Chapter Five
International Dimension of Security Dilemmas of Sri Lanka

Introduction

International dimension of national security dilemma is indeed crucial in the contemporary world scenario. International involvements of the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka have grown over the years with the escalation of the dispute between the two ethnic groups of the island. It has increased the number of international actors playing different roles in the ethnic conflict has rapidly increased over the years. The case of Sri Lanka is that of the most internalized ethnic conflicts in the world. In this broader paradigm, this chapter will thrust on the above-mentioned major theme, and the chapter will have sub-contents as,

1. Changing orientation of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict
2. Role of Norway in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict
3. The role of the United States of America in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict
4. Role of China in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict
5. Role of Pakistan in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict
6. Japan in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict
7. Role of the United Nations
8. Role of the Tamil Diaspora

5. 1. Changing Orientation of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict

After the withdrawal of the IPKF on 24 March 1990, the LTTE began to use guerrilla tactics and suicide bombers with a renewed vigour. Its most notable victim was late. Rajiv Gandhi, the former Indian Prime Minister, who had incidentally earlier ordered for the IPKF involvement in Sri Lanka. He was blown up by a suicide bomber
in May 1991. Similarly Sri Lankan President R. Premadasa was also assassinated by a suicide bomber in April 1993. Further more, the LTTE assassinated hundreds of military personnel political elite and ordinary people of Sri Lanka. Moreover, the LTTE either destroyed or damaged public property worth billons.

Against this background, with the election of the charismatic Ms. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga as President in 1994, there was a renewed hope for a peaceful settlement of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. Talks began with the LTTE but soon broke down in April 1995. This led to a shift by Kumaratunga from a pro-peace agenda to the ineptly titled ‘War for Peace policy’. This shift took place due to the gap between the aspirations of the two warring sides, each viewing the other as the spoiler.

Most civilians in the north-east only experienced the military aspect of the policy and the devolution proposal of President Kumaratunga overshadowed by the ongoing fighting. Although, the military scored some quick victories, notably retaking Jaffna in December 1995, it soon got bogged down as the LTTE returned to its guerrilla tactics. The government reverted to media censorship to cover up military reversals and atrocities committed by the security forces against the Tamils. At the same time, devolution proposals were stuck in the Parliament, with the Sinhalese opposition being unable to rise above their petty party-politics to support them. The LTTE also increased the frequency and intensity of its terrorist campaign in Colombo and the South. In April 2000, it seized the most fortified army base in the country and regained control of the strategic Elephant Pass; as many as 1,000 government soldiers

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1 See, N. Sathiya Moorthy (2008), India, Sri Lanka and the Ethnic War, New Delhi: Samskriti, pp. 07-08.
died in the fighting.\textsuperscript{4} With the defeat of Kumaratunga’s devolution proposals in Parliament in 2000, in an unholy mix of political and personal passions and the airport debacle, the failure of the whole concept of a “War for Peace” was complete. The Sinhala nationalist parties were divided in their approach to the LTTE.

In this context, with the success of the diplomatic efforts made by the international community to promote communication between the GOSL and the LTTE, the Norwegian Government came forward as the facilitator of dialogue.\textsuperscript{5} In a nutshell, instead of a finding military solution for the ethnic conflict, the GOSL proposed a political solution to amend the constitution. The LTTE expressed their willingness to give up demands for an independent state and agreed, in principle, to a federal solution.

5. 2. Role of Norway in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict

The Government of Norway is the second foreign country to attempt to act as an external facilitator in the Sri Lankan conflict, after the Indian involvement of the 1980s. As a third party facilitator, the role of Norway can be classified into two periods, which is under the PA government from 1994 to the end of 2001, and again from the end of 2002 to on 16 January 2008. Norway was first involved in the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka as a facilitator, after Ms. Kumaratunga swept to power in 1994. However, the Norwegian role was short-lived as the ceasefire ended with the resumption of hostilities by the LTTE in 1995.

In the mid 1998, President Kumaratunga again demonstrated her willingness to invite Norway to facilitate talks with the LTTE. In the late 1999, Kumaratunga administration attempted to revive the peace bid with Norwegian involvement,


however, by mid 2001, peace attempts were in limbo. After the election victory of the United National Party led coalition on the promise to re-establish peace talks in December 2001, Prime Minister Ranil Wikramasinghe again invited Norway to revive the peace talks.

5. 2. 1. Initiating Peace Process

With the diplomatic mediation of Norwegian representatives, the GOSL and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement on 23 February 2002, which was seen as Sri Lanka’s best hope for ending the ethnic conflict. (See Appendix VII) Moreover, Norway set up an international monitoring mission called the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), under the provision of the ceasefire agreement, comprising of representatives of the Nordic countries to inquire the violations of the terms and conditions of the ceasefire agreement. The SLMM established its offices in Sri Lanka and 53 officials from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland were monitoring the ceasefire.

Since the ceasefire agreement in 2002, Norway has been instrumental in arranging six rounds of peace talks between the GOSL and the LTTE. Thailand, Norway, Germany and Japan hosted peace talks while Norway facilitated the talks (See Table 01). Focus of the talks ranged from humanitarian and reconstruction issues, removal of anti-personnel land mines, accelerating resettlement and rehabilitation of internally displaced people and protection of the human rights.

Norway played a critical role to bring vital players such as, the Sri Lankan opposition political parties, India, Japan and the international community to attract

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8 Melanie Nakagawa (2005), Sri Lanka: Negotiating an Interim Agreement, Japan: Public International Law & Policy Group, pp. 03-04.
support for the peace process. Norway played a realistic role to ensure the support of India for the peace process. India was kept in the know of the peace process and all decisions were intimated it. Further, Norway repeatedly appealed the international community to continue supporting the peace drive to end the conflict.⁹

Table 5.1.

