Chapter I

Policies of France and the United States towards the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and Organization.
There are numerous examples in history of major political and military alliances formed for some specific or general purpose. Such alliances have functioned for some time and after achieving their objective, have broken down and disappeared. Their disappearance may be said to be accountable to a number of factors, such as the circumstances which called forth such an alliance ceased to exist or there developed dissensions among the constituent members of the alliance; or that new circumstances arose in which the alliance already formed was no more useful and which necessitated the enumeration of new policies due to the new trends and forces in politics. This has happened in respect of the NATO also. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States discovered that the allies were about to become rivals, and thereupon "the American Policy did revive the idea of an Atlantic Community and make it into an objective instead of a mere lofty slogan". (1)

Considered in this light the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and Organization formed originally in 1949 may be said to have lasted a fairly long term,

that is, until 1965 or for over 16 years. Thus "the world confirms the notions according to which major changes take place 15 to 18 years after a World Wars' end". (2)

The declared purpose of the Alliance was to safeguard the freedoms, common heritage and civilization of the European peoples. It was still, essentially a military alliance designed to protect Western Europe. In the opinion of Mr. F.W. Mulley "NATO will carry the stamp of a military alliance no matter what may be done to change its character." (3)

The decade that passed since the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and Organization in 1949, witnessed a large number of changes in Western Europe. The most spectacular among them have been the surprisingly speedy economic recovery of Western European countries which presented a gloomy picture in 1946, and the relaxation of tension between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The American and Western policy makers and those responsible for framing the North Atlantic Treaty and Organization hardly imagined that their image of Western Europe would change so soon and that


the principles and policies laid down by them for many years to come would be subjected to severe, scathing criticism and would be challenged so soon and reforms demanded by some Western countries.

The strategic problem has been no less responsible for creating trouble in the alliance. Over the years, both the groups of powers have come to possess formidable arrays of nuclear systems. This was a new circumstance and together with the relaxation of tensions from the influences of which NATO was not immune, it resulted in jeopardizing the strategic interests of the members of the alliance; they were no more willing to bear the burden of the alliance on the old terms.

But basically the alliance suffered from weakness inherent in its structure itself. The nation-states such as France, Great Britain, Germany, have each a distinct national tradition and history since at least three to four centuries. There have been amongst them rivalries, dissensions, wars, alliances during this period. The inherent weaknesses of NATO were concealed since 1949 by the danger of a common peril and economic weakness of Western European Allies. As these two factors ceased to operate in the years after 1960-61 the differences began to come up. The Ally, however, who made particularly strong criticism of the organization and its structure and put forward demands for reforms, has
been France. In a study of France-United States relationship in relation to the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty and Organization, the following analysis of the French attitude and policy towards NATO during 1964-65 would uncover what were considered to be as underlying forces and realities.

The Fifth French Republic was ushered in, in 1958 after a decade, since the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance and Organization. The successive governments that had followed in France since 1949 had found that NATO had been a factor of great importance in all their policies yet some of the French leaders often doubted whether they had independence at all in their policies as they had to consult often the United States on all important issues. These governments were, therefore, charged with subservience to the U.S. policies.

The fifth Republic under President de Gaulle assumed a different role and an independent policy. When in July 1958, the United States moved up its naval units in Lebanon, a Country under French influence for a long time and that without consulting France, the spirit of independence of France seems to have been aroused; and from this time onwards the President of the French Republic is seen to have begun claiming a better role for France in the affairs of the Western Alliance and in the world.
The first major international act of the new government was to have sent a memorandum on September 17, 1958 to the U.S. president and the British Prime Minister, which proposed the formation of a consultative committee of the three Western countries viz, Britain, United States and France for control and direction of the defence and diplomatic policy and policies relating to strategy and nuclear weapons. The president also pointed out in this memorandum that the progressive participation of France in the NATO would depend upon the degree of consideration accorded to these claims. The French government's contention has been that they had no voice so far in the formulation of policies over these vital matters and the implication of the memorandum of September 17, 1958 is said to have been that France should have a veto power over the use of nuclear weapons by either the United States or Britain.

The claims made in the memorandum were not accepted by the United States and the British governments; the U.S. plea against the proposals being that "The United States could not designate one of its European partners to speak for others." (4)

The French government's reaction to the U.S. reply was that the rejection of their memorandum has been discourteous. A further examination of the causes which necessitated reforms in the NATO according to the French government becomes necessary in order to be able to assess the situation arising out of France-American differences over the memorandum.

