Chapter III

French and the U.S. Policy towards European Political Unity and Integration.
During the centuries that have gone in the making of Europe and European civilization, different people at different times have contemplated of a "United States of Europe." "A melting pot of different nations." Disunity and internecine strife led to the decline of the Greek civilization at the moment of its greatest brilliance according to Thucydides, who analysed the causes of the treaty of Euboea, while stressing the need for unity. Pericles has been quoted by numerous historians of Europe speaking to the Athenians over the need of avoiding disunity.

In the more recent period powerful monarchs, brave ambitious individuals like Louis of France, Napoleon Bonaparte have tried to bring the greater part of Europe under their control by force of arms. In the present century Hitler tried to repeat the performance. In 1787 Benjamin Franklin wrote from America to a European correspondent that it should be perfectly possible for all the States of Europe to form a single federated State like the 13 colonies which succeeded in evolving a United States of America. The idea of a United State of Europe is seen to have been deeply seated in the American mind.

It is possible to point out and elaborate many other instances of a similar type in the long history of
Europe. But a survey of this history itself shows that although the idea of some sort of a European Union has been conceived of and propounded by many, although some tried to achieve it by force, in reality, the idea is not seen to have ever been translated into practice. This is so, whichever period of European history we take, ancient, medieval or modern. Europe as a political entity does not ever seem to have existed.

With this background, the analysis of the idea and practice in the present in our own times would be easier. It is necessary to see the causes of the concept of European unity, what really came about and why and whether the political union stands a chance of being realized. However, before this could be comprehended properly, it is still necessary to trace the background from the second World War. Only after this is done, a realistic appraisal of the present situation would be possible. Because the European situation in the post-war years has been in a way far different from whatever has gone before.

It was Sir Winston Churchill who proposed at Zurich in 1946 that a kind of United Europe must be built. In 1940, Mr. Churchill is stated to have propounded a full Union of the British and French people. It is from 1945 that we trace the origins of the present movement. Men like Mr. Churchill began to think that Europe could not afford
to drag along it must shed its hatreds and revenges which have sprung from the injuries of the past.

But a real beginning was made when it was realized that economic consequences of the war could not be healed by unconnected efforts. In 1945, the ideas of attaining world peace through big power co-operation in the United Nations, were entertained but in 1947 these seemed vain. Secretary George Marshall, initiated in June 1947 the Organization of European Economic Co-operation, the first important post war European Organization. It insisted on a joint character of the recovery programme and an effective organization of Europe, and made the U.S. support dependant upon it.

The Harvard address of Mr. Marshall put forth 3 concepts 1) an approach limited to the European region, 2) Close economic co-operation among the countries of that region and 3) Finding a permanent answer to the economic problems of Europe-combining this economic co-operation of the European countries with the programme of American assistance. The plan was undertaken to meet an economic crisis and the ideas took shape. The establishment of the UNRRA, the International Bank, the Monetary Fund followed in quick succession. Europe for these purposes became only Western Europe, as the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries refused to participate in it. Not only that, they appeared hostile. However, in order to meet the
economic situation the OEEC established a permanent Organization.

The U.S. position in the OEEC was strongly influenced by the American policies and objectives. The following goals were reflected in it:

1) Restoration and preservation of the democratic tradition in Europe; (2) re-establishment of sound economic conditions; and (3) a regional economic integration for the above. Integration was considered necessary not only for the immediate problem of European recovery but also by being permanent to maintain Europe's economic strength, so that the U.S. would not have to support the burden indefinitely.

Europe's reaction was a mixed one, some people were at this time contemplating a European Federation. The interests of the various states were different. The United States would have liked to see the establishment of a customs Union but Britain opposed the idea. The Marshall Plan succeeded in achieving one thing, it helped to avert the immediate economic crisis. But while the OEEC programme went ahead, a new crisis arose, that of European security. Out of this crisis, Nato was born.

NATO - its establishment.

At the time when the Soviet Union opposed the Marshall Plan, a search for Western security was considered necessary, economic organization it was thought, would not be adequate to meet this need. Proposals for close associa-
-tion of free nations for their collective self-defence began to be put forward. It was, however, soon realised that it was too difficult to achieve it for such large regions. A regional and compact grouping of all the free nations of Western Europe was considered to be the alternative.

After the creation on March 17, 1948, of the OEEC, the second European Organization to emerge was the Western Union or the Brussels Treaty Organization. It was constituted by Britain, France and the Benelux countries in the hope that around it arrangements for Western security could be built.

A congress of all private organisations supporting European Union met at the Hague in May 1948. The objective of U.S. policy was to evolve the organization of European Security on Western Union and Brussels Treaty. The U.S. and Canada were to participate in it. Although in June 1948, the Vandenberg Resolution referred to regional defence arrangements, the United States, decided to build up a new organization on an Atlantic rather than on a European basis and accepted a permanent obligation of its share of the burden. The opinion in the United States supported the idea of an American Alliance with Western Europe and also of supplying American equipment to Europe. By 1949 it became clear that the 4 Year economic aid programme was insufficient, as Europe had to be guaranteed against the Soviet Union. The U.S. congress insisted that
the European Recovery programme be used to promote economic and also political unity of Europe. Therefore, for purposes of defence the idea of a European Union was replaced by that of a North Atlantic Community. Thus the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. Afterwards economic problems again caught attention.

**Economic Unity:**

What the U.S. sought for was a single market in Europe and the strengthening of the OEEC through the Economic Co-operation Administration. Seventeen sovereign countries participated in the Marshall Plan and agreed to make review of each others' economies from time to time. This could be said to have been a significant demonstration of European Unity. The continental countries further reached accord in May 1949 on a statute for the council of Europe. However, men like Paul G. Hoffman urged that nothing less than economic integration of Europe would be adequate. He pointed out that the continuity of U.S. aid would depend upon the continuity of co-operation among the participants. In the summer of 1950, the agreement to establish a European payments Union was signed.

Some Europeans supported a Federation of Europe. They were disappointed by Britain's opposition to their efforts. In their opinion the above agreements were not satisfactory. They were, however, reassured by the
proposals of the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, the preparatory work for which was largely done by Jean Monnet. It was to be a supranational organisation. The Proposals for this community were much more precise than most of the proposals for European Unity, which preceded it. It sought to create a wide market which would be limited to one sector of the economy. The new organisation, according to Mr. Schuman, was to be built upon two important participants, France and Germany. It was also looked upon as a step towards the establishment of a common economic system for Europe and the foundation of a political union.

In the Schuman-Monnet plan were reflected ideas from Mr. Churchill's conception of Europe i.e. the new Europe would be founded on the elimination of the hostility between France and Germany and that it would have to make important contribution towards security. The role of England in the organisation remained vague. The French favoured a European Federation, the British did not favour it because it was not compatible with their common wealth ties or with their position as a world power.

After 1950, the economic situation showed signs of visible improvement, Nato pursued the course of most military alliances in peace-time. Nato seemed to have assisted Europe's security which was essential to its
economic unity and progress. At that time Nato showed an alternative to a United Europe, in the larger Atlantic Community. The European countries gained knowledge from the OEEC, ECSC and Benelux of the good chances and limits as well as intricacies of integration of national economies. They realized that the benefits of economic integration could not be achieved merely by sweeping away barriers to trade but that it required an intimate relationship among the members reaching out to all the corners of their national economic life. Out of this emerged the EEC, the common market having the goal of an economic union and in the minds of some, political union also. It was formally established on 1.1.1958. Since then the EEC has achieved spectacular success.

Two other organisations which still have to be noted are the Euratom and the Free Trade Area. The European Atomic Energy Commission sought the same goals as the EEC, an integration of the economies, limited to the nuclear industry. Its future is bound up with the movement for European Union. A convention of EFTA was initiated in November 1959. Thus over 25 years, Europe is seen to have made great progress towards establishment and successful functioning of the economic institutions. This economic unity presumed by some to be the foundation of a political union was expected to give rise to a supranational super-structure. According to the view expressed by
Mr. Walter Hallstein in 1961, economic integration which was a political process had set in motion a process which could move only in the forward direction. Historically, some have contended, Europe must unite, because it is inevitable.

However, inspite of the above mentioned changes, such is not, however, the course in reality which things seem to have taken. After 25 years, there is confusion as to whether a United States of Europe would come about or not. The struggle in the European Economic Community indicated that the efforts to move towards a political union have led to a crisis, on the one hand, the different countries have not changed their customary attitudes and are going about their national endeavours, on the other side there are unifying forces at work. Faced with the Soviet designs for the expansion, the desire for union, gained momentum. The obstacles to political unification such as geographical factors, barriers of language and race, religious, historical and cultural differences, nationalism economic competition, foreign policy differences, differences over minority problems, have not, however, disappeared.

