CHAPTER FIVE
THE I.N.A. ON A WAR-FOOTING

1. Taking-over of the leadership of Indian Independence movement in East Asia by Subhas Chandra Bose

Significance of the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose in East Asia

Subhas Chandra Bose (1) arrived at Tokyo on 16 May 1943. But his presence in Tokyo was kept a secret till it was announced first on the Tokyo Radio on 18 June and confirmed by the Japanese Press next day. (2) This came as a pleasant shock to the Indian

(1) Hereinafter referred to also as Bose.

(2) Bose reached Saban island by a Japanese submarine on 6 May 1943. A plane was despatched by the Japanese Imperial Headquarters on 11 May to fly Bose to Tokyo. The plane reached Tokyo via Penang, Saigon and other places on 15 May 1943. For about one month his presence in Tokyo was kept secret. Discussion with Lt. Gen. Saburo Isoda on 11 October 1943 at Maibashi, Japan. Lt. Gen. Isoda was the chief of the Liaison Agency from January 1944. These informations are confirmed by an official Japanese source. See Government of Japan, Subhas Chandra Bose And Japan (Tokyo, 1956) 92-3. This book is in Japanese. An unpublished English translation has been used in this study. Hereinafter referred to as Subhas Chandra Bose And Japan.

There is some misconception about the exact date of arrival of Bose in East Asia and Japan. The following are the two publications among many others which presume that Bose arrived in Tokyo in mid-June. H. Toye, The Sprinkling Tigrar (London, 1956) 179; Shah Nawaz Khan, My Memories of I.N.A. And Its Retreat (Delhi, 1945) 81-2.

Tokyo Radio announced on 18 June 1943 that "Chandra Bose, the leader of the Indian Independence League who had been in Germany recently, arrived in Tokyo...", but no date of arrival was announced. Extracts from Short-Wave Radio, Tokyo and other Affiliated Stations from December 1941 to September 1944. This is compiled by the Research and Analysis Branch, Office of the Strategic Services, Honolulu. Hereinafter referred to as Extracts from Short Wave Radio. Bose was referred to by the Japanese as Chandra Bose.

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community and their enthusiasm rose to a fervent pitch. Indians in every country of East Asia welcomed him and celebrated his arrival. (3) "The first public announcement of the dramatic arrival of Netaji Bose in Tokyo all the way from Berlin", wrote a reliable source, "caused a wave of jubilation among Indians throughout East Asia. Overnight the atmosphere was electrified. The I.N.A. and the Indian Independence movement suddenly assumed

The Domei news agency reported on 19 June that "Subhas Chandra Bose, second only to Mahatma Gandhi as leader of Indian Independence Movement, has arrived in Nippon.... Bose met Premier Gen. Hideki Tojo on June 14, following which he conferred with Gaimu Daijin Hamoru Shigemitsu...." Syonen Shimbun/19 June 1943, 1.

Shigemitsu was the Foreign Minister of Japan. The Japanese word Syonen meant the Light of the East. It was Japanese name given to Singapore.

The weekly journal of the League brought out a news item with the title "Thrilling News." In a dramatic way it revealed that "the thrilling news came from Tokyo.... Early in 1941 (1941) one of the greatest All-India leaders disappeared from his house. His disappearance was described as my sterius.... Today he is in Nippon." Indian Independence League Headquarters, Young India (Singapore) 1 (20 June 1943) 5. Hereinafter referred to as Young India.

(3) The Domei News Agency reported that: "Excitement rose to fever pitch in Syonen as news broke out here of the arrival in Tokyo of the great Indian leader, Subhas Chandra Bose." In an interview with Domei representative A. Yellappa, Chairman of the Singapore Branch of the Indian Independence League, expressing the great joy of the Indian community in Singapore felt over Mr. Subhas Bose's safe arrival in Tokyo, declared that "Subhas Chandra Bose's knowledge of India and Indians was unrivalled and his influence and leadership unexcelled and this would be of immense use to the Indian movement here." Bose's arrival was hailed in a statement issued by the Indian Independence League Headquarters in Singapore. Detailed reports of mass rallies, public meetings and rejoicings of the Indian communities in Djawa (Indonesia), Thailand, Burma and Indo-China to hail Bose's arrival in Japan were published in Syonen Shimbun, 21 June 1943, 1. Tokyo Radio broadcast in English on 22 June the reports of the welcome-meetings which were held in Japan and Thailand by the Indian community. Extracts from Short Wave Radio, ibid.
far greater importance in the eyes of all." (4) The German and
the Japanese Press and Radio stressed the significance of Bose’s
arrival as far-reaching in the Indian Independence movement in
East Asia. (5)

This was essentially true. The presence of Bose in East
Asia was significant as he gave the movement a plan to achieve
its aim, speedily fulfilled the requirements to bring the army

(4) S.A. Ayer, Unto Him a Witness (Bombay, 1951) 3.

(5) On 19 June 1943, Syonan Shim bun devoted the major part
of its front page to report Bose’s life-sketch, his political
career, his exploits in Germany and his meeting with the Japanese
leaders. The Nippon Times brought out a special issue for the
purpose. On 21 June, the Syonan Shim bun quoted the editorial of
20 June of the foremost Japanese English daily, The Nippon Times,
as having reported: "unanimously hailing the arrival of Bose in
Nippon, all Tokyo morning newspapers carried lengthy editorials
stressing the significance of his arrival as a great forward
stride towards the cherished goal of Indian Independence. Pointing
out the lack of military leadership as the weakness of the present
Indian Independence movement due to the imprisonment of her
leaders, Manichi declared that there was no need to worry on this
point with the arrival of Bose in Nippon." Syonan Shim bun,
21 June 1943, 1. Manichi refers to the Manichi Shim bun, another
English daily of Japan.

On 19 June 1943 the Syonan Shim bun editorially commented that
"the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose marks another milestone in the
progress of India in her fight for freedom.... His presence in
Tokyo would seem a signal that the war for Indian Independence has
reached its crucial stage." Syonan Shim bun, 19 June 1943, 1.

The same day a commentator said over the Berlin Radio: "The
motives of Subhas Chandra Bose’s trip to Japan and the fact that
he was accorded and received a welcome wherever he made a stop is
added proof for the Indian people that the war has stopped to be
an Anglo-American one...and that under the leadership of true
Indian patriots, such as Bose, the Indian movement of Independence
will result in the final liberation of the Indian people." Berlin
Bose (Delhi, 1946) 239. The work is a compilation of Bose’s
speeches, Press statements, Radio broadcasts etc. during 1942-5.
Hereinafter referred to as Arun.

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into action and, in doing so, established the relations between
the Japanese and the Indian community on a new ground and reinvigorated the movement.

Bose's Blue-Print for winning
India's Independence

During the three weeks following the day when his arrival
in Tokyo was made public, Bose made a number of speeches, broadcast over the radio, and held press conferences. These occasions were utilised to unfold the plan which seemed to be fully worked out by the time he had arrived in East Asia, - a plan which was to bring the Indian freedom movement to its successful end. (6)

Bose's plan stood for the coordination of the forces of nationalism within India and abroad to make them a gigantic force powerful enough to overthrow the ruling Power in India. The basic assumption on which Bose seemed to have based his grand scheme was that the internal conditions in India had made her ripe for a revolt. The non-cooperation movement must turn to active revolt. The "civil disobedience movement," he said, "must develop into an

On 24 June the Tokyo Radio broadcast: "The presence of Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose in Japan is particularly significant because our country, Japan, has long been an ardent supporter of Indian independence...." Tokyo Radio, 24 June 1943. Arun, ibid., 240.

(6) In a Press interview on 19 June (1943) in Tokyo, a reporter stressed the need of a plan to conduct the armed struggle for India's independence. In his reply, Bose emphasised this point and said: "Naturally, there is a plan and plan is being worked out. Of that, I can assure you." Syonan Shimbun, 21 June 1943, 1. Reports on this Press interview was broadcast over the Tokyo Radio on 19 June 1943. See Arun, ibid., 144.
armed struggle, and only when the Indian people had received a
baptism of fire would they be qualified to achieve freedom." (7)

India's struggle for freedom had reached a "significant
phase" with the August revolt of 1942. It had conclusively proved
that Indian people were ready to adopt non-peaceful methods in
the independence movement and thereby they had ushered in a new
phase of violent nationalism. He said:

In the history of India's struggle, August 1942
will... remain an unforgettable landmark indicat-
ing the psychological transition from passive to
active resistances. Not content with a civil
disobedience campaign Indian people are now
morally prepared to employ other means for achiev-
ing their liberation.

The time has, therefore, come to pass on to
the next stage of our campaign. All organizations
whether inside India or outside must now transform
themselves into a disciplined fighting organization
under one leadership. The aim and purpose of this
organization should be to take up arms against
British Imperialism when the time is ripe and
signal is given. (8)

(7) Ibid.

(8) Bose's address to the representatives of the Indian
communities in East Asia on 4 July 1943. See Sapan, pseud., ed.,
Natul Subhas Chandra Bose His Life And Work (Bombay, 1946) 313.
Hereinafter referred to as Sapan.

