral and political support to Malaysia. These included the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference on 15 July 1964 and the second Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964. India also gave diplomatic assistance to Malaysia to get a non-permanent seat in the Security Council in December 1964. This showed how far India was prepared to go in ignoring Indonesia's feelings in regard to
Malaysia.

It did not mean, however, that India was becoming totally indifferent to Indonesia's attitudes. In India, there was awareness of PKI's role in egging Sukarno on to a policy of opposition to Malaysia. The PKI had also unsparingly criticised India on a number of occasions and showed the extent to which it shared China's hostility towards India. India, in fact, desired that Indonesia-Malaysia dispute be resolved peacefully through bilateral negotiations or through a third party mediation. She even threw feelers to mediate in the dispute between the two countries.

But since India's open pro-Malaysia attitude led to hard feelings in Indonesia, India's overtures in this regard proved to be of little use. Ultimately, it was India's pro-Malaysia attitude and its insistence on Malaysia's representation at the second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers which led, in June 1965, to eruption of Indonesians' feelings into anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta and elsewhere.

During 1961-65, the divergence in the two countries' foreign policies led them to forge links with different countries. Whereas India's non-alignment always tilted her towards developing her relations with both the Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, Indonesia's foreign policy based on Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS", in course of time, led her into closer relationship with China. Whereas the dynamic character of Indian non-alignment enabled India to achieve a measure of success in making itself an area of agreement between the two Big Powers, rigidity in Indonesia's foreign policy posture of dividing the world into "NEFOS" and "OLDEFOS", led her into isolation.

Especially, India's links with the Soviet Union and Indonesia's links with China became more marked as a result of the two countries'
conflicting attitudes on issues of interest to them. India sought Soviet support and goodwill in order to neutralise the combined hostility of Indonesia, China and Pakistan. For this, India took advantage of the Sino-Soviet schism, insisted on Soviet representation at the second Afro-Asian Conference and, thereby, forced upon Indonesia a sort of choice between China and the Soviet Union. In fact, India's continued insistence on Soviet participation which earned Soviet goodwill for India, created tensions in Indonesian-soviet relations and led Indonesia still closer to China. China's active moral and political support to Indonesia on the issues of Malaysia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference and increasingly pro-China and anti-Soviet line followed by the PKI, helped this process.

In January 1965, following Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, both the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to have lost much of their influence in Djakarta. In August 1965, Sukarno's announcement of "axis" with China marked the zenith of Indonesia's relations with that country. In contrast, with both the United States and the Soviet Union losing their image in Indonesia, the Indian-Indonesian relations seemed to be touching the lowest ebb.

During the period of study, India and Indonesia assumed postures and pursued policies which showed indifference, bordering on disregard, of each other's vital interests. Indonesia's support to China in the Sino-Indian border dispute and to Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute proved as much disappointing to India as India's attitude of sympathy and support to Malaysia and of continued hesitation towards Indonesia's demand for the second Afro-Asian Conference. In fact both the countries just ignored each other's feelings on issues of vital importance to them. This established
the fact that in the framework of their foreign policies, neither Indonesia figured prominently in Indian calculations nor India did so in Indonesian calculations. An important field in which a country's importance in the calculations of the other could be meaningfully assessed is their co-operation in the field of culture and trade and economy. The progress in this area of Indian-Indonesian relations was never encouraging. Various provisions of the Cultural Agreement of December 1955, which was to remain in force for a period of ten years, remained mostly unimplemented. Both under the Colombo Plan and through the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, India's contribution in this field was far from encouraging. India failed to seek and strengthen common points of understanding with Indonesia. This could have been done by promoting channels of communication at various levels, that is, by exchange of teachers and scholars and by establishment of chairs in Indonesian Universities and vice-versa. Non-utilisation of the framework provided by the Cultural Agreement, in this connection, showed the lesser degree of importance India attached to Indonesia. Similarly, in the field of trade, the two countries failed to measure up to the expectations generated during the early nineteen-fifties. Between 1950-51 and 1961-62, three-fold increase in the total bilateral trade as envisaged in the Trade Agreement of January 1951 was achieved only during 1955-56. During these years, India's exports to and imports from Indonesia never constituted even one per cent of her total world exports and imports, the only exception being 1961-62, during which Indian exports to Indonesia reached just above this level (1.04 per cent). In the four years until 1965-66, the two countries' performance in this field continued to be increasingly
disappointing. They failed to achieve the total bilateral trade figure as envisaged in the communique issued at the time of the Trade Agreement of April 1963. This could be attributed to their unwillingness to evolve an institutional framework for regular flow of trade between them.

