CHAPTER II

COMPLEX OF MENTAL CONCEPTS : AN ANALYSIS

Wide discussions and often conflicting interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein's works has resulted in attributing to him views, ideas and positions which he might not have held. This may be due to Wittgenstein's style of expression. Sentences or statements interpreted in isolation from the rest of the work are inconclusive and hence may fail to give a clear idea of his position.

For a linguistic philosopher like Wittgenstein, language is the most important thing. In his early work, Tractatus, he held the view that the function of language was to 'picture' the facts. In his later work Philosophical Investigations, he pays attention to the pragmatic nature of language. Wittgenstein says that, the meaning of a word is to be understood, in the way the word is used. Thus, a word, may perform multiple functions, when used in many different ways and will have different meanings. A word is used as a 'tool' and "is characterised by its use just as a tool is characterised by its functions"! The use of a word can be understood only with reference to the context, both linguistic and social. He believes that language is behaviour of a special sort, a medium, an instrument through which we can reach one another's experiences. Consequently, one is naturally led to think and ask following questions : what is the link between our language and our experiencing a particular mental process? What is the basis for usage of words by human beings when we name a particular mental act? Wittgenstein inquires into the implication
of Cartesianism with reference to language. Descartes along with the empiricists maintained that what is immediately available to our awareness are ideas.

Descartes and other philosophers thought that this mental content vocabulary is learnt in the introspection process by giving oneself a 'private ostensive definition'. With the help of such a definition, the person mentally fixes his attention on the private mental processes and establishes a relation between the process experienced and the word used. It is private because what is going on in one's mind cannot be observed by others, neither can anyone be aware of it. If each individual learns the mental vocabulary by this method, then we need a strong argument to claim that the same thing happens in case of other minds.

Wittgensteinians interpret the relation between our experiencing a mental process and the language that is used to express, in the following way. According to them the words that we use stand for the ideas and thoughts in the mind of the speaker. Hence, language can be seen as only externally related to the 'private' thinking process. Ashok Vohra in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind draws two conclusions from the definition of 'private language'. First, that it is possible to think without language. Second, a person might have a private language to record his own private mental acts for his exclusive use. Understanding the above two issues is imperative to understanding Wittgenstein's conception of 'mind'.

Wittgenstein discusses general issues about the nature of mind rather than the particular mental states like belief, thought, emotion, etc. There is a wide agreement among
commentators on Wittgenstein, that his 'argument' against the possibility of a 'private language', a language the words of which refer to what can be known only to the speaker and his immediate private sensations, is the central theme around which a philosophy of mind can be developed.

In order to understand the relation between the mental experience and the language that we use to express it, Wittgenstein often discusses the meaning and the use of the term 'sensation'. It is believed that the terms like 'sensation', 'sense-data' and 'sensible qualities' can be used interchangeably. They are also believed to be immediate objects of observation. The above mentioned features of 'sensation' are denied in the Wittgensteinian account of the mental.

One may observe that three different uses of the term 'sensation' can be given:

1. It is used to express or mention our experiencing a sensation as an act.
2. It is used to refer to the content of sensory experience.
3. The term is employed as a comprehensive term to refer to both the above uses.

He states further that, when one uses the term without specifically mentioning the 'use' to which the term is put, confusion results. Sensations are neither identical with sense-impressions nor 'ideas' as Berkeley claims nor with sense-data as C.S. Price and Bertrant Russell think.

Similarities between the three terms (sensations, sense-impression and ideas) force philosophers to declare them as
identical. That these terms cannot be used interchangeably can be seen from the fact that we cannot say 'sense-impression of pain' but 'sensation of pain'. Neither can the above terms become the immediate object of perception. Sensations cannot be located in the sense we locate bones in the hands or the leg.

It is commonly believed and understood that our experiences remain 'private'. But Wittgenstein maintains that its (private experience) expression is through the language that is 'public'—a language that is commonly used by a community, that has got its set of rules which a person is required to understand and learn.