Although thus, political union of Europe is still distant, what is clearly seen to have happened is that more progress towards unification than at any time in the past,
has been made. Thornsten V. Kalijarvi observed, "Expecting too much, too fast in Europe, cannot but lead to disillusionment, yet the progress towards European Community since World War II has been little short of phenomenal and the obstacles which challenge unification are no cause for despair." (1)

The Problem.

Since the last four centuries, European history has alternated between two balances, the balance of power and hegemony. Since 1945, a delicate balance of power emerged in Europe. It looked like a house built without equilibrium making it collapsible in the event of a bird sitting on its roof. Crisis arose due to the fact that, on the one hand there was the urge to move towards a political union of Europe in view of the East West split and the growing Soviet power, on the other, divergences of views persisted in many respects. In the European Economic Community member states differed on the extent to which sacrifices of sovereignty were to be made for the integration of the community. There have been differences regarding the United States' involvement and control of affairs in Europe. There was also the question of the

relationship between the EEC countries and those of the Soviet bloc and the rest of the world. These differences have been the obstacles in the way of the European countries' desire for a greater role in the affairs of the world.

It was, however, realized that a new order in Europe could be shaped only through the European Economic Community, that only the EEC could be the basis for evolving a political union. In the Geographical area of the EEC or even the Atlantic Community the most important fact has been the geographical position of France and West Germany. The attitudes of these two principal countries to the problems of political union of Europe have been divergent. The French position on the German problem itself was not entirely acceptable to the West Germans. While internal and external economic and political interests are the factors that govern the respective attitudes of the two countries, the French policy is seen to have been principally shaped by the conceptions and convictions of the President of the Republic General de Gaulle. The French and German attitudes differed from each other in respect of the evolution of the European Economic Community and other world problems. Among the smaller member countries of the EEC some viz. Holland, think that the problem of European political Union should
be viewed in an Atlantic and not in a European context, so as to make the defence of Europe more real. Italy's position is seen to have been influenced by the democratic party and they have at times questioned the feasibility of a supranational Europe.

It is against this back-ground of the European situation that the attitude of France and also of the United States towards the problem of European political union has to be explored.

European Political Unity and Integration.

A study of the French attitude.

French attitude towards European political unity and integration has changed to a large extent since 1958 i.e. when the Fifth French Republic was ushered in and when General de Gaulle took power. It was largely shaped by his ideas, his political conceptions and his sense of history. It has, therefore, become a distinct attitude in marked divergence with the position held over the subject under the Fourth Republic. The new policy is not supported by every Frenchman in France, as it reflects a distinct personal impact of the leader of the Republic on the government's policy in this regard; it has, however, the support of the majority. In his first governmental declaration on Jan. 15, 1959 the French Prime Minister Debré stated it to be the aim of French policy to prepare regular and
permanent consultations among the heads of Governments from member States of the European communities. (2) In his broadcast to the French nation on May 31, 1960, the French President declared that "the path to be followed must be that of organised co-operation between States, while waiting to achieve, perhaps an imposing confederation." (3)

General de Gaulle seemed to have begun to formulate his thoughts over the future of Europe as early as the years of the second World War when the Swiss historian Carl Burckhardt visited him at his London headquarters during the War for some discussions. Regarding the nature of the European unity movement, General de Gaulle is reported to have told Carl Burckhardt, "You know in history there have been three Frenchmen who have been destined by Providence to assist in the unification of Europe. The first of these was Charlemagne. The second was Napoleon... We won't go on the third." (4)

The early formulation of General de Gaulle's attitude towards Europe finds expression in his radio television speech of 31.5.1960. He said:

"But France, as far as she is concerned has recognised the necessity of this Western Europe which in former time was the dream of the wise and the ambition of the powerful and which appears today as the indispensable condition of the equilibrium of the world."

"Now in the last analysis, and as always, it is only in equilibrium, that the world will find peace. On our old continent, the organisation of a Western Group at the East, may one day without risk to the independence and the freedom of each nation and taking into account the probable evolution of political regime, establish a European Entente from the Atlantic to the Urals."

"Then, Europe no longer split in two by ambitions and ideologies became out of date, would again be the heart of civilization. The accession to progress of the masses of Asia Africa and Latin America would certainly be hastened and facilitated. But also the cohesion of this great and strong European Community would lead vast countries in other continents, which are advancing towards power, also to take the way of co-operation, rather than to yield to the temptation of war."

"Yes, international life like life in general is a battle. The battle which our country is waging tends to unite and not to divide, to honour and not to debase, to liberate and not to dominate. Thus it is faithful to its mission, which always was, and which remains human and universal." (5)

The essential elements of General de Gaulle's idea of Europe are thus seen to be the greatness of Europe since historic times, the need to establish an equilibrium in order to establish world peace, ending divisions and conflicts based on ideologies and finally to its relevance to the progress of people in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

It was to be a close inward-looking Europe, united under the primacy of France, in a loose confederation of "father lands." It was to be built on French-German solidarity and independent of Britain and the U.S.A. and which as a "third force" could become the arbiter between East and West and ultimately form an alliance with reformed Russia. De Gaulle envisaged Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals because he prophesied that some changes would come about within the Soviet Union itself; secondly because due to Sino-Soviet differences the Soviet Union will be compelled to seek security with the states of Western Europe with whom it shares a common history and traditions. In order to remain independent, such a Europe, in Gen. De Gaulle's views must have its own military defence. He always attached great importance to his nuclear force. In a news conference on May 15, 1962 he once again asserted his views on Atlantic questions and European political Union and suggested that Europe should
now declare its independence of the United States and seek to establish peace, its own balance with East Europe. The expression of these views evoked strong reaction. Five of the French Cabinet Ministers resigned in protest. The President, however, was undeterred. In September 1963, he warned "Europe must not annihilate itself in some form of integration that would hand it over to either of the two 'foreign' hegemonies, the United States and the Soviet Union, for this would leave Europe without soul, without backbone and without roots." (6)

Further elaboration of his concept of Europe in President de Gaulle's Press Conference of 5th Sept. 1960. He said,

"France would call for a referendum in Europe to give a popular basis to the new political institutions, to provide popular basis for military and political reforms. This means an organised regular concert of the responsible governments coupled with the work of specialized bodies (i.e. the high authority and two European Commissions) in each field under the control of governments. This also means regular debates in an Assembly composed of delegates from national parliaments. And in my view this must mean the holding of a European referendum as quickly as possible, so as to give the start of this new Europe the vital element of popular approval and participation." (7)


Future co-operation between France and her five partners should be based on the 'reality' of the States' sovereignty. He proposed that in the political, defence, cultural and economic fields there should be regular co-operation between the Governments through the establishment of specialized bodies. An Assembly consisting of delegates from the national parliaments should be constituted for holding periodic deliberations. The concepts of General de Gaulle on Europe were not formulated in every respect after he became the President of the Fifth French Republic. What he said in May 1962 viz. "Europe must play the role of arbiter between the two colossal powers." (8) was already expressed by him in his 'Memoirs'. There, he had mentioned that the goal of his European policy was to ensure the primacy of France in Europe, and to try for a political economic and strategic bloc of the States along the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees as a third world power, to act, if necessary as the arbiter between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American blocks. In that early period the scant regard which he had for the two great-power blocs and the desire to introduce an independent factor, was already evident. The important thing noticeable in this speech is the declaration of the French aim to ensure co-operation of the

States of Western Europe, the approach of functional integration is side-stepped, however.

In this outline of President de Gaulle's ideas for the organisation of Europe, are also noticeable his concepts about the reform and reorganisation of the North Atlantic Community as the two are inter-connected. In his idea of European unification, he envisages a confederation of a "Europe of nations" which will retain their national sovereignty but would have regular co-operation among the governments in certain spheres. The legal basis of this Europe would be a popular referendum in Western Europe, this Europe would not be a federation with an integrated supranational political structure. Europe of his concept will be founded on the creation of special institutions which would be subordinate to the individual governments. Prominent among such institutions would be a West European Secretariat and a new European Assembly constituted by delegates from the national parliaments. This was a logical extension to the political sphere of the economic co-operation of the six States already in effect in the common market, the European coal and steel community and the European Atomic Energy Commission. It amounted to a Formula involving co-ordination of policies at top-level among sovereign states without any supranational aspects. General de Gaulle was anxious to settle the matter of
European political institutions, in co-operation with the West German Chancellor before the decision to admit Britain to the EEC was taken. This reflected his desire viz. that Europe's fate should be decided by the Europeans only and not by 'outsiders' and hence his opposition to the supranational principle.

