CHAPTER III
DISPOSITIONAL BEHAVIOURISM REVIEWED

Gilbert Ryle's book *The Concept of Mind* convinced many thinkers, that he has conclusively exposed the confusion of Cartesian dualism employing logical analysis based on a form of behaviorism.

According to Ryle, to consider the mind as an entity, like the body is to commit a category mistake. The famous example of the visitor who wants to see the University and after being shown, the Registrar's Office, the senate house and the library, still asks "where is the University?" confuses the category of the University with the category of the seen units. Similarly, Ryle says, a category mistake of the same type has been committed, in confusing the category of mind with that of the body. Both mind and body exist, but not in the same fashion, as dualists thought or are thinking. Dualists think of a human being as a composite of both mind and body. Further, it is maintained that the mind makes the body work as a 'ghost' in the machine. Ryle thought of exposing the mythical mind, by introducing the key term disposition in his explanation of mind and mental concepts. 'Disposition' for Ryle are tendencies to behave.

He takes the example of the term 'intelligence'. As a psychological concept, it is considered as a thoughtful activity, that is, before performing an intelligent act, the person thinks and that his 'prior' thinking prompts his act. Ryle explains this as a single operation and not involving various processes as it will lead to infinite regress. For to have the 'prior thinking'
leading to the intelligent behaviour, another 'intelligent thinking' is required and so on and so forth. Thus there is nothing occult or ghostly about 'intelligence' as a mental concept.

According to Ryle, any mental predicate is an actualisation of some disposition. Some dispositions are actualised only in a particular way, whereas certain other dispositions like one's being intelligent are actualised in the various behavioural forms or patterns if and when placed in a particular situation. Dispositions are tendencies and a tendency is not the same as a 'capacity'. Ryle distinguishes between a tendency and a 'capacity', but holds that both are dispositions. Jane Roland brings out Ryle's distinction between a tendency and a 'capacity' as: "a tendency implies not only that something could be the case, but that it would be the case regularly when the appropriate conditions are realised; a capacity implies the ability to do something under specified conditions but does not imply frequency or regularity".

Connected with this distinction (between a tendency and a capacity) is Ryle's further distinction between the phrases, 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. "Knowing how to do a particular thing", Ryle says, "is an ability or proneness to do certain acts or things". 'Knowing how' refers to the skill in any performance whereas 'knowing that' refers to the knowledge of factual propositions. Mind is the functioning of the body, or the appropriate behavioural responses given as the actualisation of a disposition.

The application of a mental concept to oneself and to the
others are logically equal. For example, when one says 'I am afraid', it would be true if and only if the statement another person would make about the first person by saying 'he is afraid' would be true. If there were no criteria for the truth or falsity of this third person statement, truth and falsity would have no application to it. The first and third person statement are logically equal in truth value. Therefore, mental operations are publicly observable (in one's overt behaviour). Hence, mind is not something very 'private'. The view that a person has a 'privileged access' to his mind being private leads to solipsism, according to Ryle.

Ryle deals with other mental concepts in the same fashion that he treated 'intelligence'. He rejects 'freedom' and 'free-will' as understood by traditional moralists --- as a mysterious concept. If we accept the concept of 'free-will' he points out that it leads to ridiculous consequences. If the volitions are understood as voluntary, then it leads to infinite regress, and if they are treated as involuntary, then the resulting action does not become voluntary.

Ryle rejects 'consciousness' and 'introspection' as a method to know one's 'self' or one's mental operations. As Albert Hofstadter points out: "Indefatigable is the word for Professor Ryle as he tackles the job of showing in each domain --- intelligence, intellect, emotion, volition, sense, imagination --- how the meaningful reference of mind words is exhausted in the task of describing the ways in which people behave, and how the postulation of ghostly, occult events as causal counter parts to
their conduct is a futile effect of logical ineptitude.

Ryle, then, comes with a host of arguments to deny consciousness through which we know our mental life. Ryle in his arguments says that if we know facts about mental life through consciousness then people would have reported in their expression, that it is through consciousness. And in another argument, Ryle says, if we know our mental life through consciousness, then nothing would have remained hidden to each one, in each one's case.

Still another objection of Ryle to 'consciousness' is that it is treated as mental. If it is maintained that mental happenings are known to us through consciousness, and consciousness being mental should be known through another consciousness it leads to infinite regress, maintains Ryle.

