Chapter IV

France's policy towards West Germany.
In the earlier times:

Since historic times France and Germany have been aware of each other often as enemies and rivals and seldom as friends. Germany unlike France had remained divided and feudal until right up to the middle of the 19th century. The latter part of the nineteenth century marked the triumph of the principles of liberty in Germany. Till then, however, French militarism which followed the Revolution and Napoleonic Conquests in Europe, had for little less than a century been the constant preoccupation and source of worry to the German States. After 1870 the situation was transformed. The establishment of a powerful unified German State in the heart of Europe with a military machine which became stronger than before and showed its mettle, turned out for the French to be a source of eternal fear — fear of German aggression, and deprived the Frenchmen of their sleep. Although two wars were fought since 1869 apprehensions of a future war never disappeared. The Treaty of Versailles, the most discussed treaty of modern times, justified by many Frenchmen on the ground of expediency, failed to keep the Germans satisfied with the settlements that were made. The next decade saw the beginnings of the revival of a militant nationalism in Germany. According to some people had there been wiser statesmen to conclude the Treaty, perhaps the next war could have been avoided.
Although the war was still eighteen years hence and although at that time the peace treaty settlements were acclaimed as having laid the foundations of a durable peace, the French people did not have the feeling of security. The fear of the military might beyond the Rhine incessantly haunted the French minds. E. A. Carr wrote, "the most important persistent single factor in the post-war years was the French quest for security." (1) France concluded agreements with different countries in Western and Eastern Europe in order to ensure the prevention of a recurrence of German aggression. The mistrust about Germany persisted. The objective of the French policy was to keep defeated Germany in a weak position.

However, the invasion of the Ruhr resulting from the default in reparation payments had the undesired effect on Germany.

The latter part of the nineteen-twenties showed signs of relaxation of tension between France and Germany, with the signing of the Locarno agreements and the Kellogg Pact and the admission of Germany to the League of Nations. War as an instrument of policy was renounced by France and Germany among the other signatories of the Kellogg Pact and the States no more thought of the possibility of an immediate outburst on the Rhine.

But these hopes proved short-lived. The beginning of the next decade witnessed the transfer of political power in Germany to Nazi leaders, and Germany, under Hitler, resumed her march towards strength and power. The war time alliance against Germany was practically as good as dissolved and for this reason, Hitler did not find it too difficult to flout the provisions of the Versailles settlements. The next war by consequence became inevitable. The Nazi Reich, proved a dangerous neighbour to France as did the Hohenzolern empire.

After the Second World War the strongest military power in Europe, ceased to exist any more. The division of Germany into two ideologically opposed camps (not on a provisional basis) was considered to be a solution of the German problem after the War, which, however, had no historical precedent. In 1945 a treaty had been concluded by France with the Soviet Union against the possibility of a future war. In the decade that followed no appreciable change was noticeable in the French attitude. The principle of German rearmament did not find any enthusiastic support. Proposals for European Defence Community failed among other reasons, because of Britain's refusal to participate in it and the French were unwilling to be with Germany in that Community alone. In the latter part of the fifties, however, many began to think of the possibility of better
understanding with the German people. Under the fifth Republic, the ideas of a reconciliation with the German people began to take shape. Some work in this direction was, however, already done. It was begun by Robert Schuman who did so much for the coal and steel community - which is considered to be the first practical step towards economic integration. It was a beginning of considerable importance because till this time the French attitude towards the Germans was coloured by mistrust and suspicion. Under the Fourth Republic, France was not eager to bring an end to the division of Germany. The goal of German reunification was not at any time overly supported. Positive opposition was shown to the principle of West German rearment. There were not many exchanges among the French and German people on any large scale in cultural and literary spheres. They did not know each other well. The French were attracted to the Latin countries, the Germans to other areas. But the French and German delegates sat together at Strasbourg in the Coal and Steel Community's High Authority and in various other bodies such as the NATO, the Unesco etc. The Coal and Steel Community could be said to have created the background of the future reconciliation between France and Germany. While the German people no longer thought of Alsace and Lorraine as parts of Germany, Frenchmen did not grumble about the Saar in German hands.
This was a great advance over the past.

New Policy towards Germany.

After 1958, as in other directions of foreign policy, the French attitude towards Germany began to show signs of concrete change. The new orientation to the German policy resulted no doubt from the personal views of the leader of the Fifth Republic, it seemed also to be necessitated by the changing perspective of European politics. The new policy towards Germany was also a manifestation of change in France. France of the sixties was different from the France under the Fourth Republic. A new generation was coming to the fore.

The primary objective of Gen. de Gaulle in directing French policies was the re-establishment of the greatness of France, reassertion of the role of France in the Western Alliance and in the world and to secure for France a leading position i.e. the leadership in Europe. With this view he had proposed to the United States, the three power consultations also known as tripartite directorate of the United States, France and Britain to formulate policy and to conduct strategy of NATO on a global level. The United States did not respond favourably to this suggestion. This did not deter de Gaulle, from assuming independent position and formulating French policies independently.
Soon afterwards, the French President pronounced his European policies, his concept of Europe which was basically different from the concept and policy of the United States. While the U.S. from the beginning had encouraged a political unification and integration of Western Europe in order to put an end to the historic feuds among the European countries and to present a solid Western front to the Soviet Union, what Gen. de Gaulle envisaged was a loose confederation of the European States in which each nation State retained its sovereignty. According to him, the U.S. would not maintain its presence in Europe forever (and the strategists supported him by arguing that the U.S. could not be counted upon to defend Europe at the risk of their own destruction in a nuclear war) Europe must, therefore, be master of its own destiny and must prepare for its own defence also. He envisaged a political union, not a supranational state emerging out of the economic institutions founded by the treaty of Rome.

