OTHER NYAYA-S

Chapter VIII

OTHER NYĀYA-S

8.1. Nyāyās on other subjects.

8.1.1. ANIRJĀTE'RTHE BAHUVACANAM PRAYOKTAVYAM

“The plural should be used, when the meaning is not exactly known”.


Bhāṣyakāra raises the question that in which compound does the word dvitrāḥ being, while he interpreting the rule ‘samkhya'vyāvyāsannādūradhiyāsakhyāḥ samkhyaeye’ P.2.2.25. It is bahuvrīhi and its analysis is dvau vā trayo vā (two or three). The use of the plural in dvitrāḥ will be appropriate when many are referred to and it is not so when only two are referred to. For answering this, Patañjali explains this
nyāya. Plural can be justified when the two are brought. It is common that,
the use of plural number in the question, when the speaker is unaware of
number of objects he refers to. For example, without the awareness of the
number of sons and wives, someone asks somebody that, *kati bhavataḥ putrāḥ?* (how many sons have you), and *kati bhavato bhāryāḥ?* (how many
wives do you have). Here the question is in plural. Another grammarian
says that, in the analysis *dvau vā trayo vā* when *dvau vā* (may be two) is
mentioned, *trayo vā* (may be three) is suggested, and vice versa. Therefore,
the expression *dvau vā trayo vā* ultimately refers to five. So the use of the
plural is correct.

8.1.2. **ATAJJĀTĪYAKAM HI LOKE VYAVADHĀYAKAM BHAVATI NYĀYA**

‘the interception is only by the unlike, for the unlike alone stands
between the like ones’.

‘*katham punarjñāyate- atajjātiyakam hi loke vyavadhāyakam
bhavati / evam hi kaścit kaścit prcchati-anantare ete brāhmaṇakule iti / sa
āha-nānantare / vṛṣalakulamanayorantarā iti"*² /

In the bhāṣya of the sūtra ‘*halo’nantarāḥ samyogaḥ*’ P.1.1.7,
Pūrvapakṣi says that the word ‘*anantara*’ is used even with reference to
subjects, which are intercepted. But the meaning of the word ‘anantara’ is not intercepted or separated, though we can see it is used in the sense of interception. For example, the expression ‘anantaraṁ imaṁ grāmāṁ’- these two villages are adjoining ones- is generally used even though there are rivers and mountains dividing them. Then there is the doubt- if then the word anantara is used even with reference to intercepted objects, what is the purpose served by the word anantara in sūtra. Bhāṣyakāra answered this question by saying that, in the intercepted objects, the word anantara will never use. The interception is only by the unlike, for the unlike alone stands between the like ones in the world. Someone asks another- ‘anantarare ete brāhmaṇakaule’- are these two brāhmaṇa houses adjoining, i.e. do they not have any anantara? He replies – ‘nānantarare, vrṣalakulamanyorantarā iti’. No, they are not adjoining; a house of a śūdra is between them. There is no interception between the brāhmaṇa-s, and between the śūdra-s. So in the samyogasamjñā, the word anantara means the consonants which is not intercepted by the unlike sound. The unlike sound of ‘hal’ is ‘ac’. Therefore, the hal, which is not intercepted with ac, is called samyogasamjñā. So in all cases it is the unlike alone that interceded the like ones.

Really, in anantarāvimau grāmāu, though rivers and mountains are dividing them, the word anantara is use here with the concept that the
rivers and mountains are the part of the village. The word *grāma* has many denotations. It denotes group of houses, garden, inhabitants, forest, river, mountain etc.

8.1.3. ATIDEŚANYĀYA

“atidesa is suggested even without the term vati”

‘antareṇāpi vatimatideso gamyate/ tadyathā-esa brahmadattaḥ, abrahamadattam brahmadatta ityāha, te manyāmahe brahmadattava-dayam bhavatiiti/ evam ihāpi asamkhyām samkhetyāha sankhyāvaditi gamyate’³ /

Patañjali mentions this nyāya in the rule, ‘bahugañavatudati samkhyā’ P.1.1.23 to get *samkhyāsamjñā* to the *akṛtrima* words *eka, dvi* etc. because they do not get the *samkhyāsamjñā* according to the *krtrimākrtrimanyāya*. This sūtra is not a *samjñāsūtra*, but *atidesa-sūtra* denoting similarity and it means that bahu, *gaṇa, vatu* and *dati* are like *samkhyā*. Here *atidesa* is suggested even without the term *vati* in the sūtra. For example, one says, ‘this is Brahmadatta, even though he is not Brahmadatta’. From this, we interpret that he is like Brahmadatta. So also, he calls *asamkhyā* by the name of *samkhyā* and hence it is suggested that they are like *samkhyā*. So in *samkhyāvat*, without mention the word *vati*
the word samkhya only suggests atideśa. Hence, according to Bhāsyakara, bahuganavatudati samkhya śūtra is not a samjñāśūtra but atideśasūtra.