The following statement made by General de Gaulle at his Press Conference on 15.5.1962 is a clear exposition of his objectives:

"France aims in her international actions three essential objectives which are moreover linked together -

1) To disengage herself from the overseas people who not long ago were dependent on her from political, economic and military obligations which fell to her in their countries and which the general evolution made each day more vain and costly and to transform her relations with them into a contractual and regular operation which serves development and friendship and which can besides be extended to others.

2) On the other hand, to contribute to the building of Europe in the field of politics, that is to say, of defence as well as in the field of economy in such a way that the expansion and action of this grouping contribute to French prosperity and security and at the same time re-establish the possibilities of a European balance vis-a-vis the Eastern countries.

3) Finally, to link the creation of modern national effort with our scientific technical economic and social programmes, so that in the frame work of necessary alliances and with a view to reaching a possible international detente we should be able, whatever happens, to control our own share of our destiny.
In a world like ours where every thing is reduced to the threat of a world con-

-132-

In a world like ours where every thing is reduced to the threat of a world con-
flict, the idea of a United Europe with sufficient force means, cohesion to exist by herself, and it appears quite naturally and it appears all the better because the enmities which had torn (unhappily) her apart, in particular the conflict between Germany and France, have now ceased, fortunately, .. In this field something positive has been done. It is called the European Economic Community.

It is something, it is quite a lot, but it is not everything. In the eyes of France this economic construction is not enough. Western Europe whether it is a question of its policies towards other peoples or of its defence or of its contribution to the develop-

-ment of these regions which need it or of its duty to European stability and interna-
tional detente - Western Europe must constitute it-self politically.

Moreover, if it does not do so, in the long run the European Community cannot grow stronger or maintain itself. In other words, Europe needs institutions which make her into a political entity just as there is one in the economic sphere. To organise our-selves politically let us begin at the beginning. Let us organise our co-operation. Let our heads of State or Government meet periodically to examine our problems together and to take decisions with regard to them which will be those of Europe...... Let us set up a political commission, a defence commission and a cultural commission just as we already have an economic commis-
sion in Brussels which studies common questions and prepares the decisions of the six governments.

It is perfectly true that the French proposals give rise to objections quite contradictory. Let us hear these objections. These opponents of ours tell us: You want to make a Europe of Father-lands - We want to make a supranational Europe - As if a formula were enough to mix together these powerfully established entities which are
called people and States. Some tell us—
as long as England is not in the ECM we
cannot do anything political (England
would never agree to dissolve herself...) I
have already said and I repeat that at
the present time there is not and cannot
be any other possible Europe than a
Europe of States apart of course from
myths, fictions and parades.

France cannot object to the United
States using as they see fit their dip-
-lomatic means. But as regards ourselves,
we think it much preferable to remain
reserved and our conception about Germany
at the present time is that it is not the
time to modify the accomplished facts
there. Further French-West German so-
darity is the key to the immediate
security of the two peoples as well as to
any hope of uniting Europe." (9)

Gen. de Gaulle sought the formation of Western
European Alliance based on the joint leadership of France
and West Germany and it was to be comparatively independent
of the United States, Britain and Canada. It would have
its own nuclear force to provide a strictly European balance
of power, in the frame-work of necessary alliances. The
independent Europe, under the principal leadership of France
would operate as a third force. This Europe would not be
attainable if Britain succeeded in entering the Common
Market. Because on account of its economic and political

9. Gen. de Gaulle, Major Addresses, Statements and
Press Conferences of Gen. de Gaulle (May 19, 1958 -
relationship with the Commonwealth, intimate collaboration
with the United States and independent nuclear capability,
her membership of the European common Market would create
not only economic problems but would also introduce politi-
cal influences in respect of these areas. Gen. de Gaulle
for these reasons vetoed Britain's entry.

The expression of these views gave rise to concern
among statesmen and French diplomats regarding what would
be the reaction of France's allies to the President's views?
Questions began to be asked and discussed what would be the
potential of such a Europe in politics and defence? What
would happen if an integrated and supranational Europe would
take decisions regarding politics and defence? Is a supra-
national European State possible? What difficulties
hindered its formation? What would be the position of the
North Atlantic Treaty Alliance if such a Europe is formed?

Gen. de Gaulle's views came into conflict with the
views of the advocates of a Europe in which national sovere-
ignty of each State would give way to the formation of a
supranational European Community. They regarded his views
as a step away from European Union which according to them
was the end of the logical direction and denouement of all
efforts in Western Europe's reconstruction since 1947.
Prominent among those who held these views was Mr. Jean
Monnet, originator of the European unity movement, a former
President of the European Coal and Steel Community. He told Europe that the way to gain peace was unity. In his conception, as distinguished from that of General de Gaulle, the United States had an essential place. What he advocated was an extension of partnership between Europe and the U.S. According to him the technique and manner in which economic and political unity was being developed on the continent, showed the direction in which common institutions for an enlarged Atlantic Community could be created. In his view, partnership between the United States and Europe should create a new force for peace, and should help to reduce the tension between East and West. Eventually in this partnership the United States would also be ready to surrender political authority. Mr. Monnet said in a speech,

"In the past there has been no middle ground between the jungle law of nations and the Utopia of international accord... One change in the road to collective responsibility brings another. The chain reaction has only begun. We are starting a process of continuing reform which can alter tomorrow's world more lasting than the principles of revolution, so widespread outside the West."

Mr. Jean Monnet's views regarding partnership between Europe and the U.S. were more clearly stated in

an interview he gave on April 6, 1963, to the Italian newspaper Corriere Della Sera. He said,

"It is difficult to conceive that the people of Europe will engage themselves towards a common economic destiny without engaging themselves towards a common political destiny and necessarily that leads them to have a common defence. But to assure European defence participation of the U.S. is necessary. For that indispensable participation to be established on a durable basis there must be developed a relationship of equal partners between the United States and Europe. This relationship of equal partners must be applied to the responsibilities of common defence. It requires among other things the organisation of a European atomic force including England and in partnership with the United States... we must begin and rapidly develop European political integration." (11)

At a later stage the views of European Unity advocates like Jean Monnet, Pierre Pflimlin, Jean Jacques Servan Schreiber, seem to have undergone some modification. They pleaded for full membership for Britain in EEC for strengthening continental unity and for having a strictly European nuclear force, as distinct from an Atlantic nuclear force. They concluded that there could not be genuine political unity without common means of defence. (12)

General De Gaulle's proposals did not find favour with the meeting of the Heads of Government of the

Six European States. To the European integrationists who sought a fusing of sovereignties, the proposals appeared as an effort to make Europe more independent of Britain and the United States, than the other states were willing to contemplate. The other continental states expressed the feeling that if the six engaged in formal defence activity it might result into a separate bloc within Nato and might try to be independent of the U.S. military supremacy.

F.A.M. Alting Von Geusau, Lecturer, Roman Catholic University, Tiburg, tracing the progress towards European integration process drew the following conclusions:

"(1) The apparent first conclusion must be that attempts to integrate further beyond the scope of economic integration have ended in failure; (2) The confusion over the aim of starting negotiations on political union explains why the failure caused a disintegrating spill-over; (3) This confusion dating back in fact to 1953 and even earlier emerges from an erroneous interpretation of the expansive logic of integration. According to this concept of integration, a common foreign policy (and a common defence policy) may evolve later. Deviating from this concept both the ad-hoc Assembly and the actors in the negotiations on political union in fact adopted the view that it should evolve immediately thereby erroneously applying doctrinaire thinking regarding the functions of a federation on the unique integration process; (4) In the final analysis it appears that, an, as yet unsolved inconsistency runs through the arguments on both sides."

In order to appreciate the significance of France's European policy under the Fifth Republic, it is necessary to take into consideration the basis and evolution of the United States' policy on this subject, during the same period. The United States' European policy in the present century dates back to the First World War and the Second World War period and some account of the role played by America in the reconstruction of Europe has already been given in the foregoing pages. Having entered into the Second World War for the defence of her allies, the United States was later deeply committed to the reconstruction of Western Europe beginning with the Marshall Plan, and later, the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance and the defence of the West, there could be no reverting to the old doctrine of isolationism. By its economic commitments, political and defence situations arising out of the tensions of the cold war years, the United States became ever more deeply committed to Europe in the fifties and the policy makers could not even think of any disengagements from their involvement in Europe. Granted once, no isolation and pursuit of world policy, the European policy became upper most in importance primarily because of the fact that Europe became the stage and meeting point of East-West confrontation and also
because of their considerations for the free countries of Europe. In fact, the U.S. became the leader of the free world. It is against this background that the roots of the U.S. policy towards European unity are traceable. The United States has always championed the idea of a 'United Europe' because they believed that only thus could an end be put effectively to the historical feuds and hostilities among the European nations and only then there could be an economically and militarily strong Europe closely associated with the U.S., which would be a bulwark against any possible threats. This policy has since been continuously maintained and subsequently modified as was thought fit, to suit the changing circumstances. Another factor which is of basic importance in the U.S. policy towards and the U.S. interest in European integration has been the American desire to keep W. Germany, later perhaps a reunited Germany inextricably allied with West and not to allow it to join the Soviet group. In the latter case, evidently the entire political situation in West Europe would be transformed in favour of the Soviet Union. The memories of Rapallo, of the Hitler-Stalin Pact had been a major concern not only to the U.S. but to most of the Western nations. It was, therefore, the consensus of opinion that nothing could consolidate the Atlantic Community better than merging West Germany into a United Europe.
The formation of the European Economic Community was supported by the U.S. from its beginning because it was believed that it would build up a strong Europe. This support was continued to be given inspite of the possibility which was pointed out that in future, an economically strong Europe might be a competitor for world markets. The U.S. support for Britain's inclusion into the common market arose out of the same consideration, i.e. to build up a strong Europe.

