CHAPTER VII

INDIAN-INDONESIAN RELATIONS,
SEPTEMBER 1965 - DECEMBER 1967
If September 1965 witnessed Indonesia's open hostility towards India in favour of Pakistan, it also saw an important event in the history of Indonesia since independence. On the night of 30 September, six top Indonesian army generals were kidnapped and killed. This was as a result of a coup d'etat alleged to have been master-minded and led by the PKI. It led to a chain of events, which, in due course, came to have profound impact on the pattern of internal politics as well as external relations of the country. The PKI and the governing elites with President Sukarno at the top, which had led Indonesia into a sort of anti-India combination with China and Pakistan, were eliminated, discredited or replaced. In the drastic reversal of Indonesian domestic and foreign policy postures, India found an opening for restoration of its relations with Indonesia.

1. In the wake of the coup, the six top Indonesian army generals included Lieutenant General Achmad Yani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Army. Besides the army generals, one more person killed was Captain Pierre Tendean, Adjutant to General A.H. Nasution, Minister/Co-ordinator Defence and Security. See Straits Times (Singapore), 7 October 1965.

The allegation about PKI's involvement in the coup was made by Lieutenant General Suharto, Commander of KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Command), who smashed the coup in Djakarta within 24 hours. While supervising the digging up of the dead bodies of the murdered generals, on 4 October 1965, General Suharto identified the Air Force and the members of the Communist youths and Women's Movement (Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani) as the two forces behind the crime, the former having trained the latter at Lubang Buaja (Crocodile Hole - the well in which the bodies were found buried), situated close to Halim Air Base. See Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia (Djakarta, 1968), p. 62.
Action Against the PKI

The PKI, which had played a significantly negative role in Indian-Indonesian relations and contributed substantially to strengthening anti-India sentiment among the Indonesians, particularly since the Chinese invasion of India in October-November 1962, became the target of attack from all sides. Old resentments, resulting from PKI's one-sided actions against those belonging to PNI and NU, in the densely populated areas of Central and East Java, in 1964, coupled with the "mental terror" which kept these dormant for so long, burst into the open. "KOM" (Communist) element in Sukarno's concept of "NASAKOM" was subjected to attacks from the other two elements "NAS" (Nationalists) and "A" (Agama, that is religious groups), in Central and East Java and Bali where most of the killings took place.

The Army leadership encouraged the anti-Communist parties and groups to form a united front against the Communist Party. At a meeting on 2 October 1965, held at the Headquarters of the Supreme Operational Command (KOTI), Major General Sutjipto, Head

2. In an interview with Arnold C. Brackman, Mohammad Natsir, former Prime Minister of Indonesia and leader of the banned Masjumi Party, explained that the post coup murders could be characterised as a "psychological explosion" among a repressed people who had suffered grievously from the PKI's "mental terror". See Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York, 1969), p. 118.

3. Religious groups and parties including NU, played a major role in Central and East Java and PNI did the same in Bali. In an interview in Denpasar (Bali) on 11 November 1969, Wedastara Suyasa, former Vice-Chairman of the PNI in Bali revealed to this author that his party in Bali, for various reasons, used to ignore the directives of the Central Party leadership in Djakarta and pursue its independent policies vis-a-vis the PKI. PNI, he said, was the only organised party under pressures from the PKI. The Muslim group, being only 5 per cent of the total population in Bali, never constituted a viable political force.
of KOTI's Department of Political Affairs, directly asked the representatives of various political parties and mass organizations attending the meeting, whether they would follow the Communists or the Army. There was a unanimous decision against the PKI. This resulted in the establishment on the same day of a "Co-ordinating Body for Crushing the Counter-Revolutionary 30th September Movement" under the chairmanship of H.M. Subchan, a leader of the NU.

Among the political parties, the NU was the first to speak against the PKI. In a statement on 5 October 1965, the Party called for the banning of the PKI and its affiliate youth, peasant and other mass organisations and for a ban on all their papers and publications. Three days later, on 8 October 1965, the passions roused since the findings of the dead bodies of the Army generals, found an outlet. Several thousand members of the Pemuda Ansor (youth wing of the NU Party) attacked and put to fire the PKI headquarters in Djakarta. In the following four days the offices of the PKI-affiliated Gerwani (Women's Movement), Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth) and SOBSI (Labour Wing) were burnt down, as also were ransacked the houses of Chairman Aidit and other prominent Party leaders.

On its part, the Army Command imposed a temporary freeze on the activities of mass organisations and political parties against whom there were clear indications of involvement in the 30 September


5. Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore), 7 October 1965 and Indonesian Herald, 8 October 1965.


Movement. The Army Command also captured about 2,000 members of the Pemuda Rakjat in the Capital. Under pressure from the Army leadership, on 21 October 1965, the Presidium headed by Sukarno, ordered all Government agencies and Cabinet ministries to purge their respective departments of elements involved in the coup attempt. Following this order, Radio Djakarta announced the purge of five Air Force Officers, 72 members of the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR) and several members of the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA).

Finding the Army and the Government taking decisive action against the PKI, the anti-Communist parties and groups set to settle old scores. In the few months following the coup, hundreds of thousands of Communists and their sympathisers were put to death.

8. Instructions to this effect were issued by the Supreme Operational Command to all the regional army commands. See Indonesian Herald, 16 October 1965. President Sukarno later succumbed to Army pressure in agreeing to this temporary suspension of all political organisations involved in the coup, including the PKI. For reports of ban on the PKI, see Sunday Standard (Delhi), 17 October 1965 and Hindustan Times and Times of India (Delhi), 19 October 1965.


10. Times of India (Delhi), 22 October 1965.

11. Ibid., 23 October 1965.

12. Various sources give vastly different figures of deaths, ranging from one hundred fifty thousand, which is generally considered "reasonable" to "one or two million". See Brackman, n. 2, p. 114. On 15 January 1966, President Sukarno put the figure at seventy-eight thousand. It was based on the findings of a board of enquiry instituted by the Supreme Operations Command in December 1965. The highest toll of life was reported from East Java (54,000), followed by Bali (12,500), Central Java (10,000) and North Sumatra (2,000). See Angkatan Bersenjata (Djakarta), 10-11 February 1966 and Guardian (Manchester), 17 January 1966. See also Vishal Singh, "Soekarno and the New Regime in Indonesia", India quarterly, vol. 23, no. 4, October-December 1967, p. 327.
By the time General Suharto assumed authority under the Presidential Order of 11 March 1966, the massive structure and organisation of the PKI and its allied mass fronts had been broken. By an Order issued on 12 March 1966, Suharto dissolved and banned the PKI in Indonesia. Later, he issued another order, asking all concerned to refrain from receiving and offering shelter to the members of the PKI. Suharto's orders had two implications. Firstly, his mandatory position under the Presidential Order of 11 March 1966, put an official seal on all-round repression of the PKI since the coup. Secondly, it meant to isolate the PKI from other pro-Communist political parties and groups, such as the PNI and Partindo (Indonesian Party).

Side by side the anti-Communist wave, a number of ministers in Sukarno's Cabinet, became target of serious criticism by the newly formed students' groups, such as KAMI (University Students' Action Command) and KAPPI (School Students' Action Command) and other anti-Communist fronts. The two important ministers, close assistants to Sukarno, Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh, had also advised the President not to yield to army pressure in signing the 11 March Order. In the name of the President, on 13 March 1966, Suharto

13. For the text of Suharto's Order of 12 March 1966, see Roeder, n. 4, pp. 214-15. Later, in the course of its Fourth Session, on 5 July 1966, the Provisional People's Congress (MPRS) "accepted and confirmed and raised" the Presidential Order of 12 March 1966, "to the status of a Provisional MPR Decree". Besides, it also prohibited "all Activities to disseminate or further the Ideology or Teachings of Communism/Marxism-Leninism". See Indonesia, Decisions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly), 20th of June - 5th of July 1966, Special Issue no. 005/1966 (Jakarta, Department of Information, 1966), pp. 96-97.

14. KAMI was established on 25 October 1965. KAPPI was formed immediately after Sukarno banned KAMI on 26 February 1966.

15. Roeder, n. 4, p. 42.
made an announcement about taking fifteen ministers of Sukarno's Government into "protective custody". This was the second important decision taken by him after assuming powers under the Presidential Order of 11 March 1966. Foreign Minister Subandrio's arrest was a particularly welcome development in so far as Indian-Indonesian relations were concerned. It was he who had been mainly responsible for evolving a policy of axis with China and Pakistan against India.

Replacement of Sukarno

With the PKI eliminated and with certain important ministers removed from the political scene, Sukarno faced a serious predicament. He lost his powers in three stages, with every stage creating a momentum for the next to follow. Starting from the coup when the Army began to build up anti-Communist pressures on Sukarno, the first stage culminated in the 11 March 1966 Order, according to which he agreed to relinquish his executive powers to General Suharto. The Fourth Plenary Session of the MPRS from 20 June to 5 July 1966, which took away legal competence of President Sukarno's "title of Great Leader of the Revolution", "revoked" his title of

16. The fifteen ministers included both Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh. According to a radio announcement on 16 March 1966, these arrests had been made to ensure that these ministers did not become "the victims of the target of people's anger...." See Indonesian Herald, 19 March 1966.

17. For a survey of the various stages in which President Sukarno lost his powers and position after the coup, see Vishal Singh, "Soekarno and the New Regime in Indonesia", India quarterly, vol. 23, no. 4, October-December 1967, pp. 325-37.

18. President Sukarno's 11 March 1966 Order authorised General Suharto to "take all necessary steps to guarantee security and calm and the stability of the running of the Government, while securing the personal safety of and the authority of the Great Leader of the Revolution/Mandatory of the MPRS for the sake of the Nation's integrity and that of the Republic of Indonesia, and absolutely execute all the teachings of the Great Leader of the Revolution. For full text of the Presidential Order of 11 March 1966, see Roeder, n. 4, pp. 207-8.
President for Life and declared that from now on "the issue of new Presidential Regulations is not to be justified", marked the second stage. The third stage was reached when in a Special Session from 7 March to 12 March 1967, the MPRS prohibited "President Sukarno from conducting political activities till the general elections", revoked its "mandate ... and all power of Government as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution" and appointed General Suharto "as Acting President...."

Sukarno, however, did not give up his powers without a fight. At first he endeavoured to create a mass base in order to counter the youth groups, such as KAMI, asking for action against the PKI and other elements involved in the coup. At a Cabinet meeting in Bogor (West Java) on 15 January 1966, Sukarno proposed the establishment of a Sukarno Front (Barisan Sukarno). But it failed to materialise. He lost to Suharto, who, according to Roeder, "had mastered the noble art of fighting by side-stepping".

Disappointed in this field, Sukarno tried to restore his power and position by removing General A.H. Nasution, Minister for Defence - an important anti-Communist Army leader, from his new

19. Decisions of the Fourth Plenary Session, n. 13, pp. 33, 35 and 37-39. See also The Statesman (Delhi), 7 July 1966. In the course of his 50-minute speech to the MPRS, Sukarno said that he only wanted to serve the people and the nation and to serve freedom. "This is my true desire", he said, "not to be a President or President for life or a King or an emperor. Everybody has given me medals but I do not want to be made a King."

20. Indonesia, Decisions of the Special Session of the Majelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara (The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly), 7th March - 12th March 1967, Special Issue no. 031/1968 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1968), p. 7. Although the MPRS appointed General Suharto as Acting President, there was no formal revocation of Presidentship from Sukarno. See Roeder, n. 4, p. 73.

