CHAPTER III:

MOSSADEQ AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONALIZATION OF OIL INDUSTRY

Reza shah’s regime increasingly resorted to violence to control class and ethnic opposition, so much so that by 1941 many Europeans, as well as Iranian, were speculating whether repression would work indefinitely, whether junior officers would overthrow the regime, or whether social tensions would sooner or later bring about a bloody revolution. Nevertheless, these speculations ended abruptly with the Anglo-Soviet invasion of August 1941. The allies invaded not only for the obvious reason of opening a new corridor to Russia, eliminating German agents, and safeguarding oil installation, but also for the less obvious reasons of preempting any pro-axis officers who might have been tempted to oust the unpopular shah and install a pro-German regime. As the British minister warned the Foreign office in May 1941, “the general discontent in Persia provides Germany with a good field for intrigue. The shah is the object of almost universal execration and cannot count upon full support of his army. Movement for the removal of the shah or even of his dynasty would be popular; most people in Iran would welcome a revolution, however caused”. Invasion promptly sealed Reza Shah’s fate within three days of the invasion, the army, pounded by British and Soviet plants was retreating faster than anticipated even by the allied high command within four days, Foroughi, the independent – mended jurist who had been forced into retirement, was named premier to negotiate with the allies.
Within one week, the new prime minister was swing for peace and secretly encouraging the Allies to remove Reza Shah. Within ten days, the British, eager to obtain public support, were broadcasting blunt attacks on Reza shah’s mismanagement, greedy and cruelty. Within two weeks the hand-picked deputies were openly denouncing the shah for accumulating a vast fortune, murdering innocent citizens, and abusing his titled of Army commander and commander-in-chief. In addition, within three weeks, the shah, without consulting the Allies abdicated favor of the crown prince and hurriedly left the country in the hope of salvaging his dynasty. The British minister wrote that the invasion had aroused not so much public resentment against the invaders as hopes of social improvement and thus feeling of friendship toward the Allies. The American minister arrived at a similar conclusion: “A brutal, avaricious, and inscrutable despot in his later years, his fall from power and his death later in exile were regretted by no one.” 2 In rupturing the autocracy, the Anglo-Soviet, invasion of August 1941 unleashed the pent-up social grievances of the previous sixteen years. As officers fled to the capital and conscripts absconded to their villages, tribal chiefs, many of whom had given up hope of better days, escaped from police surveillance in Tehran and rushed home to their tribal warriors. Veteran politicians who had been nursing their wounds in forced retirement hurried back into public life. Religious leaders, emerging from seminary libraries, many of them too young to remember the difficulties of 1907-1925, plunged enthusiastically into politics, editing newspapers, publishing pamphlets, and forming political parties with the goal of building a new Iran.

Even the obsequious deputies and sycophantic bureaucrats suddenly found the courage to declare their political independence and denounce their farmer master. The reign of silence was superseded by the clamor of flamboyant deputies, lively journalists, outspoken, party leaders, and discontented demonstrators. During the preceding sixteen years, power had been centered firmly round one man. But during the next years, form the fall of
Reza shah’s military monarchy in August 1941 until the rise of Muhammad Reza shah’s military monarchy in August 1953, power was to shift back and forth between five separate poles: the court, the Majles, the cabinet, the foreign embassies, and the general public. Moreover each of these power centers had its own internal struggles.

The court included civilian advisors seeking a genuine constitutional democracy as well as army officers anxious to reestablish a strong autocracy. The Majles was divided into conservative, liberal, and radical factions, as well as pro-British, pro-American, and pro-Russian factions. The cabinet contained ministers who owed their positions either to the court, or to one of the many parliamentary factions, or to the foreign powers. The foreign powers themselves turned hostile to one another as the allies of the world war became the antagonists of the cold war. Finally, the public quickly divided into rival social forces once political parties had a chance to inspire, mobilize, and represent various interest groups. These power centers fought many of their battles within the cabinet, causing permanent instability on the ministerial level. In the preceding sixteen years, there had been only 8 premiers, 10 cabinets, and 50 ministers filling 198 cabinet posts. In the next thirteen years, however, there were to be as many as 12 premiers, 31 cabinets, and 148 ministers filling 400 cabinet posts. On the average, premiers lasted eight months and cabinets less than five months. This rapid turnover, however, did not mean that social mobility had come to Iran and the middle classes had entered the corridors of power. On the contrary, of the 12 premiers, 9 came from the nineteenth-century titled families, 2 from Reza Shah’s bureaucracy, and 1 from his military elite. 3

Political instability was not confined to the cabinet. Over the previous sixteen years, the political arena-especially the streets had been quiet. Some saw that this stability permitted the establishment of orderly parliaments, responsible newspapers, disciplined publics, and even punctual railways. But to
many, it resembled the quiet of the dungeon—over the next thirteen years; however, the country was to pass from one social upheaval to another, from one political crisis to another, from one diplomatic storm to another. From some, this instability was the progenitor of social anarchy and national disintegration. From others, it was the natural but painful product of political democracy and public participation. In the previous reign, the state had controlled interest groups, concealed internal conflicts, remolded society, and in short, dominated the social structure.

In the next thirteen years, the social structure would reveal deep-seated conflicts, transform these conflicts in the political arena, and thereby remold the political system. These thirteen years, therefore, provide a rare and valuable opening through which the social scientist can observe the deep-rooted internal conflicts that are usually hidden in developing countries by one–party systems, police censors, heavy-handed bureaucrats, and authoritarian generals. The emergence of a multitude of parties, parliamentary groups, and professional associations in the years after August 1941 convinced many observers and participants, Iranians as well as non-Iranians, that the Iranian “national character” was marred by personal insecurity, distrust, jealousy, paranoia, anarchistic, disobedience, intense cynicism, conspicuous individualism and compulsive factionalism.⁴

The Thirteenth Majles (November 1941 – November 1943)

Whereas class and ethnic conflicts provided the underlying theme of politics during the next thirteen years, the immediate issue confronting the country in 1941 was the survival of the monarchy. On his accession, the new Shah tried to secure his position by making as many friends as possible. To win the confidence of the allies, he promised fall cooperation, even offering volunteers to right in Europe and remaining silent at the arrest of some fifty pro-German army officers. In return, Britain and the Soviet Union signed a
treaty of alliance with Iran, implicitly guaranteeing the dynasty and explicitly promising to evacuate the country within six months after the war. To assure the public that the dictatorship would not be re-imposed, the new shah granted amnesty to all political prisoners, and released over, 1250 dissidents during the next few months. Refused to protect two of his father’s henchmen who were accused of murdering political prisoners; and decreed the return of ecclesiastical lands to the religious foundations.

He also opened a theology college at Tehran University; transferred much of his landed inheritance to the state for eventual redistribution among the previous owners; and carefully portrayed himself in public as an apolitical youth who, having been educated in democratic Switzerland, had always been uncomfortable in his father’s autocratic court. Moreover, to allay the concern of the upper class, the Shah took his oath of office before the deputies, reintroduced parliamentary immunity for the deputies, encouraged the use of old aristocratic titles in court ceremonies, transferred the gendarmerie to the ministry of interior, and above all, invited parliament to participate again in the process of forming cabinets. Reza shah had been in the habit of sending his chosen premier, with the royal decree (farman), to parliament to obtain the vote of confidence for the cabinet. Now, the deputies first elected the premier, sent him to the shah to collect the decree, and then gave him a vote of confidence for his both program and cabinet.

In striving to preserve the dynasty, the shah was helped by one piece of good fortune. For the invasion had occurred just as Reza shah had been putting the finishing touches to the elections for the thirteenth Majles. The new shah therefore inherited a parliament that was willing to reach a compromise in which he did not dictate political matters, but did keep control of military matters. Consequently, the old chain of army command remained intact. Orders continued to go from the military office in the palace, through the chief of general / staff directly to the field commanders, by passing the war ministers.
To ensure smooth communication between the shah and the field commanders, royalists were packed into the war ministry. The ministry was reduced to mere office of army supplies, the ministers to a glorified regimental quartermaster. The new shah, moreover, protected from public hearings the field commanders who had deserted their posts in August 1941; showered officers with promotions, creating twice as many colonels and generals in twenty months as his father had done in twenty years; and signed an agreement with United State for reorganizing, retraining, and reequipping the armed force. Sir reader Bullard, the British minister, reported that the shah, being “doubtful of popular enthusiasm for his dynasty” cultivated his ties to the officers, “jealously guarded his own control over the militant” and thereby, “assumed both the title and the real authority of the commander–in-chief of the armed forces.” He added “what worries the shah is the moral state of his people. He says that they have no ideal and he wants to give them an ideal through a large army.”

The invasion thus washed away two of the three pillars that had supported Reza shah’s regime: the bureaucracy and the court patronage. The civil administration was taken over by ministers responsible to parliament. And the royal estates were handled over to the government. Out of the wreckage, however, Muhammad Reza shah managed to salvage the remnants of the central pillars, the military. It was true that the army was diminished in size, disillusioned in spirit, and shaken in discipline. However, was equally true that the same army was the country’s largest institution, the main instrument of legitimate violence, and the best-structured organization in the state. This pillar could continue to support the monarchy as long as parliament was willing to keep its compromise with the shah.

The modus vivendi, however, weakened during the course of the thirteenth Majles as the amorphous collection of deputies gradually coalesced
into the following four fluids, fluctuating, but identifiable groups: the National Union Caucus (Fraksiun – i Ittihad_i Melli); the Patriotic Caucus (Fraksiun_i mihan); the Azerbaijani Caucus (Fraksiun_i Azarbaijan); and Justice Caucus (Fraksiun_i Adalat). These four groups disagreed not only over internal issue, especially the constitutional problem of who should control the military; but also over external issue, particularly the vital question of how to retain national independence foreign occupation. The National Unionists, who mustered the largest but not the majority bloc, represented the segment of the aristocracy that had been successfully co-opted into Reza shah’s regime. In constitutional matters, they hoped to preserve the compromise with shah. In foreign relations, they like the Shah-feared both British and soviet union, and consequently sought to draw in United States to counter balance the two traditional enemies.

Dissatisfied with the constitutional arrangement, the Patriotic Caucus was formed of landowners and merchants from southern and southwestern regions under British occupation. Whereas these three groups included the diverse segments of the landed upper class, the Justice Caucus represented the older generation of the intelligentsia. Formed of senior civil servants, technocrats and older intellectuals, its members had originally supported Reza shah but had gradually grown fearful of his dictatorial methods. In internal affairs, therefore, they intended to place the military under civilian control. In external affairs, they hoped to draw in United States as a third force to counter balance the two major powers. Thus, they converged with the national unionists on the foreign issue, but diverged on the constitutional problem.

Weak situation of the National Union Caucus (Fraksiuni Ittahand-e Melli) appeared when in March 1942 three caucuses of Patriotic (Mihan), Azerbaijan) and Justice (Adalat) unified for Forghi’s removal. From September 1941, Forughi assumed leadership of the three cabinets which was by the court. In the next maneuver to choose new prime minister, the Patriotic Caucus
(Fraksiun-I Mihan) raised “Asadollah Aalam” by the back of Britain, whereas, the Azerbaijan Caucus suggested Ghavam by the help of Russian embassy. Since, above groups rejected each other nominees, the Justice Caucus (Fraksiuni Adalat) could obtain enough votes for its nominee “Ali soheily” by the American embassy support.

Soheily was prime minister for 5 months. His measures included postponing publication of 300 million rails banknotes by the national bank for occupation forces; postponing seizure of officers who cooperated with German’s returning disposed expropriated lands by the shah Reza to their owners. Finally, in August 1942 he stepped aside because of loosing his parliamentary majority. Now, Ghavam, was ready not for publishing note banks needed by occupation forces but for capture of pro-Germany officers. He seemed the most suitable prime ministry nominee. Qavam guided through parliament a special bill giving the administration of the country’s finances to Dr. Millspaugh, the America economic expert who had served in Iran during the early 1920’s. Furthermore, Qavam purged royalists from the war ministry and instructed the cabinet members to communicate with the shah only through the office of the Prime minister. The conflict between Qavam and the shah spilled over into the streets of Tehran. The upheaval began as a peaceful demonstration on December 8, 1942 outside parliament, organized by the bazaar guilds protesting the high food prices, the new issue of bank notes, and the recent income tax bill drafted by Millspaugh.

In any case, the riots had jolted the deputies, especially the Patriotic and the Justice Fraksians, into realizing that the breakdown of the military order could be an open invitation for social disorder. When parliament reconvened in February 1943, Qavam had no choice but to hand in his resignation. The young shah had survived the first of many challenges to his military position. After Qavam departure, the Justice and Patriotic Fraksians allied with the national Unionists to bring back Soheily. Obtaining a large majority, Soheily
strengthened his position by wooing the religious establishment. Although Soheily retained his parliamentary majority through 1943, his relations with the shah suffered three acute crises. The first was caused by his refusal to suppress newspapers that had revealed embarrassing personal information about members of the royal family. The second erupted over the annual budget. Soheily, encouraged by drastically reducing the army from 65,000 men to 30,000. The shah countered with the demand that the army should be increased to 108,000. Eventually, the head of the American military mission, General Ridley, set the figure at 86,000.

The third crisis revolved around the Interior Ministry as the elections for the Fourteenth Majles drew nearer. Since the Interior Ministry appointed not only the provincial governors general and the regional governors but also, through them, the local Supervisory Electoral Councils. Soheily, the shah, and the Patriotic Fraksijn fought a tug-of-war for the important ministry. In nine months, they produced three different interior minister and ten new governors general. The shah, growing concerned about the election results, suggested to Allies that the life of the existing Majles should be extended until the end of the war. The Allies, however, replied that the elections would be a valuable safety-valve, and that the people looked forward to the new Majles as “safeguard for their liberties.” Shah finding himself in a precarious position the shah eventually transferred 500,000 $ from New York to invest into the “political intrigue” of the unavoidable elections. Bullard commented, “Definitely scared about the composing of the new Majles, the shah wished to take all possible precautions.

The Fourteenth Majles Elections (November 1943 – February 1944)

The election for the Fourteenth parliament were the most prolonged, the most competitive, and hence the sot meaningful of all election in modern Iran, beginning as early as June 1943, six months before the closure of the
Thirteenth Majles, the electoral campaign continued in some constituencies until as late as April 1944, three months after the opening of the Fourteenth Majles. Over 800 candidates competed for 136 seats. Moreover, the results were determined not by the state, but by the relative strengths, on one hand, of competing social forces, and on the other hand of organized groups, especially political parties, parliamentary fraksiuns, and their foreign protectors within the government bureaucracy. Gone were the days when the shah could arrange the return of his faithful deputies. Instead, the country was galvanized by lively but highly complex elections between rival candidates attached to diverse interests, espousing different views, and appealing to antagonistic social force.

The newly created Ministry of provisions was able to influence the elections, since no one could vote without showing his ration cards. As a result, the primer minister, together with the minister of interior and provisions, wielded most influence in Tehran and Mazandaran, the two main provinces outside both martial law and foreign occupation. The shah, on the other hand, carried most weight in constituencies under martial law, especially the disturbed regions of Isfahan, Fars, Kerman, and Kutdistan. The Allies, of course, had the upper hand in their respective zones of occupation: the British in Khuziestan, Kermanshah, and parts of Tehran province, the Soviets in Azerbaijan, Gilan, and northern Khurasan. None of these forces, however, monopolized the elections. Relative power of diverse social forces was dependent on social structure of constituencies. In rural zones, tribal chiefs and big landowners had been determining the election results through dominance on peasants and tribes. In small cities, religious leaders and rich merchants had been mobilizing the traditional middle class by Bazaar class and local mosques. On the other hand in nearly most modern cities religious leaders and rich merchants formed their own political parties to resist radical intellectuals who had their own professional set up revolutionary newspaper and more important political parties. Britain embassy described the sixteen participated political parties in election as follows: “while the Iranian xenophobia reacted in leaning
to one of the allied forces in elections, but, the main evolving faction is retrogressive faction against the leftist faction, or the wing between rich and poor.” The same source at the end of the election reported those sixteen political parties had been divided to forty-two parties.  

During next two years, most of the parties were disappeared but remained six major parties that including: the Comrades Party (Hizbi Hamrahan); the Iran Party (Hizbi-Iran); the Justice Party (Hizbi-iAdalat); the National Union Party (Hizbi-i-Ittihad-I-melli); and the Father Land Party (Hizbi-I vatan) and Tudeh Party. The Comrade’s Party was formed in November 1942 by a small circle of radical intellectuals who had worked with the Tudeh but had grown concerned by the latter’s firm support for the Soviet Union. Mustawfa Fateh, the party’s leading figure, was a British-educated economist and one of the highest-ranking Iranian in the Anglo-Indian oil company. Having co-edited the paper Mardom (the people) with the Tudeh leader in a short-lived united front named the Anti-Fascist society, Fateh left and founded his own newspaper, Emruz va Farda (today and Tomorrow). In later years, he wrote an excellent Marxist study of the oil company titled Punjah saleh-Naft-Iran (fifty years of Iranian oil). The Comrade’s party espoused two broad objectives: “the granting of political equality to all citizens” and the nationalization of the main means of production to provide each according to his work. During the elections, the party focused its energies in the British occupied zone and sponsored ten candidates, all of whom were western-educated professionals and civil servants.  