At a much earlier time some Americans had felt that their concept of patriotism needed to be widened so as to cover the nation and the world also. Such a view was expressed by Mr. Stuart Chase in 1941. He had written that Americans had to become more nationalistic in one sense, more international in another.

The United States has always thought that a sort of Federal Union of Europe was the best solution to West Europe's problems and an ideal for them. During the period of the Berlin crisis, a White House declaration stated that 'the time had come to try to unite the Atlantic Community by the bond of Federal Union which the American founding Fathers devised at their 1787 convention and which since that time has worked wonders wherever the free have tried it.' The U.S. noticed in Europe a rapid change in the Social and economic life, a trend that tended to cut across
the differences of social systems, in tariffs, in boundaries between the countries. The spectacular success of the European Common Market was to them a visible manifestation of this change. These changes were considered to have led towards unity. What succeeded in the U.S., they believed, would succeed in Europe as well.

Besides the American example of Federal Union, the U.S. thinkers have pointed out to Europe another precedent viz. that of Switzerland. The development of Switzerland out of the cantons which have been diverse in languages (French, German, Italian, Romane) and culture was a classic example for Union. Its evolution was considerably similar to that of the North Atlantic Alliance. Originally, a loose defensive alliance was formed among the different parts. As generations passed there grew up a sense of affinity and common feeling among the various groups in the alliance. Eventually, in recent times a multi cantonal State emerged. The two difficulties in this parallel example are that it took generations in Switzerland to evolve a multicantonal State; the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance was just twenty years old and secondly, whether the cantons had world-wide interests in trade etc., as the European countries today have?
The general trend in American thinking on this subject is illustrated by the following:

"As political perhaps cultural and certainly economic forms of unity emerge in Western Europe, it becomes increasingly important for Europeans and for Americans also, to examine sympathetically the American experience in cultural pluralism for areas of relevance to the European situation. Without some of the elements that have gone into the making of a successful United States, the Europeans may well succeed in creating material prosperity through their common market but fail in other areas primarily in German relations and guaranteed freedoms. The leading strains of cultural pluralism in the U.S., which would be relevant to the European situation are embodied in the Federal system, Church State separation, that also absorption of immigration, democracy and constitutionalism. Europe does not have a good record for democratic government and the democratic processes will bear careful watching. The question of the relative positions of church and State is unresolved in many countries in Europe and will pose grave problems. Difficulties can be anticipated in Europe in the area of constitutionalism, because people need a guiding ideal to draw them together. European union to date has been based on reaction to the horrors of war and the fear of Soviet Military domination. Without a central principle to hold them together, Europe may lapse from Union as the war receded into the past and the fear of Soviet dominations relaxed." (14)

When Mr. Kennedy became President of the United States, the European situation was in disarray. He had a

tremendous and difficult task to keep the Atlantic community together and more in line with the changing world situation. This was due to the drive of Soviet Union's activities which was considered to have been "ambitious" and due to the rifts within the Atlantic community. The latter were the result principally it was considered, of the nationalistic policies of President of the French Republic Gen. de Gaulle who sought to make France an independent atomic power and leader of Europe. This affected the whole defence structure of NATO and was therefore, thought to have been a serious problem. The U.S. policy also desired to see an increase in Europe's economic and military strength and also declared its support to lessening world tensions. Speaking about Europe in his speech at the Supreme Head Quarters Allied Powers Europe on June 2, 1961, President Kennedy said, ... "We shall continue to insist that here in the most ancient section of the civilized world spring the force, the vigour, the strength and the commitment which can provide freedom not only for this section of Europe but also radiate it around the globe." (15)

In his message of Jan. 11, 1961, President Kennedy explained the aims and problems of foreign policy regarding Atlantic Community as follows:

"Finally the United Strength in the Atlantic Alliance has flourished in the last year. Nato has increased both the number and readiness of its air ground and naval units both its nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities. Even greater efforts by all of its members are still required... The threat to the brave city of Berlin remains. Every Nato member stands with it in this common commitment to preserve this symbol of free man's will to remain free. Regarding Berlin, I can only say that we are sparing no honourable effort to find a peaceful and mutually acceptable resolution of this problem... But the Atlantic community is no longer concerned with purely military aims. As its common undertakings grow at an ever-increasing pace we are and increasingly will be partners in aid, trade, defence, diplomacy and monetary affairs. The emergence of a new Europe is being matched by emergence of new ties across the Atlantic. The Atlantic Community grows not like a volcanic mountain, by one mighty explosion, but like a coral reef, from the accumulating activity of all."

In the early period, in his defence message to the Congress (28th March 1961) President Kennedy had stated that America would use nuclear weapons only in the event of major aggression. Although subsequently this position was

---

modified in some respects it had, at that time strengthened the argument of the advocates of a European defence capability.

Thus, the United States has been drawn ever more close to Europe in post-war years but her sense of kinship with West European nations has not been unmixed; there had also been mistrust of the Europeans and irritation over them. On the other hand many of the Europeans had the same feelings towards what some called the "over-developed offshoot of the European tradition." Although the U.S. has been repeatedly reasserting its sentimental and political attachment to Europe, they have not openly supported the fuller development of Europe, of the wider potentialities of NATO. They retained to themselves the control of vital matters as only this was consistent with the total U.S. policy towards Europe. According to Lionel Gelber, "Europe and America are like a married couple who cannot live happily together yet cannot live apart." (17)

France's declaration of its objectives for Europe was an assumption of a position of independence by a European Government towards the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance for the first time in post-world war II years.

It has compelled the United States to readjust although to a very little extent, its policies. It was possible for France to hold this position due to the fact that geographically there could not be any real economic or political unity of Europe or an effective arrangement of Europe's defence without France. France also had a sound economic base due to her prosperous agriculture and the recent industrial development. Further the position of General de Gaulle in France was indispensable as he had almost universal support for his policies and he had been successful in holding the leadership of European Common Market.

Gen. de Gaulle's concept of Europe differed fundamentally from the attitude in America over this subject and the expectations of even many of the European Economic Community's supporters. According to both, the rapid development and spectacular success of the Economic institutions in Europe had only one direction - towards some kind of unification. "It already seemed clear that the old Europe of separate national States was on the way out and that the new Europe which was arising in its own place would be immensely stronger and more influential both in relation to the Soviet world and in relation to the U.S."

Professor Hans Kohn wrote,

"An adequate defence of Western Democratic values requires a multi-national treaty that includes all the North Atlantic countries, one which repudiates authoritarianism, dogmatism and exclusive nationalism and provides for mutual consultation and close cooperation on all levels. World War (II) was followed by a period of political and economic weakness in Europe during which old styled nationalism appeared to wane. Recovery which Western Europe owes to the U.S., led at least in France to the resurgence of old nationalism, which turned against the U.S. and to the revival of hegemonic aspiration. NATO conceived not solely to defeat the Soviets but also to strengthen democracy, freedom and welfare within Western civilization, was weakened as Europeans came to lose much of their fear of Soviet military aggression. It is principally President de Gaulle of France who does not believe in a United Europe or in an Atlantic Community or in the United Nations. He is unable to understand that neither the U.S. nor Great Britain is as passionately nationalistic as he is. He is anxious to assure primacy for France in Western Europe and so make of continental Europe a third force in world affairs. In view of this, the United States should not attempt to exercise its hegemony as such but, should rather set an example of true co-operation and consultation." (19)

The European Economic Community's advocates expected a "United States of Europe" to emerge out of the economic institutions, which would eventually include other European countries. The principal difficulty in the way of such an evolution was according to them the

nationalistic policy of General de Gaulle. It was, therefore, necessary they thought, to find a way out of the difficulty, so that Europe might not remain divided in two rival trade groups.

