Chapter V

France and the United States.
In to the Past:

The relationship of amity and friendliness between France and the United States is of very old standing and dates back to the time when Lafayette returned to France, at the end of the eighteenth century with the ideas of liberty and with the lively impressions of the new-born Union, emergent America. (1) In the subsequent period there was nothing that showed divergences between the two countries, good relations continued through the next century. During the present century twice during two wars, the countries were on the same side, have worked together in war and peace and have shared common ideals. In this continued good relationship, certain changes were noticed since the forties. After the beginning of the Second World War, certain differences came in the open. These differences pertained to the American policy towards France, to America's refusal to recognise the leader of the French Resistance.

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1. For an account of Lafayette, see André Maurois, _Lafayette in America_ (New York, 1965). A captain in French Army, Lafayette was moved by the tales of the struggle of the American insurgents in August, 1775. He decided to help them and joined Gen. George Washington in Philadelphia. He served very usefully in the Revolutionary military operations. On return to France in December 1781 he tried to stir the imagination of the French people by recounting the experiment of the American colonies.
movement as the sole legal representative of France and to the distrustful attitude which the then American leaders are said to have shown towards the organizers of the French Resistance. This situation is believed not to have improved appreciably, during the post-War years of subsequent administrations. During the period after the cessation of hostilities, the French were not happy about being excluded from important conferences. Many of the French leaders were conscious of the role of France since historic times and they resented when they felt they were being slighted. The resentment was keen due to the feeling that during both the wars, the country which suffered most in Europe was France.

After 1948-49, France participated in the recovery programme to rehabilitate Western European Countries. During the period between 1946-1958 various Governments that came to power in France under the Fourth Republic consulted the United States on the policies they pursued. No attempt to assume an independent position was noticeable, for a long time. They were largely preoccupied with the internal problems of France. To the United States, France has been a close friend, an unquestioned ally, who shared beliefs in the same basic principles. During the three preceding centuries, France displayed the same feeling of amity and friendship to the U.S.
Under the Fifth Republic:

After 1958 i.e. when the Fifth French Republic was ushered in, the French attitude began to show marked changes. Those changes seem to have occurred from the French President, General de Gaulle’s vision of France, of Europe and of the world.

The situation in France by 1958, imperilled by internal and external factors, was described by General de Gaulle on June 1, 1958, to the French National Assembly in the following words “At this every moment, she (France) finds herself threatened by disruption and perhaps even civil War.” (2)

Cabinet instability was considered in the United States to have been to some extent a manifestation of the political instability in the Republic. Concern was expressed by many in the United States at the perilous situation of the internal situation of so important a Nato ally, as France. The French people had become weary of it; Algeria posed a vital external problem for the policy-makers in France. At this time General de Gaulle was already known for his nationalistic views and some of his views were not

in accord with those of the United States. Nonetheless, the United States welcomed France's decision to call General de-Gaulle to power. The essential thing in the view of the United States was that France was an ally and this could not be forgotten under any circumstances. The then U.S. President Mr. Eisenhower put the dilemma of the U.S. in the following manner. He said "In our enlightened selfinterest, the Gaullist experiment must succeed in re-establishing a tranquil, prosperous, steady nation. De Gaulle stands massively like a stone in France's rustling wheat fields. There is for the present no alternative to him but chaos." (3) During his visit to the United States in April 1960, General de Gaulle was given a warm welcome.

The visit of the French President to the United States was significant also from the point of view of the forthcoming Summit Conference. He did not oppose, as such, the American policies. The views of France were expressed by him in a manner in which it had not been done so far. And the French views mattered much because geographically France was located in the vital area of Europe and was led by the strong personality of General de Gaulle. He stood for a relaxation of tensions which tended to exaggerate the power position of the two strong states the U.S. and the Soviet

Union. He wanted the revival of traditional Western European humanist cultural values as important values in the place of the power factors. A peacefully reviving and industrious Western Europe under French leadership could become a force for peace, according to him and it will influence the super powers rather than be influenced by them. His views on other major issues arose out of this central theme of his belief.

Speaking to the National Press Club in Washington on April 24, 1960, he expressed the view that the control of nuclear weapons should begin with the control of devices for carrying such weapons around and that "in order to wage peace we must negotiate, ... the great task facing the world is to raise two billion poverty stricken people to a happier level." (4)

Another statement of his views is found in his speech to the United States Congress on April 25, 1960

when he said:

"Car, C'est grace a l'organisation d'un ensemble European del'Ouest, face au bloc construit par les Soviets, que pourra s'établir de l'Atlantique a l'oural, l'équilibre entre deux zones comparable par le nombre et les ressources. Seul un pareil équilibre permettra peut-être, un jour à l'ancien continent d'accorder ses deux fractions de trouver la paix audedans de lui-même, de donner un essor nouveau a sa civilisation, enfin d'avoir la possibilité en conjonction avec l'Amérique, d'aider en toute sérénité au développement des masses depourvues de l'Asie et des population en plein evel de l'Afrique. Certes, on peut d'abord appliquer les mesures contractuelles, aux véhicules de la mort, engins, avions, navires, qui sont encore aujourd'hui susceptibles d'être empechés de transporter des bombes et surveilles en commun." (5)

Many doubted whether the expression of these views by the French President was necessary. No positive proposals were noticed in this. But the pronouncements of these

Translation: Alone such a balance may perhaps one day enable the old continent to bring a reconciliation between its two parts, to find peace within itself, to give a fresh start to its civilization and lastly to have the possibility together with America, to help, in an atmosphere of serenity, the development of the unfavoured masses of Asia and of the awakening populations of Africa... One can indeed apply contractual measures first, to the vehicles of death, missiles, planes, ships, which even to-day, it is possible to prevent from carrying bombs and to supervise in common.
views were an indication that the French views were not identical with those of the United States and they were part of General de Gaulle's conception of Europe and the world politics. This was not known in the United States. There was indifference and ignorance about French thinking. So it was in France also about the U.S. policy. In the opinion of some in the U.S., the recovery of France was the result of American policy in the last fifteen years and although it intended during this period that France should be strong, the U.S. State Department was annoyed whenever there were indications that France was adopting an independent policy.

During the Summit Conference, which failed to have any fruitful results, De Gaulle declared it to be the objective of French policy to work for relaxation of world tensions, for disarmament and for East-West co-operation "in the Service of man".

**Nation and National Ambition**

A survey of the thinking and of the evolution of political beliefs of General de Gaulle who exerted such a tremendous influence on France after 1958, is necessary before the actual course of relations between France and the United States during this period, could be taken up.

To General De Gaulle, "nation" represented the supreme political value. The Nation-State is the reality
in the present circumstances and as such, policies had to be founded on the basis of this reality. In his speech of June 6, 1944, he pointed to the Sun of "grandeur" of France. He had immense belief in the "destiny" of France. France by her history, tradition and culture was destined for a preeminent place under the Sun and he was determined to restore France to her former greatness. In fact the conception of unity and a keen sense of history had largely inspired his policies. His stress on "nation" showed the pre-eminence of the "nation" among the political concepts and did not indicate aggressiveness. Out of this concept, the main idea of internal policy, as based on the pre-eminence of foreign policy and on the idea of national unity arises. In the third volume of his Memoirs, General de Gaulle had written about the "State" -

"I see it not as it was yesterday and, as the parties would wish that it become again a juxtaposition of particular interests from which only feeble compromises could emerge but rather an institution of decision, of action, expressing and serving only the national interest. To conceive and to decide, it is necessary for it to have the (governmental) powers which have at their head, a qualified arbitrator. To put it in other words, the aim of the state is external ambition and it is this which justified very largely, the presence at its head of a controller of the power of the state capable of moving towards the extérieur." (6)

According to him, most of the internal tasks of the state have one aim i.e. that of external policy. In his speech broadcast on Nov. 17, 1945, he explained, three (i.e. the three big ministries) levers controlled the foreign policy, the diplomacy expressed it, the army supported it and the policy protected it. Thus General de Gaulle's foreign policy and also policy towards the United States stemmed not only from his special vision and the interests of France but also from his vision of world patterns, his analysis of the trends in the world situation and his concept of realities.