The Iran Party, which soon became the country’s main secular nationalist organization, had developed out of an Engineer’s association created in October 1941. Mehdi Bazargan, a founding member of both the association and the party, latter reminisced, “While studying in Europe during the 1930s, we marveled at the sight of free student associations, free religious fraternities, and free political parties.” The association, however, split into two on the even
of the Fourteenth Majles elections, while the more radical members joined the pro-Tudeh labor movement, the more moderate ones formed the Iran Party and joined other like-minded professionals especially lawyers, doctors, and professor to stand by respectful Dr. Mossadeq. Mossadeq views were matching to the Iran Party views. (Hizbi-Iran), staged to politics again in 1941, but because of his independent personality kept away from any party independences. Mossadeq started his election campaign around three subjects by the support of Tehran’s syndicate leaders and professional associations.

First, he believed when Iran can preserve its national independence that it leaves its previous misleading foreign policy or according to him “positive equilibrium” and adopt a proper neutral policy which he called “negative equilibrium”. According to Mossadeq, it was the traditional leaders to make conflict between the northern neighbor (Russia) and the southern one (Britain) and once in a while vested a concession to one of them or sometimes they were seeking for a “third force” like Germany, France, the U.S. to balance against the two powerful neighbors. Traditional leaders following up this open policy gave concessions to the left and the right occasionally, so that, they intrigued foreign powers appetite in which Iran turn into a public battle field. Mossadeq resulted the only way to end this dilemma situation was cutting off main concessions and assuring super powers specially Britain and the Soviet of Iran’s hard nonaligned policy. Second, the other issue for Mossadeq in his election campaign was the shah. He reasoned the “Shah Reza” dictatorship was on the military basis. He emphasized the present new democracy wouldn’t be endurable unless the military forces be taken out of the Shah’s supervision to the civilian and the Majles. Third, the third issue was the necessity of changing election system. He insisted on being impossible social reforms till existing hand owners family in the Majles. Also, he had faith in making double Tehran’s deputies; illiterates disfranchising – because illiterates and rural could be pawn of their landowners_ ; replacing of civilian committees by steering professors, teachers, lawyer and other educated civilian ; and
supervision councils on election. Mossadeq’s foreign policy relied on prohibiting of any talks over concessions till quitting Iran by superpowers. His internal policy was based on opposing to militarism constitutionality and political liberalism to absorb more middle class than the old landlord’s family.

The Iran party helped bring about the election of not only Mossadeq. But also of five of its kaders: Dr. Rezazadeh Shafaq–Dr. Ghulam Ali Farivar, Dr. Abdul Hamid Zangeneh, Dr. Hussain Muaven and Dr. Abdallah Muazemi. In addition to supporting Mossadeq’s general policies, the Iran party advocated a diluted form of French socialism. It called for a national revolution against the feudal landlords to complete the reforms initiated by the constitutional movement. It argued that main social conflict in Iran was between the “exploited people” and the “exploiting rulers” not between the middle and the lower classes. It encouraged the state to implement a program for rapid industrialization, and claimed that agricultural countries, being “dumping grounds” for developed countries, could not be truly independent. 14

Whereas the young intelligentsia headed the Iran and Comrades’ Parties, the older intelligentsia who had participated in the political upheaval of the early 1920s formed who had grown up in the 1930s the Justice party. An offshoot of the Justice Caucus in parliament, the Justice Party was headed by “Ali Dasht; the outspoken deputy: Dadgar, and old democrat who had helped the 1921 coup d’etat and had served as Reza shah’s president of the Majles before escaping into exile in Europe. The papers close to the party –Bahram (Mars), Nida-yi Adalat (Call of justice), Mehr-i Iran (Sun of Iran) and Qiyam-i Iran (rising of Iran) called for reductions in the military budget, reforms in the government bureaucracy, expansion in educational facilities, recruitment of American advisers, and vigilance against both the evil of capitalism and the dangers of communism. The National Union Party was also an offshoot of a parliamentary Caucus. Formed by the royalist deputies, the party and its main organ, the Nida-yi-Mellat (Call of the nation), advocated the same policies as
the National Union fraksion. In foreign affairs, they sought American aid, especially military aid, as a counter balance to the influence of Britain and the Soviet Union. In home affairs, they intended to preserve the compromise with the Shah and to pursue conservative social program. Their day-to-day activities, however, continued to reflect their conservative – royalist backgrounds. The Fatherland Party was formed by sayyid Ziya in September 1943, immediately after his return frame exile, reviving his old paper ra’ad (thundar). with the new title of Ra’ad –I Emruz (today’s Thunder) sayyid Ziya tried to mobilize the bazaars, the ‘ulma’, and the tribes against the “Dangerous vestiges of the military dictatorship”, the “atheistic communism” of the Tudeh Party, and the “corrupt oligarchy” of the titled landowning families. Although the party was closely identified with Britain, its structure reminded many western observers, such as Millsapauh, of Italian fascism. 15

The arrival of the successful candidates in Tehran during the early weeks of 1944 intensified the forebodings of the shah. For, although few considered the forthcoming Majles infested with revolutionaries, many realized that the royalist deputies were in danger of being overwhelmed by antiroyalist land owners, tribal chiefs, intellectuals, civil servants and religious leaders. With the convening of parliament in February, the earlier fears of the shah seemed to be actualized. For although the new Majles resembled the previous ones is social composition, the presence of 60 freshmen in a Hose of 126 deputies drastically changed its political composition (The Fourteenth Majles had 136 seats, but of the elected deputies, five had their credentials rejected, two died soon after the opening of the session, another two resigned, and one was imprisoned by the British for his pro-German activities). The royalist National Union Caucus (Fraksiun-I Ittihad-I Melli) had not only lost its dominant position but was now surrounded by six hostile groups : the Patriotic Caucus (Fraksiun-I Mihan); the Democratic Caucus (fraksiun-i Demokrat) ; the Liberal Caucus (Fraksiuni Azadi ) ; the Independent Caucus (Fraksiuni
The constantly shifting alliance between those seven fraksiuns transformed the Fourteenth Majles into a complex maze of political bargaining and produced in the course of the next two years as many as 7 premiers, 9 cabinets, and 110 cabinet ministers. In fact, governmental instability became so acute and parliamentary debates often became so heated that many outside observers, particular western diplomats, gave up trying to understand the Majles and concluded that Iranian politics was nothing more than the sound and fury of underdeveloped minds. However, a close examination of the fraksiuns proves that the behavior of the deputies was invariably consistent with their regional interests, ideological outlooks, foreign associations, and most important, of all, social backgrounds. The National Union Caucus mustered at most thirty deputies. The Caucus was formed of twenty landlords, four civil servants, three religious leaders, two businessmen, and one lawyer. All had done well under Reza shah: thirteen regularly sat in his parliament: fourteen held high positions in his bureaucracy; and three made large fortunes through his economic projects. Moreover, many of the group represented constituencies whose elections had been influenced mainly by the military commanders. The Patriotic Caucus, on the other hand, included twenty-six deputies, many of whom represented constituencies in the British zone, headed by Madani, and seyyed ziya. Their group was composed of thirteen landlords. Five businesspersons—who traded mostly with Britain—three journalists, three civil servants one lawyer, and one religious notable. The Patriots worked closely with the eleven deputies of the Democratic Caucus. Known by their opponents as the “tribal group” (Fraksiun-i Ashyir) the Democrats were led by two Bakhtiyarii deputies.

The Liberal Caucus (Fraksiun-i Azadi) had twenty deputies including twelve noble landlords, two religious leaders who had been under prosecution
at the Shah Reza’s time and four northern merchants who hoped to boost the trade relations with the Soviets. Approximately, all members of the Liberal Caucus (Fraksiun-i Azadi) were selected from the occupied zones by the Soviet. Members of this group who were the substitution of the Azerbaijan Caucus (in the Thirteenth Majles) were led by northern nobles. Omid newspaper was unofficial segment of the Liberal Caucus (Fraksiun-i Azadi) in the Fourteenth Majles. All eight deputies of the Tudeh Caucus (Fraksiun-i Tudeh) were from young intellectuals, although two of them belonged to noble families. The Tudeh party supported the Liberal Caucus views over foreign issues and the constitutional subjects. Three major publication (leaflets) of the Tudeh Party included “Mardom” (people), “Rahbar” (leader), Razm (combat).

The Independent Caucus (Fraksiun-i Mostaqel) had fifteen deputies and in fact, they were heirs of the Justice Caucus (Fraksiun-i Adalat) from the thirteen Majles. The Independent Caucus (Fraksiun-i Mostaqel) changed their parliamentary title for two reasons. One, for its leader, Dashti, a common political leader of the group, was too important to show his Caucus’s Independence to the Shah and the top landowner class. Also, as for members of the caucus owed their seats to Soheily, American advocator, consider themselves, independent from Britain and the Soviet. “Ettelaat” (Information) newspaper was an unofficial segment whose editor was Abbas Masoodi a Majles deputy.

The Individual Caucus (Fraksiuni Monfaredini) was also a feeble coalition including sixteen deputies who were following Mossadeq especially over foreign and constitutional issues. The closest persons to Mossadeq were five deputies from the Iran Party and two leaders of three Comrade Party (Hizbi Hamrahan). The Individual Caucus (Fraksiun-i monfaredin) were supported by the following or independent newspapers :”Mozaffar”, its editor was Hossein Ki Ostaukin who was the theorist of “Negative Equilibrium” policy ; “Mard-e Emruz” whose editor was Mohammed Masood who
murdered for his explosive articles; “Keyhan” the main rival of the “Ettelaat” and one of the most important of non-party newspapers in the country. Therefore, the seven Majles Caucus and their blocs at out of the Majles had differences with each other on important foreign social, legal issues, on foreign affairs, the Patriotic Caucus (Fraksiun-I Mihan) and the Democrat Caucus (Fraksiun-i Demokrat) were pro-British and the Tudeh, Liberal caucuses were pro-Soviet and the Independent, National Union caucuses were pro-American and the Individual Caucus was dependent and neutral. Social issue, particularly on the need for fundamental reforms, the Tudeh, the Individuals, and at times, the Independents pressed for drastic changes; but the Patriots, Liberals, and National Unionists worked to preserve the status quo. And on conditional issues, especially on the immediate question of who should control the armed forces. The National Unionists stood isolated against the Patriot, Democrats, Liberals, Tudeh, Independents and Individuals.

**Mossadeq and the Fourteenth Majles (March 1944-March 1946)**

The routine opening of the Majles turned into a sharp attack on the shah. The Liberals, Patriots, Democrats, Independents, and Individuals, together with the Tudeh deputies, easily isolated the National Unionists and promptly drafted a new oath of office that stressed the duty of each deputy to defend the constitutional rights of the Majles. They also elected Asad Bakhtiyari of the Democrats and Madani of the Patriots to be, respectively the president and deputy president of the Majles. Moreover, they took the most important positions on the crucial parliamentary committees, where all vital legislation was hammered out.

Opposing to Seyyed Zia representation was the first action of Mossadeq in the fourteen Majles. Then, he could kill two birds with one shot through becoming a conspicuous spokesman of “Independence and Freedom”, exposing the undemocratic and unpleasant consequences of the 1921 Coup. Therefore,
he could bring “Seyyed Zia” Premiership to a standstill in future and did not let the conservative’s coalition led by the Shah Mohammed Reza to go forward. In this relation, Mossadeq’s speeches appreciated by different political spectrum including “Tudeh Party”. Then, occupation of Iran by the Allies, Seyyed Zia’a-Din Tabbatabaie, the political factor of the 1921 coup who had been spending more than twenty years in Europe and Palestine, had returned Iran for playing a new role containing preservation of Britain interests, so, he re-entered to political scene of Iran early of October, 1943, and could determine as the assembly representative of “Yazd” city. “Seyyed Zia” with a reactionary; right wing and demagogic inclination believed to positive influence of British in Iran’s Politics. He was trying to protect British goals inside Iran and also, was being protected by London. The first action of Mossadeq in the Fourteenth Majles on March 7, 1944, was opposing to Seyyed Zia credentials and his disqualification for the Parliament deputation. Mossadeq, in his first speech said:

“The way of his entrance (Seyyed Zia) to Iran after 22 years and his immediate Parliament deputation of “Yazd” prove his commission ..., This Mr. is like a small river which is connected to the “Times River”. As, there will be more water in it, it expand and can comprise large areas. Today, it can be obstructed by soil but tomorrow it cannot be cut even by an iron dam. If today, we do not bar his politics and approve his credential, tomorrow we cannot defend even with new strong arsenals…. Mr. representatives; please don’t repeat the calamity period, please compassionate the country; don’t torture and suffer our youth; don’t enjoin freedom leaders and pioneers to retrogressive executioners; let us prove that this Majles wants the magnificence and greatness of Iran”. 17

Although, Mossadeq’s attempt in rejecting “Seyyed Zia’s” credential had no result, but none of representatives defend his credential. In any case, he
could win with 58 ayes from 86 present deputies. However, “Seyyed Zia” could never enter the Majles next periods, but stayed in Iran’s political scene and had participation in anti-national conspiracies, especially during the anti-imperial struggles of the Iranians for nationalizing oil industry. After legislative approve of oil nationalization and “Hossein Ala” renunciation from Premiership in the spring of 1951, “Seyyed Zia” was again nominated for Prime Ministry by Britain.”

**Objection to Power of Dr. MillsPaugh**

On November 12, 1942, according to the Majles legislation Dr. Millspaugh A.C. from the US was employed as the head of Finance Ministry for 5 years. He had extensive powers in regulating financial Affairs, providing foodstuffs, fixing prices and budget adjusting. On May 3, 1943, he was granted more power for managing the economy of the country with the aim of reducing and balancing of prices and elimination of shortages. Then, he suggested the income tax measure to the Majles, but objection and opponent of deputies ensued and Bazaar closed. Among his thumbs up and down in the Majles, while Fraksiun-i and ideological tendencies including free and the Individuals Caucus (Fraksiun-i Monfaradin) asked for his removal; the Patriot Caucus (Fraksiun-i Mihan), the Democrat Caucus (Fraksiun-i Demokrat); the National Union Caucus (Frakiun-i Ittahade Melli), protecting by the U.S. and Britain, asked for his retaining. Mossadeq, generally, saw presence of foreign advisors inconsistent to the “National Sovereignty” and years ago, Mossadeq had opposed to Dr. Millspaugh in the six terms of the Majles, while proposing the transition bill of Dr. Millspaugh’s Power as the head of Finance Ministry of Iran to “Mekaski” another American advisor. In the fourteen Parliaments, Mossadeq opposed strongly to Millspaugh’s powers and believed to be against the constitution.
“...Legislation is the duty of the National Consultative Assembly’ and nobody and no authority can do that; also according to the constitution, the National Consultative Assembly cannot give over its legislative right to anybody. But the Thirteenth parliament did against the Constitution and now we see Dr. Millspaugh as a part of our executive, he requests powers to legislate [...] if Dr. Millspaugh was honest to this country, why he paid 2 million pound sterling to Britain without permission of the Parliament approve [...] if he is the servant and benevolent to the country why he didn’t import Iran’s share which had been determined by the Middle East Committee and made people poor? [...] if he was benevolent of the people, he wouldn’t stop sending grain to Tehran and promulgate bribe and black mail...”

Finally, “Bayat’s” government put up the continuance of Millespaugh’s service in the Parliament and on January 8, 1945 according to an offering bill by Mossadeq the Parliament voted to repeal his economic powers. Millespauh did not easily surrender and after government resistance, he stepped aside and left Iran.

**Oil Crisis**

In October 1943, in the thick of the World War II, representatives of the oil Company “Royal Dutch Shell” entered Tehran for the South Oil concession. This region was out of the AIOC reign. Also, in February 1944, another delegation from “Socony-Vaccum Oil Company of New York” came to Tehran for Oil concession. Meanwhile, another delegation from the “Sinclair Oil Corporation” entered Tehran. At the time, “Soheily” government and after March 1944, “Mohammad Saed’s” government was on power and after four months, the Fourteenth Majles would inaugurate. On September 2, 1944, despite of secret conversations between Saed government and American
companies, Saed, after Cabinet reshuffle, decided to postpone all talks to foreign companies until end of the war. Obviously, it was with the Shah and Britain advice and confirmation. In fact, Shah asked Saed for postponing the oil talks; also, he had said to British embassy, “any Oil Concession to the Soviet meant government authority ending in the North of Iran.  