The United States' interest in the European Economic Community was not only political, i.e. due to its position as the leader of the West, it was predominantly economic.

In his Independence Day Speech at Philadelphia this aspect was stressed by President Kennedy. He said,

"The nations of Western Europe, long divided by feuds more bitter than any which existed among the thirteen colonies, are joining together, seeking, as our forefathers sought, to find freedom in diversity and unity in strength. We do not regard a strong and United Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic objective of our foreign policy for seventeen years. We believe that a United Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the Common defence, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and commodities, and developing co-ordinated policies in all other economic diplomatic and political areas." (20)

The U.S. sought to protect and advance U.S. commercial interests in the EEC countries which were not less than one-fifth of the total exports, and wanted the

EEC to be liberal. From a political point of view the establishment and successful functioning of the EEC was of great importance because it was a step in the direction of European integration which the U.S. had all along encouraged. In one respect, however, the American position was similar to that of France; they held that the expansion of the European Economic Community should not be achieved at the cost of dissolving its political character. President Kennedy at this time was advocating an Atlantic or Free World Partnership. In his address at New Orleans, La. on May 4, 1962 he declared, "We are moving towards a full partnership which will have 90% of the industrial power of the free world, the greatest market that the world has ever known, a productive power far greater than that of the communist bloc, a trillion-dollar-economy when goods can flow freely." (21) This position was opposed to that of Gen. de Gaulle and at the basis of the two different concepts, those of France and the United States, seemed to lay the whole question about the future of the Atlantic Community. Two propositions lay behind de Gaulle's attitude of opposition, it was claimed. First, the United States was trying to get Britain into the European Economic Community.

so as to ensure the control of Britain and of the United States on the new European Community. Second, in case of a nuclear war the United States did not intend really to enter into a war for defending Europe, if by such abstention she could avoid the destruction of her own territory.

At his news conference of May 17, 1962, President Kennedy reacted strongly to Gen. de Gaulle's views on Atlantic and European problems and expressed his confidence that:

"The Atlantic Unity represents the true course of history that Europe and the United States have not joined forces for more than a decade to be divided now by limited visions and suspicious. Our willingness to bear our full share of Western defences is deeply felt but it is not automatic. The American Public opinion has turned away from isolation but its faith must not be shattered." (22)

Aware of the differences the Kennedy Administration continued to press its plea, for partnership. The Secretary of State Dean Rusk reiterated the same belief in June 1962. "There are no cracks in the basement of this great edifice. What we are talking about is how to add another storey on this great structure." (23) At this time, Secretary Rusk


23. Dean Rusk, Department of State Bulletin, 9 July 1962, p. 54.
was preparing for talks with the Soviet Union and therefore, wanted to have a United Western front. But there were no signs of the dismay in the West being lessened. In his speech at Philadelphia's Independence Hall (July 4), President Kennedy further elaborated the U.S. concepts of Atlantic partnership. The spirit of independence has progressed, he said, since 1776, and in the present, he added, the great new effort for interdependence was transforming the world; as a result the growing unity of Western Europe is noticeable. He said, "We do not regard a strong and United Europe as a rival but as a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations." (24) He admitted that these concepts were opposed to those of the French leaders and that it would take a long time to realise its achievements.

In the same speech he continued,

"The first order of business is for our European friends to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will someday make this partnership possible. But I will say here and now on this day of independence that the United States will be ready for a 'declaration of interdependence' that we will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded 175 years ago." (25)

In analysing the concept of Atlantic Partnership Mr. Joseph Kraft has given an elaboration of the substance behind the terms, "Grand Design" and "Atlantic Partnership" in his book entitled "The Grand Design - From Common Market to Atlantic Partnership". The essence of the Grand Design according to Mr. Kraft was a creative harmony between the United States and Europe for economic, military and political purposes. President Kennedy's trade programme which was inspired by the spectacular success of the Common Market was to be the activating factor of this partnership. The Grand Design, according to him, did not aim at a monolithic political structure but would be rather a concert of free nations.

The period of slow activity in the United States and the chronic deficit in their balance of payments impelled President Kennedy to promulgate trade legislation for restoring national momentum in economic sphere and for enlarging the scope of the Atlantic Alliance. According to Mr. Joseph Kraft had the objective of a European Federal Union been incorporated into the authorisation of funds for the European Recovery at the time of the Marshall Plan in 1948-49, it would have been possible to set Europe on the path of Union but the opportunity was lost.

In advocating the Atlantic Partnership President Kennedy was evidently trying to offer Europe an alternative
to President de Gaulle's concept of Europe which would be without the United States. In the differences between the two leaders' concepts lay all the crucial issues of the organisation of Europe, of the North Atlantic Alliance, of the German problem and of the relations with East Europe. At the centre of all these differences was the problem of atomic arms and their control. Why it was that President Kennedy insisted that this partnership could come into being only after Europe had unified itself first? Another question that was posed was that his promise of dealing with Europe on a basis of "full-equality" was inconsistent with the U.S. insistence of retaining to herself the final control of nuclear weapons. European countries did not accord their approval to these proposals - critics in Europe pointed out that in defence, the U.S. wants Europe to provide foot-soldiers and in trade she wants to ensure and enhance the export of American agricultural products rather than encouraging Europe to attain agricultural self-sufficiency. No answer to these questions was immediately available and the disarray in the West continued. President Kennedy's pronouncement had a long term significance. Currently Gen. de Gaulle's concept appeared to be continued instead of being dropped. This seemed to be the result of W. German approval of co-operating with France.

To preserve the unity and solidarity among the
NATO allies of Western Europe, the U.S. had offered to make NATO a nuclear power, retaining control to herself. Supporters of NATO upheld the proposed fleet of surface ships armed with Polaris-missiles in order to restore and maintain unity in NATO. Its significance to them was political rather than military as an international arrangement which will re-establish military integration in Europe, as a principle and policy for the alliance. NATO's position as the chief protection of Europe tended to wear out as a result of Gen. de Gaulle's nationalistic defence policies and therefore, the need to re-establish the principle of NATO's military integration was, according to them, vital. However, opposition to this proposal was indicated and proposals for an independent European unified nuclear force began to be put forward, the spread of nuclear weapons, which it was the primary U.S. objective to stop, appeared inevitable.

The concept of European nuclear force was evidently put down, in the U.S. The American views about it were expressed in the following statement of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, J. Robert Schlaetzel,

"No one even among the most enthusiastic advocates of a European nuclear force suggests that such a force is now feasible. An integrated European nuclear force, not an aggregation of loosely connected national forces, which would have military significance, in short, a force which would strengthen and not divide Europe and the Atlantic world could come about only in the context of a sophisticated well-knit European political community." (26)

It remained for the U.S. diplomacy to ask the European countries to unite as they did fifteen years ago under the Marshall Plan for economic reconstruction, so that it might be able to give nuclear aid to a unified Europe, which it was not prepared to give to an individual nation State. It was expected by some experts that when the Europeans would work together for preparing a European plan they would understand more about the problem and realize the difficulties. Whatever the form which a European nuclear force might take, it was essential for the U.S. policy to ensure that it was a fully integrated force and linked to the U.S. nuclear force. President Kennedy's 'Grand Design' faced certain realities in the European situation which demanded careful handling, in order to have chances of its success. The principal realities were, the reconciliation between France and West Germany which was

the basis of the Europe being built, the indispensable position of de Gaulle in France, necessity for the West German Government to oppose partition and the general demand for a greater voice for Europe in nuclear arms and their control.

Secretary Dean Rusk's efforts in June 1962 were intended to impress Europe with the proposals of the Administration and to clarify the essentials of Washington's policy on the complex problem of NATO nuclear deterrent. Officials in the U.S. felt that Mr. Rusk's efforts had one general result. It gave the West European countries a better understanding of the U.S. attitudes on the problems connected with the emerging European economic and political union. The central question of equality which President Kennedy assured in his speech remained unsolved. The U.S. continued to insist on a privileged position in the atomic field; the Europeans demanded a privileged position in the sphere of trade etc. The respective positions could not be reconciled. The New York Times writing editorially expressed the feeling that:

"The key to success of both military and economic not to speak of political integration is President de Gaulle. His national separatism can yet destroy, the unity that the 'European - Europeans' have been so painfully trying to build-up ever since the last world war and if they succeed it will indeed be the last world war." (27)

The same American view was expressed in Washington at a function in honour of Jean Monnet in January 1963.

