CHAPTER - 1

Theories Of Party And Party System

As the interactions between political parties constitute a party system, the origin, growth and typologies of political parties should be discussed first. Party-based politics was one of the transforming innovations of the 19th century. It is not to say that before this time parties did not exist, but it was not until the 19th century that they emerged as central organizing features in many countries' politics. Before this, parties were loose groupings at best, linked by support for a particular leader or political idea. Often, they were equated with 'factions', unwanted divisions that endangered the national order. Yet, despite these wide-spread and deep-rooted anti-party biases, during the 19th century, parties took on a well-defined shape both inside and outside the legislatures in many countries.

These changes in political parties coincided with a much wider transformation of politics. Across Europe and North America, the 19th century witnessed a broad movement towards mass electoral politics. The growth of the electorate stimulated the seeming inevitability of party-organized electoral politics. Because of this, multiple, competing political parties came to be considered as one of the hallmarks of a democratic regime. As E. E. Schattschneider would put it in the middle of the 20th century, "political parties created democracy, and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties."\(^1\)

Along with this shift came new definitions that highlighted electoral aspirations as the most important feature which distinguished political parties from other groups seeking to influence public policy. In the succinct words of Anthony Downs, a party is "a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election."\(^2\) Schumpeter observes, "A party is not…a group of men who intend to promote public welfare 'upon some principle on which they are all agreed…'. A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power."\(^3\)

Though contesting elections came to be seen as a core activity for parties, in more elaborate functionalist discussions parties performed other functions, including selecting official personnel, formulating public policies, conducting and criticizing government, providing political education and intermediating between individuals and government.\(^4\) All this was a far cry from Edmund Burke's late 18th century definition in which a party was "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some principle in which they are all agreed."\(^5\) Kenneth Janda

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\(^5\) Edmund Burke, *Thoughts on the Present Discontents and Speech*, the Echo Library, Middlesex, 2006, p.82.

Burke gave this lecture in 1770.
defines parties as "Organizations that pursue the goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions."\(^6\) To Janda, elections no longer are the crucial distinguishing criterion. He explains that his formulation is expressly designed to include both the electoral process and the placing in government positions "by a direct administrative action."\(^7\) The organizations which do pursue this goal are not deserved to be called political parties under his definition.

The word 'party' derived from the Latin 'partir' (to divide) was used in all the major European languages in the 18\(^{th}\) century. It was generally used in a negative sense, interchangeably with the term 'faction' to describe divisions around ideas or personal interests which threatened peaceful government. The term 'faction' derives from the Latin verb 'facere' denoting doing or acting and the term 'factio' soon emerges to mean a political group bent on a disruptive and harmful facere on 'dire doings'. The label 'party' was, however, not confined to the realm of secular politics; it also was applied to rival religious factions, whether within the Catholic Church or as a designation for Protestant sects. This broad usage of the party label lingered, particularly in continental Europe. Though both the terms 'party' and 'faction' were derived from Latin, their etymological and semantic meanings are not the same. The wider meaning of the word 'party' is an assembly of people who are committed to an ideology and whose aim is to capture power either singly or with others. In that sense, the party is not a faction which is essentially regarded as an aberration based on petty politics. The word 'party' has assumed its present meaning through a slow process of transition from faction to party. The term 'faction' always carries a derogatory sense, while the term 'party' does not. The 'faction' constitutes a small group within a party which is subversive of the party's authority and ideology.\(^8\)

Political parties came to assume newfound prominence throughout the 19\(^{th}\) century Europe seemingly due to two distinct but interrelated developments: the transfer of political power to legislatures, and the expansion of the electorate. Many authors have emphasized the temporal and causal priority of parliamentarization in this process: first there is the creation of parliamentary groups, then the appearance of electoral committees, and finally the establishment of a permanent connection between these two elements.\(^9\) Sartori described a similar sequence: legislatures became more responsible; parties became more important; party competition led parties to try to gain an electoral edge by enfranchising new, and presumably grateful, voters. Finally, the need to mobilize a larger electorate stimulated the parties to develop more formal organizations.\(^10\)

The sequential models proposed by Duverger and Sartori apply well to Britain, but they seem less useful for understanding countries like Denmark, where large expansions of franchise preceded the emergence for legislative politics. Their models also ignore the extent to which parties in some countries were important in winning more

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\(^7\) *ibid*.