However, making such a decision was too late, for, on September 5, 1944, Prime Minister received a message from Moscow that “Sergei Kavtaradze”, deputy of the Soviets Foreign Ministry was coming Tehran at the head of a large delegation of Oil expertise. “Kavtaradze”, after coming to Iran and having negotiation with the Prime Minister and visiting north of Iran, officially requested for oil concession of five northern states of Iran. This request obliged the Tudeh party to act in spite of its previous policy which was opposing to grant any concession to any foreign states. Dr. Reza Rad Manesh, the Leader of Tudeh Caucus (Fraksiun-I Tudeh), had announced in the Parliament as follows:

“I and my colleagues and friends are disagreeing to any kind of concession to foreign states. I believe to extract all our resources and wealth through the people’s help and domestic capital…”

But, at the time Tudeh party changed their stance and protected the Soviets’ concession. On October 27, 1944, the Tudeh Party organized 35000 non-violent demonstrations in front of the Parliament building and demanded oil concession for the Soviets and resignation of “retrogressive government” of Saed. In such a situation, Dr. Mossadeq, pursuing his political doctrine “negative equilibrium”, replied to any kind of concession demanding by the North and South advocators. Mossadeq, on October 27, in open session of the Majles (National consultative Assembly) elaborated and took note of the “D’Arcy Accord” losses which was imposed the Iranians and he considered the Soviets’ suggestion for oil concession same as the British ones in South of Iran.
Then he put up the American suggestion over oil concession and condemned demerits and deficits of Iran’s government. Then illustrated the reasons of Iran’s occupation by Britain and the Soviet allegedly for confronting Germany forces and said that the goal of occupation of northern Iran by Soviet was not for prohibiting of entering of German army, but it was Britain which had been acting in north as fifth column and provider of ammunition through Iran to Russia and also not closing to Caucasus oil resources.

**Dr. Mossadeq’s Bill**

Crisis acceleration due to oil concession demand; political pressure of Russians vehement attacks of the Tudeh party’s propaganda and the left-wing press to the Prime Minister (Saed) whom was cited as “Iran’s nation blood sucker” and “reactionary” and “fascism”; also American and British depression of their abortive demands forced the “Saed” government to resign. Removal of Saed was the beginning of a serious discussion over his suitable substitution, which was done in closed session of the legislature, because, obviously, a pro-west person had no authenticity for the Soviet and vice-versa. Consequently, success possibility was with the impartial Individuals’ Caucus (Fraksivn-i Munfaradin) or members of the Unions Caucus (Fraksiun-i Ittahade Melli), a pro-court group. The Individual caucus could come by support of the Tudeh Caucus (Fraksiun-i Tudeh) and the liberal caucus (Fraksiun-i Azadi) for Mossadeq as their nominee. However, Mossadeq who was aware of the shaky and tottery situation of his major supporters was concerned over his possible removal from Prime Ministry and loosing his deputation seat too. Subsequently, he requested for not applying a law of constitution exceptionally to him contenting all executive members have to resign of their positions in legislative branch. Members of the National Union and Caucus (Fraksiun-i Ittade Melli) refused his request reasoning that means violating of separation of powers. Finally, after two weeks discussion the National Union Caucus (Fraksiun-i Ittahade Melli) and the Patriotic Caucus (Fraksiun-i Mihan) and the
Democrat Caucus (Fraksiun-i Democrat) introduced a harsh conservative Morteza Gholi Bayat” who was one of the big hand owners of Kermanshah which was under seizure of Britain. Therefore, on November 25, 1944, Parliament approved him with 50 ayes (a weak majority) and Bullard described the new cabinet as a “good cabinet”. 23

Kavtaradze was waiting in Tehran for the decision of the new government. However, Bayat government had asserted his desire for solving the Soviets’ concession, but also, assured British ambassador over having no change in oil politics of his government. In any case, oil matter and the Soviets’ concession were still insoluble. In such a situation, Mossadeq saw the time quite suitable for implementing his anti-imperialist program was based on the politics of “negative equilibrium”. He gave both left and right puppets of foreign powers no chance to prepare a new conspiracy, so offered the bill of vest prohibition of Iran’s oil concession to aliens in the legislative session on December 2, 1944, and approved it immediately. Nobody was aware of the Mossadeq’s bill quality, so, he tried to approve it through intriguing their national honor and boosting their self-confidence.

“… Whatever I have told is for the interest of a country, which demands “political balance”. If we follow the “Positive Politics”, we should grant the oil concession of north for 92 years for having a political balance while neither Iranians nor deputies agree to it. Granting concession is like a person who has lost one of his arms and for balancing, his other arm be cut … nobody can intervene in the nation’s properties. Today, Parliament agrees to my views over prohibition on concession, because considers it in “the interest of the nation”. So, why government does this while Parliament disagrees. We ask government not to interfere in this case … because of the Parliament unity; we are going to approve it as soon as possible. If it cannot be done today and in this session, never it
can be approved because oil is something that no foreign powers can ignore it ...” 24

The bill as Mossadeq’s initiative had prepared with no previous planning was approved by all the present representatives except the Tudeh Party, and roused Iranians’ admiration and praise and surprised the traditional estate especially “Seyyed Zia-al-Din”. Also, Mossadeq criticized harshly the Soviets’ state and the Tudeh party. The text of the bill because of its historic importance is as follows:

**Article one** - No Prime Minister and Ministers or their deputies can talk or sign agreement to no official or un-official representatives or oil companies’ deputations over oil concession.

**Article two** – Prime Minister and Ministers can talk for selling Iran’s oil and the way of its extraction and its managing by the government and they have to inform the Majles of all talks and the process.

**Article three** – Violators of the above articles will be sentenced to solitary confinement from 3 to 8 years and perpetual dismissal from governmental service.

**Article four** – Prosecution of violators by the prosecutor general of the country can be done without the permission of the Majles. The prosecutor general can try the violators of these articles based on the Legislations of July 11, 1928.

In the session of December 2, 1944, (one day after approbation of Mossadeq’s bill) “Ghulam Hossein Rahimian” representative of independent left who often co-operated with the Tudeh Party was going to prepare a bill simultaneously over abrogation of the British oil company concession so he
suggested to Mossadeq regarding his “Politic of negative conflict” to sign his bill. Rahimian’s bill which had been regulating the plan in one article was as follows: The Majles abrogates the south oil concession which was vested to “D’ Arcy” company in the despotic period. – Ghulam Hossein Rahimian.  

Mossadeq refused to sign it. He invited Rahimian secretly to his home and said to him:

“You have done a remarkable sacrifice for the Iranian nation with preparing this plan, but your greater sacrifice would be not to pose this bill in this Parliament (14 Parliament), because of not being ready the basis; also it cannot be trusted to the present majority of deputies. Therefore, rejecting of this bill would be possible……then Britain would say that in the despotic period you didn’t have free Parliament but now you have, why it has rejected this concession, so the previous concession is legal. For this reason we would have many problems in future.”

Mossadeq refusal of signing the Rahimian bill brought him harsh criticism of the leftist Press and the Tudeh party with back of the Soviet. So, Mossadeq for drawing Public attention to importance of oil concession embargo law and the reason of his refusal of signing the Rahimian bill and for replying to those who said he is under pressure of Iran-Britain oil company addressed Parliament and the people on December 19, which follows:

“….These days, if anybody is going to serve his country and preserve interests of the country, are addressed by both sides. Once, the right-wing press was offending me and the left-wing press according to their papers was admiring me. Today, for my suggestion to the Parliament, the first ones are quiet and the second ones are blaming me; each one wants me to say on behalf of them. What I have said? What I have done
on December 1? Have I become pagan? I have just said that I disagree to any concession, which is against Iran’s interests. I have deemed the bill of concession prohibition advisable for the country’s interest … nobody informed of my plan till it posed in the Parliament… I have been never influenced all my life, I never preferred individual interests to public interests, so, now what has caused to be influenced? If I were not a believer, I would not fight to dictatorship regime of the Shah Reza. I fought to that regime, imprisoned, and took under surveillance”. 27

At last, the Soviet left its insist for the extraction concession of Iran’s oil and postponed it another time which was simultaneous with the end of Iran’s occupation and restraining of army forcer’s evacuation and creating the Azerbaijan disturbances. Same as to Americans and British disappointed and Bayat, then Prime Minister, released of a big political problem. Kavtaradze also left Iran. Refusing the Russian demand led to more consciousness of the Iranians, and aroused the national senses of the society and Paved the way for nationalizing of Iran’s oil Industry.

After Kavtaradze’s dispatch, the Soviet started its indirect pressure on Iran’s government through presence of his armed forces in Iran. Organized demonstrations were held in Azerbaijan and most of the other cities especially in north. Their demands were included the same inspired reforms of the Tudeh party; formation of provincial associations; good relations with the Soviet Union; establishing a coalition government; improving the life conditions of workers and peasants and also trying of Saed and banishing Seyyed Zia were the most fundamental requests.

Disturbances due to political jobbery in the Majles; Millespaugh’s outgoing, serious state of financial affairs; mischief in distributing of rationing goods; increasing of corruption in the governmental offices and even among the Parliament deputations, caused to fall down of Bayat government.
Dissidents of the then government which at the time were right Caucuses (Fraksiun-ha) including Ittahad Melli, Mihan, Demokrat were seeking for Bayat substitution. Again, they tried for Ali Soheily as Prime Minister, but both “Soheily” and “Mohammad Todayon” the Foodstuffs Minister of his second Cabinet were prosecuted for corruption and illegal intervene in the Fourteenth Majles elections and the Parliament justice commission and supreme court were also trying to acquit them. Mossadeq, again, exposed about Soheily who was being tried to return to power by the aid of some of representatives of the right Caucuses. Soheily who had been Prime Minister twice during three years after the September of 1947 and in the second term of his premiership had been interpellated by the Thirteenth Majles and was prosecuted for corruption and interfering in the elections. Mossadeq introduced him as a hated and contempt person who on the time of his removal none of his friend didn’t dare to defend him, Mossadeq, also, accused him of lobbying in this term of the Majles election.

“… Why we should always live in extravagant? Why once our destiny should be a dreadful dictatorship and the other day should be more dreadful reactions than the dictator ones? Once, the dictatorship regime had cut off any relations of the Iranian with foreign officials, but, today as its consequence we are facing with many who go to embassies and make scandal. ... one day, deputies had been such a subjugated persons which they could be breached of Parliamentary privilege today, its consequences that the Majles justice commission acquits graft and misappropriate ministers…”

Mossadeq’s speech invalidated Soheily and his supporter’s plan that were going to foist his Premiership. In addition, some deputies had considered acquitting Taddayon, but Mossadeq requested for Taddoyon’s file for 15 days while posing Justice Commission report, but they rejected Mossadeq’s
proposal. Then he got angry and was leaving the Majles said: “Here is not parliament, here is place infested with thieves”. 29

The Event of March 6

The next two days (March 6) a large group of Tehran University students, along with other people went to Mossadeq’s home and demanded him to return to the Majles. The population accompanied Dr. Mossadeq toward the Parliament while had been raising him on their hands. It was in Baharestan square that armed forces by the command of brigadier-general Golshaian, the military governor of Tehran, were being shot. Subsequently, 3 persons injured and one student by the name of Reza Khaje Noori and other one had been killed. Concurrently, speaker of the Majles (Mr. Seyyed Mohammad Tabatabai) and a group of representatives who had heard the shooting came out to the Majles court, intervened and transferred Dr. Mossadeq who had become faint to health center of the Majles. Thus, Mossadeq after a short rest came back to the court of Majles and asked students and people to be dispersed, also, session of the Majles broke up. 30

Repercussion of the people and student’s rally and murdering of one student, injuring of some caused to close Bazaar in Baharestan square and around streets. Pressure of public opinion and student’s endeavor led to the Majles giving up against the people and Mossadeq’s request. Soheily was deprived of power forever and his file along with Taddayons’ had been prosecuting. In spite of firm reasons over their guilt both were acquitted because of enhancing corruption of the Judiciary system. Nevertheless, it aroused the Iranian public opinion and paved the way toward nationalization of oil industry in next governments of Hazdeer and Razm Ara.
Frail and Abortive Governments

Intensifying of ideological tensions and the court and political elite rings along with chief deputies over the Soheily and Taddyon’s file and determining their desirable Prime Minister after rejecting the Soviets’ concession. Also empowering of the Tudeh party and Azarbaijan and Kurdistan disturbances led to failing of Bayat’s government within less than 5 months on April 17, 1945 by the nay say of the Majles. With collapsing of Bayat, a six weeks crisis appeared in which all-basic Caucuses (Fraksion-ha) run about to support their desirable candidates. Nevertheless, they could find none; soheily reached to a unanimous vote over “Ibrahim Hakimi” who was the ex court doctor and had participated in the Constitutional Revolution and was a member of the Democrat Party. He could gain back of the royalist and anti-royalist deputies. He as a Azerbaijani had old Political links with Persian speaking Politicians who were acceptable both by north and south. Hakimi’s cabinet (1945 April- 1945 June) after three weeks debate over the program of government could not get enough confidence vote, so he renounced before starting.

After defeat of Hakimi’s Cabinet, the National Union Caucus (Fraksiun-i Ittache Melli) from a coalition with the Patriotic Caucus (Fraksion-I Mihan) and the Democrat Caucus (Fraksiun-I Demokrat) to support Mohsen Sadre. Sadre was an eighty; conservative and experienced judge who the guard of clergies in Qom was at Reza Khan’s era. In addition, he had monitored on intelligentsia’s execution of the Constitutional Revolution. Bullard, the British Minister, who had described Sadre two month ago as a “retrogressive and stubborn Mullah”, now was encouraging him for Prime Ministry nomination. On May 26, 1945, 68 of 115 present deputies in the Majles announced the aye with the majority of 60 percent; the Shah was his supporter also.

The way of Hakimi’s renouncing and taking his affirmative vote from an assembly with no legal quorum, provided a 30 numbers minority leading by
Mossadeq. Mossadeq considered Sadre as an incompetent, inefficient and ignorant towards the current affairs and an unconditional agent of the Court and Britain. From Mossadeq’s standpoint, while the World War II was about to end for the Allies Forces, evacuation of foreign forces from Iran was the most important issue. Following to the 1944 tripartite accord, evacuating of foreign forces should be done within six months after the war end which was in March 1946. But, with the Soviet – Iran’s relation join on crisis and intensifying of disturbances in northern Iran in Azarbaijan, the perspective of the Soviet forces evacuating was vague. Mossadeq believed Sadre had not enough competence and ability to encounter the increasing crisis of the country. Repercussion of political crisis continuation on Sadre’s ruling led to incidents indirectly intriguing the Tudeh party. Turmoil Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran led to bloody conflicts. In the late August 1945, a group of army officers in Khorrasan province which was under seizure of the Soviets’ army staged a mutiny and with a lot of ammunition set out Gorgan.

In 12 June, Mohsen Sadre introduced his Cabinet to the Shah and in 19 June attended in the Majlis. But, opponents left the Majles so that the Majles work was unfinished because of not having vote quorum. The dissidents reasoned the cabinet without the Majles affirmation would be illegal, and protected the Majles rights. Government advocators, also, had been restoring to the distinguished monarchial privilege and proclaimed the cabinet would be legal after the Shah decree to the Prime Minister. From the viewpoint of the first group, confidence vote was basic not the Shah order; but for the second group the Shah order was basic not the confidence vote. Sadre’s government that could not acquire enough confidence votes of the Majles, was governing just by the Shah’s support. Dr. Mossadeq had been emphasized on his illegitimacy until the government introducing to the Majles and the Majles approbation on its programs. Minority obstruction was still continued. At last, on 27 September session, the minority presented in the Majles to acquire confidence vote. Sadre had said to resign if the number of the minority would
be 40 persons. From 114 of present deputies, there was 69 aye votes and 40 nays votes and 2 white votes. Sadre, however, refused to step aside and considered his government legal and confident by the Majlis. Meanwhile, unrest and disturbances had been intensifying in the north during summer. 31 From August 1945, British and American armed forces gradually moved out of Iran, but there was no evidence of the Soviets’ army pulling out. Pressure on the Tudeh Party and its supporters no in Tehran but in other cities was increased. The martial rule banned street demonstrations. Offices of the Tudeh party were attacked and its newspapers were seized. The most important incident of Sadre’s ruling was announcing autonomy by Azarbaijan and Kurdistan. “Seyyed Jafar Pishavar” in Tabriz and “Ghazi Mohammad” in Mehabad used the power vacuum of the central government in the mentioned states and also through protection and encouraging of the Russian occupiers could take control of the states. Announced aims by these movements, seemingly, was reformative and based on territorial integrity and country independence and the autonomy of the mentioned states. These slogans could obtain the support of large intellectual estates that were dissatisfied with the elite rule and demanded reforms over the country. 32

The oil crisis in the previous year deeply resented intelligentsia. In addition, it was their basic attachment and tendencies in the term of conflict between patriarchy and western oriented reforms between Iranian nationalism and Russian socialism. In the last days of Sadre’s rule, it was suggested to postpone the Fifteenth Majles election until end of Iran’s evacuation of foreign forces. This measure was despite the Tudeh party and radical forces interests, because moving out of the Russian forces from north of Iran was in the interest of traditional and pro-Britain political elite.