Causes of France's dissatisfaction with NATO

Dissatisfaction of the French with the NATO had not been, however, of recent origin but it dated back to the years when France was embroiled with troubles in the colonies. Especially, during 1955-1961, the problems posed by French decolonisation, created between France and the Alliance, particularly between France and the U.S.A., a great deal of misunderstandings and many differences and of such importance that many Frenchmen began to often ironically refer to the Atlantic Alliance; often during this period, there was also discontent resulting from the feeling that American economic policy and interests were displacing Europe's political interests. There were likewise differences with regard to the method of dealing with the Communists. Similar feelings were noticeable among the French about the war in South East Asia.

The Indo-Chinese war was a struggle in a far off land. But the two situations, in regard to the Indo-Chinese
and Atlantic wars differed. In Algeria, in addition to the defence of the West, a definite French national interest was also involved. This was not the case in Indo-China. The French claimed that France's national security extended along Paris-Alger-Brazzaville line and that for this reason, both national defence and the defence of the West justified military action in Algeria.

The allies of France did not understand this French position; they took the opposite position. Some NATO members felt that the French colonial wars were weakening the Alliance. The Algerian war was not treated as part of the struggle against Communism. As a result, opinion in France began to be critical of the NATO.

During these operations in Vietnam and Algeria, the Allies of France did not give her any aid. According to the French critics, they humiliated her and gave aid to France's enemies. When in November 1957 the United States delivered arms to Tunisia there was great indignation in France. Frenchmen began to ask what was the use of NATO?

Mr. Michel Debré speaking before the Council of the Republic declared that the Atlantic Pact was tending to become nothing more than the instrument of the American security under Anglo-Saxon direction.
It was the same grievances which in April 1958 created the final ministerial crisis of the Fourth Republic; Mr. Pierre André stated at that time that France could not be at one and the same time, a valuable ally on the Elbe and an adversary to be underhandedly combated in Tunis and Algiers. The feeling was repeatedly expressed in France that "if the American Alliance brings only disadvantages and obligations then let us give it up." (5)

In the subsequent period, the other grievances put forward by France have been numerous such as that the command-system of NATO was "out-dated", that the supreme commanders were appointed not according to merit but because of the country from which they came, that the final control of vital strategic matters rested always with the United States and the French government had no voice in it; that the organization of the command failed to give countries a voice commensurate with their contribution, etc. But the important matter underlying these differences was the basic divergence in the approaches of the U.S. and France towards the North Atlantic Organization and its problems. The French attitude of independence assumed since 1958 under the Fifth Republic stood in contradiction to the U.S. policy of integration among Western countries. From 1958

onwards the French Government reduced the size of its forces committed to the NATO. In 1959 the French Mediterranean fleet was removed from NATO commitment. Later the troops which returned from Algeria were retained in France instead of being allotted to the NATO command. They were retained on the grounds of national defence. The French also refused to permit any nuclear weapons under NATO control to be stationed in France.

The French had indicated their preference for only loose arrangements for co-operation in the event of war, like the alliances and ententes of the classical type. This policy of France gave rise to serious considerations regarding the Alliance and Organization, its structure and method. The NATO Alliance and Organization was formed by sovereign states and it has functioned under peace-time conditions. Integration in the NATO has been confined only to the level of armed forces and it is similar to the Inter-Allied Co-operation that existed during the First and the Second World Wars. So far, the method adopted by the Alliance has been that of arriving at decisions by discussion; so far, i.e. upto 1964 this method has worked reasonably well; but there was no guarantee that it would continue to prove useful and effective when the two underlying conditions viz. the sense of common threat to the way of life and the need for dependence on the United States no longer existed. In fact
the conditions were showing, in the later years, indications of change. During the period under consideration advance towards integration in political, military and economic matters was not too great. This was considered to have been a source of strength as well as weakness to the NATO. Of course the co-operation of 15 member nations on a large scale over a period of over 15 years has been a noteworthy fact.

**New French Policy Since 1958.**

Weary of the successive changes of governments and their failure to cope-up with and solve the problems that arose, the French people called General Charles de Gaulle to head the Government of the Fifth French Republic in 1958. President De Gaulle formulated a new foreign policy distinct from the policies of the previous governments with the declared objectives of independence and peace. In his view the nation state continues to be the true repository of political power and as such the safeguarding of national sovereignty has to be the primary concern of France, as is the case in other nation-states. "European policy has become the foundation of French foreign policy" was declared by the French Prime Minister before de Gaulle came to power.