This vision and new conceptions of world trends formed the basis of the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic under the presidency of General de Gaulle. It was not tainted by ideological considerations. Before 1958, the governments under the Fourth Republic had admitted an ideological basis. On the other hand, the foreign policy of General de Gaulle was inspired by his concept of unity and his sense or philosophy of history which have been in themselves, an opposite reaction to ideology. The post-War evolution of the ideology which General de Gaulle did not admit, could be stated as follows, in order to distinguish the conceptions and policies of General de Gaulle, which have been most significant in relation to the policy of the United States. The impact of these differences on the
relations between the two countries would be treated at a subsequent stage.

The world is divided into two blocs after the second world war, between the principles of political liberalism and the doctrine of Communist totalitarianism. It was, therefore, necessary for the Western Countries to organise themselves in order to oppose the assaults of an astute enemy. If the Western countries were not united and the free world remained divided, it would only benefit the camp of the adversary.

Opposing ideological camps divided the world and this division was followed also by the bipolar division of the political military and economic power. A result of this division was that only two Superstates acquired the real power to subdue the rest of the world. In expressing his opposition to it, General de Gaulle said, "if two privileged states (the Soviet Union and the United States) are always to have a monopoly of power that would be turning the world over to a double hegemony and a country like ours cannot accept that." (7) The other countries were either too small or too weak or backward in industrial development and have no alternative other than accepting the leadership of one of the powers. The Western countries,

therefore, could accept the leadership of United States, or if they were not prepared to do so, they could create a third power out of their integration. There was no other alternative. This was going to be considered to be the new disturbing element introduced into the post-War evolution.

Certain corollaries followed from the above principles. When the colonial empires of the European powers were liquidated it was admitted that the influence of the former colonial powers in these territories would come to an end. The disappearance of the influence of the Western European countries in the vast regions of Africa and Asia necessarily created the way for this influence being substituted by the influence of the Soviet Union and by the principles of Communism.

The leaders of the Fifth Republic did not accept these concepts. They rather sought to re-examine them in the light of the political convictions of General de Gaulle and also in the light of the recent changes such as the emergence of new power-centres in the international scene. For various reasons, the leaders of the Fifth Republic did not consider it possible to base their foreign policy on the principle that the world will continue to be divided into two blocs eternally. First of all, it was pointed out that governmental systems of states are not stagnant. They
evolve or erode. In either case, the process leads to changes from the bipolar concepts.

At the present moment, when both the super powers possess comparable atomic arms, any direct nuclear confrontation between the two, was out of the question. The balance or equilibrium between the two and then time (during which such changes as the wearing out of the systems could take place) could probably alter the situation. The relations among states have evolved in terms of this balance.

Further, according to the French leader, politics is not the proper field of ideology. The foreign policy of a state had to be formulated in the light of realities and the national interests of the state because the predominating elements in the world are the nation-states. It was, therefore, not possible to base the foreign policy on ideology. Ideological considerations have not been able to wipe out national interests of the states. Although the leaders of the different states paid lip service to the principles of ideology, what they pursued are national interests. If, therefore, a state wanted to have rational policy, it must, in the French view, take into consideration the realities and not ideology.

Again, by its very nature the world is more diverse than bipolar. The third world i.e. the countries
of Africa and Asia is becoming more numerous and more powerful. The bipolar division of the world was a result of international tensions. It helped to keep it up. It does not necessarily ensure world-peace.

The French leaders do not also agree that only the United States and the Soviet Union should have independent policies. They believed that it was possible and necessary for France to follow an independent policy in order to protect her interests. The decision to equip France with nuclear weapons was taken by the earlier French leaders out of their regard for the safe-guarding of French interests. It was also due to the scientific capacities of the country and as a symbol of France's role in the world. Policies of states are formed out of considerations for their internal and external conditions and these conditions were the product of a long history. From its historic past, the accumulation of experiences, traditions of generations come down to the nation and find their expression in the national character. If the nation states are merged under the authority of a single super state, the conditions which governed the policies would be destroyed. The supra-national state will not have any policies at all because the condition of politics have been the nation states.

The French leaders did not also accept the argument
about colonial territories. They say that evidence proved the contrary, as far as the French colonial territories, were concerned. Intelligent policies have enabled France to preserve her influence in her formerly associated territories. The liquidation of the colonial empire does not necessarily mean the end of the colonial powers' influence in various spheres including culture, economy etc. If the nation centered its scientific and technical efforts within its own territories, it could be a beginning of revival. If the political intelligence of a nation's leaders could utilize fruitfully and make available the scientific knowledge and technical abilities, they would assure her progress much more securely than the expanse of her territory or the strength of its population could do.

All these concepts made up the Gaullist foreign policy. The speeches and press conferences of General de Gaulle, abound in declarations which illustrate his concepts and also some of the policy decisions made by him testify to the prevalence of these concepts. His support of progressive unification of Europe and his recognition of Communist China were based on his belief that, policies, if they are to last must take into account, the realities. Formulated within the framework of these concepts, the French policy seemed to aim at securing for France a proper place in the world and to enable her to follow her national interests directed
towards peace, internal progress and development of France and relaxation of tensions, in order that Europe may not be merely a satellite of the United States. The following statement of Gen. de Gaulle is illustrative of his concepts. He said, "we want to belong to each organization but remain ourselves. That means we will not always follow the others... The United States is a great country that is our ally but still, a 'colossal friend', a 'colossal ally'. It is convenient for Americans to try to direct France, but France does not wish that; rather we wish to be independent." (8) French policy considered political, military and economic unification of Europe as necessary for its objectives and supported the unification of Germany within the framework of a European Union. Outside Europe, in the new countries of Africa and Asia, France wanted to spread her cultural influence. In 1961, General de Gaulle thought of United Europe as a force not isolated or in opposition to the United States but allied to it and sharing with it, (not obeying it as the dictator) the global policy. His

statement in his address of December 31, 1960 illustrated his ideas:

"...We shall, therefore, do in 1961 what we have to do. We shall help to build up Europe which, by confederating its nations, can and must, for the sake of mankind, become the greatest political, economic, military and cultural power that has ever existed. We shall help this assembled Europe and its daughter America, to reorganise their alliances in order better to defend the free world and to act together in all parts of the earth..." (9)

The foreign policy based on these concepts in France under the Fifth Republic evidently found itself at variance with the aims and objectives of the United States' political and economic policy towards Europe, to the North Atlantic Treaty alliance and organisation and also with other points in respect of extra-European policies. According to De Gaulle, independence of France was a hope for the countries of Asia for France championed their freedom and peace. The French thinking on the bipolar division of the world was supported by some other scholars.

also. Prof. Jacques Freymond wrote, "Thus, the bipolar system elaborated under the double influence of the Communist challenge and the development of nuclear arsenals seems to be dissolving. Perhaps, moreover, it was only a myth, the product of a conceptual effort which lost touch with reality. The increasing militarization of political thought, the ever more marked tendency in the West to constrain changing reality within models and theories, brought about an unsuspected intellectual impoverishment, a dulling of sensibilities, a decline in the intuitive faculties so essential to the practice of political art." (10)

The impact of these Gaullist policies has influenced the course of relations between France and the United States after 1958. France, it is seen, snuggled up closely to the United States upto 1958, but thereafter, there was to an extent a certain hesitation to accept the leadership of the United States out of a belief in France's grandeur and mission. The crisis in American leadership was no less a result of the changed economic and political situations in their country. The type of leadership at that time was the burning question. The prominent concern of General de Gaulle and other French leaders remained, however, the nation and the national interests. That France, due to her greatness could not be satisfied with subsidiary positions, the national army was

the best army, the defense of the country must also be national. This was due to de Gaulle's conviction that sooner or later, the United States will or will have to withdraw from Europe.

