THE FORMATION OF THE I.N.A.

When Singapore fell to the Japanese, the latter had hardly any organization ready to deal with the large number of Prisoners of War (P.O.Ws.) (1) The administration of the British and Australian P.O.Ws. was put under the charge of their commanders. (2) The charge of the Indian P.O.Ws., as it has been already pointed out, was handed over to Mohan Singh. (3) Mohan Singh's immediate task was to set-up an organization to look after the Indian P.O.Ws. The Prisoners of War Headquarters were established at Neesoon in Singapore under Lt.-Col. N.S. Gill and with Lt.-Col. J.K. Bhosale as the Adjutant and Quarter Master General and Lt.-Col. A.C. Chatterji as the Director of the Medical Services. (4)

The newly established P.O.W. Headquarters had to grapple with the difficult problems of housing, sanitation, rationing and medical aids to the large number of Indian P.O.Ws. (5) Within a

(2) Ibid.
(3) See chapter one of this study.
(4) See the typescript note received by the I.N.A. History Committee from Col. Niranjan Singh Gill, I.N.A. History Committee files, All-India I.N.A. Relief and Enquiry Committee, Delhi. Hereinafter referred to as Col. N.S. Gill's note to the I.N.A. History Committee. See also Major-General A.C. Chatterji, India's Struggle for Freedom (Calcutta, 1947) 10. Gill surrendered in Singapore in 1942 as a Lt. Col., but when the I.N.A. was formed he was promoted a Colonel.
(5) For an account of the activities of the P.O.Ws. Headquarters see Col. N.S. Gill's note to the I.N.A. History Committee, ibid.; The typescript note titled as A Short Medical History of the I.N.A. received by the I.N.A. History Committee from Col. R. Kasliwal who was for sometime the Director of Medical Training of the I.N.A., I.N.A. History Committee Files, I.N.A. Relief and Enquiry Committee, Delhi; Chatterji, ibid., 12-6.
few days after the fall of Singapore, Indian P.O.Ws. who were scattered over different places, were collected and housed in five camps. (6)

As the P.O.W. Headquarters made efforts to improve the living condition of the Indian P.O.Ws., Mohan Singh took the preliminary steps towards the formation of the national army. He set-up his "headquarters" at Singapore and took steps to popularise the idea of a national army among the P.O.Ws. (7) In spite of his early efforts, the I.N.A., however, did not actually come into existence before September 1942.

In fact, the success in raising an effective army depended on several factors. The foremost among the requirements was a favourable attitude of the Indian P.O.Ws., particularly the officers, towards the formation of such an army. The military leaders, in raising the army, were dependent on the support of the Indian community in a general way, as well as for men and money. The attitude of the leaders of the Indian community towards the question of raising the national army is therefore relevant. The attitude of the civilian leaders is important for another reason. The Indian National Army was viewed as a military instrument of the movement organized during the war by the Indians in East Asia with the objective of achieving India's independence.

(6) These Indian P.O.W. camps were situated at Neesoon (under the command of Major M.Z. Kiani), Bidadari (under Lt. Col. G.R. Nagar), Tyrsal Park (under Major Tehl Singh), Karanj (under Lt. Parshottam Das) and Selator (under Major Windman). See Shah Navaz Khan, My Memories of I.N.A. and its Nataji (Delhi, 1946) 38.

(7) Ibid., 38-9.
Moreover, the attitude of the Imperial General Headquarters of Japan towards the question of India's freedom was to play a role of considerable importance in raising the I.N.A. because of the simple reason that without their approval an armed force could not be raised in any part of the territory under their occupation. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to describe and analyse the attitudes of the leaders of the Indian civilian community in various countries of East Asia, the Indian officers and of the Japanese military authorities towards the formation of the Indian National Army. The circumstances which hastened the formation of the I.N.A. in the second half of 1942 and the nature of recruitment in the I.N.A. will also be discussed in this chapter.

1. Attitude of the Indian leaders in East Asia towards the formation of the I.N.A.

In discussing the attitude of the leaders of the Indian communities in the East Asian countries towards the formation of the I.N.A., we will at first describe the objective with which they organized their communities during 1942 and see to what extent it (the objective) was favourable for the formation of that army. We will also describe how they, in view of the well-known non-violent policy of the Indian National Congress, reacted to the plan of achieving India's freedom by resorting to violent means and by seeking military assistance from Japan.

Preliminary efforts of the Indians in Japan to organize themselves

With the declaration of war by Japan on 8 December 1941,
Rash Behari Bose and his group in Tokyo lost no time to organize themselves to make use of the opportunity thrown up by the Pacific War for the purpose of achieving India's independence. Indians in Tokyo met on the same day of the declaration of war by Japan and on 26 December (1941), the entire Indian community in Japan met in a conference. (8) Initially, two lines of activities were favoured. They called the Indian National Congress to withdraw all co-operation with the Indian Government and declare independence from Britain immediately. Only these measures, according to them, would save India from Japan's invading army. (9) Later, Rash Behari Bose made a series of radio broadcasts requesting the Indian nationalist leaders in India to follow this course. (10)

(8) The Presidential address by Rash Behari Bose to the Bangkok Conference in June 1942 gives a detailed account of the efforts to organize the Indian community in Japan with the outbreak of the Pacific War. See The microfilm of the Presidential address by Rash Behari Bose at the Indian Independence Conference at Bangkok (Thailand) 15 June 1942 (Bangkok, 1942). This speech was published by the Indian Independence League Headquarters, Bangkok, Thailand. Microfilm from Stanford University, Hoover Library, U.S.A.

(9) The resolutions of the conference held by the Indian community in Japan clearly expressed the fear that the Japanese army might enter India after over-running Burma. The Indian community, therefore, urged that Indians should cut off all connections with the British and become independent. The resolutions of the conference were quoted in Rash Behari Bose's Presidential address to the Bangkok Conference. See ibid., 5-6.

(10) Immediately after the fall of Singapore to the Japanese army, Rash Behari Bose broadcast twenty three messages addressed to the Indian people and the leaders of different political shades. In his broadcast "To Sri Savarkar" on 21 March 1942 he said: "That England is in extreme difficulties must be known to you. That England's difficulties offer golden chance for India's independence is also known to you.... Japan and her Allies being England's enemies are India's friend." He also reiterated his decision in many broadcasts to mobilize the Indians in East Asia in a supreme effort to strike at the British in India and he stressed that his

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At the same time, Rash Behari Bose contacted the Japanese high military authorities to secure their help for organizing a movement in East Asia for India's freedom. He tried to impress it on them that without the elimination of the British power from India, Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere could not be free from danger. (11) His efforts seemed to have "succeeded in prevailing" upon the Japanese Government about the desirability of helping the nationalist activities of the Indians. On 16 February 1942, after the surrender of Singapore, Prime Minister Tojo, in a speech in the Imperial Diet, called the Indians to make use of the Greater East Asia War for the achievement of India's freedom. He said: "Japan expects that India will restore its proper status as India for the Indians and she would not stint herself in extending assistance to the patriotic efforts of the Indians." (12)

efforts to organize a independence movement for India in East Asia would be successful only if the British were denied the support of the Indian people in India. See Rash Behari Bose, On To Battle (Bangkok, 1942).

This work was published by the Indian Independence League Headquarters Bangkok, Thailand. Microfilm from Stanford University, Hoover Library, U.S.A.

(11) See Indian Independence Movement in East Asia (place not mentioned, 1943) 3.

It was the printed text of a Platoon Lecture published by the Military Bureau, Indian Independence League. See also Rash Behari Bose's address to the Bangkok Conference, n. 8, 6-7; Khan, n. 6, 29.

(12) See Our Freedom and Japan (Bangkok, 1943) 13.

This publication included all important official declarations by the Government of Japan on India between 1942-3. It was published by the Indian Independence League Headquarters, Bangkok, Thailand.
The Indians were "greatly encouraged" by Gen. Tojo's promise of support. (13) Immediately, Rash Behari Bose formally established the headquarters of the Indian Independence League at Sanno Hotel in Tokyo. He published a "manifesto" expressing his intention to start a movement in East Asia for India's independence and requesting his countrymen in India to make use of the opportunity offered by the Pacific War in liquidating the British domination over India. (14) He had already sent his representatives to Hongkong and Shanghai and in both the places Indians were helped to set-up organizations with the same name, on 26 January 1942. (15)

A conference of the representatives in East Asia proposed. The most important result of Gen. Tojo's speech on 16 February (1942) was the initiative taken by Rash Behari Bose to call a conference of the representatives of the Indian communities in Japanese-occupied countries of East Asia. The necessity of such a meeting was obvious. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, there was little contact among the Indian communities in East Asia and there was no central organization to co-ordinate whatever little political activities they performed. Soon after the declaration of the Pacific War, a number of isolated organizations (bearing the names, Indian Independence League and Independent

(13) Ibid. See also Bangkok Chronicle, 17 February 1942, 1.


League of India) had been set-up by the Indian nationalists in different parts of Japanese East Asia. A conference of the representatives of the Indian communities would be an occasion to agree upon a common plan of action and a central leadership which would guide the Indian independence movement in East Asia. Accordingly, Rash Behari Bose approached the military authorities of Japan with this proposal and requested them to make arrangements for the meeting. (16)

Preliminary efforts of the Indians in Thailand to organize themselves

It has been already mentioned in the previous chapter that Giani Pritam Singh and his group had been secretly co-operating with the Japanese intelligence group, the Fushiwara Kikan, from sometime before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Pritam Singh's activities could not be popular in Thailand mainly because of their underground nature. Moreover, not all Indians of Thailand liked Pritam Singh's propaganda work for the Japanese army, when

(16) The telegram sent by Rash Behari Bose to the leaders of the Indian community in Malaya mentioned that he was "going to organize all Indians abroad for a conference for the emancipation of India in Tokyo under the auspices of the G.H.Q. ..." For the text of the telegram see J.G. Ohsawa, The Two Great Indians in Japan: Sri Rash Behari Bose and Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose (Calcutta, 1954) 48-9. That the initiative of the meeting came from Rash Behari Bose was clear from the discussion in the conference of the Indian leaders in Singapore in March 1942. Swami Satyananda Puri, the Chairman of the National Council of Bangkok, told the conference that his Council was in telephonic connection with the Indian Independence League in Japan. The Secretary of the League, Mr. A.K. Sahay, had told him that the Japanese authorities had been requested by the League to arrange for the meeting. For the proceedings of the Singapore Conference see K.S. Giani, Indian Independence Movement in East Asia (Lahore, 1947) 33-9. The book is divided into two parts. All references from this work in this chapter are from the first part.
they came to know of it after the outbreak of the war. (17) As the Japanese army occupied Thailand, they instructed that the Indian community in Thailand should choose a representative from among themselves whom they (the Japanese army) could consult on any matter regarding the Indians and to whom they could communicate their suggestions. (18) The Indian business community in Bangkok, in order to protect their commercial interests under the Japanese, naturally wished to maintain friendly contact with them. The Indian Association, the organization of the Indian businessmen, held a meeting in December 1942 and chose Swami Satyananda Puri, a prominent Indian in Thailand, as the representative of the Indian community in Thailand. (19) The Swami, inspite of his deep suspicion and dislike for the Japanese army (20) agreed to accept


(18) Ibid. This refers to Pandit Raghunath Shama's article.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Pandit Raghunath Shama and Sri Debnath Das - the two Indians who were closely associated with Swami Satyananda Puri in Bangkok told the writer about the anti-Japanese attitude of the Swami. Discussion with Pandit Raghunath Shama in July 1963 at Bangkok and with Debnath Das at Calcutta in June 1963.

Satyananda Puri's cautious attitude towards the Japanese army was later expressed in the Singapore Conference. He firmly refused do anything which might reduce his organization (namely, the Indian National Council) to look like "a body of quislings in the pay of the Japanese." The Proceedings of the Singapore Conference, see Giani, n. 16, 34-5.
the task in order to protect the interest of the Indian community. He immediately converted the Thai-Bharat Cultural Lodge, which was already existing in Thailand, into the Indian National Council.

(21) The immediate objective of the Council was to safeguard the interests of the Indian community in Thailand and, more particularly, those of the Indian business community. (22) Political activities were only of secondary interest to the Council.

The reaction of the Indian leaders in Malaya to the Japanese victories

The swift advance of the Japanese army in Malaya and the surrender of Singapore were viewed by the local Indian communities of Malaya and Singapore as very dangerous. They felt that their life, property and honour were in great insecurity. (23) As the civil administration of the peninsula and the island was very...

(21) See Bangkok Chronicle, 22 December 1941, 1. Swami Satyananda Puri was the Chairman of the Council and Sri Debnath Das was its General Secretary and Pandit Raghunath Sharma was its Treasurer.

(22) Pandit Raghunath Sharma, in his article on Swami Satyananda Puri, mentioned of several instances when the intervention by the President of the Council saved the interests of the Indian community in Thailand, more particularly those of the Indian business community from the various restrictions imposed by the Thai Government. See Sharma, n. 17.

(23) Capt. P.K. Sahgal an officer of the Indian army who was posted in Malaya during 1941-2, later told in the I.N.A. court martial that neither the Chinese nor the Malays were friendly to the Indian community in Malaya. The facilities for evacuation were not available to the Indians to the extent these were done for the Europeans in Malaya. Naturally, the Indian community felt like one deserted as the British defence collapsed in Malaya. The statement of P.K. Sahgal before the first I.N.A. court martial. See Motiram, ed., Two Historic Trials in Red Fort (Delhi, 1946) 112-3. See also Vithal Bhai K. Jhaveri and Soli S. Batilavala ed., Jai Hindi The Diary of A Rebel Daughter of India With The Band Of Jhansi Regiment (Bombay, 1945) 2-3. Hereinafter referred to as Jhaveri and Batilavala, ed.

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shaky and it had collapsed in a number of places on the eve of the
Japanese advance, the leaders of the local Indian communities were
called upon to organize their community for their protection. (24)
The objective was, of course, very limited—primarily defensive.

The President of the Central Indian Association of Malaya,
Mr. N. Raghavan, wrote about the reaction of the Indian community
and its leaders to the swift advance of the Japanese army in
Malaya. Referring to the Indian community he wrote:

They had been caught unawares. All communications
between India and Malaya were cut off.... Indian
leaders had for a time to take control of the sit-
uation. Their original objectives were two-fold:
first, honourable self-preservation of the commu-
nity and second, brotherly co-operation with
sister communities like the Malays, the Chinese and
others; and with these objectives they organized
themselves in various parts of the Peninsula. (25)

The book, in fact, is not a dairy of any person. The writer
learnt from Mr. Jhaveri that due to some reasons the editors of
the book were compelled to bring out in the present form the impor-
tant materials on the I.N.A. collected by the late Amrit Lal Seth,
the ex-editor of The Jannobhoomi (Bombay), from South East Asia
within a few weeks after the termination of the World War II.

(24) Mr. N. Raghavan told the writer that the Government
of the Settlement of Penang and Province of Wellesley collapsed
before Penang was actually overrun by the Japanese. The local
communities had to take steps to continue the administration. A
Citizens' Committee was organized which consisted of four commit-
tees, each one managing the affairs of the four communities,
namely, the Indians, the Chinese, the Malays and the Eurasians.
Mr. Raghavan was the Chairman of the committee for the Indians.
Discussion with Mr. N. Raghavan at New Delhi in April 1964.

(25) Kediyam Raghavan, India and Malaya: A Study
(Bombay, 1954) 69-70.