Further, Ryle argues against 'introspection' as a mental process through which we observe internal happenings. His claim is that 'introspection' cannot reveal to us the secrets of 'mind'. As per the 'official theory' of introspection there should be two things: the object that is introspected and the process of, or act of introspection. But we know that at any given moment we can attend to only one thing. This shows that we cannot 'know' simultaneously the object of introspection and the act of introspection. Again Ryle points out that the traditional theory of introspection cannot escape the criticism of infinite regress. If we know mental processes through introspection, then how is the process that we are introspecting known? In other words, if it is considered as a mental process, then it still requires another introspection to know the earlier introspection
as a mental process and so on and so forth.

Further, Ryle questions and doubts the infallibility of introspection when he points out that if it were true that introspection is infallible, then there would not have been any disputes in intellectual fields like philosophy with unending arguments. Ryle in turn brings in the term 'retrospection' in place of introspection, showing that there can be no difference between the private acts and the public acts. Just as one can catch oneself scratching which is an observable act in the public, similarly one can catch oneself day-dreaming which is considered to be a private act. So private acts are not 'ghostly' acts.

Applying the same thing to the knowledge about oneself and the knowledge about others, Ryle consistently maintains that, the things that we know and the way we know about ourselves are similar to the ways and things we know about others. Once we know a person with particular character and traits, we frame law-like propositions about the traits or dispositions which are established after observing certain behaviour. And this is possible with oneself as well as with others. Thus Ryle concludes that knowledge about oneself is not private and there is nothing occult or mystical about it. Nothing therefore, obstruct us from knowing others on the same line as we know ourselves.

The concept of 'I' as referring to soul distinct from body, as we find it in Indian thought, is another important mind related concept. Ryle attacks this 'ghost in the machine', which is supposed to be immortal. Ryle gets rid of this ghost by making
'I' only an index word, that stands for the particular person who utters it. Ryle argues: "'I' is not an extra name for an extra being; it indicates, when I say or write it, the same individual who can also be addressed by the proper name 'Gilbert Ryle'. 'I' is not an alias for 'Gilbert Ryle'; it indicates the Person whom 'Gilbert Ryle' names when Gilbert Ryle used 'I'."

With reference to the uses of the words 'I' and 'myself' Ryle discusses 'higher order acts' and 'lower order acts'. Just as on stealing a watch a robber is sent to the police, in which the act of sending him to the police is a higher order act against the former act of stealing, similarly when one finds oneself guilty and expresses the statement 'I found myself guilty', the words 'I' and 'myself' do not refer either to the body or to the two different entities. It refers to the person who makes the statement in two different contexts. He learns to direct higher order acts against the lower order acts of the people and then applies it to himself when the situation arises. Thus for Ryle, 'I' does not refer to any ghostly entity in the body.

Ryle exposes yet another intimately mind-related concept that of intellectual activities, like judging, inferring, to reach to conclusions on the basis of premises etc. They are said to be taking place in the secret chamber of mind. Ryle agrees that they are intellectual activities but says that there is no reason why they should be connected with imagery mind. Along with the above activities many day-to-day activities can be classed as intellectual ones as playing games or introducing bills in the Parliament. There is no fixed criteria laid down for defining an
intellectual operation. Thinking is thought to be mysterious, but it is the using of the language and words either silently or loudly as per one's convenience. To expose the claim that mind enjoys a separate status, Ryle analyses the important concept of thinking, essentially related to mind. He brings out a distinction between the two senses in which thought and thinking is understood. In one sense thought is the thinking activity whereas in the second sense thought refers to the product of the thinking activity. And a confusion between this two senses leads to the symposition of 'mind' as a ghostly entity in the body. Ryle takes 'induction', 'deduction' and 'judging' as the products of thinking activity and says that they are not to be confused with the activity itself. The theoretical findings are understood as one's thinking power showing up outwardly. Thus intellectual process is conceived to be a double process, which Ryle thinks is a vague conception. In writing or saying something, nowhere there are two operations taking place, one on a ghostly plane and other its outer manifestation.

Ryle sets to explain the process of inferring in detail. He criticises the traditional Cartesian dualism as a theory of mind, as 'seeing' the implications. Mastery in the field of arguing is achieved only through the practice and truth cannot be revealed in a flash of light. In case of a theory, it is said that the implications seen there help to arrive at certain conclusions. Ryle argues while theorising is an operation, seeing the implications is an achievement and these two cannot be similar. Theorising is just like calculating as it happens in mathematics.
and then seeing connections. This, Ryle holds, disproves, the traditionalists' account of mind as 'seeing' the implications on a ghostly stage. Neither mind is a storehouse for abstract ideas nor it is to be identified with 'conscience' or one's 'inner voice' dictating a person in his actions. The instructions of the parents as far as do's and don'ts are concerned, are rehearsed by the child and the rehearsed voice is taken as the voice of conscience. Ryle hopes for a new epistemology, which will explain the fundamental concepts without referring to the events taking place in the ghostly mental world.