Such a Europe could not obviously be constituted by France alone. In the present world, France was simply not large enough to mean much by herself, she could realise herself only in and through Europe. There was for this, the necessity of Franco-German reconciliation. It would not be correct to think that Gen. de Gaulle outlined the need for Franco-German reconciliation and reorganisation of Europe
only after he came to power in France for the second time in June 1958. He had conceived of these ideas before. In one of his speeches in 1945 (Main, Oct. 1945) as President of the Provisional Government in France, he had expressed that all the Westerners, who had also descended from the same race, might stay together from that time, in the interest of all. In another speech at Strasbourg, he said, "The Rhine can resume the role laid out for it by nature and history. It can become a Western bond once again." (2) At this time France had three objectives, viz. the end of the Reich, autonomy for the left bank of the Rhine and internationalisation of the Ruhr. What Gen. de Gaulle had stated while presenting his proposals to the then U.S. President Truman at the end of 1945 was very significant. He had written that it was not the French intention to drive the German people to despair. The French wanted the German people to live, to prosper and even to draw closer to the French. But the French wanted guarantees because if later the Germans changed their attitudes, it should be possible to reconsider the position. Further Gen. de Gaulle had written that in the absence of a threat from

Germany, the national interests of the states of Central Europe and Balkan area would inevitably rise within the Soviet Camp. It was indispensable, according to Gen. de Gaulle that West Germany should be firmly bound to the West and to the Common Market. If West Germany was not firmly attached to the west, there would be a danger, in future when Mr. Konrad Adenauer would no longer be the Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Soviet Union may try to pry upon it. Behind the French policy, there was also the concern for safeguarding French national interests i.e. the Rhine frontier. There were economic factors also. Germany an industrial country might be tempted to enter into close trade relations with Russia by exchanging the products of her industry with the agricultural products of Russia. Further if Germany was not closely bound to the West, there was the possibility that the Soviet Union would take the opportunity to offer a deal on Berlin and to propose a reunification of Germany on the basis of a federation of East and West Germany's. Gen. de Gaulle's policy of tying West Germany firmly to the West was the policy of the United States also; it was reciprocated fully by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Dr. Adenauer. These attitudes marked a departure from a policy which France consistently pursued since the end of the hostilities in 1945. France had not supported the national ambitions of
the Germans for reunification and had resisted the re-
establishment of Germany's military forces.

The views of General de Gaulle were largely shared
by Mr. Adenauer. In fact, from the beginning of the Fifth
Republic, a kind of personal alliance was formed between the
French President and the German Chancellor. General de -
Gaulle believed in the possibility of co-operation between
France and Germany in economic and political fields and
shared in 1960, Mr. Adenauer's misgivings about the inten-
tions of the Soviet Union. The two leaders exchanged
visits to their capitals frequently. Friendship even
aroused misgivings in some quarters in the United States
about what was sometimes called a "Paris-Bonn" axis. The
French were conscious of the fact that it had all along
been one of the objectives of the United States policy
towards Europe, that a rapprochement between France and
Germany should be established. Both the leaders; Gen. de -
Gaulle and Mr. Adenauer, shared the opinion that there was
a future for West Germany, if it was bound inextricably in
a Western European Community. Why were fears then expres-
ed in the United States? These were said to be based on
the suspicion that a "Paris-Bonn" Axis might give rise to
an independent force within the North Atlantic Alliance; it
would divide the alliance on such vital matters as a common
nuclear strategy. This could possibly even mean, at some
distant date, a challenge to the U.S. leadership of NATO and of Europe.

Even for the attitude of General de Gaulle, the new orientation of thinking was a considerable change caused by the necessities of the changing times. During a decade General de Gaulle's attitude underwent change. In 1948 when he was speaking to the tercentenary of the Treaty of Westphalia, he had said that another German empire should never be allowed to come into existence; there should be only sovereign German States, allowed to form alliances among themselves and to enter a European grouping if they so desired. He had added that such a need for such denationalization was due to the fact that the nature of the Germans tends to lead them to entertain very large ambitions. When he became the leader of France a second time since 1958, the Soviet policies in the intervening period had already caused a change of attitudes among both the French and Germans. Gen. de Gaulle thought in face of the new future, he might accept the Federal Republic of Germany as a neighbour with whom peaceful and friendly relations might be possible. Another factor which possibly influenced Gen. de Gaulle's thinking was his desire to restore France to her former position of great power and for doing this, he wanted to reduce the over all patronage of the United States. In this effort, good relations with West Germany
the immediate neighbour in the east, were naturally
considered desirable and necessary. This was also a mutual
need. It was not only France which sought friendship with
her neighbour, the Federal Republic wanted also the
Friendship of France as much. There were other considera-
tions also. Between France and Germany there was no
colonial rivalry. Most of the colonial empires were on the
way of passing out. The new perspective in Africa and Asia
was nationalism. While Germany looked for markets in
foreign countries for the products of her revived industry,
the search of France was directed to the mineral resources
of the vast areas in the Sahara. Internally, France wanted
peace and not war, in order to consolidate her industrial
and agricultural base.

But in the reconciliation that was achieved between
France and Germany, a factor of fundamental importance was
the personal role of the West German Chancellor Dr. Konrad
Adenauer. He directed the course of German affairs since
the Federal Republic became sovereign in such a manner as
to ensure its Western Orientation and to prevent decocci-
dentalization, so that ultimately the Federal Republic
could win the confidence of all the Western powers as a
reliable Western ally. His devotion to the church and oppo-
sition to communism endeared him to the Western allies.
Since 1955 Adenauer maintained that the goal of the German
people, who had become again a free and independent state, was a free and United Germany in a free and United Europe. The remarkable characteristic of this development, however, lies in the fact that large sections of both peoples seized upon the idea of reconciliation and supported the efforts of their governments. About the reconciliation between France and Germany Dr. Adenauer wrote,

"Germany and France have become aware of what they have in common - their histories, their interests and their responsibilities. From now on they will be still closer together... This friendship is directed against no one in the free world, it will be to the advantage of all. Europe can only benefit if the two neighboring countries in the heart of Europe are closely united. France and Germany will form a firm political dam against the advance of Soviet Communism which threatens the freedom of us all." (3)

Among the other factors which account for the changed situation in W. Germany may be mentioned the re-emergence of liberalism in West Germany, which they had inherited from the French revolutionary period. There was no more Prussia on the German map and among some sector of the German youth a revival of the more liberal traditions was noticeable. An equally important thing was the realization in both the countries by many thinkers that progress

of both the people depended on their being able to live together peacefully and that they could not afford to resort to wars as in the past. However, co-existence would always depend as much on the continued good will and understanding among the people of the countries as solely on the co-operation among their leaders. Further, France was no longer weak as during the inter-war period while the military strength of Germany was crippled. It could be called a historical coincidence that France and Germany were led by two men of high stature, integrity and character; both of them had been ardent Catholics. Dr. Adenauer had worked more than any other single individual to bind the Federal Republic to the West.