President Kennedy reminded Gen. de Gaulle that personal or national differences dilute allies' defense and that U.S. was always ready to honour its defence commitments to Europe. In his news conference of January 24, 1963 he said:

"The alliance has ample strength to hold back the expansion of communism until such time as it loses its force and momentum. Acting alone neither the U.S. nor Europe could be certain of success and survival. Because of the hard and fast realities of history that which serves to unite us is right and what tends to divide us is wrong." (28)

Mr. Kennedy has frequently expressed his confidence that the movement for European unity was a strong force and a single leader like Gen. de Gaulle will not be able to stop it. It was a prevailing American conviction that Atlantic partnership was a goal and history was on the march. It could not be thwarted.

These were also the views of all the Atlantic nations. They agreed on consolidating Western unity with or without France. In this chorus of harmony the note of discord was that of General de Gaulle who harped on a

---

Europe of his conception. The dissent recorded by France was not negligible, in fact it was considered to be very significant. In its editorial of 2 February 1963, the New York Times wrote,

"What Khruschev could not do has been done by de Gaulle. It sounds fantastic but it is true. In vetoing Britain's entry into the European Economic Community and in refusing full French military co-operation with the North Atlantic Alliance de Gaulle has dealt a body blow to both Europe and Atlantic Unity." (29)

The United States continued its efforts in the direction of a stronger Atlantic Community. These were directed principally to see that Britain continues its negotiations with the five partners of France for full membership, the creation of a Nato multilateral nuclear deterrent is encouraged and its negotiations with the EEC over tariff reductions were continued. Many in the U.S. felt that the United States should prevent the formation of a strong Paris-Bonn Alliance as it would displace Britain's influence in Europe. The goal of the U.S. policy had been a United Europe which would be in close association with the U.S. and which would include Britain, so that it would become a powerful free world bloc and would be able to increase its contribution to the common defence. There was no question of disengagement from the Atlantic Community and

therefore, the opposition to separate nuclear forces remained.

Mr. Kennedy also said that the United Europe associated with the U.S. should not be indifferent to the problems of underdeveloped nations. President Kennedy declared in his statement of February 7, 1963 that:

"The United States is prepared to make every effort to provide Western Europe with the strong voice, to join with Western Europe, to co-operate with it and to work out mechanisms that permit Europe to speak with the power and the authority that Europe is entitled to. What we would regard as a most serious blow would be, however, a division between the Atlantic, the division between the United States and Europe, inability of the United States and Europe to co-ordinate their policies to deal with this great challenge. There is the danger to Europe and the danger to us." (30)

He criticised Gen. de Gaulle's idea of Europe's own nuclear force as an unpracticable idea. He argued that the combined resources of the Atlantic Community were needed to match the Eastern threat, to maintain a balance. Only thus peace could be preserved in the face of the communist strength. For technological reasons the projected French nuclear force was soon going to be out of date and it was one of the reasons why France's partners seriously differed.

over the French attitude. The dissenting voice of General de Gaulle emerged due to the fact that Soviet Russia's power was offset by the overwhelming strength of the United States. Europe was as essential to American defence as the American power for the defence of Europe.

Gen. de Gaulle's quest for a Europe in which national responsibility to a European alliance would replace integration was contradicted by Dean Acheson, former U.S. Secretary State. According to him, it was not possible to achieve both the Europe of his conception and the Treaty of his conception. "Europe could not exclude the U.S. influence", he said, "such an assumption underlies de Gaulle's concept of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." According to the French Acheson misunderstood De Gaulle's attitude towards the alliance and his concept of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Gen. de Gaulle thought of the situation over the long period, when some changes would come about and when Europe would need a settlement with the Soviet Union.

The United States continued to win over Europe to its point of view. In his speeches during his European tour in June 1963, President Kennedy gave proof of the vigour with which the U.S. intended to pursue its policies. At Wahn Airfield near Cologne,
he said, "so long as our presence is desired and required U.S. forces and commitments will remain in Europe. For your safety is our safety, your liberty is our liberty and any attack on your soil is an attack upon our own." (31) In Italy, he declared, "We welcome strong partner. For today no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over,... I came to Europe to reassert... that the American commitment to the freedom of Europe is reliable." (32)

Grand Design of Partnership with Europe - did it erode?

Within one year, the grand design of partnership with Europe found itself in trouble even though it could not be said to have begun to erode. A number of Europeans discussed and questioned what was the real meaning and content of the offer of partnership. Nuclear problem was at the centre of these discussions. Was it, the allied nuclear navy controlled by the United States or was it a step to real equality and did he aim at an Atlantic nuclear force under the U.S. direction or a European nuclear force linked to that of the U.S. but which could act independently in


emergency? To them there seemed difference between what was practicable and what the declared policy aimed at (viz. equal partnership). For this reason it was demanded that the U.S. define what it meant by "partnership with the United States". At the same time the disarray in the Atlantic alliance did not show any signs of diminishing. Many allies were unsatisfied due to different reasons and the task of preserving the unity and solidarity of the alliance called for imaginative direction from the United States. It was a question of leadership. During his presidency, Mr. Kennedy continuously tried to provide this lead. This was no easy task due to the changing power balance in Europe and due to the fact that an economically revitalised Europe was reasserting its personality. Not only did France reject President Kennedy's proposals Mr. MacMillan's Government in Britain also withdrew its support to the movement towards Atlantic partnership by refusing to accord approval to the proposal for an international mix-crew-surface-navy. The increasing competition of Europe for export markets of the world was being felt keenly. There were also the internal problems for the United States. The Atlantic Partnership concept owed its origin to economic reasons to a large extent. If the trends noticeable at that time were to continue, it appeared the U.S. might have to rethink the whole policy.
President Kennedy was said to have a strong curiosity about Europe's future. Notable successes were achieved during his tenure of presidency in such matters as nuclear test bans by virtue of his abilities and knowledge. But his foreign policy seemed to be essentially personal one. Although it inspired his Administration, during his term, after his death his policies were not continued. This was said to have been noticed from the lack of American leadership in the NATO ministerial conference in the third week of December 1963. President Kennedy had inherited from the previous administration a complicated legacy in America's relations with her allies, France, W.Germany and Britain. Even if he had continued in office longer, there did not appear the possibility of improvement of the relations.

At one period there were about three different conceptions of Europe current, three Grand Designs of the three prominent countries. In his design Mr. Kennedy envisaged a tighter Atlantic Community under American leadership. He thought of increased trade between the United States and an enlarged European Economic Community which included Great Britain. In the concept of Mr. Macmillan, Britain's Prime Minister, there was greater stress on free trade in an enlarged European Economic Community rather than political union. General de Gaulle's
plan envisaged an economic and political federation of only the continental European countries which could be expanded into Euroafrika.

Gen. de Gaulle's concept of Europe was severely criticised in the United States and in Europe. However, de Gaulle did not seem to want a complete break away from the U.S. A likely result of De Gaulle's policies was to put West Germany in a difficult position of choosing, as they had avowed loyalty to both Europe and Atlantic Community. West German opinion was not prepared for complete independence from the United States. If complete isolation of the United States playing not any role in Europe's defence was not desired, then what role of the U.S. was suitable to Europe and what position of Europe in relation to these problems was acceptable to the United States? These were extremely complex problems and their solution needed a considerable time and thought. However, the troubles of the United States with the European allies arose from the very success it has been pointed out, of the U.S. policy which has supported the restoration of the European continent to vigour and self-confidence. It has also been stated that the differences between the American and French nuclear aims were foreseeable years ago, before the French policy was made known.

West Germany's position was not entirely similar
to that of Britain who had declared its intention to support and pursue a policy of European unity within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. The consensus among the NATO countries was that they agreed with General de Gaulle that "Europe should be Europe." But they did not agree with his concept that it should be made up of national states guarding against any loss of sovereignty. Many West Germans were of the opinion that it was not possible to prevent the evolution of the institutions of the EEC into supranational bodies, which was contrary to the French position. French proposals for union tended to weed out the small seed of supranationality planted at the insistence of all others. It would have the effect of bringing about a military grouping of the six, as a separate bloc within NATO, it was contended. This created a problem for West Germany, whose policy, since earlier times when Dr. Adenauer was Chancellor, was attachment to the West, rather than being forced to choose between the United States and France.

Another Grand Debate.

