CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

The presence of a number of Indianized units of the British Indian army and a large and economically affluent Indian community in East Asia on the eve of the outbreak of the Pacific War provided the necessary materials for raising a liberation army for India. Although prior to the Pacific War there was no widespread demand among the Indian communities for India's freedom, the very nature of the Indian population in the region (they were immigrants who hoped to return to their motherland) made them sympathetic to the objectives of the Indian National Congress. There were groups of Indian revolutionaries in Thailand and Japan, and they saw in the outbreak of the Pacific War an opportunity to organise the Indian communities in East Asia for the independence of India with the help of Japan.

On the eve of the Pacific War, the Japanese Government had neither the intention of bringing India within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere nor the desire to help the achievement of India's independence. The Imperial General Headquarters, in their own military interests, wanted to undermine the British Power in Malaya by alienating the loyalty of the Indian soldiers stationed in the region. They favoured enlisting the assistance of the Indian nationalists for this task. The intelligence organisation, which was formed by the Japanese military headquarters to perform the task, skilfully used the assurance of all-out Japanese assistance to the cause of Indian independence in order to win over the Indian nationalist groups. During the
Malayan Campaign 1941-2 the question of the formation of the Indian National Army was mooted for the first time and it came up for serious consideration by the Indians and the Japanese only after the fall of Singapore in February 1942 when the control over the Indian P.O.Ws. was handed over to Mohan Singh. Although Mohan Singh was eager to expedite the formation of a liberation army, the I.N.A. did not come into existence until September 1942.

The delay in the formation of the I.N.A. in 1942 was mainly due to the failure of the growth of an understanding between the Japanese and the Indians on the formation of the I.N.A. The usefulness of such an army to their military interests was the basis of the Japanese interest in the plan for organizing the I.N.A. In the first half of 1942 the Malayan Campaign was over and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters had no immediate plan for a military campaign towards India. They, therefore, had neither the real interest in hastening the formation of the I.N.A., nor the willingness to make it a strong army.

In 1942, due to certain reasons, some leaders of the Indian communities in East Asia were not as eager as the commander of the I.N.A. to hasten the formation of the I.N.A. Although Rash Behari Bose, Pritam Singh and Mohan Singh were willing to accept and make use of the Japanese help for India's freedom an important section of civilian leadership and almost the entire corp of Indian officers were suspicious of the evil intentions of the Japanese army towards India. These leaders, more particularly the civilian group, were hesitant in inviting the assistance of the Japanese because they (the Indian civilian leaders) were
aware of the unfavourable attitude of the Indian National Congress towards the Axis Powers.

In the second half of 1942 the news of the rapid spread of the Quit India movement throughout India, led the military leader, Mohan Singh, to form the I.N.A. This coincided with the development of the Japanese plan for a limited military campaign towards India and they saw in the I.N.A. a possibility of using it in a subsidiary role. The plan for the I.N.A., therefore, obtained an easy approval from the Japanese authorities. But the limited objective of the Japanese authorities regarding the I.N.A. did not take the I.N.A. far. The relations between the Japanese and the Indians were strained during 1942 due to the Japanese opposition to the expansion of the I.N.A. and other issues. The initiative taken by the Japanese towards the end of 1942 in despatching the I.N.A. to Burma for active service, without recognizing it as a separate army or guaranteeing India's freedom as desired by the Indian leaders, brought about a crisis in the relations between the Japanese and the Indians.

But the study of the causes of the crisis in the I.N.A. in 1942 cannot be complete without a reference to the split among the civilian and the military leadership of the Indians in East Asia. During the period of conflict with the Japanese army, the question arose, whether the President of the Indian Independence League or the G.O.C. of the I.N.A. would have the ultimate control over the army. It was this tussle between the civil and military leadership which led to dissolution of the I.N.A. in December 1942.
The President of the Indian Independence League, Rash Behari Bose, however, salvaged the I.N.A. from a total disintegration during the following six months. But he was unable to give an effective lead beyond a certain point. Thanks to the efforts of Rash Behari Bose, the civilian and the military leadership of the Indian independence movement in East Asia were integrated into the hands of the President of the Indian Independence League. This prepared the ground for his successor, Subhas Chandra Bose, to function more effectively.