\(^10\) Sartori, n.8, p.23.
responsibility for the legislature – in some instances parliamentarization was as much a product as a cause of party growth. These gaps may be the reason that others have emphasized the casual priority of the expanding franchise in stimulating the emergence of parties in the modern, that is, electoral sense of the word. As Epstein put it most concisely, "the enlargement of the suffrage accounts for the development of modern parties".\textsuperscript{11}

Huntington believes that though democracy has spread its multiple wings widely in various parts of the world but the foundation of democracy has not freed the world from internal rivalry and tension. He has ascribed the source of conflicts among the nation states to the differences in their cultures. Cultures can change the politics and economics of nations, though the degree of impact varies from a particular point of time to another. As the success of the East Asian economy is rooted in East Asian culture, similarly, the difficulties of East Asian societies have stood in the way of achieving stable democratic political systems. Democracy has failed to develop in greater part of the Muslim world due to Islamic culture. Identities of civilizations have shaped the developments of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the post-communist period.\textsuperscript{12}

Huntington has specified the periods of democratization into three waves – the first long wave of democratization ranges from 1828 to 1926; the second short wave from 1943 to 62 and the third wave from 1974 onwards.\textsuperscript{13}

Scholars have developed their own schemes of the typologies of political parties based on specific criterion deriving from the study of West European parties over the last century and-a-half. Some typologies are functionalist, classifying parties on the basis of some specific goal or organizational raison d'etre that they pursue. Sigmund Neumann, for example, distinguishes between three types: 'Parties of individual representation' articulate the demands of specific social groups. Its membership activity is, for all practical purposes, limited to balloting and the party organization, if exists at all, is dormant between election periods. Its main function is the selection of representatives, who once chosen, are possessed of an absolutely 'free mandate' and are in every respect responsible only to their own consciences. 'Parties of integration' have well-developed organizations and provide a wide variety of services to members, encapsulating them as partisan community, in exchange for which they count on financial contributions and volunteered services of members during election campaign. The first example of such a new party was presented by the Continental Socialists. 'Parties of total integration' have more ambitious goals of seizing power and radically transforming societies, demanding the full commitment and unquestioning obedience of the members.\textsuperscript{14} Herbert Kitschelt

differentiates parties that emphasize "the logic of electoral competition" for those (such as his "left libertarian type") that place much greater stress on the "logic of consistency representation." Richard Katz and Peter Mair implicitly advocate a functionalist logic in setting forth the model of the 'cartel party', in which public financing of parties and the expanded roles of the state influence party leaders to restrain competition and seeks primarily to perpetuate themselves in power in order to avail themselves of these new resources.

Other classification schemes are organizational, distinguishing between parties that have their organizational structures and those that have developed large infrastructures and complex networks of collaborative relationships with other secondary organizations. The classic statement of this kind was by Duverger, who advised a two-and-a-half category scheme separating 'cadre parties' (most commonly led by individuals with high socio-economic status) from 'mass' parties (which mobilize broad strengths of the electorate through the development of a large and complex organization), with the Leninist 'devotees' party alluded to but dismissed as "too vague to constitute a separate category." Krischelt points a four-part classification system distinguishing between 'centralist clubs', 'Leninist cadre' parties, 'decentralized clubs', and 'decentralized mass' parties. Angelo Panebianco, in the most elaborate articulation of an organizational typology, contrasts 'mass- bureaucratic' parties with 'electoral professional' parties.

Some scholars of party politics implicitly or explicitly base their models on the notion that parties are the products of (and ought to represent the interests of) various social groups. This sociological orientation characterizes the analysis of parties set forth by Samuel Eldersveld and Robert Michels, as Panebianco points out. Finally, there are some prominent scholars who indiscriminately mix all three of those sets of criteria, such as Otto Kirchheimer, who offers four party model: "Bourgeois parties of individual representation", "Class-mass parties", "Denominational-mass Parties", and "Catch-all People's Parties".

Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther find the existing models of parties deficient to explain the salient features of parties in other parts of the world. It is even true of the United States where too highly decentralized parties fit uneasily with most of the existing

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17 Duverger, n. 9, p.71.
parties. They have come up their own models of the typologies of parties convenient for developing countries.

A comprehensive typology of parties should explicitly consider other differential dimensions of party life such as the electoral strategies, social representation, principal objectives and organizational capacities of parties. Organizationally, some parties are exceptionally thin, while others are large and complex. Some parties are ethnic, religious and socio-economic groups, while others are heterogeneous. Some parties are clearly programmatic or ideological, while others pragmatic or even unprincipled. Some parties are intensely committed to securing some specific social objective, while others merely want to win elections. Diamond and Gunther have identified 15 different "species" of party, each of which, in turn, belongs to the broader "genus" of party types. These are the 'Elite-based parties', 'Mass-based parties', 'Ethnicity-based Parties', 'Electoralist parties' and 'Movement Parties'. Several of these species are, in turn, separated into sub-categories of 'pluralistic' and 'Proto-hegemonic' parties, or into sub-categories based on the extent of commitment to an ideology or programme.22

Elite-based parties are those whose principal organizational structures are minimal and based upon established elites within a specific geographic area. Deference to the authority of these elites is a feature of this type of party. The two species of parties, that fall within this category, share this feature too. Whatever national level party structure exists is based on an alliance among locally based elites.

Clientelistic parties began to emerge when the local notables faced challenges from newly enfranchised segments of the electorate within societies undergoing industrialization and urbanization. Such a party, typically, has a weak organization and is indifferent to programme or ideology. It seeks to coordinate the individual campaign efforts of notables for securing power at the national level.