8.1.4. CCHATRINYĀYA

‘the maxim of the men with umbrellas’.

‘yathaikena cchatrīnā sāhacaryādanye’pi tatsahacārīnaschhatrīnā ityucyante cchatrīno gacchantīti, tatthehi pi dyutīnā sāhacaryat śvītādayo’pi dyut iti vyapadiśyante’

The maxim originates from a number of persons walking along a road with their umbrellas spread overhead and some persons without their umbrellas. But to an onlooker they are all known by the person with umbrellas.

While interpreting the sūtra ‘dyutbhyo luni’ P.1.3.91, Nyāsakara explains the cchatrīnya. The root ‘dyut’ is only referred in the sūtra. But the parasmaipadi comes optionally to the roots beginning with dyut and ending with kripu, by the use of the plural word dyudbhyām in the sūtra. These verbs are anudātta and so by the sūtra ‘anudāttanita ātmanepadam’ P.1.3.12, they would have been invariably ātmanepadi, this sūtra dyutbhyo luni makes them optionally, so it is like the person who were not wearing umbrellas designated as wearing umbrellas due to the circumstances.
It can be seen remarks about this nyāya in Vākyapadīya;

‘purodāśābhidhānam ca dhānādiṣu yathā sthitam /

cchatrinā cābhisambandhāt cchatriśabdābhidheyatā’

8.1.5. DRAVYAVACCOPACĀRANYĀYA

‘applications as in dravya-s’

‘dravyavaccopacārāh prāpnuvanti / tadyathā-dravyesu naikena
ghaṭenāneko yugapati kāryam karoti / evamimakāram nāneko
yugapaduccārayet’

In the sūtrabhāṣya of ‘a i u n’, Bhāṣyakāra raises the question
whether the akāra is one or many? The letter ‘a’ is one, and the same in the
māheśvarasūtra-s or representing a letter ‘a’ in words in their formations,
or in roots. If so, the same akāra in the words like aśvah, arkah, arthah
etc., applications have to be done as in the case of dravya-s. For example,
many people cannot simultaneously deal with one pot and fetch water,
similarly, several people will not be able to pronounce one, and the same
letter ‘a’ at one time. According to the Pūrvapakṣa, the letter ‘a’ is not one
but many.
8.1.6. KRIYĀPI KRIYAYEPSITATAMĀ BHAVATI NYĀYA

"kriyā become most desired through kriyā"

‘kriyāpi kriyayepsitamā bhavati / kayā kriyayā? sampaśyati kriyā śṛṣṭi kriyāyā prārthayatikriyayā adyavasyatikriyayā ca / iha ya eṣa manusyaḥ prekṣāpūrvaṁ bhavati sa buddhyā tāvat kamcidartham sampāśyati , samārthāte prārthanā , prārthite adyavasāyāḥ, adyavasāye ārumbhaḥ ārumbhe nirvṛtti nirvṛttau phalaprāptih / evam kriyāpi kṛtrimam karma’

Vārṭtikakāra says that the word karma may be replaced by kriyā in the sūtra ‘kartari karmavyatīhāre’ P.1.3.14 and to read as kartari kriyāvvyatīhāre because, it may denote the technical karma and consequently that the ātmanepada may appear where there is vinimaya in the fruit of the action suggests this. But Bhāsyakāra says that it need not be read so, because, the people in the world use the word karma in the sense of kriyā as in kām kriyaṁ karisyasi, kim karma karisyasi. Here the word karma means kriyā in the rule ‘kartari karmavyatīhāre’ and not the technical term karma through the rule ‘kurtipśitamam karma’. kriyā is kṛtrima karma and kriyā become īpsitama through kriyā. Here Patañjali introduces this nyāya and says that, kriyā become īpsitama through the kriyā of comprehension through the kriyā of desire to get the fruit or through the kriyā of determination. He who is here a man of foresight first conceives an
object in his mind, desires then to get it, determines then to get it, draws a
plan in his mind then how to get it, acts then to get it and finally arrives at
the fruit. Hence, kriyā too is kṛtrima karma. So in the sūtra it does not
need to read as kriyāvyatiḥāre, but to read as karmavyatiḥāre only.