An assessment of the movement of the Indian communities in East Asia for Indian independence till the middle of 1943 reveals certain facts. No doubt, some of the Indian leaders in East Asia were willing to make use of the Pacific War in the cause of Indian independence, hitherto little significant progress had been achieved. Japanese assistance was essential if the Indian independence movement in East Asia was to be successful. But again, little progress could be made in settling the terms with Japanese under which it would be available. The liberation army was to play a significant role in achieving the objective of the movement of the Indian communities in East Asia. In reality, however, the army consisted in mid-1943 of twelve thousand demoralized and bewildered Indian soldiers and it lacked the status of a separate army.

The period from the middle of 1943 to the middle of 1945 - the two years when the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose was available in East Asia - formed a spectacular part of the I.N.A.'s career. During that period the civilian and the military
leaderships, combined in the hands of one person, acted effectively to carry out a plan which was worked out with the end in view of achieving India's freedom. The plan stood for mobilizing the forces of Indian nationalism in East Asia, the diplomatic and military assistance of Britain's enemy, Japan, in order to supplement and reinforce the nationalist force in India which had so far failed to achieve India's freedom all by itself. The plan succeeded in reinvigorating the Indian independence movement in East Asia and the I.N.A. This was mainly because Subhas Chandra Bose spelt out the plan with his authentic argument and he allowed no shadow of doubt to exist about the success of his plan. Such confidence was lacking in the leadership in the initial stages. It was under Bose's powerful leadership that the I.N.A. became a real revolutionary army - its strength increased, its morale rose, and its status became that of an army of a Provisional Government.

During the latter part of 1943, the Japanese Burma Area Army developed a plan of capturing Imphal for ensuring the security of Burma from the Allied counter-attack. Bose availed of this opportunity to put into India a part of his revolutionary army which, together with the help of his secret agents in India, would organize the Indian people to revolt against the British. This was I.N.A.'s strategy for overthrowing the British Power in India. A pre-condition of the success of the plan was the establishment of I.N.A.'s direct contact with the Indian people. The failure of the Japanese in taking Imphal removed the possibility of establishment of a direct contact with the Indian people
through a military victory. An anti-British revolt, which might have been worked up by the Provisional Government and the I.N.A. in the eastern part of India in the wake of the Japanese victory, was no longer possible.

But the basic postulate in the I.N.A.'s strategy, that the I.N.A. would be able to spark off widespread revolt in India once they came in contact with the Indian people, was borne out to a great extent during the I.N.A. officers' trials in 1945-6. Although it is doubtful if the I.N.A. leaders foresaw such developments earlier, the I.N.A. trials during 1945-6 created an widespread revolutionary anti-British movement in India. The revolutionary impact of the trials affected the civilian masses and it was powerful enough to sink, at least on the question of the I.N.A. trials, the communal disharmony prevalent in the country. What was more significant, it (the revolutionary impact of the I.N.A. trials), for the first time in many years, succeeded in removing the traditional barrier between the Indian officers of the British Indian army and the main current of nationalism in the country. A large section of the Indian officers not only showed keen interest in I.N.A. trials in which almost all Indian political parties had opposed the policy of the Indian Government, but they (a large section of the Indian officers) supported the popular demand for the release of the I.N.A. officers. Thus the I.N.A. trials were instrumental in helping the transformation of the Indian armed forces during 1945-6 from a mercenary to a national force. The reinstatement of the I.N.A. officers in the Indian army after the transfer of power, it can be argued, would
have quickened the nationalization of the Indian armed forces.

The revolutionary situation created in the country had important consequences on the British policy towards India. In the face of it, the authorities of the Indian army found it impossible to carry out their policy towards the I.N.A. Moreover, it brought about a shift in the British policy towards India. During the war and immediately after it, the British withdrawal from India would be conditional to a prior settlement of the communal question. In the face of the new revolutionary condition in India, the British policy no longer waited for the emergence of the communal agreement, but itself took the initiative in bringing about the settlement before transferring power to India.
APPENDIX

Strictly Personal & Secret.
(NOT TO BE PASSED THROUGH ANY OFFICE).