China proved to be a significant negative factor in Indian-Indonesian relations during 1961 and 1965. In the early years of Indonesian freedom, two reasons which circumscribed China's role in this connection were its outspoken criticism of Indonesian nationalist leadership and its outright rejection of the "third road", which Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy, much like that of India's non-alignment, implied.

At this stage, the Indian and Indonesian leaders showed more or less similar attitude to the China problem, although they suggested different ways of dealing with it. Indonesia's readiness to sign the Panchsheel agreement with China and Ali Sastroamidjojo's agreement with Nehru on inviting China to the first Asian-African Conference, showed the degree of weight Nehru's words carried with the Indonesian leadership.

An important factor which, however, continued to impede normalisation of Indonesia's relations with China was the question of dual nationality of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia. The signing of the Dual Nationality Treaty in April 1955, following the 'Bandung' Conference, went a long way towards putting the two countries' relations in a process of normalisation. Sukarno's visit to China in October 1956 proved to be an important event in this process. It enabled the Chinese to seek and identify common goals and objectives with the Indonesians. Besides, fully realising the importance of Sukarno's position in his country, China sought
to cultivate him and play him up as a champion of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and Afro-Asian solidarity, something quite agreeable to Sukarno's thinking. As a tangible evidence of their mutual friendship, the two sides offered to each other support for their respective claims on Taiwan and West Irian.

Later, keeping an eye on the political developments in Indonesia, in which the PKI was emerging as an important power factor, China gave full moral and even arms support to Sukarno's Government during the PRRI and Permesta rebellion during 1957-58. China's action, in a way, helped the PKI to isolate and discredit the anti-Communist parties, such as, the Masjumi and the FSI.

But, at this stage, the overseas Chinese issue came to the fore. Chen Yi's over-bearing attitude towards Subandrio during the latter's visit to China in October 1959, and China's strong criticism of Indonesians' measures against its "compatriots" in Indonesia, following the Presidential Regulation of November 1959, attracted from the Indonesian leadership charges of expansionism and "interference" in Indonesia's internal affairs. Finding, however, Indonesia determined to resist its pressures, China thought it fit to play down the issue and sought to normalise relations with the Indonesian leadership even at the cost of the overseas Chinese interests. Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia in March-April 1961 and Sukarno's visit to China in June 1961, provided to China suitable occasions to do so. The Chinese leaders gave red-carpet welcome to Sukarno and described him as a spokesman of Afro-Asian unity against colonialism and imperialism in the region as well as in Asia and Africa.

China's increasingly cordial posture towards Indonesia, at this stage, could be ascribed to growing tension on the Sino-
Indian border dispute. Treating India as its major political and economic rival in Asia, China sought to demolish India's image and to isolate her from its neighbours and the Afro-Asians in general and to condemn Nehru and his policy of non-alignment in particular. It is in the background of China's growing hostile posture towards India that its overtures towards Indonesia should be seen.

During 1961-65, China identified certain issues and exploited certain occasions, to serve its objective of driving a wedge between India and Indonesia. These issues and occasions fitted well into the Chinese scheme of things because of their direct or indirect bearing on Indian-Indonesian relations.