This basic assumption, namely, that India was ripe for a
revolt in 1943, on which Bose based his plan, rested on his
supposed knowledge about the internal conditions of India about
which his secret service men kept him informed even after he had
left India.

In his address on 4 July 1943, Bose said: "patriotic Indians
abroad are working in complete harmony with their countrymen at
home... despite all the restrictions imposed by the C.I.D. - that
is the Secret Service-I have remained in constant touch with my
countrymen at home. Today I can go so far as to inform you that
during the twelve months a large number of our representatives
have been sent into India from outside from all directions. Some
of them have been captured and shot.... But many more have been

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Though the force of nationalism within India had tended to become more violent, will it be alone sufficient to drive away the ruling Power? Bose said that in the light of his own experience, it wouldn't be sufficient. (9) In this opinion, possibly the surest proof in Bose's hand was the fate of the Quit India movement of August 1942 itself, which had failed to bring independence. This weakness made the role of a favourable international situation quite significant in India's fight for freedom. (10) The object was to mobilize aid from outside to supplement the strength able to evade arrest and according to latest reports they are working satisfactorily." Ibid., 307-8. This claim that Bose's Secret Service men kept him abreast of the internal conditions of India was repeated by him on many occasions.

(9) In his address to the first mass rally in Singapore on 9 July, Bose said that his escape from India in 1941 was prompted by his conviction that the forces of nationalism within India would not be sufficient to repel the ruling Power. "I may also assert without the slightest exaggeration that there is no nationalist leader in India who can claim to possess the many-sided experiences that I have been able to acquire. In the light of this experience I came to the conclusion that all the efforts that we could put forward inside India would not suffice to expel the British from our country. If the struggle at home had sufficed to achieve liberty for our people, I would not have been so foolish as to undertake this unnecessary risk and hazard." S.C. Bose's address to the first mass rally at Singapore. Young India (Singapore) 1 (18 July 1943) 3.

(10) On 24 June 1943 Bose in a radio broadcast from Tokyo referred to the significance of the war and said: "In this titanic conflict our national interest clearly lies in allying ourselves with those young and virile nations who are determined to overthrow the status quo and thereby give us a chance of winning our liberty." Broadcast from Tokyo on 24 June 1943. Government of India, Selected Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose (New Delhi, 1962) 170. Hereinafter referred to as Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose.

In his address to the Indian representatives he said on 4 July 1943 that "for the achievement of Independence, two conditions are essential, firstly a favourable international situation and secondly necessary sacrifice and effort." Soped, n. 8, 309.
of the nationalist front within India. It was to organize the foreign aid that he had left India after the outbreak of the World War II. As the Axis Powers were arrayed against Britain at the present juncture of international relations, they should have to be accepted as India's best friends available for the present. He said: "outside the ranks of our countrymen they are the best friends we have in the world today." (11) Bose was however fully aware that the Indian community in East Asia held Japan in deep suspicion and this had divided the ranks of their leaders and had paralysed the movement to a great extent. The fear of the Indians about the Axis aid had to be dismissed. It was natural for the Indians, he said, to receive aid from the Tripartite Powers.

Every freedom movement in history has had to seek some help or other from abroad, before it could achieve success. The logic of events in the present case has made the Tripartite Powers our natural allies and there is nothing wrong if we accept their sympathy or even their help, should we need it. (12)

(11) Bose's address to the first mass rally in Singapore on 9 July 1943. Young India (Singapore) 1 (18 July 1943) 4.

(12) Bose's address to the Indian representatives in East Asia on 4 July in Singapore. Sopan, n. 8, 510-1.

On several occasions Bose repeated his view on taking foreign aid for India's liberation. In his address to the first mass rally on 9 July, Bose said: "if you want any external help in your struggle against British Imperialism the Axis Powers will gladly come to your aid. But whether you need any help or not is for you to decide; it goes without saying that if you could do without any help it would be the best course for India." Bose's address to a mass rally on 9 July 1943 in Singapore. Young India (Singapore) 1 (18 July 1943) 4.

On another occasion he said: "The British Empire in spite of all its power and might has been seeking and obtaining help from every possible quarter. It is but natural that we too should

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The Axis Powers, too, were doing no favour to India as, only
"commonsense should tell...that the most natural thing for the
enemies of British Imperialism is to support India's demand for
liberty." (13) Apart from arguments, it was Bose's tremendous
confidence in his own capabilities, which seemed to be the surest
guarantee against any insincerity of Japan. (14)

Although Bose appeared to be fully free from all moral
inhibitions in taking foreign aid in India's freedom movement, he
was too cautious not to depend entirely on it. (15) The reason

look out for sympathy and assistance wherever it is available."
Bose's address to the Indian representatives on 4 July, Sopan,
n. 8, 110.

It is apparent from Bose's view that his efforts to secure
the aid of the Axis Powers for Indian Independence was a part of
his tactics and that it did not mean the acceptance of Fascism
as a political ideology.

(13) Bose's address to the first mass rally in Singapore on
9 July 1943. Young India (Singapore) 1 (18 July 1943) 4. Bose
repeated this point to his troops. Khan, n. 2, 102.

(14) The Tokyo Radio broadcast on 4 July 1943 that during
his first visit to the Indian Independence League Headquarters in
Singapore on 2 July 1943, Bose was asked about the sincerity of
Japan's intentions. He said in reply: "Do you believe that I
have brain enough not to be fooled by them? Then trust in my word
when I assure you that I am sure Japs cannot double-cross us."
Arun, n. 5, 186.

On another occasion he concluded his argument in favour of
trusting in Japan's sincerity by saying, "If anybody has still
any doubt in his mind on this point, I shall ask him to place his
trust in me...if the cunning British politicians could neither
cajole nor deceive me, no one else can hope to do so." Bose's
address to the Indian representatives in East Asia on 4 July 1943.
Sopan, n. 8, 312.

(15) In his public pronouncements, Bose had put the main
emphasis on the importance of the efforts and sacrifices of the
Indians to achieve freedom. In his first press conference in
Tokyo on 19 June 1943, replying to a question if an independent
status for India should be given from outside, he said: "Indepen-
dence must not be given by anybody, but should be obtained by
Indians themselves through their own struggle and sacrifice."
Syonen Shim bun, 21 June 1943, 1.
might be partly patriotic. It was too undignified to give the Japanese assistance the entire credit of achieving India's liberty as he, at a later stage, gave a Japanese commander to understand that "Any liberation of India, secured through Japanese sacrifices, is worse than slavery." (16)

But the most important factor, which seemed to have enabled Bose to work out a plan of campaign for India's freedom without drawing wholly on the Japanese aid, was the existence of an Indian community in East Asia, economically affluent and numerically strong. (17) Moreover, an armed force of about twelve thousand strong had been in existence when Bose took over the leadership of the movement in East Asia. Bose based his plan on these two factors - the strength (economic and numerical) of the Indian community and the Army.

The role of a liberation army. How would the liberation Army fit in with Bose's plan of achieving India's independence? Its role, Bose said, would be unique. In his speech on the occasion of reviewing the Army in Singapore for the first time, Bose said:

(16) Khan, n. 2, 263.

There may be other reasons too. He might be doubtful about the extent to which the Japanese would help him. He had waited on the European dictators, in vain, for a Declaration of Independence. Moreover, complete dependence on Japanese assistance might reduce the position to that of a puppet which he surely abhorred. His occasional bold assertions about his own bona fides speak of this fear.

(17) The strength of the Indian communities in East Asia and their economic position have been discussed in the chapter on Introduction.
...Throughout my public career, I have always felt that, though India is otherwise ripe for independence in every way, she has lacked one thing, namely, an army of liberation. George Washington of America could fight and win freedom, because he had his army. Garibaldi could liberate Italy because he had his armed volunteers behind him. It is your privilege and honour to be the first to come forward and organize India's National Army. By doing so you have removed the last obstacle in our path to freedom. (18)

In order that the army can successfully fulfil its task, it should be vastly expanded and for that purpose the entire economic resources and mass power of the Indian community in East Asia had to be mobilized. In his first public meeting in Singapore on 9 July 1943, Bose had put forward his famous total mobilization scheme, which was speedily put into practice. He said:

...time has come for three million Indians living in East Asia to mobilize all their available resources including money and manpower. Half-hearted measures will not do. I want total mobilization and nothing less.... Out of this total mobilization I expect at least three hundred thousand soldiers and three crores that is thirty million Dollars. (19)

A Provisional Government of Free India would be set up to mobilize effectively the forces of nationalism in East Asia. (20)

(18) Bose's address to the I.N.A. on 5 July 1943, S.A. Das and K.B. Subbaiah, Chalo Delhi (Kuala Lumpur, 1946) 137.
(19) The total mobilization scheme would not only aim at organizing the men but also the Indian women and children in East Asia. See Young India (Singapore) 1 (18 July 1943) 4.
(20) The decision to set up a Provisional Government was expressed in the meeting of the Indian Representatives in Singapore on 4 July 1943, Sopan, n. 8, 313. It can be safely assumed that another important purpose for which Bose was determined to set-up a Provisional Government for India in East Asia was to deal with the Japanese Government on the footing of equality. See Toya, n. 2, 78. It has been pointed out in an earlier chapter that in 1942 the Japanese had refused to treat the Indian Independence League as a Government.
After achieving total mobilization the liberation army would go into action under the leadership of the Provisional Government. (21) The appearance of the liberation army on the Indian soil followed by the Provisional National Government, Bose arrived at his irresistible conclusion, would give a signal for an armed rebellion for which India seemed to be ready. He said this in a speech:

The time has come when I can openly tell the whole world including enemies, as to how it is proposed to bring national liberation. Indians outside, particularly Indians in East Asia, are going to organise a fighting force which will be powerful enough to attack the British Army in India. When we do so, revolution will break out not only among the civil population at home, but also among the Indian Army which is now standing under the British flag. When the British Government is thus attacked from both sides, from inside India and from outside it will collapse.... According to my plan, therefore, it is not even necessary to bother about the attitude of Axis Powers towards India.... (22)

(21) Bose had defined the main purpose for which the Provisional Government would be set up, "The task of this Government," he said, "will be to mobilise all the resources of the Indian people and to lead the fight against the British Army in India. When the campaign succeeds and India is free the Provisional Government will make room for the permanent Government of Free India which will be set up in accordance with the will of the Indian people." Bose's address to the first mass rally in Singapore on 9 July 1943. Young India (Singapore) 1 (18 July 1943) 5.