But in the case of mental acts like 'sensations', 'pain-experience', the words used by the particular person refer to that person's own private experience and when communicated only the speaker (logically) understands it (experience). Thus, what we get here is an idea of private language, which may be described as "a language that refers to the experience of which only the speaker is aware and of which is not merely the case that it is not understood by anyone other than the speaker, but more, that it is logically impossible that it should be understood by any one other than the speaker". In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein writes: "The individual words of this language are to refer what can only be known to the person speaking to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language". Further he says: "The language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand".

The following features of 'private language' are visible on
the basis of analysis of above quoted two Wittgensteinian passages:

1. The words used by the particular person only refer to that person's own private experiences.
2. The words used also stand for that person's (speaker's) immediate private sensations.
3. Another person (other than the speaker) cannot (logically) understand the language.

Accordingly, 'private language' cannot have any word common with our public language. The language commonly used by a community is a public language. Words are the signs by which we mean certain things. Although they are the collection of alphabets they cannot be used anyhow. There are rules for the way they are used and each language has its own set of rules, which a person is required to understand and learn.

As 'private language' cannot be used to communicate to others (as one's sensations and experiences are 'inner' experiences) it will have its own rules and words. These words cannot come from or be used in public language. From this, it may be concluded that only the speaker can know the rules of private language. Wittgenstein maintains that even though 'private language' is possible, with that language not only one cannot communicate with others but also cannot communicate even with oneself.

Wittgenstein denounced the Cartesian conception of the term 'sensation' (and other mental vocabulary) that knowledge of the sensations of others is impossible. Cartesians maintain that a
person experiencing a sensation, is infallibly acquainted with his own sensations. Thus, by giving ostensive definition, sensations are named.

Wittgenstein points out that there is no criterion for doing so. In his 'diary argument' he says that when a person associates a sign with a particular sensation that is experienced, a definition of that sign is not given, because such a definition cannot be formulated. Wittgenstein further says that even though one understands the connection between the sign and the sensation and may even use correctly in future, but there is no criterion in present case to associate the sign with the sensations. As Wittgenstein puts it: "I impress... on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. In other words, the person cannot know for certain that he has used the sign correctly connecting the sensation. In fact, Wittgenstein says that we cannot talk about knowledge of sensations. The words 'I know' can have meaning only in a doubtful case that is stated. It becomes meaningful only in case of 'learning'. He maintains that, in case of sensations neither we have to learn about them nor we can have any doubts about them, as to doubt their existence becomes senseless, we just have them. The use of the words 'I know' in the first person psychological statements, Wittgenstein says, cannot be used as an expression of certainty. Self-knowledge, is understood as giving knowledge about one's real self, as claimed by Cartesians, that
is, knowledge about one's mind. Cartesians separate the mind from the body and suppose that this self desires, wills, thinks and so on and so forth. Thus, self-knowledge is equated with the knowledge about one's mind, and the question 'what am I?' can be equated with the question 'What is mind?' These questions are directed towards the inquiry into the nature of mind and self. There are many interpretations of the 'self'. Bertrand Russell defines a 'subject' as "any entity which is acquainted with something". Thomas Reid claims that mind is a substance --- when he says, "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling, I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers". Reid's contention, that, mind is a substance, may be questioned as there is no criteria to decide the existence of such a 'spiritual substance'.

John Locke rejects 'mind' as a 'substance' but thinks that it is 'tabula rasa' or a dark chamber. But does not reject the idea of the existence of mind altogether. Hume consistently thought 'mind' or 'self' to be a 'bundle of perception'. For him mind is, "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perceptual flux and movement".

Bertrand Russell developed further Hume's 'bundle theory' into 'logical construction theory', saying: "Empirically, I cannot discover anything corresponding to the supposed act; and theoretically I cannot see that it is indispensable. We say: "I think so and so" , and this word "I" suggests that thinking is the act of a person. --- It is supposed that thoughts cannot just come and go, but need a person to think them. Now, of course it
is true that thoughts can be collected into bundles, so that one bundle is my thoughts, and another is your thoughts and a third is the thoughts of Mr. Jones.