8.1.7. LIŃGAMAŚIȘYAM LOKĀŚRAYATVĀLLIŃGASYA NYĀYA

“gender depends with ordinary usages of people, but not taught by
grammar”

‘yadapyucyate sarvalinigatā ca vaktavyeti / na vaktavyā /
lingamaśisyam lokāśrayatvāllingasya’

arthena nityasamāsavacanam, sarvalinigatā ca vaktavyā- says
Vārttikakāra in the rule caturthī tadarthārthabalihitasukharaksitaiḥ
P.2.1.36. That is a rule should be stated for inconvertible compounding
with the word artha and a prescription should be made for variations in all
genders as in brāhmaṇārtham payah - milk for brāhmaṇa-s, brāhmaṇ-
ārthah sūpaḥ, brāhmaṇārthāḥ yavāgūḥ-rise gruel for brāhmaṇa-s.

Here the word artha should use in three genders as inconvertible
compound. To refute this vārttika, Bhāṣyakāra uses this nyāya and says
that, there is no need of this statement-“prescription should be made for
variations in all genders.” Gender need not be taught by grammar because

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gender depends up on the usage of people. Gender that used by the people in the world is appropriate in śāstra also. People use the form brāhmaṇ ārtha in three genders -brāhmaṇārthah, brāhmaṇārthā, brāhmaṇārtham. Therefore the three genders will get in śāstra naturally, for which there is no need to read vārttika.

8.1.8. LOKE HYARTHAVANTI CĀNARTHAKĀNI CA VĀKYĀNI DṛŚYANTE NYĀYA

“there are seen sentences sometimes making sense and sometimes making no sense”.

‘ītarathā hyasampratyaśo yathā loke / loke hyarthavanti cānarthakāni ca vākyāni dṛśyante / arthavanti tāvat-devadatta!
gāmabhyaśa śuklām daṇḍena / devadatta gāmabhyaśa kṛṣṇām iti / anarthakāni-daśa dādāmāni, śādapūpāḥ, kundamajājinaṃ, palalapindāḥ, adharorukametat kumāryāḥ, spaiyakṛtasya pitā, pratiśina iti9/

This nyāya is mention in the rule ‘vṛddhirādaic’ P.1.1.1. Vārttikākāra has made a suggestion that before the sūtra ‘vṛddhirādaic’ with which the topic of technical terms commences; a governing rule (adhikārasūtra), such as ‘athasamjñā’ should be put in. It is necessary to state which word stands for the designated and which shows the
designation. That is, one should know that the terms _vrddhi_, _guna_ and others mentioned here and in the subsequent rules, are to be understood as technical terms.

If the topic of _samjñā_ be not specifically introduced as beginning with the sūtra _vrddhirādaic_, the words _vrddhi_, _guna_ and others will not be understood as technical terms, and as a consequence, this and the following many rules will be without any sense as in ordinary language. Here Patañjali uses this nyāya and says that, there are seen even sentences sometimes making sense and sometimes making no sense. Sentences possessed of sense are- _devadatta gāmabhyāja śuklām daṇḍena, devadatta gāmabhyāja kṛṣṇām_ (Devadatta, drive that white cow over here by a stick, drive that dark one) etc. The sentences possessed of no sense are- _daśaḍādimāni saḍhapūpāh kuṇḍamajājinam palalapīṇḍah adharorukametat kumāryāḥ sphaiyakr tasya pitā prayīṣīnah_. (ten pomegranates, six cakes, a pot, a goat-skin, a handful of chaff, this petticoat of a girl, and this emaciated father of Sphaiyakṛta). In this example, _daśa dādimāni_ etc. although the various words are correct, the whole compound sentence is without any sense as the constituent pieces have no syntactical interconnection between them. Like this senseless sentence, without the _samjñādhistikārasūtra_, the words like _vrddhi_, _guna_ etc. are also meaningless.
But later Patañjali states that the *samjñādhikārasūtra* is not necessary because, one can have a definite conception of what is *samjñā* from the manner of Ācārya’s expression (*vyavahāra*).