(22) Ibid., 4.

This prediction that at the approach of the I.N.A. India would rise in revolt was the most important assumption on the fulfilment of which depended the success of the I.N.A. This was repeated over and over again to the Indian civilian and troops. A Platoon Lecture dated 4 August 1943, in defining the role of the Liberation Army mentioned: "We are all well aware from current events that a state of revolt and a spirit of resistance are already present more or less throughout the civil and military Indian population in India. The Indian army units in India, we are informed, are ready to revolt and a rebellion is about to break out at any moment among them. Such of those units who are

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2. "Setting the Stage" for the Last War of Liberation

Bose's negotiation with the Japanese Government

On his arrival at Tokyo, Bose wanted to contact the Japanese leaders. He met Lt. Gen. Arisue, the chief of the Second Bureau which had arranged for Bose's trip to East Asia. The Second Bureau had appointed Col. Yamamoto, who had recently been the Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin and was a close friend of Bose, as the chief of a new liaison agency. Col. Yamamoto took over the charge from his predecessor in the beginning of May 1943, renamed the body as 捷報部 (Lucky Department) with its Headquarters in Singapore and abolished the Political and Propaganda sections of the Liaison Agency. Subjects relating to these, were to be handed over to the League. (23) Bose also met Field Marshal Sugiyama, the Chief of the General Staff, and "expressed his strong desire to lead an army to India - by first taking Chittagong." (24) Just then the Headquarters had also been

on the Arakan Front are deserting in large numbers and joining the Nipponese forces.... There is no doubt whatsoever that all conditions necessary for the outbreak of a revolution in India are present...our object in the Indian National Army is to help in that revolution...." Indian Independence League Headquarters, Indian National Army - Its Origin and Inception (Singapore, 1943) 8-9. Bose had repeated his prediction in the mass meetings in Bangkok on 31 July and in Singapore on 15 August 1943. Arun, n. 5, 193, 194.

(23) Subhas Chandra Bose and Japan, n. 2, 95-8.

(24) Ibid.
thinking of opening a front on the Indo-Burma border and Bose's suggestion left a favourable impression on Sugiyama's mind. (25)

But that was not enough. Gen Tojo was still indifferent to the Indian problem. (26) The events of December 1942 in Singapore had made his attitude more lukewarm. (27) Nearly a month elapsed after his arrival in Tokyo before Bose could meet Tojo in spite of Yamamoto's desperate efforts to arrange an early interview. (28) The first brief meeting which took place on 10 June (1943) is said to have interested Gen. Tojo and another meeting followed four days after. (29) In the second meeting with Tojo, which was attended also by Foreign Minister, M. Shigemitsu, Bose conveyed to them his plans regarding Indian independence movement in East Asia and a military campaign against the British in India. The outcome of these meetings, as indicated by the later events was, that apart from securing Japanese Government's assurance of help to Bose, the meetings had aroused Gen. Tojo's personal

(25) Ibid.


(27) Subhas Chandra Bose and Japan, n. 2, 98.

(28) Ibid.

(29) Ibid.

Major-Gen. Iwakuro told the writer that he had heard it from one who was present at the first meeting of Bose with Tojo that the proposal of a second meeting came from Tojo himself. Discussion with Gen. Iwakuro in October 1963 at Tokyo.
interest in the Indian problem. (30) The next day, on 16 June 1943, in the presence of the Emperor, Gen. Tojo made a declaration about India in the opening ceremony of the 82nd extraordinary session of the Diet, reaffirming Japan's resolve "to exhaust all means in order to help to expel and eliminate from India, the Anglo-Saxon influence which are [sic] the enemy of the Indian people and enable India to attain full independence in the true sense of the term." (31)

Having gained the goodwill of the Japanese Government, Bose put forward his plea of setting up a Provisional Government to some Japanese officials. The suggestion was accepted in principle before Bose left Tokyo and a formal reply was promised soon. (32)

The assurances were enough for Bose to start with. He took up his task in right earnest without delay. On 2 July Bose reached Syonan, and on 4 July he took over the Presidentship of the League from Rash Behari Bose in a meeting of the League representatives from the countries of East Asia. (33) Immediately thereafter, Bose began attending office regularly at the Headquarters of the Indian Independence League. Within a short time

(30) Bose himself said about the result of his meeting with the Japanese Premier in his first press conference in Tokyo on 19 June 1943: "I can say with the utmost confidence that apart from any assistance we may receive from the Japanese Government, Prime Minister Tojo is personally anxious to see India free from the British yoke at an early date." Arun, n. 5, 143; Syonan Shim bun, 21 June 1943, 1.

(31) Syonan Shim bun, 17 June 1943, 1.

(32) Subhas Chandra Bose And Japan, n. 2, 122.

(33) For the proceedings of the meeting of the Indian representatives on 4 July (1943) see Sopan, n. 8, 293-314.
he could realise the importance of Malaya and Burma as sources for men and resources for his army, and Thailand as the source of supply. He, therefore, appointed personal representatives at once in Burma and Siam with the special task to gear up the movement in these places. (34)

For the purpose of fulfilling the scheme of Total Mobilization, it was necessary for the League machinery to operate more efficiently. With that end in view, the League was reorganized. On 13 July, the scheme of the reorganization of the League was announced. Hitherto there were five departments in the League namely those of (1) Finance, (2) Publicity and Propaganda, (3) Intelligence, (4) General and, (5) Recruitment and Supply. According to the new scheme, there would be in all twelve departments. The more important departments among the new ones were: Department of Recruitment, which was made a separate Department and would be responsible for "recruitment for the Azad Hind Fauj (35) all over East Asia in a systematic way", Department of Training, which was "to provide some kind of training for all recruits throughout East Asia until the Army is in a position to take over these recruits and put them into military barracks"; Department of Supplies, which would collect supplies "for the Indian Independence movement in

(34) Toya, n. 2, 83.

It should be noted that before Bose's arrival in East Asia the Indian nationalists in Thailand were sharply divided into two rival groups and this paralysed the movement in that country to a great extent. The League in Burma, though functioning, maintained little coordination with its counterpart in Malaya.

(35) Azad Hind Fauj refers to the I.N.A.
general and for the Azad Hind Fauj in particular", and the Overseas Department, which would act mainly liaison between the Headquarters and the different branches and direct and stimulate the activities of the branches. (36) Instructions were issued to reorganize and expand the League organization throughout East Asia as outlined in the scheme. (37)

Campau for support for the Provisional National Government

On 25 July (1943) Bose left Syonan and visited Thailand, Burma and Saigon in the course of a tour of seventeen days. The objective was more than one. (38) The plan of setting up of an Indian Provisional Government in East Asia had brought in its train two main tasks. Firstly, it was necessary to find out suitable men who could be members of the Cabinet. Secondly, the question of formal recognition of that Government was also important. Premier Tojo, during his visit to Singapore in the first week of July, had approved the idea of a Provisional Government. (39) The Japanese reply enabled Bose to take up other points in his plan of a Provisional Government. It was necessary to

(36) The other Departments in the League Headquarters, according to the new scheme, were those of Military Bureau, Finance, Publicity, Press and Propaganda, Health and Social Welfare, Women, Reconstruction, Education and Culture and General Secretary. The circular issued by the Headquarters of the League for reorganizing the League, dated 13 July 1943. See Das and Subbaiah, n. 18, 160.

(37) Ayer, n. 4, 6.

(38) The occasion of attending the ceremony for the granting of independence to Burma on 1 August 1943, for which he had been invited, was taken to visit those countries.