West Irian was the first issue of importance to Indonesian foreign policy, as it represented Indonesians' urge to complete their political independence. Finding India reluctant to agree to Indonesians' plea for adoption of forcible pressures against the Dutch, China offered militant support to Indonesia against Dutch colonialism in West Irian. Fearing, however, that once West Irian was restored to Indonesia, it might disengage itself from the struggle against colonialism in the region and start paying attention to problems of economic reconstruction through cooperation with the United States, China sought to broaden Indonesia's commitment against colonialism. China did it by emphasising US collusion with the Dutch in West Irian.

The first opportunity which China exploited to strengthen Indonesia's anti-India feeling, was provided by the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. It enabled China to assess the nature and degree of Indian-Indonesian differences, both at ideological and personal level. Identifying anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism as the running theme of Sukarno's speech
and finding Nehru's approach as opposed to it, China used its press to highlight ideological differences between the two leaders. Noting ideological convergence between China's view of the world and Sukarno's concept of "NEPES" versus "OLEPES", the Chinese press sought to play up Sukarno's and run down Nehru's role at the Belgrade Conference.

A year later, the "Sondhi Affair" in the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta, provided another occasion to China to strengthen Indonesian ill-will towards India. Through its press, China not only criticised G.D. Sondhi, the Vice-President of the IOC, but also Prime Minister Nehru. By mis-interpreting Nehru's statements about the incident, it endeavoured to impress upon the Indonesians that India and its Prime Minister were less respectful to Sukarno.

China also used this incident in order to get closer to Indonesian leadership. It criticised both "US imperialism and Sondhi" for barring Indonesia from the Olympic Games, offered full moral and even material support to Indonesia in arranging Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), and itself participated in these Games in a big way. Through press, China also gave wide coverage to the activities relating to the GANEFO and also offered loud praise to the Indonesians for successfully arranging these Games.

Following the solution of the West Irian issue, China found the question of Malaysia as quite relevant to its policy of promoting and aggravating tensions in Indian-Indonesian relations. Finding differences appearing in the two countries' approaches to the Malaysia proposal and feeling it necessary to make Indonesia favourable to it on Sino-Indian border dispute, China came out with open and categorical support to Indonesia on the Malaysia issue.
Foreign Minister Subandrio's almost pro-Peking attitude in the six-power Colombo Conference in December 1962 encouraged it to do so. China tended to utilise the Malaysia issue as a *quid pro quo* for Indonesia's favourable attitude towards it against India. Being congruent to China's ideological and strategic objectives towards Indonesia and the region and representing Indonesia's aspirations of a regional role, the Malaysia question provided to China a valuable issue in distorting India's image among the Indonesians. All along the process of establishment of Malaysia and after, China assumed postures which were diametrically opposed to that of India. Surprisingly, however, China rarely criticised India directly for the latter's pro-Malaysia attitude. China continued this policy until the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta in April 1964, whereafter it came out openly in condemnation of India's favourable policy towards Malaysia.

Indonesia's demand for the second Afro-Asian Conference was still another important issue which China exploited to serve its own ends *vis-a-vis* India's relations with Indonesia. Like the Malaysia issue, China found the Indonesian demand quite congruent to its ideological and strategic goals and perceived in it Indonesia's ambitions of an Afro-Asian role. Nehru's continued hesitation to agree to it made China's anti-India propaganda easily acceptable to the Indonesians.

In offering its support to Indonesia on this issue, China used many an occasion. By December 1963, China also actively contributed, in a summit-level diplomacy, in making efforts for the holding of this Conference. Two reasons which seem to have prompted the Chinese to do so were China's sense of satisfaction flowing from Indonesia's action in keeping the Taiwanese athletes
out of the Fourth Asian Games and from her near neutrality, tilting towards Peking, on the Sino-Indian border dispute. Another important factor which induced China to do so was its awareness of the efforts being made by certain countries, including India, towards the holding of a second Conference of Non-Aligned countries. China feared that the successful convening of this Conference would put the prospects of the Second Afro-Asian Conference in cold storage.