It was in fact the policy of the United States also to bind West Germany inextricably within a Western European Community. General de Gaulle's anxiety to seek an early achievement of an alliance with Germany while Dr. Adenauer was still the Chancellor, arose out of the fact that the latter was personally inclined toward it. Also, the French could not know what the attitude of the succeeding Chancellors would be. There was apprehension that a struggle for succession in West Germany, might ensue. It was also not unlikely, a fear was expressed, that in order to outdo each other the political rivals would even contemplate to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union.
The French Government continued the pursuit of policies of greater co-operation between France and Germany. During his visit to West Germany in September 1962, General de Gaulle called for organic ties with the German Army and military co-operation between the two countries. His objective in proposing organic co-operation between the two armies was to make the two countries a nucleus for a larger European Union. The heads of the two States agreed to initiate "concrete dispositions" in order to tighten the links between the two countries in various fields. Gen. de Gaulle in his speech to the Officers at the Bundeswehr Staff College at Hamburg, on September 7, 1962, referred to the "absurdity of the Franco-German duel over two centuries", laid special emphasis on the "organic co-operation" of the French and German armies, in the "joint and united defence essential to both our countries", in face of the "Colossal World menace of Communism" and stressed that in the light of the ever-growing cost and complexity of modern armaments, France and Germany could, "all the better provide themselves with the means of defence, if they join their capacities which will apply still more if the capacities of their European neighbours are associated with theirs." (4) What was intended by the French President

when he spoke of France and Germany "joining their possibilities" was loudly debated. While it does not appear that nuclear matters were discussed during the meeting of the President and the Chancellor, many people concluded from the statement that an effort was being made on the part of France for the financial and technical assistance of West Germany for the development of the French nuclear programme.

The French position regarding West Germany was, however, not as categorical as the West Germans would have liked it to be. The views expressed by Gen. de Gaulle have sometimes embarrassed the Federal Republic. At his Press Conference of May 19, 1962 the General declared,

"As far as we are concerned, we believe that in the present international situation it is vain to hope for a satisfactory settlement of the German problem. It seems to us like trying to square the circle. . . . Of course, France cannot object to her ally, America, undertaking on her own behalf talks with Moscow, which are euphemistically called "soundings". But as for ourselves, we think it much preferable to remain reserved." (5)

The West Germans expected unequivocal support to their demands; the French President expressed caution. To a certain extent, his views, although not liked in some quarters in Germany reflected practical and realistic

considerations over the complex and difficult problem. His policies evoked mixed and different reaction in various quarters. The criticism of the French policies which appeared in the European press, covered most of the important aspects viz. de Gaulle over rated nuclear weapons and under-rated the Atlantic Alliance; that de Gaulle's policy towards the Federal Republic might lead to uneasiness in the Western Alliance; that de Gaulle accepted the creation of a defence organization outside NATO, this was unrealistic; that de Gaulle managed to affront most of his allies in an unstatesman like manner; that de Gaulle was anticipating, inviting the withdrawal of U.S. power from Europe, but the Germans, the Italians, the Dutch and the Belgians do not want this to happen. (6)

Most of these reactions resulted from the apprehension that a separate bloc was intended to be created in Western Europe and that it was only France which was anxious and enthusiastic about it. Sometime, the French proposals were warily received even in West Germany. When for example France suggested to West Germany the co-ordination of their policies within the International Organisations of which both the countries were members, what the French sought

was the development of common policies through discussions before meetings which involved other members of the Atlantic alliance. The matters covered would not necessarily be political, they could be cultural. Apparently, what was proposed was a degree of co-operation that has been considered normal in the relations between States. Hesitations in West Germany over such plans resulted from their doubts regarding the political situation in France. West Germans also were worried about the possible effects of such co-operation on other countries, viz. Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. The policies of the latter countries were very similar in some respects although they differed on certain issues. When it came to choosing among the policies of the allies the position of West Germany was always difficult. It could not afford to choose between the U.S. and France, nor between France and other allies in the European Economic Community.

French attitude towards the Berlin Problem.

The French attitude towards the evolving situation in Germany by 1959 was influenced not only by an awareness of the new solidarity that was growing between France and West Germany but it was colored also by the considerations of French national interests. Soviet Union's new posture of seeking a separate peace treaty with East Germany and contemplating new actions against Berlin was considered to
be a new threat to the West of a serious nature. The French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, expressed his view that success in taking Berlin could encourage the Soviet Union to take other places also.

In case of a military confrontation, it was considered the West would not be able to maintain its position in Berlin, strategically, by recourse, either to conventional or nuclear weapons. When, therefore, the alternative of a diplomatic solution to the problem was considered, it meant that the original policy objectives needed to be modified, and the views of the Soviet Union would have to be given greater weight, consideration than before. General de Gaulle made his views known at his press conference of March 25, 1959. He said that a demilitarized zone in Europe could not be expected to be adequate protection unless it was so expanded as to be acceptable to Russia. It would have to extend into Russia itself and be wide enough "to prevent an (the would be) aggressor from crossing by a leap or a flight the undefended German no-man's land." (7)

Later when it was proposed to find a "negotiated settlement" of the problem with the Soviet Union, General de Gaulle recorded France's clear opposition to the idea.

At the end of 1961, on account of this position, General de Gaulle found himself in an intellectually isolated position from his allies, Britain, United States and West Germany. While according to de Gaulle, negotiations necessarily implied making concessions to the Soviet Union and to make concessions was going to weaken the entire Western position, the United States and Britain were of the opinion that the time to negotiate would arise only when negotiating the future of Berlin with the Soviet Union. Because once the Russians succeeded in making a peace-treaty with East Germany, the West will have no chances of diplomatic initiative. The French always held the view that the central problem in the European situation was the problem of Berlin and not the recovery of West Germany. While they did not approve the full military revival of the Federal Republic and militarism, they opposed the Soviet Union's criticism against any proposals of West Germany getting arms. When the subject came up for discussion during the debate in the Political Committee of the General Assembly, the French representative, Mr. Roger Seydoux pointed out that West German armament did not create tension in Europe, tension was caused by the threat to Berlin and the allied access routes, the building of the Berlin-wall and refusal to grant the German people, the right of self-
determination which was "the only sure foundation of a true peace in Europe." (8) The position of the U.S. delegate was nearly the same. Mr. Adlai Stevenson said "no matter how exaggerated, how persistent and how continuous these allegations against the Federal Republic of Germany are, the NATO alliance does not intend to lower its military guard in Europe until the threat which brought it into being and which it is designed to meet disappeared." (9)

The French attitude as it evolved since 1961 did take into consideration the Soviet advances towards West Germany. In December 1961, Mr. Khrouschev had proposed in a Note (Soviet Memorandum of December 27, 1961) to the German Chancellor the consideration of a new German-Soviet Pact, proposals similar to those made by Marshall Bulganin in February 1957. He also had pointed out in the Note that re-unification of Germany was dependent on the good will of the Soviet Union and not of the West (The Soviet Proposals for German reunification, it was feared, would involve its neutralisation and ultimately lead to Germany passing under the Soviet orbit). The Soviet Union recalled to the Germans the advantages that might result from a revival of the spirit of Rapallo when they celebrated in January 1962, the

fortieth anniversary of the Treaty. The French position was made clear in what General de Gaulle is said to have told Mr. Khruschev during the latter's visit to France. He said,