(39) Subhas Chandra Bose And Japan, n. 2, 122.
mobilize the support of the Indian communities and the local Japanese authorities in favour of his plan. He campaigned vigorously for it. He addressed public meetings in every country he visited, granted interviews to the leading members of the local Indian communities, met the chiefs of the Japanese forces in Thailand and Burma and the Prime Ministers of Thailand and Burma. (40) His success in enlisting goodwill for his plan of a Provisional Government was expressed in a press interview in Singapore on his return from the tour. He said:

By the experience gained during the recent trip I have been greatly impressed by the eagerness of all Indians abroad who are very anxious to establish a Provisional Government. I have personally interviewed Premier Pibul Songrak of Thailand and the Chief of State, Dr. Ba Maw, of Burma. They have both promised to give me all-out support in the attainment of Indian Independence. (41)

(40) In Bangkok, Bose explained to the Thai Press reporters the reasons for setting up the Provisional Government. He said that with the birth of the Provisional Government of India, "the enemies' propaganda efforts would be completely foiled", and that all Indians would "offer full co-operation to us." Arun, n. 5, 147. In Burma, he told the Indians that the organization of the Provisional Government of Free India was essential for the successful penetration into India. Bose's address to an Indian mass rally in Burma on 30 July 1943, reproduced in see K.S. Giani, Indian Independence Movement in East Asia (Lahore, 1947) 49. The book is divided into two parts. All references in this chapter are from the second part of the book.

In Saigon, he told a similar gathering that the necessity for a Provisional Government was chiefly for the prosecution of India's independence war and as soon as India's independence would be won it would be replaced by a new Government based on the unanimous will of the Indian people. Svoran Simbun, 13 August 1943, 1.

(41) Arun, n. 5, 149.

Soon after Bose's departure from Burma, the Burmese Government issued a declaration saying, inter alia, that: "The Head of State declared...notwithstanding the declaration that Burma has

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During the first few weeks after his arrival at Singapore, Bose mainly devoted his attention to set up the League on a war-footing in order to strengthen the civilian-base of the army. Simultaneously, the matters directly relating to the army also received his attention. One day after his arrival at Singapore, on 3 July, he met and assessed the real value of the senior officers of army. On 5 July, Bose formally reviewed the army and announced its existence to the world. "This is not only the Army," he said, "that will emancipate India from the British yoke, it is also the Army that will hereafter create the future National Army of Free India." (42) With the coming of the Army into existence, the last obstacle for India to achieve her freedom was removed.

entered a state of war with Britain, the following Indian British subjects will be treated not as enemy subjects but as subjects of a friendly third power: (a) those who are residing in Burma, (b) those residing in countries which are allies of or in friendly relations with Burma, (c) those who are passing through Burma...." *Syonan Simbun*, 23 August 1943, 2. The same newspaper commented: "well-informed circles commenting on the latest declaration of the Burmese Government, stress the move as highly significant as it not only manifests Burma’s friendly collaboration in the India’s Independence movement but legally and positively enables the Indian National Army to muster a powerful force in Burma for India’s freedom." The paper also assumed that "the Burmese declaration constitutes one of the measures discussed by Dr. Ba Maw and Subhas Chandra Bose during the latter’s visit to Rangoon on the occasion of Independence Day." *Syonan Simbun*, ibid.

Later on, in a party arranged by the Rangoon Committee of the League to felicitate Burma’s independence, Dr. Ba Maw said: "...when the Indian National Army starts its march towards Delhi, the Burma Army will extend its utmost co-operation." *Syonan Simbun*, 14 September 1943, 1.

(42) *Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose*, no. 10, 152.
her long political subjugation was due to the absence of a liberation army at the disposal of the nationalists. He laid special stress on the responsibilities of the officers. The responsibilities of the officers of every army are great, but for the Indian officers of the Indian National Army they are "still greater."
The reason for this, he said, is: "We have no historic tradition like that of Mukden, Port Arthur, or Sedan to inspire us." So, as "the future General Staff of Free India", the task of laying the foundation of the future military traditions of the Army of Free India will devolve on them. (43)

He gave the Army its battle-cry: "Chalo Delhi" (On To Delhi), and a sense of dignity. (44) "There cannot be anything more honourable, anything to be more proud of for an enslaved nation than to be the...soldier of its army of liberation." He was not blind to the difficult nature of the task which the Army was sworn to achieve. His warning was:

For the present I can offer you nothing except hunger, thirst, suffering, forced march and death. But if you follow me in life as well as in death...I will lead you on to the road to victory and freedom. It does not matter who among us shall live to see India free. It is enough that India shall be free and we shall give our all to make her free. (45)

There was surely something new in it which the men and officers of the I.N.A. had never felt before. Bose's address was, therefore,

(43) Ibid., 183.

(44) The honour of the army went high when on 6 July 1943 Gen. Tojo himself (who was visiting Singapore) received a guard of honour from the I.N.A.

(45) Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose, n. 10, 184.
bound to move all those men and officers who, in spite of their patriotic motive, could not join the I.N.A. at all or wholeheartedly in 1942 and early 1943. Moreover, Bose's personality proved to be a decisive factor in influencing many I.N.A. officers in 1943. His authority, singleness of mind, personal enthusiasm, straight and bold deductions from the study of international politics or any situation, were the attributes which were bound to attract a soldier's mind. (46) Running through the writings and statements of the I.N.A. officers is the admission that in Bose they had found a leader who was not only competent in military matters but who could successfully deal with the Japanese. The influence of Bose's personality on the I.N.A. officers was confirmed by an officer who later gave evidence for the Prosecution in the first I.N.A. court martial. He said: "...Subhas Chandra Bose arrived in Singapore in July 1943. After that

(46) An observer described the deep impact which Bose's personality created on the mind of the Indian soldiers. Although the event narrated by the observer took place when Bose was in Germany in 1942, Bose's appeal to the Indian soldiers was equally effective in East. The observer wrote: "I shall always remember a rally of Indian soldiers, mostly from peasant families near Dresden, where Subhas spoke for nearly an hour and a half.... Standing very erect under the shadow of a huge plane tree, Subhas began to speak to them. He spoke in Hindustani...and as he warmed up, I saw how the whole audience was coming under his spell and how they were listening with the greatest attention to every word that fell from his lip. When he finished, this audience...had almost acquired a new life, a new animation and there was a new excitement among the men, who had mostly come to the meeting out of sheer curiosity. Dozens of Jats, Sikhs, and Pathans, many of them veterans of frontier wars, came crowding and asked us to enrol them."

Girija Mookerjee, This Europe (Calcutta, 1950) 139.
everybody thought that they had got a leader who could guide them on proper lines without being subordinated to the Japanese." (47)

It is also interesting to note that the non-I.N.A. sources, including some responsible British officers, did not underestimate the influence of Bose's personality, even though they (the non-I.N.A. sources) had serious reservations about him (Bose). At the end of the war, the C-in-C of the Indian Army estimated the influence of Bose's personality in the following terms:

I am in no doubt myself that a great number of them, especially the leaders, (48) believed that Subhas Chandra Bose was a genuine patriot and that they themselves were right to follow his lead. There is no doubt at all from the mass of evidence we have that Subhas Chandra Bose acquired a tremendous influence over them and that his personality had been an exceedingly strong one. (49)

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(48) Refers to the I.N.A. officers.

(49) John Connell, Auchinleck A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (London, 1959) 808. Bose's British biographer wrote about the impact of I.N.A. officers' first interview with Bose on 3 July 1943: "Few of them had met anyone of his quality before. All were dazzled, flattered. To each he was the authentic leader, long awaited who would remove all doubts, answer all questions." Toye, n. 2, 81; see also Stephen P. Cohen, "Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army," Pacific Affairs (the U.S.A.) 35 (Winter 1963-4) 415-6.
The two factors mentioned above, namely Bose's success in making an effective appeal to the patriotism of the Indian officers and his powerful leadership, together with the liberty given to the unwilling men and officers to leave the I.N.A. if they so desired, (50) seemed to have changed the character of the army into a real revolutionary force.

On 8 July 1943 the League Headquarters published a communique (51) which gave some basic information about the nature of the Army. Organized solely by Indians, the Army had sworn "to achieve the complete independence of India." Its training was also adapted to "Indian spiritual and cultural heritage." A strong anti-British spirit and the spirit of independence are the basis of the moral and spiritual training undergone by every soldier of the I.N.A. from the commander down to the soldier. "All distinctions of class, caste, creed and religion have been abolished in the Indian National Army which has been organized on the truly national lines." To wipe out "every trace of denationalization" and to establish "strong bonds of affinity between the officers and men the Indian language had been adopted as the medium of communication." (52)

(50) The evidence of the witness for the Prosecution in the first I.N.A. court martial, Lt. D.C. Nag, see Motiram, ed., n. 48, 42; Toye, n. 2, 85.

(51) The statement made by the spokesman of the Indian Independence League Headquarters on 8 July 1943 as reproduced in Giani, n. 41, 22-4.

(52) Hindi language in Roman script was introduced as the medium of instruction in the army.
The decision on the I.N.A.'s role in the future Indian campaign

Bose, soon after his arrival at Singapore, had already called on Field Marshal Count Terauchi, the C-in-C of the Southern Expeditionary Forces and discussed with him the role of the I.N.A. in the forthcoming Japanese campaign in Imphal. (53) The promise of help to the Indian movement was given in a general way. But the attitude of the Southern Army towards the I.N.A. or its employment on some active role did not change from what it was in 1942. They chiefly needed the help of the Special Service group and the Intelligence Group to work under their own command for collecting enemy information about the enemy in the battle-zones of the Indo-Burma frontier and when Bose arrived in East Asia some such groups were acting with the same purpose. (54) When Bose met Terauchi, the latter appeared to be reluctant to have the I.N.A. appear at all on the battlefield except some groups which would be employed for the same purpose as before. (55) Terauchi's assessment of the I.N.A. was blunt. Indian troops had been demoralised

(53) Major-Gen. A.C. Chatterji, India's Struggle for Freedom (Calcutta, 1947) 165. The Imphal Campaign will be discussed in Chapter Six of this study.