But if 'mind' and one's experiences at that level is denied then psychology is left with the 'behaviour' as its subject matter, which is the subject-matter of several other subjects. But Ryle points out that psychology has got its distinctive business of studying systematically and scientifically the unknown causes of known action and behaviour. Its approach being scientific help psychology to survive without presupposing the ghostly mental activity.

Ryle through his linguistic analysis has attempted to reduce mind and every mind-related concept to behaviour and disposition. He shares with the logical positivists the view that all metaphysical muddles and problems are created because of the confusions created by language and therefore, clarification of the concepts is important. Ryle's work Concept of Mind is an excellent example of this task. Ryle is exposing the Cartesian myth of mind and to do this he takes recourse to the ordinary language. On the one hand, he expells the Cartesian ghost out of the mechanical body and on the other, he introduces his theory of
Ryle thinks that all problems in philosophy arise out of unclarity in language. So he maintains that clarity and linguistic analysis be the sole aim of philosophy. He can be criticised by pointing out that, nobody will think that the problem of evil is due to lack of clarity. Therefore, linguistic analysis can be only a method to solve certain problems but not the sole aim of philosophy.

The linguistic analysis instead of giving an insight into the life and existence, only clarifies the meaning of sentences. Linguistic analysis as a method has been criticised by many philosophers. Thus Bertrand Russell on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation comments, "Why a whole school finds important wisdom in its pages". Again, Waissman finds 'clarifying' is not the only business of philosophy. Waissman says: "There is something deeply existing about philosophy ... It is not a matter of 'clarifying thoughts' nor of, 'the correct use of language' nor of any other of these damned things ... Philosophy is many things and there is no formula to cover them all. But if I were asked to express in one single word what is its most essential feature I would unhesitatingly say: vision'.

Ryle has been criticised for his view that philosophising should be done in ordinary language. Bertrand Russell has criticised Ryle for his emphasis on the language of 'uneducated people' and attacking "the sophisticated language of the learned". C.A. Campbell and Frederick Coplestone maintain that there can be no fixed and accepted usage of language as far as
mind and mental operations are concerned.

Ryle, in his *Concept of Mind*, by emphasising ordinary language tries to show that there is no dualistic talk (about body and mind) in the ordinary language. But contrary to his emphasis it is not only found in the ordinary language, but an attempt as above robs the common man of something that is very essential to live. The discussion of the distinction between mind and body figures so large, in every day thought, that a common man can clearly distinguish between thinking as fundamentally different from sweating. It is not something being like hot or cold, cannot be pulled by a rope and so on.

Considering the treatment of term 'mind' on par with the 'body' Ryle says that traditionalists have committed a category mistake. But Ryle does not bother in the *Concept of Mind*, to define what a category is; but in turn the reader gets the idea of Ryle's "syntactical difference between the mental and the physical". Warnock in the following objected to Ryle's category mistake by asking, "if one is not prepared and indeed is deliberately unwilling, to say just what a category is, and what categories there are, can one really be entitled to employ the term 'category'?".

Further to attack the ghost in the machine, Ryle analyses the meanings of mental concepts to show that there is nothing ghostly in them. For example, the concept of 'intelligence' he says, refers not only to one activity of a person but many types, and ones intelligence is displayed in the ways he carries out these activities. In this example, we find Ryle identifying the meaning with the "method of verification". Thus, Ryle's
approach appears to be positivistic one. But the positivists with their method of verification laid the emphasis on facts of life, whereas Ryle seeking meanings of the mental concepts was only to refer to what use they can be put, without going to the 'facts' of the nature, which are very essential to understand the meaning of the words we use in language.

Though Ryle states that he does not want to increase the knowledge about what mind is, yet he introduces the new theory of mind in the theory of dispositions. And this is made clear by his opening statement: "This book offers what may with reservations be described as a theory of mind". A disposition is, as explained by Ryle, "to do and undergo certain sorts of thing under certain conditions. Mind is not something over and above our body. We are disposed to behave in a specific way when placed in a particular situation. All our acts and behaviour can be explained in terms of dispositions, inclinations and abilities and there is no need of attributing all the above referred things to the ghost inside.