Alongside, the belief in the greatness and mission of France, there has been also the personal factor, the personality of General de Gaulle, his style of action. He possessed the faith in himself to direct the destinies of France in hard times. He believed, he was destined, to do it, as if, he represented France. And he has expressed it unhesitatingly. All these ideas were severely criticised. His reply to the critics was a reiteration of his faith. He said, "Groups and individuals who have carved out for themselves, political, trade union, military, journalistic and other positions have tried to influence the direction... France will not permit this, for her direction belongs to those to whom it has been entrusted, first and par excellence, to myself." (11)

Change and Continuity after 1958:

Under the Fourth Republic, France was always preoccupied with problems of her economic recovery and material progress, with the predominance of colonial wars beginning from Vietnam to the Algerian crisis which was largely

responsible for the downfall of the Fourth Republic. Added to these was the chronic crisis of Governmental instability within the Republic. The world continued to take it to be the political crisis of France.

As a matter of fact, there is no break of continuity or radical transformation in the economic and social order which prevailed under the Fourth Republic and which has been inherited by the Fifth. Although due to the monetary reforms instituted by the Fifth Republic, economic progress has been more remarkable after 1958, the process of recovery under the Fourth Republic had been continuous and had prepared the base and structure of the recovery.

Colonial problems were solved by General de Gaulle in a pacific manner offering the colonial territories a choice of remaining within the French community or of assuming complete independence. In the internal organisation, he put an end to the instability of the ministries and instituted order, which has been considered to be one of his more remarkable achievements.

Thus, while economic progress was more or less, a continuation from the Fourth Republic, other changes were innovations of the General. And in so far as they contributed to achieve political stability and strengthening of the institutions, it was welcomed by many in the United States also. However, the critics of the Fifth Republic at this
time questioned the durability of the changes brought about by the President. According to these critics, all was not well under the tranquil surface of the fifth republic. France as a nation has been divided between the Right and the Left, ideologically. Added to this was the multi-party system and attraction to the Communist doctrine. According to others, the executive branch of the Government had been made stronger under the Fifth Republic and therefore, there was no possibility of instability in future.

There already existed by 1958, however, areas of friction between France and the United States on account of American policy in the Algerian problem and even in the earlier colonial conflicts. The discontent expressed in France about the U.S. policies in these affairs was loud; it contributed after 1958, to strengthen France's determination to evolve an independent policy for herself, including a nuclear policy and from the formulation of the new policy under the Fifth Republic in turn new areas of difference arose. Efforts to settle these differences have been made seriously as will be seen at a subsequent stage but the gulf was not breached.

French Policy after 1958 in relation to NATO and other issues:

The principal objective of the United States' policy in Europe has been since the armistice to strengthen and consolidate the North Atlantic Alliance and the Whole Western
Community. In pursuance of the new policy of the Fifth Republic under General de Gaulle, France, however, decided to withdraw from military integration in Nato. The decision not to reallocate the divisions returning from Algeria to the Nato command posed a serious problem for the alliance. France's reasons for having followed this course have been examined in the earlier chapters. But the decision to create an independent French nuclear capability was a blow to the Nato military strategy, a challenge to the United States' controlling position in Nato, and even if it was not likely to lead to a German demand for nuclear weapons, it was considered as likely at least to disrupt the Western defense system and the military balance of power. His concept of Europe and Europe's defense (Europe assuming the responsibilities of defense) indicated by implication, the eventual withdrawal of American military presence in Europe. The possibility of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany was foreseen by some Americans also but they envisaged to replace these forces in such an eventuality, by a unified system of defense. ... ... ...
Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, a former member of the U.S. Congress and former U.S. Ambassador to Italy, wrote,

"Unless we have the intention to occupy Germany forever or make it the Fiftyfirst state of the Union, U.S. troops must some day leave German Soil. When they leave, to repel any aggression on Germany, we will have to press multinational defense system. But if France, England and Germany possessed their nuclear shield, the U.S. could withdraw its troops, reasonably (certain) that there would be no nuclear attack." (12)

This posed basic problems for the policy makers in the United States, to whom withdrawal from Europe was out of the question. Any idea of return to isolationism was not entertained in the United States at the time. What would ultimately be put into question was the United States' leadership of the free-world. Relinquishing this leadership to France or Europe, which could not, in the near future be strong enough to assume the tasks of defense was ruled out by America; this would fail the attempts made so far to maintain integrity and cohesion; it would only leave the West in disarray, the U.S. thinkers pointed out, and would benefit only the adversary.

On most of the other major issues also the French policy was not in accord with that of the United States. The disaccords stemmed from the new concepts formulated by General de Gaulle, with a view to restore France to its position of

greatness. Out of this arose his suggestion for consultations among the three principal powers of the West, namely the United States, Britain and France over Western policies not only in Europe but throughout the world. Gen. de Gaulle's opposition to military integration in Nato rested on the concept that an economic or political union of the states could not be a substitute for the sovereign nation state, France would not agree to become a mere satellite.

During 1959, in spite of repeated assurances by the then U.S. President Mr. Eisenhower regarding the basic American policy, there was no evidence of any softening of the French position on all issues. The prohibition of the American nuclear stockpiles on French territory had resulted in the redeployment of Nato's air strength. It was, therefore, considered necessary in many quarters that a meeting between Mr. Eisenhower and General de Gaulle was necessary in order to review and reconcile the problems between France and her allies. This meeting took place in December 1959, at the time of the conference of the Western "Summit" or chiefs of state, convened in order to ensure co-ordinated policies among the Western allies so as to meet the Soviet leaders in the ensuing Summit Conference. ...
Earlier the Secretary General of Nato Mr. Spaak had pointed out to the need for greater political consultations among the Nato allies so as to maintain its cohesion. (13) At the meeting of the Nato Council on December 15, 1959, Mr. Herter, Secretary of State declared that it would be the policy of the U.S. to maintain American troops as an effective part of the shield in Europe, so long as there was the Soviet threat and all the members of NATO were loyal to it in participation.

Two incidents in December 1959, prevented the formation of a favourable background for the talks between Eisenhower and Gen. De Gaulle. On a Resolution on Algeria at the U.N. Session in New York, the United States abstained from voting while France expected the U.S. to vote against the resolution. Consequently, there was some irritation in Paris. Another source of irritation occurred at the Nato military Committee's meeting in Paris in which the American representative General Twining strongly criticized the French policies towards NATO and asked the French military representatives to try to change the same.

When President Eisenhower and General de Gaulle met on December 19 and 20 to discuss the policy divergences, they found that their points of view were not reconcilable. The results of the meeting were summed up in the U.S. as follows, "The Eisenhower-De Gaulle talks found the French president as strongly opposed to an integrated air or naval defense as was Eisenhower to the long standing French idea of "three-power consultations." (14)

Further discussion of the matter was postponed by them till General de Gaulle's visit to the United States in 1960 and in the meanwhile the outstanding issues were referred to the technical experts for further discussion.

Kennedy-De Gaulle Conference and after.

With a view to settle the policy differences with France the United States Administration planned a visit of President Kennedy to the French Capital for a meeting with De Gaulle. Such a meeting was predicted by Mr. Jacques Chaban Dalmas, Speaker of the French Assembly, when he visited the United States in Feb. 1961, for talks with Secretary of State Mr. Dean Rusk regarding the differences between French and American policies and the possibilities of co-operation. President Kennedy's plan to visit Paris

was considered in the French capital to be an important concession made by the U.S. policy. It had to some extent the effect of increasing General de Gaulle's prestige in the eyes of Frenchmen. Apart from these considerations, the visit of the U.S. President to the French capital was welcome to diplomats and politicians as it represented a conscious effort to settle the differences between France and the United States. In their view such an effort, although essential, to settle the Franco-American differences, was not made during the past few years. It was, therefore, hoped that a man like President Kennedy gifted with the powers of decision-making, would find out the wishes of the French people with a view to restore harmony in the relations between the two countries.

While the policies of both the leaders who were outstanding were common, if not identical towards the common market, strengthening of Europe, policy towards West Germany, there was little possibility of reconciliation of views so far as Nato was concerned. Regarding Berlin problem, the position of the General was nearly similar to that of the U.S. He wanted to tie West Germany firmly to the West in order to forestall any possible Soviet initiatives in that area. President de Gaulle's views of the U.N. differed from those of the United States policy makers. There were basic problems which were expected to figure in
the discussions. One arose out of the desire and proposal of President de Gaulle for consultations among the three principal countries of the West. In response to these proposals the United States and Britain offered to institute a committee for consultations at the level of Under Secretaries for foreign affairs, which was not acceptable to the French President. What he wanted it seemed, was regular consultation, at the highest level, over not only the Western policy and Nato, but global policy and problems as well. It was felt, Britain was being consulted on all these problems.