However, along with Indonesia, China was embarrassed to find that India and some other non-aligned countries succeeded in holding a preparatory meeting of the second Non-Aligned Conference before they had been able to hold one in respect of the second Afro-Asian Conference. They were highly upset to note that ten out of the thirteen Afro-Asian countries visited by the Chinese leaders during December 1963-February 1964 had agreed to attend the second Non-Aligned Conference in October 1964 itself.

It was with this background that Preparatory Meeting of the second Afro-Asian Conference took place in Djakarta in April 1964. As expected, Chen Yi, the leader of the Chinese delegation, attempted to highlight the Indian-Indonesian differences of approach to the issues of colonialism and world peace. He, however, found himself unprepared to meet the diplomatic offensive launched by Swaran Singh's proposals, among others, to invite Malaysia and the Soviet Union to the main Afro-Asian Conference. Feeling highly embarrassed at Indian insistence on sending invitations to these two countries, China, for the first time, came out in open criticism of India on the Malaysia issue. The Chinese press utilised the opportunity to interpret India's role as pro-imperialist and against Asian-African unity.

After the Preparatory Meeting in April 1964, the second
Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo in October 1964, provided to China an occasion to strengthen ill-will between India and Indonesia. It used its press to focus the two countries' differences on the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, on colonialism and world peace. China highly commended Sukarno for his speech at the Cairo Conference and directly criticised India and its Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, for "anti-China campaign" and for collaboration with "US imperialism". The Chinese press gave wide coverage to anti-India articles and editorials as published by the Indonesian Communist and pro-Communist dailies.

In the process of growing cordiality between Indonesia and China, Sukarno's visit to Shanghai in November 1964 and Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia in November-December 1964, proved to be crucial. These visits gave indications of the two countries collaborating their efforts against the British and American interests in South-East Asia. The two countries also found opportunities, at the highest level, to assess the prospects of the second Afro-Asian Conference. Subandrio's visit to China in January 1965, following Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, led the two countries' relations to a new stage of development. Apart from marking full ideological convergence and earmarking both the British and the United States as common enemies, it led the two countries into bilateral agreements in various fields. Especially, the military aspect of the Sino-Indonesian Joint Statement, issued on the conclusion of Subandrio's visit to Peking, created anxieties in India. There were apprehensions that Indonesia and China had entered into a kind of a military agreement.

In the period of nine months before the Indonesian coup, China continued to offer active diplomatic assistance to Indonesia in canvassing for the success of the second Afro-Asian Conference.
The Chinese leaders' visits to various African and Asian countries, in this connection, however, revealed the limitations imposed upon China's efforts. They became aware that not many of these countries were either convinced of Indonesia's insistence on keeping Malaysia out of the Conference or of China's emphasis on excluding the Soviet Union from the Afro-Asian community.

After Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, an incident which China extolled as a "just, revolutionary" action, China sought to cement its ties with Indonesia still further. Another occasion to consolidate contacts at personal level was provided by the Dasa Warsa celebrations in Djakarta in April 1965. By representing China personally, as one of the four Prime Ministers, Chou En-lai demonstrated the degree of importance China attached to Indonesian feelings with regard to the Second Afro-Asian Conference. It was in clear contrast to India which, by despatching a person below the rank of the Foreign Minister, showed its lack of enthusiasm towards the celebrations.

Side by side, China took advantage of the forum provided by the fifteen Afro-Asian nations' Standing Committee of Ambassadors, to support Indonesia's case against Indian insistence on the inclusion of Malaysia in the Second Afro-Asian Conference. This was despite the fact that a substantial majority of the members of the Standing Committee favoured the Indian proposal in this regard.

China continued to offer diplomatic support to Indonesia in convening the Second Afro-Asian Conference. Chou En-lai's arrival in Cairo on 19 June 1965, ten days before the main Conference was scheduled to be held in Algiers, showed the extent of anxiety China entertained about the success of the Conference. Coincidentally, the coup in Algiers the day Chou En-lai reached Cairo and the
political uncertainties flowing from it, made the Chinese leaders all the more anxious about it. On top of it came the appeal for postponement of the Conference, issued in London on 21 June 1965 by the thirteen Asian and African countries belonging to the Commonwealth.