During his discussion with the writer Mr. Raghavan also
reaffirmed his main objective as regards co-operation with the
Japanese army in 1942. The strongest desire was to improve the
standing of the Indian community vis-a-vis the Japanese as a
measure to ensure its (the Indian community's) safety and safe-
guard its interests. Discussion with Mr. N. Raghavan at New
Delhi in April 1964.
The Indian community in Singapore reacted in a similar manner. Prior to the outbreak of the war, the Indian community had some grievances against the British Government of the Strait Settlement. (26) The leader of the Indian community of Singapore, Mr. Goho, mentioned some incidents which made him personally bitter against the British. (27) These grievances made the Indian leaders critical of the British and they made no secret about it. (28) But it was far from being a pro-Japanese attitude. In fact, their English education and utter dislike for Japanese militarism made them more anti-Japanese than anti-British. (29) Although they felt the necessity of organizing the Indians for

(26) These grievances have been referred to in chapter one of this study.

(27) Mr. S.C. Goho in his secret note to I.N.A. History Committee mentioned the instances of racial discrimination to which he was subjected in Singapore under the British. He also mentioned that, in spite of his co-operation with the Government of the Straits Settlement at the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Government thought of putting him under arrest because of his growing influence in the Indian community. Typescript confidential note received by the I.N.A. History Committee in 1945 from Mr. S.C. Goho, 9-10, I.N.A. History Committee Files, All-India I.N.A. Relief and Enquiry Committee, Delhi. Hereinafter referred to as S.C. Goho's note.

(28) Mr. S.C. Goho wrote that immediately after the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, he gave a talk over the Japanese-controlled Saigon radio pointing out the discriminatory treatment which had been meted out to the Indian community by the British. *Ibid.*

(29) The anti-Japanese attitude of the Indian leaders was often openly expressed. Mr. S.C. Goho, together with the chief of the Chinese community in Singapore, Mr. Tan Kah Kee, published a joint manifesto in January 1942 which bitterly attacked the Japanese. See *ibid.*, 6.
their own protection and they were ready to take necessary measures for that purpose. (30) these leaders regarded the talks of the Japanese army about India's liberation with utmost caution and suspicion. (31)

Some observations on the various objectives with which the Indian communities in East Asia organized in early 1942

From the preceding paragraphs it is clear that, on the outbreak of the Pacific War, only Rash Behari Bose was willing to seek Japanese assistance and use it for the purpose of India's freedom. The immediate objective with which the leaders of the Indian communities in Thailand, Malaya and Singapore started organizing their own community in 1942 was identical; it was for their own defence and safety under the Japanese military rule.

(30) Before the surrender of Singapore, a group of Indian volunteers named, "The Indian Passive Defence" force was organized in Singapore by Mr. S.C. Goho. The volunteers managed the Indian affairs and looked after the interest of the Indian community.

Soon after occupation of Singapore by the Japanese, the local Indian leaders agreed to the suggestion of Major Fujiwara to organize an Indian Independence League in Singapore. Mr. S.C. Goho was elected Chairman and Mr. K.P.K. Menon, the Vice-chairman of the League. See ibid., 4; see also the unpublished English translation of K.P.K. Menon, Kazhinche Kalam (Calicut, 1957) 263-8.

The relevant chapters of this work were translated into English for the use of the writer. Hereinafter referred to as Menon.

(31) Although the Indian leaders favoured the idea of organizing their community they could not trust the Japanese talks about India's freedom. Having heard Major Fujiwara's proposal for making efforts for Indian freedom, "We did not make much encouraging response, we were watching", wrote Mr. S.C. Goho. Ibid., 10. Mr. Menon's reaction to Major Fujiwara proposal was similar. He wrote: "Fujiwara talked to me about two hours what I did then was just to listen to him." Ibid.
Their interest in plans for reaching an agreement among themselves to invite Japanese military assistance to raise the I.N.A. and help in accomplishing its goal was still remote. This was partly because of their common suspicion of the Japanese intentions about India. Consequently, the efforts to organize the Indian community, which (continued throughout the year 1942), were partly to keep the formidable conqueror in good humour. They thought that it would be imprudent to take any concrete measure without being satisfied about the Japanese intentions beforehand. This mood of these leaders was first reflected at their Conference at Singapore and subsequently it influenced the decisions of the larger Conferences held by the Indians at Tokyo and Bangkok during 1942.

**Singapore Conference**

On 9 and 10 March 1942 the leaders of the Indian communities in Malaya, Singapore and Thailand and those of the I.N.A. met in Singapore. (32) The necessity for arranging the conference was felt by them for choosing their representatives whom Rash Behari Bose had requested to send for the Tokyo Conference.

The views expressed at the Singapore Conference on the adoption of non-peaceful means in India's freedom movement. The Singapore Conference took up for consideration two important

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(32) The Conference was attended by Messrs. N. Raghavan, B.K. Das, Sucha Singh, K.A.N. Iyer and Dr. Mazumder from Malaya, S.C. Cecho and K.P.K. Menon from Singapore, Pritam Singh, Amar Singh, Onkar Singh and Swami Satyananda Puri from Thailand. Major Mohan Singh and Capt. Mohammad Akram represented the I.N.A. which was to be raised. Lt.-Col. N.S. Gill and Major M.Z. Kiani represented the Indian P.O.Ws. Mr. Otagura from the Fujiwara Kikan attended the meeting as an observer. See Giani, n. 16, 34.
question. (33) Firstly, it was to be decided whether the circumstances created by the Pacific War should be utilized for achieving India's freedom and secondly, if the present occasion was proper, whether non-peaceful means could be adopted in achieving India's freedom. For the Conference it was easier to agree on principle that "Indians in East Asia should unite for India's freedom." It was so, partly because some representatives - more particularly a military representative - stressed the necessity of early military action against the British in India. (34) The offer of co-operation from the Japanese for achieving India's freedom had to be welcomed. The Indian leaders agreed on their right to deviate from the peaceful policy of the Congress as a means to achieve freedom. (35) But, in reality, they chose not to do so. Although some members urged for taking up non-peaceful means, (36) an important section of the leaders wanted to make it

(33) For the minutes of the Conference see ibid., 34-40.

(34) Mr. Sucha Singh stressed the necessity of taking immediate military action against the British in India. Lt.-Col. Gill agreed with Mr. Sucha Singh. The former told the Conference that British military position in India was very weak and it was an advantage for the Indians in East Asia that the British military strength in India at that moment was based mainly on the Indian units. If the military action against British in India was delayed or if the British would come to know of "the intentions of the Indians overseas" the Indian units would be removed from India. The minutes of the Singapore Conference, see ibid., 36.

(35) The minutes of the Conference recorded that the representatives "unanimously decided that if they would be convinced that the action they were going to take would be in the best interests of India, they shall act with or without the Congress, preferably with." See ibid., 36.

(36) Mr. Menon vigorously urged that non-peaceful means should be adopted in the movement for India's freedom. Messrs.

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conditional on the prior approval of the national leaders in India. (37)

This attitude was more clearly expressed as the conference proceeded to choose its representatives to the Tokyo Conference. The unanimous view of the conference was to remain non-committal on all important questions in Tokyo as the opinions of the Indian National Congress could not be ascertained before that conference. The representatives chose to visit Tokyo in their personal capacity as members of a good-will mission rather than the representatives of their community. The mandate given to the delegates to the Tokyo Conference leaves no doubt about the non-committal attitude of Singapore Conference. The minutes of the discussion recorded:

K.N.S. Iyer and Sucha Singh also pressed that the Conference should definitely decide what they would do if the leaders in India could not be contacted within a reasonable period of time or if they (leaders in India) would oppose the application of force by the I.N.A. See ibid., 35-8.

(37) The influential leader of the Indians in Malaya, Mr. N. Raghavan, who was the Chairman of the Conference, stressed the necessity of securing the consent of the Congress leaders before resorting to application of force. He gave the conference a clear warning against the deviation from the known policy of the Congress. He said that his "personal view was that no method which did not get the approval of the Indian National Congress would succeed. If the Indians in the Far East went against the opinion of the Congress, they would run the risk of being taken to have gone against the wishes of the people of India...."

Mr. S.C. Goho another influential Indian leader from Singapore asked the conference whether it would be possible for some responsible person from there to India and try to convince the leaders of the Indian National Congress. To this Capt. Mohan Singh replied to say that "it would be possible and that it must be done...." Ibid., 36-7.
...it was unanimously decided that the delegation could at that stage (at the Tokyo Conference) commit themselves to not more than inducing the Indian National leaders to the view that may be adopted by the delegates at the Conference in Tokyo. (38)

The issues awaiting decisions at the Tokyo Conference

In March 1942 the leaders of the Indian communities of Malaya, Singapore, Hongkong, Shanghai, Japan and those of the Indian P.O.Ws. met at Tokyo to have a preliminary discussion on starting an Indian independence movement in East Asia. (39) There were two important matters awaiting agreement at the Tokyo Conference. An agreement had to be reached on the leadership of the Indian independence movement in East Asia and a decision

(38) Ibid., 39.

It should also be pointed out that the conference had agreed that establishment of contact with the leaders in India during the war would not be an easy task and one member had pointed out that "it would take about two months for a person to get into India." Ibid., 37.

Explaining the real reason why the Indian leaders elected a good-will mission to Tokyo Conference, one reliable source mentioned that "they do not wish to commit themselves in advance to any course of action that may be adopted in Tokyo." See Jhaveri and Batiwala, ed., n. 23, 8.

The non-committal attitude of the good-will mission was evident from the agreement reached in Singapore Conference that the delegates should not make any radio-broadcast from Tokyo. "If they were to do so," it was suggested by the Chairman, "they would be committing themselves and it may later on be difficult to maintain their freedom of action." See Giani, n. 16, 37.


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had to be taken on the question of acceptance of military assistance from Japan.

The move to select Rash Behari Bose as the leader. Rash Behari Bose was well known in Japan because his activities before the outbreak of the Pacific War had led to the popularization of the cause of India's independence in Japan. With the outbreak of the Pacific War the choice of Rash Behari Bose as the leader of the Indian independence movement in East Asia seemed to be fairly obvious. He was backed not only by the Indians in Japan but also by a powerful civilian circle of the Japanese. (40) The Imperial General Headquarters of Japan (I.G.H.Q.), having no decided opinion for bringing Subhas Chandra Bose to East Asia in 1942, although the Prisoners' Committee had pressed for it, wanted to put Rash Behari Bose in charge of the movement. (41) Of all Indian leaders in Japanese East Asia he alone was well known to them (the I.G.H.Q.).


(40) A group of influential Japanese civilians strongly backed Rash Behari Bose and on 20 March 1942, a few days before the Tokyo Conference opened, they formally received him in a grand party to express their support. See Ohsawa, n. 16, 49.

(41) Government of Japan, Subhas Chandra Bose And Japan (Tokyo, 1956) 82-92. This work was published in Japanese by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Government of Japan. The writer came to know of it from Gen. S. Kawabe, the ex-commander of the Japanese Burma Area Army, that the book was prepared by him. The book was prepared with the help of the available Japanese official sources. The writer has used an unpublished English translation of the book.
The suspicion of the good-will mission for Rash Behari Bose.  
The move to put Rash Behari Bose in charge of the Indian independence movement in East Asia was bound to create misunderstanding among the civil and military leaders from Malaya and Singapore. Many of these leaders came into contact with Rash Behari Bose for the first time during the Tokyo Conference. (42) While in Tokyo, they heard of Rash Behari Bose's Japanese nationality, Japanese wife and Japanese way of living. All these appeared to them as convincing proofs of his loyalty to Japan and reduced him to a persona-non-grata in their eyes. (43) Moreover, certain other reasons seemed to have helped the members of good-will mission to form an adverse opinion about the Indians in Japan

(42) The civilian Indian leaders from Malaya and Singapore hardly maintained any regular contact with Rash Behari Bose prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War. The military delegates hardly knew of his nationalist activities in Japan before the Pacific War.

(43) The impression of most of the members of the good-will mission about Rash Behari Bose corroborates this statement. Mr. N. Raghavan told the writer that he was not altogether without suspicion about Rash Behari Bose at the time of the Tokyo Conference. Discussion with Mr. N. Raghavan at New Delhi in April 1964.

Mr. N.S. Gill also told the writer that although he believed that Rash Behari Bose was a very nice man, his (Rash Behari Bose's) long stay in Japan had turned him strongly pro-Japanese. Discussion with Mr. N.S. Gill at New Delhi on 15 June 1964.

Mr. S.C. Gohe wrote about Rash Behari Bose: "...whatever his true feelings might have been, he could not give vent to such feelings because he was a Japanese subject.... Under the system in which he was brought up during the last 30 years or so, that he had spent in Japan, he had no will of his own." S.C. Gohe's note, n. 27, 11.

Mr. K.P.K. Menon wrote in his memoir that Rash Behari Bose's long stay in Japan "had turned not only his ideals and means but also his thoughts and way of life purely Japanese." Menon, n. 30, 269-73.
in general. (44)

The actual installation of Rash Behari Bose as the leader created deep suspicion in the minds of the members of the good-will mission. It was considered as an unholy plot, by which the Japanese intended to profit, to monopolise all authority in his (Rash Behari Bose's) hands. The members of the good-will mission had made no secret about their unfavourable reactions to the selection of Rash Behari Bose to leadership. Mr. S.C. Goho complained that Rash Behari Bose intended to establish a "military dictatorship" under himself. (45) Mr. Menon wrote that the appointment of Rash Behari Bose as the President of the Indian Independence League in East Asia was a part of the Japanese plot to exploit the movement for their own benefit. (46)

(44) The fact that the Tokyo Conference was held under the official patronage of the Japanese military authorities might have led the members of the good-will mission to believe that the leaders of the Indian community in Japan maintained too close relations with the official Japanese military circle to retain their own independent views. Their impression might have been substantiated by an incident which took place during the Tokyo Conference. Lt.-Col. Gill was once indiscreet in his comments about the "evil intentions" of the Japanese regarding India during a conversation with one Indian resident in Japan, Mr. Nair, whom Mr. S.C. Goho later described as "a spy of the Japanese Military." Col. Gill was then instructed by Mr. Nair not to leave Tokyo with the other members of the good-will mission. This proposal which frightened members of the good-will mission "of Lt.-Col. Gill's life," helped to create in their mind lot of mistrust about Indians in Japan. This mistrust explains the extreme statement made by Mr. S.C. Goho about the Indians in Tokyo. He wrote: "Practically everyone of them was either a spy or an informer attached either to the Japanese Military or the Japanese Navy and received pay from them." See S.C. Goho's note, n. 27, 11-3. The writer in his discussion with Mr. N.S. Gill on 15 June 1964 at New Delhi, got the story of his (Col. Gill's) difficulties with Mr. Nair in Tokyo confirmed.

(45) See S.C. Goho's note, n. 27, 12.

Mohan Singh, in a statement issued at the end of the Second World War, described Rash Behari Bose as "a well known Japanese puppet" and considered his election as President as "the most unpardonable and historic blunder." (47)

Suspicion of Rash Behari Bose affected the authority of the leadership of the movement. The suspicion which the members of the good-will mission had for Rash Behari Bose stood in their way in delegating unfettered authority to the latter in his position as the leader of the Indian independence movement in East Asia. No effort was spared in checking the leader from getting any real authority which a revolutionary leadership ought to have got. Mr. Goho as well as Mr. Menon had admitted that they strongly resisted Rash Behari Bose from emerging as a powerful leader. (48) Mohan Singh had clearly implied it. He wrote:

For shattering R.B. Bose's and his henchmen's plans of preconceived dictatorship, the drafting of Tokio [sic] Conference's resolutions and the drafting of the constitution at Bangkok Conference were the fruits of the labour of M/s Raghavan and Menon. [sic] (49)

The civilian leaders from Malaya and Singapore were men of intellectual ability. Although they (aided by the two military representatives who supported them in checking Rash Behari Bose's

(47) The copy of the written statement made by Mohan Singh on the eve of surrendering himself to the Allied forces in Sumatra in 1945, in I.N.A. Defence Counsel's Files, The All-India I.N.A. Relief and Enquiry Committee, New Delhi. Hereinafter referred to as Mohan Singh's statement on the eve of surrendering to the Allied Forces in 1945.