Cabinet announced on 21 February 1966. But this led to strong protests among the anti-Communist forces, especially the University Students Action Command (KAMI). Angry mass demonstrations around the President's palace in Jakarta on 24 February, the day of the swearing-in ceremony of the new ministers, led to firing by the palace guards and consequently to the death of a University student, Arief Rachman Hakim. The next day Sukarno officially banned KAMI. This added to the resentment against Sukarno. In less than a fortnight, however, the Army leadership persuaded the President to sign the 11 March Order, which, in effect, strengthened the anti-Communist forces at the expense of Sukarno and his close advisers. Within a week of this Order, Suharto's ban on the PKI and arrest of fifteen top ministers showed that the transfer of power was real and not merely on paper. It also showed that by persistently refusing to concede to the rising demand for a country-wide ban on the PKI, Sukarno was going out of step with the anti-Communist opposition and especially the students' community.

This, in due course, led to further erosion of Sukarno's political position and authority, as became evident from the decisions of the MPRS in its Fourth Session of June-July 1966.

In the period of nine months following the fourth MPRS Session, Sukarno made several efforts to regain his authority. These were intended to create dissensions among the ranks of the forces opposed to the PKI as well as himself. He also attempted to arouse latent feelings of personal loyalty among what he described as the


24. The ban announced on 25 February 1966 was to be effective from 26 February 1966. See *The Hindu*, 26 February 1966.
"common people" and "my weapon-bearing sons". On Armed Forces Day on 5 October 1966, he made a similar attempt by addressing the soldiers as his "sons who bear arms" and by visiting the graves of the victims of the 30 September Movement and the tomb of the late Prime Minister, Sutan Sjahrir, whom he had kept in jail and released only when he was about to die. This was possibly intended to retrieve his image among certain sections of forces working against him.

Sukarno was encouraged by the consolidation of the Nationalist Party (PNI) in Central and East Java, about this time. The Party came out, in certain areas, with pledges "to defend Bung Karno against all attempts to topple the Great Leader".

Sukarno's efforts at salvaging his position, however, sharpened criticism against him. The KAMI and the KAPPI, which had replaced the former, in the wake of Sukarno's ban on 26 February 1966, grew impatient with the slow pace of action of the Army leadership against President Sukarno. This led, on 3 October 1966, to angry demonstrations and clashes between students and soldiers, resulting in the death of one and injuries to 62 boys and girls.

This spurted Suharto to quicken action against the old leadership. In fact, the Army leadership had already started taking measures against some of Sukarno's prominent ministers and leaders of the 30 September Movement. Jusuf Muda Dalam, Minister of Central Bank Affairs, and one of the fifteen ministers arrested on 18 March 1966, was the first to stand trial before a Special Military

27. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
Tribunal, on 30 August 1966. This was followed by the trials of the former Foreign Minister Subandrio, ex Air Vice-Marshall Omar Dhani, and ex Brigadier General Supardjo. As most of these standing trial ascribed their activities to the orders of President Sukarno, it further eroded Sukarno's prestige in the eyes of the people.

By the beginning of 1967, strong public pressures developed against Sukarno. All political parties, mass organisations, youth groups, students' associations and action fronts, became very critical of the President and made demands ranging from his replacement to trial before a Special Military Tribunal. Finally, under cumulative public pressure, the MPRS met in a Special Session from 7 March to 11 March 1967, and effected a constitutional transfer of executive power from Sukarno to Suharto.

This way, President Sukarno, under whose leadership Indonesia had joined an anti-India alliance with China and Pakistan, and who had offered moral, diplomatic and even material aid to Pakistan in the latter's war with India in September 1965, was ousted from his position of two decades of supreme leadership of Indonesia.

29. The parties and groups were the Muslim Workers Movement (GEBESI), the Muslim Artists and Art Workers League (LESBUMI), All Indonesia Muslim Workers Organizations Union, West Java Section (POREBISI), Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), Islamic Students Association (HMI), Action Front of Indonesian Peasants (KATI), Association of Indonesian Independence Supporters (IKI), Christian (Protestant) Party (PARKINDO), Action Front of Indonesian Women (KAWI), University Students' Action Front (KAMI), School Students' Action Front (KAPPI), Muslim Scholars' Party (NU), and its affiliate Muslim "ANSOR" Youth Movement, United Catholic Party, Confederation of Muslim Trade Unions (GASBIINDO), Action Front of Indonesian Academicians (KASI) and others. The only party which followed pro-Sukarno line was the PNI. These parties criticised Sukarno for disowning responsibility for the 30 September coup and urged the convening of a special session of the MPRS to deal with him, demanding his replacement and trial. See Antara, 16 to 23, 28 and 30 January 1967.
Side by side with a change in the domestic scene, an important external factor in Indian-Indonesian relations, China, also found itself out of favour among the new leadership. In the liquidation of the Communist Party of Indonesia, China lost one of the strongest supporters of its policies in Indonesia, South-East Asia and Afro-Asia. It would be worth recalling here that the PKI had played an important role in damaging Indonesia's relations with India and ultimately led the country to an axis with China and a few other small East, South and South-East Asian countries.

**Strains in Indonesian-Chinese Relations**

Strains in Indonesia's relations with People's China openly manifested on 16 October 1965 and culminated in the suspension of relations from the Indonesian side, on 23 October 1967 and, from China's side, on 27 October 1967. During the interregnum of two years, a drastic change in the pattern of domestic politics, with liquidation of the PKI and gradual replacement of the old with new leadership, strengthened these strains. However, major contribution in this direction came from Indonesians' actions against the PKI, the overseas Chinese community and the Chinese diplomatic missions in Indonesia, and from the pattern of China's response to these and other foreign policy issues.

First mob action against China occurred in Djakarta within two weeks of the coup. The Chinese Embassy refused to fly its flag half-mast during the period of national mourning for the murdered Indonesian army generals. This led on 16 October 1965, to mob

30. According to President Sukarno's Independence Day Address on 17 August 1965, the countries forming the axis were Indonesia, Cambodia, North Vietnam, China and North Korea. See Sukarno, Reach to the Stars: A Year of Self-Reliance (Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia on the Twentieth Anniversary of Independence, 17 August 1965) (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1965), p. 16.
demonstrations by the Indonesians, who protested and tried to storm the office of the Chinese Commercial Counsellor in the Capital. The hand-bills stuck on the walls of the office building read: "China stage-managed the September 30 movement; Drive out all Chinese immediately", "The Indonesian Communist Party is armed by China; Hang the Chinese!", "China is the wire-puller behind the Indonesian Communist Party; Sever diplomatic relations with China at once!" These slogans indicated how China and the overseas Chinese came to be bracketed with the PKI for involvement in the 30 September movement.

The Army soldiers intervened to save the situation from turning violent and, in the process, carried out mopping up operations, leading to a search of the office of the Chinese Commercial Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy. It was reported in a section of the Indonesian press, as noted by the Chinese, that during the search, the soldiers captured leaflets carrying the declaration of the 30 September movement.

The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged an official protest. Giving a warning to the Chinese, it said: "We shall have to watch for the next few months and see what the Chinese want. You must not forget that President Sukarno can be firm in his dealings with the Chinese when the time is right." According to Radio Malaysia, Second Deputy Foreign Minister, Ganis Harsono, reportedly said that the Chinese Ambassador, Yao Chung-ming was summoned to the Merdeka Palace (Presidential Palace in Djakarta)

and told that by its "lapse" the Chinese Embassy had left the impression of China's involvement in the coup.

There were three other anti-China incidents in Djakarta in October 1965. On 21 and 22 October, the living quarters of the diplomatic staff of the Chinese Embassy and the persons of Chinese textile experts, were subjected to search. On 30 October, a mob of Indonesians demonstrated and surrounded the offices of the Djakarta branch of the New China News Agency.

There was anti-China and anti-Chinese wave immediately after the 30 September 1965 coup. Angkatan Bersendjata and Berita Yudha helped to focus China's involvement in the 30 September Movement. As early as 6 October 1965, Berita Yudha suggested the possibility of China's complicity in these words:

Can it be that the counter-revolutionary adventure of the 'September 30 movement' depended only on their own material strength without material and moral support and assistance from broad strata at home and abroad?

It was an indirect reference to both Indonesian Chinese and People's China. Four days later, Angkatan Bersendjata alleged that the 30 September movement chose October 1, the National Day of the

34. Hindustan Times, 14 October 1965. See also Angkatan Bersendjata (Djakarta), 16 October 1965. It referred to the Chinese (and Cuban) Embassy's deliberate omission to fly their flag half-mast, as decided by the Government of Indonesia, and wrote: "Their behaviour has aroused doubts among the public and indirectly hurt the feelings of the Indonesian nation." See also "China's Involvement in Indonesian Coup", (editorial), Thought (New Delhi - Weekly), vol. 17, no. 43, 23 October 1965, p. 4.

35. SCMP, no. 3566, 27 October 1965, p. 35 and no. 3568, 29 October 1965, p. 27.

36. According to Hsinhua (New China) News Agency despatch of 5 November 1965, those who did it were members of the Indonesian Armed Forces. See Peking Review, vol. 8, no. 46, 12 November 1965, p. 27.

People's Republic of China, to start a national tragedy."

The Indonesians, by and large, share a common feeling of hostility towards the Chinese in Indonesia. Their predominance in economy and exclusiveness in social sphere apart, the Chinese are also alleged to have supported the Indonesian Communist Party both directly and indirectly during the Guided Democracy period. Informal talks with some Chinese businessmen in various cities in Central and East Java and Bali, confirmed this contention. They revealed to this author that in order to get their business going, they had to make large contributions to the PKI funds. Similar was the case with the Indian businessmen in Indonesia. As revealed by some of them, in the pre-coup period, they were as much squeezed by the Communist Party as were the Chinese.

This had led to a heart-burning in the non-Communist parties, especially the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI) and Muslim Scholars' Party (Nahdatul Ulama - NU), which had a feeling of being

38. Ibid.
39. Kahin, "Indonesia", in Kahin ed., Major Governments of Asia (Ithaca, 1963), p. 618. According to Kahin, overseas Chinese financial help to the PKI has been one of the reasons of its success. Kahin identifies two major sources of indirect Chinese financial aid to the PKI, apart from direct contributions, received by the PKI under various pressures. These were Peking Embassy in Djakarta and its Consulates elsewhere in Indonesia and Bank of China. For remission of funds the Chinese were obliged to utilise channels provided by the Chinese Embassy and the Bank of China. Indonesian officials, according to Kahin, are convinced that much of the Indonesian currency so secured was made available to the PKI. See also "The Would-Have-Been Dictator", (By a special correspondent), Thought, vol. 17, no. 43, 23 October 1965, p. 5. The special correspondent observed: "It is well known that the PKI obtains most of its funds from the wealthy businessmen among Indonesia's Chinese minority. These men are by no means necessarily Communists, but by contributing money to the Chinese Embassy and Consulates they have been able to obtain some protection against trouble from the PKI and its trade unions." See also John O. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: 'Crush Malaysia' and the GESTAPU", Asian Survey, vol. 6, no. 10, October 1966, p. 531.
ignored by the Chinese community. In fact, this was one of the reasons, as some Chinese shopkeepers told the author, for widespread anti-Chinese actions following the coup.

Indonesians had also been aware of the growing relations between the PKI and People's China. Following the coup, rumours started circulating in Djakarta that the Chinese had sent arms to the PKI. Radio Djakarta was reported to have announced that the Army had seized hundreds of Chinese-made light machine-guns in a raid on Bekasi, fifteen miles from Djakarta. This in a way confirmed the rumours, although Government denied it in a statement on 23 October 1965. Thus the trio, the PKI, the overseas Chinese and People's China, came to be identified as active partners in the 30 September movement.

Indonesian sentiment against the Chinese and People's China did not remain confined to Djakarta alone for long. Within the first three weeks of October 1965, all the major cities of Java witnessed, one by one, mob incidents against the Chinese community. After the arrival of RPKAD (Para Commandos) troops of Brigadier-General Sarwo Edhie in Semarang, the capital of Central Java, masses of Indonesians ran through the streets and sacked the offices of Baperki (the Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Council, consisting

40. They were sorry for the fact that with the PKI crushed, there was none else in Indonesia who could afford them protection in exchange for financial help.