**8.1.9. NĀNALINGAKARANANYAYA**

‘the maxim of the application of various indicators at various places’

‘lokatah etatsiddham / tadyathā-loke kaścit evam devadattamāha-
iha mundo bhava, iha śikhī bhava, iha jaṭilō bhava iti yallingo yatrocyate
tallingastatropatiṣṭhate / evamayamakāro yallingo yatrocyate
tallingastatropasthāsyate¹⁰ /

Since Ācārya Pāṇini makes different indicators in each place it is learnt that, there is no confusion in the effect of *anubandha*-s. But there will arise a difficulty that, is the different indicators in each place is for the designation ‘*it*’? Bhāṣyakāra answers to this question in the bhāṣya of the sūtra ‘*a i u n*’, introducing the ‘nānalīṅgakaraṇanyāya’.

For instance, we see in the world one telling Devadatta, “appear here with a shaven head, appear here with matted hair, appear here with a knot of hair and he coming there with that particular mark, i.e. he acts at those several places exactly as instructed. Similarly, the letter ‘*a*’ is one at in all
places; it will be understood as marked with different characteristics at different places.

8.1.10. PĀMSŪDAKANYĀYA

"the maxim of the dust mixed with water"

'praśliṣṭāvarṇāviti/ nātra bhāgaviveko 'sti pāmsūdakavadyarthaḥ'

Pradīpakāra used this nyāya in the bhāṣya of the sūtra ‘tulyāisyaprayatnam savarṇam’ P.1.1.9, to prevent the savarṇasamjñā between e, o, i, au, and a. The word prayatna in the sūtra tulyāisyaprayatnam savarṇam, derived as prārambho yatnasya, means the commencement of the effort. Then there is the chance for the letter ‘a’ to become like with ‘e’ and ‘o’, since the former part of them are ‘a’. These two ‘a’-s in ‘e’ and ‘o’ are so mixed with ‘i’ and ‘u’, like dust and water that they cannot be separated. So the letter ‘a’ may not become savarṇa with ‘ai’ and ‘au’.

8.1.11. RŪPASĀMĀNYANYĀYA

‘similarity of shape’

'rūpasāmānyāt vā siddhametat / tadyathā- tāneva
śātakānācchādayāmah ye mathurāyām, tāneva śālīn bhuṇjāmahe ye
magadhesu, tadevedam bhavatah kārṣāpaṇam yanmathurāyām grhītam, anyasmīścānyābhīṣca rūpasāmānyāt tadevetam iti bhavati / evamihāpi rūpasāmānyāt siddham'12/

Bhāṣyakāra proves the ekatva of akāra in ‘a i u n’ sūtra through the ‘rūpasāmānyanyāya’- the ‘similarity of shape’. For example, even though objects are different, they are taken to be one from similarity of shape. We say ‘we wear ourselves with the same dress as at Mathura, we eat the same rice as we ate in Mathura, this is the same coin which we received from Mathura, although individually the dress, rice and the coin are not the same but are only similar. So, also the purpose will be achieved by taking the akāra-s to be one from similarity of shape.

8.1.12. SĀHACARYANYĀYA

“The maxim of association”.

‘yadyapi tāvadayam parirdṛṣṭāpacāro varjane cāvarjane ca/ ayam khalvapāśabdo’drṣṭāpacāro varjanārtha eva/ tasya ko’nyo dvitiyāh sahāyo bhavitumarhati- anyadato varjanārthāt/ tadyatā-asya gordvitiīyenārthah’13/

Bhāṣyakāra mentions this nyāya in connection with the rule ‘karmapravacaniyayukte dvitiyā’ P 2.3.8. Here a question that whether pari
of 'apaparivarjane' P 2.3.10 is used in the sense of varjana (exclusion) or in the sense of avarjana (non-exclusion). apa is always used in the sense of varjana and the pari is used here in association with apa. So pari is used to denote the meaning of varjana. It is explained that similarity, forms the basis of association. Here Patañjali introduces the sāhacaryanyāya and says that when it is said that one needs an associate to a bull, a bull alone is brought neither a horse nor a donkey. Association recalls only that which similar (sadṛśa) is. The sāhacaryanyāya can see in several other rules like 'jaśsasōśih' P.7.1.20, 'pareścaghānkayoh' P. 8.2.22, 'viparābhyaṁ jeh' P.1.3.19, 'antarāntarena yukte' P.2.3.4.