In his press conference dated 5th September 1960,
General de Gaulle declared: "

"Europe's realities, the pillars upon which it can be built, were its constituent states. They were the only entities that have the right to make decrees and the authority to act. To ensure the regular co-operation of the states of Western Europe is something which France considers desirable, possible and practical, in the political, cultural and defence fields." (6)

He envisaged a new Europe of independent states in which France will have a leading position and which will be independent of the domination from outside. The French Government entrusted Mr. Christian Fouchet, a diplomat, to prepare the framework for such a Europe. The suggestions made by him are known as the Fouchet Plan. This plan suggested that a union of Europe may develop along Gaullist lines. This would be essentially co-ordination of the foreign policies of European states as distinct from those of the states outside Europe; and the creation of a joint defence arrangement centering around the French nuclear force—the force de frappe. The Fouchet Plan was heard no more after 1962. The Plan and the scheme thereunder were criticised as having been old fashioned, reactionary and obsolete. How far this criticism is valid may debated; nevertheless,

it has to be admitted that the plan was a deliberate attempt to make Europe again an important factor in world politics. The assumption on which this Europe was to be based had been that the only Europe that could play this role "apart from myths, stories and parades is a confederal one." (7)

General de Gaulle had a certain definite image of France. His objective during the Second World War was not merely to attain immediate victory in the war, but also to revitalise the spirit of France. By tradition, history and culture, France had a certain definite place among the comity of nations and it was certainly not that of a satellite. The new policies enunciated under the Fifth French Republic since 1958 with the objective of peace, restoration of France to her former position and to lead Western policies have been indications of France's assuming independence of policy and demanding greater voice in the NATO.

The strategic problem.

In 1945 the United States had the monopoly of nuclear weapons and after the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States gave a nuclear

guarantee to the West European countries. With the development of vastly destructive nuclear missiles in Soviet Russia, French strategists expressed their scepticism as to whether America would enter into a nuclear war to protect Western Europe or France if it involved her own destruction. The argument has been put forward by the French strategist General Pierre Gallois that faced with the risk of total destruction no nation will jeopardise its survival for another. Here he maintained that each country must have its nuclear arsenal to defend itself against direct attack while leaving all other countries to their fate. (8) What was the meaning then and the true purpose of the alliance if the U.S.A's guarantee of protection and collective defence ceased to be effective?

This strategic analysis has been elaborated by Mr. George A. Kelly as follows:

"European anxiety can be explained and justified by the fact that the use of the weapon which guarantees the integrity is controlled by the United States and Great Britain. Hence proceeds the idea that the situation would be fundamentally modified if the European powers themselves individually or collectively held high powered atomic arms to discourage aggressions. General Stehlin pursued the same lines. General Pierre Gallois evoked the problem of American reliability." (9)


Further, the analysis of the German situation viz. that the security of West Berlin was dependent on the presence of American forces was a pointer in the direction. Many Frenchmen particularly General de Gaulle, drew such conclusions from the changes in the world strategic situation which resulted from Russia's attainment of powerful nuclear missiles.

When the decision to make the French atomic bomb was taken, General de Gaulle was widely criticized. However, it may be stated that the making of the bomb was contemplated in a much earlier period. When the ultimate decision to make the weapon was taken, he had no influence on it, he may be said to have only hastened the process.

The problem regarding the unreliability of the United States Protection has been clearly stated even by some U.S. military, experts. For instance, General Maxwell Taylor mentioned in 1960 that neither the U.S.S.R. nor the friends of the United States believed that the latter would use massive retaliatory forces except for purposes of its own survival. (10) The opinion of Mr. Christian Herter then the Secretary of State, was that he could not

conceive of the president's "involving us in a nuclear war unless it became certain that we were in danger of devastation ourselves." (11)

For the purpose of the present chapter, the above discussion of military strategy is probably sufficient to bring out the divergence between the United States' and France's attitude towards military strategy. A full discussion of the strategic situation will be attempted later. It may, however, be added that President de Gaulle had manifested his dislike of being involved in American policies in other parts of the world where no vital French interests were concerned. The French would not like to project policies in respect of countries in Africa and Asia, in a particular way merely because the dominating partner in the Atlantic Alliance had directed it. According to the French, the NATO is not an appropriate instrument for collective policies outside the NATO area. The Multilateral force.

The multilateral nuclear force was a device offered by the United States to lull the apprehensions of European Allies, to preserve the solidarity of NATO and

to retain its own position of control. The dissensions and differences among the members particularly in France led to a crisis of confidence in NATO. In order to meet this distrust, the then U.S. President came forward with the proposal of the multilateral nuclear force - a nuclear force jointly owned and managed by those who subscribed to it. The French rejected the multilateral force and went ahead with their "force-de-frappe", because the multilateral force, according to the strategy experts would create more problems than it would solve. There was no satisfactory solution to the problem of control and the use of force. And above all, the final control over the nuclear force, "finger on the nuclear trigger" rested with the United States.