Norway Facilitation for the Sri Lankan Peace Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-18 September 2002</td>
<td>Sattahip Naval Base, Thailand</td>
<td>Set up Joint Task Force for humanitarian mine action, accelerating resettlement and rehabilitation in the North and east</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October-03 November 2002</td>
<td>Bangkok Rose Garden, Thailand</td>
<td>Formed sub-committees, focused on humanitarian, de-escalation and political issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02-05 December 2002</td>
<td>Oslo, Norway</td>
<td>Consolidation of the ceasefire, Humanitarian and rehabilitation action and Political matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-08 February 2003</td>
<td>Berlin, Germany</td>
<td>Issues in relation to human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-21 March 2003</td>
<td>Hakone, Japan</td>
<td>To lay a foundation for a donor conference that Japan had offered to host in early June.</td>
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The internal rupture in the Sri Lankan government, Norway attempted to reconcile the differences between the GOSL and the President. Meanwhile, Norwegian representatives reported the progress of the peace process between the government and the LTTE to the opposition political parties, particularly the Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

On 25 November 2002, Norway held an international donor conference in Oslo that attracted government representatives from the Asia-Pacific region, North America and Europe. At the conference, representatives expressed strong support to

the peace process initiated by the Norwegian government and committed to providing financial assistance. In this regard, Norway made financial and humanitarian assistance for the north-east rehabilitation process of Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{10} The main objective of the grant was reduction of poverty through employment leading to corresponding reductions in social tension and political conflict.

The internal political process brought about a further fracture in the Government by the narrow November 2005 election victory of a perceived hardliner President Mahinda Rajapaksa led to a further escalation of violence between government security forces and LTTE cadres. After the GOSL notified Norway of its decision of 02 January 2008 to terminate the Ceasefire Agreement with effect from 16 January 2008, Norway expressed its strong concerns about the termination of the 2002 CFA by the GOSL. It emphasized that their belief is that there is no military solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka, and reiterated its support for a negotiated settlement.

During the period of the civil war, Norway expressed its deep concern about the human rights situation and for the protection of civilians in Sri Lanka, and called for continued monitoring of the human rights situation by such means as to assure an appropriate role for the UN.\textsuperscript{11} In the meantime, Norway issued a joint statement urging the Tamil Tigers to lay down their arms and end hostilities, as there was just a short time before the Tigers lose all the territory still under their control.\textsuperscript{12}


5. 2. 2. Dilemma of the Norwegian Mediation

The bipartisan nature of the Sri Lankan polity accentuated its stand on the peace process. This led to scoring points on the peace mission of Norway in Sri Lanka that has not been all smooth and trouble free. The SLMM led by Norway did not make use of the committees to enforce the stipulations of the agreement in the LTTE-controlled districts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. Beyond that, the LTTE was allowed to operate politically in the government-controlled areas, although no provisions were made, which would have allowed the political parties to expand their activities into the LTTE-controlled areas. Moreover, it was agreed that Tamil groups such as the EPDP, which had previously cooperated with the government in the Tamil areas, would be disarmed, giving the LTTE a de facto monopoly of power in the Tamil areas. Further, the LTTE began to levy ‘taxes’ for the use of the reopened main thoroughfare to Jaffna.

The peace mission of Norway was being discredited as being pro-LTTE. In addition to this, during the period of the ceasefire, the LTTE has been politically and militarily strengthened while the GOSL has been weakened. The LTTE is said to have killed 44 intelligence operatives of the GOSL during this period. They brought in illegal ship loads of weapons and built up its arms base, continued forcible recruitment of child soldiers, engaged in extortion, abductions, silencing and killing of political dissidents. Relatives of Tamil victims have attributed 38 political killings to the LTTE during the ceasefire up to September 2003. The CFA was itself under enormous strain due to almost daily violations by the LTTE, which at the end of August 2005 reached a total of 3113 as against 141 by the government.13 It is

important to mention here that there was not well establish machinery under the Norwegian mediation to overcome these circumstances.

The peace mission became an issue of bipartisan and opportunistic politics to gain short term political benefits. In the case of the political crisis between the President and the Prime Minister, the Norwegians suspended their role in Sri Lanka on 14 November 2003. The divided society in Sri Lanka criticized the Norwegians for being biased towards the LTTE. From the early stage of the peace efforts of Norway, the political opposition of the country, led by the President Kumaratunga has been strongly critical of the Norwegian role. At the same time, President Kumaratunga who made a turn around complained that the role of Oslo in assisting the LTTE in the procurement of a powerful FM radio transmitter raised serious questions about her impartiality. Kumaratunga advocated that the peace process led by her political rival, led to the division of the country. Therefore, she considered that the role of Norway in Sri Lanka endangers the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island nation. The President also criticised among other things, the determination of the demarcation line between the LTTE and the armed forces as well as the arbitration of disputes lay with the SLMM whose members were recruited from Scandinavian countries. The insecurity of the ruling elite in Sri Lanka greatly affected the peace mission and role the international actors.

Apart from the main opposition political party, the Sinhala political parties such as the JVP and the JHU also accused Norway of being empathising with the Sri Lankan terrorist groups since 1980s and being markedly antipathetic to the handling of the ethnic issue in the country. Sinhala nationalists accused Norway of being biased towards the LTTE with the influence of a sizeable Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora living in

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the country. What is forgotten these extreme right Sinhala parties hijacked the peace mission agenda and this works in a deeply divided and insecure society? Politicians have played on these fears and won elections as well.

Several scholars also alleged that Norway has politically, financially, technologically and diplomatically supported the LTTE since the 1980s accepting their separatist agenda.\textsuperscript{15} According to the Asian Tribune, Norway and Denmark are the two essential countries who have supported the LTTE in funding terrorism in Sri Lanka. Norway was funding the LTTE through payments made by the Norwegian Government Agency (NORAD) and Red Barna. In 2005, the LTTE front organization, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), received 2.2 million of US dollars from Erik Solheim.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, the most important support of the Government of Norway has given in support of the LTTE is through her role as an international door-opener. Similarly, the Government of Norway has allowed the LTTE to establish their international communication headquarters in Oslo. During the period of the ceasefire, the LTTE imported very sophisticated radio equipment and V-Sat equipments through Norwegian diplomatic channel.\textsuperscript{17}

5. 3. The United States of America in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict

When Ceylon achieved independence within the British Commonwealth in 1948, the Government of the United States of America was one of the first few countries to recognise Ceylon. Further, the exchange of diplomatic representatives in 1950 reflects the continued growth of close and cordial relations between both countries. Since independence, Sri Lanka tried to develop a close relationship with the


USA. In this context, Sri Lanka and the USA reached two controversial agreements on the Oil Tank Farm Development Project at Trincomalee and the Extension of Facilities to the Voice of America in 1983. More than anything else, those agreements were related to the USA strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region rather than the commercial or trade cooperation with Sri Lanka.