8.1.13. SAMBHĀVĪKĀRYANYĀYA

bhavet yadsambhavi kāryam tannāneko yugapatkuryāt / yattu khalu sambhavi kāryamaneko'pi tad yugapat karoti / sambhabi cedam kāryamakārasyoccāranaṁ nāma / tadyathā- ghaṭasya darśanam sparśanam vā14 /

In the bhāṣya of the sūtra 'a i u n', Bhāṣyakāra deny the argument that the various other difficulties will present themselves as in the case of ordinary objects, if apply the ekatva of akāra. Impossible things can be seen in the world as several people cannot bring water with the same pot simultaneously, but in cases where many can handle the same thing at the

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same time, just as seeing a pot or touching it. In the present case too, the
pronouncing *akāra* is thus possible, many pronounce it at the same time.

8.1.14. SANDEHE NIYAMA NYĀYA

‘the rule is operates whenever there is a doubt’.

‘tadyathā-loke kaścit kañcit prcchati – grāmāntaram gamīṣyāmi,
panthānam me bhavānupadiśatu iti / sa tasmāyācaṣṭe amuṣminnavakāśe
hastadaksino grahītavyaḥ, amuṣminnavakāśe hastavāmaḥ iti / yastatra
tiryak patho bhavati na tasmin sandeha iti kṛtvā nāsāvupadiśyate /
evamihāpi sandehe niyamah na cāvayavaṣṭhyādiṣu sandehah’

In the sūtra ‘ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyoga’, Patañjali says that, having hundreds
of meaning to ṣaṣṭhī, mention of ṣaṣṭhī in Vyākaraṇa, all meanings which it
has have a chance to be applied there, it is desired that the ṣaṣṭhī in
grammar is only sthāneyoga and the sūtra is read for the sake of this
‘niyama’. But by doing so, the doubt is that, will there come the
sthānaṣṭhī in avayavaṣṭhī like ‘ṣāsa idaṁ haloh’. There is no chance
for the sūtra-s dealing with avayavaṣṭhī to come within the province of
the sūtra.

There is no doubt that avayavaṣṭhī in the sūtra ‘ṣāsa idaṁ haloh’.
Therefore, the *niyama* is not important. If it is not said, it can be understood
by the ‘sandehe niyama nyāya’. Suppose one says to another, “I wish to go to the next village and please direct me”. Here replies to the stranger “you should turn right from the junction and to the left there”. He is not given any direction if there is an opposite way, since there is no difficulty for him to decide the right path. Therefore, in the sūtra also operates wherever there is a doubt. In case of avayavāsaṣṭi etc., there is no room for any doubt.

8.1.15. UTSARGĀPAVĀDANYĀYA

‘the maxim of general principles and specific features’

‘katham tarhīme śabdāḥ-pratipattavyāḥ? kincit sāmānyaviśe-
vālksaṇam pravartyaṁ, yena alpena yatnena mahato mahataḥ śabdaughaṁ pratipadhyeran / kim punastat? utsargāpavādau / sāmānyena utsargah kartavyah / tadyathā- “karmanyaṁ” / tasya viśeṣena apavādaḥ , yathā āto’nurasarge kah iti’

While discussing how the exposition of science of words has to be given, Bhāṣyakāra says that it is done either by expounding of correct words, or incorrect words or both. But the enumeration of correct words is better since, it is easier and required. When it is decided that the list of correct words is to be given, there arise the question whether an inventory of all available correct words should be taken. The recital of each individual word is not the right way of teaching correct words. There
should be followed the method of laying down general principles and specific features, so that with a comparatively small effort, a man would learn bigger and bigger collections of words.

There should be stated a general rule with a wide application, as for example, "karmanyan" P.3.2.1, it means that, if in a compound, the verb is preceded by the object, which qualifies it, the suffix 'an' follows the verb. Then a specific exception to the rule should be given like 'āto'nupasarge kah' P.3.2.2, prescribing the affix 'ka' instead of 'an' after a root ending in 'ā' and having any word excepting a preposition as the antecedent. These general principles and specific features are said to be utsarga and apavāda respectively.

8.1.16. VAIYĀKARANASŪTASAMVĀDANYĀYA

'maxim of conversation between grammarian and charioteer'.