These positions were being discussed back and forth in Europe. At the end of 1963, in the United States another Grand Debate over the extent of the U.S. involvement arose. In a lecture delivered at the Connecticut University, Mr. Dean Acheson strongly criticized those like former President Eisenhower, George F. Kennan etc. who supported
the idea of reducing the United States' Commitment in Europe, as this, according to them would serve the U.S. interests best. Mr. Acheson opposed the very idea of having this debate because of the harmful effect it was likely to have on West Germany and because it tended to destroy Allies' confidence in the American leadership which has been reaffirmed time and again. It was thus damaging to the primary objective of European unity. He also opposed giving nuclear aid to French nuclear programme because in his view, instead of arresting French nationalistic policies, it would give rise to similar demands in West Germany. He supported the important parts of the "Atlantic Partnership" concept regarding defence and trade policies. He advised the Administration to activate the projected allied, nuclear navy, to arrive at an early settlement of the agricultural policy with the European Common Market so as to arrest the French plans for an agriculturally self-sufficient Europe. For similar purpose, he urged increased co-operation with West Germany to evolve joint German-American strategy and tactics for the next round of tariff negotiations. In his lecture to the University of Connecticut, Acheson said, "withdrawl from Europe ? an illusion. We cannot disentangle our security from that of our European allies, but to make the Atlantic Unity viable, we must have close co-operation with West Germany." (33)

This debate initiated by the former President Eisenhower appeared to be like the Great Debate in 1950-1951. During the earlier debate, Mr. Hoover advocated United States' withdrawal from the Eurasian continent and stopping American aid to Europe. The recrudescence of the debate was a manifestation of the same feelings. The view of George Kennan had been that America should perhaps think of reverting to the principles of withdrawal from the main stream.

In 1951, the debate was ended by the resolution of the United States Senate that the Commitments of the North Atlantic Treaty were an essential part of the U.S. policy. In 1963 also the conclusion of the debate was not going to be different because the extent of the feeling was that the U.S. can no more extricate itself from its commitments in Europe than could Germany. Allusions to the history of three centuries were advanced to support the basic objectives of U.S. policy in Europe. During the years between 1689 and 1815 the U.S. was always involved in the quarrels of the Europeans. In the next hundred years the U.S. maintained isolation and aloofness from the wars in Europe until it was drawn into the conflict of 1914. Again after 30 years it had to intervene in the second world war. Supporters of the American policy argued that the immense destruction of life and property during the two world wars was the direct result of the fact that nations pursued nationalist policies.
suited to their national interests, rather than the common interest of all. They, therefore, argued that the preservation of freedom required the combined efforts of both Europe and America; neither by itself would be able to accomplish it. A United Europe closely allied to the U.S. was the need. This was also the only solution, to the problem posed by Soviet Union's position that reunification of Germany was possible only if Socialist revolution succeeded in West Germany. Naturally enough the U.S. policy makers were seriously disturbed at such pronouncements and they opposed France's effort to establish an independent power-base which tended to disrupt the North Atlantic Alliance. In these circumstances it was urged to the U.S. Administration that partnership with Western Germany whose interests were similar, was the only alternative to revitalize the Atlantic Community.

According to many in Europe, the kind of allied unity that was achieved during the years 1947-1962 was not likely to be attained again. The different situation that obtained at that time was responsible for this, and in recognition of this fact, it was necessary for the United States to devise a new relationship with its allies. The relationship envisaged in the Atlantic Partnership was not acceptable notably to France. The United States was not prepared to consider other alternatives as they believed
that only the United States was able to undertake the tasks of defence in alliance, with Europe. Hence they continued to insist on maintaining unity and solidarity although no threat was immediately apparent. Christian Herter asked "must we wait till some great catastrophe to produce the necessary compression of our sovereignties, the critical mass from which great new political energies should emerge?" (34)

A large number of Europeans assumed that the United States will continue to incur the huge expenses (11% of its gross national product) for the defence of Europe and that Europe can be dependant upon the United States protection, even though Europe pursued a policy of protectionism and economic-self-sufficiency. France did not agree with the concept of Europe's perpetual dependence on the United States. The United States' displeasure with France arose from the fact that the policies launched by the French President, as a solution to this problem, tended to break the movement towards European Unity and Atlantic partnership, which the U.S. wanted to strengthen.

In relation to such an assumption the United States declared that the guarantee of protection was reciprocal. The United States emphasized their determination to defend Europe but expected that it was necessary for the European

Allies to bear their share of the task. In a statement, President Kennedy stated the U.S. policy as follows:

"The U.S. cannot withdraw from Europe unless and until Europe should wish us gone. No nation can bear long the heaviest burdens of responsibility without sharing in the progress and the decisions... We cannot and do not take any European Ally for granted and I hope no one in Europe would take us for granted either. Our willingness to bear our full share of Western defence is deeply felt but it is not automatic. American public opinion has turned away from isolation but its faith must not be shattered... I am confident that the Atlantic unity represents the true course of history - that Europe and the U.S. have not joined forces for more than a decade to be divided now by limited visions and suspicions." (35)

Further, the remarks made by the U.S. President in a news conference show how seriously the progress of the Atlantic Community and partnership was taken in the U.S. He said:

"It would be long time before the members of Europe would feel in a position to defend themselves without the presence of U.S. We have been asked to stay... Now the day may come when Western Europe may feel that it can maintain its own security. Of course it would relieve the U.S. of a very heavy burden but that day has not come." (36)


There has thus been continuous reiteration of the plea that the doctrine of interdependence was the doctrine of survival and that American policy was shaped by the conviction that the Atlantic Community could be defended only by the combined resources of Europe and the U.S.

In his Press Conference dated May 17, 1962, President Kennedy stated "I think it would be most regrettable to attempt to break what has been built by so many men of good-will in every country - the Atlantic Community. But my judgment is that the security of the West is best tied to continuation of the Atlantic Community and its expression through Nato." (37) For the success of this partnership, Europe needed to be cohesive. He declared in a speech:

"The future of the West lies in Atlantic partnership, a system of co-operation interdependence and harmony, whose people can jointly meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world. Some say this is only a dream but I do not agree. The U.S. would risk its cities to defend yours because we need your freedom to protect ours. Those who doubt our pledge or deny this indivisibility of defense, those who would separate Europe from America or split one ally from another, would only give aid and comfort to the men who make themselves our adversaries and welcome any Western disarray. Only with a full cohesive Europe can we have a full give and take between equals, an equal sharing of responsibility and an equal level of sacrifice." (38)

He pressed for the construction of a Europe which would be United and strong and which would speak with a common voice, and would be a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner.

The expression of these views gave rise to mixed reaction in Europe. While many in the U.S. were a little pleased that in the Frankfurt speech President Kennedy by implication, scolded France, many Europeans felt that it was rather odd, that the doubts expressed by France were dignified by numerous rejections. Other Europeans could not understand the U.S. President's plea against Europe's isolation and his protest that Europe's problems are inseparable from those of the U.S.

In his speech on Foreign Trade Bill on 17.5.1962 the U.S. President stated:

"Far from resenting the rise of a United Europe this country welcomes it - a new Europe of equals instead of rivals - a new Europe born of common ideals, instead of the old Europe, torn by national and personal animosities. We look forward to its increased role as a full and equal partner, in both the burdens and the opportunities of aid, trade, Finance, diplomacy and defence... ... If there is to be a new Atlantic partnership it must be a partnership of strong, not weak economies, of growing, not declining societies." (39)

In the formulation of policy it was assumed that the partners of France in the common market viz. Germany, Italy, Belgium and Netherlands supported the U.S. policy because their objective was to preserve the economic strength and political unity which would be derived from the common market within the framework of a strengthened NATO. They did not anticipate withdrawal of the U.S. power from Europe.

American objectives towards Europe seemed to have been based first of all on the tenet that having contributed the great financial burden of Europe's recovery and because of its commitments to the defence of Europe, the U.S. needed a voice in all Europe's major decisions. The U.S. did not however, want its commitments to Europe to be taken for granted. No doubt the United States wanted Europe to be an economically strong and equal partner, but a partner who would not challenge the United States military and political leadership. It seemed this latter together with the problems of European relationship was the core of the debate.

The convention of prominent citizens selected from 15 NATO countries called for a closely bound military, political, cultural and moral community of freemen. The Atlantic convention was held in Paris from January 8-20, 1962,
issued the Declaration of Paris, which declared that "the time has now come when the Atlantic countries must close their ranks if they wish to guarantee their security against the Communist Menace and insure that their unlimited potentialities should develop to the advantage of all men of good will." (40) The declaration further stated, "our survival as free men and the possibility of progress of all men demand the creation of a true Atlantic Community within the next decade." (41) The convention recommended the creation of a High Atlantic council, a consultative Assembly and an Atlantic high court of justice. Another recommendation was that the Council should welcome the spirit of President Kennedy's statement that a trade partnership be formed between the United States and the European Economic Community the basis of an Atlantic Community open to other nations of the free world. The core of the argument of C.A.Herter, one of the Convention's chief advocate was that a new politically integrated Atlantic Community should take the place of "national selfishness" which was out-dated. While the convention's objective was to help achieve greater unity among the Allies in the struggle against communism, Mr. Herter

pressed the Allies to accept the U.S. proposal of NATO sub-marine force equipped with Polaris missiles. The concrete proposals for Atlantic unity were put forward by Paul Van Zeeland who advocated a true Atlantic Organisation based on an Atlantic Economic Community and a renewed and reinforced North Atlantic Alliance with a cabinet and a parliament wielding real powers.