Mossadeq believed postponing of the election was despite the constitution and the interests of the country. He demanded approving of his suggestive amendment on election, which based on it misusing ways of local
influential and property owners in rural areas were restricted, but this measure could acquire enough support even the minority support. In Mossadeq’s plan the constituencies of rural and urban block were separated each other. 136 of the present deputies elected from the rural areas according to the then constitution and following to the Article 4 of the constitution number of the deputies could be enhanced to 200. Mossadeq suggested increasing the number of the deputies from 136 to 200, but conditional on the 64 remained deputies elected just in cities by the educated, there was a supervision commission on election including senior judges, professors, and senior civil servants and the election were held in one day all over the country. Finally, after four and half months challenge and wasting time, Mohsen Sadre on 21 October 1945 stepped aside. His legacy was a rebellious country with an ambiguous future. Election of the Fifteenth Majles was just spent because of uncertainty of foreign forces exit. It, also, provided for the autocracy of “Ahmad Qavam”. Mossadeq on 26 February, two weeks before the Fourteenth Majles end, said:

“... I want to say that the people are dissatisfied of the Fourteenth Majles.... I afraid much of the interregnum, I have seen many bad things of the interregnum; if there has been any danger for the country was in the interregnum; if there has been any conclusion of accord or any coup, have been in the interregnum ... be aware, it will be a day that you will regret ...”.

The second cabinet of Hakimi could get the confidence vote with overwhelming majority of deputies (about 100) and the Majles approved the government program. The main issue of the Hakimi’s government in the first weeks facing on it was aggravating of crisis in Iran – the Soviet relations and announcement of the National state of Azerbaijan on 12 December 1945 by Seyyed Jafar Pishevari as the head of state and also formation of the National state of Kurdistan on 15 December 1945 by “Ghazi Mohammad as the head of state. On 12 December, the National Assembly of Azerbaijan opened by the
presence of the Soviet consulate in Tabriz and The Prime Minister introduced a 10 person’s cabinet to the Majlis. Two days later, Bayat, the previous Prime Minister, who entered Azarbaijan for settling the Azarbaijan problem, returned Tehran. Brigade –general Derakhshani, the commander of Tabriz military garrison and Brigade-general Zanganeh, the commander of military garrison of Rezaiye, surrendered to the autonomous regime. The central government swiftly dispatched a small military garrison from Tehran to Azarbaijan, but the Red Army forces of the Soviet stopped them in Sharif Abad of Qazvin and paid no attention to the objection of Iran’s state. 35 Mossadeq, in the session of 9 December 1945, cited his concern of Azerbaijan events and asked the Hakimi’s government for informing the Iranians of his actions. Mossadeq put forward the events of Azerbaijan after announcing of autonomy by the Pishevari’s government in Azerbaijan. On 15 December, indeed, Mossadeq stated about the quality of the Fourteenth Majles election in that province and the selection of Hakimi’s ministers and paying no attention to the tumultuous condition in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in recent months, also castigated of government performance in solving the country problems. Then, Mossadeq considered the autonomy of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan despite the Constitutional cited:

“... An autonomous state should be formed through a public referendum, our Constitution, today, does not let us form such a state. It is possible whereas there would be a referendum and out nation vote on it and want our country becomes like the United States of northern America or the Switzerland a federal country” 36

The Problem of the Allies Forces Exit from Iran

After end of the World War II, Iran’s soil evacuation by the Allies Forces (the Soviet, Britain, and America) had remained as one of discord issues of them. The Soviet who considered itself as the great factor of winning over Germany needed no help of its Western allies especially the U.S. Therefore,
they wanted more than whatever they had agreed on in the previous conferences. America and Britain had been enforcing their comments on Iran through recommendation and based on their interests and goals in Iran and the Middle East. The Soviet, on the other hand, had the Tudeh party and the Democrat faction of Azerbaijan with military and advertising possibilities. So, they hindered Iran’s sovereignty on Azerbaijan. Thus, after the war end Iran had not moved out of the Soviets’ Army, but also humming of separation was hearing from Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. At the time, Iran’s central state was in its weakest situation. In such a condition, future destiny of Iran had been discussed out of Iran, without Iran’s representative by the Allies representatives.

In the late September of 1945, a conference of the Allies foreign Ministers held in London and after some talks Britain announced its forces going out of Iran at the agreed time. But, the Soviet preferred to sustain their forces in Iran till last deadline in March 1946. Americans embarked on evacuation their forces on 31 December 1945 sooner than the British and the Soviet. Moscow Conference ended on 26 December 1945 with attendance of foreign ministers of Britain, the U.S., and the Soviet. Ernest Bevin, then British foreign minister, posed the proposal of tripartite commission on 24 December 1945. According to this proposal, a commission including three representatives of the U.S., the Soviet and Britain were sent Tehran to analyze Iran’s situation in general and Azerbaijan in specific. Bevin supported a common policy toward Iran by the Allies. The news on formation a tripartite commission for probing Iran’s problems broadcasted for the first time from B.B.C. on 4 January 1946. It was said that Sir Reader Bullard, the British Minister, and Wallas Muri, the American Minister had delivered Mr. Hakimi, then Iranian Prime Minister, the suggestion of tripartite commission and had expressed his hope on Iran agreement. Publishing the news about tripartite commission concerned political press and parliamentary circles. It had raised a storm of anger and criticism against government and reminded the 1907 and
1919 Accords of Vosuq-ol-Doleh. After some of the Majlis deputies along with Dr. Mossadeq asked the Prime Minister for an explanation over the commission suggestion. Despite Hakimi’s respond on having been rejected the commission suggestion, deputies castigated him even for his attention on the suggestion.

Mossadeq stated that if the government was against the tripartite commission so how had issued a reformative suggestion and if the Ministers of Britain and the U.S. had agreed to your reformative suggestions, how you could retract, so it’s better to resign of the Prime Ministry. Mossadeq was going to set forth it in the first session of the Majles which was going to set up on 6 January. The Majles session, however, did not hold for non-attendance of some deputies on both 6 and 8 January. Mossadeq, then, as the first deputy of Tehran published a declaration and addressed the people:

“O people, who I have accepted to be your deputy and want to sacrifice my life for you, be aware, this is two sessions that I want to say my views over political and economic performances of this government. I want to warn you this government is going to take you as captive of the aliens. They have closed Majles two sessions just for not asserting these statements”. 37

After publishing the declaration, the extra-ordinary session of the National Consultative Assembly (Majles) was formed mid night. In this session, Mossadeq declared the U.S. and Britain’s suggestion over tripartite commission a sinister conspiracy and considered it against Iran’s Independence and territorial integrity. Mossadeq chastised the way of Hakimi’s government in hiding news of tripartite commission, and thank the Soviets’ state for its disagreement with the above-mentioned suggestion. At last, after referring Iran’s complaint to the United Nation on the Soviets’ refrain from evacuation Iran’s soil, Hakimi resigned on 21 January 1946 after 76 days rule.
Government of Ahmad Qavam (26 January 1946- 9 December 1948)

After collapsing Hakimi’s government, the Majles expressed its inclination with a narrow majority to Ahmad Qavam’s Prime Ministry. The Shah Mohammad Reza and pro-British deputies in the Majles were dissident to Qavam’s Prime Ministry. But the Americans and the Russians inclined him. Some cases caused Qavam to be the only choice of ruling including crisis on Tehran –Moscow relations and remaining abortive attempts of the Hakimi’s government in closing to the Soviet to solve the Azerbaijan problem and going out of the Red Army from the North of Iran. Qavam-ol Saltaneh after receiving the Prime Ministry decree, refused to introduce his cabinet and his government program to the Majles. He had waited for beginning the interregnum to carry out his policy without the deputies’ interruption. He, after introducing his cabinet to Majles, at the head of a high-level delegation went to Moscow for negotiation. Concerning over the quality of Moscow negotiations and Qavam’s commitments on the Soviet’s suggestion had caused Mossadeq to address the Majles on 3 March and warn Qavam on not having allowed extending the evacuation duration of the Red Army from Iran. He said,

“… I have to point out a basic issue here and that is we consider the evacuation of Iran as a finished issue, because it has been determined according to the fifth chapter of the tripartite alliance. Following to this chapter, after finishing the war the allied states have to quit Iran within six months. Therefore, on the basis of this treaty there shouldn’t be even one alien soldier in Iran from the 2nd March of 1946, so it is illegal to evacuate Iran’s soil on 2 March, 1946 and it is not comparable to the Soviet’s commitments to leave a part of Iran”.

Qavam’s journey to Moscow lasted from 31 January to 10 March, three days before the Fourteenth Majles expiring. So he could delay his presence in the Majles and reply to the deputies over the Moscow talks and the Soviets
declaration through prolonging his journey. The last session of the fourteenth Majles was on 12 March. Closed session of the Majles was held because of non-attendance enough deputies. After, some deputies were chosen for administration of the Majles internal affairs in the interregnum period. Thus, the fourteen legislative periods finished. Deputies had been chosen by the court and the Reza Shah’s will from the sixth term to the thirteenth term of the Majles. Nevertheless, the Fourteenth Majles was exception because of Iran’s occupation by the Allies Forces. It was given a chance to the people to choose their nominees somehow freely. This term made the traditional pro-Britain elite warn they could not continue their previous policy on protecting British interests and they would be faced serious challenges. Opposing to “Seyyed Zia’s” credential was one of them. The most brilliant measure of the fourteen Majles, which was the initiative of Dr. Mossadeq, was approval of boycotting measure of oil concession. This was done during the presence of the Allied forces in Iran. Eviction of Dr. Millespough; making ineffective the tripartite commission proposal of the Allies Forces; objection to continuity of Iran’s seizure after ending the war were another useful enterprises of the fourteenth Majles. The other action of this Majles was prosecuting of “Ali Soheily” the Prime Minister who clearly interfered in the fourteen term of Parliamentary election and was going to continue and support the Anglophile policies and persons such as Seyyed Zia, Ali Dashti, Jamal Imami, Sheykh Hadi Taheri and….in sending to Majles. Dr. Mossadeq, undoubtedly, played a determined role on providing the plans over approving these actions based on the “Negative Equilibrium”

The most important Qavam’s enterprise in his early helm was to solve the crisis of quitting the north of Iran by the Soviet army, for they had been refusing to evacuate Iran. Also, they helped to establishment of the two cessions regime of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan. The talks of Qavam legation with Moscow was unsuccessful, as a result they returned Iran on 10 March. Ten days later, Sadchikove, the new Soviets’ Ambassador entered Tehran and re-negotiated over the previous problems. At last, on 4 April, 1946, they had
signed a common treaty which based on it the Soviets’ army had to leave Iran till end of April, instead of constituting a joint oil company by Iran and the Soviet, for 50 years. In the first 25 years, Iran had 49 percent shares and the Soviet had 51 percent shares of the company, but after 25 years the shares of both sides would be equal (50-50). The above treaty would be legal if the next parliament (15th term) were formed and approved it. 39 The agreement of “Qavam-Sadchikove” was greeted by the leftists and the Tudeh Party. This agreement exalted Qavam’s popularity on the Soviet side but concerned pro-west. So, it had intensified America’s attempt to encourage the U.N. for solving Iran’s crisis. The British officials were, also, suspicious toward Qavam.

Accompanying with the Soviet, Qavam formed a coalition cabinet with three leaders of the Tudeh party including Morteza Yazdi as the Health Minister, Fareydoun Keshararz as the Education Minister; Iraj Eskanduri as the commerce minister; also boss of the Iran party, Allahyar Saleh, as the justice minister. Furthermore, he negotiated with delegations of the Pishevari’s regime (governor of Azerbaijan) in Tehran. He, also, had detained some notable anglophiles such as Seyyed Zia; Ali Dashti; Jamal Imami and Taheri and the Gen Arfaa. Being in 16 months recess of the parliament, (19 March 1946-16 July 1947) had practically paved the way for Qavam. Mossadeq had no instrument to aware the people of Qavam’s plans. Lack of party and organization to convey Mossadeq’s ideas had caused him to cede from state of power. On 29 May, 1946, Qavam concerning to formation of the Iran’s democrat party cited; “...We have set up this party in order to achieve a real solidarity among liberalists and swift implement of reforms”. 40 This party, the same name with the Azerbaijan Democrat Party, was the first political organization, which was despite of party principles, was constituted by the government, and had been using of the governmental power and facilities. This party had comprised of opportunities; reactionaries, feudal. They had been doing whatever to achieve their goals. Soon after, the democrat party was entitled as “concession seller”.

82
On 5 October 1946, Qavam’s government issued time of the fifteen Parliament elections. Also, the Prime Minister ordered Ministry of the interior to hold the election early November of 1946 over the country. Issuing the election order was a preamble of attack to Azerbaijan and putting an end to Pishevari’s and Ghazi Mohammed’s regimes. The first of November, government issued an declaration and emphasized on accelerating the election and establishing order in the country through dispatching army units to northern provinces. Having attack to Azerbaijan in the pretext of establishing order for election had been done by the support of London and Washington. After Iran’s complaint to the security council of the U.N. and Teroman’s ultimatum to Stalin, the Soviets army retreated. George Allen, the U.S. ambassador, confirmed dispatching of Iran’s military forces to north for securing the election. Meanwhile, Hossein Alaa, Iran’s ambassador to the U.N, presented a note to the secretariat of the Security Council and asked for considering the Azerbaijan circumstances serious.

From December 7, military forces started their advance from Tehran to Azerbaijan. On 10 December, major-general Razm Ara, the chief of army staff, issued the attack order of military units to Azerbaijan. Iran’s army could easily manage dispersed resistances by escaping Democrats. Therefore, collapse of Pishevari’s regime was coincident with its establishment anniversary. After end of the World War II, the Soviet and U.S. had ever been two determined factors on Iran’s issues. It is noteworthy that no internal forces including the Shah, Prime Minister, Army or other elites had basic role in evacuation of Iran by the Red Army and solving the problem of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

**Election of the Fifteenth Majles**

After suppressing Pishevari’s regime, Qavam had been trying to allocate majority of the Parliament to nominees of the Democrat Party and eliminate contenders and dissidents especially pro-British and the court nominees.
Although, he had said many time to not having any interference in the election, but showed this election is also same as the elections after 1941. The Tudeh party was still the most powerful party of the country; despite its defeat experience from the coalition cabinet of Qavam, but it banned the election and did not take part in it. Nationalists (Melliun), liberalists (Azadikahan), politicians, eminent journalists, clergies all on the leadership of Mossadeq sat down in the court on 12 January 1947. They objected to the interferences of Qavam’s government in the election. They sat down in the court because of being Parliament in recess; also the Shah had vowed to protect the constitution. Their goal was not just for publicity but they had been using of difference between the Shah and Qavam. Nevertheless, the Shah Mohammed Reza had no visit with the refuges. He just had sent a message through his office administration: If you have any complain, you can say and if it is essential the Shah will order on it”. 43 The Shah was worry over Qavam’s win in the election but he was not still in a situation to express his opposition. As a result, Mossadeq and his accompany left the Court and Qavam continued to election with no problem. The state Democrat Party could win through having control on governmental organizations all over the country and having some links with local well known and having access not only to financial sources but also to influential cities and town. It also prohibited of Mossadeq’s selection who was the first deputy of Tehran in the fourteenth Majles. Qavam himself was selected as the first deputy of the capital. Immediately, the fifteenth Majles divided into three main causes (Fraksion) after inauguration. The Democrat Party with 80 seats of Tehran, Gilan, Mazandaran, Khorrasan, and Kerman was in the majority. This group was being led by “Sardar Fakher Hekmat”, the Speaker of the conservative landlord faction and the leader of the radical intellectual party was “Bihar”. One-third of these eighty persons had imprisoned during the Reza Shah period in different times. Monarchists had been still using title of the National Union Caucus (Fraksion-I Ittande Melli). They had included of 35 members. Its leaders were Ezatollah Bayat, Ardalan and Matin Daftari. 44 The pro-British group was the third large Caucus
(Fraksiun) with 25 deputies. Its name was the National Caucus (Fraksiun-i Melli) and “Madani” and “Taheri” the two well-known politicians from the fourteenth Majles were leading the Caucus. Most of its members had been chosen from Khuzestan, Fars, margins of the Persian Gulf. They had been supporting Britain whether publicly or un-publicly.