'kimca bho iṣyate etad rūpam? bādhamiṣyate / evam hi kaścid vaiyākaraṇa āha -ko'sya rathasya praveteti ? sūta āha- āyuśmān ahamasya rathasya prājiteti / vaiyākaraṇa āha- apaśabda iti / sūta āha- prāptijño devānām priyo na tvṣṭijñah / iṣyate etad rūpamiti / vaiyākaraṇa āha- aho khalvanena durutena bādhyāmahe iti / sūta āha - na khalu veṇaḥ
The rule ‘ajevyaghaña pó’ P.2.4.56 means that the word aja is replaced by vi when an ārdhadhātuka affix other than ghān or ap follows. According to Pāṇini when the ārdhadhātuka affix follows the root aja with upasarga pra, it is replaced by vi and the form pravetā is formed. But, according to Bhāṣyakāra the sūtra shall read only ajervi, which may mean that vi optionally replaces aj by taking here vā from the rule vā lītī P.2.4.55 and take it to be vyavasthitavibhāsa so that it operates with reference to pravetā, pravetum, pravītah, samvītih and does not operate with reference to samājah samajah udājah udajah samajanam, udājanam and samajya.

The provision should be made optional before an ārdhadhātuka affix which begins by the abbreviatory term val. This would allow the derivation of example such as pravetā and prājitā.

According to Pāṇini there have only the word pravetā, but Bhāṣyakāra accepts the form prājitā also. When the ārdhadhātuka affix trc follows, there the word aja replaced by vi so that the form prājitā does not occurred, but Patañjali introduces this nyāya and says that there is the form prājitā also.
A grammarian supporting Pāṇini questioned that 'who is the pravetā (charioteer) of this chariot'. The charioteer replies that, 'I am the prājitā of this chariot. It is incorrect form-says grammarian. Charioteer replies, 'you are a learned fool, not only the forms learnt from sūtra-s and do not know the forms secured from the opinion of the Bhāṣyakāra'. Hearing these words, grammarian says that, 'I am so slighted by this duruta. In reply to this charioteer says, 'the word sūtaḥ is not derived from the root vī, but from the root sū. If you want to derive a term of contempt form sū, it should be duḥsūṭena". From this conversation Patañjali says, the rule ajervyaghaṇapoh shall read only ajervī.

8.1.17. VYĀPTINYĀYA

'na ca mukhye sati gauṇasyāśrayanam yuktam, gauṇamukhyayor- mukhye kāryasampratayāt, naiṣa dosah, vyāpternyāyādākārasyāpi gauṇamactvamāśritya bhaviṣyati, anyathā hyajgraḥanaḥ eva kuryāt, na vrddhirgraḥanam' 18/

Nyāsakāra uses the vyāptinyāya when he interprets the sūtra 'vrddhiryasyācāmādistat vrddham' P.1.1.73. The sūtra means that, if a word consisting of many vowels, and have a vrddhi vowel at the beginning in the order of vowels, that word is called vrddham. Thus, the words śatā, mātā, etc have the first vowel ā, a vrddhi vowel; therefore, they are called
vrddham. Here the doubt arises that ‘how can we consider the long vowel ‘a’ as ‘ac’, since the short ‘a’ is ‘ac’. Short ‘a’ is primary and long ‘ā’ is secondary in ‘ac’. So the short vowel ‘a’ is ‘ac’, according to the paribhāṣa, ‘gaunamukhyayoh mukhye kāryasamprataye’. Hence, long vowel ‘a’ in the example śālīya, mālīya will not be an ‘ac’. Then there is neither vrddhisamjñā nor vrddhasamjñā.

Here Nyāsakāra introduces the vyāptinyāya. The vyāptinyāya is much stronger than the gaunamukhyayoh mukhye kāryasampratayahi nyāya because, if long vowel ‘a’ is secondary to Pāṇini, he may not say that the vrddhi will come to the sabda-s like śālā mālā. Wishing to consider the long vowel ‘a’ as ‘ac’, he use the sūtra ‘vrddhiryācāmādistant vrddham’ instead of ‘aicaryasyācāmādistant vrddham’. Instead of ‘aicah’ he used vrddhi, so the vyāptinyāya is stronger than that of ‘gaunamukhyayoh mukhye kāryasampratayahi nyāya.