(48) See S.C. Goho's note, n. 27, 12 and Menon, n. 30, 269-73.

(49) Mohan Singh's statement on the eve of surrendering to the Allied Forces in 1945, n. 47.
authority) were not many in number, (50) they succeeded in shaping the decisions of the conference according to their own views. The Conference laid down the pattern of the constitution of the Indian Independence League of East Asia (51) the political organization in which all the existing Indian nationalist bodies in East Asia would merge and which would set up new branches. An elected body, the Council of Action, was provided for - with representation from the civilian Indian communities and the army to be raised. With complete control over the army, the Council of Action would be the supreme executive body of the I.I.L. Rash Behari Bose who was to be the President of the Council should share authority with other members of the Council. (52)

The question of acceptance of Japanese assistance in India's freedom movement. Another important issue which awaited a decision at the Tokyo Conference was the agreement on the invitation of the military assistance of Japan in raising the I.N.A. and in achieving that army's end. The civil and military leaders from Malaya and Singapore took a rigid stand on the issue.

The Conference declined to deviate from the Congress policy on the issue. When the Tokyo Conference met, the Japanese forces had already overrun Rangoon and they had appeared at the eastern

(50) The strength of the good-will mission was about one third of the total number of delegates to the Tokyo Conference.

(51) Also referred to as the I.I.L. For the text of the resolutions taken at the Tokyo Conference see Giani, n, 16, 47-51.

(52) The Council of Action included four other members apart from the President.
border of India. The message of Gen. Tojo to the Tokyo Conference gave an unmistakable impression that the victorious forces of Japan would invade India. (53) This possibility influenced the attitude of the Indian leaders from Malaya and Singapore.

The Conference formally expressed its support for Japan's East Asia policy and recorded its appreciation for her (Japan's) sympathetic attitude towards India. (64) The possibility that war could be brought into India by the Japanese invading forces must have created deep worry and fear in the minds of the Indian

(53) Gen. Tojo's message to the Tokyo Conference read: "I believe you are quite aware of the fact that the British Empire is fast heading towards its downfall.... The Japanese Empire is determined to go ahead with its mission of destruction of the Anglo-Saxon Power and will not rest until that mission is fulfilled. I want to state frankly that the Japanese Government cannot remain indifferent to the fact that Britain is going to make India the base of its Eastern defense...." For the text of the message see Giani, n. 16, 45. Emphasis added.

This and other statements by Gen. Tojo and other Japanese officials during the second quarter of 1942 threatening the invasion of India had a diplomatic objective to achieve. Soon after the fall of Rangoon to the Japanese army in March 1942, the British Government, in order to secure the co-operation of the Indian nationalist leaders in the organization of the Indian defence against the possible Japanese invasion, advanced certain terms known as the Cripps Offer. (The terms offered by Sir Stafford Cripps have been referred to in note 29 of chapter seven of this study). The Japanese threats of and the actual limited military actions against India during this period aimed at convincing the Indian political parties of the superior military strength of Japan and this, it was expected, would help to break-down the Indo-British negotiations. For the description of military measures taken against India see Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby, Captain C.T. Addis, Colonel J.F. Meikle John, Brigadier M.R. Roberts, Colonel C.T. Wards and Air Vice-Marshal N.L. Descoer, The War Against Japan: India's Most Dangerous Hour, Sir James Butler, ed., History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series (London, 1958) II, 125-31.

(54) See the proceedings of the conference, Giani, ibid., 50.
leaders from Singapore and Malaya. They were, after all, not above doubts about the Japanese intentions and they had chosen to remain friendly to the Japanese with no other motive than the security of their community. Knowing fully well the attitude of the Indian National Congress towards the Fascist Powers, these leaders became more determined not to budge an inch from the Congress policy. They would do nothing irrevocable which might go against the wishes of the Congress and which had not secured the consent of the Congress beforehand. A member of the good-will mission wrote:

Ultimately, by persistent arguments we persuaded them (65) to pass certain Resolutions known as the Tokyo Resolutions. This was the best we could do. It brought the whole Movement under the influence and guidance of the Indian National Congress.

A Political Organization was formed, (56) but it was clearly understood that it would do nothing which did not meet with the approval of the Indian National Congress. (57)

The same member of the good-will mission also wrote:

We had made it perfectly clear, in spite of all the pressure direct or indirect brought on us, that we would do nothing unless it had the approval of the Indian National Congress. The main idea of the Japanese Government was to lead an army to India composed of Japanese and Indian troops. We were... against it.... (68)

(65) Referred to the delegates from Japan, Hongkong and Shanghai to the Tokyo Conference.

(56) It referred to the Indian Independence League in East Asia.

(57) S.C. Gooh's note, n. 27, 12.

(68) Ibid., 13.
The Conference put forward certain "requests" to the Japanese Government. The resolutions adopted in the Tokyo Conference confirm its cautious attitude. The Conference put up certain "requests" (59) to the Japanese Government and the co-operation of the Indians with Japan was made conditional to the acceptance of those "requests" by the Japanese Government. 

The Japanese Government were requested to make an independent declaration expressing their readiness to "help India to sever its connection with the British to attain complete independence." The Japanese Government should guarantee the "full sovereignty of India" in advance. They should undertake to recognize the independence of India, on its achievement, and induce other Powers friendly to them, to recognize it. They should also promise that "the framing of the future constitution of India will be left entirely to the representatives of the people of India." They should render such financial assistance to the Indian Independence League "in the manner and to the extent requested by the Council of Action." Such help would be treated as "a loan" to be repaid by India after her achievement of independence. (60)

The leaders stuck to their intention to ascertain the wishes of the national leaders of India and they requested the

(59) For the text of these requests to the Japanese Government see the proceedings of the Tokyo Conference. Giani, n. 16, 49.

(60) The set of "requests" included other points too. The Government of Japan should "clarify the position of the Indian troops now under control in occupied territories," "recognize and facilitate the use of the present National Flag of India in all territories under the Imperial Government of Japan" and "consult in all matters of administration, affecting the Indian community, the Indian Independence League of the respective places...." See Ibid.
Japanese Government to extend to the I.I.L. "all facilities to come into contact with the National leaders, workers and organizations in India." It can be assumed that taking of military action against India without the prior approval of the Indian National Congress was not favourably viewed by the Conference because it was decided that "before taking any military action against India... contrary to the wishes, policy or opinion of the Indian National Congress, the Council of Action shall first get the approval of the Committee of the Representatives and act as directed." (61) The Government of Japan were also requested that "military action against India should be taken only by the Indian National Army and under the command of Indians, together with such military, naval and air co-operation and assistance as may be requested from the Japanese Authorities by the Council of Action." (62)

An assessment of the achievement of the Tokyo Conference

Although the Tokyo Conference succeeded in drawing up a pattern of the constitution for the Indian Independence League, the progress made in other directions was not very substantial. Taking of military assistance from Japan was made conditional on her acceptance of certain demands of the Indian leaders in East Asia. The view that the Indians in East Asia should not deviate from the policy of the Indian National Congress without its prior

(61) Ibid.
(62) Ibid.
approval was reasserted in the Conference. The leader, provisionally chosen in the conference, enjoyed neither the unfettered constitutional authority nor the trust of those with whom he was to share power.

One major bloc which stood in the way of the Conference in welcoming the Japanese help was the deep suspicion of the Japanese intentions shared by many representatives. But some members of the good-will mission seemed to be opposed to making any progress at Tokyo. Lt.-Col. N.S. Gill who was opposed to the formation of the I.N.A. and who had participated in the Conference as the adviser to Mohan Singh later said that the main purpose of his taking part in the Tokyo Conference was to ensure that Mohan Singh did not assume any responsibility regarding the formation of the I.N.A. (63)

The leaders from Malaya and Singapore declined "to commit" their communities to the decisions of the Tokyo Conference (64) and they suggested a bigger conference to ratify the decisions taken at Tokyo. (65) An important reason of this proposal was that although some important leaders did not seriously desire to make much progress at Tokyo, they, however, wished the work of organizing Indians to continue. It was partly because the


(64) Proceedings of the Tokyo Conference, see Giani, n. 16, 49-50.

(65) See Menon, n. 30, 269-73.
Japanese liked it. Another reason for convening a bigger conference was that the representatives of the Indian community of Thailand could not take part in the conference. Burma and the other places, which had fallen to the Japanese army after the fall of Singapore, were also not represented in the Tokyo Conference.

The formation of an All-Malaya Indian Independence League

On their return from Tokyo, the leaders of Malaya and Singapore called a conference of the Indian representatives of the Malayan States on 22, 23 and 25 April 1942 and formed the All-Malaya Indian Independence League. (66) The central executive body, the Supreme Council for Malaya, consisted of a Chairman, four members and one Secretary. Mr. N. Raghavan was elected Chairman and the other four members were Messrs. K.P.K. Menon, S.C. Goho, S.N. Chopra and Dr. Lukshumeyah. Mohan Singh was appointed an ex-officio member of the Council in his capacity as the commander of the national army to be raised.

Although Messrs. Raghavan, Goho and Menon were the leading members of their community before the war, their formal election to the Supreme Council of the All-Malaya Indian Independence League further strengthened their position. Consequently, it had the effect of reasserting and strengthening the view that the formal declaration of the Japanese Government should be procured

(66) For the summary of the proceedings of the conference see Ciani, n. 16, 52-5.
before proceeding with the independence movement of India. (67).
The influence of this group of leaders on the decisions of the
ensuing Conference at Bangkok was considerable.

The Conference for Indian
Independence at Bangkok

The decision to hold a fully-representative conference had
been taken in the Tokyo Conference. The representatives of the
Indian communities in Japan, Manchukuo, Shanghai, Hongkong, the
Philippines, Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Thailand, Malaya, Burma and
those of the Indian Prisoners of War, met at Bangkok from 15 to
23 June 1942. (68) The messages from Gen. Tojo and the Foreign
Minister of Japan and the Prime Minister of Thailand were read

(67) The proceedings of the Conference mentioned: "The
opinion of the Conference was that an official and formal Decla-
ration by the Government of Japan accepting the proposals
should be had before they proceeded. See ibid., 54.

(68) The Tokyo Conference decided that the Bangkok
Conference would be represented by 90 Indian delegates from all
over Japanese East Asia. See the proceedings of the Tokyo
Conference, ibid., 50. At the Bangkok Conference the prominent
deleoges agreed to increase the total number of the delegates.
See the document containing the signatures of the delegates to
the Bangkok Conference regarding their agreement to the increase
of the number of the delegates to Bangkok Conference, Indian
Independence League Papers, National Archives of India, New
Delhi. Hereinafter referred to as the I.I.L. Papers.

In all, 125 delegates took oath of allegiance and secrecy
on 15 June 1942. These included 10 from Japan, 16 from
Thailand, 3 from Hongkong, 28 from Malaya, 1 from Singapore,
4 from Shanghai, 5 from Manila, 1 from Indo-China, 17 from
Burma, 3 from Java, 28 from the Indian P.O.W.s., 1 from the
Manchukuo, 5 from Borneo, 4 from Hongkong. One more delegate
also attended the conference. Oaths of allegiance signed by
delegates to the Bangkok Conference on 15 June 1942, I.I.L.
Papers.
out. (69) The representatives of the German and Italian Governments spoke encouraging words. (70) The Indian delegates made speeches full of patriotism (71) and they passed thirty-five resolutions regarding their movement. (72) The Bangkok Chronicle hailed it as the "historic conference" for the attainment of India's freedom. (73)

The progress made in the Bangkok Conference. In Bangkok Conference the various Indian organizations in East Asia advocating the independence of India were formally merged into one body called the Indian Independence League (I.I.L.) of East Asia. (74)

The pattern of the constitution of the League agreed upon in Tokyo Conference was developed into a fully democratic constitution and approved in the Bangkok Conference. (75) But what

(69) For the texts of the messages of Prime Minister Gen. Tojo, the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Thai Prime Minister F.M. Pibulsonggram, see Bangkok Chronicle, 15 June 1942, 1, 5.

(70) For the text of the speeches by the German Minister at Bangkok, Dr. E. Wendler, and the Italian Minister at Bangkok, Signor Guido Crolla, see Giani, n. 16, 74.

(71) For the text of the speeches by Sri Arand Mohan Sahay, Mr. N. Raghavan, Major Mohan Singh, Lt. Col. N.S. Gill, see ibid., 73-4; Bangkok Chronicle, 15 June 1942, 4 and 18 June 1942, 2.

(72) For the text of the resolutions adopted at the Bangkok Conference see The Indian National Army History Committee Files, All-India I.N.A. Relief and Enquiry Committee, Delhi. Hereinafter referred to as the Resolutions of the Bangkok Conference.

(73) Bangkok Chronicle, 15 June 1942, 1.

(74) Ibid.

(75) Ibid.

(75) The Indian Independence League in East Asia would consist of Local Branches, Territorial Branches, a Committee of Representatives and a Council of Action. All members of the Indian community above 18 years in Japanese East Asia would be the

(Contd. on next page)
were the real achievements of the Bangkok Conference towards the formation of the I.N.A.? To what extent progress was made in reaching an agreement regarding acceptance of the Japanese military assistance?

The decision to raise the I.N.A. The Bangkok Conference decided to raise the national army without delay. It can be assumed that in the Bangkok Conference, the military representatives must have taken the initiative to hurry up with the work of the formation of the national army. Mohan Singh, since his return from Tokyo Conference, had taken up the work of raising the army in right earnest. (76) Moreover, the Bangkok Conference met against the background of the popular unrest in India which culminated in the August 1942 revolt. The news of the growing unrest in India were given prominence by the Japanese controlled press before the conference met. (77) The Conference resolved

member of the Local Branches - elected by local Indian community. Representatives elected by Local Branches would form a Territorial Committee. A Committee of Representatives would be constituted by the civilian representatives elected by the Territorial Committees and those selected by the National army to be raised. This Committee will be responsible for the general policy of the Indian independence movement in East Asia. A supreme executive body, the Council of Action, would be elected by the Committee of Representatives (and it would consist of a President (the first President would be Rash Behari Bose) and four members equally represented by the civilian and the military members (the first four members were Messrs. N. Raghavan, K.P.K. Menon, Major Mohan Singh and Lt. Col. G.O. Gilani.) The Council with collective responsibility would exercise control over all the I.I.L. branches in East Asia and the national army. See The Resolutions of the Bangkok Conference, n. 71.

(76) See the section of this chapter dealing with the attitude of the Indian officers.

(77) On 1 May 1942 the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress, passed a resolution demanding that Britain must

(Contd. on next page)
that the Indian Independence League would "immediately proceed
to raise an Army called the Indian National Army from among the
Indian soldiers and such civilians as may hereafter be
recruited...." (78)

The conditions adopted at Tokyo Conference reiterated. On
the question of co-operation with Japan, the Bangkok Conference,
under the guiding influence of the civilian leaders from Malaya
and Singapore, reaffirmed the position taken at the Tokyo Con-
ference. (79) Such co-operation would be subject to the explicit
acceptance by the Japanese Government of the conditions put
forward at the Tokyo Conference. Bangkok Conference reiterated
those conditions without any amendment. (80)

The new conditions put forward at the Bangkok Conference.
Moreover, the Bangkok Conference kept on record certain new

withdraw from India. See Benoy Krishna Bhattacharya, A Short

In an editorial, Bangkok Chronicle pointed out that the
decision of the Indian National Congress "has been welcomed by
the entire Indian people in particular and the whole of East
Asia in general..." Bangkok Chronicle, 7 May 1942, 2. The
General Secretary of the Indian National Council in Thailand, Mr.
Debnath Das, stated: "...the nation's representatives have once
more challenged the British contention that the present war is
India's too...." Debnath Das, "Indian National Council Welcomes
The Congress Decision," ibid., 1. See also Svenan Times
(Singapore), 7 May 1942, 1.