Therefore, the fifteenth Majles was starting while Qavam had a prominent but instable majority. Then 16 months being in recess, the fifteenth Majles inaugurated on 16 July 1947. In spite of Qavam’s attempts, most of the deputies followed the Shah from the beginning. On 21 October, Qavam reported his elaborating report on his achievements; Azarbaijan and Kurdistan’s events: negotiations with the Soviet and signing protocol with Sadchikove. Just in that meeting, Dr. Reza Zadeh Shafak suggested a single article over refusing the Qavam-Sadchikove protocol that approved with the minority of 102 and 2 abstensions. From now on, the Shah and his sister, Ashraf deepened their activities against Qavam. On the 3 December, most of the Qavams ministers offered their resignation to the Shah by the Court encouraging. Four days later, Qavam illustrated and defended his previous actions in the National consultative Assembly and asked for confidence vote. From 112 present deputies were 36 confidence votes, 45 nay votes, 31 abstentions. Immediately, after resignation on 10 December 1947, he (Qavam) went to Paris for cure. Monarchists delivered a prosecution plan on him to the Parliament, because they believed Qavam had made election fraud in the benefit of the Democrat Party. 45

The meeting of 21 October of the Parliament was not just over rejecting the Qavam-Sadchikof protocol but vindication of Iran’s rights on all underground resources especially Iran’s south oil. Indeed, this law was a repercussion of the Iranians’ demand. In addition, it had been forcing government to re-start its talks with the South Oil Company. Oil, later, became one of the most important issues of Iran’s politics and the Shah gradually
staged to power after Qavam’s exit. The Shah showed himself as a constitutional king until 1948, a Shah who just reigned not ruled, although he managed army secretly and often interfered in weakening or re-enforcing of Ministers. But, in 1948, he had apparently been interfering in politics and deposed or appointed not ministers but Prime Ministers. In 1949 Shah was enough powerful to constitute a parliament by his own to enhance his legal privileges. A young king who defeated his dissidents at first and now he had made the monarchy as the basic institution of the country.

**Frail governments**

Abdolhossein Hazhir was a desirable substitute of the Shah for Qavam. Nevertheless, the situation had not been provided for his Prime Ministry, so, the Majles with 72 votes from 106 expressed its inclination to the Prime Ministry of “Sardar Fakher Hekmat”. However, threats by the Qavam’s advocates caused him to regret of accepting Prime Ministry. In the private session of the parliament, there were 53 votes both for Dr. Mossadeq and Ibrahim Hakimi but with the vote of “Sardar Fakhar” to “Ibrahim Hakimi”, he appointed as the new Prime Minister. Hakimi’s Cabinet (27 Dec 1947-8 June 1948) was a resolving cabinet. Pro-Shah deputies voted to Hakimi just for acceptance of Hadzir as a Cabinet member by Hakimi. Hakimi appointed “Ali Soheily” as the advisor Minister who had been acquitted by the Supreme Court just 1 month ago. “Abbas Eskandari”, and “Gholam Hossein Rahimian” attacked his Cabinet from the beginning. They attacked to Hakimi’s government because of its indefinite stance about oil and Bahrain. However, he was interpellated by “Ha’eri Zadeh” and “Abdol Kadir Azad” but could achieve again the confidence vote. Nevertheless, despite many attempts to keep the court satisfy he could not be successful. On 8 June 1948, he attended in the parliament for the confidence vote but with 58 abstentions against 38 aye votes, he fell down. 46
After downfall of Hakimi’s government, Hazhir, a loyal and reliable person to the Shah, State and the Shah’s sister, Ashraf, could achieve 66 ayes votes of 120 present deputies on 13 June 1948. There were 43 votes for Mohammad Saed the other nominee. Despite harsh objection to Hazhir’s Prime Ministry (June 1948-November 1948) by Ayatollah Kashani through closing Bazaar and scattered street rallies, the Shah issued his decree. Hazhir while announcing his program on 17 June in the Majles, emphasized on implementing the 21 October law on vindication of Iran’s rights from underground resources and talks to Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In 18 July, Shah was set out for Europe by Britain’s invitation. Four days later Abbas Eskandari interpellated Hazhir’s government for its fault on vindication Iran’s rights about the South oil and restitution of Bahrain’s sovereignty to Iran. He, also, castigated Tagizadeh as one of the extending factors of the 1933 accord. At last, Majles without paying attention to details of interpellation went for silence vote on it. On 31 August, Hazhir embarked on issuing approbation over the press strictures. Following it, no civil servants could have newspaper or press concession. This enterprise was a threat against the press and led to another interpellation by Abdol gadir Azad. Unsuccessful Hazhir had been deriving from public opinion who considered him as a loyal and devotee of the court and the British. His way also was confirming this theory, so intrigued the Prime Minister’s political and religious opponents.

Publishing the news over private journey of Musa Noori, Esphandiari, the then Iran’s foreign minister to Britain in order to discussion with Bevin, the then Britain’s foreign minister, over “Reviewing the Iran’s Constitution” raised a large excitement and explosion in Iran’s political scene. This news, which was published by London Radio on 2 November 1948, inflicted harshly Hazhir’s government in which led to his resignation on 5 November.

Selection of “Saed” as the premiership (November 1948-March 1949) was done by recommendation of Le Rougetel, the then British Minister.
Meanwhile, Iran and Britain talks had begun for vindication Iran’s rights over South Oil. On 8 November, Majles expressed its inclination to Saed Prime Ministry through 56 ayes, 2 noes and 37 abstentions and after the Shah issued the Premiership decree of Saed. The most important matter for the Shah, which was on his desire from long ago, was to enhance his power through reviewing the Constitution. Britain agreed to increase Shah’s power in order to achieve their goals, which was agreement on restricting of Iran’s oil revenue according to 1933 accord. The Americans were also confirming to review the constitution and had been trying to enforce the Shah to implement his mean through formation of Senate Parliament. The Shah’s assassination on 4 February 1949 made a suitable opportunity to execute his considering plan on power increasing of the monarchy. Saed used the opportunity and restored rough actions including installing martial law; declaring the Tudeh party illegal; arresting some of the dissident journalist and trying them in military tribunal; banishing Ayatollah Kashani to abroad; approving the seven years program bill and new bill of the press by the Majles, also confirming suggestive deputies by the Shah for forming the Constituent Assembly. In the sessions of 21 April to 11 May, an article was added to the Constitution by Taqizadeh’s suggestion. Based on the new changes, the article 48 was reviewed and dissolution right of both Majles was given to the Shah. Following to another approbated article both the Senate and Consultative Majles could independently form the Constituent Assembly to review some special articles of the Constitution. Therefore, Taqizadeh, Hakimi, Sadeq, Sadr, and other fathers of the first Constitution defended the Shah’s action over changing the Constitution. 49 Mossadeq who was confined to the house, objected to the Constitution changing. On 14 September 1949, Mossadeq invited some of the minority deputies of the fifteenth Majles and correspondents to his house and said:

“.....the Constituent Assembly wanted to review the Constitution and give the Shah a kind of power whenever wants to dissolve, can do it and by this he can always be a threat for deputies and can approve whatever
he wants. Sir, It has never been like this that the right of Iran’s nation and the Constituency trample upon … deputies of the 15th Majles buried themselves by their hand. 50

Saed’s government had been trying to approve the Supplementary Agreement of Gess –Gholshaian in the frame of 1933 Accord through deputies’ support. British authorities were very optimist about the approving of this proposal. The British and Iranian deputies signed this treaty on 17 July 1949. The fifteenth Majles would end on 28 July and the Supplementary Agreement had delivered to Majles on 15 July. On 21 July, Hossein Makki, the minority deputy, read the Mossadeq’s letter to the deputies of the fifteenth Majles. He banned deputies of approving this proposal. On 27 July, statements of Hossein Makki had been continuing in the morning and afternoon session and the last session of the Majles continued until one and half hour after mid night. Therefore, voting for the proposal could not do. The next day 28 July of 1949 was finished the fifteenth Majles. 5

Most of the deputies of the fifteenth Majles were relatives of “Qavam-ol Saltaneh” and agents of the Democrat Party and the Court nominees. It was the worst legislatives terms in the decade after September 1941. One of its enterprises was rejecting the Qavam-Sadchikove Protocol. Political circles considered it as a harmonious plan for preventing concession giving to the Soviet. Britain considered it as a tactical action and satisfied of not posing the “Bahrain matter”. The talks with the Oil Company had started from 1947 along with Neville Gess coming to Iran, its discussion continued in the Hakimi and Hazhir’s government, and at last, on 17 July 1949, it was signed under pressure of Shah and Britain. If it was being posed some weeks sooner the ending of the fifteen Parliament, it would be approved because of the imminent election of the sixteenth Majles. The fifteenth Majles had no role in evacuation of the Red Army from Iran and dissolving the Pishvari riot in Azerbaijan and Ghazi Mohammad in Kurdistan. The fifteenth Majles was not successful in
confronting with repression atmosphere after the unsuccessful assassination of the Shah on 4 February 1948, which led to martial rule, dissolution of the Tudeh party, closing the press and arresting journalists and opponents of the count and exiling Ayatollah Kashani. Finally, the fifteenth Majles made its biggest mistake and paved the way for dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Shah through forming the constituent Assembly and the constitution changing. It also paved the way for American presence in political scene of Iran.

Amidst February, the Shah was shot by a correspondent and injured while visiting the Tehran University. However, the shooter was killed on the spot, but apparently he was identified through his identity card, which indicated he was working for the religious newspaper “Parcham-e Islam”. He also, had paid the journalist Union dependent to the Labor Movement, which was advocator of the Tudeh Party. Thus, the Shah manipulated the sympathy of people and started repression of the communist-religious dissidents. He declared martial rule all over the country, closed all critical newspapers and magazines and announced the Tudeh Party illegal. Also, he banished Kashani to Beirout and confined Mossadeq to his house. More important, Shah formed the Constitutive Assembly at once. Members of the Senate Majles who were selected in the martial rule circumstances all voted for formation of Senate Majles, also, granted him the right of Majles dissolution contingent upon to hold elections within 3 months and formed the new Majles. Therefore, he had been still getting privilege from the fifteenth Majles.

**Formation of the National Front (Jebhe Melli)**

With the beginning of the sixteenth Majles election (July 1949-February 1950) election and the first term of Senate Majles, the high situation of the Shah seemed unconquerable. The Constitution had been changed to boost the Shah’s situation. Supervision on the armed forces had remained under the
Shah’s control. Monarchial lands had been returned to the Darbar (court) and bureaucracy especially the election was on the hand of the monarchists. In general, the Shah’s power had returned before September 1941. Despite all the above privileges, Shah had two serious weak points: One, he gradually lost his public support in the late 1949 for first his non-interference in oil affair with Britain, and secondly his increasing power reminded people his dictator father. Two, he was dependent to the U.S. not only for military advisors and artilleries but also for economic helps to begin his turbulent seven years program. Nevertheless, America who had not been still forgetting the “Kuomintang Defeat” was not ready to forgive easily anything to anyone. As New York Times stated, the Congress had learned not to pay money in the mouse hole”, so, they were not going to help Iran unless social and political reforms and removing corruption. 52

On October 1949, the Shah had been preparing to leave Iran for the U.S. after the U.S. helped Iran. In addition, the interior minister was going to put their puppets in the sixteenth Majles. One day before the Shah leaving Iran, a number of politicians, students and Bazaar merchants leading by Mossadeq entered the Court (darbar) of palace to object the Sham elections. This objection was the repentance of the 1947 one, but this time Shah was objected. When demonstrators reached the courtyard, formed a 20 persons committee leading by Mossadeq to talk with Hazhir who was the Court (darbar) Minister. This 20 persons committee, which became the first core of the Jebhe-Melli was consisted of three groups. Members of the first group comprised of significant anti-Court politicians such as Amir Alaei, a lawyer and nobleman who had served in Qavam’s government; Mahmoud Nariman, an independent senior civil servant who had also served in Qavam’s government; Yousef Moshar Azam; old friend of Mossadeq and a veteran politician who had been expelled by the Reza Shah from the country.
The second group compromised of interlinked politicians to Bazaar; Seyyed Abol Hassan Haeri Zadeh”, close allied of Ayatollah Kashani from the anti-republicanism conflicts in 1924; Mozaffar Bakaei, an educated lawyer from Europe who always had many sympathizers among conservatives of Bazaar and Kerman city; Hossein Makki”, a young civil servant from a Bazaar family of Yazd and the author of the famous book “20 years history of Iran” with a positive view toward the clergies and enmity view to the Pahlavi Monarchy. Makki, Bakaei and Haeri Zadeh had gone to the fifteenth Majles as Qavam’s advocators but had renounced the Democrat party to organize the Bazaar objection against government. Third group and the important one of this committee had been constituting of hothead youths and western educated like Dr.Karim Sanjabi and Zirakzadeh and two leaders of the Iran Party, Dr. Ali Shaygan, the head of law faculty and the culture minister of Qavam in 1946; Hossein Fatemi, a French educated journalist who later became the martyr of the National Front; and Ahmad Razavi, a French educated engineer who had been supporting the Tudeh party and the hard-line faction of the Democrat Party. 53 Mossadeq has been stating his motivation of forming the National Front as follows:

“Some persons whom later the National Front was constituted by them talked me about the election of Tehran and what could be done? I did something in the fifteenth Majles term but with no result, so, I didn’t desire to engage myself in politics in the sixteenth Majles, but after much thinking I found to betray my country if I would be quiet. So, about three days before Tehran elections I invited the heads of Press. Because, there was no organized party in the country, so, propaganda was possible just through press and media. The mentioned meeting was formed in my house and seven heads of the press were invited for co-operation, and a declaration with my sign was published in the press. Also, it was asked people and intellectuals for gathering in front of the monarchial palace on 14 October to offer an objection over election to
the Majesty…Those 20 individuals who was defined in Kakh Street to
go to the court were the founders of the National Front”.

Refuges after four days staying in the Court (darbar) intensified their
actions and went for hunger strike, but it had no result so, they ended their
strike and issued a declaration addressing the Iranians elaborated their reasons
for going on refuge in the Court and putting an end to their strike.

“Bad state of the country affairs was due to corruption and spiteful
behavior and the way for its improve was free election. The most
concerning affair, for the Iranian Nationalist is to loot and plunder the
worthiest Iran’s resources freely like Oil. However, we delivered the
people’s objection to the Majesty over the government interference in
the election. We waited for response 4 days but it appeared the people’s
demand had been ignored. We did not have any duty just to announce it
and it was for this we embarked on strike but after 4 days, we exited the
court. Now, we declared to the downtrodden Iranians that this election is
illegal. Iran’s nation doesn’t consider such a Majles as their true Majles,
so any decision by this Majles over vital affairs is not people’s
decision”.

Signed by 19 sanctuaries

Ultimately, the objection and rallies resulted and the court promised to
end election disorders. After this promise, the 20 persons committee went to
Mossadeq’s house and after long discussions decided to establish a large
coalition by the name of the National Front. The National Front in its first
public announcement posed three demands: holding correct election; nullifying
the martial rule; freedom of the press. One of participants in that meeting later
said there was no discussion over oil affair because at the time all the leaders of
the Front had been focusing on election not Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Mossadeq was elected as the general secretary of the National Front, also was
defined a committee for compiling program and articles of the Front. The program of the front announced as follows; installation of social justice; implementing of the constitution; free election; free expression of political and developed thoughts; Improvement of economic circumstances. Based on the Front articles, a central council had been defined. It had been invited all organizations such as newspapers offices and student’s Union. Professional associations and political parties joined the National Front. Mossadeq had been insisting on forming a free and open coalition of organizations with one public goal for Iran. He believed this coalition is much more suitable than a political party with order members is and compiled programs. He also had been insisting on speaking from the side of all nations.

Therefore, a long discussion was done over the kind and nature of this political organization which Mossadeq was going to establish. Ultimately, on Dr. Fatemi’s suggestion, the title of (National Front) “Jebhe Melli” was approved and the newspaper “Bakhtar Emrooz” was introduced as the organ of the National Front. Some days later, regulation, constitution, and program of the “Jebhe Melli” were approbated. On 1 November 1949, the “Jebhe Melli” officially announced its entity. Later months, the Iran Party, Hezbe Zahmat Keshan, the Iran Nation Party (Hezbe Mellat-e Iran) and the Islam Fighter’s community (Jame’e Mojahedin-e Islam) jointed the National Front and formed the organized and basic support of Mossadeq.

Although the Iran Party had changed its stance in 1947 from a Pro-Tudeh organization to pro-Mossadeq supporter, but the leadership cadre still had sustained their socialist views and their professional middle class base. This base was more among engineers (the party founders), educated employee in governmental offices especially in economy ministry and registration office, new educated women whom the women organization had been formed for them by the Iran Party and students whom had a weekly publication titled “socialist youths” and a youth organization by help of the Party. The Jebhe
Azadi (Freedom Front), newspaper of the Iran Party were going to boost and sustain the Constitutional Monarchy; establishing national independence; dispossessing noble Landlords and establishing a socialist society. Their mean of the Constitutional Monarchy was disconnection between the Court and the military, abrogation of the Constituent Assembly amendments and changing the Shah’s position to a ceremonial one. They believed that Power centralization in the hands of kings makes a weak society and a corrupt people. National independence means to follow a hard neutral policy in foreign affairs, including opposing to imperialism, putting end to mission of the American military commission, nationalizing of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and fisheries which was under control of the Soviet and ideological fight against the blind support of the Tudeh party from foreign communism. By disposing noble landlords means to use compromising ways like hand reforms, making laws against corruption and defining punishments for making friendship in the army for demolishing power of the feudal families. By a socialist society means equality of citizens including women with men and social possession of basic produce instruments. From the Iran Party viewpoint, it is just socialism that can make the fast industrialization practical, establish democracy and remove the class war between the rich exploiter and poor exploited and despite apostasy, international communism recognize the legitimate religious rights and national identity.