8.1.18. YATHĀSAMKHYANYĀYA

“the maxim of arranging in regular succession”

‘tadyathā acāvidhanau devadattayajñadattau ityukte tatra na jnāyate kasyājādhanam, kasyāvayava iti / yadyapi tāvalloka esa drṣṭāntah, dr-
In the rule ādyantau takitau P.1.1.46, the compound ādyantau is dvanda-ādiśca antaśca iti ādyantau and takitau-ṭit ca kit ca also a dvanda compound. Then this sūtra is worded in compounds and it is not clearly known which is ādi and which is anta. To clear this doubts Patañjali explains the yathāsamkhyaṁyāya. In the expression-ajāvidhanau devadattayajñadattau- Devadetta and Yajñadatta have the wealth of goats and sheep; it is not definitely known who has the wealth of goats and who has that of sheep.

Even though this ambiguity is admitted in the world, in śāstra also the doubt arises that which is ādi and which is anta. Though the doubt in the world cleared through some individual effort, in śāstra, through the sūtra yadhāsamkhyaṁanudeśaḥ samānam P.1.3.10, this doubt is removed. That is this rule means that assignment of equivalents for equal number of elements follows the order of enumeration. So the elements marked with ‘t’ or ‘k’ becomes the initial and final segments respectively of items in the genitive to which they are introduced.
8.2. Paribhaṣa

8.2.1. ASIDDHAM BAHIRAṄGAMANTARAṄGE NYĀYA

"a bahiraṅga is non-existent for the purpose of an antaraṅga"

‘tad yathā-puruṣo ’yam prātaruttāya yānyasya pratiṣarīram kāryāṇi
tāṇi tāvat karoti / tataḥ suhṛdāṁ, tataḥ sambandhinām / prātipadikam
cāpyupadistam sāmānyabhūte’rthe vartate / sāmānye vartamānasya
vyaktirupajāyate / vyaktasya sato lingasamkhāḥbhāyāmanvitasya
bāhyenārthena yogo bhavati / 20

This is a very famous paribhaṣa in Vyākaraṇaśāstra. Patañjali states
this nyāya under the rule ‘acaḥ parasmin pūrvavidhau’ P.1.1.57. This
paribhaṣa is of manifold benefits and certainly is it to be resorted to. The
operation of this paribhaṣa is supported from what is seen in the world.
Object in the world, which is subjected to a large number of operations, is
seen thus. First, it is operated upon with reference to the closest limb, then
with one a little more remote, then with one remoter than the second is and
so on. It may be illustrated as follows- man, after getting up from his bed,
first attends to the actions pertaining to himself, then to those of his friends
and then to those who are connected with him. Likewise, in śāstra, stem
too, as soon as it is mentioned, produces in the mind of the hearer the idea
of the genus, and then the individuality, and it in its turn comes in
association with gender and number, so that it becomes connected with
external object. The order of procedure in words is the same as is found in
objects. Similar should be the operations on them. Likewise, a man relates
firstly the antaranīga objects, and then the bahiraniḍga. The paribhāṣa,
asiḍham bahiraniḍgamanantarāṅge means that, the bahiraniḍga is regarded as
not having taken effect, when that which is antaranīga is to take effect. The
status of internal and external conditioning is determined on the basis of
forms (śabda) and not meaning (artha).

8.2.2. Kṛtrimaṇkṛtrimayoḥ kṛtrime kāryasampratyayahan īyāyā

The rule that "whenever it may appear doubtful whether an operation
has reference to that which is expressed by the technical or to that which is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of a particular term, the operation refers
only to that which is expressed by the technical meaning of the term is
question".

'kṛtrimaṇkṛtrimayoḥ kṛtrime kāryasampratyayo bhavati/ yathā loke
gopālakamāṇaya kaṭajakamāṇya iti yasyaisā samjñā bhavati sa āniyate/ na
yo gāh pālayati yo vā kaṭe jātaḥ'²¹/
To get the technical term *samkhya*, to *bahu, gaṇa*, *vatu*, and *dati*, and for the sake of getting designation to the numbers *eka, dvi* etc., the word *samkhya*, has to be read in the *samkhyaśamjñā sūtra, ‘bahugan avatuḍati samkhya’* P.1.1.23. Since the numbers *eka, dvi* etc. are not *krtrima* and the *samjñā* of *bahu, gaṇa*, *vatu*, *dati* etc. are *krtrima*, of the two, *krtrima* and *akrtrima*, it is said that rules operate on *krtrima*, though the nyāya *krtrimākrtrimayoh krtrime kāryasampratyayah*. So it recognizes only the *krtrima* numbers *bahu, gaṇa*, *vatu*, *dati* etc. and not recognizes numbers like, *eka, dvi* etc. to get the designation *samkhya*.