(78) See the resolutions of the Bangkok Conference, n. 71.

(79) The leader of the delegation from Malaya, Mr. N.
Raghavan, was the Chairman of the Subject Committee of the Bangkok
Conference. Discussion with Mr. N. Raghavan at New Delhi in
April 1944.

(80) See the resolutions of the Bangkok Conference, n. 71.
conditions which required the implicit or explicit acceptance of the Japanese Government. The army to be raised should be under full control of the Indians and it should be "accorded the powers and status of a free National Army of an Independent India" and placed "on a footing of equality with the armies of Japan." (81) The conference also strongly pleaded that the Government of Japan should allow the Indian Independence League to manage, control and make use of the incomes from all the properties in Burma left by the Indians in 1942. (82)

The Tokyo Conference expressed its dislike for a military campaign against India without securing the consent of the Indian National Congress although it (the Tokyo Conference) kept on record that the military action against India could be taken with the consent of the Committee of Representative of the League even if the wishes of the Indian National Congress could not be ascertained. The Bangkok Conference ruled out the alternative course and upheld the prior consent of the Indian National Congress as an absolute condition for any military action towards India. It said:

Resolved that before taking any military action against the British or any other foreign power in India, the Council of Action will assure itself that such an action is in conformity with the express or implied wishes of the Indian National Congress. (83)

(81) Ibid.

(82) Ibid. Large number of Indians had left Burma for India leaving their properties as the victorious Japanese army advanced into Burma in 1942. See the part dealing with Indian community in Burma in the chapter on Introduction.

(83) The resolutions of the Bangkok Conference, n. 71.
Soon after the fall of Singapore, Mohan Singh called a meeting of the senior Indian officers and tried to ascertain their views on the question of raising a liberation army for India from the P.O.Ws. (84) As it was too early for most of the officers to arrive at a decision, it was agreed that they should be given some time to think over Mohan Singh's proposal and to express their views freely. (85) Mohan Singh's proposal was passed on to the junior officers (the V.C.Os. and the N.C.Os.) during March 1942. (86)

In April 1942, after his return from Tokyo, Mohan Singh

(84) Khan, n. 6, 36.

(85) Ibid.

(86) About the proposal put forward by Mohan Singh in this meeting one officer who was present at the meeting later pointed out: "Mohan Singh expressed his intention for the formation of an Indian National Army but he emphasised that the membership of the army should be purely on a voluntary basis. We, the responsible officers of our various units, were asked to convey this message to our troops." See the statement of Capt. H.M. Arshad before the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers. The Prosecution Counsel and the witnesses for the Prosecution in the first I.N.A. court martial confirmed that the proposal of Mohan Singh was conveyed to the camps of the Indian P.O.Ws. by the Senior Indian officers. See the Opening Address by Sir N.P. Engineer, Counsel for the Prosecution, in the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 6-7; the evidence of Capt. K.P. Dhargalkar and that of Major Baboo Ram, Motiram, ed., Ibid., 49, 51-2.
reorganized the I.N.A. Headquarters (87) and called another meeting of the senior Indian officers to whom he submitted his proposal to proceed with the organization of the I.N.A. (88) The officers participating in this conference agreed that the army to be raised would fight for independence of India and it would go into action "on the invitation of the Indian National Congress and the people of India." Until then, the officers pointed out that they would endeavour to make themselves "better and patriotic Indians." (89) It was agreed that these decisions had to be conveyed to the junior officers and the ranks and that those who would not join the proposed army should be separated from the rest. (90)

This decision made it necessary to separate the volunteers from the non-volunteers. This was done in May 1942. (91) According to Mohan Singh, of the 55,000 Indian P.O.Ws. which came under his control by February 1942, 15,000 kept away from the I.N.A. in 1942. (92) The rest, 40,000 men and officers are said to have

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(87) Mohan Singh appointed M.Z. Kiani as A.Q., Habibur Rahaman as Adjutant, H.M. Arshad as Quartermaster, A.C. Chatterji as Director of the Medical Services. See Chatterji, n. 4, 18.

(88) Ibid., 17.

(89) Khan, n. 6, 41.

(90) Ibid.

(91) The statement made by P.K. Sahgal before the first I.N.A. court martial, see Motiram, ed., n. 23, 113.

expressed their desire by the end of August 1942 to join the I.N.A. (93) An effort will be made here to analyse the motive of these volunteers.

Of the 40,000 volunteers who agreed to join the army overwhelming majority consisted of the ranks. (94) The attitude of these men is comparatively easier to explain. In the Indian army the focus of loyalty of an average and illiterate sepoy was his immediate higher officers (95) and in many cases during 1942, the decision of the ranks to join the I.N.A. or to keep out of it, must have been influenced by the views adopted by their

(93) Ibid. H. Toye corroborated this figure. He wrote: "By the end of August 1942 forty thousand Prisoners of War had signed to pledge 'to join the Indian National Army under Mohan Singh". Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger: A Study of Subhas Chandra Bose (London, 1959).

(94) According to a reliable source, about 400 Indian officers joined the I.N.A. The rest consisted of the rank. Of the 400 officers, according to the same source, about 250 were the officers from Indian Medical Service. (The writer regrets that he had been asked not to mention the source of this information.)

(95) Gen. Auchinleck, the former C-in-C of the Indian army, in a memorandum to all the senior British officers wrote: "Those who served for many years with Indian troops, as I have done, have always recognized that the loyalty of our men was really to the officers of the regiment or unit, and that although there may have been some abstract sentiments of loyalty and patriotism to the Government and to the King, the men's allegiance for all practical purposes was focussed on the regiment, particularly the regimental officers, on whom they depended for their welfare, advancement and future prospect". The photostat copy of the personal and secret memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief in India, Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck, on the effects of the first I.N.A. court martial, and circulated in February 1946 to the four C-in-C's and the commands of the various Area, District and Indian Divisions of the Indian army in India and abroad, 3. Photostat copy obtained by the writer from Sir Claude Auchinleck. Hereinafter referred to as Gen. Auchinleck's memorandum to the senior British officers.
An analysis of the motives of the Indian officers, therefore, becomes more important.

The motives of the various sections of the Indian officers

The British and the I.N.A. sources agree that the Indian officers were influenced by a variety of motives. A reliable British source claims that among the officers who joined the I.N.A. were those who were waiting for the earliest opportunity to go over to the British forces, those who were "opportunists" and found it convenient to pull on with the I.N.A., and those who were "fervent nationalists". Mohan Singh has also admitted that some of those who joined the I.N.A. later on defected to the Indian army and that there were many who were influenced by patriotic motives.

Neither of the above two sources, however,

(96) Lt. Gen. Tucker, a senior British officer, posed the question in his memoir: "Why did the rank and file join the I.N.A.?" The main point which he suggested to answer the question was: "because their Indian officers led them over to join it and they had been taught to obey". Lt. Gen. Sir Francis Tucker, While Memory Serves (London, 1950) 97.

This analysis can be supported by fact. Major Rawat, for example, said in his statement to the I.N.A. Defence Counsel that the Garhwaui Regiment (consisting of 16,000 soldiers) which he officered joined the I.N.A. in a body because the officers thought it would be the right course to take. See the statement by Major Rawat to the Defence Counsel the first I.N.A. court martial I.N.A. Defence Papers.

(97) See the Foreward by Mr. Philip Mason to Toye, n. 93, VI. Mr. Mason as the Additional Secretary to the War Department of the Government of India during and after the war was well informed about the I.N.A.

(98) See Mohan Singh's speech in the Parliament, n. 91.
has explained the respective attitude of the different sections of the Indian officers, such as, mainly, the King's Commissioned officers (K.C.Os.), the Indian Commissioned officers (I.C.Os.) and the Viceroy's Commissioned officers (V.C.Os.) towards the question of the formation of the I.N.A. An attempt would be made to describe and analyse the attitudes of the different sections of officers in broad terms. In doing so, we would depend on the writings, and mostly on the evidence and statements of the numerous I.N.A. officers on the occasion of the I.N.A. court martials during 1945-6.

The general consequences of the existing grievances of the Indian officers on their loyalty to the British. The attitude of the Indian officers should be analysed in the background of their condition in the Indian army before the surrender of Singapore in 1942.

The fact that before the surrender of Singapore there were strong grievances among the Indian ranks and officers, over slow Indianization, differential treatment with regard to pay and allowances and racial discrimination, is beyond doubt. (99) These (99) In October 1939 there were 396 Indian officers in the combatant section of the Indian army. The proportion of the British and Indian officers was 10.1 : 1. In January 1941 there were 596 Indian officers in the combatant section but the British-Indian ratio was further unfavourable for the latter. It was 12 : 1. At the end of the war there was large number of Indian officers (eight thousand in all) and the ratio comparatively favourable for the Indians (British to Indian 4.1 : 1) but the Indian officers who surrendered at Singapore in 1941 did not work in such favourable situation. See Nandn Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Force and Defence Organization, 1939 - 1945, Bisheswar Prasad, ed., Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the

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grievances were not only pointed out by the Indian officers at the time of the I.N.A. officers' trial at the end of the war, (100) but these had been acknowledged by the highest authority of the Indian army. The Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army put forward those grievances in the pre-war Indian army in justifying the adoption of a lenient policy towards those Indian officers who renounced their loyalty to the British and joined the I.N.A. He pointed out:

...the early stages of "Indianization" from its inception to the beginning of the late war were badly managed by the British Government of India, and this prepared the ground for disloyalty when the opportunity came. There is little doubt that "Indianization" was at its inception locked on as a political expedient which was bound to fail militarily. There is no doubt also that many senior British officers believed and even hoped that it would fail.

The policy of segregation of Indian officers into separate units, the differential treatment in respect of pay and terms of service as compared with the British officer, and the prejudice and lack of manners of some - by no means all British officers and their wives, all went to produce a very deep and bitter feeling of racial discrimination in the minds of the most intelligent and progressive of the Indian officers, who were naturally nationalists,

Second World War, India and Pakistan: Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (place not mentioned, 1966) 182.

In the Indian army an ordinary sepoy used to receive as his pay Rupees twenty five only while a British soldier used to get three times every month. Khan, n. 6, 21. An Indian Lieutenant used to get Rupees three hundred and fifty only as his monthly pay while British Lieutenants were drawing nearly double of that amount. Statement of Capt. H.M. Arshad to the I.N.A. Defence Counsel, I.N.A. Defence Papers. Instances of racial discrimination practiced in the clubs for the officers of the Indian army are mentioned in the non-I.N.A. source also. See Humphray Evans, Thimayya of India: A Soldier's Life (New York, 1960) 82, 111.

(100) Mentioned later in this chapter.
keen to see India standing on her own legs and not to be ruled from Whitehall for ever. (101)

It may be mentioned in a general way that the grievances which existed among the Indian officers before the fall of Singapore had a good deal to do with the disloyalty which the Indian officers showed later in joining the I.N.A. These grievances were exhaustively marshalled and used by the I.N.A. headquarters as one of the justifications for the Indian officers in taking up arms in the I.N.A. against the British. A Platoon Lecture organized by the Directorate of the Military Bureau of the I.N.A. mentioned that all the Indian officers in the Indian army had been given differential treatment in the matters of their pay, allowances, clothing, rations, accommodations, service conditions, social privileges, etc., not only in India but in every theatre of war to which the Indians had the misfortune to be posted. It is a standing disgrace that such invidious distinctions have always been kept up between the arrogant Britishers and the Indians from time immemorial, in all walks of life, more particularly so in the Indian army. In addition the British officers gets various unofficial privileges such as, choice of station, choice of job etc. Whatever the British officer does or does not is correct, as he is always like Caesar's wife above criticism and his defeat is his recommendation, because he is British. Such was the arrogance displayed by the British in military circles in India. (102)

The attitude of the K.C.Os. towards the formation of the I.N.A. To be more precise, the adverse effect of the existing grievances in the Indian army on the loyalty of the different

(101) Gen. Auchinleck's memorandum to the senior British officers, n. 95, 3-4.

(102) Indian Independence League Headquarters, British Army of Occupation in India (Singapore, 1943) 4.
sections of the Indian officers was not uniform. The Indian officers who held the King's Commission (the K.C.Os.) usually came from well-to-do Indian families. They had their education in British Public Schools and later on in the British Military Academy at Sandhurst and were close to the British and British way of living. (103) Although they felt somewhat sore about the racial discrimination against the Indians, hardly any one of the K.C.Os. was anti-British. (104) This also explains their attitude towards the formation of the I.N.A. during 1942. For them any co-operation with the Japanese was as much a difficult job as it was for a British officer. Of about the half a dozen K.C.Os. who surrendered at Singapore (105) none did full heartedly support

(103) The biographer of Gen. K.S. Thimayya, one of the earliest K.C.Os. among the Indians, described that in the unhappy relations between the senior British officers and the anti-British Indian officers which existed in Thimayya's unit, Thimayya became a "favorite" of the Commanding Officer. See Evans, n. 99, 96-103. The position of Second-Lt. Thimayya can be an illustration of the position of the K.C.Os. by and large, in the Indian army. A senior British officer of the Indian army, Lt. Gen. Tuker supports this argument. See Tuker, n. 95, 64.

(104) It is interesting to note that although Lt. Col. Gill, a K.C.O., mentioned in his statement to the I.N.A. Defence Counsel, of an instance of colour bar in a club in Malaya, none of the K.C.Os. who were called up for evidence either by the Prosecution or the Defence of the I.N.A. court martial mentioned of any grievance over slow Indianization or differential pay and allowances in the Indian army before the War. See the statements of Lt. Col. N.S. Gill, Gen. Bhonsle, Col. Bhagat to the I.N.A. Defence Counsel, first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers. See also the evidence of Capt. K.P. Dhargalkar for the Prosecution in first I.N.A. trial, see Motiram, ed., n. 22, 47-9.

It is also interesting to note that some of these K.C.Os. had British wives and after their retirement from service, they settled down in Britain.

the raising of the I.N.A. in 1942.

Some of them expressed themselves as non-volunteers at the outset and kept out of it (the I.N.A.). (106) Others chose to pull on with the I.N.A. They had more than one motive. One of them, Major M.S. Dhillon, went over to the Indian army at the earliest opportunity in 1942. (107) Another K.C.O. of this category, Lt. Col. N.S. Gill, was convinced that I.N.A. should not be raised and that it would not bring freedom for India. In spite of his conviction, Lt. Col. Gill, as he had later on confessed, chose to 'drift' along with the I.N.A. in the initial period of its career. (108) His "drifting" with the I.N.A. had the consequence of arresting the growth of the I.N.A. during

(106) Capt. Dhargalkar and Budhwar did not join the I.N.A. in 1942. Evidence by Capt. Dhargalkar for the Prosecution in the first I.N.A. trial, see Motiram, ed., n. 23, 47-8. Major Bhagat did not join the first I.N.A. for he "did not trust the Japanese at all". He was then sent to Borneo by the Japanese. Later he joined the I.N.A. to avoid hardship and to make himself, as he said later, "more useful in resisting the Japanese". He was discharged from the command of the Second I.N.A. Division in 1944 "for insubordination and disloyalty". Col. Bhagat's statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial I.N.A. Defence Papers, Toye, n. 93, 108.