Mass-based parties made their appearance in Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It is characterized by a large base of dues-paying members who remain actively engaged in party affairs even during periods between elections. This genus of parties aim at widening its base among different segments of population in an effort to disseminate the party's ideology and programme. Affiliated trade unions, religious, and other social organizations serve not only as political allies helping to mobilize supporters at election time, but for the projection of the programmatic objectives of the party from the electoral-parliamentary arena to a variety of spheres of social life.

Two types of distinction further divide the genus into six different species of party. The first involves the thrust of the party's ideology or unifying belief system. This ideological thrust have involved varying types of commitment to socialism, nationalism and religion. The second dimension involves the degree to which each of these is tolerant and pluralistic on the one hand, or is committed to securing a hegemonic position within the political system and imposing its radical programmatic commitments on society.

Pluralist parties assume to be functioning within the democratic system and, therefore, accept its institutions and rules of the game. Proto-hegemonic parties want to replace the existing pluralist society and democratic system with one better suited for the achievement of their radical transformative objectives. Unless they can do that, they existing institutions and rules and their behaviour is, at best, 'semi- loyal' in its willingness to link up with anti-system parties. Pluralist parties seek to win elections as the principal avenue toward achieving their programmatic objectives and their vote mobilization strategies rely heavily on the development and activation of a mass-membership base. Consequently, recruitment of militants to the party is open, although some resocialization of new party members is required. Proto-hegemonic parties, by contrast, place greater emphasis on discipline, constant active commitment and loyalty on the part of the party members for the conduct of political conflict in both electoral and extra-parliamentary arenas.

Ethnicity-based parties lack the extensive and elaborate organization of mass-based parties. Unlike the most mass-based parties, they do not advance a programme for all of society. Their goals and strategies are more narrow: to promote the interests of a particular ethnic group or coalition of groups. And like nationalist parties, their programmatic objectives do not typically include secession or even a high level decision making and administrative autonomy for the existing state. Indeed, they are content to use the existing state structure to channel benefits toward their specifically defined electoral clientele.

There are three party types in the broader genus of 'electoralist parties'. Although there are differences between those three party types (as well as between the 'catch-all', 'electoral professionals' and 'modern cadre' parties of Otto Kirchheimer, Angelo Panebianco, and Ruud Koole respectively), they are all organizationally thin, maintaining a relatively skeletal existence. The one exception to this thinness comes at election time, when they spring into action to perform their primary function of campaign for which they utilize 'modern' techniques and rely heavily on professionals who can skillfully carry them out.

Finally, there is a type of partisan organization, that straddles the conceptual space between 'party' and 'movement'. The prominent examples of the German Green and the Austrian Freedom Movement make it clear that those types of organizations must be included in this comprehensive typology since they regularly field candidates, have been successful in electing members of parliament, and in Germany in 1991, were able to form part of coalition government at the national level and in several Lander (state). These movement parties are of two types: Left-libertarian parties and Post-industrial extreme right parties.

After discussing the different models of party typologies, we can now turn our attention to the basic theories of the party system. The concept of a party system, as differentiated from the notion of a party, has been utilized as an analytic device to explore both the conditions under which they exist and their behaviour while inhabiting the
political environment. The idea of a party system assumes that parties are linked horizontally and vertically to other social groups by structure, function, or both. Viewing parties in this manner offers wide latitude to explore degrees of interdependence and interrelatedness as well as patterns of interaction between parties, interest groups, elites in other power structures and the various political institutions of the governmental apparatus. A party system is itself a sub-system of the larger political system which, in turn, is related to the socio-economic, cultural and, particularly, the legal-constitutional life of a state.

A party system consists of regular and recurring interactions among its constituent parts. Although the term 'party system' came into use before he wrote, one of the first systematic uses of the term came to be found in Duverger's *Political Parties*. He argues that "with the exception of single-party states, several parties co-exist in each country: the forms and modes of their coexistence define the 'party system' of particular country being considered."\(^{23}\) In addition to characteristics of parties, these include "new elements that do not exist for each party community considered in isolation: numbers, respective sizes, alliances, geographical localization, political distribution and so on. A party system is defined by a particular relationship amongst all these characteristics."\(^{24}\)

Party systems, in Eckstein's terms, can be defined as 'competitive interaction patterns among parties.'\(^{25}\) Sartor argues:

Parties make for a 'system' only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition. That is, the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in a mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties.\(^{26}\)

Party systems have a number of distinct features arising from electoral competition and parties' relations to each other. These include the number of parties contesting elections and winning legislative seats, their relative size and strength, the number of dimensions on which they compete, the distance on which separates them on key issues and their willingness to work with each other in government formation and the process of governing. Party systems can vary on any or all of these. Voters, politicians and political analysts of think of parties divided along a left-right spectrum, but it is not unusual for party systems, at least in their origin, to reflect multiple dimensions of conflict. Party systems, for example, often reflect not only economic or distributional issues, but also language, religion and religiosity, class and many other cleavages.\(^{27}\)

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\(^{23}\) Duverger, n. 9, p.203.