The reluctance of the Western countries particularly France to accept the strategic arrangements has been pointed out by Mr. H.G.Gelber who wrote "A good many Europeans could do with some of Mr. McNamara's cold realism but they will be reluctant to accept all the same, the conclusions of a nuclear logic which demands that all major strategic decisions be left in American hands." (12)

The reason of General de Gaulle's opposition to

the Nassau agreement was said to have been similar. The
French Government prepared their atomic weapons, the
"force-de-frappe". The Gaullist strategists had developed,
as a solution to the above problems and in support of the
French nuclear force, the theory of relative invulnerabi-
Hlity. According to this theory, the minor power will
have the relative invulnerability, 'if it had the capacity
to inflict an amount of nuclear destruction' such as would
outweigh the advantage expected from contemplated aggre-
Hsion directed specifically against it.

French World Policy.

The Government of the Vth French Republic
formulated a new world policy after 1958. They began to
assume independence for many aspects in their policy.
President de Gaulle maintained that the present bipolar
division of the world would not be everlasting and as such
Europe must prepare herself for her own future. The
rapprochement with West Germany, the Paris-Bonn Treaty of
1963 was conceived and worked out, out of this new idea
of Europe. The alternative for West Germany for a time
appeared to be a choice between the United States and the
Atlantic Alliance, and France and Europe. When it seemed
that Germany was inclined not to choose the Paris-Bonn
Treaty lost its real significance. However, France continued
to impress West Germany on the new approach.
De Gaulle's conception of Europe continued to be that it would be independent of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and that it would act as a mediating force between them. The Europe of this new conception was a Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural, which included the Soviet Union; but an integrated Europe did not seem to have any historical precedent. According to some western historians Europe as a political entity never existed. The Holy Roman Empire was the nearest approach to it.

The French view of Europe under the Fifth Republic, therefore, needs to be examined more. However, before we embark on it, it would be useful to examine the United States policy and its basic motives towards Europe. The attitudes of the two countries are different regarding the basic ideas. Since the first years of the formation of NATO the U.S. policy has been directed towards supporting the policy of integration of the West European countries. The U.S. has desired to preserve to herself the independence of action in the non-Atlantic parts of the world. The U.S. has sought to retain predominance in military strategy as the European countries were not in a position to shoulder the vital responsibilities for defence. It has also desired the creation of a European community, willing to co-operate closely with the U.S. in trade and defence and policies.
towards the communist world. The U.S. involvement in
Europe has, therefore, been deep.

There have been large American investments in
Western Europe. The presence of the U.S. forces and
missiles in Europe was necessitated by the expansionist
policies from the East. It achieved the purpose of safe-
guarding Europe. The U.S. desired to preserve this U.S.
presence and the U.S. interests in Europe, for various
reasons. More important among them have been: (i) "to
end Europe's internecine wars; (ii) to provide a counter
weight to the U.S.S.R.; (iii) to bind Germany politically
and militarily to the West and (iv) and to provide an
adequate partner for the United States." (13) President
Kennedy stressed the interdependence between the United
States and a United Europe in the following words "A
politically and economically integrated Europe would
become an equal partner with the United States and share
with us the burdens and obligations of world
leadership." (14) In order to achieve these objectives
the United States has been insisting on a politically
unified Europe in close association with the United States.

and its opportunities to the U.S." (14 Sep. 1962),
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV No. 1192,
p. 711.

14. John F. Kennedy: "The Goal of an Atlantic Partner-
ship", 4 July 1962, Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. XLVII No. 1204, pp. 131-33.
This political unity was desired to be achieved by establishing supranational federal institutions and which would be controlled by a European Parliament. (15) Many Americans including President Kennedy considered that the model of the American system might work well for Europe also.

The idea of the movement for European Unification has roots in the earlier past of the U.S. also. For instance, it was President Roosevelt who suggested that a United States of Europe would be created in which the barriers among the different states would be reduced and movement among which would be free and among whom a single economic structure would be established. Thus, the idea seems to have been rooted in American minds since long.