The Hezbe Zahmat Keshan (Toiler Party) was found by Bakaei, previous democrat, and Khalil Maleki, an intellectual Marxist who had left the Tudeh party for Political differences with its leaders. Program of the Toiler Party included of establishing a real constitutional monarchy; removing privileges of the high class; encouraging small industries; National independence from all kinds of imperialism including Russian one; reducing class tensions between employees and employers. The Party views were stated by “Shahid” newspaper and its arrest “Attar” publication was replaced. Its members had been estimated around 5000 which had been absorbed more from
three different sources: Tehran University, newspaper of the Party youths, the Third Force, and intellectual magazine of science and life all had many readers; Kerman, Bakaeei’s birthplace; Kermani merchants especially grocers of Tehran Bazaar. They had supported not only Mossadeq but also Kashnai and Makki in their first declaration. In addition, this party had been supporting by “Shaban Bi Mokh”. “Shaban Bi Mokh” was an athlete from disgraceful locals in Tehran. He had much publicity as a religious-popular hero and follower of a real rogue but his opponents considered him as a thug. Khalil Maleki in series of articles titled “What is the Third Force” writes; “all social forces whether deep or skin deep believes to the fight of Iran’s nation against foreign expansionism. Perhaps, they come in the front in a large, allied, and anti-imperialist Front, which is the Third Force in general…, and in particular, it is left faction of the National Front. He, also, illustrates about the Toiler Party and its positive views over Marx’s standpoints about economy, politics history and society but negative views over his materialistic analysis on religion. Islam as the nation and state religion of Iran is the last global religion, which has come for developing of social awareness of human being. Thus, the Toiler Party was a combination of small businessperson of the old Tehran Bazaar and intellectual socialist of Tehran University. This dualism, later, led to gap and difference in the Party. Khalil Maleki and Mozzafar Bakaeei were leaders of the Labour Party till early of August 1952. But after disclosing the secret visit of Dr. Isa Sepahbodi, one of Bakaeei’s friends and colleagues, with Qavam-ol Saltaneh during his five days ruling (17 July-21 July 1952), a friction appeared between Mozzar Bakaeei and Khalil Maleki. The Party divided in two parties, one the Toiler party of Iran’s Nation leading by Bakaeei and the other one, the Third Force leading by Khalil Maleki. After the 1953 coup, Khalil Maleki was arrested and imprisoned some months in Falak-ol-Aflak fort of Khorram Abad. After releasing, he embarked on constituting a new organization titled “Socialist community”. In September 1960, this organization introduced as the “socialist community of Iran’s National movement”, but its activity was out of Iran.
The Iran’s Hezbe Mellat-e Iran (Nation party) was founded by Dariush Foruhar, a law student being born in 1929 in Esphahan, who had been active in the National Front till the Islamic Revolution 1979. He had started his political activities in 1942 immediately after arresting by the British for having possible relation with Germans. He was one of the first zealous sympathizers of Mossadeq in which in 1944 he had been arranging demonstrations for support of Mossadeq. He had been arresting several times in Tehran University. During his education in University, he along with his friend Mohsen Pezeshk Pour founded the socialist organization of “Pan-Iranist”. Nevertheless, Foruhar had doubt about his friend’s support of Mossadeq, so, left Pan-Iranist and founded the Hezbe Mellat-e Iran (Nation Party). The Party was founded in memory of ideology and thought of “Lieutenant Jahansuz” who had been executed for a Fascist conspiracy plan against the Reza Shah in 1929. The ideology of this Party was vehemently against darbar (court); anti-communist; anti-capitalist; anti-Semitism and even anti-cleric. It had been suggesting through returning “the lost lands” of Bahrain, Afghanistan and Caucasian, we can make Iran again. They believed the noble race of Iranian had been treating and jeopardizing not by the Soviet communism and Britain capitalism but by Arab and Turkish expansionism. Another view of the party was about “retrogressive clerics”, “Colonialist Landlords”, foreign powers and religious minorities especially Jews and Bahaeis. It believed they are other reasons of Iran’s backwardness. Members of the Hezbe Mellat-e Iran (Iran’s Nation Party) had been protecting the achievements of Iran’s National Movement during Mossadeq ruling. In uprising of 21 July 1952 and plot of 28 February, they organized a large demonstration in supporting the national government of Mossadeq. On 19 August 1953, the only national force who fought mercenary thugs in Baharestan square was members of the Hezbe Mellat-e Iran (Nation Party). Its newspaper, also, was Arman-e Mellat (Nation Ideal).
The Jame, Mojahedin-e Islam (Islam Fighters Community) was founded by Ayatollah Kashani, his family, three rich Bazaar merchants and a preacher by the name of “Shamsedin Ghanat Abadi”. This community, which had formed in 1950, had a feeble structure. Its supporters were Bazaars, especially heads of trade unions, religious students and small traders. Despite its significant religious features, it was not a zealous fundamentalist organization. Its main goal was to boost political stance of Kashani, so, in its many public declarations which had been publishing by the name of Bazaar asked for implementing Shari’a; abrogation of irreligious laws of the Reza Shah; regulating Veil (Hijab); protecting of national industries and Muslim alliance against west. The community was along with the National Front and the National Movement until July of 1952, but after it separated Mossadeq and started to fight against Mossadeq. The leader of the community, Ghanat Abadi, was one of the reasons of Kashani’s cutting off from the National Movement. Following the 1953 coup, it was disintegrated for corruption, disgracing of its leader, Ghanat Abadi, after Ghanat Abadi was officially engaged by the court.  

Other organization, which had a close co-operation with Kashani, but was not dependent to the National Front, was Fadaian Islam (Islam Devotees). A twenty years old religious student, Seyyed Navvab Safavi, founded this organization in 1945. Its goal was identity unity with the first Shia government in Iran. The Fadaian Islam (Islam Devotees) was establishing for fighting against all kind of irreligious shapes, in its first action murdered, Kasravi, the famous irreligious author and historian. Murdered were acquitted in a court-martial, because both religious leaders supported them and governmental authorities hoped to manipulate it against the Tudeh party. Nevertheless, the Fadaian Islam (Islam Devotees) instead of co-operating with governmental officials went on the side of Kashani and helped him in organizing Bazaarian strikes against Qavam, public gathering in protecting of Palestine Arabs and violated demonstrations against the Prime Minister, Hazhir.  

Till 1949,
foreigners considered Kashani as leader of the Fadaian Islam (Islam Devotee) by mistake.

However, both groups had differences socially and ideologically. While the traditional middle class was supporting Kashani’s group more, the Fadaian Islam (Islam Devotees) was supported more by low–rank youth of Tehran Bazaar. Meanwhile, Kashani was pragmatist; the Fadaian Islam (Islam Devotees) was zealous fundamentalist. Content of their program was included virtuous, Sharia, prohibition of alcohol, cigarette, opium, film, gamble, cutting hands of robbers, execution of aggressors, banning all kind of foreign cloths, punishing bribe-taker and corruptible and punishing clerics who misuse their religious position, eliminating non-Islamic courses like music, enforcing veil (Hijab) for women so far could back to their traditional and her roles at home.61

Thus, the Jebhe Melli had two different factions: one, traditional middle class-Bazaar-consisting of small trades, clerics, nobles of trade unions, which were still under influence of old-fashioned primary school and preachers of Mosques, they considered Islam as a way of life and Sharia as source of correct laws, and religious authorities (Ulama) as true guards of Shi’a society. Members of this group had link with Bazaar merchants, and had been protecting free economy and opposed with government interference in Bazaar. Second faction of the Jebhe Melli comprised of new middle class including expertise, irreligious educated intellectuals who had been graduated from state schools. They had been considering religion as a private affair, Napoleon code as a basis for civil law and had been thinking of western educated intellectuals as the most competent for organizing the new society. Members of this group were dependent to governmental incomes. They considered hoard as an obscene action, and frightened of increasing inflation of 1927 admired government as a primer institution in development. Members of these two groups were different even in food taste, spending free time, dressing, and language. Members of traditional middle class had come and went to Bazaar
teahouses, sometimes used ties and used Arabic words in their daily conversations, which were taught from old religious Arabic texts. Meanwhile, members of new middle class had their food in European-style restaurant and had a lot of care in wearing western cloths used French words while speaking which had learned from irreligious and new books. In any case, one was conservative, religious, trader and the other was modernist, irreligious, technocrat and socialist. However, what had gathered them in a same line and in the frame of the National Front was “common commitment” which was consisted of; Common combat against coalition of the Darbar (Court) and the military; fight with British Oil Company, and political thoughts and charismatic personality of Mossadeq.

Mossadeq a previous tax collector (Mostowfi) and governor had been famous for his trustworthy. He as a bold deputy had opposed to the 1921 Coup and dictatorship of Reza Shah and influence of monarchial family. He was manifest of superior principles and disappointments of the “Constitutional Revolution”. He was famous as a real Patriotic, because he had always been opposing to foreign concessions and foreign dependencies. He was one of the rare nobles who was living in his village, had a suitable behavior, and was less in trade affairs. He called the Fourteenth Majles “Robber’s Ambush”. He was from the high class but was speaking for the middle class and their interests. The National Front took part strongly in the sixteenth Majles election after gathering these forces. The front had some nominees in central cities. The Jebhe Melli had been denouncing the Constitutional Assembly and was consistently bargaining for a correct and healthy election. In addition, it was condemning the court for election fraud. When, one of members of the Fadaian Islam (Islam Devotees), the one who killed Kasravi in 1945, killed Hazhir, the conflict reached its peak. Saed, then Prime Minister, stopped the election immediately and issued re-election decree in Tehran. In next election, Mossadeq, Haeri Zadeh, Makki, Nariman and Shaygan from Tehran, Azad from Sabzevar, Bakaei from Kerman and Saleh from Kashan were elected for
deputation. It seemed these eight deputies from the Jebhe Melli among 130 deputies were not important, but in later months, it was just eight persons who could influence not the Shah, but all the country through support of the middle class. According to Richard Cottom, the author of “Nationalism in Iran”, “Perhaps, the Shah considers the permit of free election in Tehran as his greatest mistake”. 62

From social viewpoint, the sixteenth Majles had no difference with previous Majleses, for most of its constituting members were from high class. Eighty five percent of 131 deputies were Landlords, rich traders, senior governmental civil servants. This Majles had been politically forming of four groups. Few deputies of the Jebhe Melli (National Front); A pro-British caucus (Feraksiun) consisting of conservative nobles of South; about 40 independent deputies like Abdghasem Amini, Khosro Ghash ghaee and Naser Zolfaghari; and majority of veteran monarchists like Esfandiari, Matin Daftari who could rely on Senate Majles and significant politicians like Taghi Zadeh, Hakimi, Malekzadeh, Farrokh and Abbas Masoodi who despite their previous differences, now were protecting the Shah. The new Majles began on 9 February 1950. Subsequently, majority of monarchists unseated Sa’ed who had three pro-British ministers in his Cabinet and appointed Ali Mansour as the Prime Minister. Ali Mansour was Prime Minister in the Reza Shah era and after Tabriz Claw-back he was governor of Azerbaijan. It was the first time the court could put the other groups’ representatives out of the cabinet. 63

Mossadeq in the Sixteenth Majles

On 9 February 1950, the Shah Mohammad Reza, after returning from the U.S., inaugurated the first term of Senate and the sixteenth Majles-e Shoraye Melli (the National Consultative Assembly) without presence of Tehran deputies. He wanted both Majleses to review some of the Constitution principles. According to Shah, those principles needed urgent review and the
constituent Assembly asked the both Majleses for doing it. On April, Ali Mansour, the new Prime Minister, got his confidence vote and before presence of Tehran deputies, visited twice Mossadeq. During this visit, Mossadeq as the leader of the Jebhe Melli demanded the Prime Minister to consider his two programs including election laws and reviewing Press law prior to reforming the constitution. In spite of the Shah’s expectations, Mansour offered first the new election laws and after some days, the new measure of the pres

Mossadeq along with the seven deputies of the National Front presented in the Majles, On 25 April 1950 (approximately 75 days after majles inauguration) .Mossadeq after the oath ceremonies brought forward the bill of reviewing the constitution and warned to oppose it also addressed the Majles and considered forming of the Constituent Assembly illegal and denounced it strongly. Mossadeq warned the Shah of any attempt against the constitution and any insisting on acquiring veto right for dissolving both Majleses and appointment of ministers. Furthermore, he exposed interferences of the Darbar (court) and the Army staff and Ashraf, the Shah’s sister, in the country affairs and recommended the Shah to be a Constitutional king. Mossadeq said:

“...I don’t say the constitution which is creating by the human thought is unchangeable. I say the constitution has to change by true deputies of nation and the Iranians do not approve any change except this and so, action of the Constituent Assembly is invalid and unpredictable… Threatening to dissolve is an oppressive instrument that just a spiteful person can use it to weaken the deputies and not let them to serve the nation…” Then, Mossadeq recommended the Shah Mohammad Reza to not interfere in government affairs, so people would like him. “...We should make the Shah so popular, admirable and reinforced that he doesn’t flee for any event. If, the Shah would be protected by the “people, his monarchy can sustain, and if the Shah wouldn’t have any backers so I predict no good future for this monarchy. …This constituent Assembly is fake and Iran’s nation cannot tolerate it, even if
you say the Constituent Assembly has changed this law, it is not legal because it is against the people aspirations. Even Koran has some abolished verses which according to expedient have been put an end ... the constitution must be accepted by the desire and eager of the People…”

The Shah got angry of Mossadeq’s resistance in refusing the bill of revising the Constitution for boasting the Shah’s power; flexibility of Mansour, the Prime Minister, on the National Front and Mossadeq’s will. The Shah Mohammad Reza considered nature of the Jebhe Melli and mere neutral policy so dangerous and castigated Mossadeq during his visit to British ambassador and called him “Our Demosthenes”. Also, the Shah confessed to consider the Jebhe Melli more dangerous than the Tudeh party for its ambiguous and negative views. Meanwhile, the Shah was trying to consolidate his power; Mansour was going to prepare both the Shah’s will and the Jebhe Melli one. Mansour invited Ayatollah Kashani who was in exile in Lebanon after the Shah’s assassination to return Tehran, because the people elected him as Tehran deputy. Mansour refused to state explicitly his opinion about the Supplementary Agreement, which was so notable for the Shah and the British. While introducing his government program, he charged the Majles to decide over the Supplementary Agreement. Therefore, Mansour disqualified for the Shah and the British expectations. So, it was expecting to replace by an authorities and active person whom be confirmed by the British and American and Shah. Assassination of Ahmad Dehghan, Tehran deputy and editor of “Tehran Mossafar” magazine and one of the courtiers’ relatives, in June by Hassan Jafari, a member of AIOC, brought concerning about revitalization of the Tudeh party. One of the weakening factors of Mansour’s government was enhancing financial and economic problems, which rooted in non-approbation of the Supplementary Agreement bill. Mossadeq who was aware of changing government and ruling an authoritative Prime Minister, who would be protected by Britain and America, started his conflict against the Premiershi
of Lieutenant – General Razm Ara. He, on 13 June 1950, addressed the Majles and said:

“... Instead of making people free from offences of this corrupt system and complaining of discontent of all over the country and finding a way for reform and social justice, we are going to establish a new dictatorship to make Iran’s native captive for another next half century. I cannot deem result of this advisable for the people and Shah. Till we, the National Front deputies, are in the Majles oppose to any which exceed from parliamentary and democratic principles. Even we are ready to scarify our lives in this way”. He, also, pointed out: “Iran’s nation cannot be relief and achieve its national right, as long as someone doesn’t scarify their lives”. 67

After, he read his plan over discredit ability of the Constituent Assembly and revising the Constitution and asked 14 deputies for signing it in order to recognize. Except the Jebhe Melli members all deputies refused to sign it, so his plan defeated. Also, annex principle to the constitution complementary in establishing single Majles from Senate and the National Consultative Assembly for reviewing some principles till 1957 was suspended.

On 18 June, the Mansour’s government suggested to Majles measure of Supplementary Agreement (Gess-Golshaeian) again. The Prime Minister charged Majles and a special commission to clear the supplement but he himself expressed no aye or number of notion over the supplement. In spite of Mossadeq’s insisting on determining government stance about it, Mansour refused to do so. On 22 June, report of Commission of inquiry was read in Majles and result of selecting commission members in six-fold branches was announced, too. Members of Oil Commission were consisting of; head of commission Dr. Mossadeq, deputy chairman Mir Seyyed Ali Bebahani, Javad Ganjei, Rapporteur, Hossein Makki, Secretaries: Khosrow Ghashghae and Dr. Hassan Alavi; Members of Commission: Dr. Nasrollah Kazemi, Naser
On 26 June 1950, Mansour resigned and was appointed as Iran’s ambassador in Italy. Despite his ministry and Prime Ministry experience, he never agreed to surrender the Shah and British and their expectations. He never defended the supplement of Gess –Golshaeian to disgrace himself and attack by Mossadeq and the Jebhe Melli.