\(^{24}\) *ibid.*

Although the definition of party system is not separate from the characteristics of the parties themselves, Duverger's reference to 'forms and modes of their coexistence' and 'characteristics that do not exist for each party community considered in isolation' indicates the importance of interaction.


\(^{26}\) Sartori, n. 8, p.44.

systems can be more or less pluralized on all or any of these dimensions. Other features on which party systems may differ include the degree to which this competition for government is open to all or closed – restricted only to certain parties\textsuperscript{28} and the degree to which the party system itself is institutionalized or entrenched.\textsuperscript{29}.

The traditional method of categorizing party systems is to describe them according to the number of parties they contain. For example, the erstwhile Soviet Union had and the People's Republic of China, has one-party system. Britain and the United States have two-party system, and France and Italy have multi-party system. Although no other method has received general approval, this so-called typology of counting parties violates the basic concept of competitive interaction patterns. The empiricists are critical of the theoretical dilemmas caused by the 'number approach' to party systems. They maintain that cannot be intra-party competition in a one-party state; that is, in fact, the United States and many other two-party polities have had viable third-party movements; and that the category of multiarty states is therefore the category of multiparty states is only acceptable single-party-system pattern.

Frank J. Sorauf suggests that such comparisons offer only one-dimensional measurement and thus overlook ideological rivalries between major and minor parties that do not actually compete electorally; that the range of competition extends to political groups other than parties; that party differences in organizations are ignored; and, finally, that the expectations of systems analysis far exceed the product of competitive party-electoral analysis.\textsuperscript{30}

Perhaps the dimensions of the problem can best be illustrated by a brief presentation of other classificatory systems and methods of analysis utilized by several distinguished scholars. Gabriel Almond, applying the concept of the aggregative function described above as a criterion, has established four categories of party systems: (1) "authoritarian party systems" (with a subcategory called "totalitarian") (2) "dominant nonauthoritarian party systems", (3) "competitive two-party systems" and (4) "competitive multiparty systems".\textsuperscript{31}

Totalitarian parties aggregate interests by deep penetration into the social structure of the nation and therefore the transmission and aggregation of demands must come through the single party structure. Authoritarian party systems are more lenient and permit demands to be made openly, but the absence free elections causes policy to be made through authoritative structures such as the party, army and bureaucracy. Dominant nonauthoritarian party systems emerge when interest groups join in a programme of

national independence. A loyal opposition is lacking, party cohesion becomes difficult to maintain, and interests are not effectively aggregated, in part because decisions must be postponed. Competitive two-party systems are exemplified by circumstances represented in the United Kingdom and the United States. Multi-party systems are subdivided into "working" and "immobilist" classes. The former, found in the Scandinavian countries, are 'broadly aggregative' and homogeneous, permitting a stable majority and opposition conditions to run the government. The latter, represented by France and Italy, exist in a 'fragmented, isolative political culture' wherein political coalitions are fragile.

Maurice Duverger has offered another type of categorization of party systems. He uses party strength as a criterion.\textsuperscript{32} Strength is measured in terms of both voters in the electorate and party seats in the legislature. Duverger emphasizes the latter in his presentation. His categories of strength are four in number: (1) parties with a majority bent on commanding an absolute majority in a parliament, which he finds commonly in two-party systems and only exceptionally in multiparty systems; (2) major parties without hope of ever obtaining an absolute majority and forced to accommodate to the necessity of operating as part of a coalition of parties; (3) medium parties incapable of forming a minority government and confined to either following the lead of a major party or keeping the opposition divided; and (4) minority parties unable to play a political role either with government parties or with parties in opposition.

Roy C. Macridis prefers not to distinguish between party and party system when devising his typology or scheme of classification. He employs three criteria.\textsuperscript{33} The first is sources of party support, and here he distinguishes between "comprehensive parties", which attempt to solicit votes from the entire electorate, and "sectarian parties", which seek adherents from a particular class, region, or ideology. The second criterion relates to internal organization: a "closed party" restricts membership and an "open party" permits virtually anyone to join. The third criterion specifies modes of action as "specialized" or "diffused". The former follows conventional procedures for controlling the government for a limited purpose and for a limited time. The latter is pragmatic in utilizing practically any means to come to power and it stresses permanent and total control.

The most influential formulation comes from Giovanni Sartori's seminal \textit{Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis}. Sartori does not find adequacy in the traditional "counting approach" to the number of parties as a criterion for the classification of party systems. According to this approach, party systems are classified into "one-party", "two-party" and "multi-party' systems on the basis of number of parties existing in the system. Instead, Sartori uses two-dimensions for this purpose: (1) the number of relevant parties and (2) the degree of ideological polarization.