Further, the US supported the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. The US was of the opinion that a settlement to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka should be based on the devolution of power. In 1980s, the USA openly supported the mediatory role of India in Sri Lanka. Since 1994, the USA has strongly supported the proposed constitutional changes of the Sri Lanka government known as ‘the devolution or peace package’. In the mean time, the USA designated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997 and demands that the Tigers lay down their arms.

After 9/11 the US took a very strong stand against all types of terrorist violence. It displayed a greater interest in South Asia and in the developments of Sri Lanka. The US made it very clear that Washington has its support towards the GOSL. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wikremesinghe met the USA President George W. Bush twice since the peace process began in 2002. Improved relations with the USA were of crucial importance for the Wikremesinghe administration, unlike his later successors, as Washington has become one of the most significant members of the international safety net. In 2002, the USA called upon the LTTE to adhere to the ceasefire agreement. The US also welcomed the ceasefire agreement between the GOSL and LTTE.

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In the Tokyo Donors’ Conference of 2003, as a Co-Chair, the US encouraged the GOSL to find a peaceful solution for the ethnic conflict and urged an end to the violence, a return to negotiation, and the preservation of the ceasefire agreement of 2002. Further, the USA pledged $54 million, including $40.4 million of The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding. In FY 2006, the USA granted US$ 20 million, about half as Economic Support Funds meant to support the peace process through democracy and governance programs. The USA has taken a keen interest in the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka and convened a meeting in Washington, D. C. on 14-15 April 2003, which saw 21 countries and 16 organizations pledged $ 3.5 billion over three years to the peace process. The US had designated the LTTE as a terrorist organization since October 1997 and consequently the LTTE was not invited to the conference.20

Even though the USA denied to supply any kind of military hardware as contradictory to its overall objective regarding the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, the arms supplied to Sri Lanka by Pakistan, China and Singapore are believed to be from the US, which does not wish to be seen as directly involved. Further it has been believed that military hardware have been supplied by the USA through the Israeli Interest Section that was set up under the auspices of the USA Embassy in Colombo on 24 May 1984.21

Since 1994, Sri Lanka and the USA military cooperation have been growing in term of providing limited military assistance and the United States Special Forces

(USSF) have been training the Sri Lankan Army. Moreover, in 2002, Sri Lanka signed an agreement with the United States Foreign Military Financing (USFMF) programme that would provide training to the Sri Lanka military. The training was estimated to cost $2.2 million and continued from August 2003 to February 2004.

In 2004, USFMF granted to $2.5 million to Sri Lanka and its grants increased up to $5 million in 2005. In addition to this, the USA has increased its military credits under its USFMF programme: from $496,000 in 2005 to an estimated $1 million in 2006. Furthermore, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding for Sri Lanka was $200,000-$250,000 in 2006 and in the fiscal year (FY) 2007, the IMET granted USA $540,000 to professionalize the Sri Lankan military at the USA military training institutions and through mobile training teams.

In addition to this, in July 2004, the United States Coast Guard transferred the donated USCG Cutter Courageous offshore patrol vessel to the Sri Lanka Navy. In FY 2007 Sri Lanka was eligible to receive granting the Excess Defence Articles (EDA) under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. The EDA is improving Sri Lanka’s maritime interdiction capability by providing spare parts, operational and maintenance support, and communications equipment.

Similarly, Sri Lanka and the USA signed the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) on 05 March 2007 providing for mutual logistical support during humanitarian missions, peace keeping operations, and joint military exercises. The agreement will be in force for 10 years. In 2007, the USA granted Sri Lanka with a radar-based maritime surveillance system and several advanced inflatable boats under

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Section 1206 of the National Defence Authorization. The Commander of the United States Pacific Command, Adm. Robert Willard, visited Sri Lanka in January 2008 to meet with his naval counterparts there and review ongoing maritime cooperation. Additionally, the USA is integrating intelligence, law enforcement, legal and diplomatic efforts against terrorism in Sri Lanka.

It is important to mention here that the USA had put an enormous pressure on the LTTE by increasing her attention to the fundraising and other activities by the LTTE and the Tamil Diaspora. This was made clear in August 2006 when The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested eight persons in the USA, charging them with conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization- ‘the LTTE’. The defendants were accused of attempting to purchase surface-to-air missiles and other weapons.

When the ethnic violence sparked in mid-2006, with major government military offensives in 2007 and Colombo’s formal withdrawal from the ceasefire agreement in January 2008, US policy supported peaceful efforts to reform democratic political system of Sri Lanka in a way that provides for full political participation of all communities. When the GOSL officially pulled out of the Ceasefire Agreement, the USA has shown deep regrets on this decision by the GOSL. Thus, the USA President Barack Obama urged Sri Lanka to stop ‘indiscriminate shelling’ of civilians and urged the Tamil Tiger rebels to lay down

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In addition to this, the US insisted that this is an opportunity for Sri Lanka to turn the page on its past and build a Sri Lanka rooted in democracy, tolerance, and respect for human rights.\footnote{Press Release (2009), “The United States Remains Deeply Concerned”, Washington: The US Department of State, 19 May 2009.} Further the USA insisted that it is the time for the government to engage the Tamils, Sinhalese, and other Sri Lankans to create a political arrangement that promotes and protects the rights of all the Sri Lankans. Moreover, the USA also made a request from the GOSL to provide for the needs of the 280,000 civilians who are Tamils currently living in the relief camps.