Wittgensteinians maintain that, both the empiricist and the Cartesian theories are based on wrong assumptions. Mind is neither like a 'ghost' nor a theatre where perceptions and ideas appear and disappear. Mind is not the name of a place where mental experiences take place.

In the Wittgensteinian sense, "a mind exists in so far as and only in so far as one or more of a person's mental capacities are being expressed. The term 'capacity' used here is synonymous with capacity, power, ability, faculty and disposition of willing, hoping, feeling, imagining, acting, perceiving, hating, remembering, thinking, deciding, wishing, fearing, regretting and so on. All these acts are called mental acts and the words that express these mental acts are called mental concepts. Mind is attributed to a being, capable of performing mental acts."

It may be interpreted that mind, according to Wittgenstein, is a complex of mental concepts. To an organism, if mental concepts are applicable, then there is said to be the existence of mind. Mind is not an organ but it is the ability and proneness to do certain things which a person cannot do without his body. Since mental concept is expressed in our behaviour, the behaviour of a 'person' and the mental concepts or acts cannot be separated from the body. All the mental capacities of person taken together is given the name 'mind' and therefore mind is not 'mysterious something' in the body. And there is no need for any evidence to
prove to oneself that man possesses a mind. Wittgenstein maintains that mind is revealed to us in linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour (the term behaviour referring to past, present and future behaviour) and it takes place in the complex of conditions in which that person is placed.

Wittgenstein holds that 'private language' is not needed to know our inner states and we can certainly know other's pain and correctly make judgements about the internal states of others. As Wittgenstein puts it: "I can be as certain of someone else's sensations as of any fact".

This behaviour based certainty is different from mathematical certainty. It should be noted that there are different types of certainties. For instance certainty in a language game --- depends on the kind of language game. Not only are there types of certainties in each field, but also the criteria of certainty varies from one field or subject to the other. For example, the kind of certainty required in economics is different from the kind of certainty required in Sociology. In conclusion, it may be said that, for Wittgenstein, sensations are communicable. In other words, whenever others are in pain we can know it and when we are in pain others can know it.

Wittgenstein further maintains that it is not logically contradictory to say that one can feel other's pain. To him the actual pain felt by a person in his body can be 'experienced' or 'felt' by another person in an analogous sense. The criteria of 'pain' is the behaviour of the person through which he expresses that. Any pain or experience is termed as 'private' by Wittgenstein when it is not manifested in any way, like in the
case of "chess move considered and discarded in imagination". If there is itching sensation in an individual, and he does not communicate or report or express that in any way - if there is no publicly observable behaviour - then it remains private. In the same way some of our pains are private but we cannot pass from 'some' to 'all'.

Wittgenstein holds that sensations are neither incommunicable nor private. One cannot make it private by naming it privately, for naming requires concept formation and retention of it. This in turn is dependent on a great deal of stage setting. Such a stage setting requires, for example, the formation and retention of rules, which is not possible in 'private language'. Therefore, 'private language' does not make any sense.

One strong assumption on the basis of which philosophers claim sensations to be private is the fact that the particular person who is in pain, has before his consciousness, a particular 'state' of his physique which others cannot experience. But it is quite possible for one to know the experiences and understand them with certainty because of 'sameness' of our feelings and 'states of the body'. If one maintains that 'pain' which is experienced in one's own private consciousness can exist only when 'I' experience it (that is, if it is thought private in this manner) then, the statements 'he is in pain', 'you are in pain' will become senseless. For, we do not know, in this sense, whether there exists 'pain' as far as others are concerned, since we cannot experience other's pain.
Wittgenstein emphasises the language-game and the grammar of the words used and not the 'sensation' aspect of it. For a blind man, even though he cannot see anything but still can use the word 'see' in his language, in the same way it should be possible for a person who does not experience 'pain' understands the behaviour of the word 'pain' in the language-game. And, so he concludes, that in order to understand the meaning of the word 'pain' it is not necessary to have an experience of it, and that we do not learn the meaning of the word 'pain' the way we experience it.