The significance of a party does not only depend on the relative distribution of power, but on the position value; that is on its positioning along the left-right dimension. The strength of a party means its electoral strength reflected in the number of seats

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\bibitem{32} Duverger, n. 9, pp.281-299.
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gained by it in the lower chamber provided that the other chamber does not have different majorities. The existence of a relevant party, whether it is big or small, affects the tactics of party competition and the direction of party competition from centripetal to centrifugal, either leftward, rightward or in both directions – of governing oriented parties. The parties that have neither "coalition potential" nor "blackmail potential" can be discounted. Conversely, the parties having either a governmental relevance in the coalition forming arena, or a competitive relevance in the oppositional arena must be counted.

Sartori suggests seven types of classification of party system: (1) "one-party" system; (2) "hegemonic party" system; (3) "predominant party" system; (4) "two-party" system; (5) "limited pluralism" or "moderate pluralism"; (6) "extreme pluralism" and (7) "atomised party" system.

One-party system is that system where only one party exists and power is monopolized by one party only. It does not permit the existence of any other party. Sartori is not ready to accept this category as a system because it lacks the very basis of a party system – competitive interactions among parties. It is something of a misnomer to refer to the one-party system as a system. A hegemonic party system permits the existence of other parties only as 'satellite' or, at any rate, as subordinate parties; that the hegemony of the party in power cannot be challenged by other parties. In case of a predominant party system, power configuration is found in which one party commands absolute majority alone for a long time without being subjected to alternation. A predominant-party system results from excessive fragmentation of all other parties. In a two-party system, power configuration is simple. One party controls the government and the other plays the role of the Opposition. Ideological polarization divides the party systems into (ideologically) moderate or limited pluralism and (ideologically) extreme pluralism. Party systems characterized by low fragmentation (up to five parties) and non-polarization can be attributed to (ideologically) moderate pluralism. If parties are highly fragmented (above five parties) and polarized, the party system, that they produce, belong to (ideologically) extreme pluralism. The atomised party systems can be defined in the same sense as it is used in economics to mean automistic competition, that is as the situation where no one firm has any noticeable effect on any other firm.33

Classifying party systems on the basis of number of parties face problems in the regimes where democracy is not consolidated. The problem arises because it overlooks substantial differences in the degree of institutionalization of the party system and how democratic polities function. To treat multi-party systems as an undifferentiated category is a mistake. For example, both Brazil and Sweden have multi-party system, but the level of institutionalization in the party systems of these two countries varies. Sweden has more institutionalized party system than its Brazilian variant. This is not to ignore the importance of the number of parties and ideological distance in classifying, analyzing and comparing the party systems. But the deficiency of this approach is that they fail to

33 Sartori, n. 8, pp.106-116.
analyze considerably the party systems beyond the advanced industrial democracies. Democracies with multiparty systems differ in the degree of institutionalization of their party systems. Institutionalized party systems structure the political process to a high degree. In fluid systems, though parties are important, they do not have the same structural effect. In institutionalized party systems, the fundamental contours and rules of party competition are supposed to continue in the foreseeable future. In this system, there is stability in the existence of main parties and their pattern of behaviour. Institutionalization does not completely produce change, but limits.

There are four dimensions of party system institutionalization. First, more-institutionalized party systems enjoy considerable stability; patterns of party competition manifest regularity. A system in which major parties regularly appear and then disappear or become minor parties is not well institutionalized.

Second, in more-institutionalized systems, parties make deep roots in society to establish stable linkages between parties and citizens; otherwise parties do not structure political preferences over time and there is limited regularity in the voting pattern of citizens. Strong party roots in society help provide the regularity in electoral competition that institutionalization implies. In fluid or less-institutionalized party systems, most citizens cannot understand what the major parties represent and very few of them identify themselves with parties. Similarly, linkages between organized interests and parties are generally more developed than in fluid systems.

As a consequence of these linkages between parties and their constituencies, parties within more institutionalized systems tend to be consistent in their relative ideological positions. A party, that is markedly left to the another party, does not suddenly change its ideological position to gain short-term electoral advantage; parties are constrained by their need to maintain a faithful following. If major parties change their electoral position, it implies weak ties between parties and society and a lack of regularity in the process of how parties compete and how they relate to the social sectors.

Third, in a more institutionalized party system, political actors accord legitimacy to parties. They see them as a necessary part of democratic politics even if they are critical of specific parties and express skepticism about parties in general. Where citizens believe that parties are a core institution of democratic politics, there is a greater likelihood of system stability.

Finally, in a more institutionalized party system, party organization is important. Parties are not subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders; they are an independent status and value of their own. Institutionalization is limited as long as a party is the personal instrument of a leader or a small coterie. The party becomes autonomous vis-à-vis individuals initially may have created the party for instrumental purposes. It is sign of greater system institutionalization if party structures are firmly established, are

35 Kitschelt, n. 15, pp.1-8, 41-74.
technically comprehensive, are well organized and have resources of their own. In more institutionalized systems, there is a routinization of intra-party procedures, including procedures for selecting and changing the party leadership.\textsuperscript{36}

The four dimensions of institutionalization need not go together but they almost always do. Consequently, a party system could be fairly institutionalized along one dimension but weakly institutionalized along another. However, empirically this is the exception.