Critics of Ryle have questioned Ryle's theory of disposition. In Ryle's account the dispositions are exhibited only in overt behaviour. Why a disposition is understood always in terms of outward behaviour only? Can there not be a disposition which is not manifested in overt behaviour, but by virtue of which that person has private experiences? As A.C. Ewing pointed out, a disposition need not refer to mainly "to behave in a certain way, but a disposition to have private experiences of certain kind".
Again Ryle's account of mental concepts and abilities has been questioned. Ryle maintains that the presence of any ability in a person, is known from his behaviour. For example, the ability of being intelligent is displayed in intelligent doings or behaviour of the person. But sometimes an intelligent person might not act intelligently because of nervousness or anxiety, but that does not mean that he is not intelligent. On the contrary the so called over achievers, achieve not because of amount of potentialities they have for any trait but because of certain other conditions. Ryle's criteria of certifying the presence of any ability in a person exclusively in terms of overt behaviour, is fallible, although it is true that, the intelligence of a person is displayed in at least some of his acts. The 'leap' in Rylean inference, from one's overt behaviour to certify an ability in a person, is not as certain and guaranteed as Ryle thinks. G. D. Jha, in his critical study of Ryle's concept of mind, writes that Ryle has confused and has failed to distinguish "between the essence and evidence of mental concepts".

Ryle's criteria of certifying a disposition in a person, poses the difficulty of requirement of infinite number of 'if statements'. It is not enough just to mention three or four or ten of such hypothetical statements concerning a particular disposition and to say that he is disposed to behave in that way. In fact the criteria limits the ability of a person to few acts. Therefore, in order to understand the disposition infinite number of 'if-statements' are to be mentioned. A very appropriate criticism of Ryle's criteria comes from Peter Geach when he says:
"it is really a scandal that people should count it a philosophical advance to adopt a programme of analysing ostensible categorical into unfulfilled conditionals, like the programmes of the phenomenalists with regard to 'physical object' statements and of neo-behaviourists with regard to psychological statements."

Ryle distinguished between the "single-track" and "many-track" dispositions; 'smoking cigarette' is a 'single track' disposition referring to only one tendency whereas 'greediness' is a 'many-track' disposition. The tendencies brought under one term are of different types and not of same species, therefore, they cannot be brought under one 'many-track' disposition.

A further criticism of his dispositions is that Ryle has not distinguished between human dispositions and dispositions of other non-living objects. Although there is a distinction between physical and mental dispositions Ryle has not made it clear in what way, these are different from dispositions of other objects.

It is the main aim of this theory of dispositions to show that the mental concepts are dispositional. Ryle holds that the traditional dualist theory has misunderstood the logic of mental concepts. He maintains that mental concepts are not reports of occurrences, for there are no such occurrences in the ghostly world. But Ryle's introduction of 'mongrel-categorical' terms, shows that he overlooked the logical distinction between the two terms. The dispositional words according to Ryle are one type of logical words while episode words are of other logical type. This occurrence-disposition dichotomy proves to be a handicap for
Ryle, and is forced to say that logic of both, the occurrent and disposition words, meet in the 'mongrel-categorical' terms. This weakens Ryle's original thesis (that disposition and occurrent words are logically different) and also shows that concepts are not purely dispositional and dispositions or semi-dispositions cannot replace 'mind'.

Ryle while criticising consciousness as an intimately mind-related concept, tries to identify consciousness or one's awareness with his behaviour and thus finds "Not-worlds but one world; not a ghost, but a body; (people are not) occult but obvious". That consciousness is private and not something that can be publicly observed is essentially a common man's as well as a philosopher's view. One's being aware of a particular object in his surrounding, remains private to that person, unless he makes a statement or expresses his awareness of the object in some way, others do not know it. Consciousness is obvious, a natural fact, a pre-condition that we do not refer to it in our conversation as there is no such need.

Ryle's attempt of replacing consciousness by dispositions, results in absurd consequences. Thus, as he maintains there are dispositions and body behaves according to these dispositions. Thus the idea that an intelligent man's body is disposed to behave intelligently under certain conditions, without that man's being conscious of his intelligent doings, is absurd and unacceptable. Thus in case of 'creative people' they cannot be held responsible for their 'creations' but the credit of creating will go to their dispositions.