Mr. Schaetzel, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs, in a recent article in "Foreign Affairs" recalls what Benjamin Franklin wrote on October 22, 1787 to a European correspondent. "If it (our federal constitution) succeeds, I do not see why you might not in Europe carry the project of the Good Henry IV... of a federal union and a one grand republic of all its different states and kingdoms by means of a like convention? " (16)

The U.S. thinkers have repeatedly pointed to the Europeans that the Europeans could succeed in becoming one single nation like their cousins who crossed the Atlantic and that their model would be successful in Europe also. It was considered evidently essential in the later period for the preservation of cohesion and integrity in the N.A. Alliance and even for the preservation of NATO itself.

French ideas of Europe.

As regards the French, their own ideas of Europe have influenced their policy towards the NATO. Since 1958, French policy has more and more been to become identified with a European policy, and Europe's interests. It seemed to be more Europe-oriented than before. French policy has projected a new image of Europe, a new vision which aimed at making Europe play a leading part in the world affairs. This seemed to be due to the desires for France being able to play a greater role in world affairs. A Europe that could aspire to be independent of both the super powers was also contemplated. The leaders of the Vth French Republic have not been perturbed by severe criticisms, levelled at times from both the Soviet Union and the United States, against these ideas. These ideas were clearly not compatible with the N.A.T. Alliance and Organization as it existed then.
In the post-war years, it was claimed that nationalism in the European states was on the wane. This appeared so, it has been argued, due to the weakness of the European state system after the war years. General de Gaulle has continued to believe in the role of nation states. According to him, the nation state is as yet, the only legitimate source of power.

"It is true that this nation is a human and sentimental element, whereas Europe can be built on the basis of active, authoritative and responsible elements. The states are in truth certainly very different from one another, each of which had its own spirit; its own language, its own misfortunes, glories and ambitions but these states are the only entities that have the right to order and the authority to act." (17)

France, according to him is entitled to a definite role in the affairs of the world, by reason of her history, tradition and culture. He has imagined a distinct role for France since the years of war, as can be seen from his reference in his Memoirs "toute ma vie je me suis fait une certaine idee de la France." (18) While expressing his ideas of Europe at a press Conference dated 5th September 1960 wherein he proposed regular consultation


among the governments of European states and for an assembly composed of delegates from the national parliaments, he declared:

"France must help to build Western Europe into an organised Union of States so that gradually there may be stabilised on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps, and peoples of the channel, the most powerful, prosperous and influential political, economic, cultural and military complex in the world." (19)

Thus the Fouchet plans, the French proposals for a European Political Union suggested a loose union of sovereign states, of an economic community in which governments would be supreme—contemplated consultations at heads of state and government levels. The plans were, however, rejected. The contradictions which they involved for the NATO were evident.

The objective of the French policy has seemed to be the creation of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." This goal was sought to be achieved gradually by stages. In the first place, France was to be rebuilt. Economically and militarily it should be strong and have stability. Such a France was to help in the creation of an association of Western European states. And finally, this Europe was to extend from the Atlantic to the Urals

and was to become "L'Europe fraternelle." In this Europe the small states and satellites and reunified Germany could live together peacefully and work for peace and aid the underdeveloped areas.

Much regarding how this Europe was to be achieved has been left unexplained. However, it pre-supposed an understanding between countries of Eastern and Western Europe. It has since then, been the French policy of encouraging a détente between East and West by means of a series of bilateral treaties providing for cultural and technical aid, concluded with Eastern bloc countries on Germany's Eastern frontier. Finally, there is the concept of the third world - "Tiers Monde" - which means that greater understanding should be established between France and Western countries and that the underdeveloped areas were to receive economic aid. The French would use influence wherever in the world countries were trying to win or retain some independence of the "two hegemonies." The French believed in the independence of the nation-state and in the responsibilities of the great powers for maintaining peace, the respect for non-interference in the affairs of others.

Thus, according to the French, their ideas did not involve the creation of a third military force in the world to add to the tensions. The other powers were not then in a
position to compete or equal the super-powers although
the situation could change in the years to come. It has
been argued that from a military point of view there is no
room for a third force. "The fate of the future of
Europe is bound to a close alliance with the United States.
Militarily there is no room for the concept of a third
force in the arena of East-West conflict," says a
German political leader. (20)

The objective of the third-world policy had been
stated by the French to be not merely to create a third a
military force; it is rather to act as a sort of a mediator
between the super powers. Militarily, the underlying idea
is to prevent aggression, to deter the aggressor. Again,
the argument quoted above, appears to assume the perpetua-
tion of the present world situation, as it is. In the
dynamic circumstances, according to the French, the
present situation may not be perpetuated.

The French ideas have differed from the policy of
an integrated Europe desired by the United States: The
model of the U.S. Federal constitution succeeded under
different circumstances. It was formed on a new continent.