(55) Subhas Chandra Bose And Japan, n. 2, 143.
by their defeat in the Malayan campaign, they were used to getting good rations and would be unable to stand the rigours of a Japanese campaign. Mercenaries, as they had been, it would be difficult for them to resist the temptation of going over to British side. (66)

Terauchi, therefore, suggested that the Japanese soldiers would do "all the fighting and liberate India and all that the Japanese solicited was the personal co-operation of Netaji to enlist the goodwill and sympathy of the Indian people." (57) The part which Terauchi wanted I.N.A. to play on the battlefield fell short of the much publicised decisive role which Bose wished to attribute to it. Also its implication was to do away with any plan of expansion of the I.N.A. to which Bose was committed.

Bose tried to make the most out of a bad bargain. He took a patriotic stand. Any liberation of India by the Japanese Army was not worth having, he told Count Terauchi. He also impressed upon the latter that the question was one of national honour for the Indians and that it was proper that the maximum sacrifice should come from the Indian themselves. The purpose of the Japanese help should be mainly to supplement the Indian military effort. The reaction was favourable and Terauchi agreed with Bose. It was decided that one I.N.A. regiment (roughly equivalent to a British brigade) would be brought up in the ensuing Imphal Campaign as a test case and if their performance came up to the

(66) Khan, n. 2, 39.

(57) Ibid.
Japanese standard and they could bear the rigours of a Japanese campaign, the rest of the I.N.A. would be brought to action. From this arrangement some deductions can be made. The question of the expansion of the Army was not solved and it remained to be approved by the Japanese. Although the employment of the whole of the existing army would depend on the performance of the first battalion, the role of the latter in the Imphal campaign in which three and a half Japanese and four and a half Allied Divisions took part could be anything but decisive.

However, a fighting role for I.N.A. having been secured, the reorganization of the army demanded Bose's attention. He addressed himself to this task on his return from the tour in July-August (1943). As a first step, he took over the command of the army on 25 August and proclaimed this action in the first "Special Order of the Day" issued by him as the Supreme Commander. (58) With the assumption of the office of Supreme Commander by Bose, the Directorate of the Military Bureau became redundant and therefore it was abolished. (So also was the post of the army Commander). Instead, a "Supreme Headquarters" was set up with thirteen Departments. The three existing Regiments would constitute the No. 1 Division with Lt. Col. M.Z. Kiani as the Divisional Commander, while other formations remained unchanged. (69)


On the occasion of assuming the Command of the Army by Bose, it was considered if it was necessary for him to assume a military rank. The decision reached was against assuming any such rank. Chatterji, n. 54, 44.

(59) See Chatterjee, n. 54, 93-7.
The Division was handicapped by inadequate medical and transport facilities. (60) The armaments of the Division, which were to be drawn from the old captured British stocks, were predominantly light ones and not adequate. (61) Bose himself once said, "We have no modern armaments, artillery, aeroplanes, etc. Moreover, we are small in numbers." (62) Its artillery force was only nominal. There was no air and naval support of its own. These factors made it difficult for the First Division to act as a regular Division and it was decided that all the Regiments of the First Division would get the training of and operate as Guerrilla Regiments.

The unique role which Bose had assigned to the I.N.A. required that the latter should be a highly organized army with full confidence in its aim and leadership. But when Bose assumed the leadership of the Army it was ill-organized and its morale was low. The army's Supreme Headquarters having been reorganized, the First Division was hurriedly sent to North Malaya for training. Intensive military training was imparted to them by the officers, (63) but Bose himself took keen interest in raising its

(60) R.M. Kasiwal, "My Reminiscences of the I.N.A. and Netaji," in Shri Ram Sharma, ed., Netaji: His Life and Work (Agra, 1948) 191. Kasiwal was for sometime the Director of the Medical training of the I.N.A.


(62) Bose's address to the second batch of I.N.A. cadets at their graduation ceremony on 27 October 1943. Young India (Singapore) 1 (7 November 1943) 11.

(63) For the details of the training programme see Chatterji, n. 54, 100-1.
morale. He spoke ardentl to the officers about the necessity of high morale (64) and took keen interest in every detail of the army affairs. He revised the pay of the I.N.A. ranks, reviewed its training at every opportunity, improved its rations and made every effort to bind the officers in true comradeship. (65) Lectures were arranged for the soldiers from time to time so that they could understand the significance of the purpose for which the army had been organized. (66) In order to raise their morale suitable national dramas and playlets were performed before the troops. (67)

(64) The address of the Supreme Commander to the I.N.A. officers on his assumption of the command. See Das and Subbaiah, n. 18, 143-9.

(65) A Pay, Allowances and Pensions Sub-Committee was set up, which fixed up the rates of pocket money to the I.N.A. ranks. Chatterjee, n. 53, 144-5. It was also decided that after the successful conclusion of the war of independence every soldier would be rewarded with a 'bonus' and the War of Independence Medal. The martyrs would also be suitably honoured. See Young India (Singapore) 1 (9 January 1944) 14-5.

(66) The following subjects were listed to be the subject of lecture to the troops. These were: (a) history of the Indian National Congress and sacrifices of the Congress leaders, (b) history of Forward Bloc and internal revolution in India, (c) brief history of India proving India's greatness, (d) revolutionary history of other countries, (e) geography - with special reference to India's eastern border, (f) weak points in British war organization and civil administration in India; youth organization in Japan and Germany. Giani, n. 49, 110.

The lectures were published by the Indian Independence League Headquarters at Singapore, and distributed among the ranks. Some of those printed in English were: Indian National Army - Its Origin and Inception (Singapore, 1943); and the British Army of Occupation in India (Singapore, 1943).

(67) The central theme of these dramas was "the high conception of National service displayed in safeguarding the independence of one's Motherland." Young India (Singapore) 1 (22 November 1943) 15.
The expansion of the I.N.A.

Simultaneously with the efforts of raising the morale of the volunteers, measures were taken for the expansion of the army. Bose had expressed his intention to the Hikari Kikan about expanding the present strength of the army. (68) Although he had put forward a grandiose scheme of an army of three million in his plan of total mobilization, the immediate objective was set at 50,000. (69) Bose wanted to fill up the major part of the target from the Indian Prisoners of War and the rest of it would come from the civilian volunteers. According to Bose's plan there would be three divisions from 30 thousand regulars and another unit of 20 thousand mainly from the civilian volunteers. (70) He accordingly insisted that the Hikari Kikan should bring back the Indian P.O.W.s, whom they had moved out of Singapore since 1942 to use as a labour force. (71) Independence or no independence for

(68) Subhas Chandra Bose and Japan, n. 2, 124.

(69) Ibid. The address of the Supreme Commander of I.N.A. on his assumption of the army command. Das and Subbaiah, n. 18, 147. The C-in-C of the Indian Army, Gen. Auchinleck, later implied that the total strength of the I.N.A. in 1945 was 45,000. He wrote that Indian army "had to deal with 45,000 men" of the I.N.A. in all during 1944-5. The photostat copy of the personal and the secret memorandum of the C-in-C of the Indian Army, Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck, on the effects of the first I.N.A. court martial, and circulated to the four G.O.C.-in-Cs and the Commands of the various Area, District and Indian Divisions of the Indian Army in India and abroad. Photostat copy obtained by the writer from Sir Claude.

(70) Subhas Chandra Bose and Japan, n. 2, 124.

(71) Chatterji, n. 53, 93.
India, the Hikari Kikan would not accept it. The liaison body reaffirmed their right of control over the P.O.Ws, who had not joined the I.N.A. (72) The maximum strength of the I.N.A., according to the Hikari Kikan, must not exceed thirty thousand, including the new civil recruits as the Japanese were able to provide arms for that number only. (73)

After Bose's arrival in Singapore the campaign for fresh enlistment from the former members of the I.N.A. and the P.O.Ws. started. Although this resulted in adding, soon after Bose's arrival in Singapore, two thousand more volunteers from the Indian P.O.Ws, (74) to the already existing strength of the I.N.A, (which was 12 thousand) the surplus over the first Division was inadequate to raise the second.

Greater emphasis, therefore, had to be placed on the civilian recruits, should the plan of expansion of the army be carried out. A number of Volunteer Training Camps were set up at Singapore and different parts of Malaya and a senior officer of the army was sent out to Bangkok, Hong Kong and Shanghai to facilitate the work of civilian recruitment and training. (75) In order to meet the great

(72) Ibid.

(73) Subhas Chandra Bose and Japan, n. 2, 124.

(74) Toye, n. 2, 82.

(75) A notice with the heading "Wanted: Volunteers for I.N.A." was published. Young India (Singapore) 1 (18 July 1943) 1. The response among the civilians was overwhelming. The number of offers for enlistment exceeded the capacities of the existing Training Camps of I.N.A. Many of the medically fit volunteers had to be kept in waiting for the next training period. In Singapore city itself there were 13 Recruiting Offices for I.N.A. volunteers. See Young India (Singapore) 1 (25 July 1943) 1.