Party systems characterized by a lower degree of institutionalization can be termed fluid. This implies less regularity in patterns and rules of party competition, weaker party roots in society, less legitimacy accorded to parties and elections, and weaker party organizations, often dominated by personalistic leaders.

Another debate about party systems and democratization, that focuses on the number of parties in the system, compares the stability of two-party competition with a multi-party system. A multi-party system is thought to be less stable than a two-party system or a dominant party system. Huntington, for example, predicts that in the long-term two-party or dominant party systems are more likely to be better fitted to the Third World countries to produce political stability. They provide a form of party competition which is more effective in assimilating new groups into the political system. Single parties find it difficult to accommodate the new social and economic interests created by political mobilization without coercion and, therefore, induce instability. In the multi-party system, incorporation of new social forces is possible only by increasing the number of parties. "The two-party system … most effectively institutionalizes and moderates the polarisation which gives rise to the development of party politics in the first place", he stated.\textsuperscript{37}

Another view shows that a preference for a two-party system reflects Eurocentric and Anglo-American predispositions, a confusion of governmental with regime instability, and an assumption that party politics is dominated by a single Left-Right dimension. However, this is far from reality for in the Third World countries, other dimensions of conflict, such as ethnicity and religion, are superimposed on the political process.\textsuperscript{38} A multiplicity of parties provides for the representation of all interests, encourages lawful political participation and reduces incentives to provoke political violence. This controversy remains unsettled, though one comparative study of the Third World democratization appears to be 'weak and fragmentary', for the hypothesis that democratic consolidation was more likely under a multi-party than a two-party system. This is significant in view of the propensity for countries emerging from authoritarianism to spawn a multiplicity of political parties. For example, the small state of East Timor, after its emancipation from Indonesian occupation in 1999 and its emergence as a

\textsuperscript{36} Janda, n. 6, pp.19-28, 98-107.
sovereign state on May 20, 2002, has produced not less than 16 parties to contest the first
election to the 88-seat assembly.

The strength of party organization in the Third World has frequently been
dependent upon the distribution of patronage and the allocation of state resources among
them. Patron-client relationships produce a distinctive image for Third World parties. A
successful party has to contain and contend with factors that encourage factionalism and
weaken party unity, such as 'caste and community or region' in India. Another such
factor is the electoral system, as the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and the
United States demonstrate. Morgenstern addresses the two aspects of a party, faction or
coalition: the identifiability of groups as collective actors and the ability of the voters to
identify those actors on the ballot. Voters can target parties and provincial or state
deleagues in Argentina and Belgium, coalitions and parties in Chile and parties and
factions in Uruguay. The significance of clientelism can be reduced if parties are formed
along ideological lines where mobilization of political support is based on horizontal
rather than vertical linkages, such as class rather than kinship. The significance of
clientelism in politics can be reduced by the bureaucratic allocation of public services on
the basis of legal entitlements. The development of a universalistic political culture and
institutions of civil society through which citizens pursue their individual rights and
entitlements also provide alternatives to clientelism.

There is a consensus among scholars that the presence of a new demand or a
neglected issue is not on its own a sufficient reason for the emergence of new actors on
the electoral scene. Despite the early formation of an environmental consciousness in the
Netherlands, a new political party, the "Green Party of Netherlands" (GPN), failed to
emerge for some time. In the words of Ruding, the "problem push" does not make a
sufficient background and there has to be an "opportunity pull" as well motivating the
emergence of a new party. Hauss and Rayside claim that political and institutional
factors are the two crucial elements which influence the "opportunity pull". The way in
which these factors influence the emergence of new political parties are also important.
Although they argue that a new party does not need a strong organizational foundation to
be created, the institutional and political facilitators mediate between the cleavage

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43 Wolfgang Ruding, "Explaining Green Party Development: Reflections on a Theoretical Framework",
paper presented to the workshop on Government and Politics, No. 71, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow,
structure and the creation of a new party. All these new parties must overcome or take advantage of these political and institutional “facilitators”.  

The new political party can be a social movement, a citizen initiative, a political entrepreneur or even a group of members of an existing political party. It is characterized and defined by the fact that it brings a new demand or a neglected issue to the forefront, particularly at the time of its emergence, which it wants to be addressed by the polity. It expresses these demands and hopes that they will be integrated by an existing party.

An established party is encumbered with many demands directed toward it that requires its decision to accept or to reject it which proves to be quite difficult. Peter Mair addresses the question of whether certain parties are most 'adaptable' than others, and whether certain issues or conflicts are more capable of being adapted than others. Further, insofar as the notion of adaptation suggests that the response of parties can help determine whether issues or conflicts will be kept limited within an existing area rather than allowing to affect inter-area competition, it is then a notion that takes us back to the centrality of party per se, as well as to the identification of further parameters.