In the world, if one says, “bring Gopālaka, bring Kaṭajaka”, then brought one who bears that name not one who is look after cows, or, who is born on a straw-mat. People in the world do not seek after the derived meaning of a word, but they are satisfied with its meaning by *rūḍhi* and proceed further to operate upon it. Here Bhāṣyakāra refutes the opinion of *pūrvapakṣin* and says that, in the world, the *krtrimākrtrimanyāya* operates only according by the denoting capacity or the context.

8.2.3. SAKRḌGATINYĀYA

“A prior rule once blocked by a subsequent rule remains blocked forever”.  

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This nyāya is mentioned in the Mahābhāṣya under the rule ‘stānivadādeśo’nalvidhau’ P.1.1.56. He says that in the example tisṛnām (tri + ām), two rules can apply. The rule ‘trestrayāḥ’ P.6.3.48, requires that tri be replaced by trayas and the rule ‘tricaturoh striyām tisṛcatasr’ P.7.2.99 requires that tri be replaced by tisr. These rules are equal in strength. By the rule ‘vipratiṣedheparamkāryam’ P.1.4.2, the subsequent rule ‘tricaturoh striyām tisṛcatasr’ comes and tri is replaced by tisr to yield tisṛnām. But by the sūtra ‘stānivadādeśo’nalvidhau’, there is a chance for the ādeśa traya to appear there by the sūtra ‘trestrayāḥ’. To avoid the scope of application of the sūtra, Patañjali mentions the sakṛdgati nyāya and says that, when two rules conflict with each other, the one defeated at its first operation is defeated forever. So the sūtra ‘trestrayāḥ’ will remain blocked forever. Just like a person killed never return to the life, in Šāstra also a rule once blocked by a subsequent rule remains blocked forever in a conflict of equal strength.
8.2.4. YATRĀNEKAVIDHAMĀNTARYAM TATRA STHĀNATAH
ĀNTARYAM BALĪYAH NYĀYA

"in more proximities, give preference to the organ of utterance"

'atha sthāne iti vartamāne punaḥ sthānagrahaṇam kimartham?
yatrānekavidhamāntaryam tatra sthānataḥ eva āntaryam balīyo yathā syāt/
kimpunastat? cetā stotā/ pramāṇato’kāro guṇaḥ prāpnoti, sthānata
ekāraukārau/ punaḥ sthānagrahaṇātekāraukārau bhavataḥ\[23/]

The sūtra ‘sthāne’ntaratamah’ P.1.1.50, means adeśa which is to
replace a sthānin must be most homogenous to the sthānin. This similarity
is valued in view of four factors. stānakṛta (similarity based on place of
articulation), arthakṛta (based on signification), guṇakṛta (based on sound
quality), and pramāṇakṛta (based on space of articulation). But according
to this paribhāṣa-yatrānekavidhamāntaryam tatra sthānataḥ āntaryam
balīyah, the nearness in the organ of utterance has preference, in the
selection of proper substitute. The use of the word sthāne in this rule when
it was available by anuvṛtti from ‘saṣṭhī sthāneyoge’ P.1.1.49, the use of
sthāne again is to indicate that whenever there is a possibility of similarity
based on more than one factor, a similarity based on sthāna (place of
articulation) should be considered decisive. In the world if a person died
without any successor, his properties will get to his close relative, even
though he has more relatives. Likewise in śāstra also in the derivation of ceta (ci+tr) and stotā (stu+tr), 'sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoh.' P.7.3.84 orders a guna replacement for 'i' and 'u'. They are a/e and a/o, that is 'a' also qualifies because it is similar in duration. However, in addition to being similar in duration, 'e' and 'o' are also similar to 'i' and 'u' in place of articulation, hence they win.

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### REFERENCE


5. VP, 3.12.22.


8. Ibid, P. 2.1.36, p-382.


10. Ibid, aiun, p-93.

11. Ibid, Pradīpa, P. 1.1.9, p-245.


15. Ibid, p-100.


22. Ibid, P. 1.1.56, p-461.