New Delhi,
February, 1946.

I have now been able to study a large number of reports from higher and unit commanders and other sources on the effect of the action taken in respect of the first "I.N.A." trial on the Indian Army as a whole.

It is most important that we should study and analyse carefully these effects, as they may influence very greatly our ability to maintain the solidarity and reliability of the Indian Army in the difficult times which undoubtedly lie ahead of us. It is for this reason that I am writing this letter to you. I have considered the desirability of making a personal public statement in explanation of my action in commuting the sentences of transportation passed by the Court on the first three accused, but I have decided that this would not be in the best interests of discipline or the maintenance of my influence and authority as Commander-in-Chief.

I feel, however, that we should do all we can to remove the feelings of doubt, resentment and even disgust which appear to exist in the minds of quite a number of British officers, who have not the knowledge or the imagination to be able to view the situation as a whole, or to understand the present state of feeling in India.

(1) Obtained from Sir Claude Auchinleck and reproduced with his permission.
2. As I see it, the commutation of the sentences of transportation on Shah Nawaz, Dhillon and Sahgal has had the following effects in India:

(a) On the general public, moderate as well as extremist, Muslim as well as Hindu.

Pleasure and intense relief born of the conviction that confirmation of the sentences would have resulted in violent internal conflict.

This feeling does not, in my opinion, spring universally from the idea that the convicted officers were trying to rid India of the British and, therefore, to be applauded, whatever crimes they might commit, but from a generally genuine feeling that they were patriots and nationalists and that, therefore, even if they were misled they should be treated with clemency, as true sons of India. In this connection, it should be remembered, I think, that every Indian worthy of the name is today a "Nationalist", though this does not mean that he is necessarily "anti-British". All the same, where India and her independence are concerned, there are no "pro-British" Indians.

Every Indian Commissioned Officer is a Nationalist and rightly so, provided he hopes to attain independence for India by constitutional means.

(b) On the Indian officers of the Indian Army.

Except for a few recovered prisoners of war who have suffered much at the hands of their fellow countrymen who joined the so-called "I.N.A.", the vast majority, almost without
exception, however much they may like and respect the British, are glad and relieved because of the result of the trial. Most of them admit the gravity of the offence and do not condone it, but practically all are sure that any attempt to enforce the sentence would have led to chaos in the country at large and probably to mutiny and dissension in the Army culminating in its dissolution, probably on communal lines.

The more senior and intelligent undoubtedly realise the implications of our having established in principle the seriousness of the crime of forsaking one's allegiance and the wisdom of meeting it with a heavy punishment such as "Cashiering" which carries with it the stigma of disgrace.

They realise that if their future is to be at all secure, discipline and loyalty must be maintained, but they, too, are the Nationalists and their feelings are much the same as those of the public at large.

(c) On the V.C.0s and rank and file of the Indian Army.

In very many units apparently little interest was displayed in the "I.N.A." trials, especially in the more illiterate and educationally backward arms of the Service, such as the infantry and artillery.

In the technical units and amongst clerks etc, however, interest was keen and widespread.

Some of the V.C.0s and rank and file had suffered like their officers at the hands of their former comrades who joined the "I.N.A." and perhaps feel correspondingly bitter and disgusted at the leniency shown. This is inevitable and can not be helped,
regrettable though it may be. This section of opinion is relatively small.

The great majority are, I think, pleased that leniency has been shown for a variety of reasons.

Many of them have relations and friends from the same villages amongst the "I.N.A." Many think that, as the war is over, bygones should be bygones and a fresh start made.

Others are genuinely nationalistic in outlook and have been affected by agitation and propaganda. The great majority feel, I think, that the whole episode is unpleasant and discreditable to them as a class and to the Army as a whole, and would wish it forgotten and decently buried as soon as possible.

Under all this, there is, I think, an uneasy feeling as to the future and doubt as to whether their interests will be as well watched in the days to come as they have been in the past.

