CONCLUSIONS

The Conservative Party which returned to power in Britain, in October 1951, under Winston Churchill, had proclaimed itself as the Party of the Empire. A statement of policy, on which the Conservatives won the 1951 election, said: "The Conservative Party, by long tradition and settled belief, is the Party of the Empire. We are proud of its past. We see it as the surest hope in our own day. We proclaim our abiding faith in its destiny. We shall strive to promote its unity, its strength and its progress." In his own election address, Churchill declared: "a Britain that is not strong and free will be powerless to fulfil its high destiny as the centre of an Empire and Commonwealth on whose cohesion the best hopes of world peace rest." The Party's manifesto said: "In the wider world outside this island, we put first safety, progress,

1 Lord Boyd told me: "The Conservative Party had always been, in the public mind, identified with the cause of the Empire, in a noblest sense of the word - an association of free people choosing to stay together, bound by common history, in many cases common interests, and often by the unity of the English language which brought the large quarter of the world together. But it was in no sense an Empire, in a sense a permanent domination."


3 East Africa and Rhodesia, vol. 28, no. 1414, 15 November 1951.
and cohesion of the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations.... To foster commerce within the Empire, we shall maintain Imperial preference. In our own home markets the Empire producer will have a place second only to the home producer." The aim, it declared, should be to guide the colonies along "the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire."

But, in the atmosphere charged with the important currents of colonial nationalism against such move in the colonial territories, and also the world public opinion against it, this declaration was indeed an ambitious one. It was then feared that the advent of such a party to office under Churchill - recalling his famous wartime-stand that he had not become the King's first Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire - should mean "Good Night to Colonial Freedom" and reversing the trend established during the previous Labour Government, in which India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon had become independent and a start had already been made in the Gold Coast, British Guiana and number of other colonial territories for self-government.


5 Self-government, thus, appeared to imply less than independence.

6 An article "Good Night to Colonial Freedom" in the West African Pilot of 27 October 1951 said: "Mr Winston Churchill who is the incarnation of British Imperialism is now destined to wield political power once more. If that should be the case, then good-bye to Colonial Freedom!"
Lyttelton's promise as a Colonial Secretary in the Churchill Cabinet at his first Press Conference that the Conservative Government had no intention of going back on constitutional changes already made in the colonies, or of retarding progress, or that they would not be committed with regard to what was pending or under consideration, but what was already done or promised would be carried through, was, however, reassuring. While self-government within the Empire would continue to be the basic policy, he emphasized that economic development must keep pace with the political. Also, his first statement in the Commons on Colonial policy was no different from that of his predecessors in the previous Labour Government. He said there would be no change in colonial policy under the new Government. The policy of building up the institutions necessary for attaining self-government within the Commonwealth as the circumstances permitted, and the social and economic strength needed to support them, in order to keep pace with their political development, would be continued as "above party politics". In reply to supplementary question from James Griffiths, he confirmed his acceptance of the principle of equal consideration for "all colours and creeds" in multi-racial communities. But here, the Conservatives did not actually follow the principles so faithfully.

7 Daily Telegraph, 8 November 1951; see also East Africa and Rhodesia, vol. 28, no. 1414, 15 November 1951.

8 493 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 984, 14 November 1951, Lyttelton.
The basic principles of British colonial policy were settled long time ago and were not in dispute between the parties. The Conservatives and the Labourites alike believed that British rule in the colonies was exercised as a trust on behalf of the local inhabitants and that it was their duty to promote their advance to self-government within the Commonwealth. But there were, of course, different degrees of feeling on the subject in both the parties. Churchill, for example, was a sup 9 9 imperialist by nature; Harold Macmillan, who is also a Tory, felt differently. But in the period just after the Second World War, both the parties recognized the dissolution of the Empire as inevitable, whatever Churchill might have said.

The difference between the Conservatives and the Labourites at this time was that the Conservatives, in the main, believed in a policy of "gradualism", advocating a slow, step by-step transfer of power. Gradualism also had some support from the Labour Party leaders when they were in power. The Conservatives always opposed the idea of a time-table, since, if a firm date for independence was hostile to the concept of gradualism. Thus, there were differences between the British parties over the pace of political advance in the colonies.

9 Tory is used synonymous to Conservative.

repeated statements of policy had made clear that the Conservatives, too, aimed to lead the colonies towards self-government within the Commonwealth and had no intention to "put the clock back".

However, one cannot say that Tory Party, as a Party, had a single, firm, sharp philosophy about colonialism or colonies. There were strong differences within the Tory Party - not necessarily ideological differences; they were differences of attitudes, differences of personalities. There were also different groups. Here, one would have to look at the period in which the BOW group was formed. The BOW group was a very important group in strengthening what one would call, the liberal-wing of the Tory Party on colonial questions, particularly concerning Africa. This was the group - of young forward-looking Radical Tories - that produced later Ian Macleod. So one finds many currents into the Tory Party but no clear view. Churchill, Lyttelton, Lord Salisbury, Hopkinson -- all belonged to the old school of imperialism whose thinking on Empire was based more upon sentiment than upon clearly considered policies. They dealt with the Empire as a symbol of British glory, rather than as an actual

11 This was a group of Conservative graduates, with its headquarters in the East End of London.

12 Interview with Colin Legum, Commonwealth Correspondent of The Observer in London on 6 May 1970.
13 political problem.

In the Churchill administration, imperial affairs, however, got a low priority - foreign and domestic affairs getting the top priority because of the possibility of the Korean war being developed into a third World War; also, the Conservatives desired to stabilise social reforms introduced by the previous Labour Government and to combine them with a rising standard of living of the people in order to consolidate their position in office.