"You say, you would like to have an easing of tension? We would like too. But there can be no easing of tension without equilibrium. There can be no possible equilibrium if the Federal Republic does not belong to the West. The Federal Republic will no longer belong to the West from the moment that West Berlin is, directly or indirectly abandoned. For this will be proof that the Atlantic guarantee is weak, precarious and revocable. What will happen then? The whole of Germany will tumble into neutrality and the safety of our Rhine frontier which we have secured at the cost of two terrible wars, will be placed in question again. It is in order to avoid this fatal chain of events that France is urging the greatest firmness in the defence of Western rights in Berlin." (10)

What France alone could have done to give a desired shape to the evolution is not certain. With all her lofty plans and attractive ideas she could not have jumped beyond the means at her disposal. This, however, did not come in the way of France's seeking with Germany, a lasting reconciliation. General de Gaulle did not choose to participate in the proposed Soviet-American talks regarding

Berlin. According to him, the U.S.S.R. had artificially created the Berlin problem and so long as it did not change the basic positions, negotiations could only fail or lead to capitulation by stages. In the first case, he held, international tension would be increased by trying to work towards a détente. In the second case the way for a German Soviet rapprochement would be cleared. Withholding of France's participation was in his view, necessary to avoid the break with Germany and the West.

However, in France itself, Gen. de Gaulle's views were contested by some Europeanists. René Pleven was of the opinion that de Gaulle was not following his German policy to its logical end. France would be in the dangerous position of isolation, if at some time in future her alliances broke up. In order to prevent such an eventuality it was necessary to have an irreversible union of France and Germany based on institutions of supranational form. Gen. de Gaulle evidently had not intended to push his policy to that extent.

**Franco-German Treaty of Co-operation.**

The result and culmination of all the efforts made by the leaders of the two States was the Franco-German Treaty of co-operation signed in January 1963. The Treaty sought to bind the two nations together in partnership and to put an end to the historic rivalry. It was acclaimed
as an event of great significance. The signature of the Treaty by Dr. Adenauer and General de Gaulle was a sign of the change that had come about in the West European politics since 1945 when General de Gaulle signed a pact with the Soviet Union against Germany.

The text of the Treaty indicated the range of the spheres in which the two governments sought greater co-operation. To what logical end would the policies pursued in this direction would lead? In other words what was the significance of the Treaty to West Germany ultimately? This was a question that loomed large in the minds of many in the following months when the Treaty was sent for ratification to the legislature. Many political thinkers questioned whether the consequence of Gen. de Gaulle's policies regarding West Germany involved for the Federal Republic a choice between the United States and France. They were evidently not in a position to make such a choice, as Germany needed the support and good will of both the countries; there did not exist at this time, any intention to call to account all the post war settlements in Europe. Germany further, could not choose between a strong ally and a comparatively weak neighbour. All the political parties in West Germany demanded from the Government a reaffirmation of its promise for close co-operation with the United States. They were not prepared to allow
the Treaty to interfere with the intimate co-operation with the United States. The West German Chancellor had to make in unequivocal terms, the pledge of his government to continued co-operation with the United States. "West Germany" he said, "could not survive without American support." (11) Adenauer had to assure not only the German people but the United States that the newly signed Treaty with France did not mean a departure from the policies pursued so far. In his message, he communicated to the Deputy Secretary of State in the Department of State, Mr. Gilpatric, that West Germany would continue to stick to the agreements made with Washington and no change about them was intended. The German Bundesrat or the Upper house voted Chancellor Adenauer's Treaty of co-operation with France on May 1, 1963 and forwarded it to the Bundestag, the Lower House. At this time Mr. Willy Brandt suggested the incorporation of five principles in a separate resolution as West German national policy. These were, self-determination and reunification of the German people, an integrated joint defence of the Atlantic Community in NATO, European unification on the basis of an expanding Common Market and removal of trade barriers among free nations.

On account of the growing demand made by all parties for giving a pledge of co-operation with the United States, the Government coalition parties agreed to preface the ratification of Chancellor Adenauer's treaty of co-operation with France with a declaration of fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance and European unity. The declaration was to be placed in the preamble to the ratification-law and was meant to calm the fears in Germany and abroad, that the new Treaty with France signified a fundamental change in the Foreign policy of the Federal Republic. The French had assured Dr. Adenauer before he accepted the preamble, that any statements made in the preamble to the ratification law would not be considered as affecting the content of the Treaty.

Thus came about out of the instincts of self-preservation, out of national interests, and out of changed circumstances the reconciliation between France and Germany rivals for more than three hundred years. With the advance in nuclear technology, isolationism appeared to be on the way out. It is difficult to say whether the reconciliation will be lasting but beyond doubt, it could be described as one of the most significant events of the post-war years. The Franco-German Treaty of co-operation that was signed on the 22nd of January 1963, covered wide spheres; it has a broad scope relating to cultural, economic and military
matters. In the immediately succeeding period it seemed to be a victory of statesmanship over the developments of history. But later it was viewed by many, as an effort by the two leading countries of Western Europe led by Gen. de Gaulle and Dr. Adenauer to initiate a sort of balance of power, limited to the West European area. The Treaty, however, could not be said to have achieved a complete co-ordination of the approaches of France and Germany. Gen. de Gaulle's policy in relation to the United States and his veto over Britain's admission to the European Economic Community were not supported whole heartedly in West Germany. Gen. de Gaulle's position regarding unification of Germany was not as categoric as the Germans would desire.

General de Gaulle's policy and ideas behind the Franco-German rapprochement did not fail to give rise to certain questions as to what real, ultimate objective he sought by them. Did his concepts reflect greater concern for France rather than for the West? Was not, what he tried to achieve, a sort of a concert of Europe which would emerge as a "third force" between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to maintain a European balance? .
Would it be possible to agree with a view like the one which states, "the role of the individual in international politics seems to have been reasserted through the Franco-German Association, yet the urgency of international problems occasioned by nuclear armaments makes it vital to rise above purely individual considerations." (12) The answers to these questions were not easy to seek. It would be, however, possible to get some indications from a review of the objectives on which France and Germany agreed. The leaders of the two countries agreed that the necessity of political unification of Europe arose out of the threatening attitude of the Soviet Union. In the face of the latter it was then necessary for Western Europe to organise itself, setting aside all kinds of differences, in the spheres of foreign policy, defence and cultural exchanges.