(107) Chatterji, n. 4, 15; Col. Gill's note to I.N.A. History Committee, n. 4, 11.

(108) Lt. Col. N.S. Gill, in his statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. trial, said: "Although I felt that thinking of the freedom of the country was good, but that this I.N.A. was not genuine and I could not believe that this will result in freedom of the country. From the beginning I never thought it to be correct,...but I adopted the expedient measure of following it not to show to others that it was not correct, even to Mohan Singh..." Lt. Col. Gill's statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers. See also Col. Gill's note to the I.N.A. History Committee, n. 4, 10-11.
1942. (109) Lt. Col. J.R. Bhonsale, in his statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, did not mention his desire to join the I.N.A. in 1942. (110)

The attitude of the I.C.Os. and the other junior Indian officers towards the formation of the I.N.A. The existing grievances among the Indian officers created comparatively a more adverse effect on the loyalty of the Indian Commissioned Officers (the I.C.Os.) and other junior Indian officers.

The sharp reaction of the I.C.Os. and the I.C.Os. to the pre-war grievances in the Indian army. The I.C.Os. were educated in India and commissioned from the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. Some of them were officers of high professional talents. (111) Unlike the K.C.Os., they had little contact with the British outside their academy. It was quite natural, therefore, 

(109) Capt. S.M. Hussain, a Staff Officer of the Indian P.O.W. Headquarters of which Lt. Col. Gill was the Chief, mentioned in his statement to the I.N.A. Defence Counsel that Lt. Col. Gill favoured a cautious and a go-slow policy so far the formation of the I.N.A. was concerned. Capt. Hussain said that by March 1942 "Mr. Gill and Mohan Singh had already started differing on certain points, one of them being that Gill wanted Mohan Singh to go-slow with regard to the idea of the I.N.A. which Mohan Singh did not like". See Capt. S.M. Hussain's statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. trial, I.N.A. Defence Papers. Capt. Hussain's views on Lt. Col. Gill's attitude towards the formation of the I.N.A. is supported by the attitude of Lt. Col. Gill during the Tokyo Conference. This has been mentioned earlier.

(110) See the statement of General Bhonsale to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. trial, I.N.A. Defence Papers.

(111) Major M.Z. Kiani gained a belt of honour from the Indian Military Academy. Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan was awarded the Sir Partap Singh Memorial Prize by the same Military Academy. See Tuker, n. 96, 560; the statement of Shah Nawaz Khan before the first I.N.A. court martial, see Motiram, ed., n. 23, 103.
that those officers were bound to react most sharply to the existing grievances in the army.

Some of the bitterest criticism of the pre-war British policy of slow Indianization, differential treatment to the Indians with regard to pay and allowances came from the I.C.Os. on the occasion of the I.N.A. officers' trials during 1945-6. Mohan Singh said that in the pre-war Indian army "Discriminatory treatment between the Indians and British soldiers by the champions of equality and liberty in the world was in evidence everywhere." (112) Shah Nawaz Khan in his statement before the first I.N.A. court martial said:

I saw with my own eyes that as far as fighting was concerned there was no difference. The Indian soldier stood his ground and fought to the last, why then should there be so much difference in their pay, allowances, food and living conditions.... It seemed to me to be extremely unjust...out of two and a half millions in the Indian Army, (113) not a single officer was given the command of a Division, and only one Indian was given the command of a Brigade. There were some very senior and competent Indian officers in the army and it appeared to me that lack of talent could not have been the reason for more Indians not getting higher commands. (114)

These grievances were echoed by many other I.C.Os. (115)


(113) That was roughly the strength of the Indian army at the end of the Second World War.


(115) Grievances were expressed by other I.C.Os. too, over slow Indianization and discrimination on pay and allowances in the Indian army. See the statements of Capt. S.M. Hussain, Capt. Eshan Qadir and Capt. Rodrigues to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers. See also the statement of Col. Burhanuddin before his court martial. The text

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Moreover, it is also evident that the V.C.Os. and the N.C.Os. were not happy about the adverse promotion policy in the pre-war Indian army. (116)

The service in Malaya and Singapore added new bitterness. The pre-war grievances over slow-Indianization and discriminatory treatment with regard to pay and allowances, as it would be evident from the above, had caused dissatisfaction specially among the I.C.Os. and the junior Indian officers. As the Indians went to Malaya and Singapore for active service on the eve of and after the outbreak of the Pacific War, they acquired new bitterness against the British. Many Indian officers in their statements to the I.N.A. Defence Counsel narrated the instances when they were victims of colour bar in the trains and clubs of Malaya. (117) During the Malayan campaign, the lack of air support and modern military machines like tanks, and anti-tank guns for the Indian soldiers, the heavy loss of arms and ammunitions in the initial engagements with the Japanese in northern

of the statement is available in The I.N.A. Speaks (Delhi, 1946) 56. The book is the compilation of the statements made by the accused I.N.A. officers in their court martials. The book is published by the Raj Kamal Publications, Delhi, for the All-India I.N.A. Enquiry and Relief Committee. Hereinafter referred to as the compilation of the statements of the accused I.N.A. officers.

(116) The statements of the V.C.Os., Fateh Khan and Puran Singh in their court martials. See the compilation of the statements of the accused I.N.A. officers. Ibid., 91-2, 129.

Malaya had created a situation where the Indian army was working against heaviest odds. (118) It had given birth to a general feeling among the Indian officers that in defending Malaya they had been given too exacting a task. (119) In that frame of mind they came across, during the campaign, instances when discriminatory treatment was meted out to the Indian troops, and to the Indian civilians in their evacuation from Malaya and Singapore.

(120) There were also instances of lack of fighting spirit among some superior British officers. (121) All these together damaged

(118) Lt. Gen. A.E. Percival, the G.O.C. Malaya Command, wrote that the 6/2 Punjab Regiment fought the Japanese troops gallantly near the Slim River in Malaya on 7 January 1942 in a "battle of men against machines." About the general condition in which the Indian men and officers were fighting during the Malayan campaign Lt. Gen. Percival wrote: "they had been fighting and moving by day and night for a month and few of them had any proper rest or relief. To their physical fatigue was added a mental fatigue brought about by the enemy's complete supremacy in the air and on the sea and by a general sense of futility. In the exhausting and enervating climate of Malaya this was too great a test of human endurance and the troops had reached a stage when their reactions were subnormal." See Percival, n. 1, 206.

(119) See Khan, n. 6, 22-5; see also the statements of Major Rawat, Lt. M. Riaz Khan, Capt. H.M. Arshad and Capt. Rodrigues to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers.

(120) See Khan, ibid., 25-6; the statement of Capt. F.K. Sangal before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 113; see also the statements of Capt. Ehsan Qadir, Capt. S.M. Hussain and Capt. H.M. Arshad to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers.

(121) Shah Nawaz Khan, who belonged to the 1/14 Punjab Regiment, in his statement before the first I.N.A. court martial, said: "In the battle of Singapore on February 13, 14 and 15, 1942, when the British officers, on my right and left flanks had disappeared with their units, I held on to my position..." Major Rawat in his statement to the I.N.A. Defence Counsel described the low morale of his commanding officer, one Brigadier Painter and other British officers of his regiment, The Garhwali Regiment.

(Contd. on next page)
the good faith of a large number of the Indian officers in British leadership. (122) The fall of Singapore, which was believed to be an impregnable stronghold of the British empire, ruined that confidence. (123)

The anti-British feeling of the I.C.Os. and the V.C.Os.: helpful but inadequate reason for volunteering in the I.N.A. That the discriminatory treatment to the Indian officers had created in them a suppressed anti-British feeling was evident from the

Fateh Khan, a V.C.O. of 5/14 Punjab Regiment, in his statement before his own court martial said that when his battalion was pierced through by the Japanese tanks on 7 January 1942 his company commander, a British Lieutenant, "ran away first". He added: "The rest of the British officers also ran away and there was nobody to control. I took the command of the company there and went on fighting for two days continuously and did not surrender..." See the statement of Shah Navaz Khan before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 104; the statement of Major Rawat before the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, the I.N.A. Papers; the statement of Major Fateh Khan before his court martial, see the compilation of the statements of the accused I.N.A. officers, n. 115, 92.

(122) Almost all the I.C.Os. and the V.C.Os. who joined the I.N.A. and later explained their behaviour on the occasion of the I.N.A. court martial confirmed it. See the statements of Capt. Eshan Jadir, Capt. H.N. Arshad, Capt. Rodrigues, Major Rawat, Lt. M. Riaz Khan, Capt. Gulam Hussain to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers; the statement of Capt. Shah Navaz Khan to the first I.N.A. court martial, ibid., 104-6; see also the statement of Fateh Khan in his court martial, compilation of the statements of the accused I.N.A. officers, ibid.

(123) Gen. Auchenleck in his memorandum to the senior British officers stressed on "the effect of the capitulation of Singapore on the Indian troops involved in it". He wrote: "The terrible tragedy of Singapore following on the fall of Hongkong must have seemed to the great majority of the V.C.Os. and rank and file to be the end of all things, and certainly of the British 'Raj' to whom the Army had been used for so many years of war and peace to look as its universal provider and protector, acting through their regimental officers". Gen. Auchenleck's memorandum to the senior British officers, n. 95, 3.
instances of unrest among Indian armed units before the outbreak of the Pacific War and during the Malayan campaign. (124) Due to their anti-British feelings these officers were likely to adopt an attitude after the surrender of Singapore which was more favourable, in comparison to that of the K.C.Os., to a plan of raising a national army for India's independence with the assistance of the British enemy.

But as a matter of fact, this factor by itself (the anti-British feeling of the I.C.Os.) was not powerful enough to drive them to join the I.N.A. For that, they wanted to be sure that the co-operation with the Japanese would not end in the Japanese domination over India. Their education had made them alert.

(124) Capt. S.M. Hussain in his statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial described an incident in Singapore in April 1940 when some units of his battalion (the 4th battalion of the 19th Hyderabad Regiment) went on strike protesting against the removal of an Indian officer, Lt. Ziauruddin, who was anti-British in his attitude. The situation was brought under control with the help of some senior Indian officers, one of whom was Capt. K.S. Thimayya. The latter's biographer described the incident as a "mutiny". The biographer wrote that before the "mutiny" broke out, the British and the Indian officers of the battalion were "not even speaking to each other" and the co-operation between the C.O. and his staff had vanished. Capt. S.M. Hussain's statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. trial; see also Evans, n. 98, 167-72. It is evident from Lt. G.S. Dhillon's statement in the first I.N.A. trial that during the Malayan campaign there was unrest in the first battalion of 14 Punjab Regiment. Lt. Dhillon said: "The situation became such that the commandant of the 7 M.R.C. wanted my presence in order to control the Indian troops who were getting dissatisfied due to discriminatory treatment. The commandant said that he had great confidence in my handling the troops". Lt. G.S. Dhillon's statement to the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 117. Mohan Singh wrote that I.C.Os., as a class, have been "discontented officers and this discontentment was the cause of grave danger for the army". Mohan Singh's statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers.
enough to realise the risk in taking military assistance from a power which was no less imperialistic in its outlook. A powerful and dependable political leadership might have held out a safeguard against the probable Japanese insincerity (as it did during 1943-5 when the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose was available to the I.N.A. in East Asia) and thus it would have succeeded in drawing the I.C.Os. in the I.N.A. But in 1942, the I.C.Os., by and large, could not feel quite confident about the sincerity of the Japanese. Nor the leadership available in that period did appear to be equally dependable to all the I.C.Os.

These two reasons explain the fact that in 1942, the I.C.Os. as a class, in spite of their lack of sympathy for the British, were not guided by the patriotic motive alone in joining the I.N.A. The security of the Indian P.O.Ws. and Indian civilians in East Asia, the desire of protecting India from the invasion by the Japanese army and the determination to resist the formation of the I.N.A. from within, were the other distinct motives which influenced the I.C.Os. in joining the I.N.A. More often, as it would be clear from the following pages, the decision of the I.C.O. and the V.C.O. was influenced by the mixture of any two or more of the motives mentioned above.

The consideration of security of the Indian civilians and P.O.Ws. in East Asia. The main snag which stood in the way of many I.C.Os. in joining the I.N.A. was the deep suspicion of the real intentions of the Japanese army regarding their proposal for India's independence. Running through the statements made by the I.C.Os. on the occasion of the I.N.A. court martial at the
end of the war, one feels convinced about it. (125) The deep suspicion about the Japanese intention explains the fact that a very large number of the I.C.Os. viewed, to a varying degree, the proposal of raising a national army in 1942 as a measure of defence against the misconduct of their ally. This section of the I.C.Os. included some officers who aspired for nothing more from their participation to the I.N.A. than the security of their own men and that of the Indian civilian community in East Asia from the Japanese atrocities. An officer of the Garhwal Regiment, Major Rawat, said in his statement to the I.N.A. Defence Counsel:

The Japanese were so mysterious that we could not know their intentions and this created all sorts of doubt in our minds. ...All my people preferred to be in the I.N.A. than to fall into the hands of Japanese. We were experiencing quite clearly that it was on account of that movement that the Japanese treatment began to be better towards Indians. The immediate thing that we had in mind was that we shall be able to protect the Indian civilian population from the Japanese atrocities. (126)

Another officer of this group, Capt. Rodrigues, said: "we decided to form I.N.A. (1) to protect Indian soldiers from Jap treatment; and (2) to protect Indian civilians and women from Japs". (127)

(125) The suspicion of the Japanese intentions was a common factor in the consideration of all groups of the I.C.0s. and V.C.0s. whose motive would be discussed here.


The number of this group of officers, who considered the security of the Indian P.O.W.s. and civilians in East Asia from the Japanese atrocities as the be all and end all of their participation to the I.N.A., could not have been many. (128) But in 1942, as it would be evident from the following paragraphs, many other officers could hardly neglect this consideration, although the importance attached to it varied.

Patriotic motivation. Patriotic feeling, more precisely the desire to liberate India, was certainly an important factor which influenced the decision of many Indian officers in joining the I.N.A. in 1942. Although the life in the Indian army had kept the Indian officers withdrawn from Indian politics (129) there was nothing, however, to refrain them from reacting on a nationalist line on any future issue involving the interests of their country. These officers, the I.C.Os. in particular, were young men, brought up and educated when the Indian National Congress had been vigorously conducting national movement for the country's freedom. It was natural, therefore, that they in general would feel more keenly the need for India's freedom. On

(128) Of all the witnesses called up by the Defence and the Prosecution of the I.N.A. court-martial, only two other V.C.Os. said that they joined the I.N.A. just to escape the fatigue duties of the Japanese army. The evidence of the Prosecution witnesses, Havildars Sucha Singh and Mohammad Sarwar in first I.N.A. court martial. See Motiram, ed., n. 23, 60, 64.

(129) The statements of Shah Nawaz Khan and Fateh Khan before their court-martials, see Motiram, ed., ibid., 103; compilation of the statements of the accused I.N.A. officers, n. 114, 94. Gen. K.S. Thimayya's biographer wrote: "As a soldier, he had been taught that to think of politics was bad form". See Evans, n. 99, 110.
the other hand, it was also doubtful if the desire to liberate India was a factor which alone could explain the participation of the I.C.Os. and the V.C.Os. in the I.N.A. in 1942. (130) Among the I.N.A. officers who appeared as witnesses for the Prosecution or for the Defence in the I.N.A. courtsmartials, not many, certainly no I.C.O., claimed to have been influenced by patriotism alone in joining the I.N.A. in 1942. (131)

The officers with mixed motives. A larger number of I.C.Os. and V.C.Os., in joining the I.N.A. in 1942, had mixed motives. They thought that the I.N.A. could not only fight for their country's freedom from the British, but it would be an useful instrument for protecting India from the excesses of a Japanese invasion. The knowledge of the easy victories scored

(130) With the few exception like Mohan Singh and Mohammad Akram.