The question of adaptability has become increasingly important with respect to recent challenges to the established party systems. Several authors argue that parties sometimes fail to integrate demands or issues that are important among the public. Mair frames the question of party failure within a larger context, linking it to the relationship that parties entertain with other non-electoral organizations.

Parties should be seen not as being in complete control of the political agenda, but rather as sharing that control with other non-electoral organizations. The key question then becomes the degree of linkage that exists between the parties and various non-electoral alternatives, and therefore the degree to which the parties indirectly augment their own specific control …. This sharing of roles presents no patterns for the parties as long as these latter organizations are linked to them in some way. A weakening of these links, however, and/or emergence of new non-party associated organizations, and/or a weakening of agenda-setting role of these associated non-electoral organizations that do exist, could imply a challenge to the hold of party systems on the mass public.

So, established political parties become confused about taking a decision on accepting or rejecting new demands. In particular, they rarely know of the predicament that they have to face should they fail to incorporate a particular demand into their

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46 *ibid*, p.420.
political agenda. It is not clear to them how enormous electoral losses would be, should a new party be formed.

Gunnar Sjoblom, while discussing an inventory of reasons as to why accountability of parties might decline, formulates three propositions:

- The larger the number of issues, the more unpredictable is the agenda-setting.
- The larger the number of actors who influence the agenda-setting, the more unpredictable will be the result.
- The greater the unpredictability of the agenda-setting, the greater will be the strategic uncertainty of the parties.\(^{47}\)

Sjoblom argues that the increase in the number of issues leads to the growing importance of the public sector. But his hypotheses are much more widely applicable to democratic polities. Political parties always face numerous issues. But they have no clear perception about which of the different issues are important to the electorate. They find themselves always in an uncertain position.

Simon Hug formulates his model for the emergence of a new party. His model gives three different sets of outcome.\(^{48}\) In equilibrium, no new parties will ever appear if the established party is fully aware of the strength of a challenger, or if there is a very high possibility of a strong challenger. An immediate consequence of a high probability of strong challengers is that the established party accepts all high demands. The ultimate result is that no new parties appear.

A second set of outcomes consists of the emergence of only strong new parties. Uncertainty of the established party, the lower probability of facing a strong challenger and lack of credibility of the weak challenger create the necessary conditions for this outcome. Uncertainty of the established party and lower likelihood of a strong challenger lead the established party to reject high demands with a certain probability. Rejection of the high demand of a strong challenger by the established party results in the emergence of a strong new party. Weak challengers, if they lack credibility, will refrain from floating a new party. This leads the established party to reject all their low demands.

A final set of outcomes consists of the emergence of both weak and strong new parties. This can only occur if the established party is uncertain, strong challengers are not too likely and weak challengers can credibly threaten to form a new party. The

\(^{47}\) Gunnar Sjoblom, "Political Change and Political Accountability: A Propositional Inventory of Causes and Effects", Daalder and Mair (eds), n. 45, p.389.

uncertainty of the established party and lower possibility of facing a strong challenger leads the established party to reject high demands with a certain probability. The weak challenger's credibility, however, motivates it to accept all low demands. The rejection of some strong demands leads to the formation of both weak and strong new parties.

Discussion on party and party systems remains incomplete without giving a brief account of the theories and models on party competition developed by Political Scientists in the decades following the Second World War. The responsible party government model directs scholars' attention to the link between political parties and the electorate. In particular, it suggests that to the extent that the competing parties present divergent policies and citizens use these policies as the basis for their voting decisions, parties provide effective vehicles for representing the electorates' political belief.

Spatial modelers and behavioral researchers have quite different perspectives on how voters decide. Spatial modelers typically assume that voters are entirely (or at least chiefly) motivated by the policies that the competing parties or candidates present in the current campaign, and, in their empirical applications, policy factors are the chief (if not the only) influences that are incorporated into their models. In case of spatial modeling, the most basic result is the median voter theorem – that in the election involving two parties competing over a single policy dimension the parties will converge to the position of the median voter. This result implies that parties will present stable policies in that the parties reach an equilibrium – that is, a policy configuration such that neither party has incentives to change its policies. However, this two-party equilibrium entails policy similarity in that the parties present identical policies and thus fail to offer the electorate divergent positions that provide voters with meaningful choices. Moreover, while results are somewhat different in two-party competition over multiple policy dimensions, recent theoretical work suggests that in these situations vote-seeking parties can again be expected to converge toward extremely similar, centrist positions. Although early spatial modeling results applied almost exclusively to two party elections, the theoretical prediction that vote-seeking parties will present similar positions extends to three party competition. Furthermore, such multiparty elections also encourage a high degree of policy instability in the sense that the parties have electoral incentives to continually leapfrog their competitors.