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demand for Officers (both commission and non-commissioned officers) which would occur due to the expansion of the army, a short training course of ten weeks for the officers was hurriedly envisaged and carried out in the face of various difficulties. (76)

No. 1 Guerrilla Regiments: Subhas Brigade

In accordance with Bose's agreement with Count Terauchi about giving the I.N.A. a trial role at the Imphal campaign, a new guerrilla regiment was raised in September at Taiping. It

By September 1943, three Volunteer Training Centres had come into existence in Malaya. Young India (Singapore) 1 (26 September 1943) 14.

In course of his general report on the progress of the movement the General Secretary of the Indian Independence League said in October 1943 that up to that month four main Civilian Training Centres had been established in Malaya and in future some more would be set up. In addition, ...the Training Department of the League had set up an "Azad School" for the training of instructors, Syonan Shimun, 23 October 1943; 2. All these training centres were under the direct control of the League. Chatterji, n. 53, 102. It should be pointed out, however, that in 1943 some civilian training centres had been in existence in Burma. But the League had little or no control over these centres which were run by the Japanese Army. Later on, however, these centres came under the control of the League. Indian Independence Movement and I.N.A. in East Asia, n. 54.

(76) By the end of October two batches (each of about 100 recruits) of cadets had passed out of the officers Training School. The ten weeks length of time was not sufficient to train out officers. But the shortage of time was made good by strong exertions and hard work. The first batch of cadets found great shortage of training facilities, but things improved during the training of the second batch of cadets. Bose's address to the second batch of I.N.A. cadets at their graduation ceremony on 27 October 1943. Young India (Singapore) 1 (7 November 1943) 10.
consisted of chosen soldiers from all the three guerrilla regiments of the No. 1 Division and Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan was appointed its commander. (77) Like the three other regiments the new regiment was armed with light arms, and had inadequate transport and medical facilities. (78) During the period from September to the second week of November, when the regiment received training in Taiping, efforts were made to build up an excellent morale of the regiment and to remove its deficiencies of arms.

Formation of the ARZI HAKUMAT-E-AZAD HIND:
Provisional Government Of Free India

The reorganization of the League having been completed and the preparations of reforming the army having been started, the next important step in Bose's programme was the declaration of the establishment of the Provisional Government of Free India. (79) This had to be done before the army could go into action. The support of the Indian community had been mobilized for it during

(77) Khan, n. 2, 101.

Col. Thakur Singh was Second in command to Shah Nawaz Khan, and Maj. Mahboob Ahmed was selected adjutant of the regiment. The regiment was divided into three battalions. Major P.S. Natuni, Maj. Ran Singh and Maj. Padam Singh commanded the First, Second and the Third battalions respectively.

(78) Ibid.

(79) Bose himself, later on in a press interview on 23 October 1943, referred to the advance made in the reorganization of the League and the army and said, "These political and military preparations naturally demanded as a next step the formation of the Provisional Government of Free India...." Young India (Singapore) 1 (31 October 1943) 6.
the months of July and October. (80) Bose himself was eagerly awaiting the occasion since the declaration of independence of Burma and Philippines in August and October 1943. (81) The lower ranks of the Japanese army in Singapore and many officers of the Japanese liaison agency were hostile to the formation of the Provisional Government as those officers did not like their authority over the Indians to be curbed. It, therefore, took a long time to reach an understanding with the Hikari Kikan on the details of the plan of the Provisional Government. (82) On 9 October 1943 the Supreme Military Headquarters of Japan, which were in charge of the Indian affairs, took some important decisions regarding the Provisional Government of India which would be set-up by Bose. The decision read:

In case Subhas Chandra Bose will organize the Provisional Government of India, the Imperial Government of Japan will disclose the intention to recognize it for the purpose of strengthening the activities towards India particularly for the aggressive propaganda.

In connection with the above disclosure, formal international relationship of course should not be commenced.

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(80) The representative of the Domei News Agency interviewed the League representatives from all East Asian countries on 21 October 1943 and published a detailed report on the "consensus of opinion of delegates" in favour of establishing such a government. Syonan Shim bun, 22 October 1943, 1.

(81) On 30 July 1943 Bose referred to the plan of Provisional Government in a meeting in Rangoon and said: "I am going to make the announcement of such a Government at a right time." Bose's speech at Rangoon on 30 July 1943, see Giani, n. 40, 48. On 15 August Bose told his audience at Singapore: "I am hoping that day is not far off when we shall be able to set up a Provisional Government of Free India." Bose's speech at Singapore on 15 August 1943, ibid., 53.

The recognition by the third party country should not be jeopardized. (83)

The decision of the I.G.R.Q. hastened the formation of the Provisional Government. Within two weeks of this decision, on 21 October 1943, the Provisional Government of Free India was set-up with its seat at Singapore. The structure of the Provisional Government was very simple and there was no diplomatic exchanges at the time of its establishment. The Provisional Government of Free India consisted of five Ministers with Bose as the Head of the State, Prime Minister and Minister for War and Foreign Affairs, eight representatives of the I.N.A. and eight civilian advisers representing the Indian community of East Asia. (84) The Provisional Government was recognized by the Axis Powers and their allies. (85) The first decision of importance

(83) English translation of the decision of the liaison conference between Supreme Military Headquarters and the Japanese Government on 9 October 1943 regarding the recognition of the Provisional Government of India, War History Office, Government of Japan. Photostat copy of the document obtained by the writer from the War History Office.


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which the Provisional Government took was its declaration of war on Britain and America, which was decided in the night of 22-23 October. (86)

That the establishment of the Provisional Government and its declaration of war against Britain and the U.S.A. would have profound impact on the nationalist struggle for freedom in India seemed to have appeared as a foregone conclusion. "The Provisional Government is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Indian," the Proclamation had asserted. It did also "call upon them to launch the final struggle against the British and their allies in India." (87)

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Government of Burma, see Syonan Shim bun, 24 October 1943, 2; Government of Germany, Singapore Radio, 30 October 1943, see Arun, n. 5, 262; Government of Free Philippines, Free India Radio, Saigon, 30 October 1943, see Arun, ibid., 263; Government of Thailand, Young India (Singapore) 1 (21 November 1943) 12. Apart from these Governments, Governments of Italy, Croatia, National China and Manchuria also recognized the Provisional Government. Ayer, n. 4, 7.

(86) Young India (Singapore) 1 (31 October 1943) 4.

(87) Proclamation of the Provisional Government of Free India, Young India (Singapore) 1 (24 October 1943) 6.

The Provisional Government was eager to know about the political unrest in India which, they thought, was bound to be created by the establishment of parallel nationalist Government. It was clear from one incident. On 12 October 1943, the Japanese controlled press reported about the unconfirmed news of a "large scale desertion involving some 12,000 Indian soldiers" from the British Army in India. Syonan Shim bun, 12 October 1943, 1.

This was at once taken up and publicized as an inevitable occurrence about which Bose had predicted. The League weekly wrote about the "countrywide rebellion of the entire civil population" in India and it repeated the earlier press report about desertion of 12,000 troops. Young India (Singapore) 1 (17 October 1943) 9.

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Formation of the Rani of Jhansi Regiment

Since the creation of the Women's Department in the Indian Independence League, the response from the women section of the Indian community towards taking active role in the movement was encouraging. By November, there were offers for enlistment for active service from about one hundred women in Singapore. (88) Bose's response to this was the decision to raise a regiment, named after Rani of Jhansi, the heroine of the 1857 revolt against the British. Although the regiment's primary duty would be to nurse the wounded I.N.A. troops in forward areas, its name "the Rani of Jhansi regiment," its picture of women carrying arms or engaged in bayonet-charge would have immense propaganda impact. Bose was sure about it. (89) On 22 October, Bose formally opened

After the declaration of war by the Provisional Government, the same weekly wrote: "Mountbatten and Wavell are already busy working out plans to deal with uprisings throughout India, particularly in Bengal, Assam and Bihar...." They "are fully alive to the fact they are sitting on the top of a volcano behind the Eastern Frontier which might break into eruption at the most critical moment and gulf their Eastern Army between the streams of lava on the one side and the fire and steel of the advancing Azad Hind Fauj on the other." Young India (Singapore) 1 (31 October 1943) 3. Bose himself said: "More than 12,000 Indian troops now in the British Army" had assured the Provisional Government "of their full support as soon as the Indian National Army enters India." Tokyo Radio, 3 November 1943. On 5 November Bose said: "The British apparently seem to have withdrawn the Indian troops from the front owing to the increasing cases of Indian troops deserting the British. This will increase still more." Arun, n. 5, 152, 154.

(88) Young India (Singapore) 1 (28 November 1943) 15.

(89) Bose told his women audience in a meeting on 12 July 1943: "It is not the number of rifles you may carry or the number of shots you may fire which is important. Equally important is the moral effect of your brave example." Arun, n. 5, 194.