(131) None of the officers who did make statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial in 1945-6, claimed to have been guided by patriotism alone in 1942. Only one accused I.N.A. officer claimed that patriotism was his sole motive of joining the I.N.A. in 1942. See the statement of Subedar Singhara Singh before his court martial, compilation of the statements of the accused I.N.A. officers, n. 114, 70.

Of the witnesses for the Prosecution only two officers expressed the similar views. See the evidence of Subedar-Major Baboo Ram and Lance Naik Mohinder Singh before the first I.N.A. court martial. Motiram, ed., n. 23, 55, 76. To what extent the two Prosecution witnesses were sincere in their patriotic motive was not above doubt. Mohinder Singh said in his evidence that he defected to the British in 1944. Moreover, the two witnesses for the Prosecution and the accused I.N.A. officers who claimed patriotism as their only motive of joining the I.N.A. in 1942 were all V.C.Os. Many of the V.C.Os. who joined I.N.A. in 1942 did so as a result of the abolition of the rank of the V.C.O. from the proposed national army. It has been mentioned in the previous chapter.
by the Japanese armed forces during the first half of 1942 and
the awareness of the military vulnerability of the India during
the same period (132) had convinced many I.C.O.s. and the V.C.O.s.
that the Japanese army would attack India. It was also evident
to these officers that if the Japanese army did so, they (the
Japanese army) would not only inflict war damages on India but
they (the Japanese army) might even step into the British shoes.
It would be evident from the following pages that in a strong
I.N.A., accompanying the Japanese army into India, many I.C.O.s.
and V.C.O.s. saw the best way of defending India's interest.

Although the two motives, the desires to liberate India
from the British and to safeguard her interest in case of the
Japanese attack, influenced the decision of many I.N.A. officers,
the proportion of the influences of the two motives in the mind
of the officers varied. Capt. P.K. Sahgal, for example, said in

(132) It was a fact that immediately after the surrender
of Singapore, the main outpost of the British Empire in the East,
India became exposed to the foreign invasion. This military
unpreparedness of India was evident from the secret report of
Field-Marshal Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army,
to the Secretary of state for war in London. In the summary of
his report Wavell wrote: "...India command...had been rudely
awakened from a somewhat detached interest in the war by the
shock of Japan's aggression and the wholly unexpected disasters
in Malaya and then in Burma. When the danger approached closely,
both the armed forces and the nation were unprepared to meet
invasion...in March 1942 India had not a single fully-trained
division. The Air Force...was similarly ineffective. And the
Eastern Fleet was unable to control Indian waters. So India
stood in greater peril of invasion than for some hundreds of
years". Secret Report from Field-Marshal Wavell to the Secretary
of State for War: Second Despatch from India Command Covering
period March to December 1942, 1943, 11, Combined Inter-Service
Historical Section, India and Pakistan, Registered File No.
601/7407/H, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Herein-
after referred to as Gen. Wavell's Report to the Secretary of
War.
his statement in the first I.N.A. trial that he in spite of his desire to see his "motherland free from all foreign domination" first kept out of the I.N.A. in 1942 because he was "sceptic of the intentions of the Japanese." About the circumstances which compelled him to join the I.N.A. later, he said:

However, during the period between June and the end of August 1942 events of far-reaching importance took place which compelled me to revise earlier decision to keep out of the Indian National Army. ...the Japanese forces met with the most astounding successes in every theatre of the war, and an attack on India appeared to be imminent.... The last Indian drafts that had arrived to reinforce Singapore consisted only of raw recruits and gave one a fair indication of the type of men available for the defence of India. Officers who came to Singapore shortly before its surrender told us that there was no modern equipment available for the army in India.... The information we had about the state of defence in India was by no means encouraging and the most optimist amongst us could not be sure of the ability of the British to stop the Japanese advance.... After protracted discussions the only solution that we could think of for our country's problems was the formation of a strong and well-disciplined armed body which should fight for the liberation of India from the existing alien rule, should be able and ready to provide protection to their countrymen against any possible molestation by the Japanese, and to resist any attempt by the latter to establish themselves as rulers of the country in place of the British. This being also the avowed object of the Indian National Army, the questions that began to agitate the mind of us, who had so far stayed from that Army was whether it was not our duty to join that army for securing the freedom of our country - not so much from the British who could hold her no longer but from the Japanese who were bent upon invading India. (133)

Other officers of this group were aware of the military unpreparedness of India. But the relative importance attached to the two motives, namely, patriotism and the protection of

(133) Statement of Capt. P.K. Sahgal before the first I.N.A. court martial, see Motiram, ed., n. 23, 113-4.
India from the Japanese invasion, was hardly clear from the statements they made before their court martial or from their writings. The statement of a V.C.O. before the I.N.A. court martial corroborates this analysis. He said:

We, Indians in Malaya, had to believe that if the Japanese would sweep over India, then the conditions and the plight of the Indians would be worse than it was under the British. Taking in view... the above facts and hardships we had undergone, I could do nothing but join the Indian National Army. It was the first time in my life that I realised that I was an Indian and the freedom was my birth right as it was the birth right of every Britisher and every American. (134)

In this group of the I.N.A. officers there were some who were influenced, apart from the two motives mentioned above, by the consideration of the security of the Indian P.O.W.s, and civilian population in East Asia. Col. Burhanuddin's statement before his court martial illustrates the motives of these officers. He said:

Thinking on these lines I came to the conclusion that the only way I could serve my country effectively was to join and help in organizing a strong I.N.A.... It was therefore not only a question of liberating India, but of immediately protecting Indian lives and property in the Far East and if need be in later in India. (135)

(134) Statement of Capt. Jaswant Singh (V.C.O.) before his court martial; see also the statement of Major Puran Singh (V.C.O.) before his court martial, compilation of the statements of the accused I.N.A. officers, n. 115, 103-9, 132-4. Lt. Dhillon (V.C.O.) and Major-General A.C. Chatterji (a medical officer of the Indian army) belonged to this group of officers. See the statement of Lt. G.S. Dhillon before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 113-9; Chatterji, n. 4, 350-1.

(135) Statement of Col. Burhanuddin before his court martial, see also the statement of Major Fateh Khan before his court martial, compilation of the statements of the accused I.N.A. officers, ibid., 59, 95.
The motive to resist the formation of the I.N.A.: There was another section of officers, mostly the I.C.O.s., who shared the strong suspicion of all the previous groups of I.C.O.s. and V.C.O.s. about the intentions of the Japanese. They were no less patriotic than the officers who belonged to the preceding group. But this group of officers differed from the preceding group of officers in their lack of confidence in Mohan Singh’s ability to deal with the Japanese if — and many officers of this group felt sure about it — the Japanese would double-cross with the Indians. Shah Nawaz Khan, who had known Mohan Singh since long and had served in the same Indianized regiment which Mohan had officered, made no secret of this in his statement before the I.N.A. court martial. (136)

This group of officers were initially opposed to the idea of raising the I.N.A. at all in the existing circumstances. (137) They naturally came closer to Lt. Col. N.S. Gill in the initial period which preceded the raising of the I.N.A. Lt. Col. Gill,

(136) Shah Nawaz Khan, in his statement to the first I.N.A. court martial, said: "With all due regard to Capt. Mohan Singh’s sincerity and leadership which he displayed later — I had known him well for the last 10 years — he had always been an efficient, but very average officer.... I was fully convinced, knowing Mohan Singh so well, that politically at any rate, he would not be able to cope with the Japanese political intrigues and we would be exploited by them for their own ends." Statement of Shah Nawaz Khan before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 106. Emphasis original. Mr. Mahboob Ahmed, an I.C.O., belonged to this group of officers. Mr. Ahmed told the writer that "Mohan Singh was just one of us, he had no such towering personality and political leadership as Netaji had." Discussion with Mr. Mahboob Ahmed at Kuala Lumpur in August 1963.

(137) Statement of Shah Nawaz Khan before the first I.N.A. court martial, ibid., 106.
as it has been already pointed out, was earnestly insisting on a
go-slow policy in raising the I.N.A., contrary to the opinion of
Mohan Singh. In his statement to the Defence Counsel of the
first I.N.A. court martial, Lt. Col. Gill explained the reason
of his mental reservation about co-operation with the Japanese
and said:

Therefore arose the difference of convictions and
actions between me and Mohan Singh. As much as I
knew I judged Shah Nawaz to be with me and thought
to rely upon him. I thought that his reaction was
the same as that of mine. I considered him to be
a man of character and there were lots of people
behind him. (133)

At another place Lt. Col. Gill suggested that the strength of
the I.C.0s, who backed Shah Nawaz Khan was between fifty and
sixty. (139)

In May 1942, when volunteers were separated from the non-
volunteers, these I.C.0s. met several times. Shah Nawaz Khan
has pointed out that in those meetings "it was decided that
since we had failed in our first objective to prevent the forma-
tion of the I.N.A. the next best thing was for senior officers
to join it." The immediate objects of doing so had little to do
with such lofty principles as the liberation of India. Khan had
pointed out that the objects of these I.C.0s. in joining the
I.N.A. in May 1942 were to protect the Indian P.O.Ws. and prevent
them from "being exploited by the Japs" and to "sabotage and

(138) Statement of Col. N.S. Gill before the Defence
Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers.

(139) Ibid.
wreck" the I.N.A. from within, as soon as the bad intentions of the Japanese would be evident. (140) Thus a resistance unit came into existence in the I.N.A. and it was reinforced by the support of the senior officer, Lt. Col. Gill.

Some events took place in the middle of 1942 which clearly manifested this resistance. Lt. Col. Gill had come back from the Tokyo Conference with his suspicion of the Japanese intentions strengthened. Reinforced by the support of the I.C.Os. he challenged an order of the Japanese army to abolish the P.O.W. Headquarters which had been set-up after the fall of Singapore. (141) Shah Nawaz Khan also mentioned that he did not only dislike Mohan Singh's proposal that the army should take part in the Bangkok Conference (June 1942) but he openly disapproved of the method by which Mohan Singh wanted the Indian P.O.Ws. to be represented in that conference. (142)

It is difficult to know if the resistance did grow strong enough for Mohan Singh's task. It can, however, surely be said that the resistance was not allowed to grow and before the Bangkok Conference (in June 1942) both Lt. Col. Gill and Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan got transferred from Singapore - the former by

(140) For the decisions of these meetings see the statement of Shah Nawaz Khan before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 106.


(142) The statement of Shah Nawaz Khan before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 107; see also Khan, n. 6, 49.
an order from the Japanese army and the latter by that of Mohan Singh. (143)

3. The Imperial General Headquarters' attitude towards Indian independence in early 1942 as a factor in the formation of the I.N.A.

Like the attitudes of the leaders of the Indian community in East Asia and the Indian officers towards the formation of the I.N.A., the attitude of the Imperial General Headquarters (I.G.H.Q.) towards the question of Indian freedom played a role in raising that army.

It has been already pointed out that on the eve of the Pacific War the Japanese Government were not keen on bringing India within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The I.G.H.Q. had only a policy with a limited objective. They wanted to support the Indian nationalists in South East Asia to enlist their help in facilitating the task of the Japanese army in the

(143) Col. Gill later on said that he was transferred from Singapore by an order from the Japanese army. See the statement of Col. N.S. Gill before the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers.

The staff officer of Lt. Col. Gill's headquarters, Capt. S.M. Hussain, however, expressed his suspicion about Mohan Singh's influence in the transfer of Lt. Col. Gill. Capt. Hussain said: "But as Gill was very popular among the officers and Mohan Singh got the doubt that he might hinder the progress of the I.N.A. So he managed to get Gill sent to Bangkok." Capt. S.M. Hussain's statement before the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers. For the details of the circumstances which led to the transfer of Shah Navaz Khan see Khan, n. 6, 49-50.
campaigns for Burma and Malaya. (144) During the Malayan campaign, on 10 January 1942, a decision was taken in the Liaison Conference between the Japanese Cabinet and the I.G.H.Q. and this decision summarised their attitude towards India and the Indian freedom during the first half of 1942.

The policy formulated in January 1942

The decision (145) underlined that the aim of the Japanese military policy regarding India was "to cut off the transportation route between U.S.A. and Britain," (146) and try by propaganda means to make the Indians not "to co-operate with Britain." It also pointed out that among the Indians in East Asia "the anti-British movement schemes should be strengthened according to the development of military campaign. In charge of this scheme should be Supreme Military Headquarters and other governmental organizations should co-operate." (147)

(144) The attitude of the Japanese Government towards India and that of the I.G.H.Q. towards the Indian community in East Asia prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War have been discussed in chapter one of this study.


(146) It refers to the air ferry route between the Allied base in India and the American base in China.

(147) Four days later, on 14 January 1942, another liaison conference between the Japanese Government and the Military Headquarters agreed upon a draft statement to be made by Prime Minister Tojo with regard to "independence of Burma and India." In general terms the draft mentioned that the "Imperial
The I.G.H.Q., not keen about the I.N.A. Certain important conclusions can be drawn from the above decision. The Japanese Government desired to fan up anti-British feelings in India through propaganda means. The decision, however, did not suggest that the Japanese Government contemplated any military campaign towards India. Their aim was to weaken the Allies by cutting off the air supply-route between China and India.

Although I.G.H.Q., as it did before the outbreak of the Pacific War, continued to show interest in the Indian communities in East Asia, the decision did not mention any specific plan of raising an army from the Indian P.O.W.s. to help India's liberation. It was only mentioned that the "schemes" of "anti-British movement" would be encouraged. Was it possible that the encouragement of such an anti-British movement in East Asia implied the Japanese support for the formation of the I.N.A.? Assuming that it did, it cannot be denied that the pursuit of such a favourable policy was made subservient to the military necessity of their (the Japanese) army. By implication, the top-most Japanese military authorities would support the raising of the I.N.A. only when they would have in their hand a plan of military campaign towards India. Was there any such plan in the first half of 1942?

Government is not hesitating whole-hearted effort to help the independence movement of India...in and out of India." Prime Minister's statement regarding the independence of Burma and India, English translation of the decision taken in the Liaison Conference of the Japanese Cabinet and the I.G.H.Q. on 14 January 1942, War History Office, Government of Japan. Photostat copy of the decision obtained by the writer from the Japanese War History Office.

But the decisions of the liaison meeting on 10 January (1942) more specifically outlined the objectives of the Japanese policy than the general terms of the draft of Gen. Tojo's statement.
As it has been pointed out, the decision of the Liaison Conference of 10 January (1942) did not mention any such plan. Moreover, with the capture of Burma by the Japanese army in March 1942, the north-western border of their Co-Prosperity Sphere, as defined before the outbreak of the Pacific War, was secured. (148) The previous plan did not provide for any further advance. In the period that followed, the I.C.H.Q. gave the utmost priority to the consolidation of their position in the territories which had already been conquered. (149) The post-war Japanese official account of their military operations in Burma shows that their army in Burma, having completed the conquest of that country, immediately addressed itself to the two-fold tasks of strengthening its line of communication with the rear areas of the Co-Prosperity Sphere (namely, Malaya, Indo-China etc.) and securing the defence of Burma against the probable Allied

(148) See chapter one.

(149) There were two main reasons for adopting this policy. The condition of the Pacific War had started giving unfavourable indications for Japan from the middle of 1942. The advance of the victorious Japanese navy was checked at the battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 and in the battle of Midway (June 1942) the Japanese Navy was defeated. Japan's forces withdrew from the Guadal Canal in February 1943.