20. Kurt Birrenbach, Future of the Atlantic Community
(New York, 1963) p. XII.
The colonies which united had no deep-rooted traditions, they went through similar experience and struggled together for freedom. In Europe the situation is different. The European States have distinct traditions, culture, and history of which they are the products. As such, all attempts at political integration rouse immediate opposition. No progress, therefore, could be achieved in that direction, at once.

Mr. Arnold Wolfers has examined the reasons why an integrated Europe policy could not make progress. According to him, "the Six have failed to reach an agreement on the form integration is to take and on the stages by which it is to be achieved." (21)

These ideas contradicted Nato's policy and strategy. The U.S. sought to preserve freedom and democracy as against Communism not only in Europe but everywhere in the world. This policy would be put into jeopardy if Nato disintegrated as the Soviet Union desired and tried. The reaction in the U.S. to these policies was, therefore, naturally adverse.

At the time when General de Gaulle's suggestion for three power consultation was made known, the idea of supranational organization was defended by many pointing out that if members prepare for a modest surrender of sovereignty, "it would revolutionize both the military and political practice of the alliance." According to Mr. F. W. Mulley "the creation of NATO was the result of sober realization that no individual country, however, powerful, could provide effective defence by her own independent effort. This is just true today." He further goes on to argue that "having ceded the substance of national sovereignty (for defending one's country) there is little logic in denying the proper form." (22)

However, it has been pointed out that the circumstances in 1949 when the NATO was formed were different from those obtaining in 1964-65 when the threat to the national security is felt to have ceased to exist. At this stage, a question would not be irrelevant; has the situation basically changed and if so to what extent?

In this connection, the U.S. policy has been

criticized as possessing inconsistencies with regard to the role of the national states,

"In the emerging areas, the 'nation-state' was treated as natural and in Eastern Europe great hope was placed in nationalism as a counter weight to communism. But in Western Europe where the concept of nationalism had originated, American policy decried the nation-state as out-dated and backward." (23)

It seems the U.S. policy was perhaps based on the practical results that were desired. If in the emerging areas the form of political organization was not that of nation-state, there would arise the possibility of growth of communism. In Western Europe, if traditional nationalism was to have its way it could lead to repetition of the European civil wars.

The United States has also been keeping to herself the freedom of action in respect of non-Atlantic areas and in respect of dealing with the Soviet Union. Again the United States did not encourage integration in the vital aspects of defence and military strategy. These policies seemed to the French to indicate that what the United States desires and expects of an integrated Western Europe - as a partner - is that it (i.e., Europe) should be so modelled as to preserve the predominant place of the United

States in key matters of defence and nuclear strategy, that it will not harm any U.S. interests anywhere but would rather be complimentary to them. The U.S. position has been that they entered Europe and maintained their presence in response to the call of Europe and also in conformity with their general policy, such co-operation as they expected from their partners was necessary for the objectives of their over-all policy towards Europe and NATO and could not be construed in any other way. The purpose of NATO was not a temporary one and hence the concept of interdependence.

The French had opposed the creation of a supra-national Europe. President de Gaulle stated:

"This was the case with regard to the project for a so-called supra-national Europe in which France as such would have disappeared except to pay and orate, a Europe governed in appearance by anonymous technocratic and stateless committees, in other words, a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity for defence, and, therefore, doomed in the face of the Soviet-bloc, to being nothing more than a dependent of that great Western Power which itself had a policy, an economy and a defence - the United States of America." (24)

The French point of view seemed to have been that Europe should be an equal partner of the United States in all matters of policy including the control and

use of nuclear weapons. In 1962 the foreign Minister M. Couve de Murville declared:

"Little by little Europe will become an equal partner of the United States. It will at least be able to represent the continent of Europe and so be an element of stable equilibrium vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Its creation will foreshadow the pacific settlement from the Atlantic to the Urals which must one day take shape." (25)

According to the opinion of some Americans, however, among partners, where one is incomparably far superior (in respect of power and resources) to the rest, such an equality, even if desired, would not be possible. This approach, has not been unchallenged and equality was demanded:

"The Atomic poker game requires rapidity of decisions and the concentration of the power of decision in the hands of a single man, which non-American leader can heartedly place the physical existence of his fellow citizens in the hands of President of the U.S.? Where then is the equality of the Alliance?" (26)