(d) On the British officers of the Indian Army.

As I have already said, the effect on many British officers has been bad, and has led to public criticism which has not been in accordance with the traditional loyalty I am entitled to expect. To these officers, perhaps not always very perceptive or imaginative, an officer is an officer, whether he be Indian or British, and they make no allowance for birth or political aspirations or upbringing, nor do they begin to realise the great political stresses and strains now affecting this country. They are unable to differentiate between the British and Indian points of view.

Moreover, they forget, if they ever knew, the great bitterness bred in the minds of many Indian officers in the early days
of "Indianisation" by the discrimination, often very real, exercised against them, and the discourteous, contemptuous treatment meted out to them by many British officers who should have known better.

These facts constitute the background against which the decisions should be judged, always keeping before one the object, which is to preserve by all possible means in our power the solidarity of the Indian Army, and of the R.I.N. and the R.I.A.F. as well.

I have not specifically mentioned the two younger services, but everything I have said in this letter applies to them just as much as to the Army, and perhaps more so, as the ratings or other ranks of these services are better educated and perhaps more politically minded than those of the Army.

3. I would like you also to consider and to impress on others, especially those British officers who have been upset by the result of the first "I.N.A." trial, the effect of the capitulation of Singapore on the Indian troops involved in it, from amongst whom the "I.N.A." was subsequently formed.

Those who have served for many years with Indian troops, as I have done, have always recognised that the loyalty of our men was really to the officers of the regiment or unit, and that although there may have been some abstract sentiments of loyalty and patriotism to the Government and to the King, the men's allegiance for all practical purposes was focussed on the regiment, and particularly on the regimental officers, on whom they depended for their welfare, advancement and future prospects.

In these officers their faith and trust was almost childlike,
as events have proved time and time again. It is true to say
that in almost every case of serious discontent or indiscipline,
and there have been remarkably few of them, which has occurred
in the past fifty years, the cause could be traced to indifferent
officers and bad man-management.

4. The terrible tragedy of Singapore following on the fall of
Hong Kong must have seemed to the great majority of the V.C.Os
and rank and file to be the end of all things, and certainly of
the British "Raj" to whom the Army had been used for so many
years of war and peace to look to as its universal provider and
protector, acting through their own regimental officers.

Their British officers were at once taken from them and
they were at once assailed by traitors who had been kept in readiness
by the Japanese to seduce them from their allegiance. Their
Indian officers in many instances proved false to their trust and
used their influence to suborn their own men, skilfully aided
and encouraged by the Japanese.

The strain and pressure to which these men, the majority of
whom were simple peasant farmers with no cultural or educational
background, were subjected is very difficult for any British
officer, however experienced, to visualise. Nevertheless it is
quite impossible for any British officer to judge them fairly
unless he does try to visualise it and realise what these men
must have thought and felt.

It is quite wrong to adopt the attitude that because these
men had taken service in a British controlled Indian Army that
therefore their loyalties must be the same as those of British
soldiers. As I have tried to explain, they had no real loyalty or
patriotism towards Britain as Britain, not as we understand loyalty.

5. So much for the rank and file. The officers who went over present a much more difficult problem. Owing to their presumably superior education, knowledge of the world and experience generally, it is not possible to apply the same reasoning to them, except possibly to the very junior and to those who had been promoted from the ranks, whose background was more limited and whose knowledge was less.

There is no excuse for the regular officers who went over, beyond the fact that the early stages of "Indianisation from its inception to the beginning of the late war were badly mismanaged by the British Government of India, and this prepared the ground for disloyalty when the opportunity came.

There is little doubt that "Indianisation" was at its inception looked on as a political expedient which was bound to fail militarily. There is no doubt also that many senior British officers believed and even hoped that it would fail.

The policy of segregation of Indian officers into separate units, the differential treatment in respect of pay and terms of service as compared with the British officer, and the prejudice and lack of manners of some - by no means all - British officers and their wives, all went to produce a very deep and bitter feeling of racial discrimination in the minds of the most intelligent and progressive of the Indian officers, who were naturally nationalists, keen to see India standing on her own legs and not to be ruled from Whitehall for ever.
It is no use shutting one's eyes to the fact that any Indian officer worth his salt is a Nationalist, though this does not mean, as I have said before, that he is necessarily anti-British. If he is anti-British this is as often as not due to his faulty handling and treatment by his British officer comrades.