When the Conservatives took over in 1951, everywhere in the colonies, the aims of British colonial policy had become much clearer than they were during the confused period when the Labour Government took office, just after the war. Although India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon had become independent, Empire in Africa, the West Indies, the Mediterranean and South-East Asia was still intact; Britain was still the leading Power in West Asia. But in Malaya, the situation was serious, because of the Communist terrorists movement; the West Indies were discontented; and the African continent was restless to have power to run their own affairs. Already, the Gold Coast was enjoying a degree of self-rule.

14 Ibid., pp. 284-5.
Between 1951-57, the Conservative colonial policy was mainly directed to two objectives: first was creating bigger units - economically viable and politically independent - out of smaller ones in British Africa and the West Indies; and second was guiding other territories like British Guiana, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda etc. on the road to self-government, which, in turn, was the gateway to independence within the Commonwealth.

Thus, the Conservatives were then impressed by three major schemes of grouping the colonies into federations, so that they could become economically viable and politically independent units of the Commonwealth. Two of them were in British Africa: Central African Federation and East African Federation, although they were not that enthusiastic about the latter. The third was to unite the British islands of the Caribbean into a West Indies Federation. And the new Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, a business executive of aristocratic background, with full backing of his party, was out to create bigger units out of smaller ones, although to some extent it was an extension of his predecessor's policy.

The motives were different in each case. The motive behind the Central African Federation (which consisted of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) was the oft-stated wish of the White settlers of the two Rhodesias to control all of Central Africa before normal British colonial
policy would have given the Africans of the two Northern territories, then under British control, too much political advancement for them to fit into the Southern Rhodesian pattern. This also suited the Conservative thinking and their policy of "gradualism". It might have appeared to the Conservatives then that a federation of the three territories would delay the independence, particularly of two Northern territories which had made considerable advance towards self-government and where the granting of independence, with African majority rule, could not be long delayed. Thus, they found out the mechanism of "partnership" by which the Africans would steadily acquire more political power. But this was a myth that was being preached by the Conservatives to retain White supremacy and White leadership. What the White settlers really wanted, and what they intended one day to bring about was a White-dominated unitary state in close alliance with South Africa and Portugal. These were the men -- Lyttelton, Churchill -- who by temperament thought that Government in civilized hand was the right way ahead. For them, Central African Federation was the grand design - this is the way one could get the progress - constitutional economic progress and also maintain White leadership. This was what they wished for and pushed with vigour. There was no division here between Lyttelton, Hopkinson, Churchill and the rest of them.
The difference between the Labour and the Conservative attitude to the issue of federation was not that of principle but of procedure. While the Labour made African consent a prerequisite for introducing federation, the Conservative did not. On the contrary, they took the line that the African opposition was not to be taken seriously because those who opposed the federation were a small group of vocal townsmen and "disgruntled intelligentsia", not the true representatives of the people. This was the standard argument of the White settlers and was accepted by the Conservatives, because it supported their policy of "gradualism". The Conservatives argued that as a Protectorate power, Britain had a moral duty to take a decision for the good of the people who, in their opinion, were ignorant and did not understand niceties of the Federal Constitution. The Federal Constitution which was the product of the two Conferences, with African out, was to be amended only by two-thirds majority of the Federal Assembly which then consisted of majority of Europeans because of the tough franchise qualifications. Even the so-called African Affairs Board seemed quite ineffective to promote any political advancement of Africans. Thus, in the final scheme, the British Government were handing over the substance of power, including military power, over six million Africans, to the White settlers, not for seven years or ten years, but until such time as the European minority in Central Africa had agreed to any such advancement. In fact, the
Conservatives considered the federation issue as the great issue of imperial policy and were successful, temporarily, in creating, in 1953, a bastion of British power in the heart of Africa.

In the West Indies, the motive was different. Here, there was no problem of sizeable White settlers like Central Africa. And the underlying motive was to form a larger, and therefore more viable, economic and political unit, particularly for reasons of administrative tidiness as some of these islands, the Conservatives found, were a burden on British taxpayers. Looking at the map, one finds that these islands have enormous patrolling and security problem. And therefore, to the Conservatives, federation became an obvious financial attraction. Also, they were then faced with the problem of how to stop the movement of the West Indians immigrants into Britain for employment.

But the proposals for a West Indies Federation had not aroused the same strong emotions as those respecting Central Africa. This was partly because the British Government had no desire to impose its views on the island communities and London's Colonial Office always left it to the colonies to decide whether

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15 Lyttelton said: "This (federation) is...the greatest political questions which have been posed to the British people in this century. Upon its bold, courageous and enlightened solution depends the whole future of Central Africa for all its peoples."

to federate or not - but the initiative coming from London, rather than from the colonies themselves, and partly because the West Indians themselves were convinced of the advantages of the Federation in principle. But it was essentially a Whitehall concept adopted by the British Government without perhaps sufficient appreciation of the conditions and opinions in the territories that were to be linked together in the new federation. It was this aspect that was overlooked to a considerable extent at the time the federation was set up.