Behavioral researchers, by contrast, suggest that, although policy matters at least to some voters, their choices are affected by a variety of considerations besides the parties' current policies. These include voters' party identification, comparative evaluations of the party leaders' competence and integrity, socio-demographic characteristics, their perceptions of economic conditions and retrospective evaluations of the incumbent government, group loyalties based upon class, religion, geography, ethnicity etc. Spatial modelers and behavioral researchers have put into question the responsible party government model. Their findings suggest that political representation

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49 Downs, n. 2, pp.122-132.
through responsible party government is impossible because the prerequisites for responsible government are not met in most western democracies.50

Furthermore, while spatial modelers typically posit that voters prefer parties whose positions are close to their own positions along salient policy dimensions – some research, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that this behaviour is modified by voters' realization that parties and candidates will not be able to perfectly implement the full extent of policies that they advocate.

James F. Adams, Samuel Merrill 111 and Bernard Grofman have integrated spatial and behavioral perspectives – in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools – into a unified theory of voter choice to explain the theoretical puzzle of party divergence and to identify the centrifugal as well as the centripetal forces that most strongly affect the extent of that divergence.51

Dealignment and realignment of voters with political parties have an important effect on the party system. V. O. Key, Jr. is widely credited with the organization of party realignment theory in a pair of articles. In his seminal work, Key identifies a category of elections as 'critical election' which is "a type of election in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties."52 These realigning elections, said Key, are characterized by intense voter involvement and readjustments in power relationships. A distinguishing feature of realignment is, of course, one identified by Key at the outset – durability. On this there is not much disagreement; without the notion of durability, the concept would disappear altogether.

Every election sees some change in the distribution of vote between the parties. A party's record in office, or its stand on particular issues, will attract or repel at least some voters, in every contest. But a voter who crosses the line to vote against the party he normally supports is not realigning unless he makes a lasting shift of party loyalty and attachment. If the shift is temporary, he is merely deviating. Sometimes the number of deviants is so great that the whole election can be classed as a deviation from the political norm.53

It is when the political norm itself changes that realignment occurs. The concept then applies not to voting behaviour as such, but to what underlines voting behaviour to the basic party attachments of the voting citizens. "Most members of the electorate feel some degree of psychological attachment to one of the major parties", Campbell wrote, "This partisan identification is remarkably resistant to passing political events and typically remains constant through the life of the individual." The voter's behaviour at a particular election "derived from the interaction of his political predispositions and the short-term forces generated by the current political situation." It is the pattern of those predispositions, of party identification within the electorate, that defines the alignment of the party system. In any alignment, of course, a substantial number of voters remain independent, without psychological attachment to any party. In the analysis of changes in the structure of the party system, these voters have to be disregarded as being outside the system. The matter of identification is complicated also by the possibility, in a federal party system, that some voters may identify with one party at the state level and another at the national level.

Much of the writing on the subject of realignment introduces explicitly or implicitly, a second criterion – one of magnitude. Thus, a treatise entitled Partisan Realignment published in 1980, while giving no formal definition, appears to confine the term to what are characterized as "major" or "historical" realignments. The "lasting electoral change" that occurs between realignments is variously referred to as "adjustments" or "realigning change of small or moderate magnitude". Yet, since they use the phrase "major realignment", they suggest that realignment can be of a minor scale as well. Another 1980 study, which draws on earlier studies of the subject, defines realignment as "a durable and significant distribution of party support." Trilling and Campbell agree that a realignment can occur "without the emergence of a new majority party … as in the case where a noncompetitive minority party becomes a competitive minority party." Petrocik holds that a realignment may not alter the relative strength of the parties; he distinguishes such realignments with the adjective "noncritical".

A party system that divides people into two contending political groups on the basis of their attitudes and beliefs about one set of public issues is divided by a new issue, or cluster of related issues. The new issue cleaves the electorate on a different line and

hence divide each of the parties internally. The new issue sometimes becomes such a serious political concern to some sections of voters that if it encounters resistance from the parties with which they are affiliated, it overrides all considerations that form the basis of their attachment to those parties. These voters raise a passionate voice against any attempt dedicated to maintaining the status quo. Thus, within each party, two hostile blocs take form, located on the opposite sides of the line of the cleavage created by the new issue and at the extreme of intensity of feeling on each side – at the poles. In modern parlance, they are single-issue groups, wholly dedicated to their cause. In between are the voters who have not been polarized, who may be called centrists; some may feel strongly about the new issue but all have a common desire to see that the party that has served well as the instrument for united action in dealing with the old issues, not be torn apart by controversy over the new one. If the centrists are able to resolve the new issue before the polar groups gain strength, both major parties will survive and the realignment will be minor. The scale of the realignment in that event will depend on the size of the polar forces at the time the issue is resolved.\textsuperscript{59}

David Mayhew in a recent critique of the realignment 'genre' goes beyond dealignment theorists in his argument that realignment is not now, and never was, a useful tool in electoral analysis. He stands in contrast to the early dealignment theorists, who acknowledged the periodicity of electoral and party change in American politics and to dealignment theorists such as Ladd and Silbey, who argue that party decay renders the concept of realignment useless. Mayhew rejects both the concept of realignment and observations of the periodicity of electoral change.\textsuperscript{60}

As coalitions are manifestations of party systems, the theories of coalition politics will be the topic of the next chapter.