In the second area of difference, i.e. France's determination to equip herself with an independent French nuclear capability, it appeared already that de Gaulle would not be persuaded to give up the French nuclear effort. Britain's nuclear policy programme was recognised and assisted by the United States. According to opinion in France, the French programme also needed the same. There was also little possibility of the French President withdrawing his opposition to the Nato nuclear force proposed by General Norstad and President Eisenhower.

The two leaders had thus to face important policy divergences. However, this did not mean any fundamental opposition to the United States, it was pointed out. In spite of these differences, there have been important
underlying sympathies between the two nations and the aspirations of the two peoples. The French ambassador to the United States Mr. Hervé Alphand, speaking to the American Society of the French Legion of Honour put accent on the identity of the fundamental approach between the two countries, in order to soften the American public opinion. He pointed out that there did not exist any important differences of objectives or policies between the two countries. Replying to a charge made against the Fifth French Republic that it sought a position higher than that to which she might be entitled, he assured that France tried to attain only such position as she would be able to accomplish by means of her culture, ideas, economic and political power. He also explained what really Gen. de Gaulle asked, in what was called the "Directorate of the Three." Gen. de Gaulle wanted that the "Western nations with similar interests, vocations and principles, confer on questions of common interest and try to harmonize their actions." (15) He did not want to wreck the Atlantic Alliance. He also made plain in the same speech that de Gaulle did not want the destruction of the U.N. but its reorganization on realistic lines.

In his first speeches on his arrival in Paris on May 31, 1961, President Kennedy eulogized France for the

greatness of her past and her present vitality and stressed the long standing relationship between the two countries. He obviously wanted not only to smooth the differences between the countries, but to prepare a favourable background to ensure a solid Western front behind him in the talks with the Soviet leaders four days later. Mr. Kennedy said at the airport,

"But long before my country was born French influence, French philosophy, French culture, led the Western world to such a degree that the first American Ambassador to Paris, Benjamin Franklin, could say, "Every man has two countries, France and his own". "But I come to-day not because of merely past ties and past friendship but because the present relationship between France and the United States is essential for the preservation of freedom around the globe. I come also because of the grandeur of France's present mission, the productivity of her workers, the brilliance of her universities and the vigour of her leaders."

"France and United States have been associated in the past in many great causes but I can think of no more happy cause than to be associated together in the defence of freedom." (16)

In another speech on May 31, 1961, President Kennedy said,

"In this city in 1783, Benjamin Franklin signed the treaty which made us sovereign independent and equal and in addition, it is not difficult for this President of the United States to come to "France"... But it is an interesting fact in history that John Adams who was also a Minister to France, and a successor to General Washington, should want his epitaph to be written, "He kept the peace with France"... The security of my country would be directly threatened, if France were not independent strong and sovereign. Therefore, I think it is quite natural that in the most difficult decade of the 1960's France and United States should be once again associated together." (17)

General de Gaulle replied to this speech in few words, "from its very birth to the present day never the United States happened to be opposed to France in any conflict, and this privilege second to none among the great powers." (18)

In the talks between the two leaders during 31st of May to 2nd of June 1961 according to well-informed sources, there was agreement on the broad issues such as having a United position on Berlin, where they agreed not to yield to force. The visit of President Kennedy to Paris

17. Ibid, 1 June 1961.

(This statement of Gen. de Gaulle was subsequently called a historical error because of a small incident that had taken place.)
and his talks with General de Gaulle were considered useful because it reasserted the basic relationship between France and the United States. However, the differences which arose out of the independent nationalistic policies of General de Gaulle could not be reconciled. The exclusive U.S. control of the Western Alliance's nuclear power was not acceptable to France and the French could not be persuaded to drop the project of their independent nuclear force. It conflicted with the U.S. policy not only in NATO but also regarding the nuclear test-ban-treaty. General de Gaulle's opposition to integration of French forces under NATO could not be changed. There seemed a contradiction in French policies. France was not willing to put herself under the leadership of the United States. They wanted unity of Europe under the leadership of France. Mr. Dean Rusk conceded it later that the fundamental cause of differences between the U.S. and France was the American insistence on retaining a veto power over allied nuclear policy. President Kennedy said France was a "full and equal partner" and promised General de Gaulle to "study with the Congress the problem of supplying France with the same nuclear information given to Britain." (19) However, he did not support the independent French nuclear programme. According

to an agreement between the two leaders, which was not disclosed at that time, the French troops in NATO were to be trained to use the weapons capable of delivering nuclear warheads, when authorised to do so. He also promised that France would be consulted in future as intimately as Britain was, although he did not show any agreement towards the three big-power-consultations idea. These conscious efforts to make concessions to France (according to many scholars, to the determination and personality of General de Gaulle) in order to preserve the solidarity of Western Europe were indicative, not only of the dynamic and imaginative leadership of President Kennedy, but also of the extent to which the United States was prepared to go in sustaining their foreign policy. Assuming that even though Mr. Kennedy was prepared to do more to reconcile French differences with the Western alliance especially in nuclear matters, the congressional restrictions on his capacity to manoeuvre would have acted as a check at this stage, to further progress in that direction. Although President Kennedy's Paris visit out of his sincere desire for reconciliation, was acclaimed as a real success the differences, however, remained and no substantial results seemed to have been attained. The views of Mr. Kennedy himself in this regard were expressed in his reply to a journalist,
"It has been my hope in these conversations that he had a renewed appreciation of how seriously we consider our ties with France and Western Europe, ... how our new government in the U.S. is firmly committed to the security of this area and means to implement its commitments." (20)

At the end of the two leaders talks, the following joint communiqué was issued:

"The two Presidents discussed the principal issues with regard to both the relations, between the United States and France and to their policies in all parts of the world, ... they examined the position of the two countries with regard to the Soviet Union and the Communist world and the activities of these two countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America etc. They also examined means for strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, that fundamental association of free nations. These conversations have shown the fundamental agreement that exists between the two presidents (in particular towards Berlin). The conversations have allowed them to know each other and set forth fully the respective positions of the two countries... Thus the talks have made an essential contribution to the development of relations between France and the United States." (21)

On his return to the United States, Mr. Kennedy in a speech to the Nation regarding his visit to France, stated, "my talks with Gen. de Gaulle were profoundly encouraging. I found him a wise Counsellor, for the future and an informative guide to the history that he has helped to make. He is a man of extra-ordinary personal character symbolizing the new strength and the historic grandeur of France." (22)

In September 1961, in pursuance of a plan agreed between him and President de Gaulle, President Kennedy asked the authorisation of the U.S. Congress for training French troops in NATO in the use of nuclear weapons. It was made clear that the agreement was intended only for training the French forces stationed in West Germany in nuclear weapons, and it would not involve transfer of war-heads to France. President Kennedy urged the Congress to approve the plan immediately because it was most essential to preserve the unity of the North Atlantic nations, in view of the Soviet threat to the freedom of West Berlin and the grave international situation. The House of Representatives recorded its approval and only Senate's approval was necessary for the agreement to go into immediate effect. As it would strengthen the over-all forces in Germany the pact signed

between the U.S. and France was significant and important from the American point of view. It was only of marginal importance to the French, it was not going to give them any nuclear weapons, although the training of French troops in their use was welcome.

The relations between France and America in the beginning of 1962 were more or less in the same state as before President Kennedy's Paris visit. No great amelioration was noticed. In fact the relations tended to deteriorate although in certain limited spheres only. The French policy towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation did not change in any respect. French Air Force, Navy and the troops returning from Algeria did not participate in the respective NATO forces' tasks. France's participation in NATO, reduced to the minimum, did not seem to be that of an ally. President Kennedy invited General de Gaulle to join in a conference, two months before the Bermuda talks with the British Prime Minister, with a view to further explain the U.S. policy. According to the French, such a conference was not going to serve any purpose, because their basic position was unalterable, they were determined not to alter it and therefore, nothing could be done (at least on their side) about the differences arising out of the issue. French leaders were determined not to revise their refusal to abandon the independent French nuclear capability.
programme and to participate in any NATO-controlled nuclear force. There was less trust in France about the U.S. and vice-versa.