Foreign Ministers Chen Yi and Subandrio joined efforts to offset the adverse impact of the coup and the appeal for postponement, by immediately recognising the new Algerian regime and by reaffirming the necessity to hold the Conference as scheduled. The Chinese Prime Minister even sought to utilise President Nasser's influence in this regard. China also tried to use its influence, by physical presence, in preventing the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth, including Pakistan, from renewing their appeal for postponement on 23 June 1965. But in spite of all their efforts, both China and Indonesia failed to salvage the Conference.

Postponement of the Conference to a date in November 1965 was a serious setback to the two countries' diplomacy, although both refused to take it in that light. The Chinese and the Indonesian leaders were fully aware of the Indian role in seeking postponement of the Conference. China reiterated its support to Indonesia in arranging the Conference and described India's role as "destructive" to the Conference.

India's efforts at seeking postponement of the Conference enabled China to still further tarnish India's image among the Indonesians. China continued to play a damaging role in Indian-Indonesian relations until the coup in Indonesia in September 1965.

Besides China, Pakistan was another important external factor which, all along the period of two decades since independence, played a role damaging to Indian-Indonesian relations. For seeking Indonesia's friendship on a priority basis, Pakistan
manifested its rivalry with India as early as March 1951. Signing of Friendship Treaty between Indonesia and India on the one hand and Indonesia and Pakistan on the other provided the occasion for this. Pakistan's role assumed significance especially after the first Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade in September 1961. Prominent among the various factors which prevented Pakistan from disrupting Indian-Indonesian relations during the first phase, were its theocratic basis and its policy of alliances with the United States and other Western countries. On both these counts, Indonesian leadership found itself nearer to India than to Pakistan and, hence, caused disappointment to the latter.

A change in the United States' South Asia policy perceptible since John Fitzgerald Kennedy's election as President in early 1961 and China's attack on India's northern borders in October 1962, prompted Pakistan to give a new orientation to its foreign policy in favour of reduced dependence on its erstwhile allies and, consequently, to remove the impediments in the way of developing relations with Indonesia. It is interesting to note that a shift in Pakistan's foreign policy in favour of Communist bloc countries, and especially, towards China, coincided with its developing cordiality with Indonesia. It is also significant that Pakistan's relations with the United States continued to be cordial and strong and arms from the United States under SEATO framework continued to flow into Pakistan, without evoking any protests from China.

Like China, Pakistan exploited various occasions and issues in order to promote ill-will between India and Indonesia. The Belgrade Conference in September 1961, the so-called "Senghi affair" in September 1962 and the Sino-Indian border conflict in the following month, provided the occasions to do so. Pakistan
also gave unreserved support to Indonesia on issues like Games for the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Second Afro-Asian Conference. India's lack of interest in the first and its lack of enthusiasm for the second, came in handy for Pakistan to tarnish India's image among the Indonesians. This was besides the constant barrage of propaganda that Pakistan carried on against India's secularism and democracy and its belief in peace and good-neighbourliness.

Malaysia's participation in the Second African-Asian Conference was the one issue which proved quite embarrassing to Pakistan. At the Preparatory Meeting of Ministers in April 1964, Swaran Singh's proposals, among others, served the purpose of forcing upon Pakistan a choice between Malaysia and Indonesia. But by assuming a posture of silence as well as of neutrality, Pakistan, for the time being succeeded in maintaining its cordial relations with both and thus foiled Indian efforts to disturb its growing relations with Indonesia. Besides, by giving support to the Indonesian delegation against the Indian proposals to shift the venue and the timing of the Second Afro-Asian Conference, Pakistan sought to increase its influence with the Indonesian leadership.