(Contd. on next page)
the Training Camp for the Regiment and put it in charge of the Secretary of the League for its training. (90)

A curriculum covering four months' training for nursing was drawn up for the recruits, as it continued to receive military training. (91) The maximum strength of this regiment later on reached five hundred. (92)

Financial difficulties of the Provisional Government and the measures to overcome them

One of the most acute problems which the Provisional Government faced was that of securing funds for financing the movement. In the initial part of the movement the response among the Indian community, in general, to the appeal for funds had been superficial

The British Indian Army Headquarters curiously followed the formation of the establishment of the Women Regiment. An "interesting side-light" of the movement is the organization of the "Amazon Force", as the regiment was described, wrote Gen. Claude Auchinleck. It was also doubted as to how far the regiment would be of help in the march to Delhi. Despatch of Auchinleck on the Operations in the Indo-Burma Theatre based on India, 21 June - 15 November 1943, 22, Combined Inter-Service Historical Section, India and Pakistan, File No. 601/7753/H, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Hereinafter referred to as Auchinleck's Despatch, June to November 1943.

(90) Svoon Sambun, 23 October 1943, 1.

(91) Chatterji, n. 2, 128.

(92) A factual account of the women movement was given in the report of the Secretary of the Women Section of the League, submitted on the occasion of the opening Women's Training Centre on 22 October 1943. Young India (Singapore) 1 (24 October 1943) 8-11; Indian Independence League Headquarters, The Rani of Jhansi Regiment (Singapore, no date mentioned).
and the pocket money given to the I.N.A. men and officers was nominal. Thus, when Bose assumed the control of the movement, there were two avenues to get funds - to receive it from the Japanese Government on account of the maintenance of the P.O.W.s and to collect it from the Indian community. Bose accepted funds from the former. But there was "strong feeling among his followers that Japanese money should not imply Japanese dictation." (93) It was therefore accepted as credit to be repaid after India gained her independence. (94) The call for total mobilization of the resources of the Indian community in East Asia had implied that maximum financial liberty would be sought. Bose planned to pay for all civilian activities of the League including recruitment and training of the civilian for I.N.A. In October 1943 Lt. Col. A.C. Chatterji, the General Secretary of the Indian Independence League, submitted a report on the progress made in the movement and the financial position of the League. (95)

(93) Toye, n. 2, 96.

(94) Lt. Gen. Isoda, who was the chief of the Hikari Kikan from January 1944 to August 1945, told the writer that from the time of the establishment of the Provisional Government of Free India to November 1944, funds were made available to the Provisional Government against the letters of credit issued by Bose. In November 1944, an agreement was entered into by Bose representing the Provisional Government on the one hand and Lt. Gen. Arius, the Chief of the Second Bureau of the I.O.H.Q., Gen. Sato, the chief of the Military Administrative Bureau of the Imperial Headquarters and Lt. Gen. Isoda the chief of the Hikari Kikan, on the other, representing the Japanese Government. It was agreed that the Government of Japan would advance funds to the Provisional Government of Free India on credit to be paid back by India after she got her independence. Discussion with Lt. Gen. Isoda in October 1963 at Maibashi, Japan.

(95) The report was published. See Shukan Shimbun, 23 October 1943, 2.
According to this report the monthly expenses of the League in October exceeded ten lacs taking into account the four and a half lacs of Malayan Dollars for cost of the existing training centres, the three and a half lacs for the pocket money of I.N.A. in its present strength and more than two lacs which would be required for food and equipment for the army. With the further expansion of the I.N.A., it was estimated that the monthly expenses of the League would be "at least 50 lacs."

The League's earnings were not satisfactory. Its only source of income was the occasional voluntary donations from the Indians. The total amount of collection, according to Chatterji's report, had been 16 lacs up to July 1943 and 40 lacs from July to October 1943. The rate of income was bound to fall short of the rapidly mounting expenses of the League with the expansion of the army. The reason was that the response for funds from all the sections of the Indian community had not been uniformly heartening. The poorer and the middle class sections of the Indian community had been very enthusiastic. (96) But the richer section, particularly the businessmen, had been indifferent. Bose "was frankly disappointed at the initial indifference of the moneyed Indians to his passionate appeals for funds," wrote one of his close associates. (97) But his disappointment was, however, offset by the tremendous enthusiasm of the comparatively poor classes and

(96) There were many cases when the persons from the poorer section and the middle class had contributed all that they had, and volunteered themselves to the army. Some examples were published. See *Svorn Samhun*, 27 October 1943, 2.

(97) Ayer, n. 4, 245.
then his attitude towards rich merchants gradually stiffened. He had claimed fifteen million dollars from Singapore and 10 crores of rupees from Malaya which roughly represented 10 p.c. of the assets of the Indians. (98) He first tried persuasion and mild warnings. On 15 August he told the Indians in Syonan that, "the money that has been forthcoming from Syonan has not been enough." (99) Indians in Kuala Lumpur were told on 5 September that they should multiply their contribution "at least five times" and if they did not do that they would be doing "a great disservice" to India. (100) He finally tried his power of persuasion in a meeting of the Indian merchants in Malaya on 25 October. He said:

Syonan's relation to other places in East Asia is the same as the relation of a Commander to the troops of his regiment.... The part which Indians in various parts of East Asia are going to play will greatly depend on the example which you are going to give from Syonan.... (101)

Melting the heart of this section of the Indian community proved difficult and persuasion fell flat. Some of the Indians were holding back expecting an early return of the British. (102)

Bose had received reports that some rich Indian merchants were

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(98) Bose's speeches on 15 August and 25 October 1943 in Singapore, see Giani, n. 40, 52, 102.


(100) Bose's speech at Kuala Lumpur on 5 September 1943. Giani, ibid., 56.


murmuring that he was harassing them, some were thinking of changing their nationality to avoid paying contribution, and some were bent on making false promise of payment. (103)

This, to Bose, was sheer enmity. On 25 October he warned the Indian merchants in Malaya that "everyone, who refuses to help our cause, is our enemy because we are engaged in a life and death struggle today." (104) In his threat, he brought to bear the full authority derived from his newly assumed status as the Head of a Government. "I stand here today representing the Provisional Government of Azad Hind which has absolute right over your lives and properties." Bose based the claim of the Provisional Government on the assertion that when a nation is engaged in a war to achieve freedom or to defend it, there is nothing as private property in the absolute sense of the terms. Those who would not realise this truth and act accordingly, the Provisional Government would not hesitate to use force against them. We will have "to carry out Total Mobilization voluntarily, if possible, by compulsion, if necessary," he said.

The Provisional Government's assertion of authority over the property of the Indians was supported by the Japanese. (105) Bose too, as a last resort, went ahead with the threatened measure and


(104) Bose's address to the merchants of Malaya, on 25 October, was a skilful mixture of persuasion, appeal to patriotism and, as a last resort, threat of stern measures. The full text of this speech is available only in the following two publications. Giani, n. 40, 97-102; Sopan, n. 8, 408-17.

(105) Syonan Shim bun, 27 October 1943, 1.
some of the merchants were taken into custody. (106) This measure changed the attitude of the Indian merchants and the immediate response was promising. (107) A more regular arrangement for getting funds was favoured to occasional contribution. Boards of Management for Raising Fund were set up to which Indians had to declare their assets from the beginning of 1944. The levies collected varied from 10 to 20 p.c. of the assets. (108)

Measures to precipitate internal revolt in India

Along with the efforts to reorganize and strengthen the army, it was not forgotten that as regards the ultimate success of the army, even after entering India, the actual conditions existing in India would be a factor to reckon with. Collecting informations from India and sending agents into the country were essential to precipitate the internal revolution of India at a time when the liberation army would knock at the door of India. It has been mentioned earlier that the Special Service Training Schools at Penang and Rangoon were under the control of the liaison agency and they remained so for sometime after Bose's arrival in Singapore. The attempts made by the Japanese in 1942 and in early 1943 to collect information from India had not gained much except calling

(106) Ayer, n. 4, 246.

(107) The donations which were received on 25 and 26 October 1943 in Singapore, following Bose's speech on 25 October totalled 20,000,000 Malayan Dollars. Syonan Shim bun, 28 October 1943, 1.

(108) Toye, n. 2, 95.
forth the serious counter-measures taken by the India Command. (109)
On his arrival at Singapore Bose arranged to send a submarine party
under one S.N. Chopra to India who would establish a direct wireless
link to pass on informations of economic and military importance. (110)

Erskine negotiations with the Imperial
Government and the Imperial Japanese
Headquarters

On 25 October, Bose left Singapore for Tokyo. A communique
published by the Board of Information of the Government of Japan
on 31 October announced his arrival in Tokyo. It said: It is
understood that during his sojourn in Nippon, Mr. Bose will exchange

(109) Toye mentioned that 130 persons had been sent by the
Japanese through the Japanese outposts in Buma in 1942. All of
them were comprehended. In March 1943 a group of paratroops were
dropped in India by the Japanese. Toye, n. 2, 86-7. Before October
1943 a submarine party was sent to India. Four of the party were
captured, tried under the charge of acting as enemy agents and hanged
in October 1943. This was reported in the New York Times, 7 and
23 October 1943, 6.