However, the federal scheme had the blessings of both the political parties in Britain. At both the Conferences - 1953 and 1956 - the Conservatives were successful in patching up the differences of the West Indian delegates and hammering out a scheme agreeable to all. What seemed to have happened was that a general determination to get started on the federal scheme triumphed over the individual reservations of the various delegates. And here, reasons and politics went together. But Lennox-Boyd was right in calling the federal scheme a product of compromise - compromise produces often its own weaknesses and its half measures - and warning the West Indies that like all other federations, the Caribbean Federation would inevitably suffer from them.

In the 1950s, while the Conservatives were busy in creating bigger units - economically viable and politically independent - out of smaller ones in Central Africa and the West Indies,
they were committed to guide other territories like British Guiana, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Malaya etc. on the road to self-government within the Commonwealth. As stated earlier, the aim of British colonial policy was to aid and encourage people eventually to run their own affairs, but the tempo and the precise form which it might take, differed from time to time and territory to territory and depended on the particular circumstances and conditions prevailing in different colonies.

In British Guiana, the Conservative Government carried out the promise of the previous Labour Government by implementing, in 1953, the Waddington Commission's recommendations, giving the Colony, for the first time, an elected lower house on the basis of universal adult franchise and responsible Ministries all at once. But, later they suspended the Constitution.

The action of the British Government in suspending the Constitution was criticised in the World's Press. The dispatch of gunboats to quell a colonial people smelt too nearly of the bad old imperialist days. The Conservatives argued that the PPP Ministers were under control of a Communist clique with a "Communist plot" to seize control of the whole life of the territory and to run it on totalitarian lines. And since they were against the setting up of a Communist State within the Commonwealth, they had no other alternative but to suspend the Constitution. But the Government's White Paper on suspension of the
Constitution seemed weakest even on first reading and the "Communist plot" was not clearly exposed in it. Also, it included evidence of occurrences which had happened after the suspension of the Constitution, and not before. The weak point in the Government's case at that time seemed to be that drastic action was taken and force deployed before any serious violence had occurred.

In a Commons debate, the Opposition differed from the Government only as regards the suspension of the Constitution and both Attlee and Griffiths agreed that the Government had done right in dispatching troops. The only difference between the Government and the Opposition was that while the former thought that the only alternative was to suspend the Constitution, the latter's indictment was that there were other methods and the Government should have tried them before suspending the Constitution.

What prompted Britain to take this decision was the security problem. The basic trouble in the 1950s was that the British Government, no longer, had large masses of troops and carrying capacity in the world. Churchill was unwilling to argue this, but Attlee was ready to admit this. Besides this, Churchill, obviously, had no more faith in Dr Jagan and his people in British Guiana, who were known for their sympathy for the Communist bloc, that they would be able to run their own affairs. Also, in the background, there was America's concern
that there should not be any appearance in the South American continent of those who were sympathetic to the Soviet bloc. Added to this was the pressure of big business interests - particularly of the plantation owners. Thus, it became obvious for the Conservatives who now had a second thought whether to continue in British Guiana the Labour Party policy to which it, and more of its supporters, were no doubt strongly opposed, or to make an opportunity to reverse this policy and to carry out another policy in line with its supporters' interests and ideals. It chose the second course. And since it received backing from the Labour Party which did not dispute the facts leading to the suspension of the Constitution, the Conservatives had little difficulty to "put the clock back". Also, nobody at that time, in a colonial status, would have allowed Dr Jagan to turn the country into a Communist country.

Kenya's political problem was complicated by the presence of 50,000 White settlers who had made permanent homes there, occupying most of the fertile land on the Highlands and dominating the Government and politics in Kenya. Here, the Conservative Government had to grapple with the problem of Mau Mau movement which was the result of the long-standing grievances and accumulated frustration - political, economic and social - experienced by Africans prior to 1952. The British Government, however, took a very different view. Lyttelton himself said Mau Mau was not the child of economic pressure, but later agreed that it would
have been impossible for Mau Mau to "have gained such momentum unless it could feed the fires of its campaign...with the fuel of some supposed, some feigned and some genuine grievances."

The British Government believed, in a sense typical Tories, to put this Mau Mau movement down by force and they were too slow in understanding the gravity of the problem. The Army view - General Erskine - was pretty early on that "Mau Mau cannot be beaten up by soldiers. Mau Mau needs a political solution."

But the British Government picked up this idea of political settlement much later. So, it was pretty late in the day only after they found that they could not defeat Mau Mau by force, they decided to go in for more and more economic and social change. On the one hand, the Conservatives would deny economic grievances, on the other hand, they would go in for more and more impressive programme of land consolidation which finally succeeded in Kenya.

So when the situation improved, Lyttelton went to Nairobi in March 1954 and announced his new constitutional proposal based on the principle of "multi-racialism", in which for the first time in British Africa, excluding West Africa and Sudan the ministerial responsibility was offered to non-Europeans.