**Government of Lieutenant –General Razm Ara (July 1950-March 1951)**

On 26 June 1950, simultaneous to Mansour’s resignation the Shah issued decree of appointing Lieutenant –General Ali Razm Ara as the new Prime Minister without attention and confidence vote of Majles. British and Americans, both had agreed on Razm Ara as a powerful, modernist Prime Minister, but his appointment was more with the U.S. embassy recommendation especially the U.S. ambassador John C. Wiley. They believed Razm Ara is like a dam against communism growth because they did not consider the Shah decisive enough to resist against communism. Chief problems of Razm Ara for political reforms consisted of: interferences by British embassy; disaffection of Mossadeq and the Jebhe Melli, the Shah and his family; Hakimi as the Darbar Minister. His government program included fighting against corruption; decentralization of political and official power; dissolving the Majles; restricting the Shah’s power; agreement with AIOC like other Middle Eastern countries; transferring executive responsibilities of economic and social programs to Tagi Nasr.

The U.S. press and media welcomed Razm Ara ruling and considered it as a sign of attempt for starting public reforms program in Iran. New York Times described him as the only one who can rescue Iran from political
instabilities and financial bankruptcies. Confronting of the Soviet and America interests, after starting Korea War; importance of the Middle East Oil; revising in Aramco Treaty with the Saudi Arabia had much influence on the U.S. and U.K. relations in Iran and ruling of Razm Ara. Lieutenant –General Razm Ara was one of stormy and tumultuous political features of Iran in decades after 1941. He had completed his military education in “San Sir” of France and because of his genius and skill could advance quickly. In 1946, he was put in the head of army staff during crisis of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. He had a basic role in mobilizing and dispatching of military units to Azerbaijan. After escaping of Pishevari and ending of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan disturbances, Razm Ara issued martial trial order and shot down a group of army officers who had joint Democrats. In addition, he played role in 1949 election of the Constituent Assembly and election of the sixteenth Majles. Reviewing of the Shah Mohammad Reza’s memoirs confirm the theory that important reason of appointing Razm Ara as the Prime Minister has been confronting against Mossadeq and approbation of the supplementary. The Shah, in his book “Answer to History” which published a few weeks after his death, says about this:

“…disturbances due to economic turbulences, inconclusive attempts of government in talks to AIOC and prolonging these talks had paved the way for Mossadeq…and Razm Ara’s efforts, as I hoped, had not resulted. Also, he couldn’t or didn’t want to reach a result with Oil Company; his situation in the Parliament was serious. Amidst this situation, Mossadeq with his attractive statements had been performing so skillful and had been increasing his authenticity and credit, If Razm Ara had acted decisively. Mossadeq couldn’t have reached to fame” 

On 27 June 1950, Razm Ara presented in the Majles for introducing his cabinet members who its list had been regulated before appointing him as Prime Minister by consulting with the U.S. and U.K. embassy. Most of
ministers were deputies of ministries and educated senior official ranks who for the first time were being charged with ministry posts. The Jebhe Melli issued a declaration on 26 June and in the session of 27 June of the Majles was read by Mossadeq. He described Razm Ara’s premiership “Coup-like” and warned the Iranians of installation a military dictatorship regime. Declaration is as follows:

“…It is declared to the world, we cannot tolerate imposing of such a government which restore to alien and is against public will, we, also, have the honor to sacrifice our lives for preserving our national and religious rights and our constitutionality and democracy…”

Nonetheless, American and British ambassadors support and the Shah’s support had caused to achieve confidence vote by 95 ayes votes, 8 nays votes and 3 abstentions. Despite setback of the National Front in opposing to Razm Ara’s premiership, they continued their activities against the Prime Minister through publishing Mossadeq’s speech in the press and this led to increase public disaffections throughout society. Razm Ara performed as it was expected. He brought twelve new figures to his cabinet, suggested to enhance taxes of riches and made a specific committee for examining corruption in high levels. He himself supported suggestions over new oil contract. Furthermore, Razm Ara delivered two important reformative measures: one for distributing governmental hands among peasants and two, for establishing promised state associations in the Constitution. Being more close to the left faction, he refused to dispatch forces to the Korea war, signed a commercial contract with the Soviet, and reduced imposed strictures on the Tudeh party. When ten leaders of the Tudeh party escaped from jail, it was spread among public that Razm Ara had helped them. Developing relations with Moscow led to sour relations with Washington and as a result reduced possibility of receiving economic aids of America. Reformative suggestions and re-manifestation of the Tudeh Party made conservative deputies concern. According to one of
deputies, talk of land distribution had provoked class disgust against rich class. The other deputy said land reforms intensified the class competitions.

“Suggestion of land reforms, may be, would be suitable for medieval Europe, but it is not practical at all in Iran, because, Iran never has faced feudalism despite Europe. Our peasant has remained like free partners in the production process and our landowners are performing like a responsible and peaceful citizen and behave with their peasants like their children. Thus, landlord – peasant relations are based on affection and respect. Those who are shouting for land reforms today, tomorrow will plan for a proletariat dictatorship. Removing any law, especially sanctity and respect of private possession, will jeopardize all of our Constitution…”

Measure of state associations was tumultuous. From Bakaei’s view, decentralization was a British plot for disintegrating Iran. Makki warned that official decentralization in the country with various languages is not wisely, because there is always danger of independence of one of local organizations from the center. Kashani through a telegraph announced the Majles no real Muslim wants to disintegrate Iran’s thousand-year state. Mossadeq, also, emphasized state associations, may be, had been beneficial in the Constitutional Revolution era but now in the cold war era it would dangerous and those who agreed on local organizations should remember our recent experience in Azerbaijan and present war in Korea. Therefore, it was no wonder advocates of the Jebhe Melli were less than other parts of Iran. Suggestions over oil were the most disputable affairs of Razm Ara. The Jebhe Melli announced Razm Ara was going to establish a military dictatorship and through it enforced suggestions on people. It was said domestic reforms should be postponed until solving Iran’s problem with the AIOC, because domestic reforms was not as important as danger of British Oil Company. Measure of the supplementary Gess-Golshaian was the most important affair of Razm Ara
government, because, he acquired British support for Prime Ministry contingent on attempt for approbation of the above Supplementary Act. Britain did not want to change any article of the Supplementary during their talks to Razm Ara but, Mac Ghee, American foreign Minister deputy, had been insisting on giving more concessions to Iranians to prohibit nationalizing oil and British should not be so hard against Iran and should understand new circumstances of the world.  

From eighteen selected members of Oil Commission, five were the Jebhe Melli representatives who had plans on oil. Dr. Mossadeq and his companions aimed on nationalization of oil throughout Iran. They considered it as main goal of Iranian nation in vindication their rights. So, any endeavor on rejecting the supplementary was considered as a basic process towards nationalizing oil. Razm Ara had doubt on posing the supplementary in the Majles. He had been suggesting on Iranization of staffs, publishing accounts, delivery of oil and gasoline with less price for domestic consumption. In July, he asked the Oil Company for paying any owes from the supplementary to Iran, because he was not going to pose it in the Majles until six month later. According to Shepherd, Razm Ara had wasted his first months ruling with tentative acts. Grady American ambassadors in Iran had been expressing his concern over hard policy of Britain on refusing Razm Ara’s suggestions. He suggested to the US foreign Ministry to solve Iran’s oil problem through giving a 50 million dollars gratuitous loan to Iran by the US. Britain insisted on helping Iran after approving of the Supplementary in the Majles. In the Majles, Mossadeq had been insisting on announcing government view and stance on this bill to the commission. At last, Oil commission through a letter, which was read in the session of the National Consultative Assembly on 26 September asked the government to send all files about oil to the oil commission within 3 days, also, government had to express its views over offering measure to Oil Commission within 10 days. If, government would not send files and its views to commission within defined times,
Commission had been interpellating government. Mossadeq in a press interview on October 1950 said, “The Jebhe Melli could not recognize D’Arcy and 1933 Accords and also the Supplementary and these invaluable papers could not usurp Iranian rights”. Ultimately, refusing of Razm Ara led to interpelletation of his government and the Jebhe Melli deputies had been stating disadvantages of the supplementary and discreditable of the 1933 Accord politically and socially which lasted 4 days. Allah Yar Saleh said: “...In the world two powerful factors are determining destiny of backwardness countries, one is money and the other is force. The AIOC has both factors, it has penetrated in social estates of the country and has hindered social advantages of the Iranians...” also Haeri Zadeh said: “Britain has formed a powerful state inside Iran’s weak government and has spread about illegitimate powers, and has damaged Iran’s political and economic independence”. Makki said: “AIOC doesn’t consider any control right of technical and accounts operations and is going to prevent Iranians from tenure of technical and important jobs. If the British company had gratuitous oil, but was paying its customs right on its imports, it had to pay 60 million lives to Iran’s state which is much more than the concession right.” Concerning this, Mossadeq said:

“Confirmation of Treaty belonging to the dictatorship period will be caused the Iranian nation to remain under cruel regulations till next 43 years, 1993, and they will be deprived of their enormous under ground minerals. This treaty is illegal and null. As you know the two sides of the treaty should have qualification of its conclusion and be free both in signing and approving of it. You know that the majority of deputies in dictatorship era were not true deputies of people and ministers also had not carte blanche”.

Then Mossadeq added Mr. Tagi Zadeh’s remarks, the then Finance Minister and signer of the 1933 Treaty in the Fifteenth Majles, over the 1933 Treaty as follows:
“I, myself, dissatisfied of extension the treaty and other deputies so like me, if there were any fault or defect it was not because of us but because of the Shah Reza…”. Mossadeq continued “there were also some approbation in the dictatorship Majles but was in the interest of the Iranians. However, about this treaty, one of the reasons of establishing dictatorship and taking away freedom of people and Majles was for approving this treaty. Of course Iran’s nation disagree with the Supplementary Agreement, because AIOC especially in article ten was going to delude Iranians”.

Mossadeq rely on balance sheet of AIOC in 1948 expressed sum of 79 million revenues of the company, 28 million lives were specified for tax on revenue to British government, Meanwhile 10 million lives was just Iran’s concession right. Then he asked deputies to follow “Negative Equilibrium” policy to vindicate Iranian rights and not to surrender their country. Mossadeq added: “…Anywhere, officers are fighting and killing to defend their countries’ rights, but in this country Lieutenant – General wants to surrender his country to AIOC. O’ death on those who betray their country instead serving it…”

Answer of Razm Ara to interpellators was weak and unfounded. Finally, the Prime Minister expressed his agreement on the Supplementary Agreement and added: “If you care to this process, you will understand when a government delivers a file and introduce its representative means its agreement on the measure, unless, he wasn’t introducing or delivering any one or any file”. At the end of conversations, most of the deputies had silence votes to interpellation of the Jebhe Melli deputies.”³⁸
Bill of Nationalizing Oil Industry

Along with announcing of protecting the Supplementary by the Prime Minister, conflict over nationalizing of oil started in the Majles. Razm Ara in answering to questions of Oil Commission members about next measures of government said: “He will follow talks to AIOC, because it is one of the main and important affairs of his government. On 22 November 1950, Razm Ara and Forouhar (Finance Minister) defended the Supplementary bill through presence in Oil Commission meeting. In the twentieth second meeting of Oil commission on 25 November, leader of the jebhe Melli while rejecting views and reasons of Finance Minister, posed bill of the oil nationalization all over the country. Mossadeq had emphasized on this bill more for its political and ethic point than economic point and said:

“Iran’s nation has still interested nothing of oil revenues, and it has been spent in a way that just foreigners or some persons benefited it that has been puppet of the Company and enmity of Iran. If oil industry will be nationalized, there is no company, which influence or interfere in domestic affairs of Iran and shows corrupt persons as a trustworthy and patriotic ones. Today, our ethical level has varied more than 1933. It has reached to a level in our society which has been disdain for every Iranian…” In the end of Mossadeq’s letter, suggestion of the National Front was read as follows: “….In the name of Iranians happiness and for help to global peace, signers of this are suggesting to nationalize oil industry all over the country, it means that any exploration, extraction and exploitation operation would be in the hands of the Iranians”.

Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq; Haeri Zadeh; Allahyar Saleh; Dr. Shaygan; Hossien Makkie. 79

Nevertheless, oil commission of the Majles did not accept the bill of oil nationalizing but in the meeting of 27 November, it was approved rejection of the Supplementary bill by consensus as follows: “Oil Commission which had
been formed by the decision of 20 June of the Majles, after talks and studies resulted to oppose the Supplementary of Saed –Gess, because it is not enough for vindication of Iran’s right”. Publishing news about rejecting the Supplementary and not approving of “Nationalization of Oil industry” by the Oil Commission caused to provoke large rally against the Oil Company and Razm Ara’s government and protecting of nationalization of oil plan all over the country. After that, attempts of representatives of the Oil Company and Britain and Razm Ara and American political deputies were re-enforced to prevent “nationalization”.

On 10 December 1950, Hossein Makkie, commission reporter, delivered Oil Commission report to the Majles. In this 260 pages report, the commission acts within 24 sessions (from 26 June-29 November 1950) was largely elaborated. Rejection of the Supplementary, was the most important decision of the commission, also, it had been referred to the jebhe Melli suggestion nationalizing of oil industry. Extensive rallies were done by the support of minority deputies and against Razm Ara’s government and the AIOC. Ayatollah Kashani supported the nationalizing of oil through a message. Students of Tehran University gathered in Baharestan square with slogan, “Iran’s oil must nationalize”. Following religious authorities such as Ayatollah Mohammad Khonsari and a group of clergies encouraged the people by sending a message to protect the plan of “oil nationalization”. Then, Mossadeq thanked everyone who by the name of Iran’s nation had done everything to clear public mentalities towards the vital affair of oil nationalization. Dr. Shaygan asked deputies to rescue and leave Iran from colonization restricts, and stated:

“History of ethical decline of Iran’s nation begins from the time Britain have dominated on Hindustan and from there they came to our country. ... Basis of their act is to propagate corrupted morals. If two individuals would be nominee to do something for them, they care to choose one
who is more corrupt, more wicked and more traitor than the other does, if everywhere they find a patriotic and honest person; demolish him in any way.... Iran’s nation has national sovereignty and for its right, they can nationalize each industry according to their discretion. Just now, international environment is suitable, too, so do it manfully”  

Furthermore, Dr. Hossein Fatemi wrote in the first number of Bakhtar Emrooz, an organ of the jebhe Melli, in an article entitled “Iran is not that cemetery Britain wishes” as follows: “I defend the most legitimate and the holiest right of the Iranians. I have reflected million opinions of oppressed and hunger people and I have shouted for belonging Iran’s oil to the Iranians. If, this statement is guilty per as Razm Ara’s government, I honor it and nobody can talk of nothing except “nationalizing of oil industry….”

Struggle had reached its peak, In Tehran and other cities people had fixed three colors bands with slogan of “Oil must be nationalized”. Many went to prison with these slogans. Thus, backing of Parliament deputies over oil nationalization plan increased. Iran was on the verge of a big historic decision. It has concerned western powers and British and American politicians and they were seeking to get rid of this dilemma. However, an event, which was unbelievable for the Oil Company, happened.

**Restitution of the Supplemental Agreement Bill**

Regarding to the Supplementary Agreement rejection in the Oil Commission, government decided to defend it or restitute it. In the session on 23 December 1950, government exposed its intention over restitute of the Supplementary Agreement. In addition, Razm Ara was going to restitute it to prevent of approving the jebhe Melli suggestion for oil nationalizing and continuing talks to the Oil Company. Foruhar was the first and last Finance Ministry who defended openly of the supplementary Agreement and castigated oil nationalization. Moreover, Forouhar defended of Golshaian, signer of the
Supplementary Agreement in Saed’s government, considered it more beneficial from financial point than the 1933 Accord, and said:

“There is no doubt, with present global situation, oil nationalization in Iran has no result for Iran except misery, unemployment for people ... and “government cannot charged such a responsibility. ... At the end, regarding the Oil Commission has not considered the Supplementary Agreement bill enough for vindication of Iran’s right, so, government restore this bill to conduct it in vindication of the country right based on the law of 21 October, 1947……” 82

Forouhar’s statements provoked a storm of anger and criticism of majority and minority deputies and increased the number of government dissidents and advocators of the “Oil Nationalization”. Moreover, his statements made tension among cabinet members and subsequent objection to him, ministers Dr. Abdollah Daftari, Minister of national economy, engineer Jafar Sharif Emami, Minister of roads and transportation, and engineer Ibrahim Mahdavi, Minister of Agriculture, resigned on 29 December 1950. On 17 January 1950, the Majles affirmed a bill which based on it the Oil Commission had been charged on reporting over defining the government duty to vindicate Iran’s rights about oil within two months. Through approbation of this bill, the Majles took away the government duty of vindication. Iran’s rights and transferred it to the oil commission.