D. M. Armstrong analyses Ryle's example of brittleness in
glass, that is when the glass lightly struck it breaks because it is brittle. Brittleness for Ryle would not be the cause of breaking of the glass, rather it is the disposition in glass. And dispositions are manifested in 'if conditions'. When the same thing is applied to mental processes like thinking, according to Ryle's account then, if there is any thinking going on then it should lead to actions. If it does not, then it amounts to saying that, that man was not 'thinking'. Armstrong finds the logical behaviourism of Ryle unsatisfactory as a theory of mind. As he points out: "when I think but my thoughts do not issue in any action, it seems as obvious as anything is obvious that there is something actually going on in me that constitutes my thought. It is not simply that I would speak or act if some conditions that are unfulfilled were to be fulfilled. Something is currently going on, in the strongest and most literal sense of "going on", and this something is my thought. Rylean Behaviourism denies this, and so it is unsatisfactory as a theory of mind. Yet I know of no version of Behaviourism that is more satisfactory".

Treating every mental concept as a disposition to behave (bodily overt behaviour) Ryle has identified mental concepts with bodily behaviour. Armstrong goes for a programme of giving a complete "physico-chemical" account of man, i.e., of physical and mental processes. He attacks Ryle's above position in the following: "Behaviourism is a profoundly unnatural account of mental processes. If somebody speaks and acts in certain ways, it is natural to speak of this speech and action as the expression of his thought. It is not at all natural to speak of his speech
and action as identical with his thought. We naturally think of thought as something quite distinct from the speech and action that, under suitable circumstances, brings the speech and action about. Thoughts are not to be identified with behaviour, we think; they lie behind behaviour. Armstrong in turn thinks that 'mind' is the 'inner cause' of any behaviour.

Ryle perceives dualism as committing a category-mistake which consists in replacing a causal hypothesis in place of functional description. The mental terminology, in fact is used to describe the way we behave or perform, but is misunderstood as describing the performances as if they are the effects of mind and mental processes. This is what Ryle sets to refute in his book the Concept of Mind. He puts forth the theory of dispositions, which he thinks can account for all mental happenings. Well, this itself can be considered as a mistake, an ignoratio elenchi. For it appears that he has misread the nature of mental happenings. He terms all mental conduct statements as 'dispositional' and 'semi-dispositional' statements. As he defines it (disposition), it is a tendency to behave in a certain way when placed under a particular situation, that is our behaviour depends on the 'under-if' conditions. But one may observe that it is not only difficult but also impossible for one to know all the possible 'under-if' conditions and perhaps this is because of the nature of the mental happenings itself that they refuse to be reduced to 'dispositions'. Again Ryle's introduction of 'semi-dispositional' or 'mongrel categorical' statements, which are part episodic and part hypothetical, raised doubts about the success of his theory of dispositions. Moreover,
Ryle says that dualism ignores this (semi-hypothetical) nature of statements about mind and treats them as categorical. According to Ryle, a categorical statement can be distinguished from a hypothetical one, in the sense that the former as stating a fact while the latter is not. Albert Hofstadter observes Ryle as using the word 'fact' in a peculiar way. He says that one can find, in this world, hypothetical statements stating facts. For example, one can say that "it is a fact that water freezes at 0 degree centigrade at normal pressure", which may be an "experimental fact". This shows that Ryle wants to restrict the use of the word "to a very small portion of what would ordinarily be said to be the case".

It is still puzzling, as to what sort of things can be termed as facts. Taking Ryle’s example of ‘John Doe is speaking French’, he considers as a factual report and it is a ‘semi-dispositional’ statement. It may be formulated in the following way: "for all x, if x understands French and x is listening carefully to John Doe, then it is highly probable that x understands what John Doe is saying". This way of formulation shows that there is no pure categorical statement apart from Ryle’s ‘mongrel-categorical’ sense and hence the above mentioned distinction between a hypothetical and a categorical statement with reference to ‘fact’ cannot be maintained. But Ryle maintains that hypothetical statements do not state facts. Hofstadter therefore says that it is a sign of nominalism.