16 509 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 1228, 16 December 1952, Lyttelton

17 Interview with Cyril Dunn, Correspondent of The Observer in London on 14 May 1970.
However, it was nothing but the colonial version of "partnership" preached by Sir Roy Welensky in Central Africa and that remained the leading theme of British colonial policy for quite some time. But the way the British Government saw political settlement, was not the way in which militant nationalists saw political settlement. This produced a cleavage between the multi-racial concept of Blundell and the Conservative Government and the nationalist concept of Africans. The Conservatives said: they were in favour of independence and liberation but on a multi-racial basis and against nationalism. Black nationalism was racist as White nationalism. This was the theme in the speeches the Conservatives made at that time. The Conservatives, thus, were trying to create and set up their idea of multi-racialism against the nationalists idea of African nationalism. And, multi-racialism, whatever its intensive merit, was very heavily discredited by the fact that multi-racialism was the defense for the increasing unpopularity of Central African Federation. Therefore, while buttressing up this hated Central African Federation for the sake of multi-racialism they were trying to encourage multi-racialism in all its aspect in Kenya, and thereby pursuing self-defeating policy. As a result, the nationalists were gaining strength everywhere.

Besides a post in the Council of Ministers, the only other concession to the Africans in the 1954 Constitution was that African members of the Legislative Council would be elected, not
nominated, and elections for this were to take place only after
the method of election had been decided by a Commission. It was
also true that Africans as a group or as an organisation did not
positively endorse the new constitutional arrangement in 1954,
but had agreed that they would not come in the way of any member
of their group joining the Government if it were offered.

But the outcome of the African elections in Kenya, held
in March 1957, created a difficult position for both the Kenya
and the British Governments. As a result, the Lyttelton Consti-
tution became unworkable and Lennox-Boyd proposed another Consti-
tution. But the basic principles of the new Lennox-Boyd Consti-
tution were the same as the old Lyttelton one, that there should
be sufficient number of official members whether *ex-officio* or
nominated by the Governor to enable a government formed of
official and unofficial ministers to get its measures passed,
even if the remaining unofficial members, who were then all
elected by their separate races, opposed them, and that all
major races should be represented in the Council of Ministers.
But this was resented by the elected African members.

Whether the Mau Mau had speeded up Kenya's advance towards
independence is a debatable point, but at least one fact bears
out that it had certainly checked the Conservative Government's
effort taking Kenya towards Southern Rhodesian pattern (by
transferring powers of the Colonial Office from London to
Nairobi), if they had a wish to do with the White settlers'
backing. Even otherwise, as late as 1957, the Conservative
Government saw no prospect, in the "foreseeable future", in
abandoning their responsibility in Kenya.

The problem in Nigeria was different in kind from that
of Kenya, as there was no sizeable presence of the White sett-
lers, but there were profound differences in language, traditions
and cultural patterns and ways of thinking between the groups of
African tribes inhabiting the three Regions of Nigeria - the
Northern, the Eastern and the Western. However, by 1957, Nigeria-
Britain's biggest Colony on the West Coast of Africa - was well on
the road to self-government and eventual independence.

In 1953, the Conservatives were faced with a major consti-
tutional crisis in Nigeria, when the Macpherson Constitution of
1951 showed signs of instability. And therefore, the central
political problem before the Conservative Government, at the
1953 London Conference, was to find the means of binding the
Regions together to form a new nation while preserving sufficient
regional autonomy to satisfy the varying aspirations of the
nation. This was done by promising self-government in 1956 to
those Regions who desired it. Also, the Region's dependence on
Centre was removed by not requiring Regions to submit their
legislations to the Centre for approval and by transferring
residual powers from the Centre to Regions thereby making the
Regions more autonomous than before. But this created a myth
as if the original powers belonged to the Regions, which were no
more than artificial boundaries with only a very general ethnic justification, the part of which they had devolved to the Centre. On the other hand, the Centre was made stronger by introducing direct and separate elections in an attempt to break the dependence of Central Ministers on the Regional Governments which had led to the breakdown of the Macpherson Constitution in 1953.

According to the 1953 promise, the 1957 London Conference conferred internal self-government on the Eastern and the Western Regions. The Colonial Secretary, however, refused to agree to the demand of the Nigerian delegates for the independence of Nigeria by 1959, but agreed, if by 1960, a newly-elected House of Representatives passed such a resolution, to consider it with sympathy. What prompted Lennox-Boyd to say this was that there was much unfinished business to be completed; the two Regions had just launched on Regional self-government, while the third and largest did not wish to receive it for some time. Also, the minorities problem was still to be settled and was referred to an expert commission with a possibility of creating new regions for them from the existing ones.

The British policy in Nigeria came in for a praise and tributes were paid to Lyttelton and Lennox-Boyd for playing the role as a "mediator" and "negotiator" at the Conferences. For Britain did two things. First, it granted internal self-government, which each of the three big parties wanted so that
each of the Region could be able to have a power base in their Regions and then set a date for "independence". Thus, there was a consensus and Britain was caught in a consensus - first self-government in three Regions and then independence of the federation within the Commonwealth.

In Uganda, the Conservatives ran into the problem of the Kabaka arising directly from the speech made by Lyttelton in which, after a reference to Central African Federation, he talked very incautiously about the possibilities of federation in East Africa. In 1953, it set off angry protest within Buganda and the Kabaka's suspicion got into this. And then, there was no going back. The Conservative Government, however, was wholly wrong in banning the Kabaka because this strengthened the Kabaka's position vis-à-vis his own people. It made the nationalists position very difficult because they would not speak against him as they would not approve the colonial action. On the point at issue, there could be little doubt that the Kabaka was in the wrong as he wanted the separation of Buganda from the rest of the Protectorate. The Kabaka should have been banned by his own people and for different reasons than what the Conservatives had given for his deportation. The Kabaka's action though wrong headed had its roots in the suspicions and frustrations of many of the Baganda. Only next door, in Kenya, similar fears and frustrations had taken a more hideous turn. And there seemed no doubt that the Baganda had been asked to swallow, too large a
dose, all at once. High Court judgement which went against the action of the British Government played a larger part in bringing the Kabaka back to his throne. But, at the same time, the Conservatives could not ignore such thing as African public opinion which was very much against the colonial action and they had to bow before it.