At the time, Razm Ara had been under pressure and his hopes over approving the Supplementary Agreement was decreasing, some of British Foreign Ministry authorities suggested William Freezer, the director general of AIOC, Iran interest of 50-50 but he had no desire to it. Freezer expressed his displeasure of Americans and said; “They do not help to us in Tehran.” Meanwhile, talks between representatives of ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia were going to agree based on 50-50 interest. Britain suggested ARAMCO to
postpone publishing official declaration on result of talks. Finally, Agreement between ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia signed on 30 December 1950 and some days after the Supplementary Agreement refusal, news reached Tehran. This agreement was the first one in the Middle East based on interest bisection. The Saudi Arabia state was receiving 30 shilling for per ton oil, nearly double of money that was suggested for the Supplementary Agreement. 83

Before signing this agreement between ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia, Americans especially Acheson, the Foreign Minister, and Mack Gee, deputy of the FM, warned Britain to choose more suitable way towards Iran and they replied: “We have a long experience over this matter and we know how to behave with the Iranians. We do whatever we have said before”. After signing ARAMCO Agreement, Britain claimed, “American hadn’t informed Britain and British oil companies in the Middle East of the ARAMCO Agreement qualities”. 84 Any case, publishing news of ARAMCO Agreement with Saudi Arabia was a “released shot” to the Supplementary Agreement. Harsh reaction of the Majles to the Supplementary Agreement and exiting of operation initiative of government hands put Razm Ara in a dilemma of dissolving the Majles or changing the Agreement. Razm Ara in a meeting with Shepherd, the British ambassador, said: “the only remaining way for him is to ask the Shah to dissolve the Majles and arrange new elections”. Shepherd protected the Prime Minister position, but the Shah did not deem it advisable, because of strong public attention to oil matter. Dissolving the Majles had been consolidating Razm Ara’s power and the Shah was concerning on it. From public viewpoint, the possible Shah’s action on dissolving the Majles was considered as a treacherous act towards the national movement. The Majles was aware of dissolving, so, Mossadeq had referred and warned over dissolving Majles threat in his statement on 5 December in the Majles.

The Britain was surveying other ways to confront nationalization danger. They were going to use their Iranian agents to influence or pay off
among deputies or even being close to the jebhe melli as their alternative solutions, but shepherd refused all of them. Follow to British Embassy authorities, resorting bribe was not concluded Mossadeq and his followers, but there were someone who had been receiving money. For instance, Mir Seyyed Ali Bebbahani, the Majles deputy, in a message to Lanslot Pyman, the eastern counselor of British Embassy, asked for money and choosing a rational behavior in oil affair contingent on financial help of Britain. Britain responded him that embassy was not in a situation to help him, it would be better for him to contact with Razm Ara. 85

**Approving of Nationalizing Oil Industry**

“Nationalization” was a threat for Britain after rejecting the Supplementary Agreement bill. Americans who had been aware of oil nationalization danger and its subsequent results was pressuring the British to confront this threat through interest bisection. Shepherd informed Razm Ara, it had been arranged to pay Iran 285 million pound sterling in 1951 by AIOC, also, pay 10-pound sterling million to Iran during this year and signing an agreement based on 50-50 interest. 86 Shepherd hoped Razm Ara could approve this bill, so, consulted the Treasury Ministry, Fuel and Energy Ministry and after offered final bill according to interest bisection. It was ordered to Shepherd to tell Razm Ara anything except this suggestion would be unacceptable by Britain including nationalizing oil. Razm Ara presented in the Oil commission on 21 February 1951, but didn’t expose the British bill, just read something over Iran’s technical weakness in establishing an organization such as the South oil company, shortage of oil expertise and transportation of oil to global market, also considered oil nationalization damaging point politically, economically, judiciary. Mossadeq, on 7 March 1951, considered Razm Ara’s government as an illegal and obstinate government. Before noon in March 7, when the oil commission members were listening to Mossadeq’s statements, Razm Ara went for attending in commemorate meeting of
Ayatollah Feyz. He was in the court of the Shah mosque who was shot. The Fadaian Islam (Islam Devotees) had sent one of its members by the name of “Khalil Tahmasebi”, a 26 years old carpenter, to assassinate Razm Ara as the British protégé. 78

About Razm Ara’s murder, there are many narrations. It is said that he was killed by the Shah’s order. According to Seyyed Zia testimony: “I was present by the Shah Mohammad Reza that Asadollah Alam was hastily coming and said the Shah gladly: “he was killed” so we were relieved. 88 The day after Razm Ara assassination, oil commission approved nationalizing of Iran’s oil industry, and offered its report to the Majles. The Majles: “concerning to receive suggestions to Oil Commission over nationalizing oil industry all over the country, it has been accepted by Oil Commission but because of time shortage, the commission asks the Majles two more months”. Within one week, Oil Commission delivered its report on oil nationalization suggestion; nevertheless, many attempts were done to prevent its approbation. The British ambassador and the Shah had been trying to prohibit approving oil nationalization in the Majles. Shepherd reported British foreign Ministry like this: “We did whatever we could, till voting for the oil nationalization and the Majles couldn’t get enough deputies for vote”.

For this mean, Lanslote Payman, the embassy advisor, visited Asodollah Alam and suggested the Shah to use all of his influence for not presenting of deputies in the Majlis while putting oil nationalization bill. Payman also, suggested this to two deputies. Finally, Payman was formed at the time of posing the bill 43 deputies of 131 would prevent to attend in the meeting…..” After disappointing of this act, Britain hoped to the Senate Majlis, but Shah’s attempt had no result, too. Now the best solution for Britain was to dissolve both Majles, but was doubtful. Shepherd wrote in his report to the Foreign Ministry as follows:
“If within two or three months, Ala’s government would change and its subsequent would be dissolving of both Majles and disappearing of the Oil Commission and there would be dealing possibility with Qavam or Seyyed Zia unless one of them chose for the Prime Ministry. But dealing with Qavam would be difficult. In both cases, oil nationalization principle should be accepted because recent events have spread it such extensively in public thought that no state can ignore it”. 89

On 15 March, deputies of the National Front and some of other deputies suggested to put the Oil Commission report and deciding about it prior to other bills of the Majles. Then, a single article offered the majles to approve. After short statements of Mossadeq over importance of this historic decision, which deputies faced with it and appreciating of members of Oil Commission, the single article was put to vote by the speaker of the Majles and approved with an overwhelming majority of votes.

Single Article: The Majles (National Consultative Assembly) confirms decision of the Oil Commission on 7 March 1951 and agrees with its extension.

Immediately, after announcing the single article approbation, all deputies, press correspondents and bystanders raised and started to applaud. Next day, on 20 March, the Senate Majles affirmed decision of the National Consultative Assembly and the Shah signed the above law in that day. Therefore, Iranians won first term of their conflict over nationalizing oil industry. 90 Iranians considered news of approving Oil Nationalization as a glorious victory and held celebration in Tehran and other cities. Assassination of Razm Ara threatened some of Oil Commission members but had no definite result on oil nationalization bill. After affirming suggestive bill of Oil Commission in the Majles, Shepherd, the Ambassador of Britain, reported his Foreign Ministry even those who had been ordered by the Shah, not to attend in
the meeting to vote, they went to Majles and voted for nationalizing oil. His report had been referred to being influence of Majles by the terrorist ways of the Jebhe Melli and Kashani. Threaten deputies to introduce as a traitor if not attend in the meeting led to acquiring majority of the Majles.  

News about assassination of Lieutenant –General Razm Ara and affirming suggestion of the Oil Nationalization bill by the Majles was published as the most important incident all over the world. Political future of Iran regarding oil nationalization, Britain and big oil companies reactions and effect of Oil Nationalization on other oil producing countries in the Persian Gulf were debate of all political and economic circles. Daily Mill newspaper in its number of 9 March wrote, “...Razm Ara wanted to conclude a new oil contract with Iran, but failed ... his death is dreadful for he left Iran without defense”.

Analysis of Radio London was like this, “Today, Iran’s Parliament approved suggestion of nationalization of oil Industry. Some retrogressive and rich persons are supporting this suggestion also, some bias Mullahs like Seyyed Abolghasem Kashani.... “And some negativists whom some youths are following them, they were shouting: “Iranian oil for Iranians”, but nobody said how it is possible for an Iranian to manage its oil. There were individuals just like Razm Ara who knew administration of oil by Iranians are impossible...”  

George Middleton, American charged affairs, wrote in one of his reports: “Later when events of 1951 will be clear in dimensions that are more extensive, it will be evident that assassination of Razm Ara was a watershed in Iran’s history”. The Soviet considered oil nationalization as a “deceitful Plan” of Americans. Pravda, organ of the Soviets’ Communist Party, wrote in its first page:

“General Razm Ara, Iran’s Prime Minister, was assassinated by who has close relations with Americans … if we care to the truth, it will easily be
evident that neither British nor Russians were involved in this murder nor it was just Americans that have manipulated it. According to the Soviet Union, conceive, only Razm Ara could improve relations of Iran and the Soviet. Indeed, he talked the Soviet for contract two commercial agreements with Iran, were in the mutual interest the countries. But, Americans desired to remove Razm Ara”. 95

Anthony Eden, the British FM, has stated about secret talks of Razm Ara with AIOC and their agreement on 50-50 interest as follows: “It is possible based on Iran’s Prime Minister request had been agreed not to publish any news over suggestions of financial helps to Iran by AIOC just like not informing of Iranians about agreement on 50-50 interest”. He added “Any case, situation was in the interest of Mossadeq and his victory and attempts for oil nationalization had been continuing. Majlis asked the Prime Minister to announce the government view over being practical oil nationalization to the deputies. General Razm Ara charged Iranian expertise to survey about it and above commission hadn’t deemed it advisable and beneficial for Iran ... On 3 March, the Prime Minister delivered the report to Majles and four days later he was assassinated”. 96

Emanuel Shin Vole, the British Defense Minister, said, “If, it is allowed Iran to win in this conflict, Egypt and other countries of the Middle East will be encouraged to follow Iran. Next enterprise would be nationalizing of Suez Canal”. Acheson, the American Foreign Minister, after informing of assassination of Iran’s Prime Minister cited “We hope Iran and Britain can solve the oil affair in a way to cover interests of all countries, and exporting of Iran’s oil would be continuing to the world market”. 97

On 7 March, the day of Razm Ara’s assassination, Asadollah Alam visited Shepherd, the British ambassador, to discuss about next government whether it would be a strong government or according to the Majles speaker
would be a harmless one. The British ambassador believed to a “strong personality” for administrating country affairs, but regarding public dissidents towards murdered Razm Ara appointing another military person was not advisable. However, after consulting with Americans, a “Soluble Cabinet” was considered. Ultimately, the Shah restored Ala again and convinced him to accept the Prime Ministry. On 9 March, the National Consultative Assembly expressed their desire to Ala Cabinet. Ala, because of his experience as ambassador in the US, had been considering the U.S. as a neutralized forced against Britain and the Soviet. He was a loyal monarchist and was confirming the National Movement of Iran. He during talks with the British pointed out suggestion of 50-50 interest and affirming an agreement on it is impossible because now “Iranians just wished to nationalize oil as a principle … they cannot tolerate any more the imposed concession of 1933”.

Ala who was choosing his ministers based on Mossadeq’s recommendation, entered Amir Alaei from the Jebhe Melli to the Cabinet and allowed Kashani to return Tehran. Adding this, he did nothing against approving of oil nationalization bill first in the above mentioned commission and second in the Majles and at last on 20 March in Senate. Hence, a small Parliamentary minority had formed which was protected by hard public support in which none of the deputies whether monarchist or pro-Britain could not anything do on their desire. In midst of April, when the Tudeh party showed its real power, fears changed to terror and agitation. The Tudeh party went for a public strike in Khuzestan in objection to unfavorable situation of residential houses and low wages of the oil industry workers. Furthermore, it arranged large rallies against government shortages in implementing of nationalizing law. When Abadan police shot towards demonstrators and killed 6 persons. Britain sent war ships to the Persian Gulf and the Tudeh Party in tensed rallies in Tehran, Esfahan and northern cities. Ala had been announcing martial law, because he believed these unrests raised class differences and was in the interest of foreign enemy. During confronting of military forces with workers 6 was killed and some injured. In addition, two British workers and a British
sailor were murdered. After assassination of Razm Ara and becoming Iran – Britain relations critical, America concerned more about Iran. Strike of workers in oil fields; dispatching some war ships to the Persian Gulf; possibility of military confronting between Iran and Britain and bring pretext for the Soviet about military interference led the America’s foreign Ministry to order deputy of foreign Minister in the Middle East affairs to go Iran and survey situation by close. On 17 March, Mac Gee who had been visiting Pakistan went Tehran. He visited with American ambassador in Iran, Shepherd and the Prime Minister, Ala, and the Shah. Mac Gee says about his visit with Shepherd:

“….I told the British ambassador: Our wish is that the AIOC can pass nationalizing and in our opinion AIOC was very hard in its talks and couldn’t recognize well the new situation in Iran … Shepherd in replying my question said: this kind of nationalizing is not inevitable, but the main point is to make the nationalizing principle practical”. Mc Gee says about his visit with the Shah: “...In this visit, I saw a scene that never forgets. I had seen the Shah during his official visit of Washington About half a year before. At the time, He was a proud tall young man who was resisting and insisting on his requests, but this time, I saw a depressed man in a dark room who was sitting on an armchair. I felt he is frightening of being killed. After I asked the Shah: Can he divert the nationalization route?” The Shah answered: “He can not do this and added: I even cannot establish a government”. All afraid of invisible enemy, they present everywhere…So; I realized nobody can convince Iranians to change their minds over nationalizing oil…”

London and Washington had different views over strategic situation; British were not ready to remove American concerns towards military interference of the Soviet. From the American viewpoint, the strategic situation of Iran was prior on oil interests of Britain in Iran. On the other hand, any taking weak stance of British Labor Party in previous years was harmful
for Labor Party. After assassination of Rzm Ara, British tried to bring “Seyyed Zia” to power as Prime Minister. The FM of Britain considered him as an ideal candidate for ruling. They expected “Shepherd” could encourage and convince the Shah for the Premiership of “Seyyed Zia”. Some days after Razm Ara’s assassination, Seyyed Zia after consulting with the Shah delivered a comprehensive plan over his ruling to “Payman”. This plan included dissolving of the Majles by the Shah and appointing a Provisional Prime Minister who after two weeks would be the Prime Minister. Based on this plan, Seyyed Zia government would solve the oil affair based on 50-50 interests. In addition, he was going to bound monarchy family interferences in political affairs, and to agree with the Shah’s views over the country affairs to 60 percent and fulfill both softness and harshness policy towards the Jebhe Melli.

Seyyed Zia demanded to consult with one of economic advisors of the Embassy and asked the British to contact the Shah and protect his plan. Britain welcomed the Plan and asked Asadollah Alam to inform Shah. They told Seyyed Zia that AIOC had paid 5 million Sterling before and was ready to pay ever two months two millions Sterling till end of 1951 and put another 10 million lives as deposit in the Iran National Bank in London. With appointing Ala to Prime Ministry as a “soluble” Prime Minister, everything was providing for ruling of Seyyed Zia. If it was possible, Majles would dissolve. Shah in response to British Embassy said Seyyed Zia would be appointed to Prime Ministry less than a month. Nevertheless, dissolving of the Majles would remain as main affair. It was not just “Seyyed Zia” who was trying to be Prime Minister but Ahmad Qavam who had returned from Europe was trying to acquire support of British Embassy through his envoys like “Azizolah Nikpei” and “Salman Asadi”, but Shepherd considered him as a corrupt and unreliable person and “unfavorable element”. 100

Americans had no positive view towards “Seyyed Zia” regarding his instable relations with the Darbar (court) and his dependency to British.
Americans were supporter of Soheily’s Prime Ministry. However, the FM of Britain believed Soheily was a protégé of Princess Ashraf Pahlavi and relation with landlords. More important, that he had financial capitalization and interferences in the fourteenth Majles election. In spite of ending strikes in Khuzestan and gradual solidarity of Ala’s government in the Majles and becoming Tehran situation calm and quiet, British were hesitantly trying to arrange Premiership of Seyyed Zia who was only salvation hope for AIOC and preserving Britain interests and credibility. On 26 April, British ambassador offered Ala a three articles suggestion over solving oil problem. Following this suggestion, concession of AIOC would transfer to a new British company and in its board of directors, there would be Iranian representatives and interests would be divided equally between the Company and Iran’s state. In fact, the above suggestion was to retain AIOC and was against nationalizing oil, because on the same day, oil commission after 5 hours discussion approved a nine articles plan in order to implement oil nationalization. On 27 April Hossien Ala, after 46 days ruling, resigned for his weakness in encountering with oil crisis and was appointed as the court Minister by the Shah.
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