On the other hand the United States' promise to consult France fully on all important matters, made at the time of Kennedy - de Gaulle meeting in June 1961, was not seen to have been observed in spirit. There was also no change in the U.S. policy of not supplying nuclear assistance to France. On examining the problems of Europe and policy on the Berlin issue, the Kennedy Administration seemed to conclude that only the independent policies of France were the cause of disrupting Allied Unity. The U.S. proposal to open negotiations with the Soviet Union over Berlin for a negotiated settlement, which was supported even by West Germany was opposed by France. A question began to be asked in America, "we are serious and know what we must do. Is de Gaulle?" (23) According to the French, it was not the question of their sincerity, it was the reaction of the Soviet Union to such a policy that mattered. General de Gaulle's refusal to participate in negotiations arose out of his objection to the word "negotiated", because according to him, if the West showed willingness to "negotiate", the Russians would treat it as a sign of weakness.

At this situation many friends of France stressed the need for patience, and restraint to the U.S. Administration, because France was their oldest ally and friend and it deserved sympathetic patience at a time when it found itself in danger due to the Algerian problem and the internal division.

President Kennedy renewed his attempts to settle the differences with France in his letter of 31st December 1961 to General de Gaulle. He pointed out in this letter that as there was no disagreement between France and the United States about the basic objective regarding Berlin, there was no objection and no harm to that basic identity of approach, in seeking a negotiated settlement of the future of Berlin. He wrote that the same was necessary in view of the fact that the Soviet leaders would not postpone a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Secondly, he also intimated the need for the abandonment of the projected French nuclear force on the ground that it would arouse demands for nuclear weapons, in West Germany and eventually lead to proliferation. In reply to this letter, Gen. de Gaulle wrote, repeating the old stand, that attempts to negotiate over Berlin, would be construed by the Soviet Union as a sign of weakness. As regards the nuclear problem, he stated that he understood the American unwillingness to share the control of the nuclear weapons and the reasons for
the French Atomic force were national. It would not be so strong as the Soviet nuclear power but it could be capable of inflicting considerable harm on Russia and it would add to the West's overall deterrent. The issue of his September 1, 1958 proposals for three-power-consultations was considered to have been closed in the Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting of June 1961. In this letter General de Gaulle revived the idea and proposed that the Chiefs of Government, foreign ministers and defence ministers of the three principal western countries should consult at regular meetings and formulate West's global policy. Evidently, this was not going to be acceptable to the United States; it seemed to be a manoeuvre in statesmanship.

It became clear from the above letter that changes in the French policy, desired by its other allies were not going to be made. It was the United States which was trying in this direction in order to preserve the essentials of her foreign policy and over-all Western policy. The recall at this time of the U.S. Ambassador at Paris, James M. Gavin, was construed as an indication of the fact that U.S. position on her foreign policy was firm and the Administration was in no mood to tolerate differences or even the criticism of its policy. Mr. Gavin was unofficially charged to have become "too Gaullist" in his interpretation of General de Gaulle's policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and East-West
confrontation. As a matter of fact, it was more likely that the recall of Mr. Gavin from France was an attempt on the part of the U.S. to impress upon de Gaulle the American atomic diplomacy. It was clear that the effort was not going to succeed. During his stay in Paris, he was not able to bring about any change in the French policies. Mr. Gavin had expressed as his opinion that in view of the Soviet Union's challenging attitude showed plainly in its continued rocket-launching, Gen. De Gaulle's refusal to enter into negotiations could possibly be right. Further Mr. Gavin's assessment of the situation regarding the Franco-American relations was not said to have been agreeable. He is said to have reported his conclusion that United States' refusal to give France nuclear aid or even listen to France's position was having unfavourable effects on the U.S. position and on the solidarity of NATO. (24) In this regard, Mr. C.L. Sulzberger wrote,

"A new Ambassador will soon be assigned... But this does not necessarily mean policy change should be expected. He may echo Washington's viewpoint with more enthusiasm than Gavin. But the task of an envoy is to size up a situation not in terms of preconceived official bias. And the reality of the French situation dictates a less obdurate Washington approach... For if the plain language of truthful James M. Gavin had been viewed as unwelcome it has represented the opinion of every professional in our embassy." (25)

25. Ibid, 1 August 1962.
The situation in 1961-1962 was different from what it had been during the preceding decade and half. The changes arose out of the revival of economic and military strength of France. It was, therefore, considered doubtful whether any other Ambassador could have been able to obtain the desired results.

According to the view widely held in Paris at that time the United States' opposition to France becoming an independent nuclear power was responsible for strains and for the unsettled state of Franco-American relations. These were also the views of General de Gaulle. This indicated the French discontent with the balance of nuclear power and her position in the NATO and implied that France could not be taken for granted. France's refusal to join in the proposed multilateral nuclear force and to rely on the U.S. nuclear protection was indirectly refusing the U.S. leadership of the Alliance. The French view was that their independent nuclear force would not be used as the basis for a "European third force" and that the argument of demands being aroused in Germany for nuclear arms was intended for discouraging the French project and for preserving the monopoly of nuclear weapons' possession, to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

American opinion on the French Policies on the other hand was hardening. Many in the U.S. expressed fears that the French policies were likely to bring about results
favourable to the Soviet Union and the other opponents of NATO. Hence they were anxious about the future of NATO.

The problems arising between the two countries were discussed successively by the two governments. Although they could not be solved, efforts to explore the possibilities of settlement continued. Areas of co-operation between France and United States such as combating communism in South America and Africa were suggested. The remarkable thing was that in spite of differences, a deterioration in the relations as such was denied. French Foreign Minister Mr. Couve de Murville stated on May 10, 1962 that there was no deterioration in the French-American relations although in some quarters of the Press reports to this effect appeared. He said, "We are and shall remain on the same side, belonging to the same alliance, inspite of divergences of opinion." (26) After one year, the views expressed by Mr. Couve de Murville did not indicate that the strains in the relationship had adverse effect on the friendship that was traditional between the two countries. In May 1963, during his visit to the U.S., Mr. Couve de Murville discussed with President Kennedy and Mr. Rusk, the problems in France-U.S. relationship and the ensuing tariff negotiations in which the U.S. was seeking outlet for its farm products into the Common Market area. Speaking at this time about the State of France-United States relationship,

Mr. Couve de Murville said that they were "very good substantially and then of course there are always problems that you have to deal with but which you must not exaggerate." (27) The European Governments, in the wake of economic recovery were expecting more and more equality in the place of what they considered "patronizing" by the U.S. It was also asserted that the common interests between the United States and France dwarfed their differences.

An evidence of common interests between the two countries was furnished at the time of the Cuban Crisis when the confrontation in Cuba appeared likely to lead to war, General de Gaulle declared unequivocally that France will stand by the side of the United States in the event of a war. He praised the U.S. President for the forthright manner in which he dealt with the situation. The good feeling about France in the United States reached the peak on this account. It lasted for a short time only. But the relations between the two countries during 1958-1964 were never so good as during this short period. The basic policy difference re-emerged. President Kennedy decided to persuade the Congress for sale to France of an atomic-powered submarine. The French were pleased if the offer were to realize without undue delay. They were always interested to have access to the secrets of nuclear weapons.

On June 19, 1962 President de Gaulle and U.S. Secretary Mr. Dean Rusk held discussion over the differences. Their talks resulted only in indicating the necessity of a new meeting between General de Gaulle and President Kennedy. France declined to a proposal made by Rusk that when the French nuclear force is built up, it should be coordinated with the American and British forces. Although the French nuclear programme could not expect any American assistance and would continue to be opposed, yet the fact that Mr. Rusk recognised the French nuclear force as a fact, was considered to be a gain from the French point of view. Mr. Rusk's proposal indicated the U.S. willingness to give France a nearly equal position with the United States and Britain. In his note to the U.S. President on September 1, 1958, General de Gaulle had asked for full equality in the global policy.