5. 4. Role of China in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict

People’s Republic of China and Sri Lankan official diplomatic relations goes back to February 1957. However, since 1952, both the countries have started only bilateral trade relations. In 1952, Sri Lanka and China entered into a bilateral trade agreement known as Ceylon-China Trade Agreement with the firm objective of enhancing trade and mutual relations between them.\footnote{See, Shelton U. Kodikara (1982), Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka: A Third World Perspective, New Delhi: Chanakya Publications, p. 173-181.}

The Chinese supports remain one of special interest to Sri Lanka. It is more strategic than political. Though China maintained that the ethnic conflict was an internal affair of Sri Lanka, she was one of the important extra regional powers, which supplied arms to Sri Lanka in considerable quantity. So China is a major source of arms supplies to the GOSL. In 1984, China agreed to supply new military equipment to the GOSL, some of which was made for counter insurgency operations. In this
context, since 1984, China has been supplying various defensive and offensive arms. Among them, it provided gunboats, T-56 assault rifles, F-7 fighter jets and Infantry Fighting Vehicles. Arms supply of China is partly a friendly response to the request of Sri Lanka for assistance, but it could also be ‘a part of her export drive in promoting arms sales abroad’.  

Especially in the last decade, trade between the two countries has steadily expanded, culminating in the signing of a China-Sri Lanka Joint Communiqué in September 2005. This served as a benchmark for future expansion of the bilateral relationship, which Gotabaya Rajapakse, Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary, recently highlighted that. ‘The president went to China three times, I went five times,’ he said. ‘Sometimes, the president speaks to the Chinese premier by phone. We have set up good relations. We have understood who is important to us.’ 31 During his visit to China, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse held talks with the Government of China, covering an in-depth exchange of views on all aspects of China-Sri Lanka relations and on regional and international issues of common concern. During their talks, Rajapakse said that the two countries enjoyed long-term friendliness and Sri Lanka’s new government will continue to carry out friendly policy toward China and dedicate to the all-round cooperation. 32

Further China increased its arms sales significantly to Sri Lanka in 2007, when the US and India suspended military aid. In 2008, Sri Lanka signed a classified $37.6 million deal to buy Chinese ammunition and ordnance for its army and navy. It was beneficial for Colombo in its war against the LTTE. Since 2007 China has encouraged

Pakistan also to sell weapons to Sri Lanka and to train Sri Lankan pilots to fly the Chinese fighters.\textsuperscript{33} Further, Chinese Jian-7 fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns, JY-11 3D air surveillance radars and other supplied weapons have played a central role in the Sri Lankan military successes against the LTTE.\textsuperscript{34}

Like other countries, China too did not criticize the mediation of India and Norwegians facilitation in the ethnic conflict as it was accepted by Sri Lanka. However, China was critical of the support of the support for the Tamil militant in 1980s by India. In 1983, Chinese Prime Minister informed the GOSL that ethnic problem of a country is strictly an internal affairs and no other country had the right to interfere.\textsuperscript{35}

The Government of China urges the territorial integrity, peace and stability of Sri Lanka. China welcomed the ceasefire agreement between the GOSL and the LTTE in 2002. With the collapse of the peace talks in 2003, China articulated that the peace process of Sri Lanka could be continued.\textsuperscript{36} In March 2006, China welcomed the resumption of the peace talks between the GOSL and the LTTE and promised help to improve the infrastructure and repair port facilities damaged by tsunami in December 2004 of the island nation. And also China expressed its desire to support Sri Lankan government’s effort to promote national stability, reconciliation and economic development.\textsuperscript{37}

In addition to this, China has also used it veto power in the UN Security Council, blocking the efforts to put Sri Lanka on the agenda in its fight against the


\textsuperscript{37} - Ibid -
LTTE. In the middle part of 2009, China defended Sri Lanka in the UN Security Council and the UNHRC declaring that the civil war in Sri Lanka was an internal matter of Sri Lanka and was not a threat to the international security. As soon as Colombo declared victory in the war against the LTTE, Chinese government took friendly note of it.\textsuperscript{38}

In 1952, prior to its establishment of diplomatic relations with China, Sri Lanka, ignoring the sanction of some Western countries against China, signed the trade agreement on rubber for rice with China, thus ushering in friendly cooperation in economic and trade fields between China and Sri Lanka. Bilateral trade From 1953 to 1982, Sino- Sri Lankan trade was Accounts-keeping trade, and since 1983, this bilateral trade has been conducted in the form of cash settlement. In 2002, the traded volume between China and Sri Lanka totalled US$ 0.35 billion, down 11.4\% from 2001, of which China’s exports accounted for US$ 0.34 billion and its imports US$10 million.

Chinese economic assistance to Sri Lanka grew five-fold last year to touch $1 billion, thus displacing Japan as Sri Lanka’s largest donor. There is also a visible increase in China’s presence across the island. In the capital Colombo, China is funding the construction of a performing arts theatre. At Norochcholai in Puttalam district, north of Colombo, it is constructing a coal power plant and in the Mannar area China has been awarded a block for exploration of oil and gas.\textsuperscript{39}

And at Hambantota, 230 kilometers south of Colombo, the Chinese are building a port at an estimated cost of $1 billion-over 85\% of the project is being funded by the Chinese. The four-phase project is scheduled to be completed in 15

\textsuperscript{38} M. K. Bhadrakumar (28 May 2009), “Sri Lanka Wards off Western Bullying”, \textit{Asia Times-South Asia}, [Online-web], Accessed on 04 July 2009, URL: \url{http://www.atimes.com}

years and work on the first phase began in 2007. The second phase envisages construction of an industrial port with a 1,000-meter jetty and an oil refinery. The entire project will include construction of a gas-fired power plant, a ship repair unit, a bunkering terminal, an oil refinery and storage facilities for aviation fuel and liquefied petroleum gas. The construction of the new port when completed will directly provide 6000 new jobs and 50,000 to 100,000 jobs as indirect employment.\(^{40}\)

5. 5. Role of Pakistan in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka are generally warm. Sri Lanka’s ties with Pakistan are warming gradually. Like China, the Government Pakistan also provides direct military assistance to Sri Lanka. Given their anti-Indian postures in foreign policy the China and Pakistan military support to Sri Lanka is not surprising.\(^{41}\) Apart from the supply of arms and ammunition, Pakistan provided facilities in Pakistan for the Sri Lankan security forces in countering guerrilla warfare. It is claimed that the Pakistani mercenaries have been advising the Sri Lankan government on counter-insurgency measures.