One cannot name a sensation 'pain' in teaching a child that 'this is a pain', as 'pain' is not an object with physical properties. If there is no outward responsive behaviour (reaction to some sensation) then we cannot teach a child the meaning of the word 'pain'. It is this behaviour that we share with each other and it helps us in understanding and making sensation language possible.

Vohra, supports the Wittgensteinian claim of impossibility of 'private language' says that, "we are under the illusion that one could always 'pick out' the sensation 'pain' from the stream of one's consciousness and name it. But we forget that 'picking out' presupposes that we possess the concept of sensation and therefore it cannot serve to explain our acquisition of it. A concept is not formed merely by looking at a thing, or a colour. To have a concept means to know how the word is used, it is to know the rules which govern the use of the word in the language-game".

Wittgenstein further maintains that even though the private
linguist succeeds in specifying a sensation concept, it is impossible to retain the same for future occasion. For Wittgenstein, the view that 'private language' is possible rests on the 'category mistake'.

Though Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind has far reaching consequences, it is unsatisfactory as he has not been able to address himself to the specific question 'what is mind?' His Philosophical Investigations appear to be 'dogmatically negative' as every attempt made to analyse fundamental mental state is disposed off along with the refusal to admit that there exist private phenomena.

Wittgenstein repeatedly attempts to destroy the 'private' the 'inner'. For example, in his 'beetle' example he says: "suppose everyone had a box with something in it. We call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and every one says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; Not even as a something: for the box might even be empty". Further Wittgenstein says: "It is not a something, but not a nothing either. The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said". On the basis of the above two passages, it can be interpreted, that for Wittgenstein, 'mental experience' or
private experiences' are such that nothing can be said about them.

Wittgenstein, throughout his Tractatus as well as Philosophical Investigations attempted to find out the link between our language, the words, the naming that we do, and our experiences. A person's crying when he is in pain is the behaviour, not the description of pain. Pain can be similarly ascribed to another person referring to his overt behaviour. In other words the statements ascribing pain to others are meaningful, only if they can be verified in public. It stresses the linguistic expression or external behaviour. This led C.W.K. Mundle to label Wittgenstein's thesis (that nothing can be said about private experiences) as 'linguistic behaviourism'.

C.W.K. Mundle finds two different meanings of 'private language': (1) when symbols are used to refer to one's private experience in the rigorous Wittgensteinian sense and (2) when the rules for the use of the symbols are known only to the person who invent it. A person's communication with himself as far as his experiences are concerned will involve the use of symbols in the former sense of 'private language' -- that is, a symbol that is used to refer to his private experience. Considering the fact that, it is possible to express one's private experiences to others, it may be said that the language that will be used for this purpose cannot be private in the former sense (rigorous Wittgensteinian sense). Thus, the symbols used may be either 'public' or 'private' in the later sense, as far as the rules for the use of the symbol is concerned. Thus, in case of Wittgenstein's 'diary argument' the person using a particular
symbol, say 'E' to refer to a sensation, would describe it as a 'pain in my left eye'. The diarist can divulge his use of 'E' by explaining this in the public language. Again, "the diarist might reveal (something about) his use of 'E' by his behaviour, by groaning and clutching his left eye whenever he wrote 'E'". But Wittgenstein maintains that, if the diarist is able to reveal his use of 'E' through the above mentioned way, then it cannot be counted as a 'private language'. As Wittgenstein puts it: "Now what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I can understand? How do I use words to stand for my sensations? As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensations? In that case my language is not a 'private' one. Someone else might understand it as well as I".