Accord between the U.S. and France on the nuclear problem was not likely to be reached, as it was never reached till 1964. When France determined to become a nuclear power, the difference became inherent in the situation. The following comment over the nuclear problem...
appeared in the New York Times,

"French and American Statesmen when viewing the atomic problem, find themselves in the position of the blind men inspecting an elephant. They analysed the same problem and talked about different things as Washington and Paris have done when examining the nuclear brute. Likewise Franco-German alliance is regarded from different angles on each side of the Atlantic... ... We sometimes misinform ourselves about the reality of events abroad and try to make them conform to dreams or night-mares." (28)

By the end of 1962, as viewed from the United States point of view the situation was unsatisfactory and annoying. General de Gaulle stood against most of the concepts supported by the U.S., viz. political union of a supranational Europe, military integration in NATO, opening of negotiations on the Berlin problem. He also stood aloof from the eighteen-nation disarmament committee, nuclear test ban talks and the U.N. An American view of the French

policies can be illustrated from the following passage,

"As usual this was especially true with respect to France, for many years, the most precarious and unpredictable element in the entire Atlantic Community... By 1962, the Fifth Republic of Gen. De Gaulle could claim three undeniable accomplishments, the achievement of a remarkably strong economic and financial position, the establishment of an unprecedented friendly relationship with the nearby German Federal Republic and the virtual liquidation of the painful seven year old war in Algeria. For all the greatness of these achievements General de Gaulle had not succeeded in assuaging the deep political antagonisms that continued to rend the French nation and his insistence on a policy of maximum French independence in Foreign Affairs had tied knots in virtually every phase of the community's joint endeavours." (29)

The fact that De Gaulle was able to institute stability in French political life was viewed in the United States and also by other Western countries as welcome, they nonetheless found that General de Gaulle was hard to deal with. It also seemed by the end of 1962 that the United States and the rest of her allies in NATO did not think alike on every issue. The dynamic policies of President Kennedy appeared to inspire the U.S. administration with self-assurance in dealing with the world situation. The gradual recovery of economic strength in the West European countries tended to make these countries more assertive of

29. Richard P. Stebbins, "One West or Two"
The United States in World Affairs - 1962
their interests, the Western countries' demand for greater voice in over-all western policies was also the result of the same fact. There was the problem of Britain's entry into the EEC, which the U.S. supported as the leader of the Western community from a political point of view. It also sought to ensure and enhance her economic and commercial interests in the EEC area. Against this back-ground, the coming year i.e. 1963 seemed to be a very important period from the point of view of the Atlantic community and partnership.

France's differences with the United States in NATO over such issues as that of Congo, were manifested even in the U.N. This was an unhappy State of relations. They continued to affirm from time to time that friendship existed between the two countries but the signs of friendship in terms of concrete accords over various issues were not forthcoming.

**Gen. de Gaulle's Press Conference of January 14, 1963**: The reaction in the U.S. to General de Gaulle's press conference of Jan. 14, 1963 in which he vetoed Britain's entry into the European economic community and reiterated his refusal to participate in a NATO nuclear force of sub-marines, was loud and an extremely harsh criticism of his policies was voiced in numerous quarters. According to P.H.Spaak, the entire Western policy of the last 20 years had been put into jeopardy by De Gaulle's Press Conference.
of January 14. Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman of the U.S. Senate's Foreign Relations Committee charged that France's quest of unattainable ambitions was relegating the security and prosperity of the West to a secondary role. He said, "The U.S. has provided economic and political support for the revival and reunification of W. Europe. In the light of these facts, it is beyond my understanding that General de Gaulle can profess to believe that the United States and Britain cannot be trusted to meet their obligations for the defence of Europe." (30) Mr. Fulbright appeared to ignore, the military-strategic aspect of the nuclear argument. The U.S. spent annually $325,000,000 for its forces in France and the grievance against France arose out of the fact that this expenditure was not offset by commensurate arms purchases by France in the United States. It also called forth charges of ingratitude on the part of France. Further, France's policies of courting Spain and Denmark to join the French bloc, were construed as a challenge to the Atlantic policy of the United States. General de Gaulle's continental plans were criticised as having shattered President Kennedy's design for organizing a unified defence of the free world. General de Gaulle was accused of instituting personal policies rather than voicing the French opinion.

In view of the growing criticism in the United States, a clarification of the French policies was made by the French Ambassador in Washington Herve Alphand in his speech to the Ambassadors' forum on Feb. 4, 1963. Mr. Alphand sought to assure the United States on the Western Alliance but also declared that the policies represented the opinion of the French people. While attempt to soothe the American opinion was clearly noticeable, in the speech, it was also evident from it that the important positions outlined by the French President were going to be maintained. Mr. Alphand said,

"Through a Europe economically and politically united - a Europe to which one day we hope Great Britain will belong by accepting its rules and through a close co-operation between this Europe and America, we believe, we can facilitate the realization of a modus vivendi between East and West which has always been one of the bases of French policy. France would proceed with the development of a national nuclear force but it could be combined with that of similar forces of her allies and before all with the gigantic force of the United States. American nuclear power (was recognized as) the essential guarantee of world peace... Her (France's) policy of firmness, her views regarding the organisation of Europe and of the Western world, her determination to seek when the moment comes a global settlement do not represent only the personal opinions of one prestigious man. They are supported by a freely-elected Parliament and by the massive votes of her whole people each time this people has been consulted... The development of French nuclear power was for the protection of the 'Supreme interests of the country' and indicated 'no sign of mistrust' towards our allies... To the integration of Atlantic forces, she prefers a co-operation among allied forces."

Mr. Alphand also denied any intention on the part of France to help W. Germany in the development of atomic power. Both the most favoured projects of the U.S. were said to be struck by de Gaulle in one blow. Some were annoyed, others outraged in the U.S. and called De Gaulle a "madman". Although the American resentment over the failure of the two projects was understandable, basic facts appeared to be ignored. There was never any real possibility of Gen. de Gaulle offering France's participation in the NATO nuclear force and of admitting the adhesion of Britain to the Common Market. In newspapers and other writings Gen. De Gaulle began to be charged with designing to isolate Western Europe from the rest of the Western Alliance and to reach a separate understanding with Russia. Such charges were not supported by any declarations and statements of French policy. General de Gaulle considered France to be a U.S. ally. France had no objection to co-ordinate the French nuclear strategy with that of NATO. (32) He desired to tie West Germany firmly to the West. According to another criticism, de Gaulle's policy towards the United States was prejudiced and this prejudice was a result of his war-time experiences with the U.S. leaders. Although Gen. de Gaulle is a person with a

32. This was actually agreed upon in the December 1964 meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council.
keen memory, it does not appear likely that he might have allowed prejudices to affect his policy which was based on "nation and national interests." Prejudices did not come in his way when he achieved reconciliation with West Germany in spite of the long standing hostility. He wanted France to be the master of her own destinies. The stalemate in the relations with the United States began with his September 1, 1958 note in which he had proposed the creation of a machinery to coordinate the policy of the three principal western powers on all issues. Mutual positions have since hardened. The French felt that there was nothing between the two countries that could be discussed in view of their unchangeable positions. Further according to Gen. de Gaulle Europe must be a "Europe" first and then have close co-operation with the U.S.A. and not be dictated by it.

After Mr. Rusk's meeting with De Gaulle, it was suggested only a meeting of the two Presidents would be helpful in resolving the problems and differences. In the opinion of President Kennedy expressed in his Press Conference of April 24, 1963, the United States' relations with France could be best handled at the diplomatic level rather than in a direct meeting with General de Gaulle. But he also said, "All protocol aside, I would be glad to go to France if there was some matter, which we felt an exchange would solve." (33)

Later President Kennedy was reported to have expressed his willingness to visit Paris also during his scheduled tour of Italy, West Germany and Ireland. General de Gaulle, it seemed, did not like to be visited by the U.S. President during a tour of several countries. When he announced his intention to visit the United States at an "opportunite time" the possibility of Mr. Kennedy's visit to France in June 1963 was set aside.