41. One rumour was that Chinese arms had been smuggled into Indonesia under cover of construction materials for the CONREFO (Conference of New Emerging Forces) project. See Roeder, "Old Comrades", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 50, no. 5, 4 November 1965, p. 189.


43. Roeder, n. 41.
largely of Chinese), the Baperki-run university, and over a hundred Chinese-owned shops in the city. As the news of this incident spread, a large number of Chinese shops in Jogjakarta and Surakarta, other two cities of Central Java, also met a similar fate. In Surakarta alone, the anti-communist mobs burnt down more than 30 Chinese shops and department stores and other 200 private Chinese homes. In a mass demonstration in Jogjakarta, one of the speakers claimed that Chinese arms had been discovered in the hands of the PKI-affiliated youth front (Pemuda Rajkat), whose members had been earlier identified as having participated in the murder of army generals in the wake of 30 September movement. This fanned the anti-communist, anti-Chinese and anti-China sentiment of the demonstrators who marched to the Baperki office. Army's timely intervention, however, saved the situation from turning violent. Later, the army searched inside the Baperki office and found files containing lists of Chinese making regular contributions to PKI funds. This provided proof of overseas Chinese having close relations with the PKI, and a justification for their persecution


45. This account of mob actions against the Chinese community in Surakarta was cut off by censor from a despatch by a correspondent of the Far Eastern Economic Review. See "Travellers' Tales", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 50, no. 8, 25 November 1965, p. 385.

Some Indian shopkeepers in Surakarta told this author that, to no fault of the Indonesians, one of the Indian textile shops adjacent to the Chinese shops, was also damaged by fire aimed against the latter. They also told him that Surakarta, one of the major strongholds of the PKI, which had witnessed anti-Indian sentiment rising to a pitch, following the Indo-Pakistan conflict in September 1965, switched to anti-Communist and anti-Chinese sentiment in a few days after the coup. The state of panic among the Indians as created by the PKI thus came to an abrupt end.

46. Dommen, n. 44, p. 151.
by the anti-communist forces.

The anti-Chinese and anti-China pattern set in October 1965 got strengthened in the following months. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, every incident generated a momentum for the next to follow as the persecution of the Chinese community shaped along racist lines of Malays versus Chinese. Secondly, it served to consolidate the new leaders' political position against the old leadership of President Sukarno. Thirdly, it was bound to create tensions in Sino-Indonesian relations and consequently lead to restoration of confidence among the Western countries and the United States, the major sources of capital aid for development, which Sukarno's policies had alienated. Fourthly, People's China responded, as expected, unfavourably, with its criticism of new Indonesian army and other leadership, which became more and more offensive and even abusive. This naturally embittered Indonesians' feelings against China.

China's Responses

Surprisingly, however, China's response to Indonesian developments following the coup, came after eighteen days of silence. On 19 October 1965, the New China News Agency (NCNA-Peking) published a detailed account of events in Indonesia. It started with an admission that "sudden and drastic political changes have taken place in Indonesia since the night of September 30". Apart from giving facts about the 30 September Movement and quoting excerpts from various Indonesian leaders' announcements and press comments and editorials, it also surveyed how the PKI and its affiliated organisations, had become the focus of attack from the

\[\text{source}\]

46. *The Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 43, 22 October 1965, p. 7. The caption of the NCNA description read: "Sudden, Drastic Changes in Indonesian Political Situation".
Army and Muslim groups. It used the term "hooligans" for anti-PKI, anti-Chinese and anti-China forces, and came out clearly in favour of those who became the victims of these forces. It also charged "the army authorities" with having "worked up a great agitation over the execution ... of Yani, and some other army generals", through papers and radio under their control. Citing from news items and commentaries in various Indonesian army papers, especially Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersendjata, the NCNA alleged that the Indonesian army was stirring up anti-Chinese sentiment, creating anti-Chinese incidents and implicating China in the 30 September movement.

In the following months, as incidents involving the Chinese and China multiplied, China grew more and more anxious about the anti-China stance in Indonesia. Its only hope, as that of the PKI, was Sukarno's reassertion of full political authority. This explains why when China criticised the army leadership, it not only spared Sukarno but also gave wide coverage in its press and other news media to Sukarno's pro-Nasakom, pro-Chinese and pro-China statements, following the coup. But as the new leadership succeeded in

47. Ibid., p. 9. In substantiation of its charge, it referred to Angkatan Bersendjata of 4 October 1965, having written in connection with the PKI: "These disgusting devils who always talk about urban and rural devils are real devils themselves." The NCNA quoted Angkatan Bersendjata of 8 and 9 October 1965 to have written: "Get the gallows ready" and "Crush Aidit's Indonesian Communist Party". It also referred to various Muslim parties, especially the NU's statements broadcast over the radio on 5 October 1965, calling for the "speediest dissolution" of the PKI.

48. Ibid., p. 10.

establishing itself by March 1966 and Sukarno suffered further erosion in political authority and influence, as a result of decisions of the fourth session of the MPRS in July 1966, China's criticism against the new Indonesian leadership grew still more bitter.

China sent to Indonesia two protest notes in October 1965, five in November and three in December 1965. These made allegations against the armed forces for inspiring and instigating the mob attacks against the Chinese community and the Chinese Consular and diplomatic missions in Indonesia. Besides, these invariably demanded, first "apology", and later, "public apology" from the Government of Indonesia for these activities. The tone of Chinese protests rose sharply as anti-Chinese and anti-China wave in Indonesia spread far and wide. According to China, in seven months after the coup, the Indonesian press and radio featured more than 2,000 anti-China articles. Besides, on twenty occasions, Chinese missions in Indonesia were raided and more than 40 Chinese diplomatic officials, staff members and newsmen were beaten up and injured. Besides, there were widespread riots against the Chinese nationals in Indonesia. It was thus quite natural for China to criticise Indonesian leaders in still sharper tones.

The inevitable result for China was to fall more and more into disrepute in Indonesia. Indonesia's China image in the period after the coup underwent a serious modification. From an axis partner in August-September 1965, China came to be looked upon

50. Half the number of these protest notes, that is, five, were in reference to the persecution of Chinese in Indonesia, and the other half concerned with the attacks on Chinese Consular and diplomatic missions.

as a threat to political stability and economic development of Indonesia and other states in South-East Asia.

Within less than two months of replacing Subandrio as Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, in a major policy speech in the Indonesian Parliament (DFR-GR) on 5 May 1966, blamed China for having launched, since the coup, "irresponsible" and "humiliating" attacks, "causing reactions within the Indonesian society". He attributed a number of mob actions against Chinese missions in Indonesia to this reaction, produced by China, for having shown a lack of understanding of the post-coup developments. He also charged China with interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs by giving "asylum and facilities to Indonesian counter-revolutionary and subversive elements taking refuge in Peking..." and for using "these traitors for their anti-Indonesian campaign...." Stressing that in spite of all these Chinese provocations, "the Government in principle would like to maintain normal and good relations with the RRT (People's China)", Adam Malik reminded China of Article 4 of the "Bandung Dasasila" (Ten Principles), calling for "abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country".

52. Indonesia, Indonesia's Foreign Policy as Based on the Pantja Sila Principles, Special Issue 003/1966 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1966), p. 11. Adam Malik became Foreign Minister on 18 March 1966, the day Subandrio and fourteen other erstwhile ministers were taken into custody.

53. The new Indonesian Foreign Minister, in this connection, referred to Djawoto, former Indonesian Ambassador to China, having condemned Indonesia in various conferences such as the one held under the aegis of the Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association in Peking.

After having defected to China on 16 April 1966, Djawoto had been made the Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association, which shifted its offices from Djakarta to Peking after the 30 September 1965 coup. In his general report presented at the meeting of the Association, in Peking, between 20 and 24 April 1966, Djawoto had severely condemned the Indonesian army leadership. See Peking Review, vol. 9, no. 18, 29 April 1966, pp. 15-18.
A year after the coup, in the first week of October 1966, Husein Kartasasmita, Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee and House Secretary in the Indonesian Parliament, said: "We do not want to become the second Pearl Harbour". Suggesting the despatch of a strong protest note to China for its continued interference in Indonesia's internal affairs, he added:

If People's China did not want to prove itself as a peace-loving country, nations in South-East Asia should think of a way to deal with it especially if China posed a danger to any of the nations in the region. 54

Indonesians' apprehensions about China's intentions were confirmed by revelations of its involvement in the 30 September coup, during the trials of the former Foreign Minister, Subandrio, and former Minister/Chief of Staff of Indonesian Air Force (AURI), Vice Marshal Omar Dhani. Appearing as a witness in Subandrio's trial, former Air Rear Marshal Sri Muljono Herlambang, revealed that in January 1965, Chou En-lai had offered to Indonesia, free of charge, 100,000 pieces of small arms. Another witness, Suwito Kusumowidagdo, First Assistant to Vice-Premier/Foreign Minister, testified, in the course of the trial, that Subandrio had not only agreed to accept a gift of 100,000 small arms from China for use by a "workers and peasants militia", but also concurred in importing them without the knowledge of the regular armed forces. He also

55. "Special Military Tribunal Trial of Coup Leader, Ex-Foreign Minister Dr. Soebandrio; 1st October - 22nd October 1966", Facts and Figures, no. 11/FF/FenLugri/Vol.IV/69 (Djakarta, Department of Information, Indonesia, 1969), p. 35. Chou En-lai made this offer to Subandrio during the latter's visit to China in January 1965. Sri Muljono Herlambang was a member of the Indonesian delegation then.

56. Ibid., p. 46. In the course of his testimony, he referred to Foreign Minister Subandrio's talk with former Information Minister Achmadi, in which the former said "that the question of small arms (China promised to supply Indonesia) should rather not pass (to General Nasution, then Co-ordinator Minister for National Defence and Security), but let them be stored in our own warehouse."
disclosed Chou En-lai's suggestion to Subandrio, regarding the formation of the fifth branch of the Indonesian Armed Forces, in line with the PKI's demand for it.

Standing trial before the Special Military Tribunal, Omar Dhani, the former Minister/Air Vice-Marshak of the Indonesian Air Force (AURI), revealed that in his talks with Chou En-lai, in the middle of September 1965, the latter confirmed the promise to supply Indonesia with 100,000 pieces of light arms.

Besides the anti-PKI, anti-Chinese and anti-China wave, China's reactions to new Indonesian foreign policy postures on various issues contributed to developing strains in its relations with Indonesia. The first such issue that provoked China was Indonesia's successful bid to end confrontation against Malaysia.

China was critical of Indonesia's approaches to end its early policy of confrontation against Malaysia. In its note to the Indonesian Government on 9 June 1966, the Chinese Foreign Ministry referred to the changes that had occurred in the Indonesian foreign policy since the coup and observed: "You have launched a massive...

57. Ibid. He quoted Chou En-lai as having said: "President Sukarno is the Supreme Commander of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Police. In the framework of the confrontation against Malaysia, Indonesia has succeeded in mobilising 21 million volunteers. How good it would be if Indonesia has a fifth branch of its armed forces."

58. "Special Military Tribunal Trial of Coup Leader Ex-Air Force Chief Ex-Vice Marshal, Omar Dhani, 5th December - 24 December 1966", in ibid., p. 18. This was confirmed by Commodore Agustinus Andoko, ex-Deputy Air Force Minister for Logistics, who had accompanied Omar Dhani in his 'secret mission' to China on 16 September 1965. Appearing as a witness, he said that one of the purposes of the visit was to secure delivery of the promised 100,000 pieces of fire-arms. He disclosed that China could (was ready to) send only 25,000 pieces if Indonesia could take care of the shipment. The 400-tons of goods were to be sent by sea. Witness, however, expressed his ignorance about whether the deal for weapons was reported to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff. See ibid., p. 33.
campaign against China and Chinese nationals. You have stopped confrontation against 'Malaysia'. You regard the vicious enemies of the Indonesian people as your friends, and their close comrades-in-arms in opposing imperialism and colonialism as your enemies."