C.W.K. Mundle points out that Wittgenstein confuses between the two senses of the 'private'. He says that Wittgenstein in the above passage "lays it down that if a person's use of "words for sensations" can be inferred by others from his behaviour, these words are not to be called "private". This is to define a 'private language' as one in which communication is impossible. But one important question which may be intended by a person who asks "Can there be a private language?" is .... : Can we communicate about our private experiences? To guarantee a negative answer to this question by giving an arbitrary definition of 'private language' seems frivolous".

Wittgenstein points out the lack of criteria for the identification of a sensation. According to him, memory criteria
is not justifiable since in that case one memory will be appealing to another memory. Wittgenstein questions the epistemic adequacy of private memory judgements claiming "the process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image ... could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory?" In other words, Wittgenstein wants to stress that 'private experience' is meaningless as the experience is not able to verify 'correctly' the use of private symbol.

Norman Malcolm supporting Wittgenstein also advances various arguments to justify the claim "that there is an epistemically radical difference between private and public memory judgements". The arguments are advanced to show that it is impossible to have a criterion or 'concept of correctness' in the case of private memory judgements whereas it is possible to have a criterion in public memory judgements.

Malcolm says that term 'memory' as used in both 'private memory' and 'public memory' has radically different meanings. He says that, "by a memory impression we understand something that is either accurate or inaccurate, whereas there would not be in the private language, any conception of what would establish a memory impression as correct, any conception of what 'correct' would mean here". The concept 'correct' has no application in 'private language' and therefore there can be no rules in 'private language' leading to the possibility of that language. But Michael Stocker points out that, "without the prior distinction based on the impossibility of the occurrence of the concept 'correct' in a private language, Malcolm could not
invidiously distinguish between public and private memory..."

Stocker further argues that it may be shown that the concept 'correct' has an application in 'private language'. He refers to Malcolm's criteria for the correct use of a private term --- the consistent use of the symbol as a sufficient condition. Stocker presents a thought experiment to show the application of concept 'correct' in the private language: "In the epistemological present, while there is no doubt that the pain we experience is but the same - i.e., the numerically identical - sensation we could say 'Let us call this S'. Before the end of the same epistemological present we could say of the numerically identical pain 'This is S'; and finally in still the same epistemological present we might sum up our activities by 'My use of 'S' was correct'. Stocker further gives the example of different burnt fingers, where one can say that the 'pain' that is experienced from one finger is qualitatively identical with the 'pain' that is experienced from another finger. Because of the similarity perceived in experience, we may denote both the sensations by using one symbol, may be 'S'. Thus, our memories, whether are veridical or not, becomes irrelevant, says Stocker.

However, Malcolm's contention may be better understood in his statement: "The point to be made here is that when one has given oneself the private rule 'I will call this thing 'pain' whenever it occurs' one is then free to do anything or nothing. That 'rule' does not point in any direction. On the private language hypothesis, no one can teach me what the correct use of..."
'same' is. I shall be the sole arbiter of whether this is the same as that. What I choose to call the 'same' will be the same. No restriction whatever will be imposed upon my application of the word. But a sound I can use as I please is not a word. Malcolm here is concerned with inter-subjective teaching and checking. Malcolm is right when he says that before choosing a rule for the private application of 'pain' anything or nothing can be called 'pain'. But this is true in case of public terms also. Stocker while arguing against Malcolm's contention, says that, the private application of term 'pain' "... is not true needs to be shown, not simply asserted - that after one has given himself the rule he could not know if he were keeping or violating it. Of course, he could change the rule - intentionally or not. But then again, so could a rule for a public word be changed - intentionally or not. And 'Rule R is changeable' does not imply 'one cannot check R for change'. The possibility that enough, or all, rules might change and thus one would not be able to check R for change is (i) again an appeal to scepticism which needs to be shown, not simply asserted - that after one has given himself the rule he could not know if he were keeping or violating it. Of course, he could change the rule - intentionally or not. But then again, so could a rule for a public word be changed - intentionally or not. And 'Rule R is changeable' does not imply 'one cannot check R for change'. The possibility that enough, or all, rules might change and thus one would not be able to check R for change is (i) again an appeal to scepticism which applies to public as well as private rules. Malcolm maintains that it is impossible for the person himself to check his application of a private term, and therefore raises the very question that his argument was supposed to settle: can our private memory be checked? In conclusion it may be said that Malcolm's invidious distinction between private and public memory judgements is not justified. His attempt to present such a difference, fails. And it fails by being an example of Petitio. Michael Stocker, thus arguing against Malcolm concludes that, 'the 'private language' shows that no language at all is
Wittgenstein's contention that, communication is impossible in 'private language' is also objected to. C.W.K. Mundle argues for the possibility of communication in 'private language' saying that, "a person who has already learned to talk in the way that we all have - by means of ostensive definitions, explicit or implicit - can proceed to talk about his private experiences".