Under the Conservative administration - between 1951-57 - the Gold Coast and the Federation of Malaya were the only two British territories which achieved independence in 1957. Both the territories were free from the White settler problem, unlike Kenya, and special factors existed in each case for their early independence.

In fact, the Gold Coast was already enjoying a degree of self-rule since February 1951 within the limits of the Coussey Constitution which gave the Gold Coast, for the first time, an elected majority - an African majority - on the basis of adult franchise, similar to that of Waddington's Constitution in British Guiana. But later, so long Churchill was in-charge of the administration, the Gold Coast did not advance further except that the Leader of the Government Business was designated as the Prime Minister. There continued the process of internal self-government which had begun in 1951.

What made the Conservatives not to reverse the clock was

18 The Times, 1 December 1953.
that the Gold Coast was free from the White settler problem, unlike Kenya, and Dr Nkrumah who had earlier called the Coussey Constitution as "bogus" and "fradulent" was ready to give a try till a new one was granted. He also showed moderation. And it was sheer accident of history that personalities were involved in the Gold Coast's development. Besides this, it was a rich country and had more educated people than other British colonial territories. Also, in West Africa, it was accepted fairly early that the major African states - the Gold Coast and Nigeria should move towards self-government and independence. Self-government fast, because it had already moved that way and then to delay independence until there had been reasonable opportunity to move from self-government to independence. So, the argument really was about the timing which, Lyttelton said, must constantly weigh. Thus, it was only in June 1954, a new Constitution came into force and the Gold Coast began to enjoy full internal self-government, following the British practice in the Legislative Assembly and cabinet responsibility.

But there emerged, in September 1954, the National Liberation Movement in Ashanti with a demand for a federal form of Government against unitary one under the Coussey Constitution. The chief motive behind the NLM campaign for a federation was,

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19 Interview with Colin Legum, Commonwealth Correspondent of The Observer in London on 6 May 1970.
oddly enough, much the same as the one behind Buganda's opposition to an East African Federation. Both Buganda and Ashanti had been historically the dominant powers in the regions. The Ashanti were totally devoted to the chiefdom system presided over by the Ashantehene and his Golden Stool - a symbol of quasi-religious significance for the people. One of their leaders — till lately (1971) the Prime Minister of Ghana - Professor Busia then argued that if old African states were to make real progress in freedom in the modern world, it was essential for them to start going back to their own historical roots and to grow in accordance with their own real natures — a point of view for which there was great deal to be said. But it was not the attitude which in those days commanded much respect in Britain, where it was dismissed as "tribalism" and seen as a real threat to the viability of the new independent African countries.

The British approach to the controversy was rather different. There had been enough excuses for the Conservatives to postpone the granting of independence if they had so wished. But they had not. Lennox-Boyd's announcement on 11 May 1956, in the Commons, for a general election in the Gold Coast as a prior condition of its independence to resolve a deadlock on the constitution was timely. But it was not until Lennox-Boyd's visit, in

20 Interview with Cyril Dunn, Correspondent of The Observer in London on 14 May 1970.
January 1957, to the Gold Coast which brought him much praise, the final draft of the Constitution was agreed upon and compromise brought, providing a kind of safety valve by introducing Regional Assemblies and Houses of Chiefs and making Ashantehene as the Head of the Ashanti region. The British Government quite rightly ruled out the partition of the Gold Coast as was demanded earlier by the NLM and the Northern People's Party. The speeches made by Dr Nkrumah and Dr Busia on the eve of independence revealed that Britain had retained goodwill and influence which was so vital to the British interests. But it was the absence of White settlers in the Gold Coast that speeded its early independence.

Besides the Gold Coast, the Federation of Malaya was another British territory which achieved independence in 1957, under the Conservative administration. Malaya's problem had not been one simply of "colonialism". Like Kenya, Malaya was a "plural society" which consisted of three main racial communities - Malays, Chinese and Indians, but was free from the White settler problem.

When the Conservatives took over in 1951, the situation in Malaya was serious because of the Communist terrorists movement which claimed to be fighting against the "British imperialists" and there was a danger that the country might be lost to the Communists if nothing was done. Within a month of his appointment Lyttelton decided to go on a three weeks' visit to Malaya to
obtain first hand knowledge of the situation, and his visit had a wholesome effect on the situation in Malaya. His decision to outline some of his conclusions on the spot had convinced everyone who doubted it that he meant to employ all methods at the Government's power to restore order and security and they seemed wise and practical then. His stress on the importance of the cooperation of the population in the suppression of the Communist terrorists and his recognition of the fact that war could be won without the deployment of large additional military troops, showed that they would result in a change of policy in London. Indeed, it did. On his return to London he was able to convince Churchill that the key to Malaya's problem was that one man should be responsible for both civil and military sides.