Further, there was agreement between the two countries that Britain may eventually be admitted to the European Economic Community but the evolution of a European Confederation should not depend upon the occurrence of that event. There was also agreement between the two countries that it was not likely that, in future, the United States

and Britain would continue to remain the sole possessors of the most advanced weapons. The role of French and European nuclear forces was automatically envisaged here. The French were not content with the fact that nuclear weapons crossed the Atlantic but stopped at the channel.

In an analysis the significance of these considerations cannot be underrated.

There was no reason why confidence, trust in mutual good intentions could not come about in France and Germany. Of course, it was a matter of time and mere pronouncements of amity by the respective administrations could not create an atmosphere of good will in a short time. Between England and France, the settlement of the age-old hostility resulted from a fundamental change in the European political situation viz. the rise of a powerful German State in the centre of Europe. Before 1904 nobody could have believed that in future England and France would fight on the same side. From that time on, a war between France and England was ruled out.

The essential thing in the reconciliation from the Western point of view at that time was that the old hostility between France and Germany, ended, not in the victory of the one or the other but in an acknowledgement by both that, in the changed circumstances, there was risk to their political independence and way of life. If French-
men to-day and other Europeans also continued to believe in Lord Vansittart's description of the German race as "unique in wickedness, the brazen-horde and the butcher-bird throughout the ages" no hopes for the future of the West and its civilization could be entertained. If the reconciliation had to be made durable and lasting, it would require the implantation in Germany of a democracy with real contents and not merely superficial frameworks, but based on secure foundations. This in turn would depend upon the education of the younger generation in schools and universities, in order to create an enduring good will. Apart from the sentimental factors evoked by the heads of the respective states, there was another factor behind the reconciliation that came about and it was the fear of a German-Soviet reconciliation or pact. If the French-German reconciliation was intended to be more than merely a provision against common danger, it would need from 1963 onwards an organic evolution in the attitudes of their peoples leading to a new era of understanding, good will and co-operation based on common purpose and values. It would be the latter and not merely the common purpose of preventing a German-Soviet rapprochement that created conditions for a Franco-German rapprochement.

At that time, however, the purpose appeared to be achieved. Dr. Adenauer believed that the objective of the
policies of France and West Germany from that time needed to be that the two peoples should be brought together in such manner that neither of their governments could contemplate a treaty with Moscow at the expense of the other. He gave expression to this view, while speaking to the journalists, on May 15; 1962, on his return from visit to France. General de Gaulle also had declared that Germany "did not at present represent any kind of danger to France," (13) and this meant that the possibility of an agreement with Moscow over the German danger, was set aside at that time.

Co-operation under the Treaty.

The year 1963 thus marked a significant period in post-war European policies. It witnessed the opening of a new chapter in the relations between the two principal Western countries which pointed to the direction of co-operation rather than mistrust of each other. The two Governments pledged their efforts to create understanding and good neighbourly relations between the two peoples. Co-operation under the Treaty was sometimes looked upon with suspicion. In June 1963, the Defence Minister of France Pierre Messmer visited Bonn for discussions over the

proposals for developing weapons jointly. He denied the charges that were made that the two countries were preparing for a plan for the defence of Europe when the United States would eventually withdraw from Europe. This was to a large extent merely a statement of facts because during the subsequent years the only concrete result of French-German military co-operation was manifested in their efforts to develop jointly some transport air-craft. However, till the end of 1963, no plans were initiated for contingency defence of Europe. Dr. Adenauer supported France's policies. On Oct. 5, 1963, he declared his support to the concept of a European nuclear force. This was considered to be his last service to his French allies.

When Mr. Erhard succeeded Dr. Adenauer, some changes were noticeable in the German policies that were pursued under the previous chancellor. In his speech to the German Parliament on October 18, 1963, he stated his determination to develop good relations with France because he said, "all problems of European policy centre on the relations between the German and the French people." He further said in the same speech that "no individual state belonging to the NATO alliance can protect itself in isolation." (14) His speech pointed out the difference that

was becoming clear, between the positions of France and her allies and by implication, put in question General de Gaulle's policy of insisting on military as well as political independence. It was a criticism of de Gaulle's nationalistic policies.

Chancellor Erhard's views differed from the policies of France on some other issues also. Regarding the solution of the German problem, he supported the idea of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and also suggested that a Committee of the four countries, the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union should be formed to work out a peace-treaty with Germany. This position differed from the French position on the subject. Mr. Erhard was also of the view that cooperation with Britain was useful and necessary.

In February 1963 i.e. the month following the signature of the Treaty, France indicated her willingness to redeploy some of her armed forces in West Germany (moving one French division to the Eastern area). This was, according to some Germans, an acknowledgement by France of the utility of NATO's forward strategy (of defence) and indicated that France was ready to draw all military consequences from it. According to some others, it was necessary to view the importance of the French-West German military agreement with caution rather than with too much optimism.
United State's reaction to the Franco-German Treaty:

The United State's reaction to the Franco-German reconciliation could best be summed up by recalling the remarks made by the then President Mr. Kennedy at his Press Conference in Bonn on June 24, 1963 in which he declared that the United States supported the goal of Franco-German reconciliation embodied in the recent treaty signed by the two countries. At the same time, he said, the U.S. had no less concern and attached great importance to maintaining the integrity of NATO. (15) What the United States, at this time supported was the improvement of relations between the two countries within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance.

President Kennedy's clear and unmistakable acknowledgement of the right of the German nation to freedom and self-determination evoked in September 1963 expressions of gratitude from West Germany. But it came under criticism also. Mr. Taylor Adams wrote in his letter, "To make so definitive a commitment to the resurgent Germans, a war-like people now smarting under defeat and dedicated to a bellicose revanchism, could be called dangerous adventurism which all peace loving people will deplore." (16)

this could not be said to have been a representative opinion and while those in favour of reviving the milita-
rism in Germany would be too few in the United States and even in France, the United States' support of Germany was in conformity with their own traditions; it arose out of their desire to see West Germany included in a strong bul-
-wark against expansionist designs from the East. Dr. - Adenauer who was a staunch opponent of Communism always stood for a "hard line" towards the Soviet Union. According to him if the Soviet Union showed more receptiveness to agreement with the West, it did so because of internal diffi-
culties within the communist bloc and it sought to make a virtue of necessity at West Germany's expense. The West German foreign Minister told President Kennedy that although West Germany was always prepared to try to see whether negotiations with the Soviet Union were possible, the basic problem of the dangerous situation in Europe was no other than the necessity for German reunification and self determination.