Wittgenstein in the 'diary argument' suggests that the diarist cannot have any use for the symbol or sign, that is associated with his sensation. Also it cannot have any meaning for him, because the diarist is not in a position to verify the correctness of his application of the symbol on any occasion. His diary argument runs as follows: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign 'E' and write this sign in the diary for every day on which I have the sensation .... I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition (of 'E') .... I speak, or write this sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation ..... in this way I impress upon myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. But "I impress it on myself" can only mean : this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say : whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'".

One may observe that, in the above passage, the diarist has a memory and the capacity to recognise what he feels, sees or
hears. But Wittgenstein insists upon, that for the words to have meaning, there should be 'independent confirmation of the correctness' for the use of the private symbol. It can be shown that, in a statement when someone says 'that is an apple, isn't it?', the 'independent confirmation of the correctness' of his use of the word 'apple' in the above statement, is his hearing a sound which he has to recognise as a token of the sentence 'yes, it is an apple'. In this case the person has to rely on his own capacity to recognise his experiences in order to get such confirmation. Mundle says that "my recognising the sound I hear as the sentence, 'yes, it is an apple', confirms the correctness of my own use of 'apple' only because this sound (so interpreted) is evidence that another person (a) is having private experiences of seeing, touching, tasting, or smelling the object in question, and (b) he has performed a private act of ostensible recognition, that is, an act of the kind that I had performed before saying 'that is an apple, isn't it?' . Thus it may be concluded that communication with oneself is possible in 'private language'.

It can therefore be concluded that we do frequently have distinctive experiences and recognising these experiences need not be thought as an impossible task. Although these experiences are private, they are as recognisable as other objects and are observable in public. But Wittgenstein in his beetle's argument denies 'private experiences' in case of others (other than oneself) when he says 'the box might even be empty'. Each one knows that there is something in the box in one's own case. But to infer the same about other people's boxes is not possible, simply because we do not have access to their boxes. Mundle says
that, Wittgenstein goes too far, when he says that, the box might even be empty'. In other words it results into saying that other people may have no private experiences. Mundle while arguing against this, says that we have "adequate evidence that other people see things as coloured, for they will, on request, describe and draw things which are both looking at, and their descriptions and drawings tally closely with what I see; and they could not discriminate the different things which I and they are looking at unless they saw them, as I see them, as differently coloured. Similarly with pains, etc. - I have no way of verifying that what you feel when you have a dental abscess is the same as what I feel when I have one. But your behaviour and your description of your pain may leave me no room for doubting that you are feeling localised sensations for which you feel strong aversion, and this is all I need to be sure about to have a reason, for e.g., giving you my last aspirin; and I'd have no reason for acting thus unless I believed that you were feeling sensations in some degree similar to some species of the sensations which I call "pains" when I have them". Mundle says that given two principles - the verification principle in some form and the principle that denies "meaning to the statement that similar physiological conditions give rise to more or less similar sensations in different people", both cannot be accepted. For the second principle to be meaningful, we should reject the first principle. The second principle forms the basis for the argument from analogy and if we want to defend against philosophical scepticism, we have to depend on argument.
from analogy. For, we all feel convinced that other people have private experiences which are similar to our own experiences.