These recommendations of the Atlantic Convention of Paris were endorsed by the Congressionally appointed citizens commission. It reported that necessary steps to make the Atlantic Community a reality needed to be taken soon even though it involved some surrendering of national sovereignty. The citizen's commission hoped that Kennedy Administration's plan for a trade partnership between United States and European Economic Community would become the nucleus of an Atlantic Economic Community.

A plan to increase the economic co-operation between Europe and the United States was prepared by the Atlantic Institute in Paris. This study group examined all aspects of an economic partnership between Europe and the United States and emphasized institutional arrangements. According to this Institute, the creation of more permanent institutions such as a Council of partnership between Europe and North America, a parliamentary Assembly of American and European legislators, would be, possible only after Britain
joined the Common Market. They laid particular stress on harmonization of the economic policies of the different states.

The views expressed by Prof. Walter Hallstein, an advocate of European unity are nearly incidental. Speaking to a joint meeting of the Common Market's European Parliament and Assembly of the seventeen nation council of Europe he said, "As things are, there is no way other than Atlantic partnership (advocated by the United States) by which we can share in world politics and it is on those that our fate - the fate of Europe depends." (42)

The statements by high officials of the U.S. about European problems were repetitions of the attitude formed thus, towards the different phases of the European situation.

Mr. Acheson addressing the Congress of the European Movement declared that the nationalism of the French leaders was a danger for European and Atlantic Unity. To solve the agricultural problems of the two sides, he suggested the creation of an international Committee, to act as advisers and consultants, constituted ... ... ...

"men of quality... Jean Monnet Karl Gunnar, Myrdal, Alberto Lleras, Camargo and Lord Franks. National ambition has been the very essence of European controversies. This is deeply disturbing to us in the United States. We see in this incipient counter-revolution of policy an attack upon the movement toward the unity within Europe and an undermining of the alliance between Europe and America." (43)

In October 1963, the mission of Mr. Dean Rusk was to persuade Europe to move towards political unity. He assured them that the European powers could assume greater responsibility for their own nuclear defence if they made progress from the present political condition towards greater political unity. He hinted the United States might be prepared to forego veto over the proposed multinational deterrent atomic force if they achieved political unity.

The European situation did not in 1962-63 give a coherent uniform outlook. It had numerous aspects. Within Europe itself there were complex problems which were not only economic and political but psychological also. The constant pre-occupation of West Germany had been Berlin. In Paris, stability seemed to rule the scene but underneath the peace there were undercurrents of trouble regarding the future. The division among the French people had not totally

vanished. England was preoccupied with the problems regarding the Common Market.

The U.S. Policy continued, however, to be based on the assumption that there was growing up a single community of free nations with territory on both sides of the Atlantic, what Clarence K. Street had been advocating for a generation.

The Marshall Plan was inspired by the desire of the U.S. to see a strong viable Europe, which could defend itself against the communist bloc. It presupposed a cohesive United Europe. A question was asked: could the reason for the disarray over the French action be that a Europe just strong enough to serve as a market and support the defence positions had over-stepped its usefulness?

At the end of 1963 it seemed that there was stalemate about 'Unification of Europe.' The Atlantic Partnership concept did not show promise. American administration thought of directing their efforts at the building of solid foundation of the Atlantic Partnership, towards the tariff negotiations in the beginning of 1964. It was little ironic that in trying to achieve an economic partnership, the United States and the European Economic Community became entangled in a tariff raising round known as the Chicken-War. What was feared in this development were not the small amounts involved but the possibility of differences assuming larger dimensions.
Some people felt that the Grand Design of the Kennedy Administration for a United Europe in active partnership with the U.S. could not be pursued as a policy so long as Gen. de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer dominated the political scene. The U.S. had not been unreserved in its professions of Atlantic Unity and Partnership. In the NATO they were not prepared to part with the control of the alliance's nuclear weapons. In the Atlantic Partnership in which Europe would be linked to the U.S., the Administration felt, it has been stated, the U.S. must not become so closely linked to the growing Europe that its freedom of action in other parts of the world would be jeopardized. In the long run, President Kennedy is thought to have envisaged more co-operation in the planning of economic and trade policies and in the development of joint military and strategic policies.

Gen. de Gaulle seemed to have led the European moves for independence from the U.S. leadership. The U.S. appeared to many Frenchmen to be giving the kind of military and political leadership within the alliance that was necessary ten or twenty years ago but which was unsuitable and sometimes irrelevant to the since changed conditions. A principal change was the revival of powerful national states such as France, West Germany, within the Atlantic Community. Gen. de Gaulle did welcome the effort to
co-ordinate the international diplomacy of the West, but reserved the right to withhold France's support from any joint policy which France might consider dangerous or ill-timed. In defence, most of the Europeans believed in the U.S. military power but they appeared inclined to look for more independent foreign policies.

Gen. de Gaulle's concept of the national state begins with independence of either of the two super powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. However, independence does not mean indifference or immobility. Many Europeans seemed inclined to side with the French attitude. Further, according to de Gaulle, in future, a confederation of independent European States would be formed and it will exert as much influence in the Western Community as the U.S. This, at that time, seemed to be his objective. He also did not like that Europe's future be decided by outside powers or be arbitrated by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. He, therefore, wanted a Europe allied to but not led by the U.S.

It appeared that the other Western countries wanted to pursue freely their economic interests and trade not only in Europe but in other parts of the World also. The French policies in this respect were widely discussed.

According to some scholars, Atlantic Unity has become inevitable historically. In the sphere of defence the idea of national defence has become anachronistic.
Politically, some scholars and statesmen question whether nationalism itself has not become obsolete in the nuclear age. There is also a similar feeling and change in the European institutions. In this connection Prof. Halle wrote:

"The direction in which history is so rapidly bearing us makes the increasing unification of the primitive nation-states that have come down to us from the past a virtual necessity. What should be the area of unification? Since European and American defence are integral, the United States of America and the United States of Europe, would properly be drawn to each other in a partnership of equals or eventually in some even closer association. Looking at the long historical perspective in which the events of our present are but passing incidents we cannot say where we may eventually get to or chart the exact road by which we will get there. What is clear is direction... there will be switchbacks in the road that takes us in this direction. The direction, however, remains clear; it is away from the 19th century nationalism of which de Gaulle is the last great representative. This is why he will surely fail in his efforts to assume the leadership of Europe." (44)

In the opinion of Jacques Vernant, Director, Centre d'Etudes de Politique Étrangère Paris, unification of Europe in the sense of a single political supranational state of the present Western European States is not possible.

In 1964 Dr. G.K. Mukerjee wrote that the obstacles in the realization of the ideal of United Europe were many. (45)

The present trend is not the same as the Nineteenth century nationalism; but it did not seem to have been that of supranational state of the continents either. During the period under consideration the possibility of evolving a single, politically united state of Europe in which the nation-states surrendered their national sovereignty did not exist. In some respects the present seemed to be a transition period. In many respects, the trend showed the direction towards unity. The answer to the question whether this trend would be so powerful as to sweep away the barriers of nationalism, tradition and culture of the nation-states and would lead to Europe's political unification, need, it seems, await passage of time.

The U.S. desired the construction of a Europe which would be a full partner in the N.A. Alliance and which would be closely related to the U.S. in all policies, and which would be politically a supranational state. Gen. de Gaulle stressed organised co-operation between the states of Europe with the objective of achieving a confederation. He thought of Europe as a distinct political entity which would not merge in either of the two superpower groups.

---
He also thought of France playing the leading role in Europe. France could not aspire to attain such a position so long as her relationship with her most important neighbour i.e. West Germany, continued to be that of unfriendliness or even hostility. It was therefore, of vital importance to General de Gaulle that he should try to bury the hostility with Germany, to establish close friendly relations with the Federal Republic so that the Europe of his "image" could be built on the basis of a French-German solidarity and on no other basis, and it was to be independent of the two superpowers. A rapprochement and reconciliation between France and Germany was made possible by the personal attitude of the contemporary leader of West Germany, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, who remained German Chancellor upto the end of 1963. The United States had supported Franco-German reconciliation within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, although it would not have liked to see the emergence of a Paris-Bonn axis, rising as a third force. Beyond these points, it appeared that the Franco-German reconciliation was perhaps of marginal interest to the United States.

But to the French and the Germans, the reconciliation was a historic achievement, a rapprochment unprecedented in the annals of the history of modern Europe, an event full of meaning and importance. The true significance and the implications of the Franco-German reconciliation has been treated in the succeeding chapter.