Albert Hofstadter explains systematically how a historical account of the origin of the dualistic category-mistake is given
by Ryle: "(i) People know how to apply mental conduct concepts. They know how to distinguish intelligent from unintelligent behaviour, good from bad arithmetic, politic from impolitic conduct, fertile form infertile imagination, before they develop any theories about how the distinctions are made. That is, they already know how to distinguish an intelligent performance from others, and how to distinguish it as intelligent, simply by reference to the overt characteristics of performances and the dispositional and semi-dispositional characteristics of persons. (ii) For some reasons or other (theological, philosophical, etc.) the theorist wants to understand the distinction between mental and non-mental behaviour. He already knows, together with others, how to distinguish the one from the other. What he wishes to know now is the nature of the distinction. (iii) In attempting to solve this problem, he supposes (and here is where he trips) that the distinction is a causal one. Mental conduct differs from non-mental conduct in that the former is caused by a different kind of things than the latter. Intelligent behaviour is caused by the operation of an intellect within the person, and this is what makes the behaviour intelligent. (iv) The mistake consists in looking for a causal differentiation between intelligent and non-intelligent, emotional and non-emotional, etc. behaviour. We already have the differentia in the behaviour and dispositions and semi-dispositions, referred to, and we need only analyze our language to find it."

According to Ryle, they are the same reasons mentioned above which forced Descartes to save religious and moral lives of men
from 'mechanistic' approach of 17th century.

Ryle's historical account offers nothing as evidence for such a category mistake as dualism. It only gives information about the confusion with reference to a criteria to distinguish between the intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour where (people) take a cause, which serves as the criteria. It is not to distinguish between the intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour. The mental terminologies were introduced, but to explain the same, a principle called 'mind' or soul was presupposed. A human being's behaviour differs from that of a stone. By using Ryle's terminology one can ask, 'how can we explain the fact that whatever dispositions and semi-dispositions human being has, a stone cannot share?'

Hofstadter says that dualists are more bothered about giving a theory explaining the basis of such a distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour. The question, 'how do we differentiate intelligent from non-intelligent behaviour?' refers to the logic of the language, to the logical analysis of the words used in the language.

Every problem in philosophy cannot be solved by logical analysis, as Ryle does in Concept of Mind. Ryle is of the opinion that, there is nothing else in philosophy save, 'logical analysis' and hence any philosophical problem is that of logical analysis. Hofstadter says that Ryle perceives logic where it is not really there and therefore, one may say that he is committing a category-mistake.

It is of utmost importance that any philosophical idea which
prevails should be subjected to severe re-examination. It is not only the case that, the search and re-examination should be of the idea and its basis, but also it is important that, while re-examining one should not deviate from the heart of the subject. Dickinson S. Miller observes that Ryle's pitiless re-examination of concept of mind (as an entity) and mind associated other concepts like consciousness, not only shows such a deviation, but also that his arguments are irrelevant to the conclusions he draws. With regard to consciousness he should have considered the facts that force us to have this concept of consciousness. In other words the re-examination of its grounds should have been done. But Ryle does not consider this important, as according to him it is not necessary to question the basis of familiar facts. Therefore, the irrelevant discussion may be taken as not proving his point.

Ryle compares 'mind' with a 'ghost'. But the analogy itself is defective. As D. S. Miller shows: "A ghost is something that appears, however nebulous it may be and however likely to evoke the exclamation, "Whence and what art thou, questionable shape"? Another name for it is an apparition". The meaning of 'ghost' as we understand is folklore and other types of literature, as a nebulous body and not as 'mind'. Further the ghost appears, whereas consciousness and mind does not 'appear' like a ghost.

According to D.S. Miller, "consciousness is a field of apperance. It is the condition, for each one of us, of having any world at all".

Further, he points out that, "the privacy - that is, the fact that another person can not perceive it" --- (it refers to a
person's conscious vision of others) —— "extends to a man's thoughts, imaginations, emotions, sensations and will. This does not mean, of course ..., that we do not often use these words or the like of bodily behaviour that can be observed; it means that a man's own side of all this, his own experience of it, can not be observed". Ryle uses the word ghostly in the sense that it is mysterious and elusive. D.S. Miller maintains that, unlike a ghost "the content of the field of consciousness, however, is the least ghostly thing in the world of thought, for it reveals its true and whole nature in the very fact of its existence, it has no claim to existence as content of that field except precisely in so far as it does appear. As present in that field it is exactly what it appears to be. Consciousness is the one realm where appearance and reality coincide".

Consciousness itself is not an action, it is a field of appearance. Still more it is not an event. An event is something happening, or taking place, coming to an end or changing. An event is not something concrete by itself. Something concrete must exist so that 'in that' event take place. In other words field of consciousness must exist and then there is the appearing, disappearing, 'changing of qualia, concrete qualia, colours, sounds, tastes, bodily sensations, etc. the concrete appearances of our experience".