General de Gaulle's policies came under severe criticism not only in the U.S. but also in France where the supporters of the Atlantic Community pointed out that a new Atlantic Community suitable to the new conditions of the present decade, could not be built, so long as Gen. de Gaulle pursued his independent policies. It was, therefore, most essential from their point of view that the differences between the two countries be reconciled. In the French National Assembly the Socialist leader - Mr. Guy Mollet, opposed the President's policies which according to him were "unrealistic and ungrateful" to the U.S. According Mr. Pflimlin, de Gaulle's policies were likely to result in supporting American isolation. The criticism voiced everywhere, in newspapers, in debates and conversations, in books and articles, was profuse. It, therefore, seemed, General de Gaulle would have to clarify what basically his
policies in relation to the United States have been. In his Press Conference of July 29, 1963, he explained at length his ideas and his policies. The relevant parts of his statement are quoted below:

"The fundamental factors of French-American relations are friendship and the Alliance. The friendship has existed for close on 200 years as an outstanding psychological reality in keeping with the nature of the two countries, special and reciprocal bonds maintained by the fact that among all the world powers France is the only one, with the exception I should say, of Russia, with which the United States never exchanged a single cannon-shot while it is the only power without exception which fought at its side in three wars; the war of Independence, the First and Second World Wars, under conditions forever unforgettable.

For such a moral capital to be jeopardized would require infinitely serious and infinitely long dissenion. There can be, there are, political divergences between Paris and Washington. There is journalistic ill-will. But it is not these divergences and it is not this journalistic ill-will of the moment which can lead France to believe that the United States seeks to wrong her. Conversely for the United States to imagine that France seeks to harm it would be a ridiculous absurdity.

As regards the French-American alliance, if since the days of Washington and Franklin, of Lafayette, of de Grasse, or Rochambeau, it was forged only during the First World War in 1917 and 1918 and during the Second after December 1941, it is a fact, it now exists and that everything makes it vital for the two countries to maintain it. Indeed so long as the free world is faced with the Soviet bloc, which is capable of suddenly submerging this or that territory, and which is moved by a dominating and detestable ideology... The Atlantic Alliance is an elemental necessity.
and it is obvious that in this respect the
United States and France have a capital
responsibility ... the fact that in the event
of a general war, France with the means it
has, would be at the side of the United
States and this I believe is mutual.

The alliance is not in question... To my
mind the present differences are purely and
simply the result of intrinsic changes which
took place in the last few years and which
are continuing with regard to the absolute
and the relative situation of the United
States and France.

France who is industrial and agricultural
cannot and does not wish to see either the
nascent economy of Europe or her own,
dissolved in a system of the Atlantic Commu-
nity type which would be only a form of the
famous integration... The evolution of both
countries has created this state of things...

It is quite natural for a country such as
France who is beginning to have the means to
free itself to a certain degree from this
permanent terror, continue along this course.
All the more so, since nothing prevents the
two rivals, their tests having been halted,
from continuing to make missiles, in increas-
ing quantities and power and to equip them-
selves with increasingly advanced launch
vehicles, rockets, air-planes, submarines and
satellites.

A mere agreement will not prevent France
also from equipping herself with the same
kind of means." (34)

34. Charles de Gaulle, *Major Addresses, Statements
and Press Conferences of Gen. de Gaulle,*
(May 19, 1958 - January 31, 1964) (New York,
The French President refused to agree to the proposed non-aggression-pact because according to him it would mean settling the future of Europe by the non-European super-powers. The Press Conference further revealed the divergences that existed between France and her other allies on most important issues. On the problem of nuclear weapons no negotiations seemed possible between France and the United States. However, General de Gaulle's Press Conference and the discussions, reactions that ensued, led to the necessity of clarifying the mutual positions. The French foreign Minister Couve de Murville visited the United States for talks with the leaders of the United States. The view was already expressed that at least a better understanding of the position which France sought within the Atlantic Alliance was necessary in order to evaluate the situation from the point of view of reconciliation. By independence within the Atlantic alliance what France sought was the right to have an independent nuclear capability, right to express independent diplomatic views and greater role for Europe in the Atlantic policies and consultations. In case of war, the French assured complete solidarity with the West and disclaimed any intentions of remaining neutral. They, however, did not alter their position of opposition to integration and of safeguarding national sovereignty. The French foreign minster is also
said to have expressed concern over the U.S. attempts to force W. Germany to choose between itself and France. The French point of view was that Franco-German Co-operation should not be the cause for concern to the United States. France's policy towards W. Germany arose out of considerations which were fundamentally the same as those of the United States and, therefore, any competition to court Germany was not, according to the French, reasonable. No results, beyond communicating mutual points of view, were seen to have been achieved.

During his European tour of July 1963, in the speeches in West Germany, President Kennedy implored the West European countries to adhere to the Atlantic partnership envisaged by the United States. There were implied suggestions in one of his speech that the nationalism of General de Gaulle should be rejected. Although officials in the U.S. Administration were reported to be pleased by Mr. Kennedy's indirect hit at the French policies his speech was criticized and resented in France. The French government expected that during his visit to Germany General de Gaulle would be able to lessen the impact of President Kennedy's speeches which apparently resulted in making Europe aware of the fact that there existed a powerful alternative to the French conceptions and reaffirm the soundness and wisdom of French policies. The U.S. officials
explained that President Kennedy in these speeches did not intend any attack on President de Gaulle, and that he was only reaffirming a fundamental American attitude towards NATO and Military, economic and political unity of the Atlantic Community of nations. In this connection, a comment that appeared in the New York Times dated June 28, said "other aspects of what was in effect a political campaign by the President and in Europe against the German-French alliance raise a more serious question of Mr. Kennedy's statecraft abroad than his 'no' and 'yes' about working with the Communists." (35) France was not prepared to accept an Atlantic Community in which Europe and France did not have any voice. In the American view, an independent Europe as partner of the United States, led by France and without the inclusion of Great Britain was no acceptable solution to the problem.

Evidently there could not be any bridging the gulf between the diverging policies of the two countries. What the United States expected was not a mere clarification of the views. In view of the unshakeable French position, they concluded that the French President does not want to work closely with the United States. The resentment over the French policies continued unabated.

President De Gaulle's proposal to recognise communist China contributed to the widening of the breach between France and the United States. Apart from the merits of the case, it was pointed out, such a decision arose out of the test-ban treaty in which France was not consulted.

At the end of 1963, the possibility of a meeting between the French and American Presidents to discuss the issues between the two countries in the beginning of 1964 was discussed. No modification of French views regarding NATO, integration in Europe or nuclear weapons was, however, noticed. On the other hand the U.S. President Mr. Johnson was not expected to depart from the policies of the Kennedy Administration; on the contrary according to many, he would be as firm as the former President had been. An end was put to these discussions, when Gen. de Gaulle made it known that he would like to meet the U.S. President in Paris, rather than in Washington, (it was felt, he did not owe a return visit to the new U.S. President. He owed it to Mr. Kennedy). Probably, the underlying idea seemed to be that little could be accomplished by a personal meeting between the two Presidents. Probably, the views in the U.S. Administration had been the same because many of General de Gaulle's policies which were divergent from the U.S. policies, including the French nuclear project, were well
underway and there was no reason (which they could see) to think that a direct meeting between the Presidents would help to resolve the divergences. Between the French view of an organised Europe in co-operation with the United States and the American insistence on integration in the West there was no room for compromise. Mr. C.L.Sulzberger, analysing Gen. de Gaulle's differences with his allies and his individualistic policies wrote,

"The Gaullist foreign policy stems from the General's special vision of French interests, world patterns and his own concept of realities. But it is nonsense to suspect that de Gaulle has any mischievous ambitions to undermine the West of which after all, France feels inextricably a part. He has no secret plan to visit Castro, ... nor any invitation from Mao-Tse Tung. He has no plan to see Khruschev next year...He harbours no crafty designs but is merely determined to assert France's freedom of action within the Western Community and to avoid illusions... Yet, there are grasping distinctions between what he and his allies respectively hold to be reality." (36)

In effect by 1963 France found itself opposed to the United States on most issues i.e. East-West relations, and the NATO. In economic spheres French position on the agricultural problem resulted in shutting the doors of the European Economic Community to Britain and in the so-called "chicken war". It also involved opposition to

Germany which desired expansion of trade over the world. The economic differences were reflected in the GATT negotiations after April 1963. The French point of view which wanted to consolidate the common market and protect their products against imports from outside, conflicted with that of the United States, Britain and West Germany which sought reduction of tariffs to enhance their world trade. These also became part of the basic divergences regarding the future of the Atlantic and Western Community. At issue was the question whether the six countries of the Common Market could develop into a force vis-a-vis the super-powers in economic, military and political spheres.