Since 1958, France has been asking for herself a greater role in Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. When the French proposal for three-power consultations was rejected Paris turned its policies in another direction stressing the need for a stronger Europe in which France and West Germany would play a leading role. The France-West German Treaty of co-operation of 1963 - the so-called Paris Bonn axis, was signed keeping in view a policy of this kind. However, by 1964 it appeared that West Germany chose to align itself to the United States rather than to France and Europe. The Erhard Government emphasized and supported the U.S. sponsored project of multi-national nuclear force and other U.S. policies also. They are also a party to the nuclear test-ban treaty. These changes in German policy were indicative of sharp divergences from the French policies. However, when it would come to putting into practical operation the multi-national force or political integration of Western countries what the West German attitude will be cannot be predicted with any certainty in view of the difficulties inherent in these problems. The French were, however, seen to have continued to maintain their policies and in April 1964, the foreign Minister Mr. M. Couve de Murville claimed that France had settled all the great problems of the past and enjoyed a freedom of action which no other nation enjoyed.
French attitude regarding the United States' role in Europe

Since the close of the war the United States has been present in Europe in all the six Western countries. The presence took economic, military and political forms due to the needs of the situation. With the recession of the threat from the East, the military presence has been considered to be of less vital importance except in W. Germany. But it has, however, continued. In fact, opinion in many quarters including France has claimed that the U.S. presence has resulted into the U.S. domination in regard to defence policy and economic affairs. In France, the economic domination has also been disliked by many people. A political thinker like Mr. Maurice Duverger stated that American influence in economic and social spheres was a danger to Europe.

This has not been the official view of the French government. The fear of American economic domination was not shared by the business community in France or in other E.E.C. countries. However, with the growth of national economies in France and W. Europe, it was natural that these countries would care more for their own economic interests and hence all these differences arose. The Europeans including the French did not appear to be prepared to sacrifice their economic interest for the sake of an alliance in the changed circumstances.
"The French proposals for monetary reform therefore, aim at Europe's total emancipation from American influence." (27)

What some Frenchmen think in relation to the Atlantic Alliance and about their expectations from the U.S. is that the U.S. decides what is good for others, it is always right: the U.S. expects her allies merely to comply with its wishes obediently. They consider this to be a kind of protectorate and therefore, demand consultation on questions of Foreign policy and the right to veto on the use of nuclear weapons.

This has also not been the official view of the French Government as it appeared earlier. The views of France have not been shared by all her partners in the Western European Alliance. In France itself the policy has support in government circles and also in some quarters of the opposition also.

In the formulation of their foreign policies, the U.S. Allies did not claim independence during this period. The French Government seems to have, however, assumed independence of action in some spheres and their world policies seem to have opposed "the Atlantic conformity" desired by Washington. This is seen from the

various issues related to NATO such as creation of an independent nuclear force, the desire for direct approach to the Soviet Union, West Germany, recognition of China etc. etc.

In the sphere of military strategy the fact that the central control over the use of the nuclear weapons has been retained by the United States and that the Allies have no voice in the final decision making has not been liked by the Western countries, particularly, France, for political and strategic reasons.

This view has not been shared, however, by all and has been criticized on strategic and political grounds. Further and full discussion on these points will be made in subsequent parts and it would suffice to point out here that the fact that the U.S. position on all the respective points has been disliked is not insignificant. Even in France, there are some who feel that the American involvement in Europe is inevitable. They, nevertheless, continue to vote for General de Gaulle because he has succeeded in creating self-confidence among the French people. He has succeeded in making them believe that France enjoys greater freedom of action, greater prestige and is in the front rank of nations.

The French policy has been subjected to criticisms and it has been attacked not only by some of the
Allies but by many people in France itself. It has been claimed that this policy will not last longer than the present regime in France. If viewed objectively, it appears that the problems said to have been posed by France are not created by de Gaulle. The difficulties and the dissensions of the Alliance are inherent in its structure itself; they represent the impact of the change of times. The French have brought them to light; had it not been for General de Gaulle, someone else would have focussed attention on them. The French have asked for a greater role for France. They have not created the difficulties of the Western Alliance. Even according to some Western scholars, France has frequently pointed out the differences, dissensions, the inconsistencies that already existed in the Western Alliance. They are never seen to have asked for dissolution of the Alliance. Evading these problems of the alliance would not solve the difficulties. Prof. Raymond Aron wrote in 1962 that it was an illusion to believe that the problems raised by General de Gaulle would disappear when he no longer graces the scene.