Ryle attacks consciousness denying the claim that it is through consciousness we are aware of our mental life. Ryle says, if that were the case, then nothing would have remained hidden to each one in each one's case. But it may be pointed out against
Ryle, that negatively it shows, that there is something which remains hidden and if it is not accessible through consciousness then certainly not through our behaviour, as it is public. If consciously experienced mental processes, are not able to reveal the 'hidden' how can our outward behaviour expose the mental?

One may observe that the criticism implied in the ghost metaphor does not hit the target. The metaphor may be taken as misdescribing and misrepresenting dualism.

Most of the people consider a belief in the ghost as a superstition. Thus Ryle's intention here is to show mind as mythical and a superstition, like a ghost. H.P. Rickman in his paper, "exorcising the ghost in the machine" points out that "members of some primitive tribes, believe that minds and soul are ghosts or ghost like, though some people still believe that souls can 'materialise' as ghosts ... ghosts can be seen, heard, felt and smelled. They can move objects and throw things about. They are material manifestations though the matter of which they consist is rather thin". In other words it may be taken as suggesting that 'mind' itself is a thin matter animating and controlling the matter constituting our bodies.

If it is interpreted in this way, then it is not a mind-body dualism. In turn it may be described as "two-tier materialism". Modern behaviourists consider only the content of sense impressions as the only thing that has any epistemological value. And then finding themselves in a situation from which, the escape they see in this 'two-tier materialism'. Observing, that the 'overt behaviour' is not self explanatory and it fails to give a coherent and intelligible account of all that is there.
(especially with reference to mental experiences), modern behaviourists are forced to search for something (consisting of thin matter may be) and say that a machine is inside another machine. Then they perceive the 'ghostly behaviour' of the matter. This has reference to the movements of the brain-particles, fizzing of neurons in the brain, unobservable movements of the speech organs and so on - which according to them accounts for, our normal overt behaviour. Thus the behaviourists "as devoutly as ghost hunters in supposedly haunted houses or spiritualists round their ouija boards that this ghostly, material world, hidden behind or within the observable one, would also become observable if only we could look more closely".

Dualism, as Ryle has criticised, Rickman says, does not represent 'dualism' in a serious sense. A dualistic theory according to Rickman makes sense, when there is the presupposition of two entities, distinct from each other, as in Cartesian dualism: "I am not something tenuously infused into that body; I am not a breath of air, not a flame, nor a vapour, nor breath itself, nothing of all that I can invent with my imagination".

H.P. Rickman, while arguing for dualism says that there is sufficient evidence in the history of philosophy leading to a clean distinction between mind and matter. And a man need not be conceived as a machine haunted by a ghost. Mind and matter can be distinguished, mind is the subject and matter is the object of knowledge or cognition. The acts of feeling, perceiving and
desiring are all mental acts or subjective experiences corresponding to which there is something that is perceived, felt and desired. And this relation is irreversible. This can be seen from simple examples. One can perfectly say 'I perceive a billiard ball', and 'I like cake'. But to say 'billiard ball perceives me' or 'cake likes me' is absurd.

Ryle emphasises the distinction between simple or chance overt performances and overt intelligent performances. Performances are the workings of our mind, "... the styles and procedures of people's activities are the way their minds work... overt intelligent performances are not distinct to the workings of minds; they are those workings". And in "judging that someone's performance is or is not intelligent we have... to look beyond the performance itself... we are not trying to pry into some hidden counter part enacted on the supposed secret stage of the agent's inner life. We are considering his abilities and propensities of which this performance was an actualisation". For example, the hitting of the bull's eye by a professional marksman and by a novice, though are identical as far as their occurrences are concerned, are dispositionally distinct. In other words professional marksman's hitting is skillful, directed, thoughtful action than the novice's action. Ryle by using several terms and their opposites like 'intelligent act', 'chance act' and along with other terms like 'heed', 'conscious', 'minding', and the opposites of these creates 'terminological confusion'. As Ryle says, an intelligent performance is the working of the mind, since it is 'directed action' and hence the performer is responsible for that action.
When we say A's action is intelligent rather than stupid, in order to judge the 'intelligent action' in this second sense, we should assume that it is intelligent in the first sense. The term 'intelligence' is used here as two different species of directed action. In other words, *his action must be, in our judgement, directed before it can be well directed. How he directs his action will determine what professor Ryle calls his "character of mind". Similarly the word "chance" may mean simply an undirected, "mechanical", action, or it may mean an unskillful directed action. The novice in Prof. Ryle's illustration who hits the bull's eye his first shot will certainly be said to do so "by chance", but his action will be no less a "working of mind", however ill-directed". A similar treatment can be given to the terms 'minding' or paying some heed to what one was doing. Paying some heed means doing something carefully, that is one is not doing that mechanically. In other words it is directed action. The consequences of such an interpretation are as follows: The person who is paying some heed is prepared for various associated tasks and tests which might have cropped up and at the same time prepared for the task with which he actually coped, and that his actions were not simply directed but well directed. This unclarity as far as the terms are concerned and ambiguities as far as their usage are concerned, and the confusion that is created, is not only misleading but also perplexing to the readers. One may even go to his extent of saying that *Concept of Mind gives a "constructive thesis, that of the explanation of mentality by the device of dispositions"*. Even granting that a distinction that can be made between
'intelligent' and 'non-intelligent overt behaviour' by referring to one's dispositions, there is every possibility that the professional marksman may make a chance shot and the novice a skilled one. Thus whether a performance is a 'working of mind' or not, we can never know by referring to dispositions. And therefore, the dispositions are irrelevant in certain cases as that of a professional marksman and a novice. Thus Ryle's distinction between the terms may be said to be a play upon the words.