Don Locke rejects Wittgenstein's claim that a 'private object language' is impossible. It is the claim that words cannot refer to private objects, sensations, what the person who is experiencing that, is aware of. Wittgenstein does not see the distinction between the two claims; that pains and other similar things which a person can feel and that, pains and other similar things which a person can know. A private object is something which only the subject can be aware of. Don Locke says that 'one's being aware of something' can be understood in two different senses: one's being aware of something may be taken as perceiving, some item, (for example, when one is aware of some sound or pain), and in the second sense it may be taken to refer to realising some fact (for example, our awareness that two and two makes four). Don Locke defines a private object, as one 'which only the one person can be aware of', that is 'awareness' in the sense of perception. So pain is a private object because it is something which only one person can feel and not in the sense that only one person can know of its existence. Supposing that we understand 'pain' as private object, in the sense that only one person can know, Locke inquires whether there can be a private object language in this sense of 'private object'? Locke observes that, there cannot be such a language for it "would be a necessarily private language, and .... that such languages are impossible. That is, if I am the only one who can know anything about X then I am the only one who can know what 'X' means, and consequently 'X' cannot be a genuine term in my, or any
Thus, Locke says that Wittgenstein fails to distinguish between 'private object language' and a 'necessarily private language'. Locke says that Wittgenstein refutes the sceptic's claim that, only he (sceptic) can know whether he is really in pain. According to Wittgenstein sceptic's claim is not correct, and it is either false or incoherent. But Locke says that, Wittgenstein also makes the same mistake. Locke argues in the following way: "if 'pain' did refer to a private sensation then only the one person could know that he feels a pain; we can and do know that others feel pain; therefore 'pain' cannot refer to a private sensation". The first premise in the argument is false. But Wittgenstein does not notice that it is false and commits the same mistake as the sceptic. Don Locke critically comments that Wittgenstein mistakenly thought that the "absurd scepticism follows from a certain theory of language, a certain interpretation of the function of words like 'pain', a theory which must therefore be mistaken. Wittgenstein does not argue both that the scepticism is absurd because it is based on a mistaken theory of language, and that the theory of language is mistaken because it leads to an absurd scepticism. Rather he argues that the sceptical conclusion is absurd, and therefore that the theory of language which commits us to it must be mistaken. But Wittgenstein is himself mistaken in thinking that it is the theory of language which commits us to scepticism about other minds". Wittgenstein assumed that if a term had a private reference then only that one person would know whether what was said was true. In other words if 'pain' refers to a private
sensation then only that one person would know whether he feels pain. And this very mistaken assumption leads to scepticism. Wittgenstein's private language argument involves this assumption. But Wittgenstein failed to see this, as Locke says, "partly because of his basic desire to show that all philosophical errors arise from a misunderstanding of the workings of language, and partly because he does not distinguish the claim that pains and the like are things which only one person can feel from the claim that they are things which only one person can know".

The word 'pain' cannot refer to private object, which only one person can feel. That is, 'pain' refers to a private sensation, such that others also know, about the feeling of 'pain' in a person. Referring to 'pain' as a private sensation, it does not follow from this, that others cannot know about a person's feeling pain. Moreover others can know, what the person who is in pain says and talks about.

Don Locke points out that Wittgenstein would not accept, the problem of other minds, as a genuine problem. According to Wittgenstein, "the fact that we accept knowledge of other minds as knowledge is not something that can be or needs to be justified". Wittgenstein would not pass the problem of mind as 'unnecessary puzzlement' as he does in case of some philosophical problems. Alastair Hannay points out that Wittgenstein "... suggests that we treat the mind as sui generis, .... secondly, he points out certain features, or preconditions, of our understanding of mental phenomena which show that it is wrong in any case to regard the inner as an autonomous sphere of mental
life, as if, for example, what distinguished a mental image from a so called exemplary one was its privacy, unmeasurableness, and so on.