In exchange for its support to Indonesia on issues of major importance to it, Pakistan sought a shift in its favour in Indonesia's attitude on the Kashmir issue. It was only in April 1964, however, when Indonesia did it to the entire satisfaction of Pakistan. Pakistan thus became the major beneficiary of the anti-India feeling among the Indonesians arising from the Indian proposals at the Preparatory Meeting. A pro-Pakistan shift in Indonesia's attitude
on the Kashmir issue, interestingly enough, coincided with a similar shift in China's posture. It was only in February 1964 that China had come out openly in support of Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. This indicated a re-alignment of forces in Asia, with both China and Indonesia joining Pakistan in an anti-India combination.

Indonesia's pro-Pakistan attitude, however, prompted Pakistan to satisfy, as far as possible, the economic needs of the former. Pakistan's offer of easy credits during 1964-65, which increased about ten times the total trade between the two countries, showed Pakistan's readiness to help Indonesia economically during these years. Realising the importance of bilateral co-operation in the fields of culture, trade and economy, Pakistan also sought to build more or less permanent bridges of friendship and, by August 1965, succeeded in evolving an organisation called Indonesia-Pakistan Economic and Cultural Co-operation Organization (IPECC) with Indonesia. Thus Pakistan succeeded where India had failed. It was a tribute to the dynamic character of Pakistan's diplomacy in Indonesia.

In the beginning of 1965, strong anti-India tone of the Indonesian press showed the degree of success both Pakistan and China had achieved in their objective of damaging Indian-Indonesian relations. In its anti-India tirade, the press in Indonesia gave clear indications of following the propaganda line as emanating from Rawalpindi and Peking.

Pakistan's attitude of criticising India as pro-imperialist was, at best, opportunist. Despite the fact that Pakistan came to be seen in Indonesia as a country belonging to the "NEFOS", Pakistan continued to be a member of the SEATO. Indonesian leadership, however, tended to ignore this contradiction in Pakistan's foreign
policy, just because Pakistan had chosen, in marked contrast to India, to give to Indonesia active political support in the holding of the Second Afro-Asian Conference.

However, when the fixed dates for the Second Afro-Asian Conference came nearer, Pakistan manifested an ambiguous attitude. Although President Ayub Khan attempted to prevent the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth from issuing an appeal for postponement of the Conference in June 1965, on finding the majority of these Afro-Asians insistent on doing so, he also joined them and signed the appeal.

By virtue of the personal rapport established between the Pakistani and Indonesian leadership since Ayub Khan’s visit to Indonesia in December 1960, Pakistan managed to tie over the difficulties created by this action. This was not the case with India which had to suffer because of a communication gap between the Indian and Indonesian leadership growing since the Belgrade Conference in 1961.

By September 1965, Pakistan’s role assumed such a great importance that Indonesian leadership came out openly in support of Pakistan in its war against India. This showed the great extent to which Pakistan succeeded in driving a wedge between India and Indonesia. Indonesia, on its part, now chose to ignore moral, diplomatic and material support India gave it during its struggle for freedom against the Dutch. Its attitude demonstrated that international politics was based neither on sentiment nor on sense of gratitude. It was a hard lesson for India to learn.

Despite all Indonesian provocations, bordering on hostility, during the Indo-Pakistan conflict, however, Government of India refused to sever diplomatic relations with that country. It was
in accord with the long-term prospects of Indian-Indonesian relations. In view of the internal political developments where Sukarno was aging and ailing, and the PKI and the Army leadership were inching towards some kind of a show-down for political power, a precipitate action in the diplomatic field would have rather added unnecessary irritants in the future relations between the two countries.

The 30 September 1965 attempted coup in Indonesia came to have a cataclysmic effect on Indonesia's domestic and foreign policy postures. Various forces and factors which had led Indonesia into an alignment with China and Pakistan and worked against the interests of India, got eliminated, discredited and replaced. The first to become the target of attack from all sides was the PKI. Due to its alleged involvement in the coup, the PKI became the victim of the Army leadership and all the non-Communist and anti-Communist parties and groups in Indonesia. Within three months, the entire structure of the Party was broken with hundreds of thousands of Communists and their sympathisers killed and many of their leaders killed, captured and detained.