Though initial reports of Sri Lankan request for arms to Pakistan were denied, Pakistan contributed Rs. 10 million in 1983, towards relief assistance and gave an option to the Sri Lankan government to utilise it for the purchase of consumer goods. During his visit in April 1984, President Jayewardene requested the Government of Pakistan to provide military help to deal with the ethnic problem of his country. About a month later, Sri Lanka received a large quantity of weapons like AK 47 and M-16 from Pakistan for its fight against the Tamil separatists. Further, an estimated


8000 Sri Lankan officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and other ranks completed their courses in counter insurgency, artillery and basic training Pakistan.\textsuperscript{42}

During his five-day visit to Sri Lanka in December 1985, President Zia-Ul-Haq was categorical about the support of Pakistan for Sri Lanka, in its war against ‘terrorism’ and he called upon the neighbours and friends of Sri Lanka to give maximum support to preserve its unity and integrity.\textsuperscript{43} During his visit, the GOSL significantly expressed the gratitude of Sri Lanka to Pakistan for its practical support to their efforts to combat Tamil guerrillas. Jayewardene continued to maintain the friendly ties established with Pakistan under the previous regime, and even nurtured personal rapport with Zia-Ul Haq. One writer indeed has suggested that Zia-Ul Haq, with his influence in the West Asian countries, personally helped Jayewardene to neutralize the strong Arab opposition to the establishment of the Israeli Interests Section in Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{44}

The most encouraging support from Colombo in the wake of Indian intervention came from Pakistan. Pakistan strongly condemned the Indian action and offered all possible help in defence of Sri Lankan sovereignty. This led to reports that Sri Lanka was considering a Pakistani offer to strengthen its air-defence system. During his discussion with Sri Lankan Minister of Education, Ranil Wikramsinghe, and Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali, Zia-Ul Haq assured that ‘Pakistan will welcome all opportunities for further consolidating the existing friendly relations’.\textsuperscript{45}

Sri Lanka started buying arms and ammunition from Pakistan in a big way from 1999. In May 2000, President Musharraf of Pakistan supplied millions of dollars

\textsuperscript{44} P. R. Kumarasamy (1987), Op. Cit, p. 1352.
of much-needed weapons to the Sri Lankan government, when separatist Tamil Tiger rebels were about to recapture their former capital of Jaffna. With India reluctant to sign a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Sri Lanka and unwilling to supply it with the kind of weapons it is looking for, Colombo has turned increasingly to Pakistan. There are segments of opinion in Sri Lanka that are in fact in favour of the government finalizing a defence cooperation agreement with Islamabad. The total arms purchases from Pakistan until December 2007 were worth $50 million. In May 2008, the Sri Lanka Army held talks with his Pakistan Army counter-parts regarding the sale of military equipment, weapons and ammunition. The sale of 22 Al-Khalid MBTs to the Sri Lanka Army was finalized during these talks in a deal worth over US$100 million. In April 2009, Sri Lanka requested $25 million worth of 81 mm, 120 mm and 130 mm mortar ammunition.

With the Chinese encouragement and close relationship with the GOSL, Pakistan has boosted its annual military assistance loans to Sri Lanka to nearly $100 million. Since 2007, China has encouraged Pakistan to sell weapons to Sri Lanka and to train Sri Lankan pilots to fly the Chinese fighters because most of the western countries and India suspended their military aid. During the period of the ceasefire, the Government of Pakistan expressed appreciation and support for the efforts of Sri Lanka to consolidate the peace process and preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. With the abolition of the ceasefire agreement in 2008, President Musharraf said, ‘Pakistan well understood the challenge faced by Sri Lanka and expressed my support for the efforts of the government in its fight against terrorism and to preserve Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’.46

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After the victory of Sri Lanka over Tamil terrorism on 18 May 2009, the Government of Pakistan stated that Pakistan has always been a steadfast friend of Sri Lanka and strongly supported the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

Pakistan is the second largest trading partner of Sri Lanka within the South Asian region. Sri Lanka was the first country to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Pakistan. Free Trade Agreement between Pakistan and Sri Lanka is operational from June 12, 2005. Covering 100 per cent duty concession offered by Pakistan on 206 products and by Sri Lanka on 102 products the FTA has been implemented.

Items in the zero duty list of Pakistan include frozen fish, vegetables, spices, fruits/juices, polymers of vinyl chloride in primary forms, natural rubber, raw silk, tanned/crust skins, wool, some varieties of paper and board, carpet and floor covering, non-alloy aluminium, iron and steel products and toys/dolls. Sri Lanka’s nil duty items under the FTA include chickpeas, dates, oranges, benzene, toluene, apparel and clothing accessories, ball bearing, penicillin/streptomycin/tetracycline and their derivatives and vacuum flasks.47

5. 6. Japan in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict

It is important to mention here that Japan has been another important actor in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and the peace process. Japan is also one of major partner of the international mediation led by Norway, assisted by the USA. Despite its long and friendly relationship with Colombo, Tokyo showed no interest in becoming involved in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict until the CFA initiated by Norway. Some assume that the neglect shown by Japan towards the Sri Lankan conflict was a

consequence of the Cold War politics. Thus, the end of bipolar confrontation paved way for Japan to pay more attention to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.

Both the GOSL and the LTTE welcomed the involvement of Japan in the peace talks. On 15 August 2002, Japan formally announced its participation in the peace process by appointing Mr. Yasushi Akashi as the representative of the Government of Japan for peace building, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Sri Lanka. In the aid meeting at Oslo of 25 November 2002, Mr. Akashi made the objectives of Japan clear as participation in the peace process of Sri Lanka. Those objectives are as follows.