His selection of General Templer for Malaya to perform the job was most felicitous. Lyttelton's directive to General Templer, while placing a political solution at the head of the preamble, in a later paragraph, described the restoration of law and order as the "primary tasks". The political solution was to guide the people of Malaya for a fully self-governing nation, preferably within the Commonwealth. While the defeat of the terrorists gang had been Templer's first task, it had always been a tenet of his faith that "Communism will not be beaten up by military measures alone." He, thus, understood the problem to be unlike that of Kenya and said that to ally the Malayan nationalism was the only way to defeat Communism - a straight-
The emancipation of Malaya was a necessary part of the ending of Western rule in Asia and of the attempt to put relations between Britain and Asian peoples on a basis of cooperation and equality. The Colonial Office realized that it could never achieve stability there, unless they had a political formula that was going to take this steam of Communist terrorists out. The Emergency, of course, lasted there for many years after independence. But then the Malayans were running the country politically. This struck at the very basis of the appeal of the Communist guerilla force in the jungle. Also, there was no White settler problem. In fact, Britain was caught between the Alliance's demand for independence and the Communist terrorists claim that they were fighting against the "British imperialists". And therefore, it was quite logical for Britain to meet the former's demand rather than holding back the independence and losing the country to the Communists. Also, Malaya was a sophisticated society with large trained people who could run the Government. So, the parallel's of India, Burma, Ceylon was held, when Malaya's demand for independence was being considered.

From the study of Conservative colonial policy during its first post-war administration, one thus gets the impression that so long Churchill was in-charge of the administration - 1951-1954 - the Conservatives did not make any decisive move towards independence. One might ask what about the Gold Coast? The answer would be that the previous Labour Government had already
forward calculated strategy and he succeeded.

And when the situation improved, General Templer expressed his willingness to appoint a committee of the Legislative Council to examine the question of Federal elections. In view of Lyttelton's earlier statement that there could be "no elections in Malaya until safety is assured", this was a subtle change in British policy. This was largely because of General Templer's success in carrying out his forceful military policy against Communist terrorists. But it would be wrong to give the entire credit to him because it is difficult to separate the effects of the psychological impetus which he administered to the anti-terrorist campaign from the consequences of the new Communist directive which came into operation about the time of Sir Gurney's murder in 1951, deprecating violence as likely to alienate public opinion from the Communist cause.

Although the Committee's main recommendation was for nominated majority, Lyttelton, on the advice of General Templer, agreed to grant an elected majority of six in the Legislative Council in 1954. This was not only a victory for the Alliance - of the UMNO and the MCA - which had then made considerable headway, but also an unusual step and notable departure from accepted British colonial precedent. What motivated Lyttelton to endorse the proposal for the elected majority was the very satisfactory progress made, during the previous few years by the people of the Federation in discharging through the "Membership system" and
otherwise the responsibilities which had fallen to them in the conduct of public affairs.

After the July 1955 election in which the Alliance - now triple Alliance of the UMNO, the MCA and the MIC - came out victorious, the Chief Minister, Tungku Abdul Rahman, took an early opportunity to put forward a time-table for self-government within two years and independence in four years for Malaya. It was against this background Lennox-Boyd invited the representatives of the plural communities and of the Rulers to visit London early in 1956 to work out changes in the Malayan Constitution. The London Conference ended in a complete agreement on the immediate grant of home-rule, leading to full independence within the Commonwealth, if possible, by August 1957. This promise was to be fulfilled whether or not the Emergency had been brought to an end by that date. The target date (31 August 1957) met the nationalists needs and for that matter it also buttressed British policy. Certainly, it was a good thing that Malaya became independent with maximum good humour among the Malays and Britain was entitled to congratulate itself on having brought to an end a dangerous phase in its connection with Malaya. Otherwise, it might have been caught there as the French were caught in Indo-China and the Dutch in Indonesia.

Britain had considerable economic interests in Malaya. The independence of Malaya was, therefore, a gamble for a stable and national government. It was a gamble which had to be made.
set the wheel in motion and, in 1951, had given Dr Nkrumah the chance to become the Leader of the Government Business - the post equivalent to that of the Prime Minister. But later, so long Churchill was in-charge, the Gold Coast did not advance any further. There continued the process of internal self-government which had begun in February 1951. All that happened was that Dr Nkrumah was designated as Prime Minister and the Governor-in-Charge continued to administer the Colony with no prospect of independence on any date at all. The political reality was that Churchill was just marking time. Everybody was marking time in every territory. There was no plan of Churchill or his Colonial Secretary - Lyttelton - to grant independence to one more colonial territory. This stands out from the records. They were certainly not in a mood to advance politically the Brown and the Black peoples in Africa, in the Caribbean, to run their own affairs either in the form of internal self-government or as full independence with the exception of Central African Federation under the White minority rule. It was, thus, a total political standstill of the Brown and the Black peoples, but full speed advancement of the White minorities. Although Churchill could not wholly reverse the clock, as that would have gone against the spirit of the time, his Government did not hesitate in taking the extreme step of suspending the Constitution in British Guiana or suppressing the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, without knowing what the people really wanted. Added to this list of disasters were
the imposition of Central African Federation under the White minority rule, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Africans and the deportation of the Kabaka. It was only after the change at the Colonial Office with Lennox-Boyd taking over as Colonial Secretary, one finds re-thinking on the colonial policy with the Gold Coast and Malaya moving towards independence, the Kabaka being restored to his throne, the dream of West Indian Federation coming to reality, the two Regions in Nigeria being permitted to launch on internal self-government, and Kenya moving towards multi-racial Government on the principle of parity with the European elected members. But it would be wrong to give the entire credit to Lennox-Boyd, because it was Lyttelton who had successfully advanced the cause of West Indian Federation at the 1953 London Conference; promised internal self-government to two Regions in Nigeria, by 1956; brought the non-Whites, for the first time, in the Council of Ministers in Kenya; and met the Alliance's demand of elected majority in Malaya.