Ryle does not consider self-knowledge as private, something to which the person has got privileged access. There is nothing occult or mystical about self-knowledge. Once we know how a person is disposed to behave, we can frame law like propositions about his behaviour.

But Ryle forgets that in case of doubtful instances, as that of a professional marksman and a novice, the performer himself alone has a 'private access' to his ability and proneness — in short, the 'working of his mind'. And therefore he alone can tell whether his performance was a chance action or a result of working of mind.

Moreover, our overt actions only represent a small portion of the working of our mind. And there is the wealth of non-overt bodily activity, to which the performer alone has a 'private access', which may be revealed to the others through the method of introspection.

Ryle in the phrase 'knowing how' takes the word 'know' as a capacity verb and the phrase 'knowing how' as referring to skill,
in an operation. For example, 'one's knowing how to play chess', or 'knowing how a machine works', etc. is dispositional — "is an ability or proneness to do certain acts or things". But Ryle never makes clear the logical status of 'knowing that'. 'knowing that' refers to our knowledge of factual propositions. But one may notice that this distinction does not hold in the strict sense, in ordinary language, for instance, when Smith says 'I know how the accident took place'. Also the phrase 'knowing that' is used in ordinary language, not referring to any factual propositions, as in the case when we say 'Sita knows that she ought to speak the truth' or 'Sita knows that cheating is bad'.

Thus the distinction between the two phrases 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' may be observed as unstable says Jane Roland. Roland refers to John Hartland Swann's discussion of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. According to Hartland Swann every instance of 'knowing that' is an instance of 'knowing how' and therefore 'knowing that' statements can be reduced to 'knowing how' statements; i.e. "if we call the statement "Johnny knows that Columbus discovered America" dispositional, then it must be translatable into some such form as "Johnny knows how to answer the question 'who discovered America'? or 'what did Columbus discover'? correctly". However, the reduction is possible, provided the 'dispositional analysis of "know" is given up.

Ryle in Concept of Mind builds a theory of mind by inquiring into the logical behaviour of words, in sentences containing mental concepts. His attempt is to reduce these mental concepts to dispositions. A disposition, according to Ryle, is the
tendency to behave. Therefore, mind and other mental concepts according to Ryle, can be analysed and explained in terms of dispositions which are manifested in overt behaviour. In his dispositional behaviourism, Ryle, through a conceptual analysis rejects ontological existence of mind.

NOTES

1. Morris Weitz like Malcolm calls Ryle a logical behaviourist. Ryle through out his book Concept of Mind inquires "into the logical character of certain model sentences containing imagination, perception, though, emotion, etc., words and concepts". Behaviourism because, it has the implication that every description of human beings, containing mental terms, may be replaced by a purely physical description --- that is, a description containing no mental terms. It holds that physical side as being the more fundamental and the mental side as derivative. Morris Weitz, "Professor Ryle's Logical Behaviourism", Journal of Philosophy, vol. XLVII, No.9, 1951, p.297.


5. Gilbert Ryle, Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson, 1949, p.188.


13. Ibid., 199.


15. G. D. Jha, op. cit., p. 75.


18. Ibid.


22. Ibid., p. 7.


24. Ibid.


27. Ibid., pp. 261-266.


29. Ibid., p. 271.

30. Ibid., pp. 271-272.

31. Ibid., p. 274.

32. Ibid., p. 276.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p.492.
38. Ibid., p.45.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., pp.283-284.