1. Japan has in the past ten years had been engaged in the post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction in Cambodia, Afghanistan, East Timor and elsewhere and now it has decided to give its support and commitment to accelerating the peace process in Sri Lanka.

2. The ‘peace dividend’ in the form of reconstruction and rehabilitation should be evenly distributed taking into account the balance between the north-eastern and southern part of the country and the equally sensitive balance between Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims.

3. As the largest external donor country to Sri Lanka, contribution of Japan to the social and economic development of the country would continue in a positive spirit.

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48 S. Chandrasekharan (2003), “Sri Lanka: Japan and Peace Talks-There is a Need to Tread Carefully”, Update No. 44, South Asian Analysis Group, p. 179.
4. Japan will positively involve itself in the reconstruction support in the north and east and would appeal to the two parties to achieve sustainable peace.

5. Japan is ready to continue to contribute to the Sub-Committee on Intermediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation as an Adviser.

It suffices to say, as head of a 16 member high-level Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace (AGICP), Mr. Yasushi Akashi visited Sri Lanka including northeast a number of times, since his appointment in September 2002. He also visited New Delhi to discuss some issues relating to the peace process.

Since November 2002, representative of the Government of Japan, Yasushi Akashi, on the Peace Building, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Sri Lanka, has visited Sri Lanka several times and discussed with the GOSL leaders and various other political parties, representatives of international organizations, and others to work on a steady progress for the peace process of Sri Lanka, and to exchange views on such matters as the challenges and future outlook of the peace process. On December 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Fukuda said that achieving peace in Sri Lanka was essential to further strengthen the relationship between the two countries, and that it was important to achieve a solution not only by using force but also by political steps. He also said that it was also important to produce a devolution package under the leadership of a strong President, and propose it to all the parties concerned, including the LTTE as soon as possible so that the devolution package would present the basis of political dialogue among them.49

On 03 January 2008, the Government of Japan was deeply concerned over the decision taken by the GOSL to withdraw from the CFA with the rebel organization, the LTTE, which was reached in 2002. The Government of Japan also called on the parties concerned to reach a solution not by violence but by political means through negotiation.\textsuperscript{50} Further, Japan reiterated the importance of ensuring safety of civilians including internally displaced persons and their freedom of movement, and the access of aid workers to the civilians. The Government of Japan was concerned over the serious humanitarian situation facing the internally displaced persons in Sri Lanka, and made a cabinet decision on 15 May 2009 to provide humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{51}

Following the end to the military conflict between government troops and the LTTE on 18 May 2009, Japan welcomed the GOSL and expressed its sympathy for the many precious lives lost over twenty-five years of civil war. Moreover, Japan insisted that the Government of Japan will continue to support the GOSL in its efforts towards national reconciliation.

5. 6. 1. Impact of the Tokyo Donor Conference

In June 2003, Japan organized a donor conference ‘Regain Sri Lanka’ in Tokyo. The main objectives of Tokyo declaration were to provide the international community with an opportunity to demonstrate its strong and unified commitment to the reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka and to encourage the parties to redouble their effort to make further progress in the peace process.\textsuperscript{52}


Around 50 countries and 20 international organizations attended this mammoth aid conference.\textsuperscript{53} The donor conference discussed the peace negotiations and international assistance for the development and reconstruction in Sri Lanka. The donors pledged aid over US$ 4.5 billion. Out of this sum, Japan alone promised US$ 01 billion to be disbursed over three years. At the Conference, the international community demonstrated its strong and unified commitment and support to reconstruction and development of the entirety of Sri Lanka, including the war-torn North and East. The Conference confirmed the importance of the inter-linkage between the implementation of the assistance to Sri Lanka by the international community and the progress of the peace process. Before the aid conference, Japan had promised 33.6 billion yen in easy-term yen loans as a part of its assistance aimed at peace consolidation. This amount earmarked for projects such as rural development and power generation brings the cumulative total of Japanese yen loans to Sri Lanka to 622.5 billion yen. Similarly, the post-war reconstruction plans of Japan have been underscored by substantial financial contributions.

In addition to this, the refusal of the LTTE to attend the Tokyo Aid Conference undermined the Japanese initiative and endangered the peace process in general. Japan strongly insisted the LTTE to attend the conference as one of the important steps to consolidate momentum in the peace process.\textsuperscript{54} The LTTE rejection signalled that only the financial inducement was not enough to push the fragile peace process in the island.

5. 7. Role of the United Nations

Sri Lanka became a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) in 1955. Since then the UN is supporting different types of programme in Sri Lanka. Although the UN is partly a donor, most of its funding comes through bilateral donors. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the lead agency for the UN development activities in Sri Lanka and, as elsewhere, it works primarily through the government. Its development work in the south focuses on governance, poverty alleviation, human rights and gender.

Apart from this, the UN agencies have gradually become more prominent in the war-torn parts of Sri Lanka in the early parts of the 1990s, and with the ‘war for peace’ their programmes become rather substantial. The take over of the Sri Lankan Army of Jaffna in 1995 was the trigger for increased UNDP involvement in the north east, through the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) of the UN rehabilitation and reconstruction effort in Jaffna. In 1995, a United Nations Emergency Task Force (UNETF) was established to monitor the humanitarian situation in the Jaffna peninsula and to co-ordinate rehabilitation assistance. Those agencies faced severe restrictions in their humanitarian work such as refugee settlement, food and medical supplies, arranging humanitarian corridors, exchange of slain combatants and other similar activities.

Subsequent to signing the ceasefire agreement in February 2002, the GOSL requested the UN system to support the socio economic aspects of the peace process. In response, there was a high level UN mission to Sri Lanka in April/May of 2002, which after consultation with the relevant stakeholders of the UN formulated strategy to support the Sri Lankan Peace Process. Further, the UN highly appreciated and
welcomed the ceasefire agreement between the GOSL and the LTTE.\textsuperscript{55} Especially, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expressed their commitment to the peace process and the ethnic conflict. It has been involved in resettling refugees displaced by the war. Moreover, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) painstakingly tried to end the recruitment of the child soldier by the LTTE in the northern and eastern provinces. The UNDP to map and ferret out stray mines in the Northern and Eastern provinces is also another involvement in the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka.