Moreover, from 1942 Japan was losing merchant ships at an increasing rate. She lost, between December 1941 and December 1942, 241 merchant vessels of 1123156 tons; in 1943, 434 ships of 1820919 tons; in the first six months of 1944, 315 ships of 2065194 tons. These losses progressively weakened the connection between the homeland and the Southern Regions and removed the possibility of reinforcements from Japan. Consequently, consolidation was preferred to further expansion. See Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby, Captain C.T. Addis, Brigadier M.R. Roberts, Colonel G.T. Wards, Air Vice-Marshal N.L. Denoon, The War against Japan: The Decisive Battles, Sir James Butler, ed., History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series (London, 1961) III, 227-8, 233, 285-6, 475-6. Hereinafter referred to as Kirby and others.
counter-attacks. (150)

The I.G.H.Q. continued to prefer the policy of stabilization to that of further expansion during the first half of 1942. This is evident from an Imperial decree issued on 29 June 1942. This decree re-defined the responsibilities of the Japanese Southern Army. According to this decree, the Japanese Southern army would strive to achieve self-sufficiency and stability in the occupied areas and perfect the defence of those areas. (151)

The pursuit of a policy by the I.G.H.Q., which might have been favourable for raising the I.N.A., had been subordinated to


(151) Imperial Decree issued on 29 June 1942: Orders relating to changes in the responsibilities of the Southern Army, Combined Inter-Service Historical Section, India and Pakistan, Registered File No. 601/7775/4, Translation of the Japanese Documents, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

The non-Japanese sources also agree that the Japanese army did not intend to carry out a military campaign towards India during the first half of 1942. The war-time foreign Minister of Italy, Count Ciano, in the entry of his diary on 7 March 1942 wrote: "The Japanese admirals have informed us that they intended to proceed towards India." This created concern in Ciano's mind who never liked the Japanese victories in East Asia because "after all they belong to the yellow race and their successes are gained at the expense of the white race." Immediately the Italian ambassador in Tokyo sought a conference with the Japanese authorities and the intentions of the Japanese were recorded in the entry of Ciano's diary on 15 March 1942. He wrote: "...Japanese have defined their plans. No attack on India, which would disperse their forces in a field that is too vast and unknown, no attack upon Russia, an extension of the conflict towards Australia, where it is evident that the Americans and the British are preparing a counter-attack." Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., Ciano's Diary (London, 1947) 443-6.

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the military necessities of the Japanese army. It was quite natural, therefore, that in the absence of any plan of military campaign towards India in the first half of 1942, the I.G.H.Q. did not feel any urgency in hastening the formation of the I.N.A. The primary objective, which the Japanese Government wanted to achieve in the first half of 1942, was to foment an anti-British sentiment in India (and in the Indian community of East Asia) through propaganda means. The I.G.H.Q., more particularly their Second Bureau, therefore, went ahead with the re-organization of the liaison agency as suggested by Major Fujiwara soon after the capture of Kuala Lumpur by the Japanese army. (152)

The formation of the Iwakuro Kikan

In March 1942 the I.G.H.Q. commissioned a senior officer of the Imperial Guard Regiment, Col. Iwakuro, to reorganize the liaison agency into a larger body. (153) Col. Iwakuro took over

That the Japanese Army in Burma had gone on the defensive was correctly assessed by the C-in-C of the Indian Army, Field Marshal Wavell, when the Japanese Burma army did not take the advantage of the military unpreparedness of India. Field Marshal Wavell, in a secret and personal telegram, informed the British Prime Minister on 14 June 1942: "Situation as regards Japan has changed considerably lately...May and June looked like being critical months. Eastern fleet was in no position to oppose Japanese attack, airforce was weak and land forces quite insufficient. Japanese contended themselves with driving Chinese and ourselves out of upper Burma and turned east." From Gen. Wavell to Churchill, 14 June 1942, Gen. Wavell's Report to the Secretary of War, n. 131, Appendix 'E', 16.

(152) Fujiwara's suggestion for the expansion of the Liaison Agency has been discussed in chapter one.

(153) The liaison agency was also known as the Iwakuro Kikan (Iwakuro Department). It consisted of General Affairs Department, Political Department, Military Department, Special

(Contd. on next page)
the charge from Major Fujiwara on 12 April 1942 and completed the work of reorganization of the liaison agency by the end of April. The Iwakuro Kikan started functioning from May 1942.

Iwakuro's own assessment of the intentions of the higher Japanese military authorities. At the time of his appointment as the chief of the liaison agency Col. Iwakuro did not receive any specific instructions from the Second Bureau of the I.G.H.Q. regarding the formation of the I.N.A. (154) His own impression was that in 1942 Prime Minister Gen. Tojo had no real interest in the affairs of India or of the Indian community in East Asia and he (Gen. Tojo) was opposed to setting up a Provisional Government for India in East Asia. (155) The Second Bureau of Service Department and Propaganda Department. The Headquarters of the Iwakuro Kikan was at Bangkok. The Special Service Department was situated in Penang. The Military Department was at Singapore. The Propaganda Department was at Saigon. The Burma Branch of the Iwakuro Kikan was in charge of Lt. Col. Kitabe and it functioned under the command of the Japanese 18th Army. There was another branch of Iwakuro Department at Hongkong. Discussion with Gen. Iwakuro in October 1963 at Tokyo; Discussion with Col. Kitabe in October 1963 at Kyoto, Japan.

For all information used in this section dealing with the Iwakuro Kikan, the writer has entirely depended on the notes of his discussion at Tokyo in October 1963 with Gen. Iwakuro who, as the chief of the liaison agency, was in charge of implementing the Japanese policy towards India and the Indian community in East Asia during the greater part of 1942.

(154) Col. Iwakuro was not given to understand either by the I.G.H.Q. or the Southern Army Headquarters that the Japanese Government were bound by Major Fujiwara's agreement with Fritam Singh in December 1941 and his (Major Fujiwara's) promise to Mohan Singh during the Malayan campaign regarding all-out Japanese support for raising the I.N.A. Discussion with Gen. Iwakuro in October 1963 at Tokyo.

(155) Gen. Iwakuro told the writer that Gen. Tojo's interest in Indian affairs grew after he (Gen. Tojo) had met Subhas Chandra Bose in 1943. Ibid.
the I.G.H.Q. favoured the idea that the Indian community in East Asia should be organized but the Bureau left the task entirely to the Southern Army. Col. Iwakuro was told that the liaison agency would work under the command of the Southern Army. The Southern Army, which was occupied with the hundred and one odd tasks of administration and defence of the vast regions of South East Asia which had come under its control, (156) had had little suggestions to make on Indian affairs. Gen. Iwakuro told the writer that since his appointment as the Chief of the Liaison Agency to the end of 1942, the Southern Army Headquarters gave him virtually a free hand in all matters regarding the Indian affairs.

Iwakuro chose his own tasks. Left entirely to himself, Col. Iwakuro made his own assessment of the intentions of his superior authorities. He had no doubt in 1942 that, whatever might have been the attitude of the I.G.H.Q. towards the Indian affairs, it should fit in as a part of their own military strategy. Being aware of the attitudes of Gen. Tojo, the Second Bureau of the I.G.H.Q. and the Headquarters of the Southern Army on Indian affairs, Col. Iwakuro felt quite certain that there was no immediate plan of military campaign towards India. It appeared to him that the higher military authorities wanted the independence movement of the Indians in East Asia to be just carried on. They

(156) After the fall of Burma, the various Japanese armies which had been used in the invasion of Malaya, Burma, Java and the Philippines were all brought under the overall command of the newly set-up Southern Army. Ibid.
expected that the existence of such a movement in East Asia would create trouble for the British in India. Col. Iwakuro's own task would be nothing more than keeping the movement "alive".

The main objective which Col. Iwakuro, therefore, wanted his liaison agency to achieve was to create anti-British sentiment among the Indians, particularly those in India. To achieve that end, he planned to send Indian intelligence agents from East Asia to work up unrest in India and to carry out anti-British propaganda through wireless and other means. Two more objectives, namely, to support the Indian Independence League and to organize an Indian National Army, were kept in his programme. Col. Iwakuro squeezed in the last two objectives in his plan of action even without any instruction from his higher authorities because he understood, as his predecessor had done, that without those items the co-operation of the Indians could not be secured.

Some concluding observations on the attitude of the Japanese military authorities towards the I.N.A.

It can be concluded from the above discussion that in the earlier part of 1942 the highest military authorities of Japan did not have any comprehensive plan to raise a liberation army for India. Although organizing the Indians was considered desirable by the I.C.S., the task was not considered important and it was left to one officer under the Southern Army. The Iwakuro Kikan attached more importance to anti-British propaganda. A plan to hasten the formation of the I.N.A. with the earnest
purpose of helping Indian nationalists in their desire to liberate India was something more than what the liaison agency actually wanted to follow in 1942.

4. **Circumstances hastening the formation of the I.N.A.**

In the previous sections of this chapter the hindrances which delayed the formation of the I.N.A. during the first half of 1942 have been discussed. A coincidence of some favourable circumstances in the latter half of the year (1942), however, hastened the formation of the proposed army in September 1942. In bringing the I.N.A. formally into existence the influence of two factors would be stressed. These were the Quit India movement which started in India in August 1942 and the plan of the Imperial General Headquarters, which developed in the latter half of 1942, to open a limited front on the Indo-Burma border.

**The impact of the Quit India movement in India on the formation of the I.N.A.**

The Bangkok Conference, as it has already been pointed out in this chapter, had met in the background of unrest in India. The newly appointed Council of Action lost no time in taking up more urgent matters immediately after the Conference. Between 24 June and 9 July 1942 the Council of Action had at Bangkok nine sessions which distributed the portfolios among the members of the Council, made the essential appointments to the League Secretariat and sought to work out a financial scheme for the
League and the proposed army. (157) The members of the Council of Action at the same time followed the events in India with keen interest and radio broadcasts were made to give "correct information" about the Indian Independence Conference at Bangkok to the Congress Working Committee which was meeting at that time in India. (158)

The decision of the Congress Working Committee of 1 May 1942 that the ruling power should withdraw from India or the Congress would launch a civil non-cooperation movement against it was modified on 14 July (1942). (159) The decision was endorsed by the All-India Congress Committee on 8 August 1942. This was followed by the arrest of the Congress leaders which brought in its train the spontaneous outbreak of violence all

(157) In its first three sessions the Council of Action dealt with the distribution of portfolios. After a great deal of discussion on various suggestions the Council of Action finally agreed on the allotment of portfolios on 1 July 1942. The portfolios of Liaison, Finance, Education, Intelligence and Transport were allotted to the President of the Council of Action, Sri Rash Behari Bose; portfolios of Information and Publicity were allotted to Mr. K.P.R. Menon, portfolios of Relief and Medical Organization and Civil Volunteers were allotted to Mr. N. Raghavan, portfolio of the Military Department was allotted to Lt. Col. Gilani. Mohan Singh, who was appointed C.O.C. of the proposed I.N.A. was allotted the portfolio of General Staff. See the minutes of the first nine meetings of the Council of Action held between 24 June 1942 and 9 July 1942 at Bangkok. The Indian Independence League Papers, National Archives of India, New Delhi. Hereinafter referred to as the minutes of the meeting of Council of Action from 24 June to 9 July 1942, I.I.L. Papers.

(158) On 9 July 1942, at the request of Mr. N. Raghavan, the member in charge of the portfolio of Information agreed to circulate to the members every day a bulletin containing news regarding India. It was also decided that broadcasts would made by the members of the Council to keep the Congress Party abreast of their activities. Ibid.

(159) See Bhattacharjee, n 77, 133-4.
over India and its ruthless suppression by the Indian
Government. (160)

Before long, these items of news were known in East
Asia (161) and agitated the Indian communities all over the

(160) For a systematic account of these events see Amba
Prasad, The Indian Revolt of 1942 (Delhi, 1958) 57-60.

(161) Bangkok Chronicle gave an extensive coverage of the
news of the August (1942) revolt in India. On 3 August 1942
(p.1) it carried the headlines: "INDIA DEMANDS INDEPENDENCE NOW,
GANDHI DECLARES: WON'T CONSIDER BRITISH PLAN OF POSTWAR FREEDOM".
On 7 August (p.5) the same newspaper reported: "The stage is set
in Bombay today for the most epochal event in the history of
India, may, in the history of Western domination over Asia. This
day, the All-India Congress Committee is meeting to ratify its
decision to launch Mass Civil Disobedience and to force Anglo-
Saxon domination and tyranny out of India."

On 10 August (p.1) the same newspaper reported: "The crisis
in India has reached its climax. Last week the Indian National
Congress passed the resolution demanding the withdrawal of the
British and Americans from India and the British Government has
replied to this demand with the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana
Abdul Kalam Azad, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and other Indian
leaders. Rioting has broken out in Bombay and other cities....
The situation is extremely grave." The newspaper, on the same
day, in a long editorial (p.4) wrote: "The decision of the Indian
National Congress is tantamount to India's declaration of war
against Britain...." On 12 August (p.1) the same newspaper pub-
lished two long reports under the headlines: "DEATH ROLL UP &
BRITISH ATROCITIES INCREASE AS UNREST SPREADS IN INDIA", and
INDIAN TROOPS IN EGYPT STAGE VIOLENT REVOLT AGAINST BRITISH".
The revolt among the Indian troops in Egypt was said to have
"occurred when the news of the arrests of Gandhi and other Indian
leaders became known to them." On the same day (p.5) the news-
paper reproduced the text of the statement issued by Subhas
Chandra Bose from Germany which said: "The clarion call for the
last battle for our national liberation has sounded. Every man,
woman and child must participate in this struggle irrespective
of the sufferings and sacrifices which it involve."

On 13 August (p.1) the same newspaper carried detailed
reports of the outbreak of violence in various parts of India
and on its suppression under the headlines: "DEATH STALKS INDIAN
CITIES AS BRITISHERS SHOOT DOWN PATRIOTS: CRISIS HITS CLIMAX;
STRIKES, RIOTS SPREADING TO ALL PROVINCES". The next day, on
16 August 1942 (p.1), the same newspaper carried the headlines:
"CASUALTIES MOUNT IN INDIA'S BATTLE FOR FREEDOM; OVER 500
PATRIOTS DEAD 3000 INJURED."
region. (162) It seemed to them from all these events that an open anti-British revolt was inevitable in India. Moreover, the adoption of non-peaceful means by their countrymen against the British seemed to have convinced the Indians in East Asia that they were on the right side of the fence in their struggle against the British. The civilian leaders eagerly waited for the declaration from the Imperial Japanese Government clarifying their opinion on the various points put forward at the Tokyo and then at the Bangkok Conference to proceed further with the movement. (163) But the military leadership, more specifically Mohan Singh, read in the news of unrest in India a green light signal to proceed with the task of raising the national army.

The J.N.A. formed. The campaign for enlisting the recruits was geared up after the Bangkok Conference and more particularly in August. It has been already pointed out that the volunteers had been separated from non-volunteers in May (1942) and before

(162) On 13 August 1942 (p.5) Bangkok Chronicle reported: "Aroused by the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi and other leaders of the Indian independence movement, the Malaya branch of the Indian Independence League today is stated to hold extensive anti-British demonstration in the principal cities throughout Malaya.... Tens of thousand Indians demonstrated on Wednesday in the streets of the Shonan city carrying posters with the inscriptions "India for the Indians" or "Independence for India Now or Never...." At Medan, Sumatra the Indian independence League also carried through a big anti-British demonstration...." On 14 August (p.2) the same newspaper reported that the Indian community in Shanghai met on 12 August and adopted the resolution: "The Indian community in Shanghai expresses condemnation of the inhuman act of arresting all the leaders of the Indian National Congress."