An official source mentions that of those who were sent for
fifth columnist activities in India up to November 1943, some
escaped arrest and some were comprehended. These men were directed
to perform sabotage activities and prepare to help the I.N.A. when
it would advance into India and to obstruct the British war efforts
in India. As a measure to counter the activities of the "Japanese
Indian Force" (J.I.F.), as I.N.A. was referred to in official docu­
ments of British Indian Army, a new department was set up in the
Indian Army to foster solidarity and good relations among the
Indian forces in the fronts and to create hatred for the Japanese
and the J.I.Fs. An intensive wireless propaganda against the
J.I.Fs. was planned and carried out. See Auchinleck's Despatch,
June to November 1943, n. 88, 21.

(110) Toye mentioned that this party reached India in
December 1943 and "It was at large in India with its wireless
sets for less than two months." Toye, n. 2, 88.
views with Premier Gen. Hidemitsu Tojo and others on various problems
including future co-operation between Nippon Government and the
Provisional Government of Azad Hind." (111) On 3 November 1943
Tokyo Radio broadcast that Bose:

would discuss with responsible Tokyo officials
on the situation created by the Provisional
Government's declaration of war on Britain and
America. He expressed the hope that he would
be able to further strengthen the friendly re-
lations which he had established with the
Japanese Government at his last meeting. (112)

On his arrival in Tokyo, Bose was invited to attend the
Assembly of the Greater East Asian Nations, scheduled on 5 and 6
November 1943. (113) He preferred joining the conference as an
observer as otherwise it would be to commit India to the Co-
Prosperity Sphere which he was not willing to do. (114) Bose's
informal meeting with the representatives of other East Asian
countries, his participation in the Great East Asia Assembly in
personal capacity and his address to the Assembly had earned warm
appreciation and moral support from all East Asian delegates for
his efforts for India's independence. All indicated his remark-
able personal success. Commenting on Bose's presence at Tokyo,
his biographer wrote:

there had been no foreign statesman in Tokyo who
had approached Bose in political stature or per-
sonal force and this his hosts had warmly

(111) Svapan Samhun, 1 November 1943, 1.
(112) Arun, n. 5, 150.
(113) Bose's speech over Tokyo Radio, 16 November 1943.
See Arun, ibid., 214.
(114) Subhas Chandra Bose And Japan, n. 2, 144.
acknowledged...he had received flattery and deference from the Japanese and other national leaders, had been received by the Emperor. (115)

Being fully aware of the lukewarm attitude of the Hikari Kikan and the Southern Army on various points to which Bose pinned his hope for the progress of the movement, he used well his success in Tokyo in his negotiations with the Japanese Government and Military Headquarters. Tojo's declaration in the Japanese Diet on 27 October of the unstinted support to the Provisional Government reassured Bose of the former's sympathetic attitude. (116) Bose met Tojo, Sugiyama and the officers of the Navy Department and discussed with them various problems relating to the increase of the strength of the I.N.A., financial help of the Japanese Government, the military campaign in India and the transfer to the Provisional Government of the Indian territories which were already under Japanese occupation.

In his discussion with Bose on 1 November 1943, Tojo agreed to hand over the administration of the evacuee Indian property in

(115) Toyo, n. 2, 98.

A Japanese account, having described how deeply the delegates of the Greater East Asia Assembly were moved by the address of Bose, concluded with the following words: "His participation and his speech in truth were the essence of the Greater East Asia Conference." Subhas Chandra Bose And Japan, n. 2, 148; see also Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan And Her Destiny (London, 1955) 293-4.

(116) Tojo in his statement to the 83rd extraordinary session of the Imperial Diet referred to the Provisional Government of India and said: "It is truly a great pleasure for us to declare to the world through this chamber that Nippon is determined to support that Government consistently in the future and to put forth her utmost efforts for the independence and emancipation of India." Shyonan Shim bun, 27 October 1943, 1.
Burma to the Provisional Government and promised in near future a decision regarding the Provisional Government's administrative control over the Indian territories which were under the Japanese occupation. (117) But an important decision which resulted from Bose's meeting with Tojo was the one regarding the question of transfer of the islands of Andaman and Nicobar, which were under the Japanese Navy, to the Provisional Government. For Bose, the transfer of these islands was a urgent necessity. It would give his Government a foothold over the Indian territory and make it a reality. He seemed to have emphasised this point in his meeting with Tojo on 1 November 1943. (118) It is also evident that later, in a meeting with the chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Bose expressed his desires to appoint a Governor to the islands, fulfill the participation of the Provisional Government in the administration of the islands, pay a visit personally to the islands, and despatch units of the I.N.A. to the islands. (119)

For the Japanese I.G.H.Q., the islands were important naval outposts. So long as the Pacific War continued, it was in their own military interest that the actual control over the islands must remain under the Japanese Navy. The I.G.H.Q. and the Japanese Government therefore, were ready to fulfill Bose's

(117) Toya, n. 2, 96.

(118) Ibid.

(119) From the Chief of Military Affairs Section of the Navy Department, T. Oka to Subhas Chandra Bose, 16 November 1943, Exhibit EEEE, first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 47, 375-6.
wishes, so far as it was possible, without hampering their own military interest. Gen. Tojo, following Bose's address to the Greater East Asia Assembly on 6 November, had expressed his desire to transfer those islands to the Provisional Government in the near future. (120) On 10 November 1943, a liaison conference between the I.G.H.Q. and the Japanese Government took the decision regarding the question of the transfer of the islands. (121)

It was decided that in the liaison conference that the "time to transfer the Andaman and Nicobar to the Provisional Government should be decided separately" at a later date. Some immediate measures, however, were suggested to honour Bose's wishes. These were:

Provisional Government Staff will be allowed to stay in the area, participating in administration provided such participation will remain within the limit of smooth military campaign and its related activities will not be jeopardised.

The said administration participation will be further extended by and by, and the desire of Provisional Government of India will be fulfilled by and by under the leadership of Regional Supreme Commander.

Another decision was taken to give publicity to the point that

(120) Gen. Tojo declared: "the Imperial Government of Japan is ready shortly to place the Andaman and Nicobar islands ... under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind." No exact date of transfer of the islands was, however, pointed out by him. Statement of Gen. Tojo before the Greater East Asiatic Nations, 6 November 1943, Exhibit UUUU, first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., m. 47, 370.

(121) The English translation of the decision taken at the liaison conference between the I.G.H.Q. and the Japanese Government on 10 November 1943 regarding the Andaman and Nicobar islands, War History Office, Government of Japan. The photostat copy of the document was obtained by the writer from the War History Office.
Japan was sincerely supporting the Provisional Government. The liaison conference decided that the Provisional Government would be allowed to make propaganda use of the point that the transfer had already taken place and it was "an existing fact."

In his meeting with Bose on 13 November 1943, Tojo conveyed the decision of the liaison conference to Bose. (122) On 16 November the Japanese Navy Department informed Bose, that his (Bose's) visit to the islands would be arranged by the Japanese Navy. The appointment of a Governor would await the completion of transfer but a "Chief Commissioner" would be received in the islands before the transfer. Despatch of I.N.A. units to the islands was kept for future consideration. (123) But Bose, in a way, bypassed the caution of the Naval Department. He renamed the islands as Shahid (Martyr) and Swaraj (Independence) and announced in a Press Conference in Tokyo that "for Indians the return of the Andamans represents the first territory to be liberated from the British yoke. By the acquisition of this territory, the Provisional Government has now become a national entity in fact as well as in name." (124)

Military matters were discussed with Sugiyama, Chief of Imperial Staff. In the Imphal campaign "the I.N.A. would rank as an Allied Army under Japanese Operational Command." (125)

(122) From Oka to Bose, n. 119.
(123) Ibid.
(124) Young India (Singapore) 1 (15 November 1943) 3. Emphasis added.
(125) Toyo, n. 2, 98.
Since the Imphal Campaign was planned and carried out by the Japanese Burma Area Army, the actual role of I.N.A. was left to be determined by the Japanese C-in-C in Burma. Sugiyama consented to the raising of the Second I.N.A. Division, to the planning of the third and to the training of cadets for the I.N.A. in Japan. "The Japanese would remain financially responsible for the ex-prisoners of war in the I.N.A., and Bose would find the money to pay his civilian recruits." (126) Equipments would come from the captured British stocks. On his way back to Singapore, Bose called on Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon on 24 November 1943 and it was decided that the I.N.A. First Division and his own Civil and Military Headquarters would move to Burma in January 1944. (127)

With these agreements on the status and expansion of the I.N.A., and on the financial arrangement, the outstanding problems which the I.N.A. was facing from 1942, were solved. The preparatory stage in the I.N.A.'s career seemed to be over. Before he left Tokyo, Bose made a broadcast on 8 November 1943 over the Tokyo Radio in which he summarised the successes which he claimed to have achieved after his arrival in East Asia. He said:

We have realized five of the six important objectives necessary for the salvation of our motherland. First, through knowledge of the war situation. Secondly, sympathy of Britain's enemies, thirdly, direct relations between our agents at home and abroad; fourthly, synchronizing the Indian War of Independence with the present World War; and fifthly, the organization of the Provisional Government of India. The last objective, which still remains to be achieved, is the delivering of the fatal blow to the enemy in co-operation with our Allies. (128)

(126) Ibid.

(127) Ibid.

(128) Arun, n. 5, 212-3.