Economic Factors:

During the same period, there arose in Europe, particularly in France opposition to the U.S. economic policies in other spheres also. The threat of American economic penetration was too frequently voiced in France. Fears began to be expressed that Europe was likely to be colonized by the United States and the necessity to counteract this situation by pooling the resources of the Europeans was emphasized. Mr. Edmond Taylor wrote, "American economic domination is viewed with alarm by journals ranging from the Communist L'Humanite to the official bulletin of the Conseil National du Patronat Francais, the French NAM." (37)

The growing dimensions of the American business firms functioning in the Common Market area, were charged by the French critics as subordinating European economic enterprise, although they recognized that American investments were still needed in Europe. The principal objection was that the giant firms of the United States were likely to crush their European competitors in their business. Although the opposition to the bigness of the American economic enterprises was not confined to France (it was noticeable among the German industrialists and Bankers also) it was most pronounced among Gaullist Frenchmen. The "Conseil National du Patronat Français", through its monthly "Patronat Français" mainly inspired the campaign against U.S. investments. The other participants in the campaign were some of the socialist, communist and labour groups and such journals like "L'Humanité". They pointed out that in comparison to the Chief U.S. and European Corporations, the top French Company ranked only number 57. According to the United States experts the problem of the bigness of American investments was exaggerated. The apprehensions raised in Europe were not lullled and the opposition continued, concern over the "Dollar-invasion" has not vanished in France.

France's interest in preserving the limited character of the EEC had arisen due, no less to political reasons than to economic reasons. After 1963, the situation showed
signs of change. The most important fact of this period was the revival of economic strength of the West European countries. As a result of this fact it seemed the relationship between Europe and United States which evolved during the cold war years, needed to be reviewed. The most important problems of the period, viz. the Soviet threat, the German problem tended, to be considered less and less urgent and threatening. On the other hand there was the spectacular success of the Common Market of the six Western countries. Attention began to be centred on the problems of economic and financial relations among the Western nations. General de Gaulle who seemed determined to press his policies also, began to consider that it might be necessary to put an end to the privileged position of the Dollar and the Pound-Sterling in international finance and bring back the gold standard which was abandoned in 1930. The United States' insistence that the Atlantic countries of the West should hold together was interpreted as a cover to preserve her political and economic interests. In most of the issues of policy from Europe to the world, France and United States seemed to be on opposite sides and the climate of Franco-American relationship seemed less hopeful.

The assessment of the state of Franco-American relationship is beset with many difficulties and complexities. However, it seems permissible to state that the
outlook for Franco-American relations was generally discouraging. Signs of deterioration were at times noticeable although they could not have deteriorated too much. Diplomatically, in the beginning of 1964 the tendency in France seemed to have been that effective diplomacy in her relations with the United States be exercised very cautiously. Numerous diplomatic attempts to explore the differences and to seek amelioration of understanding were not countered to be useful in settling the matters between the two countries. The countries blamed each other for the state of affairs. Since the Cuban war, General de Gaulle was convinced that if a war took place, it would only be a nuclear war and for this reason he shed the United States protection. The United States charged de Gaulle with disrupting the Atlantic and Western solidarity and unity by his narrow nationalistic policies.

An assessment of the relationship also involves the consideration of the future of nationalism and other political concepts of General de Gaulle on which the French policies have been based.

From a historical point of view the present political dilemmas of the world are traceable to the evolution, three hundred years ago. This movement which began three centuries ago was different from the political past that went before. The movement that is to-day diverting
man's activities would also lead to a future which will be new and different from the present. In the fast changing world nothing is static, political arrangements also change, giving place to the new ones, demanding new concepts. General de Gaulle's argument of the utility of the alliances could be taken to be valid in this way. But the alternative envisaged in his thinking viz. national defence forces, could be regarded as a reversion to the nineteenth century philosophy of nationalism. It has been called anachronistic and criticized on the ground that it would not enable the world to ensure peace. According to some scholars, what was really obsolete in the nuclear age, was the nationalism of 19th century itself. That system viewed against the nuclear age seemed to be like an international anarchy. The problem of preserving peace in the nuclear age was different from that in the earlier period.

What shape the evolving political situation will take in future, would be largely in the sphere of guesses. History of course is a guide but not necessarily and not always a clear one. Evolution of the world is a continuous movement and it could be admitted that it would lead to a future which may be different dependent upon many other things.

What the Gaullist policy may be said to have succeeded in achieving is that it has led to a dismantling
of the military organisation of the Atlantic Alliance. It has also created a contradiction between the concepts of the European community and the Atlantic Alliance. It has also sought to create opposition to the United States' over-all policies for the reason that it is becoming "too" powerful and therefore, in the interest of equilibrium, its power must be curbed.

Will the Gaullist policies post-date him and are they durable? This has been the pertinent question frequently discussed to which some found an easy answer viz. that disappearance of General de Gaulle would change the political perspective in relation to France. According to others, it is not reasonable to conclude that such a change will take place after de Gaulle and that the essentials of the Gaullist policy would be continued even after him.

According to a view held in 1962, de Gaulle had received a mandate from the country in certain circumstances and for this reason nobody contested his power and authority. When, however, by 1962-63, the purpose of the mandate seemed to be achieved the political class in the country was expected to try to come to power. The logic of this argument is not sustained by facts. While it is true that political divisions in France are deep, the political class had not been able to reassert itself and take over France.
By the end of 1963, further the two basic factors on which Gen. de Gaulle's concept of East-West rapprochement rested seemed to have been further from realization. One was the hostility between the Soviet Union and China (the two communist powers) which was not only ideological but national also. Second was the occurrence of the changes in the Russian Society, which were expected to make the Soviet people seek better relations with the Western countries. This vision of the French President could be said to have a long term relevance rather than a short term effect for the immediate future. General de Gaulle's policies were opposed by most of the Western Allies, who supported the U.S. idea of a United Europe as an equal partner of the United States. Assuming hypothetically that the French opposition to the proposal of a United Europe as a partner of the United States in an Atlantic Community had not existed, what precisely would have emerged is not clear. The terms "Atlantic Community, Unity", were ambiguous not defined or clear. General de Gaulle is charged to have ...
delayed this evolution. The following comment on the situation was made in 1962,

"It is not fanciful to describe Kennedy and de Gaulle as antagonists in a great debate. The debate is whether to build the future of the West on the Atlantic Community or on a continental Europe of independent but co-operating States in harmony with Britain and the United States. The more one thinks of the perils and glories of nuclear age the more we are driven to the necessity for unity. Charles de Gaulle is an anachronism, a grand, brave, high-minded patriotic voice from the past...He has helped to restore France to greatness and history will give him due credit. But neither France nor De Gaulle's "Europe of the Fatherlands" can stand alone." (38)

While the trend towards unity is unmistakably clear, in the year 1962 or 1963 itself, what could have emerged, would not have been far different from the Atlantic Alliance. From a long-term point of view it would possibly be different.

The assertion of independence of France under the Fifth Republic, could be said to have been a manifestation of the pressures within the Western alliance of forces which tended to check the progress towards European integration. ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

Mr. Raymond Aron wrote about the French position,

"It is not too much to hope that one day Western Europe as far as the Urals will be converted to Western Values to the point where the geographic entity can become the home of a single civilization. In awaiting that day, as long as the rivalry continues not between "two hegemonies" as de Gaulle says, but between two civilizations "as Debre wrote, France regardless of verbal alliances belongs to Western civilization." (39)

It may finally be said that the problem of relations between the two countries is not centred around the person of de Gaulle.

It would, therefore, not be solved by waiting till General de Gaulle disappears from the political scene. The real problem is that of the relations between the unequals, the United States and France (or even Europe) a great power and a smaller nation, viewed not in the light of the cold-war-years-relationship but of the situations, changed since beyond recognition.

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