In due course, the close advisers of President Sukarno, including Foreign Minister Subandrio who played a significant role in Indonesia's policy of "axis" with China and alignment with Pakistan, were removed from the positions of power and taken into "protective custody". With the passage of time, Sukarno himself was manoeuvred into a position of insignificance.

In the wake of the action against the PKI, the overseas Chinese as well as China became involved, for alleged complicity in the coup. This led to the undoing of all that Sukarno had done. His concepts of NASAKOM and "NEFO" versus "OLDEFO" as
well as the foreign policy of "axis" with China and some other
small Communist and non-Communist countries in Asia now lay in a
shambles.

The Indian press took note of the developments in Indonesia
and perceived a shift in its foreign policy attitudes. Government
of India, however, kept silent. It could be attributed to the
failure of the Indian diplomacy in maintaining channels of communi-
cation with the Indonesian leadership as well as to the uncertain-
ties inherent in the fast changing political situation in Indonesia.
Fortunately for India, the new leadership with General Suharto,
Adam Malik and Sultan Hamengku Buwono at the top, expressed their
desire in May 1966 to restore normal relations with India. India,
which had viewed the pre-coup developments in Indonesia helplessly
and inexorably turning against it, saw in the new Foreign Minister
Adam Malik's press statement and speech on 4 April and 5 May 1966
respectively, indications of a healthy trend in Indonesian foreign
policy. Quite encouraging to India was a new note struck by Adam
Malik on the Kashmir dispute.

India thus expressed satisfaction over Indonesia's new
policies towards Malaysia and the United Nations. India also
grasped the opportunity to restore normalcy in her relations with
Indonesia and came out openly for it. This was despite opposition
from some Communist members of the Lok Sabha who charged the new
Indonesian leadership with mass killing of the Communists.

Changing attitudes led to exchange of delegations, at various
levels, between the two countries. Important among these were the
visits to India by Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Presidium
Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs, Sultan Hamengku Buwono,
in September 1966, and visits to Indonesia by the Indian Minister
for Foreign Trade, Manubhai Shah, in December 1966 and Minister for External Affairs, M.C. Chagla, in January 1967. These visits were in pursuance of normalising relations both in the trade and economic and political fields.

In the political field, Chagla's visit proved quite valuable. In the Joint Communiqué issued at the end of Chagla's visit, Adam Malik reiterated his hope that the "outstanding" Indo-Pakistan problems would be solved "through peaceful negotiations on the basis of the Tashkent Declaration", and thereby confirmed a shift in Indonesia's attitude of total support to Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. The Indonesian leaders were also believed to have assured the Indian Foreign Minister about the question of Indonesia's arms aid to Pakistan. Chagla was encouraged to believe that the two countries had similar attitude towards China, towards the South-East Asian region and Afro-Asia. The healthy trends noted in Indonesia during Chagla's visit in January 1967, led to a flow of delegations from one country to the other. This paved the way for resumption of ties in all fields, cultural, trade and economic and political.

India's offer of Rupees Ten Crore credit to Indonesia in April 1966 was an important gesture of goodwill in the field of trade and economic relations. This was followed by a Trade Agreement between the two countries in December 1966. An appreciable increase in the bilateral trade by the end of 1967 showed encouraging prospects for Indian-Indonesian relations in general.

It, however, suggested one thing. Development of relations between them would depend very much on their capacity to give and willingness to take from each other. It meant establishing an
institutionalised framework in which their economies could be meaningfully co-related. Viewing retrospectively, one could not fail to note that all along the period of study, both India and Indonesia had failed to achieve this objective. A sound and effective organisation ensuring bilateral co-operation in the fields of trade, economy and culture alone could be expected to prove a shock-absorber in case strains in the political field clouded the relations. In this connection, India could take a cue from the IPECC formed between Pakistan and Indonesia in August 1965, make serious efforts in building bridges of mutually gainful friendship and ensure better prospects for future relations with Indonesia.