Despite the GOSL began an offensive against the LTTE in 2006 and the abolition of the ceasefire agreement by the GOSL in 2008, the UN System continues to engage in the socio economic aspects of the sustainable peace in close partnership with the GOSL. The UN has also been involved in providing relief assistance to the hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankans trapped or displaced by the fighting. On 21 February 2009, the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocated US $10 million in order to help UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration assist thousands of civilians affected by the conflict.\textsuperscript{56}

Further, John Holmes, the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Humanitarian Coordinator, who visited Sri Lanka in August 2007, acknowledged that ‘the situation which had gone through a bad period was getting better’.\textsuperscript{57} In a statement released on 16 January 2009, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator called upon the LTTE to


allow civilians to be able to move freely in areas where they feel most secure and for the Government to receive newly displaced people according to internationally agreed principles. Moreover the UNICEF also called on the LTTE to ensure the free movement of hundreds of thousands of children out of conflict areas. As a result of the resumption of heavy fighting between the military and the LTTE, the UN Secretary-General expressed his deep concern about the safety and well-being of civilians caught in intensified fighting in the Vanni Region of Sri Lanka and called on both parties to respect ‘no fire zones’, ‘safe areas’ and the ‘civilian infrastructure’, including schools, medical facilities, humanitarian facilities and assets. He also made a special request to the parties involved in the conflict to stop using heavy-calibre weaponry, including mortars, in the areas with high civilian concentrations. In his statement dated on 30 January 2009, the Secretary-General welcomed the announcement of President Mahinda Rajapaksa of safe passage for all civilians trapped in the area of intense fighting in the North to a secure environment. Further, he urged the GOSL and the LTTE to do all in their power to make this safe passage a reality, and to ensure the protection of civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law.

In the meantime, in March 2009, diplomats from USA, Britain, France, and Austria had been open to holding a formal discussion in the Security Council on the situation in Sri Lanka. However, Russia, China, Libya and Vietnam had opposed putting the issue on the agenda of the UN Security Council considering the war as an internal matter rather than a threat to international peace and security.

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59 United Nations (30 January 2009), “Secretary General Welcomes Sri Lankan President’s Announcement of safe Passage to Secure Environment for Civilians Trapped in Fighting in North”, Secretary-General SG/SM/12078, New York: Department of Public Information.
Furthermore, on 13 May 2009, the UN Security Council members, Austria, Mexico and Costa Rica backed by the USA and Britain, called for an informal briefing on the humanitarian crisis faced by the tens of thousands of people trapped by the war in northern part of Sri Lanka. China, supported by Russia, blocked the move declaring that it was an internal matter for Sri Lanka and was not a threat to international security. At this moment, the UN Security Council for the first time voiced grave concern over civilian deaths in the war in Sri Lanka and demanded that the security forces and the LTTE take urgent action to protect civilians. Members of the Security Council strongly condemned the LTTE for its acts of terrorism over many years and demanded that the LTTE lay down its arms and allow those still in the conflict zone to leave. At the same time, Council members acknowledged the legitimate right of the GOSL to combat terrorism and expressed deep concern at the reports of continued use of heavy calibre weapons in areas with high concentrations of civilians, and expected the GOSL to fulfil its commitment in this regard. It also called on the Government to take further steps to facilitate the evacuation of the trapped civilians and the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance.60

In addition to this, the eleventh special session against Sri Lanka convened in Geneva on 27 May 2009 at the request of 17, out of the 47 members of the UNHRC, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Britain, and with special initiative of the EU aimed at forcing Sri Lanka to face charges of gross human-rights violations in its war against the LTTE. In the resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 29 in favour for GOSL, 12 against, and 6 abstentions, the Council commended the measures taken by the GOSL to address the urgent needs of the internally displaced persons and welcomed the continued commitment of Sri

Lanka to the promotion and protection of human rights for all, and encouraged it to continue to uphold its human rights obligations and the norms of international human rights law.\textsuperscript{61}

With fighting ended on 18 May 2009, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said that its ultimate objective is to support the efforts of the government to restore normalcy in the lives of the population by ensuring that they return home as soon as conditions are in place. In the meantime, the agency insisted that it is working with the GOSL to provide urgently needed aid to the hundreds of thousands who fled the conflict zone. Issuing a joint statement on 23 May 2009 at the conclusion of the visit of the UN Secretary-General to Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan President and the Secretary General agreed that addressing the aspirations and grievances of all communities is a priority, and that all forces are working towards a lasting political solution, which was fundamental to ensuring long-term socio-economic development in Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{5. 8. Role of Tamil Diaspora}

The 1983 riot is considered to be the watershed for the expansion of Tamil Diaspora around the World since the ethnic conflict began. The violence in Colombo and some other southern cities generated a massive number of displaced Tamil people who initially became refugees in South India and consequently settled in various parts of the world. Majority of them ended up in Europe and North America where the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora is significant today.


In addition to this, the growing sympathy towards the Sri Lankan Tamils within the international community is an important factor for the rapid expansion of the Tamil Diaspora. A number of western states swiftly changed their immigration and refugee laws to accommodate Tamil exodus. The pressure from the Tamil expatriates of older generation played a vital role in getting immigration laws changed to accommodate new Tamil migrants. In 1983, there were 225,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India, mostly living in Tamil Nadu either in refugee camps, with friends, relatives or in rented houses.