Lyttelton's tenure of office in the first post-war Conservative administration had been the liveliest since the days of Chamberlain. This might be ascribed in part to the increasing complexity of the colonial situation - the Labour Government had gone a long way in acceding to nationalist demands and the people in those territories were inclined to be distrustful of a Conservative Colonial Secretary - which had set him tests more severe than those undergone by any of his predecessors, and partly to
the action of the Opposition in selecting the colonies as almost
the principal field for their attacks upon the Government. This
was made evident from the start when, led by the former Colonial
Secretary, Griffiths, they challenged Lyttelton on his methods
of implementing Central African Federation, a project for which
they themselves when in office had been responsible. Lyttelton
had, indeed, shown himself often brusque and sometimes tactless.
His piecemeal approach to colonial policy had been largely forced
upon him by circumstances. He had had to deal with one emergency
after another, as it arose. In Malaya, his achievement had been
notable. In Kenya, he was slow to appreciate the extent and
depth of Mau Mau movement. In British Guiana, his action of
suspending the Constitution came under fire. But it had also
been abundantly clear that Lyttelton was prepared to go through
fire and water politically, rather than to compromise on some
unpopular measure, which, rightly or wrongly, he deemed to be
necessary. The whole of the Buganda story was proof of this.
A second misapprehension on the part of the Opposition was that
Lyttelton would prove a reactionary. It was not believed that
the Conservative pledges to carry on with the Labour policy of
developing the colonies towards self-government would be
honoured. Certainly, Lyttelton had accomplished much in
"tidying up" the colonial Empire, so as to present it in more
suitable shape for self-government. The implementation of the
Central African Federation, the West Indian Conference on
Caribbean federation, and the successful outcome of the Nigerian constitutional talks -- had all tended to this end. However, like his Labour predecessors, he had not fully faced the need to formulate a policy for the numerous small territories which had no obvious future. For Cyprus, the remedy sought had been determined by the island's future fortress role, which took it out of the main colonial stream.

Lyttelton's successor, Lennox-Boyd's first act in office was to take up the case of the Kabaka - then entering his second year of exile in London - and to work out a personal reconciliation around his own dinner-table between the Kabaka and Sir Andrew Cohen, the Governor of Uganda. There had never been a Secretary of State who had exerted so vital a personal influence on individual territories. This came partly from predilection, partly from the trend of the times, which had led one Colonial Secretary after another further up the path of personal contact and intervention. After resolving the Kabaka crisis, he went on a tour to South-East Asia, during which he quickly appreciated the importance of political reforms in Malaya and Singapore. He managed to get the confidence of Tungku Abdul Rahman. And later, as a consequence, he tidied up the Reid proposals and made it

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Cyprus was not a colonial problem in the ordinary sense; the difficulty it presented derived from its strategic importance (also a lack of consensus between the Greek
possible for independence to be reached on time in Malaya. In the Gold Coast, he persuaded the Ghana leaders to accept a recipe for independence which was equitable to the Ashanti and other minorities. The West Indians added to his portion by agreeing among themselves on a site for the federal capital and thereby removing the last obstacle to a federal solution.

His success stemmed from two causes. In the first place, although he was very much the politician, he was one of the few in either party whose chief ambition had always been to be Colonial Secretary, and who did not regard it as a mere stepping stone for higher things. To Lennox-Boyd, it was the fulfilment of life's ambition and he threw the whole of his energy into it. Secondly, Lennox-Boyd saw colonial problems in their human as well as in their economic and political context. He received every kind of colonial visitor from important statesmen to a humble student.

Political development was not the whole story. For political health, the Conservatives said, it was necessary that a territory should enjoy a reasonable level of prosperity and a reasonable general standard of living. The appointment of Oliver Lyttelton - a skilful and successful businessman - in the Churchill's Cabinet in 1951 - was, therefore, regarded, an attempt by the Conservatives to hold economic development in the colonies of sufficient moment to demand the whole time attention of a Minister of the first rank. Economic development was at the root
of all colonial advancement and had, in the two previous Labour Governments tended to suffer from being delegated as a special interest to one of the subordinate Ministers at the Colonial Office.

Both the Conservatives and the Labourites were committed to a policy of "development and welfare". And there was "no party politics" in the sphere of economic development although there were differences of approach. In the main, the Conservatives believed in the necessity of an imaginative and bold policy of colonial development to take full advantage of the economic situation created by then increasing demand for primary products, and above all foods, in Britain and all over the world. Lyttelton considered it Britain's duty to bend all their efforts to develop the resources of the colonial Empire, but at the same time to see British goods and textiles in particular found a ready market in the colonies. Capital was the most difficult problem, but it was not the most immediate. The Conservatives argued that the economic development was not held up because of lack of capital.

In the Conservative programme, there was an emphasis all through on the peasant farmer, the peasant proprietor - the central figure of the agricultural economy and there was no intention of displacing him. Although agriculture remained the
prime source of wealth in the colonial territories, the Conservatives realised that mineral development and the extracting industries should be encouraged if they were natural and healthy, but they, the Conservatives said, ought not to be artificially forced and, above all, those which served primary production should be helped.