"Renmin Ribao" termed the Indonesian-Malaysian agreement of 11 August 1966, as "a big betrayal ... of the Indonesian people's interests", "a big treachery to the Afro-Asian people's cause of unity against imperialism" and "another glaring exposure of the reactionary features of the Indonesian Right-wing generals' clique which has hired itself out to US imperialism." Describing the new regime's repeated professions of pursuing "an independent and active foreign policy" as "sheer humbug", it charged that it "has become a new lackey of imperialism for the suppression of the national liberation movement in South-east Asia." 

Indonesia's re-entry into the United Nations on 20 September 1966, was another event which caused irritation in Peking. Sharply reacting to the new Indonesian Government's decision to this effect, the NCNA described it as "another move by the Indonesian right-wing military regime to curry favour with US imperialism." Besides, it also saw in it an Indonesian attempt to follow policies which would ally it with the Soviet Union and in opposition to China.

When later, in its endeavour to restore normal relations with India, the new Indonesian Government sent its Foreign Minister Adam Malik to India in September 1966, Peking perceived in it "an anti-

59. Current Background (Hongkong), no. 841, 17 November 1967, p. 27.
China stepped up collusion between the two countries. Criticising both India and Indonesia for their similarity of approach to various issues like Vietnam, Kashmir and Malaysia, and towards the United Nations, *Peking Review*, under its "Round The World Survey" column, concluded: "The identity of views on many subjects ... between the Indonesian Rightists and the Indian reactionaries merely shows that they are birds of a feather." China repeated a similar charge of anti-China collusion between India and Indonesia when the Indian Minister of External Affairs, M.C. Chagla, reciprocated Adam Malik's September 1966 visit in January 1967. Belittling India's economic capability, the *NCNA* (Peking) wrote on 19 January 1967 that "although the Indian economy was in a mess, Mr. Chagla had boasted without shame that India could use her skill to help countries in Southeast Asia."

65

ASEAN, which Acting President Suharto's Government had been instrumental in evolving as a stabilising factor in the region, became still another point for Peking's resentment. *Peking Review* termed the ASEAN as a "Puny Counter-Revolutionary Alliance" of "the

65. ASEAN which stands for Association of South-East Asian Nations, was established in August 1967 and comprised of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Even the idea of forming a new regional group could be traced to Adam Malik. It was believed that regional co-operation was on the agenda of the talks held between the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Malaysia in Bangkok in May 1966. Indication to this effect was given by Adam Malik himself. He revealed in an announcement after the Bangkok Accord that he had proposed the formation of a new regional group and that the three *ASA* (Association of South-East Asia) members, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, had already decided to join. See *New York Times*, 3 June 1966.
handful of US imperialism's running dogs in Southeast Asia". It added: "This set up is an out-and-out counter-revolutionary alliance rigged up to oppose China, Communism and the people...."

China's adverse reactions on Indonesia's new foreign policy initiatives combined with its serious criticism of the new Indonesian leadership for encouraging anti-PKI, anti-Chinese and anti-China mob actions, ultimately led the two countries' relations to the brink of a collapse. It is estimated that between October 1965 and December 1967, China, through its diplomatic, press and other information media, issued 110 official protests and commentary-length (over 300 words) statements against anti-overseas Chinese actions, 72 against anti-China actions, 54 carrying adverse comments on Indonesia's new foreign policy postures, 29 against anti-PKI actions and 30 on the necessity for a new Indonesian Communist party. If Indonesians' mob actions prompted China to make these massive number of protests, serious anti-Indonesian strictures contained in these incensed Indonesians' feelings towards the Communists, the Chinese and China still further.

Process of rupture in diplomatic relations between the two countries, however, started in January 1967. In a Note on 24 January 1967, the Indonesian Government charged Shin Hsin Jen, the Deputy Naval Attache of the Chinese Embassy, with unfriendly attitude towards the government and people of Indonesia and asked

66. *Peking Review*, vol. 10, no. 34, 18 August 1967, pp. 39-40. The comment was made in the Round The World Survey column of this journal.

him to leave the country within four days. As an instant retaliation, the Chinese Government, on the following day, charged the Indonesian Assistant Military Attache in Peking, Lieutenant Colonel R.M. Jonohatmodjo, with carrying out "improper activities detrimental to the friendly relations between the Chinese and Indonesian people", declared him persona non grata and asked him to leave China within five days.

In the following three months there were reports of widespread mob actions against the Chinese in Java and Sumatra. A Chinese protest note on 12 April 1967, against the anti-Chinese repressions, led to a still hard feeling against them. On 15 April 1967, an Indonesian mob, chanting anti-Chinese slogans, smashed the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta. Later, there were riots in the capital in which the Chinese shops were looted and, at least, three Chinese were reported stabbed or beaten to death. On 24 April 1967, the Indonesian Government declared the Chinese Charge d'Affaires, Yao Teng Shan, and Consul General, Hsu Jen, persona non grata, alleging that they had organised the anti-Government demonstrations staged by the Chinese community.

Once again, People's China took prompt retaliatory action, and on the same day, declared the Indonesian Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Baron Sutadisastra, and Counsellor Soemarno Sorrohardono, in Peking, as persona non grata and ordered them to leave for home within 24 hours. Its criticism of the new


70. Hindustan Times, 16 April 1967.


72. SCMP, no. 3927, 27 April 1967, p. 37. See also Hindustan Times, 21 April 1967. At Canton, en route to Djakarta, the two Indonesian diplomats were punched, kicked and spat by the Chinese mobs.
Indonesian leadership became still more violently worded. This is obvious from a Chinese Embassy Note of 18 May 1967, in which it described the new Indonesian Government as "the fascist through and through and racists in the true sense of the word". It also termed its anti-Chinese activities as "brutal racist atrocities...". In a speech at a press conference in Peking on 13 May 1967, the former Chinese Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Yao Teng Shan, said that hundreds of thousands of Indonesians had been slaughtered as part of the Government's policy against the PKI. This policy, he added, was "inseparable" from that of "opposition to China and persecution of overseas Chinese...."

Besides, an editorial in the Red Flag (the Communist Party of China theoretical journal) came out strongly and "unflinchingly" on the side of the Indonesian Communist Party and with firm assurances of support to "the struggle waged by the Indonesian Communists in leading the Indonesian people to overthrow the Suharto-Nasution fascist regime and establish a completely independent and democratic new Indonesia".

The Indonesians expectedly took a serious view of such statements emanating from Peking. Their sharp reaction was typified by these words: "We cannot disregard this latest Chinese remark because it clearly indicates the Chinese real intentions towards us. We have to take it seriously." Already in mid-June 1967, the

---

73. SCMP, no. 3945, 24 May 1967, p. 38.
74. Yao Teng Shan was expelled by the Indonesian Government on 24 April 1967, on charge of organising the Chinese demonstrations.
76. The Hindu (Madras), 9 July 1967.
77. Ibid.
Indonesian Parliament had urged the Government to take "firm and positive steps" concerning relations with People's China, including, if necessary, severance of diplomatic relations. Foreign Minister Adam Malik had then replied that "the government would try hard to meet the wish of the people" but that it needed time.

In the meantime, pressures on Government to sever relations with China continued to mount. On 5 August 1967, the furious Indonesian mobs once again demonstrated at and attacked the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta. There followed a scuffle in which three reported Indonesian youths and one security soldier were killed. This resulted from alleged firing resorted to by the Chinese from inside the walls of the Embassy.

The immediate provocation for this incident grew from Chinese actions and restrictions against the diplomatic staff of the Indonesian Embassy in Peking. As a reprisal, the Chinese Embassy had, since the beginning of August been virtually surrounded. The Government had banned the movement of the Chinese diplomatic staff outside the Embassy. Although it seemed that relations between Indonesia and China had reached almost a breaking point, the

79. Ibid., 7 August 1967. In a statement to the reporters at Bangsaen (Thailand) on 6 August 1967, Foreign Minister Adam Malik said: "The trouble in Jakarta can be traced to the order of the Jakarta District Governor to scale down the walls of all the buildings in Jakarta." The Chinese red-painted Embassy in Djakarta had high walls. Governor of Greater Djakarta area, Major General Ali Sadikin had in a regulation fixed the height at 4 feet 10 inches. The Chinese had refused to agree to this regulation. See Times of India (Delhi) and Djakarta Times, 8 August 1967.
80. A statement by the Indonesian Foreign Office, published later, said: "After thorough investigations conducted since the shooting incident at the Chinese Embassy last August in which three Indonesian youths and one security soldier were wounded, evidence shows that the mainland Chinese Embassy was the source of the incident." See Hindustan Times and Djakarta Times, 15 September 1967.
Indonesian Foreign Minister stressed, in a statement in Bangkok, that despite Chinese provocations Indonesia will not take initiative in severing diplomatic relations with China.

Nevertheless, the killing of four Indonesian youths through the Chinese firing from within the Embassy on 5 August 1967, could not be easily ignored. On 14 September 1967, the Government charged China's interim Charge d'Affaires, Lu Tzu-po, and the Second Secretary, Siu Sang, with the responsibility of firing on the Indonesian youth, declared them persona non grata and ordered them to leave Indonesia by 18 September 1967.

The next day, that is, on 15 September 1967, Foreign Minister Adam Malik announced that he had ordered the recall of the entire Indonesian Embassy staff in Peking, as for lack of protection from the Chinese authorities, it could no longer carry out its functions. But, he clarified, it did not mean his Government's intention to break off relations with China.

By the middle of September 1967, China suffered further distortions in its image among the Indonesians. Angkatan Bersendjata was quoted to have condemned China for having exposed itself as a dangerous threat to its neighbours. The Army newspaper was cited to have referred to India-China clashes on Sikkim borders and written thus:

"Peking is carrying out theft tactics by shouting 'thief' while it does all the stealing. What is happening with India now may happen with

81. Times of India (Bombay), 7 August 1967.
82. Djakarta Times and Hindustan Times, 15 September 1967.
83. Djakarta Times and Straits Times, 16 September 1967.
other countries in future because Marxism and Maoism are nothing but imperialism in disguise. 84

In his speech in the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1967, Adam Malik denounced China for "subversive and provocative acts directed against Indonesia's national integrity and people...." 85

It was clear, the new Indonesian elite had come to share with India, its image of China, which, following the Chinese attack on India's northern borders in October 1962, the old Indonesian elite led by Sukarno and Subandrio, had refused to do. October 1967 saw virtual suspension of relations between Indonesia and China. It started with still another mob attack on the Chinese Embassy on 1 October 1967. It was counted to be "43rd armed raid on the Chinese diplomatic missions in Indonesia..." This day, marking the anniversary of the launching of the coup, hundreds of Indonesian demonstrators were reported by the Chinese to have ransacked the Embassy building and burnt, among other things, portraits of Mao Tse-tung. According to a Chinese Foreign Ministry protest note of 5 October 1967, twenty members of the Chinese Embassy were wounded. The Chinese Charge d'Affaires ad interim also sustained wounds from gunfire.

84. Hindustan Times, 15 September 1967. Angkatan Bersendjata, in its issue of 14 September 1967, considered China's accusation that India was aggressor as "ridiculous". It respected India's view that India loved peace, but the respectable one. It concluded saying that Marxism and Maoism are but "imperialism-in-disguise. See Djakarta Times, 15 September 1967.