Reactions and attitude of West Germany to French Policies:

Dr. Adenauer and his followers were enthusiastic supporters of France since 1958-59 i.e. from the beginning of the Fifth Republic. Many Germans, however, held other views and expressed differences and anxiety over different aspects of the new policy of France as far as it concerned
West German interests. The French President's views expressed from time to time in his speeches and Press Conferences have at times, created embarrassing position for the West Germans. His Press Conference of Feb. 1962 particularly disappointed many Germans. They had assumed that France's divergences from her allies regarding NATO and Common market were mainly due to the difficult situation France had to face in Algeria and once that problem was solved French policies would be more in conformity with the views of their allies. Many Germans, therefore, resented the reaffirmation by Gen. de Gaulle of his opposition to the principle of supranationalism and integration in NATO. It indicated a clash with the West German policies on the same subject and gave rise to the fear of its unwelcome effects on Germany. Many West Germans like the former Foreign Minister Von Brentano were convinced supporters of the evolution of the European Economic Community into supranational institutions. Others did not approve of the French proposals for union which in fact were according to them the reviving of the military grouping of the six countries, as a separate block within NATO.

In their meeting in Paris in July 1962, Gen. de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer announced the unity between their countries. Both were anxious to move towards European political unity very early. Gen. de Gaulle wanted
to achieve it before Britain entered Europe. Mr. Adenauer's eagerness was explained by the fact that he was already 86 and was worried about what the views of his successors would be. Dr. Adenauer was of the view that in the wake of the Coal and Steel Community and the Six nation common market which were remarkable achievements, the solidarity between France and Germany would provide the basis of European unification. However, he supported the American Trade expansion Act and close co-operation with the United States in trade policy. He also believed that mere economic integration of Europe was not sufficient by itself for the interests of Europe, but a Union of European States with close co-operation in the political i.e. foreign policy field was necessary. In his view, the unification of Europe was not likely to be achieved without the active support of the North Atlantic Alliance. Atlantic Alliance and NATO were instruments of proved utility, because, he believed, since their establishment Soviet advance in the direction of the West was held up. It was a measure of the success of the common policy in defence. He, therefore, advocated that NATO should be preserved and must remain effective. But NATO also represented close unity between the States on both sides of the Atlantic and Dr. Adenauer supported the preservation of this link. He committed the Federal Republic to these ideas.
No definite proposals, however, seem to have been discussed at this time. Further, according to Dr. Adenauer, if the efforts to move towards European unification were delayed, the European political development would lose its power and in the end, the Soviet Union would be encouraged in its hope to divide the free world.

Dr. Adenauer believed that when the Western countries demonstrated their United strength, the result often was that Soviet pressures on Berlin and other areas automatically relaxed. It was, therefore, of the greatest importance, according to him, to maintain Western strength and unity so as to convince the Soviet Union that maintaining constant tension was not likely to yield successful results. Although the Soviet tactics were changed, the West could not think of making concessions to the Soviet Union. The free world, according to Dr. Adenauer, had a responsibility towards not only Berlin but towards East Germany also; and it related to the question of the destiny of 17,000,000 people. The United States was committed to it and the Germans reposed trust in their pledge.

The next meeting of the heads of two States in Nov. 1963 showed different results. The German view held by Chancellor Erhard showed divergences from basic French policies. General de Gaulle favoured the development of Europe as an independent entity, allied to the United States but
not subject to their political and military control. Dr. Erhard declared:

"We Germans are convinced that we can and must rely on the Atlantic alliance, we feel sure that the United States will reply with all its force if Europe or any part of Europe was attacked. Common and reciprocal action of Europe and the United States offered the best guarantee that world issues could be resolved within the Alliance." (17)

According to him, the French West German Treaty was a new force which would lead Europe towards its common destiny, which in the German view, was closely tied with that of the United States, which had encouraged European Union long ago. To Dr. Erhard the value of the French-German reconciliation lay in the fact that in time the whole of free Europe would be aware of its common destiny and develop with America close political, military, economic and social relations.

The differences which existed regarding farm policy in the European Economic Community were mentioned in the Communique issued at the end of the meeting. It said, "they had recognized the importance for France and the Federal Republic and for the EEC, of adoption within agreed time of agricultural and financial regulations still in suspense." (18)

The differences over farm-price policy resulted from the fact that the agricultural prices in France were low and the French were not prepared to raise the gain prices to a common level for fear of inflation. The position in Germany was opposite. The agricultural prices in Germany were high and they did not want to lower them for fear of arousing discontent among the farmers. The Franco-German Treaty was intended to compose such differences by mutual consultations. The meeting of the heads of States in Nov. 1963 could not resolve these divergences. The German point of view at this time seemed to be different from what it was when Mr. Adenauer was Chancellor. French ideas on European Unity were also not supported by Germany.

The prospect of Franco-German relations did not therefore, appear encouraging. The West German policy affirmed by Dr. Erhard amounted to declining to follow the lead of France. It put into question the balance that was reached by the Franco-German alliance. Although Chancellor Erhard had declared that, "we have the highest respect for French nuclear effort," (19) the position from which he was speaking appeared to be that of strength. Five years hence Germany could be much stronger still so strong as to question France's leadership of Europe. It would have, then, a 12 division army, a share in the multilateral fleet, close

relations with the United States and Europe's most advanced industrial structure.

Originally, the proposals towards unity in Germany, France and elsewhere in Europe were motivated by the desire to put an end to the old nationalistic hostilities that were the cause of many wars and destruction. This desire lost considerable part of its force due to the changed circumstances viz. the establishment of a balance of terror between the two big powers, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. which possessed catastrophic nuclear weapons. Even a United Europe, it was thought, could not hope to attain the strength of either of them. The fear was also expressed that unity could not be founded on conformity to one country's (viz. France's) policies on all issues.

The positive aspect of the meeting between the two leaders was a recounting of the success achieved in the cooperation in many economic and social fields, under the Franco-German Treaty. It was noted with satisfaction, that the centuries-old rivalry between the two countries was composed and it was by itself a significant fact in the recent period. Glaring differences remained. One thing was evident; in the Europe that de Gaulle wanted, a Europe built on alliances between the great states, Germany was going to be a little more important every year.

The growing emphasis of the West German policies on unification could be illustrated by a reference to
Chancellor Erhard's speech to the German Parliament on Oct. 18, 1963 in which he said, "And yet we shall have to do all possible to remove it. Above all the division of our country is put forward as a reality, the will of the German people to restore its unity is a far stronger reality." (20) In the beginning of Dec. 1963, he expressed his confidence in France as a faithful member of the Western alliance. He also saw the possibility of better French-American relations and indicated his willingness to help to work out mutual agreement.

West German position in relation to the United States:

In order to grasp the political significance of the Franco-German Treaty of co-operation, it is necessary to see the basic elements in the German policy since it became sovereign. Germany was the central problem of all European policy even after the cessation of hostilities. After 1949 it was included in the North Atlantic Alliance, the principle of West German rearmament was conceded and it was involved inextricably in the military framework of NATO.