In the United States, a few people appreciate the French point of view. Nonetheless they are very critical of General de Gaulle's methods and ambitions for France; they have charged him with having created division in Europe by his preference for a Union of States.
The debate over integration and the French policies seems to indicate that what is at stake are two fundamentally different conceptions of the international order. President de Gaulle who brought to light the inconsistencies of the Alliance has been described by Edmond Michelet as "un homme d'avant-hier et d'après-demain", a man of yesterday and the day after-tomorrow, the reference to the past indicating his ideas of the nation-state as the beginning of his policy and the day after-tomorrow, pointing out that he looks to a period of 10 years hence. The economic institutions of Europe could not evolve into political institutions of a supranational Europe, as was expected. What does this point out to? Perhaps it could be a matter of time.

In the French - U.S. policies an interplay of opposing forces was thus visible. The United States has been endeavouring to see the formation of a supranational political Europe, which would be in close association with the United States; if this could not be achieved, their efforts were to be directed to preventing the formation of a Europe of General de Gaulle's image. They were trying for this purpose through diplomatic means and by offering projects such as the multilateral force. France on the other hand was seen to have continued her policy consistently advocating a union of sovereign states. They have been trying to prevent the formation of the United States
sponsored Europe. Their policy did not appear to have been changed over the years, in spite of the fact that most of the French initiatives since 1958 beginning with the proposal for three power consultations have been rejected by the U.S. and her Atlantic Allies. The curious aspect about the controversy may be stated to have been that both the countries differed although they advocated nearly the same objective so far as the European unity is concerned.

"The irony of the Franco-American rivalry is that President de Gaulle's conceptions are greater than his strength while the U.S. power has been greater than its conceptions." (28) According to Mr. Kissinger, de Gaulle's conceptions as distinct from his style would, in future, be considered to be greater than those of most of his critics.

Reference may also be made to a rather different point of view namely, that General de Gaulle's policy towards the United States has been based on his experiences during the war years. He had differences with other allies such as Britain or the Soviet Union also; nonetheless these past differences were not seen to have come in the way of his seeking a rapprochement with these countries. During the period under consideration his criticism of the NATO policies has been consistent although he has not shown willingness to

quit the Alliance altogether. Two significant changes in the international situation could be said to have enabled the French to reconsider their policies and resume independence of action. First, there was the relaxation of tensions, that the threat from the East was considered to have receded in the background. On the other hand, the need arose for the United States to ensure support of the Western Allies in respect of their world-policies. However, in order to bring out the correct implications of the French policy and attitude towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, further study seemed necessary, to seek out differences in view, of analysis and interpretations. As has been remarked by Mr. Stanley Hoffman, "It is necessary to indicate the foundations, its mainlines, expectations and techniques of President de Gaulle because his foreign policy has been subject to many contradictory or erroneous interpretations in the United States." (29)

The new policies which Gen. de Gaulle initiated on his return to power in 1958 emerged out of his concern for the condition of France at that time. In his speech as Premier Designate he had himself described it before

the National Assembly on June 1, 1958 as follows:

"The rapidly accelerating degradation of the state, the immediate danger to French unity, Algeria in the throes of trials and emotions, Corsica suffering from a feverish contagion, opposing movements in Metropolitan France hourly whipping up their passions and reinforcing their action, the Army, long tried by sanguinary and praiseworthy tasks but shocked by the lack of any real authority, our international position disparaged even within our alliances - such is the situation of our country. At this very moment when so many opportunities, in so many directions are offered to France, she finds herself threatened by disruption and perhaps even civil war." (30)

Gen. de Gaulle's objective was the regeneration of France. It was also his aim to solve the impending immediate problems like the Algerian problem, to recreate confidence among the French people and to utilize the resources and power in the country such as existed, in a direction which would lead to the prosperity of France.

While this task demanded on the one hand the establishment of political stability in Metropolitan France and solution to the imminent problems, on the other it meant the regeneration of France as a powerful nation-state in the troubled world. For all these things, the possession of atomic weapons by France was considered most essential.

France, therefore, did not agree to the talks relating to the suspension of nuclear tests but was determined to go ahead with its nuclear programme, intended eventually to equip France with her own atomic weapons. While the overall policies launched under the Fifth Republic have been subjected to wide criticism in the United States and Britain, the policy of pursuing the nuclear weapons programmes inherited from the Fourth Republic, has been the central point of all criticism. It is from the pursuit of this policy of possessing atomic weapons, to safeguard national interests, that divergences with the policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization emanated and became most vocal and it was of such vital importance in Franco-American relations at least upto 1963-1964, that President Kennedy was obliged eventually to recognise France's possession of atomic weapons as a 'fait accompli'. The evolution of this French nuclear programme and the role it played in the French-American relations during the period, is traced in the chapter that follows.