87. SCMP, no. 4038, 10 October 1967, pp. 31-32. According to Indonesian sources, twenty of the Chinese diplomatic personnel suffered minor injuries, were provided with medical facilities and none of them died. See Djakarta Times, 3 October 1967.
In the tense situation that this incident generated, Indonesia's relations with China came to be at the "lowest point". A week later, on 9 October 1967, the Indonesian Government, in a communiqué issued after an emergency cabinet meeting, decided about severance of diplomatic relations. Explaining to the reporters, on 10 October 1967, Adam Malik attributed suspension of relations with China to the "increase of Chinese subversion in this country". Later, in its note of 23 October, Government of Indonesia announced the closing of its Embassy in China and the withdrawal of all the Embassy personnel; it also demanded the closure of Chinese Embassy in Indonesia, the Chinese Consulates in Djakarta, Medan, Bandjarmasin and Makassar and withdrawal of all the personnel of the Embassy and consulates before 30 October.

China took reciprocal action after four days. On 27 October 1967, Government of China announced the closure of her diplomatic mission in Indonesia. In a lengthy statement it observed inter alia, that "these ugly clowns like Suharto and Nasution have revealed even more thoroughly their true feathers as traitors and will surely end up in dropping on their own feet the rock they have lifted." And thus the Djakarta-Peking Axis, which

88. Straits Times, 3 October 1967.
89. Daily Telegraph (London), 10 October 1967. During a meeting with the pressmen on 10 October 1967, however, Adam Malik stated that the Foreign Department statement of 9 October 1967, concerning efforts to seek withdrawal of the Indonesian Embassy staff in Peking, did not mean a severance of diplomatic relations with China. Nevertheless, he said that if this request were not granted by China, it would practically mean freezing of relations between the two countries. See Djakarta Times, 11 October 1967.
90. Times of India (Delhi), 11 October 1967.
92. Current Background, no. 841, 17 November 1967, p. 64 and Times of India (Delhi), 29 October 1967.
the PKI, President Sukarno and Subandrio had built up so assiduously until September 1965, came to be broken.

**Indian Assessment of Post-Coup Developments in Indonesia**

The Indian press took cognizance of the developments taking place in Indonesia. Within four days of the coup, *The Hindu* observed, in an editorial, that "the collapse of the coup" meant "a defeat for the pro-Communists in Indonesia." It also suggested the possibility that it might mark an end to the tendency of moving closer to Peking and a beginning of "re-assertion of purely nationalistic elements in Indonesia..." When, within a few days, anti-Communist wave turned anti-China as well, *Times of India* predicted "a turning point in the hitherto friendly relations between China and Indonesia", and came out with a suggestion that "the latest developments in Indonesia will have an adverse effect on China's foreign policy". It observed editorially that "it seems reasonably clear that the concept of NEFO or the 'new emerging forces' and Sino-Indonesian relations have been major casualties of the Army's successful seizure of power." In the gradual emergence of a new leadership in Indonesia, it saw an opening for India and prophesied that realism of the new Indonesian leaders would "enable New Delhi to reconsider its relations with Indonesia and seek its co-operation in the cause of stability in this part of the world". An editorial in *The Hindu*, later, concluded with the remarks that "the old Peking-Jakarta axis has been badly damaged and is not likely to be rebuilt in the near future".

95. Ibid.
Notwithstanding these speculations in the Indian press, Government of India maintained silence over the developments in Indonesia. This cautious approach in New Delhi was quite understandable. In the first six months, until March 1966, the new Indonesian leadership remained pre-occupied with its activities against the PKI and its sympathisers, in and out of press, parliament, educational institutions and administration. A part of its attention, it devoted to neutralising the influence of the close advisers of President Sukarno. In an uncertain situation, such as this, involving a serious conflict between the new leadership and the old leadership and the forces backing them up, it would have been premature to make an official comment on it. Government of India wanted to watch the situation for some time until it crystallised this way or that way.

India was, of course, well aware of the internal and external factors which had colluded in damaging its relations with Indonesia. As early as September 1962, Prime Minister Nehru had suspected Chinese involvement in the anti-Indian mob activities in Djakarta during the Fourth Asian Games. It was the National Front of all the political parties, including the PKI, NU and PNI, which had held demonstrations against India and sacked the Indian Embassy in Djakarta.

India also knew well that besides the PKI, all the Islamic parties and groups had been privy to an open and active pro-Pakistani shift in Indonesia's foreign policy during 1961-65. There were reasons to believe that Pakistan's anti-India propaganda had

97. See Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, p. 182.

98. Ibid., p. 180.
found a high degree of receptivity among the leadership of the banned Masjumi party as well as the NU which was the religious adjunct of Sukarno's Nasakom arrangement. By April 1964, Indonesia's openly hostile attitude towards India on the Kashmir dispute had demonstrated the degree of influence Pakistan had succeeded in mustering at various levels of the Indonesian leadership. It was Pakistan's decisive gain at the expense of India, which had lost because of its failure to consolidate personal rapport with the Indonesian leaders.

Now the Islamic parties and youth fronts had, after the coup, actively joined with the Army leadership in settling the old scores with the PKI. In such a political situation, silence on the part of Government of India was all the more necessary to avoid any future complications.

Fortunately for India, the 'triumvirate' that emerged as a result of the President's Order of 18 March 1966, included Adam Malik, a top Murba Party leader, reputed for his secular and nationalist attitudes. The other two were General Suharto, who smashed the coup in Djakarta and Sri Sultan Hamengku Bwono IX of Jogjakarta, an anti-Communist and a famous freedom fighter. As expected, the new leadership soon came out with a new foreign policy stance. In a press statement on 4 April 1966, Adam Malik as new Foreign Minister, observed: "In the conduct of its foreign policy this Government will seek the broadest possible international co-operation, politically, economically, socially as well as

99. With the removal and arrest of fifteen erstwhile ministers on 18 March 1966, a new Cabinet Presidium came into being. This included, among others, Adam Malik, Suharto and Hamengku Bwono. Adam Malik was made Minister Co-ordinator for Foreign Affairs/Foreign Economic Relations. See Indonesian Herald, 19 March 1966.
culturallY..." He stated that the new Government would "endeavour to strengthen its relations with any country, when such relations are beneficial and fruitful to our national interest and to the welfare of the people." Clarifying his point still further, Adam Malik remarked: "Indonesia's foreign policy will be aimed at the extension of economic and financial co-operation between Indonesia and the outside world, both East and West, as long as such co-operation does not harm Indonesia's national interests." It implied that inhibitions imposed upon Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy by Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS" were making way to a pragmatic policy of co-operation with all, without any regard to ideology. Besides, Adam Malik's hint at a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia issue and at the possibility of Indonesia rejoining the United Nations from which she had withdrawn in January 1965, gave clear indications of a change-over from an isolationist policy of 'axis' to one of good-neighbourliness and international co-operation.

India, which had helplessly viewed its relations damaged by various forces during the Sukarno era, found in it an indication of a possible normalcy in its relations with Indonesia. The encouraging trends that emerged in April 1964 were confirmed a month later. While addressing the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR) on 5 May 1966, Adam Malik expressed his Government's intention "to pursue a realistic Asian-African policy" and put special emphasis on reconsidering relation with India. "Particularly with regard to India", the Indonesian Foreign Minister said, "the Government

100. Indonesia's Foreign Policy, n. 52, pp. 4-5.
intends to smoothen relations with India and thoroughly review Indonesia's relations with that country." Commenting on India's importance, he observed: "It may not be forgotten that India belongs to one of the important countries in international politics, especially on Asian-African and non-bloc politics. (Sic) Indonesian-Indian relations have lately been shrouded by misunderstanding towards one another. The Government shall strive to clear the atmosphere between Indonesia and India and thus smoothening and giving substance to those relations."

On Kashmir dispute also, Adam Malik struck a new note when he expressed his Government's "hope that the Tashkent Agreement be implemented sincerely by both parties in order to help promote African-Asian solidarity". Although he expressed his Government's conviction "that the best way to solve a problem like the Kashmir dispute, is the democratic way, which gives an opportunity to the people concerned to determine their own destiny..." he left no one in doubt about Indonesia's shift from a posture of total support to Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute.

Malaysia issue and Indonesia's relations with China were two other important points Adam Malik touched upon in the course of his speech in the Indonesian Parliament. As regards Malaysia question, he expressed his Government's desire to settle it peacefully and thus contribute to the promotion of peace, stability and security and mutual co-operation in the region. Adam Malik's views as regards China's attitude towards Indonesia have been surveyed

101. Ibid., p. 13.
103. Ibid., pp. 7-10.
It was re-assuring to India to find the post-coup Indonesia discarding its policy of axis with China and reverting to its earlier policy of peaceful relations with its neighbours. There had been a general belief in India that every step nearer China had led Indonesia away from India, and that Indonesia's hostility towards India was the result largely of Chinese intrigues. It would be gratifying to India if the new Indonesian leadership refused to play the role of a "junior partner to Peking adventurists...".

**Two Countries' Eagerness to Normalise Relations**

In the following days, the new Indonesian leaders expressed their eagerness to normalise their relations with India. Speaking at a press conference in Djakarta on 9 June 1966, Adam Malik said: "Relations with India have been rigid in the past two years. We would like to improve the relations." A month and a half later, on 19 July 1966, the Indonesian Foreign Minister told newsmen in Djakarta that his Government had been trying to bring relations with India to "normal proportions". Adam Malik made this observation after attending a formal ceremony at the Foreign Ministry, marking the presentation by the Indian Ambassador, Perala Ratnam, of US $5,000

---

104. See pp. 499 of this Chapter.
105. "India and Indonesia," (editorial), Indian Express (Delhi), 22 April 1966.
107. The Statesman (Delhi), 10 June 1966. In the press conference, the Indonesian Foreign Minister said that he was looking forward to a visit to New Delhi, possibly in July 1966 and hoped to meet the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh. He also indicated that strained relations between the two states might be eased soon.
worth of textiles and medical supplies for flood victims in Central Java. He described it as a token of friendship from India.

While commenting on his proposed visit to several Asian and African countries, in the first week of August 1966, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia revealed that he would first of all go to India "to improve relations". In order to restore confidence among Afro-Asian nations and to assure that Indonesia was determined to revert to its earlier policy of non-alignment, he said: "We have to convince our former friends, including the new nations of Africa and Asia, that we are going to resume once more a strong role in international affairs on the basis of a free and active foreign policy."

This statement by Adam Malik, less than a month before his five-day visit to India, starting from 3 to 7 September 1966, was significant in that it meant to restore confidence and mutual understanding with New Delhi.

From August 1966, a number of Indonesian official and other goodwill delegations started coming to India. A three-member delegation of Indonesian journalists, led by J.S. Hadis of Berita Yudha visited India in August 1966 itself. This was followed by two official and one students delegations in September 1966. Five-day visit by Foreign Minister Adam Malik was followed by three-day visit by Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Presidium Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs. Two leaders of the University

110. News from Indonesia, 23 August 1966. The other two members of the delegation were Dharto Wahab of Duta Masjarakat (NU Party language daily) and Sjafat of Mertiwi Suat (another language daily). News from Indonesia is a news sheet brought out irregularly by the Indonesian Embassy in New Delhi.
111. Times of India (Delhi), 22 September 1966.
Students Action Command (KAMI), Yozar Anwar and David Napitupulu, visited New Delhi on around 22-23 September 1966, on way home from Nairobi, where they had gone to attend an International Students Conference. In October 1966, a five-member Indonesian Parliamentary delegation, headed by Subagio Reksodipuro, visited India.

Indonesian leaders' eagerness to resume normal relations with India, prompted the latter to grasp the opportunity, discard its cautious approach and encourage new Indonesian policy postures. The Government of India thus broke its silence and came out with full support to the Indonesian efforts to end Sukarno's policy of confrontation against Malaysia. The Indonesian-Malaysian accord in Bangkok on 31 May 1966, was a welcome news to India. It represented the new Indonesian leaders' earnest effort to re-adopt good-neighbour policy, conspicuously absent in the four years preceding the coup.