After the birth of the Federal Republic, attachment to the west and close relations with the United States was the corner-stone of West Germany's policy. West Germany frequently reiterated its pledge to the United States, who on their part declared their firm commitment to West Germany.

The opposing political parties in West Germany viz. Dr. Adenauer's party and the Social democratic party held nearly the same position on this issue. On the eve of the German elections, in March 1961, Willy Brandt, the leader of the Social democratic party declared that West German foreign policy would continue to be Western-oriented irrespective of which party won the elections. He said,

"The cornerstone of German foreign policy is now and will be in future, the unbreakable friendship with the United States and the Western Community... There can be no separate settlements of the questions of Berlin and of German unification... political as well as ideological and economic unity must be realized in the Atlantic Community of free nations... The United States must retain its place as the first among the equals in the Western World." (21)

The West German readiness to agree to opening of negotiations with the Soviet Union was made known in Nov. 1961 (as in the subsequent years also). The Communique issued after the meeting between President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer said,

"They are in accord on the basic elements which will permit a peaceful resolution of this crisis through negotiations if there is reasonableness on the part of the Soviet Union. At the same time they also agreed on the necessity for maintaining and increasing the ability of the NATO alliance to cope up with any military developments." (22)

It also stressed that the goal of the two governments was the unification of the two Germanys, on the basis of self determination.

Dr. Adenauer naturally advocated a "hard line" towards the Soviet Union although he and Mr. Kennedy had not opposed the proposals for negotiations with Russia. There was at times, the feeling that American tactics of meeting the Russian challenge was not adequate. There was dislike for the possibility of a deal between the United States and the Soviet Union for preventing their allies from possession of advanced weapons.

Some of the remarks made by Dr. Adenauer in the second week of May 1962, regarding the Berlin situation and the European Economic Community had the result of creating fears in the United States that West Germany was getting inclined to France's proposals for a Western European Alliance within the Atlantic Alliance which would be comparatively independent of the United States and Great Britain. These fears were aggravated by the policies declared by the French President in his news conference of 15-16 May 1962 in which he spoke of a European balance of power (in Europe alone) based on a political union of six participants in the European Economic Community. Gen. de Gaulle also suggested possession of a separate nuclear force by the Union of the six.
These visions amounted to the creation of a separate bloc within NATO and clashed with President Kennedy's ideas of the future which included Britain in the European Economic Community.

The statements reported to have been made by Adenauer raised alarm. President Kennedy was patient but did not indicate any changes in policy regarding negotiations. It was recognized in the United States that Germany was an "enormous" economic power. It was the result of its peculiar history that West Germany had to place reliance on others for its protection. Most of Europe did not trust Germany due its past record and present strength. The American view of looking at Germany was that democracy, though instituted, had yet to take firm roots in Germany. It was governed by an old leader and there was the possibility of a frantic struggle for succession. West Germany declared its firm commitment to the West. It was still subject to blackmail from the East, the uprising of the extremists in West Germany could not also be ruled out. The Germans lived with the dreams of reunification with East Germany and hopes for a revival. As a result of all these factors, the whole situation in Germany seemed to have an unsettled outlook. They also thought of the Atlantic Community of free nations which had been the cornerstone of Kennedy Administration's policy which was upheld that time.
The matter regarding differences arising from the statements said to have been made by Dr. Adenauer was declared as closed after President Kennedy's letter to the German Chancellor and discussions with the West German Ambassador Mr. Grewe on May 15, 1962.

West Germany had to maintain a delicate balance vis-a-vis the United States and France as it could not oppose either. Dr. Adenauer's interview published shortly afterwards by "Die Welt" indicated that position. According to its English version which appeared in the New York Times, of May 18, 1962, Adenauer said,

"We must under no circumstances release the U.S. from NATO. Europe cannot get along without the U.S. . . . There are no longer any big powers left in Europe. Europe's influence must, nonetheless, be maintained, but this should not mean the setting up of a defence organisation separated from the United States. . . . I hold absolutely to the German-French understanding. . . . Britain must sign the Treaty of Rome. We agree with the Americans about the continuation of their talks with the Soviet Union." (23)

The expression of these views barely two days after Gen. de Gaulle's press conference had the result of indicating that West Germany did not subscribe to the concept of a European power independent of the United States and that West German policies did not contradict those of the United States for

the sake of the Franco-German Treaty. In the face of French and American points of view, the position of the German Chancellor became untenable. The declaration of the Free Democratic Party's position looked like a warning—"It would be fatal if de Gaulle ever intended to confront the Federal Republic with a choice between Paris and Washington. For the Germans it must not be France or America, but France and America." (24) Difficulties lay in this. During the period when Mr. Adenauer was Chancellor, Germany seemed mainly preoccupied with the preservation of its concepts of German national interests, rather than attaining the leading or dominating position in Europe. He wanted to maintain unchanged position regarding the problems of Berlin and East Germany and West's relations with the Communist countries of the East. Maintenance of these positions was of vital importance to the Federal Republic. West Germany's opposition to Britain's entry into the European Economic Community was also due to the fact that in West German view, it was from Great Britain that the initiative of opening talks with the Soviet Union came. And if Britain with an opening in the Soviet Union enters the European Economic Community it could have the effect of smoothening the anti-Communist policies of the Community.

Mr. Adenauer's policies always emanated from his basic anti-communism and he always advocated a hard-line towards the Soviet Union. A corollary of this policy was his stress on the NATO where the policies of France tended to diverge. During his visit to the United States, he declared: "If you hear of peaceful co-existence over and over again then you gradually get used to believing that such a State exists with the other side. But in future when I hear of peaceful co-existence mentioned again I will think of Cuba." (25) It was only natural that an agreement was reached between Dr. Adenauer and President Kennedy that the North Atlantic Alliance must be strengthened. Although the German Chancellor supported the idea of opening negotiations with the Soviet Union, he opposed making any concessions. He believed that the Franco-German Treaty would be in the interest of all Atlantic Allies. He upheld President Kennedy's European Policy in extending his support to the idea of European Unification in close partnership with the United States.

Although at times, the views of Dr. Adenauer appeared to differ from and contradicted the United States policy and although at times the political situation gave rise to mutual irritations, his belief in the American-German

relations was never shaken. In an article on the German problem, he had written in 1962,

"When after the last terrible war Germany lay conquered and beaten on the ground it was the Western occupation powers led by the United States that lent us a helping hand. The economic assistance provided by the American Government and thousands of private American citizens was important, it contributed to our survival and the reconstruction of our country. But still more valuable was the human spirit underlying this attitude. It is rare in history that the victor helps the defeated enemy to his feet and is prepared to accept him as an equal if he proves his worth as an ally and friend. This attitude of the American people will go down in history as a great and exemplary act. I have already expressed my thanks to the United States... I shall continue to do so, we shall never forget what America has done for us.