It is essential for the preservation of future unity that this fact should be fully understood by all British officers.

No Indian officer must be regarded as suspect and disloyal merely because he is what is called a "Nationalist", or in other words - a good Indian!

6. This aspect of the business, though it can not excuse the action of these officers in going over to the enemy, must be considered as it does provide the background against which we must view the present and the future.

We have very full evidence of the mental processes which these officers went through and many of them hesitated for a long time before they finally succumbed to circumstances and the persuasion of the Japanese and their extremist fellow-countrymen. Many of them having joined the first so-called "I.N.A." under Mohan Singh refused to join the second under Bose and spent the next three years as prisoners of war in the islands of the Pacific. This does not excuse their original lapse but does show that they were subjected to conflicting stresses and strains mentally.

7. There remains the matter of the decision to commute the sentences of the first three officers (Sahgal, Dhillon and Shah Nawaz) from "Transportation" to "Cashiering". If, as we have
admitted, they were guilty of the worst crime a soldier can commit, then it may well be asked - "Why be lenient with them?".

In taking the decision to show clemency, the whole circumstances past, present and future had to be considered and was so considered most carefully and over a long period.

The over-riding object is to maintain the stability, reliability and efficiency of the Indian Army so that it may remain in the future a trustworthy weapon for use in the defence of India and, we hope, of the Commonwealth as a whole.

It was essential to establish the principle that falseness to his allegiance is a crime which cannot be countenanced in any officer under whatever Government he may be serving. By confirming the finding of the Court and the sentence of 'Cashiering' which carries with it the highest degree of disgrace to an officer, we have done this. To have added imprisonment to this sentence would not in any way have helped to emphasise the principle we were concerned to preserve.

On the other hand, having considered all the evidence and appreciated to the best of my ability the general trend of Indian public opinion and of the feeling in the Indian Army, I have no doubt at all that to have confirmed the sentence of imprisonment solely on the charge of "waging war against the King" would have had disastrous results, in that it would have probably precipitated a violent outbreak throughout the country, and have created active and widespread disaffection in the Army, especially amongst the Indian officers and the more highly educated rank and file. To have taken this risk would have been seriously to jeopardise our object.
Always keeping before one the difference in outlook between British and Indian, which I have tried to explain in this letter, I decided, therefore, that, in the interests of the future of both India and Britain and because of the unprecedented circumstances of the case, the only proper course to pursue was to confirm the finding and so establish the principle but to show clemency in respect of the sentence. Some bewilderment has been caused, I believe, by the fact that Shah Nawaz who was found guilty of "abetment of murder" as well as of "waging war" received the same treatment as the other two accused who were found guilty of "waging war" only. Shah Nawaz's offence, which was committed by him as an officer of the "I.N.A." in the alleged execution of his duty, in that he ordered a sentence authorised by a higher I.N.A. authority to be carried out, did, in the circumstances, flow from his basic offence of "waging war" as a member of the I.N.A. The punishment for this - the principal offence - was "Cashiering" in the case of all three officers. Shah Nawaz did not himself commit any brutal or violent act against any person, but passed on the orders of a superior authority which he claims to have believed to have been properly constituted.

It is necessary also to remember that some 20,000 officers and men joined the so-called "I.N.A." and that, even if it were desirable, it would have been a physical impossibility to bring all these men to trial within anything approaching a reasonable period of time.

8. The situation now is that the principle that the forsaking of his allegiance by a soldier is a crime in any circumstances has been established, and that no further trials on this account
alone will be held. Those against whom there is adequate evidence of murder and brutality will be tried and punished in the ordinary way.

In the second, third and fourth trials the charge of "waging war" has been included in addition to the other charges because these trials were commenced before the finding of the Court in the first trial was known. If the accused in these three trials are found guilty on this charge the Court will pass the sentence of "Transportation for Life" which is the minimum admissible under the Army Act for the offence of "waging war".