Viewing it as symbolic of their desire to contribute to peace, stability and economic progress in South-East Asia, Swaran Singh, India's External Affairs Minister, observed: "India is all for it (settlement)". He was talking to newsmen, at the Cairo Airport, en route to Paris, on 31 May 1966.

Agreement to end the policy of confrontation was a concrete evidence of the growing capability and political credibility of the new Indonesian leadership vis-a-vis President Sukarno. It was also a confirmation of their determination to pursue pragmatic foreign policy as outlined in the new Indonesian Foreign Minister

113. Ibid., 11 October 1966. Other members of the delegation were: (1) Sutakno Djiatikusumo, (2) Nja Yusda, (3) Mrs. Walandow, (4) Muhamad Burroh.
Adam Malik's statements of 4 April 1966 and 5 May 1966. Hence it prompted Government of India to encourage such policy.

About two months later, in a statement in the Rajya Sabha, on 8 August 1966, Swaran Singh expressed his great happiness over the steps being taken by Indonesia and Malaysia to end the "unfortunate confrontation which had bedevilled (their) relations". "These are our friendly countries", he said, and added that resumption of friendly relations between the two "will contribute to stability and for lowering tension and for the development of healthy relations." He reiterated these sentiments, in a statement in New Delhi on 18 August 1966, at the signing of the Indonesia-Malaysia Agreement.

Government of India had also all along been assessing the Indonesian situation as well as the new leadership's overtures towards it for normalising relations. This became obvious from the Government replies to questions relating to Indian-Indonesian relations, in the Rajya Sabha on 23 August 1966. Minister of State for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, expressed his Government's distress at the mass murders in the post-coup months in Indonesia. He rebutted a Communist member, Niren Ghosh's charge that Government of India was jubilant over a "reactionary turn as was evident from the butchery of the people" in Indonesia. But, he also refused to identify the new Indonesian leadership with "reactionary trends" and put the blame for these killings on the old regime. "Unfortunately this reactionary trend came into Indonesia a few years ago",

115. See text of Adam Malik's statements of 4 April and 5 May 1966 in Indonesia's Foreign Policy, n. 52, pp. 3-5 and 6-21.
116. Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), vol. 12, no. 8, August 1966, p. 200. This journal is published by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
117. Ibid., p. 212.
he observed.

External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, while justifying his Government's warm response to the overtures for amity made by the new Indonesian leadership, put the blame for sharp deterioration in relations in 1965 on certain "forces" belonging to old regime. He remarked that "as soon as those forces which were keeping the normal thinking and the normal reactions of the people suppressed were relaxed, the people came into their own and our relations with the people and the Government of Indonesia are now good."

His argument was in keeping with his statement in the Rajya Sabha ten days earlier. On 8 August 1966, Swaran Singh had noted with great happiness "that the present Government of Indonesia have expressed their desire to strengthen and improve relations between Indonesia and India". He had referred to the "rude shock" the two countries' relations received in the last "two or three years", leading to "sharp deterioration" and then to "climax" during the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Believing in the inherent goodwill the Indians and Indonesians have for each other, he had stated that despite "temporary set-backs" to mutual relations, the Government of India patiently continued to hope "that the day was not far off when our relations would revert to the normal equation of friendship and understanding and comradeship". He added: "There are distinct signs of that developing now and taking a concrete shape." 120

Despite persistent opposition by Communist members, Government of India came out clearly in favour of improving and


119. Ibid., col. 3540.

120. Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 12, no. 8, August 1966, p. 200.
strengthening close relations with Indonesia. In the Rajya Sabha debate (question hour) on 23 August 1966, Government view on the subject drew applause from all sections of the House except Communists, who were isolated.

Adam Malik's Visit to India

Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik's 5-day visit to New Delhi in the first week of September 1966, thus, provided a valuable opportunity to the Indian leaders to establish personal contacts with one of the top representatives of the newly emerging leadership in Indonesia and to know, at first hand, their attitudes on political and economic problems.

The Indian press gave wide coverage to Adam Malik's visit, and greeted the Indonesian leader and his delegation with favourable editorials and comments. Considering it as "of great significance" for the two countries' relations, Indian Express commented that it marked "the beginning of a new chapter in Indonesia's history". Viewing retrospectively, it observed that, in the pre-coup period, Indonesia's anti-Indian policies on Sino-Indian conflict as on Kashmir issue, under "Chinese machinations", had led Sukarno and Subandrio to offer "moral as well as material help to Pakistan".

In an editorial "Mending old ties", the Hindustan Standard expressed its jubilation over the turn the two countries' relations were expectedly taking. It expressed satisfaction over the identity of views the Indonesian and Indian Foreign Ministers had reached on various issues and observed thus: "This is as it should be. India and Indonesia are neighbours, both spatially and politically." It noted further: "Both are natural friends and there is no reason why

121. Times of India (Bombay), 24 August 1966.
they can't go back to the days of warm friendship of a few years ago." It concluded by cautioning both the States against a third party intervention in their mutual relations. "Indo-Indonesian Friendship", it said, "must be based on such solid foundations that no third country could in future damage it. The two countries must learn from experience and should not allow any other power to bedevil their amity." In this connection, the editorial described India's offer of a credit of Rupees Ten Crores to Indonesia as an expression of the former's "earnest ... desire" for friendship with the latter.

The Indian-Indonesian talks at the highest level, during Adam Malik's visit, revealed an identity of views on various issues of vital importance to each other. New Delhi was happy to find a change in Indonesia's attitude towards China. Addressing a press conference in New Delhi on 5 September 1966, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, in this connection, regretted that China had not "reciprocated" Indonesia's "good intentions". "We are going to resist any influence forced upon us from outside", he declared, while commenting on the prospects of Sino-Indonesian relations.

India was also satisfied to find a shift in Indonesia's position on the Kashmir dispute. At his press conference, Adam Malik confirmed his earlier views on Kashmir question and said: "The Kashmir question can be settled on the basis of the Tashkent declaration without interference of a third party." His views were similar to India's official position which called for

123. Hindustan Standard (Calcutta), 6 September 1966. A crore is equal to ten millions.
124. Times of India (Bombay), 6 September 1966.
125. Ibid.
bilateral solution of the Kashmir dispute in the framework of the Tashkent declaration. Hence, it marked a significant departure from the pro-Pakistani stand taken by Sukarno's regime since April 1964. In the Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of his visit, the Indonesian Foreign Minister reiterated his Government's equal friendship towards both India and Pakistan and "expressed the hope that the outstanding problems between India and Pakistan would be solved through peaceful negotiations for which the Tashkent Declaration provided a basis".

Another achievement of the Joint Communique was the two Governments' reaffirmation of "their faith in the principles of non-alignment as an instrument for the prevention of war and consolidation of peace, for alleviating international tensions and developing international co-operation". Significantly, it marked an end to Sukarno's beacon-light foreign policy, and a policy of axis based on his concept of new emerging forces and old established forces, which saw the world divided in two camps and in which non-alignment became totally irrelevant.

Besides, the Joint Communique put "special emphasis ... on the further development of relations between India and Indonesia and mutually beneficial cooperation in all fields". It expressed "their desire for taking concerted steps in furthering and strengthening their relations in the economic, technical and cultural fields". As a manifestation of it, both the countries "agreed to reactivate the existing cultural Agreement concluded in 1955 between India and Indonesia. They felt that exchanges of visits and cultural delegations would help to enlarge the scope of

127. Ibid., p. 231.
With the understanding in the political field developing between the two states, it was natural to expect them to lay a firm basis of mutual co-operation in the economic and cultural fields. It is correct that in the trade and economic field the two countries had, for various reasons, left much to be desired. It is also correct that many provisions of the Cultural Agreement signed in 1955 had remained in abeyance before and after 1961. But the fact remained that neither of the two countries had abrogated the cultural Agreement officially, although, in the four years preceding the coup, it was subjected to serious strains and had practically become as good as non-existent. The Governments' desire to "reactivate" it was, in this sense, a good augury for mutual relations and a step in the right direction. If re-activated, it would provide the framework in which the two countries could make meaningful contributions to strengthening bilateral relations in the cultural field.

Relations in the Fields of Trade and Economy

In the trade and economic field also there appeared to be much scope. Sukarno's emphasis on "Nasakom" politics and on foreign policy of "axis", had isolated Indonesia, with disastrous consequences for its economy. By abandoning Sukarno's policies at home and abroad, the new Indonesian leadership had given ample evidence of their shift in emphasis from politics to economics and their desire to use foreign policy as an instrument to serve the

128. Ibid.
long-neglected economic needs of the people.

In view of this development, the basis of future friendship between the two countries was to be their willing co-operation in the field of trade and economy. Besides, in the light of Indonesia's massive economic difficulties India's readiness to offer material incentive for growth in bilateral trade was to determine the development of friendly relations between them.

In interviews with Frank Moraes, Chief Editor of the *Indian Express*, Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Minister of Finance Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, had expressed their warm goodwill for India. At the same time, both had stressed that goodwill was a bilateral business and that much depended on how India reciprocated.

In a written reply, General Nasution had also told Frank Moraes that the two countries' relations "are expected to become normal gradually like those of the Bandung spirit period". But then he had also observed: "Indonesia wants to co-operate with all nations, particularly Asian and African countries, but, of course, it also depends on the attitude of the countries concerned." The implication was

129. Major theme of Adam Malik's press conference on 4 April 1966, was to make "foreign policy ... serve the national interest, and not the other way round...", as was the case in the pre-coup period. Stressing his Government's determination to adopt a "balanced policy" in order to meet "the most urgent needs of the people, such as food and clothing", he had declared: "The Indonesian Government is of the opinion that foreign policy should be aimed at the achievement of the welfare of the people. In this regard, Indonesia's foreign policy will be aimed at the extension of economic and financial co-operation between Indonesia and the outside world, both east and west, as long as such co-operation does not harm Indonesia's national interests." See *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, n. 52, pp. 3-5.

130. Frank Moraes, "Indonesia in Asia - III", *Indian Express*, 24 August 1966. This article, third in the series, was based on Frank Moraes' observations and impressions gathered in interviews with various top leaders of the new regime, during his visit to Indonesia in the last week of July and first week of August 1966.

131. Ibid.
clear. Any country which desired to bring normalcy in its relations with the new regime in Indonesia, would have to seek basis of friendship in the economic field. India, in this sense, could be no exception.

Various Indian national dailies also carried out a similar assessment of Indonesian attitudes towards India. There were suggestions that the two countries' future relations would primarily depend on India's offer of economic aid. Commenting on the new Indonesian leadership's successfully ending the confrontation policy and on their realising the urgencies of the domestic situation, the National Herald, in an editorial "New Trends" saw in it Indonesia's readiness to do a "political fence-mending with a number of its neighbours who had been quite unnecessarily alienated". It also linked India's offer of Rupees Ten Crores credit with Djakarta's desire to normalise relations with New Delhi, interpreting it as the latter's warm response to the former's desire.

In pursuance of the two countries' eagerness to normalise their relations in the trade and economic field, as evident in the joint communique issued at the end of Adam Malik's visit to New Delhi, the two Governments did not delay in taking the follow-up action. Only two weeks after, a high-level Indonesian delegation, led by Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, the new Presidium Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs of Indonesia, paid a three-day official visit to India from 20-22 September 1966. This was reciprocated by a 3-day visit to Indonesia of an Indian delegation

132. "Indonesia Revamps Foreign Policy" (By South-East Asia Correspondent), The Hindu, 1 July 1966. It extensively quoted Adam Malik's first foreign policy statement in his press conference in Djakarta on 4 April 1966 and analysed the change perceptible in Indonesia's foreign policy resulting from its shift of emphasis from politics to economics.

led by Minister of Foreign Trade, Manubhai Shah, from 26-28 December 1966.