In this age of tension, the United States has a special role to play. It is the strongest of the Western powers but according to the concept of freedom, leading does not mean commanding, leading is more difficult but also more successful.

I fully agree with the aim of President Kennedy, in his speech of July 4, in Philadelphia in which he outlined the principles of a genuine partnership between the United States and Europe. We shall do everything in our power to make this partnership healthy and strong." (26)

There has not been great support in West Germany for the idea of developing Europe as a third force which would be equal to the U.S. and the Soviet Union. To this concept, the Germans preferred an Atlantic Community which included Western Europe and North America. The Germans during this period seemed to be convinced that only the United States possessed all the attributes of leadership and that the U.S. should be blindly followed. Although the Germans may not agree with every part of the U.S. policy, they were of the opinion that no other country was able to provide leadership to the West. The United States policy towards Europe had, according to the Germans, the greatest significance for West German affairs, because the United States was deeply involved and committed to them. West Germans, therefore, opposed the concept of loosening the bonds with the U.S., changes in the U.S. policy directly affected West Germany in regard to NATO, East-West relations etc. It was for this reason that many West Germans resented the changes contemplated in the U.S. strategic doctrine viz. greater stress on conventional rather than nuclear weapons, or the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany. There was basic difference in French and West German positions in the European situation.

United States' commitment to German reunification was reaffirmed by Mr. Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of
State during his visit to West Germany. He also assured that the U.S. forces will not be withdrawn. This declaration was necessary because of the alarm that had been caused in West Germany as a result of the demands in the United States to reduce its forces in Germany, in order to stop the outflow of gold. Europe's contribution to the common defence was also criticized as being inadequate. These led to the fear in West Germany that basic changes in the policy laid down by Mr. Kennedy were being contemplated. This policy, according to the Germans, had chances of succeeding only if it was supported by the Defence, Treasury, Finance i.e. Federal Reserve, Agriculture and Central Intelligence Departments. Mr. Rusk had to declare in October 1963 that, "We have six divisions in Germany. We intend to maintain these divisions as long as there is need for them and under present circumstances there is no doubt that they will continue to be needed." (27)

At this time, the U.S. Administration was trying to take the new West German Govt. of Dr. Erhard away from the French influence and bring it to the U.S. point of view. This policy did seem to have some effect. At his news conference of Nov. 1, 1963, President Kennedy assured West Germany that he was not planning any reduction

of the forces in West Germany. He declared that not only
the six divisions allotted to NATO would remain in Germany
but the additional reinforcements sent to Germany at the
time of the Berlin crisis of 1961, (the artillery and
armoured battalions and one armoured cavalry regiment)
would also be kept in Germany in order to offset the short
contributions of other NATO allies.

Mr. Dean Acheson seemed to have the same purpose
in view when he criticized the former President Eisenhower
and George F. Kennan, the former Ambassador to the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, for suggesting troop-cuts. He
contradicted Kennan's proposal for a "neutralised Germany
possessing only weapons of defence" because these would
create possibility of an East-West deal at the expense of
Germany. What Mr. Acheson said was, of course a reitera-
tion of the objectives of U.S. policy as it had evolved
but the new stress on safeguarding the German positions
was also indicative of the effort to woo the West German
Government of Erhard.
Mr. Acheson said in his lecture at the Connecticut University:

"...To make Atlantic Treaty viable we must have close co-operation with West Germany. In making military and political judgements affecting Europe a major consideration should be their effect on the German people and the German Government. The reason is that Germany is the point of contact between the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet bloc. Russia wants to bring all Germany under Soviet influence. This would be a threat to the stability and peace in Europe. Germany's indispensable to the existence of both a United Europe and a European defence. Both the present state of affairs and similarity of interests have cast the United States and Germany in the role of partners to get the Atlantic Community moving again." (28)

What is the impact of the Franco-German Treaty?

The reconciliation that was signed between France and Germany had already been developing in the years before 1963. It did not and should not have come as a surprise at that time because Franco-German reconciliation was a desired goal since the last two decades. What surprised some people was the all-embracing character of the Treaty. Many people began to think, if the centuries-old Franco-German rivalry could be settled, it should also be possible to settle other problems arising out of history.

In the view of the French President, a European union emerging as a third force was a necessity to solve the problems of the present day world. But he desired a United Western Europe at least as much for itself as for the role he wanted France to play in Europe and the world. German co-operation was considered to be indispensable for achieving these objectives. There was response from West Germany because the latter intended to align itself with Western Europe and the only country to which they could have turned for this alignment with the West, was France. To Dr. Adenauer, reconciliation with France was a unique achievement which nobody in the past fifty years was able to accomplish.

What would be the impact of the Franco-German reconciliation, would be clear only in the period after 1963. Soon after the signature of the Treaty, it was ratified by the West German Legislature. Ratification was approved on the condition of introducing a preamble to the Ratification Act. This was a sort of political reservation and it went to show that a large section of the German opinion was not prepared to sever its ties with other countries viz. the United States, for the sake of this treaty. But they could not refuse to ratify the treaty either, because their way to Europe seemed to be through France. In this situation, the preamble compromise
was the result. It may be useful in this connection to note two events. One was a speech by Walter Hallstein, President of the Common Market Commission, to the European Parliament on March 27, 1963. He said the Governments and Parliaments concerned should make it as clear as possible that interpretation and implementation of the Franco-German Treaty "must not interfere with the existence, functioning and dynamism of our Community". (29) Secondly, the resolution passed by the Christian Democratic Party during its session of 14.2.1963, clearly envisaged a European political union which included Britain, and ultimately an Atlantic Community Treaty with the United States. Of course those represented only a part of the German opinion. Still they had some significance.

It looked in 1963 that if Gen. de Gaulle could enlist West German support to his ideas, he could halt the process of evolution of the European Economic Community into political forms. Gen. de Gaulle did propose organic cooperation between the French and German armies but there had not been any overt deal regarding West Germany's supply of technical and financial assistance to the French nuclear programme. More important consideration was whether Franco-

German reconciliation would help in the reunification of Germany. General de Gaulle's views expressed in 1963 regarding the permanence of the Oder-Neisse Line indicated that he was not too enthusiastic about German reunification. Some Germans at least doubted this from his speech. Another question which will have to be answered before the impact could be ascertained would be that whether West Germany with her growing strength every year, would be content to leave the leadership of Europe to France, assuming that democracy takes firm roots in Germany.