When it comes to confirmation of the sentence, however, the facts in respect of the other charges of brutality will be the guiding factor.

In any subsequent trials, the charge of "waging war" will be omitted as our object is now to punish those who may have been guilty of brutal acts towards their former comrades.

9. As to the great mass of rank and file of the so-called "I.N.A.", these are now being examined by Courts of Inquiry as rapidly as possible with a view to finding out whether they are to be classified as "White", "Grey" or "Black". I realise very well and so does everyone else at C.H.Q. and in the War Department, the urgent need for disposing of these men at the earliest possible moment, so that the whole affair may have a reasonable chance of being forgotten, which is I am sure the ardent desire of the Army as a whole. At the same time, it is quite certain from the evidence at our disposal that if this enquiry is not carried out with reasonable thoroughness, great injustice may be done to innocent men. The temptation, therefore, to discharge or dismiss
all and sundry summarily and without more ado must be resisted.  

10. There is one other criticism which is often made. It is said that we ought to have dealt with the accused summarily in forward areas; that if the men were to be brought to India we should have avoided publicity, and in particular trial in the Red Fort; and that we ought to have put out counter publicity from the start. The answer to the first point is that we had to deal with 45,000 men, in one instance a whole I.N.A. division surrendering without firing a shot. It was obviously impracticable for forward areas to deal with men on this scale summarily and it was the obvious course to send them back to India where the records and Intelligence organisation existed for interrogation. As to publicity, I am sure it was right to decide not to hold trials in secret because it would have been thought that the men were not getting a fair trial. Once it was decided that the trials could not be held in secret, it would have been wrong to tuck them away somewhere where defence counsel, relations, etc. could not conveniently attend; and the Red Fort was the most convenient place from nearly every point of view. We avoided counter publicity because it was practically certain that a big publicity drive would be represented as prejudicing the accused in their trial; but in any event it is not possible for us to force papers to publish anything which they regard as propaganda, and with which they do not agree. We have no control over them in this respect.

11. This letter has become very lengthy, but I make no apology for this as I consider it essential that the full facts of this sad business should be put before you, so that you in your turn
can put them before the officers serving under you, as and when it appears necessary to you.

You should not, in explaining the matter to your officers, quote me as Commander-in-Chief but should use the material I have tried to give you in this letter in any way you think suitable to the purpose as if it came from yourself.

12. Finally let me again state the object: it is to maintain the reliability, stability and efficiency of the Indian Army for the future, whatever Government may be set up in India.

This can be done only if the British and Indian officers of that Army trust and respect each other and continue to work wholeheartedly together for the common cause as they have done in war.

It is your task to do your utmost to bring this about and I am sure you will; you have excellent material on which to work.

13. If you are still in doubt on any point or have any suggestions to make in furtherance of our common object, I will be glad if you will let me or the Adjutant-General know.

Sd/- Claude Auchinleck
General.

By name to all:

G.O.s.C.-in-C, Commands,
Cands,
Areas,
Districts,
Ind Divs (in and ex India).

P.T.O. for actual distribution.
### DISTRIBUTED TO:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOC-in-C</th>
<th>Eastern Comd.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Comd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Comd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>303 Bengal Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>202 Assam Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>110 Poona Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>108 Bombay Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105 Madras Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>101 Bihar and Orissa Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>109 Bangalore Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baluchistan District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagpur District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delhi District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lahore District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lucknow District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rawalpindi District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sind District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waziristan District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peshawar District</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 23rd Ind Div |
| 25th Ind Div |
| 10th Ind Div |
| 30th Ind Div |
8 Ind Div
19 Ind Div
5 Ind Div
17 Ind Div
7 Ind Div
4 Ind Div
20 Ind Div
14 Ind Div

2nd Ind Airborne Div

British and Indian Troops, Japan.

Viceroy.

SACSEA with spare copies (9) for distribution.

General Mayne.

FOCRIN
AOC-in-C.

CSS
PAO
AG
QHG
MCO
WG
DMS
MS
E-in-C.
Secy WD.