This exchange of trade delegations was important in that it enabled the two Governments to understand each other's difficulties and limitations in the field of bilateral trade and economy. It also enabled the Government of India to know that it was round the pivot of economic co-operation that future relations between the two countries were to revolve. In a meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 21 September 1966, the leader of the Indonesian delegation was understood to have told the former that Indonesia was keen not only to normalise political relations but also economic ties with India.

Apart from working out the details of India's offer of a credit of Rupees Ten Crores, Sultan Hamengku Buwono's visit to India was more of an exploratory nature. Both the Indonesian and Indian delegations discussed the details of a new trade agreement and prepared a draft agreement (envisaging) the promotion of closer economic and commercial relations between the two countries and the expansion and diversification of trade between them...." The two sides also agreed to extend bilateral co-operation in the technical field. The first step in this direction was India's offer of training facilities for a few Indonesian officers through the Reserve Bank of India.

The Indian-Indonesian talks were important in that these marked "the beginning of a new chapter of fruitful economic

134. Times of India (Delhi), 22 September 1966.
136. Ibid.
cooperation between the two countries and ensure(d) that the
economic cooperation between them would be extended to other fields
in the near future". In this sense, these talks represented
"positive steps to strengthen traditional bonds of friendship and
to build up economic cooperation between the two countries for 137
mutual benefit".

About three months later, during a three-day visit to
Indonesia, from 26-28 December 1966, an Indian delegation, led by
Minister of Foreign Trade, Manubhai Shah, pursued talks on bilateral
trade and economic co-operation. This resulted in the signing of a 138
two-year trade agreement on 28 December 1966. The two countries
were resuming mutual give and take in the field of trade and economy.
The Agreement contained proposals for carrying out studies for joint
ventures, agreement to exchange "at least two businessmen's
delegation in 1967", to hold "exclusively national exhibitions" in
each other's country, and India's offer of cooperation in the
technical field. The two sides also agreed to arrange periodical
meetings of their senior officials so as "to review the working of
the Trade Agreement and the progress of the various measures for
increasing technical and economic cooperation between the two 139
countries".

The Indian Minister, Manubhai Shah, described it a historic
occasion because, he said, "we shall be able to lay a strong

137. Ibid.
138. See text of India's Trade Agreement with Indonesia, Djakarta,
28 December 1966, in India, India's Trade Agreements, As in
Force on January 1, 1968 (New Delhi, Ministry of Commerce,
1968), pp. 159-61. The Trade Agreement came into force
 provisionally with immediate effect and was to be effectively
valid for two years from the date of ratification by the two
Governments.
139. Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 12, no. 12, December 1966,
pp. 316-17.
foundation not only for political and historical friendship, but also for economic relationship between our two countries." His feelings were in accord with the two countries' expectations, as expressed in the Joint Communiqué, "that not only would normal trade relations between the two countries be restored soon but that as a result of all these steps, there would be considerable expansion of trade and economic co-operation between the two countries in the near future."

On the political plain, the process of strengthening India-Indonesian relations was continued by a visit to Indonesia by Indian Minister for External Affairs, M.C. Chagla, in January 1967. By sending its External Affairs Minister on a return visit, India desired to seek confirmation of Indonesia's changed policy attitude towards Pakistan, China and towards the region of South-East Asia. It would enable the Government of India to make a first-hand assessment of how far Indonesia had reverted to a correct posture of non-alignment and good-neighbourliness.

**M.C. Chagla's Visit to Indonesia**

During a brief stop-over at Singapore Airport, enroute to Djakarta, M.C. Chagla stated that the two countries' relations had "considerably improved". Earlier at Santa Cruz Airport in Bombay, before his departure for Indonesia, he had stated that, among other things, he would try to "activise" the existing cultural agreement which had for long been in a state of "suspended animation". About China, he had remarked: "one cannot help discussing China wherever one goes.... China is the big question mark of the future."

141. *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 12, no. 12, December 1966, p. 316.
On reaching Djakarta on 16 January 1967, M.C. Chagla found the political atmosphere quite different from the one witnessed by Swaran Singh in April 1964, and by C. Subramaniam, leader of the Indian delegation to the Bandung Anniversary Celebrations (Dasa Warsa Celebrations) in April 1965. Replying to a newsman, at the welcoming ceremony at the Djakarta Airport, India's External Affairs Minister remarked that the two countries' relations had been clouded in the past, "but the sun is breaking through now".

One of the three major issues causing anxiety to India was Indonesia's attitude towards Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. More than once the new Indonesian leaders had indicated their reversion to the posture of impartiality between the two countries. Nonetheless, India had continued to entertain fears which it now sought to remove through personal assurances. India had not yet forgotten that only about fifteen months ago Indonesia had offered arms and other material and moral support to Pakistan in its conflict with India and thus threatened India's security. Hence, it formed an important issue in the discussions which M.C. Chagla had with the Indonesian leaders.

At a press conference in Djakarta on 19 January 1967, the Indian Minister for External Affairs revealed that during his talks with the Indonesian leaders he had hinted at Pakistan's "collusion" with China in the latter's aggressive policy towards India. Spelling out implications of arms supplies to Pakistan and his Government's reaction to it, he observed:

Pakistan faces no threat from China or from Russia or from India. Therefore any military assistance or supply of arms to Pakistan by anyone would mean

---

143. Ibid. He was welcomed at the airport by Adam Malik, Indonesia's Foreign Minister.
strengthening China. India has made it clear that any supply of arms to Pakistan will be considered a hostile act against her. 144

It represented an Indian effort to convince the new Indonesian leadership that Pakistan's thesis of anticipated threat of aggression from India or from any other quarter was just a false pretext to seek more and more arms supplies against India. In effect, it strengthened China which colluded with Pakistan against India. To his satisfaction, M.C. Chagla found the Indonesian leaders quite receptive to this argument. Basing its information on PTI sources, an English daily from New Delhi, reported M.C. Chagla as having said that Indonesia won't give arms aid to Pakistan. It also referred to assurances by General Suharto, Chairman of the Presidium of Ministers and Adam Malik, Foreign Minister, to the Indian Minister for External Affairs, that any commitment for military assistance to Pakistan, as given by the previous regime, would not be honoured. Adam Malik was believed to have informed his Indian counterpart that the naval crafts and military personnel stationed since then (September 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict) in Pakistan waters or Pakistan territory, have been withdrawn. 145

This was a major achievement of M.C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia. He seemed to have been able to carry conviction with the Indonesians that both legally and constitutionally Kashmir had become a part of India since 1947. Besides, he successfully impressed upon them that Kashmir, being a Muslim majority state, was a symbol of India's secularism. Hence India could not agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir as demanded by Pakistan. 146

146. Ibid.
The second major issue was Indonesia's posture towards China. In the light of growing estrangement between Indonesia and China following the 30 September 1965 coup, and in view of the resultant fall in China image in Indonesia, India could be sure of Indonesia coming in line with its own view of China as an aggressive, expansionist state, threatening the security and integrity of its neighbours. There was a feeling in India that President Sukarno had been "mainly responsible for propelling Indonesia in the direction of China under the guise of waging a campaign against neo-colonialism". But if China's alleged complicity in the coup led it into more and more disrepute among Indonesia's new elites, Sukarno's persistent advocacy of maintaining "axis" with Peking, led, in part, to erosion in his personal and political prestige and power.

M.C. Chagla disclosed at his press conference on 19 January 1967, that the two Governments had similar views about the "danger to world peace from China and Chinese expansionism through military and subversive methods". He also indicated agreement between them on the view that "expansionism of China should be contained not through military methods but through the economic development of South-East Asia...". "We believe", he added, "the best way to


148. This is obvious from President Sukarno's address to the Organisation of "1945 Generation" as late as 6 September 1966. He described himself as Marxist, accused the United States CIA of attempting to overthrow him, felt amused at the MPRS's resolution to outlaw Communism and Marxism, and stressed that the strategy for defeating imperialism was for Communist China to strike a blow against the American troops in Vietnam from the north while Indonesia struck from the south. See New York Times, 7 September 1966. Perhaps this was the most forth-right explanation of Indonesia's regional ambitions, evident in Sukarno's policy of confrontation against Malaysia, and of the basis of Indonesian-Chinese "axis", with a suggestion of division of South-East Asia between themselves.
contain Chinese expansionism is for India and Indonesia to strengthen themselves economically. They are the two most important 149 countries in South-East Asia."

The Joint Communique issued at the end of the Indian-Indonesian talks confirmed M.C. Chagla's contention that it registered the two sides' disapproval "of foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of the South-East Asian countries".

Indonesian view of China was now getting closer to India's. In a statement on the restoration of the lawful rights of China, in the United Nations, on 28 November 1966, Indonesian Ambassador to the United Nations, Roeslan Abdulgani, had favoured China's representation on legal and not only political grounds as was the case earlier. For the first time since many years, the Indonesian delegate had made a distinction between the legal and political aspects of the question of China's representation at the United Nations. He had stated thus: "We uphold peaceful co-existence based upon mutual benefit and interest, and reject at the same time interference in the domestic affairs of others." Expressing Indonesia's new mood towards China, he had said regretfully but emphatically: "We cannot remain passive towards hostile and unfounded allegations. The more so since what was vitally at stake in the October events last year in Indonesia was the very survival of our State Ideology, the Pantja Sila, against dogmatic, intolerant and extreme left-radicalism using and misusing political opportunism


and economic adventurism."

Closely linked with the issue of China was the question of Indonesia's attitude towards South-East Asia. During the Sukarno era until the coup in September 1965, Indonesia had pursued a policy of confrontation against its neighbour Malaysia. Apart from having adverse effect on domestic politics and economy, this policy had led Indonesia into an estrangement with non-aligned India, to an "axis" with China and, finally, to withdrawal from the United Nations and the resultant isolation. Implied in Sukarno's concept of New Emerging Forces versus old Established Forces had been Indonesia's veering away from the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. Indonesia under Sukarno had, in theory, extolled the ten principles of the Bandung Conference in April 1955 which, in practice, it had tended to disregard. Thus, in actual effect, it had abandoned the good-neighbour policy in favour of "Crush Malaysia" policy and showed to the world that, instead of proving a stabilising factor in the region of South-East Asia, it had grown to be a source of political and economic instability.

By bringing to an end Sukarno's policy of confrontation against Malaysia, the new governing elites in Indonesia had shown their readiness to assume a stabilising posture in the region. India had offered its ungrudging moral support and encouragement to this policy as it arose out of a shift in Indonesia's scale of priorities from politics to economics.

In fact, M.C. Chagla was encouraged to find that Indian thesis of putting emphasis on domestic economic development through a policy of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence and international

151. GAOR, session 21, plen. mtg 1479, 28 November 1966, pp. 11-12.
co-operation, (which Jawaharlal Nehru had quite early put forward to Indonesia during his visit to that country in June 1950) was getting wide acceptance among the Indonesians. To his satisfaction, for the first time in its post-independence history, Indonesia had found leaders who showed marked preference for economic rather than political development.

M.C. Chagla's talks with the Indonesian Foreign Minister revealed that both were also agreed as to the manner of containing Chinese expansionism in South-East Asia. Both disapproved military alliances and suggested economic development through regional co-operation, as an effective method to do so. In a television interview in Djakarta on 17 January 1967, M.C. Chagla had stated that an economically viable and strong South-East Asia could meet the danger of aggression. He believed that instead of increasing the strength of a country, military alliances and pacts only tended to reduce it to the position of a satellite. Two days later, at a press conference, he observed that increasing economic strength of both India and Indonesia was "the best way to contain Chinese expansionism...". Finding the Indonesian leadership receptive to the idea of regional co-operation, M.C. Chagla was reported to have suggested the establishment of an Asian Council and Common Market, embracing the South-East Asian states, Japan and Australia. Lest it should create an adverse reaction among the Indonesian leadership,

152. Antara, 13 January 1967. Later, at a dinner, M.C. Chagla reiterated his Government's views on economic and political viability of South-East Asia in these words: "We are only anxious that the economic development of the countries in the region should be speeded up because that is the only guarantee against external threats and subversion." See Hindustan Times, 21 January 1967.


he endeavoured to reserve for India only a side role and contented himself by assuring "Indonesia of India's full support to any initiative Indonesia might take to bring about a regional grouping for promoting greater economic co-operation in South-East Asia".