Table 5.2. 
Tamil Diaspora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-East</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fiji, South Africa &amp; Papua</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Guinea</td>
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<td>500</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, a wave of migrants occurred as the LTTE successively banned TELO, EPRLF, PLOTE and all other groups including the TULF, from functioning in the North-East. Thereafter, the LTTE embarked on a killing spree that shocked even the Tamil community. At least 20,000 militants left for Canada or to Europe to sought asylum. As a result, there are at least 8000 former militants in Canada and 5000 in the UK seeking refuge from the LTTE. It is estimated that the members of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora exceeds 650,000 and are scattered in around 60 countries of

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the world.\textsuperscript{65} Even though there are no reliable statistics available of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora, in 1997 statistical estimates are as follows,

The expanding Tamil communities around the world spearheaded a massive propaganda campaign against the GOSL in the aftermath of the 1983 riots. Tamil organizations mushroom in every large European cities and have made a concerted effort against the GOSL. One of the earliest and most active Tamil overseas expatriate centres, with its own Tamil Eelam information service, came up in London. In 1983, the first World Tamil Eelam Conference was held in New York which was attended by over 200 delegates from various countries.\textsuperscript{66}

The Tamils have established their own publication, newspapers, news bulletins, radios and television channels around the world. According to analysis, the Tamils are using over 40 different official newspapers published in various languages for their propaganda purposes.\textsuperscript{67} In this respect the Tamil Monitor published by the Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations is worthy to note. Moreover, a high proportion of the academic, professional and technically qualified Tamil personnel held lucrative and responsible appointments in a variety of international, multinational and national organizations around the globe. They have orchestrated the case, internationally, for an independent Tamil state, with great effect and have argued trenchantly against manifested impossibility of achieving Sinhala-Tamil unity, let alone amity, by the use of force. It is important to mention here, that the Tamil Diaspora effectively uses the electronic media including internet facilities against the GOSL and the Sinhala people. In this connection, Margaret Trawick mentions \textit{just as}

The Vietnam War was the first television war, the War in Sri Lanka may be the first internet war.68

The increase awareness of terrorism in the international community has put additional pressure on the ethnic Diaspora. This new development has also helped the GOSL to fight the material contribution of the Diaspora to the LTTE. Since 1983 riots, the LTTE has well-established network with the Tamil Diaspora. The Tamil Diaspora also has financially contributed to the ethnic conflict. Although, many believed that there was no critical necessity for the Tamil Diaspora to provide support for militancy during the pre-1983 period, the level of Diaspora support increased after the burning of the Jaffna library in 1981.

It is said that the Tamil expatriate groups of North America, Europe, South-East Asia, Africa and the Middle East raised funds for the war expenditure of the LTTE. The LTTE has been particularly skilful in mobilizing Tamil Diaspora as their primary source of funding. Becoming active in the Tamil Diaspora since 1980s developing relations and networks around the world, the LTTE members later carried out a massive fund raising campaign. The LTTE used those funds to purchase vessels69 and arms from the Bangkok-Singapore channel.

About 80% of the annual budget of the LTTE, which was estimated around $82 million, was generated from the contribution of the Diaspora and revenue from international trade, enterprise and investments. According to the former Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, Lakshaman Kadirgamar, the LTTE collected anything between $03 million and $04 million every month from fellow tigers living overseas for its armed separatist movement. The other major source of funds for the LTTE was narcotics

trade. It is reported that the LTTE used its merchant vessels to smuggle narcotics. In addition to this, the LTTE fund raising activities included cultural shows, festivals and food fairs. Those funds transfer to the LTTE through the number of banks in the world.

It suffices to say that in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent US-led ‘Global War on Terror’, it was difficult for the LTTE to sustain a high level of fund-raising in Western countries. Most of the key western states where the Tamil Tigers had previously raised vast amounts of funds, such as the USA, the UK and Canada, have already designated the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and tightened their law-enforcement machinery, which made it difficult for the Tamil Tigers to sustain their fund-raising activities. In this context, the LTTE pressured the GOSL through Tamil Diaspora and international community to find a peaceful solution for the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.

It is important to mention here that when the GOSL began an offensive against the LTTE in 2006, the Tamil Diaspora took a series of protests and demonstrations, which took place in several countries across the world containing pro-LTTE Tamil Diaspora, urging national and world leaders and organizations to take action on bringing a unanimous cease fire to the Sri Lankan Civil War, which had taken place for over twenty-five years.\(^70\) In mid-2008 the Tamil Diaspora spread its protest campaigns in Canada, UK, Norway, France, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Australia, India, Malaysia, South Africa and many other countries. The protests took several forms, such as human chains, demonstrations, rallies, hunger strikes, self-immolation, agitations, boycott of Sri Lankan products, attacks on Sri Lankan Embassies, Sinhala businesses and attacking students. Protesters and critics of the

GOSL alleged that the civil war was a systematic genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Sri Lankan Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. The Tiger lobby in Tamil Nadu was expected to do the same in India. It was felt that only high-level pressure exerted by the international community could compel Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa to call off the offensive and enter into negotiations with the LTTE.

The first protests occurred in Chennai and other cities of Tamil Nadu, India in mid-2008 where organizations, politicians, celebrities and student associations raised their requests for the government to intervene and stop the civil war. The aim of the protests was to urge leaders, such as the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu M. Karunanidhi, Tamil Nadu opposition J. Jayalalitha, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee to intervene and stop the Sri Lankan Civil War and cease any diplomatic assistance or relations with the island nation. Following the Tamil Nadu protests, other major protests took place in the vicinities of other Tamil Diaspora. The goal of the protests was to persuade world national leaders and organizations to intervene in the Sri Lankan Civil War and bring a permanent ceasefire with an internationally coordinated diplomatic strategy, appeal to humanitarian aid organizations to provide resources to the affected areas of Sri Lanka, and help remove the LTTE from any list of terrorist organizations. After the civil war ended on May 18, 2009, protest campaigns continued in a few countries, urging governments and the UN to undertake a war-crimes inspection in Sri Lanka.

**Conclusion**

The ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka is one of the most internationalised conflicts of the world. A number of international actors playing their role in the conflict have rapidly increased over the years. However, Sri Lanka has been fortunate with serious international involvement in the recent times. Compare with some African and Asian conflicts that are still suffering from total neglect or isolation like in the past, Sri Lanka must consider itself fortunate to have heavy international involvement in the peace process. Although international actors including Norway, Japan, USA and European Union has been involved in the peace process they have not been able to help resolve protracted ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The next chapter will evaluate the whole study and also includes major findings.