(163) Toye, n. 93, 8.
the Bangkok Conference twenty thousand volunteers had agreed to join the I.N.A. (164) By the end of August 1942, about forty thousand P.O.Ws. in all had agreed to join the I.N.A. (165) There was enthusiastic response for enlistment from the Indian civilians. Measures were taken to infuse national spirit among the recruits. (166) The Japanese liaison agency gave its consent to raise and arm one division from the Indian P.O.Ws. (167) Consequently, the structure for the division was worked out, a separate army act, the Indian National Army Act, was drafted and a scale of pocket money for the I.N.A. soldiers suggested. (168) On 1 September 1942, came into existence the First Division of the Indian National Army, an armed force of sixteen thousand and


(165) It has been mentioned earlier in this chapter.

(166) Lectures used to be delivered to the volunteers. These lectures dealt with political and economic problems of India, the lives of the Indian national leaders and the Indian efforts for achieving freedom. Men of different faiths were encouraged to live together, take meals from the same kitchen and celebrate their religious festivals jointly. See Gianl, n. 15, 90.

(167) Toyg, n. 93, 9.

(168) For the details of the structure of the first I.N.A. Division see Khan, n. 6, 63-60; also the Opening Address of the Council for the Prosecution in the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 6.

The Prosecution witness, Lt. D.C. Nag said that arms supplied to the I.N.A. by the Japanese army "were British arms and not Japanese arms." He also said the I.N.A. Act was drafted by himself in August-September 1942 under Mohan Singh's order. See the evidence of the Prosecution witness, Lt. D.C. Nag, before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 22.

(Contd. on next page)
three hundred officers and men. (169)

Change in the attitude of the Japanese military authorities towards I.N.A.

The consent given by the Japanese liaison agency to raise one division of I.N.A. in September 1942 was the result of a slight change in its attitude effected by the development of a plan of military campaign towards India. By the end of June 1942 the naval and the army authorities of Japan agreed among themselves to co-operate mutually to ensure the defence of the region of South East Asia under their occupation from the counter-attack of the Allies. (170) This agreement envisaged the necessity of destroying "the enemy air forces in S.W. China and Northeast India" to perfect the defence of Burma.

The monthly rates of pay to the I.N.A. personnel and the P.O.W.s suggested by Mohan Singh to the Council of Action on 9 July 1942 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I.N.A.</th>
<th>Prisoners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sepoys, Lance Naik</td>
<td>$5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naiks</td>
<td>$7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havildar</td>
<td>$10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>$15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt. &amp; Lt.</td>
<td>$25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains &amp; Majors</td>
<td>$25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>$25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other amenities $1 per head for both I.N.A. personnel and the Prisoners. See the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Action from 24 June to 9 July 1942, I.I.L. Papers, n. 157.

(169) Toye, n. 93, 9; Chatterji, n. 4, 35.

On 22 August 1942 the Chief of General Staff of the I.O.H.Q., General Sugiyama, issued an order instructing the G.O.C. Southern Army, Field Marshal Count Terauchi, to prepare for a campaign to occupy "the important areas of North-East Assam and Chittagong." The objective of the plan was to "facilitate the air operation" mentioned above and to endeavour "to intercept the air supply route to China." (171) To implement this plan the Japanese army in Burma decided to take Imphal, Dimapur and Tinsukia. (172) This campaign was to open sometime between the last quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943. (173) Ultimately, the campaign could not be carried out as the Japanese plans clashed with those of the British to penetrate into the Arakan and north Burma during the last quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943. (174)

(171) From Gen. Sugiyama, Chief of General Staff to G.O.C. Southern Army, Count Terauchi, 22 August 1942, _ibid._

(172) The Japanese Account of their operations in Burma, n. 150, 3.

(173) There appears some difference on the proposed period during which the operation would have to be started. Gen. Sugiyama's order dated 22 August 1942 mentions that the time for the opening of the operation would be "from the middle or the end of October this year onwards." See Gen. Sugiyama to G.O.C. Southern Army, Count Terauchi, n. 171. The post-war Japanese account mentioned that "the date of the offensive was expected to be the end of February 1943. See the Japanese Account of their operations in Burma, n. 150, 3.

(174) The Japanese Account of their operations in Burma, _ibid._
But the possibility of the campaign towards India had urged the liaison agency in the last quarter of 1942 to intensify the movement in East Asia for India's independence. It can be assumed that the raising of a limited armed force from the Indian P.O.Ws. was also favoured on the expectation that it could be used in the ensuing campaign for the same purpose as the Japanese 28th Army had used the Indian units during the Malayan campaign.

5. Nature of recruitment to the I.N.A. in 1942

The charges of the Prosecution of the first I.N.A. court martial (1945-6)

At the end of the World War II, the Prosecution of the I.N.A. court martial brought the charge that discriminatory treatment had been meted out to those Indian P.O.Ws. who did not join the I.N.A. in 1942. The Prosecution also challenged the voluntary character of the recruitment for the I.N.A. in 1942.

The charges against the accused in the first I.N.A. court martial were of "waging war against King Emperor" during 1944-5 and of murder and abetment to murder in the field of battle in 1945. (176) Although evidently these charges had little to do with the recruitment for the I.N.A. in 1942, the Prosecution of the first I.N.A. court martial presented before the court a number of witnesses who complained against the discriminatory treatment meted out to those Indian P.O.Ws. who did not join the I.N.A. in 1942.

treatment and bad living conditions of the concentration camps in 1942. The Prosecution Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial brought forward the accusation:

In the Indian P.O.W. camps efforts were made to induce and compel them to join the I.N.A.; those who resisted were removed to concentration camps. No food was given to them for days and such food as was given was extremely bad. No medical aid was given at all...." (176)

In order to prove the above charges, the Prosecution Counsel called upon a number of witnesses. Capt. K.P. Dhargalkar, a Prosecution witness, said in the first I.N.A. court martial that he, along with about 1,000 Indian P.O.Ws., was sent to Thailand in 1942 to do fatigues. When he returned to Singapore in July 1942 he was sent to the Bidadari Concentration Camp, where the condition of living was bad. He "was not treated as an officer" and was made to work for "8 to 10 hours a day", sometimes in cleaning up the gardens. There was no medical aid for the non-volunteers. He "saw quite a good few Indian ranks being beaten by Fateh Khan, the Second in Command in the Camp." In the Buller Camp in Singapore also he saw the prisoners being tied up to trees, beaten and generally maltreated. (177) Prosecution witness Ahmed Nawaz complained of hardships, beating, bad food and being compelled to carry cowdung in the Concentration Camp. (178) But

(176) The Opening Address by the Prosecution Counsel before the I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., ibid., 7.


the serious charges brought by the Prosecution of the first
I.N.A. court martial referred to two incidents of firing, one
at the concentration camp of Kranji and another at Bidadari in
Singapore. (179)

The condition in the I.N.A.
Concentration Camps

Due to lack of documentary sources it is difficult to know
to what extent the charges of the Prosecution were based on
valid ground beyond the fact that the I.N.A. officers were found
guilty for their responsibility in the incidents of firing men-
tioned above. (180) It is difficult to rule out the occurrence
of incidents like these - at a time when the discipline had
degenerated to the lowest level after the surrender of Singapore.
On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that the charges
of the Prosecution represented the general condition of the non-
volunteers. Mohan Singh's opinion about the condition in the

(179) The Prosecution witness, Mohammad Sarwar, was the
witness for the former incident of firing and Walit Bahadur and
Ravilal of 2/9 Gurkha Rifles for the latter incident. According
to Mohammad Sarwar, Singhara Singh and Fateh Khan, the two I.N.A.
officers, came in August 1942 to the Kranji Camp with 14 armed
guards. They asked the three hundred Muslim P.O.Ws. of the camp
to join the I.N.A. and when none volunteered, they and their
guards opened fire. Two of the prisoners and one I.N.A. guard
were killed. In the month following, a similar incident occurred
in the Bidadari Concentration Camp, where the men of the 2/9
Gurkha Rifles were staying but there was no case of death. Evi-
dence by the Prosecution witnesses Ravilal and Walit Bahadur and Rifleman Ravilal before the first I.N.A. court

(180) The accused I.N.A. officers Singhara Singh and
Fateh Khan received rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years each
and Puran Singh for seven years. See the compilation of the
statements of the accused I.N.A. officers, n. 115, 69, 90, 123.
concentration camps would be relevant in this context. He said:

That place was situated in open air, very clean and healthy, had barbed wire enclosure, which were reserved for criminals. Men were accommodated in tens and had better accommodation as was allotted in Indian Army camps; there were no cells and no solitary confinement.... I gave them full bedding, full rations, facilities for game, hospitals for sick and camp canteens for all.... I had provided mosquito nets. The nature of work that they were asked to do was six hours gardening, i.e., producing vegetables for themselves and their friends and for supplying vegetables into the hospitals. Later on two hours of this were reduced, finally time was allotted for education. No one suffered in the camp for more than 2 to 3 months. (181)

In discussing the living conditions in the concentration camps in 1942 one should take into account the general unsatisfactory condition of all the P.O.Ws., British, Australian and Indian, so far as their accommodation, medicine and ration were concerned after the surrender of Singapore. (182) The I.N.A. sources agree that the general condition of the P.O.Ws. was bad. One of the camp commanders, Shah Nawaz Khan, who was opposed to the formation of the I.N.A. in 1942 wrote that the treatment in the concentration camp was "rough, but not brutal." (183) The account of the concentration camps given by some of the Prosecution witnesses in the first I.N.A. court martial leave no doubt


(183) Khan, n. 6, 44. See also Chatterji, n. 4, 12-6.
about the general unsatisfactory conditions in the camps but they deny the charge of discrimination.

One Prosecution witness, Major Baboo Ram, being asked by the Defence Counsel about the condition in the Neasoon Camp, said:

In that camp there were both volunteers and non-volunteers. They lived together and had the same food. The camp had an accommodation of approximately 2,000 men. When I reached there, there were about 7,000 to 8,000 men. After that more men came in. When I reached there, there were no arrangements for water or sanitation or light. All the arrangements for water, sanitation and light were made by Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan.... Before Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan took over the command of the camp the hospital arrangements were poor. But after he had taken over the charge things grew gradually better. (184)

Another prominent witness for the Prosecution, Capt. K.P. Dhargalkar, who was sent to Thailand by Mohan Singh to do fatigues in 1942, said: "The treatment in the Thailand camp was good.... I do not complain of any treatment here." He along with some other officers was removed to Bidadari camp in August 1942. Here, he said, "None of us were sic ill-treated.... In this separation camp we were given one towel each and five dollars, and we had our rations. The rations were not good but they were alright." (185)

One medical officer, Lt. Col. Choudri, who never joined the I.N.A., said in his statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. trial:

(184) Evidence by the Prosecution Witness, Major Baboo Ram before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 54.

I remained all time P.O.W. I was running hospital for the P.O.W.s. In the beginning I was under the I.N.A. of Capt. Mohan Singh. Ration and medicines were received from I.N.A. (186)

In the course of interrogation of the Prosecution witnesses by the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, it was evident that the non-volunteers could and they did avail of whatever medical facilities were in Selatar and Kranji camps. (187)

The Nature of the Recruitment policy

The next question which is to be considered is if the coercive method was adopted as a general policy of recruitment of volunteers for the I.N.A. in 1942. Or in other words, what was the real purpose of opening the Separation and the Concentration Camps?

It is fairly certain that following the surrender of Singapore there was little of discipline left among the Indian P.O.W.s. (188) Mohan Singh, who had been made responsible by the Japanese Army for everything relating to the Indian P.O.W.s., had two alternatives. Either he should hand over the criminals to the Japanese army for punishment or he himself should punish them. He chose the latter course and "allowed all commanders to continue


(188) Mohan Singh's statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence Papers. See also Khan, n. 6, 43-4.
to use their powers of watching and punishing as they were empowered in Army according to Indian Army Act." (189) Towards the middle of 1942 concentration camps had been opened in Singapore. Those who were found guilty of various crimes after proper investigation (190) were removed to those camps. Moreover, officers and men who were suspected of being "British fifth columnist" or those who were "carrying on anti-I.N.A. propaganda" were also removed to these camps. (191)

It is certainly difficult to rule out the possibility of misuse of authority either by the top I.N.A. leadership or at the level of camp commanders, as both have been accused of doing

(189) Mohan Singh's statement to the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, Ibid.

(190) Ibid.

That in the I.N.A. investigation or court martial preceded the punishment for any offence, and that this practice was followed in the battlefield too, was confirmed by the Prosecution witness. See evidence of the Prosecution witness Jamadar Ilkal Razaq before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 56.

(191) Khan, n. 6, 44. It has already been mentioned that there was a group of I.N.A. officers who resisted the formation of the I.N.A. in 1942. Lt. Col. M.K. Durrani, an officer of the Bahawalpur Infantry, had a strong pro-British attitude. His memoir gave a detailed account of his efforts, during 1942 and in the following years, to subvert the I.N.A. See Lt. Col. Mahmood Khan Durrani, The Sixth Column (London, 1955) 62-76. It is also evident that some of those witnesses for the Prosecution who complained in the first I.N.A. court martial of torture in the I.N.A. concentration camps had a great deal to do with the underground resistance movement in the I.N.A. during 1942. See evidence by the Prosecution witnesses, Capt. K.P. Dhargalkar, Havildar Mohammad Ahmed Rawaz and Jamadar Mohammad Hayat before the first I.N.A. court martial, Motiram, ed., n. 23, 48, 63, 65.
Although it is a well-known fact that no charge of atrocity was brought by the Indian army authorities at the end of the war against Mohan Singh, some reliable sources believed that all was not fair in 1942 so far as recruitment to the I.N.A. was concerned. (193)

Although harsh methods of persuasion might have been adopted in some cases, it stands to reason that there was no need to pursue such methods as a policy. That measures were taken to freely ascertain the opinion of the officers has already been pointed out. So far as the ranks in the I.N.A. were concerned, it should be remembered that the main difficulty to raise a big army in 1942 was not the shortage of recruits but that of persuading the unwilling Japanese army to agree to it and supply...

(192) One of the Indian Camp Commanders, Shah Nawaz Khan, wrote that Mohan Singh adopted some "drastic measures" against those "who proved to be stumbling blocks" in his way to raise the I.N.A. in 1942. See Khan, p. 88. Toye wrote that "Mohan Singh was largely ignorant of... coercive recruitment" in the I.N.A. in 1942. Mr. Toye held some camp commanders responsible for "harsh method of persuasion...including severe corporal punishment...." See Toye, p. 93.

(193) Mr. Mahboob Ahmed, who was an I.C.O. and joined the I.N.A. in 1942, later told the writer that one could not be proud of all that happened in 1942 so far as the recruitment of the I.N.A. was concerned. Discussion with Mr. Mahboob Ahmed in August 1963 at Kuala Lumpur. Mr. H. Raghavan, who was a prominent Indian leader in Malaya, also told the writer that he (Mr. Raghavan) had heard of confinement in camps of army personnel who had objected to the taking of the pledge of loyalty to I.N.A., because the pledge was a personal pledge to the G.O.C. of the I.N.A. Mr. Raghavan said that he personally visited one such camp. Discussion with Mr. H. Raghavan in April 1964 at New Delhi. Mr. S.C. Goen, a leader of the Indian community in Singapore, also accused that coercion was used in some cases for recruiting men to the I.N.A. in 1942. See chapter three of this study.
arms to equip it. In September 1942, in addition to the first division, Mohan Singh had twenty-four thousand surplus volunteers waiting to be absorbed in the second. (194)