The Joint Communiqué later confirmed similarity of views of the two Governments as regards the region. Both sides "agreed that security in South-East Asia was, in the first place, the responsibility of the South-East Asian nations themselves...". They disapproved "foreign intervention" in the region and "viewed with concern the use of economic and financial assistance as an instrument of political pressure on developing countries".

Besides Indonesia having agreed to give up its anti-India approach on the Kashmir dispute and shown a more or less similar attitude towards China and towards South-East Asia, the Joint Communiqué, issued on 19 January 1967, revealed that the two Foreign Ministers had found themselves agreed on all other issues of foreign policy. They "reaffirmed their faith in the policy of non-alignment as an instrument for strengthening peace and fruitful cooperation in the international community". They also agreed on the strengthening of ten Bandung principles. They shared each other's views on Vietnam question, on the Apartheid policy in South Africa, on the problem of eliminating "all forms of imperialism and colonialism", and on nuclear weapons' explosions. They "condemned subversion and the use or the threat of use of force as a means of settling bilateral or international disputes".

156. Documenta Diplomatica, n. 150, p. 52.
157. Ibid., pp. 52-53. See also The Hindu, 20 January 1967.
As regards bilateral relations, the Joint Communique expressed their hope that economic, commercial and technical cooperation between the two countries would be further developed as a result of these visits. They agreed in principle to maintain regular contacts at official level annually to review progress in the strengthening of bilateral relations. They also agreed to reactivate the Cultural Agreement between Indonesia and India ratified in 1958 and to work out detailed arrangements in this regard.

The Indian External Affairs Minister's visit to Indonesia in January 1967 was an important landmark in the two countries' relations. M.c. Chagla himself stated that "the best result of his visit was the strengthening of relations between India and Indonesia". Apart from showing promises of growing healthy relations in the field of politics, culture, trade and economy, it indicated the two nations' common resolve to contribute to the strengthening and stabilising of South-East Asia. Commonness of approach on various issues had grown to such an extent as to prompt Indonesian Foreign Minister to tell India's External Affairs Minister (who, said the former, "is very dear to us") that "you can now feel that there are no real problems between India and Indonesia." Commenting on the results of M.C. Chagla's visit, Adam Malik said, on another occasion, that the two countries' relations "have immensely improved". He added; "India and

158. Ibid., p. 52.
159. Hindustan Times, 21 January 1967. While speaking in Bombay on 23 January 1967, M.C. Chagla observed; "We have not only restored the relations as they had been before but they have become better than before." See Times of India (Bombay), 24 January 1967.
Indonesia now stand shoulder to shoulder in foreign policy matters."

The Indian press was jubilant on the achievements of M.C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia. The Hindu commented thus: "We have no doubt that the friendship between India and Indonesia, which flourished for so many years after independence, will be restored as the result of Mr. Chagla's visit." Reporting complete agreement on all matters discussed by the Indian and Indonesian Ministers, The Statesman observed that "differences that existed between India and Indonesia have disappeared and there is now perfect understanding between the two countries."

Commenting editorially, another prominent English daily expressed happiness over the turn of events in the two countries' relations. Viewing retrospectively, it attributed the Indian-Indonesian strains during the Sukarno era to "erratic policies" of Sukarno rather than to "a clash of national interests", and observed: "India and Indonesia are by far the most important countries in the Indian Ocean area and their security is interlinked. The misunderstanding between them which developed some time ago could have undermined the security of the whole region."

The Indian Express also commented on Indonesia's new posture towards China, towards axis policy and on prospects of its relations with India. It wrote: "The disillusionment with China has changed all that. China is now recognised as a menace, the Peking-Jakarta-

164. "Idential Approach", (editorial), Times of India (Delhi), 20 January 1967.
Rawalpindi axis is at an end, and everything points to the traditional amity between India and Indonesia being restored. It added: "The restoration of friendly ties between India and Indonesia will prove an important stabilising factor in the region."

**A New Phase in Indian-Indonesian Relations**

M.C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia thus marked a new phase in India's relations with Indonesia. It initiated the process of re-establishing mutual goodwill and understanding which had characterised the early nineteen-fifties. The year 1967 thus witnessed a steady flow of goodwill delegations from one country to the other.

Atleast three Indian delegations visited Indonesia during this year. A four-member Indian handloom and handicraft delegation headed by T.N. Lakshminarayan, Secretary, Department of Industries, Labour and Housing of the Government of Madras, paid a 4-day visit to Indonesia from 3 February to 7 February 1967. It was with a view to explore the prospects of increasing export (to Indonesia) of handloom and handicraft goods as also to study the consumers' tastes and other allied factors. Apart from discussing the development of handloom and handicraft industries, the two sides explored the possibilities of training of handloom skilled labourers by Indian experts.

Another Indian delegation, composed jointly of the Indian Jute Mills Association, Calcutta, and the Calcutta Jute Fabrics Shippers' Association, visited Djakarta during the same month.

---

166. *News from Indonesia* (New Delhi), 11 February 1967.
167. Ibid., 6 February 1967.
Its purpose was to assess Indonesian requirements for jute bags.

In the third week of June 1967, an Indian businessman, John P. George, Director Island Sea Foods Company Ltd., Cochin (South India), visited Djakarta to survey possibilities of importing shrimps and lobsters from Indonesia. Besides studying the marketing potential, John P. George was reported as having evinced particular interest in setting up business in Indonesia in this field.

From Indonesian side, a five-member Parliamentary delegation led by H.A. Sjaichu, the Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR), visited India in October 1967. It was the second Indonesian Parliamentary delegation in a year, the first having come in October 1966. The Indonesian Speaker came to India at the joint invitation of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. While explaining the purpose of his visit to some Asian countries, including India, on the eve of his departure from Djakarta, Sjaichu said that his mission was aimed at promoting closer relations with certain Asian countries, especially with their parliaments. Another purpose, he added, was to give information about recent developments in Indonesia and to facilitate smooth economic and trade relations between Indonesia and these Asian countries. Being one of the top leadership of the

168. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
170. See p. 518 of this Chapter.
172. Djakarta Times, 3 October 1967. Other members of the Indonesian Parliamentary delegation were, H. Osmar Ismail (NU Party), Rasjid Sutan Radja Mas (PNI), Utomo (Parkindo - Indonesian Catholic Party) and Fahmi Idris (KAMI - University Students' Action Command).
NU Party, Sjaichu's visit to India was quite significant. It would enable the new Indonesian leadership to remove misunderstandings in India created by NU Party's pro-Pakistan attitude on Kashmir dispute during the period of this study until the coup in 1965.

In a statement at a press conference in New Delhi on 21 October 1967, the Indonesian Speaker emphasised that Indonesia greatly desired to promote friendship and co-operation with India in both cultural and economic fields. This co-operation, he added, would enable the two countries to play an important and constructive role in preserving world peace. He stated that since both Indonesia and India were facing similar political, economic and social problems, they had wider ground for engaging in close co-operation in order to accelerate development of the two countries in all fields positively and profitably.

One of the fields in which the two countries' relations showed distinct signs of improvement was the two Governments' attempt to re-establish relations at personal level. These had been under growing strains following the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. Even close and frequent consultations on various issues of regional and international importance at diplomatic level, which characterised Indian-Indonesian relations during the fifties, had virtually stopped. For two years, the Indian Ambassador in Djakarta had not been invited to make his usual Republic Day Address over Radio Republic Indonesia.

174. This was revealed by Peralu Ratnam, the Indian Ambassador to Indonesia, in the course of his address on the 17th anniversary of the Republic of India. Speaking before Radio and Television in Djakarta on 25 January 1967, he regretted "that it was not possible for me to address you all in the last two years". He, however, added: "The clouds of misunderstanding have now passed and we are happy that relations between our two countries have become normal and we have resumed old contacts." See News from Indonesia, 6 February 1967.
For the last three years preceding M.C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia, the Indian diplomatic mission had been in a state of virtual isolation. In December 1966, on invitation from the Indonesian Minister of Education and Culture, Sarino Mangupranoto, the Indian Ambassador, Perala Ratnam, attended and addressed the Congress of the Taman Siswa educational institution in Jogjakarta (Central Java). He also visited the headquarters of the Diponegoro Division under Major General Surono and received cordial hospitality wherever he went. The Indian Ambassador also took this opportunity to meet the leaders of the Indian community in Tjirebon and Semarang (the cities in Central Java where the PKI was a dominant factor). He was fully satisfied over the friendly relations subsisting between the Indians and Indonesians there.

The two countries also sought to resume and strengthen contacts in the cultural field. Their efforts to reactivate the 1955 Cultural Agreement, during Adam Malik's visit to India and M.C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia, have already been surveyed. An important activity in this field was Government of India's invitation, among others, to a Jogjakarta Ramayana Ballet from Indonesia. The 45-member Indonesian Ramayana Ballet, led by Prince Paku Alam VIII, Governor of Jogjakarta, came to participate in an East-West Theatre Arts Seminar and Festival, organised in New Delhi by Bharatiya Natya Sangh, in collaboration with the Indian National Commission for UNESCO and the Ministry of Education. The function took place in New Delhi from 24 to 30 October 1967.

Still another field in which there were distinct signs of improvement in Indian-Indonesian relations was bilateral trade.

175. Ibid., 24 December 1966.
Deterioration registered in this field during 1961-65 has already been surveyed elsewhere. The trade figures for 1965-66, 1966-67 and 1967-68 are as follows:

**India's Trade with Indonesia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965-66</th>
<th>1966-67</th>
<th>1967-68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>5.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Trade</td>
<td>(-) 1.41</td>
<td>(+) 0.99</td>
<td>(+) 5.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above figures show that the Indian exports to Indonesia, which had dwindled to a record low level of Rupees 81 lakhs rose to Rupees 107 lakhs during 1966-67 and Rupees 586 lakhs during 1967-68. Barring the Indian export figures of 1961-62 (Rupees 697 lakhs), the figure registered during 1967-68 was the highest during the period of study. This was largely the result of an Indian credit of Rupees 10 Crores afforded to Indonesia in September 1966.

The sharp rise in Indian exports was, however, not matched by Indian imports from Indonesia. Indian imports which stood at Rupees 222 lakhs during 1965-66 dwindled to an all time low of Rupees 8 lakhs during 1966-67 and Rupees 11 lakhs during 1967-68. This was due to a sharp fall in India's imports of petroleum.

---

177. See Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, pp. 246-50.


179. For Indian-Indonesian trade figures since 1961-62, see Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, pp. 249.
products from Indonesia, a priority import item mentioned in Schedule "A" attached to Trade Agreement of December 1966.

Although rise in Indian exports indicated encouraging trends, a big deficit in trade balance as registered by Indonesia *vis-a-vis* India (Rupees 99 lakhs and 575 lakhs during 1966-67 and 1967-68 respectively) showed an unsatisfactory development in the two countries' relations, which seemed to be growing satisfactorily in other fields.

180. In fact, petroleum products had all along been the major Indonesian export item to India. Out of the total Indonesian exports of Rupees 222 lakhs (to India) during 1965-66, petroleum products alone amounted to Rupees 202 lakhs. See *India's Trade with Some Asian Countries*, n. 178.