With regard to industrialisation, the Conservative policy was a cautious one - as not to make it an end itself but as the means of raising of average levels of living, and therefore, individual freedom of economic decision was an important element of it. Also, the growth of heavy industry in colonial territories on any sizeable scale as an economic proposition was not considered feasible for various reasons, including shortage of fuel and power, ferrous metals and skilled labour. It might have appeared to the Conservatives then that industrialisation on a large-scale in the colonial territories would affect British industries since British goods would then have less market in the colonies.

In regard to trade in general, the Conservative policy was aimed at an expansion of world trading at multilateralism and adherence to the GATT, with no restrictions or discrimination in trade. And the effect was that the colonial economies were

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exposed to the full blast of world price fluctuations in primary products which these territories produced. Also, when the Conservatives came to power in 1951, one of their declared objectives was to dismantle the Labour's system of state trading and restore the private trading as far as possible, except where long-term guarantees to colonial territories necessitated other means. The Conservative Government carried out its policy, and by February 1955, only the really long-term contracts for colonial products remained into being. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement whose term was later extended to December 1962 was one of them and was still and is of major importance. But the trade in many foodstuffs had reverted to private importers. And the tariff concessions offered a little relief.

In 1955, the Conservatives took the credit for passing a new Colonial Development and Welfare Act which extended the life of the previous C.D. & W. Acts until 31st March 1960, but the strong doubts were expressed by the Labour M.Ps' as to whether the money provided was sufficient for the purpose, taking into account the fall in the real value of money. And the facts remained that the basic services which would make a direct contribution to the expansion of the territories resources, were still inadequate, after nearly a century of Imperial rule.

In the Conservative scheme of things, there was an empha-
"high profits and quick returns". Even where private enter-
prisers had helped to increase the income of a particular terri-
tory as the Copper-miners in Northern Rhodesia had, they did not
correspondingly increase the prosperity of the native peoples.
Also, it was very easy to find private capital for extractive
industries, but these did not necessarily help to build a
balance economy.

During the Conservative administration, the public cor-
porations - the Overseas Food Corporation and the Colonial
Development Corporation - initiated by the previous Labour
Government, had been either allowed to run down or changed
drastically. While the previous Labour Government had already
announced, in January 1951, its decision to abandon original
scheme of growing groundnuts in Tanganyika, which had been
widely criticized for its failure, and in its place to introduce
an experimental scheme for investigating the economics of tropi-
cal farming to be run by the Overseas Food Corporation, in areas
of the previous scheme, the Conservative Government, in 1955,
transferred the remaining enterprise of the Overseas Food Corpo-
ration to a new body - the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation -
thus, making it an ordinary C.D. & W. scheme. Because the Con-
servatives had little faith in a public corporation where the
risk of the British taxpayers' money was more.

When the Conservatives took over in 1951, the Colonial
Development Corporation, whose object was to establish or assist
any enterprise in the colonies which was designed to increase their productive capacity, was incurring heavy financial losses in its early years. But under the Conservative administration, the Corporation moved cautiously and applied commercial principle of profitability in a stricter sense. Consequently, in 1955, it was able for the first time to show a profit in its annual accounts. But this result had not been achieved, however, without a criticism in Parliament and elsewhere that the Corporation was being too cautious; that it was undertaking too much "finance house" business and too little direct development, involving private enterprisers in the colonies in large number of projects.

When Lyttelton became the Colonial Secretary, it was generally assumed that with his wide business experience, he would devote himself principally to economic development. In fact – largely again through force of circumstances – he and his successor Lennox-Boyd concentrated on politics and left the economic pattern to settle itself. Also, colonial development was a difficult task; its aims and methods would always be subject to great deal of misunderstanding.

British colonial policy was remarkable for its variety rather than for its standardization. There were many cogent arguments in favour of such an approach. The Empire was itself heterogeneous and many sided. Yet, the piecemeal approach seemed to have gone too far. Undoubtedly, the great anomaly of British colonial policy, whether interpreted by the Conservative or the
Labour, was the haphazard order in which colonies approached independence. It could hardly be disputed that the Mediterranean and West Indian colonies were more mature politically and educationally than the West African. But the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and the economic vulnerability of the West Indian territories had held them back from the head of the queue. Although there were differences between the Labour and the Conservative over the pace of constitutional advance in the colonies, the colonial policy was still bi-partisan in some areas. In the West Indies, the West Africa, and the Far East, it would be difficult to distinguish the policies of one party from the other. It was in the strategic bases and in the countries with a strong European minority that they tended to differ. The Conservatives were much less inclined to withdraw where a strong strategic interest was concerned. The Labour, according to its profession in the Opposition, were less inclined to let strategic considerations stand in the way of the march towards independence. The Conservatives did not wish to push forward the plural societies with strong European minority to self-government and independence under African majority and counselled caution. The Labour, on the other hand, wanted to move a little faster than the Conservatives in this respect. But both the parties, it would seem, had not allowed the question of a Colony's economic value to retard independence. In the world of growing nationalism and shifting powers, the Conservatives
had to present a balance between her obligations, her needs, and her responsibilities. By 1957, it was possible to see individual points where the Conservatives had made mistakes from which recovery had been slow and incomplete. But the balance was reasonably well held. The Conservatives' only major failure in the colonial Empire by 1957 was Cyprus, and there it was international, rather than colonial, complications which had bedevilled the issue.