Wittgenstein says that, we should not ask, what an image is? or what happens when one imagines something? but should concentrate on the 'usage' of the word 'imagination'. According to Wittgenstein, our 'nature' of understanding mental phenomena has two necessary components: Distinction is experience and context of importance. Wittgenstein illustrates distinctions in experience with the help of notions like seeing as or aspect seeing where a particular figure "can be seen alternately as a representation of different things". Wittgenstein in the following passage points out the distinctions, "the colour of the visual impression corresponds to the colour of the object (this blotting paper looks pink to me and is pink) - the shape of the visual impression to the shape of the object (it looks rectangular to me, and is rectangular) - but what I perceive in the downing of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects". It is not to be concluded that one can see the object in two different ways. Instead one should say that "it follows in some way from this fact that I see something different in the two cases, the fact must stand on its own as that which 'gives us a reason' to use this expression here". For Wittgenstein, it is the kind of a thing which gives us a reason to say that we see something in a novel way and it is that we can "give a new kind of description of it".
Hannay says that, according to Wittgenstein, the "concept of an aspect is fixed in terms of the importance the expressions referring to aspects acquire for us in ordinary contexts. This is what gives us the right to say such things as 'I am now seeing it as ...,' not some story about a personal contribution".

Wittgenstein maintains that a causal or a physiological explanation, for the above distinction in experiences, would not have helped in understanding of the mental phenomena, as "to understand a phenomena is always to seek a conceptual justification for it". In understanding the nature of the mental, Wittgenstein says that we should appeal to our experience and thereby find out whether there is anything to be distinguished. Secondly, we should appeal to the types of consideration, that Wittgenstein thinks as determining the importance of a distinction. Further, "the question of whether there are mental states, mental processes, or mental objects is to be settled by a "grammatical investigation the results of which are determined by the uses that have already been given to words in everyday situations".

According to Wittgenstein, we can understand 'mental phenomena' in the following way: when we are giving the nature of something, we are giving a description of it. In the case of mind there is nothing to explore, as there is nothing to describe. The talk about the mind as a medium is analogous with a sign. Just as we explain 'something' that we assume to be giving life to the sign or making it meaningful, so also mind should be understood as a non-body but a vital factor, pointing to genuine
experiences such as feelings, images, etc. It appears that there is mental accompaniment of acts like remembering, day-dreaming, expecting etc. But mind may not necessarily accompany these acts and may not serve to distinguish the above acts. Hannay Alastair interpreting Wittgenstein's views on mind says that "there is nothing specifically mental to point to as the mind at work, or if there is something specifically mental it isn't an explanation of the mental works differentiated by our psychological vocabulary. Similarly when I talk of aspect-seeing in terms of a personal contribution to a basic impression received from outside, nothing in the experience corresponds to this, to see something as a portrait of a friend is not to see one thing superimposed upon another". Any accounts of the mental processes are neither necessary nor sufficient for our understanding mental phenomena.

According to Wittgenstein, when we refer to 'mental occurrences' or 'mental processes' we cannot specify anything that we do in a mental process or anything that occurs mentally. In case of a colour of a flower that "we meant the colour; yet we cannot specify anything we did or anything that occurred, which can be identified with meaning the colour. So we think: "Meaning the colour is just something that occurs in the minds. You cannot say what it is, but you know what it is. It is a unique, in describable mental occurrence. It is something definite but impalpable".

Malcolm interprets Wittgenstein's views on the mental in the following way. Malcolm says, for Wittgenstein the inclination to understand "the mental state of meaning the colour as being
"impalpable" or "intangible" ... is one of the greatest importance. It expresses our idea that mental phenomena are somehow mysterious. Mental acts and states, we feel, are tremendously significant. But we cannot say what they are. Meaning the colour just is "a particular mental act". Remembering what you ate for breakfast is "a certain mental experience". Intending to say "so I must leave at ten o'clock" is a perfectly concrete but indescribable mental state". The fact that a mental experience is indescribable, one cannot get hold of it. That is, for example 'intending' as a mental act cannot be identified with an image or anything that we intend to do. Wittgenstein observes that, the part of the force of the word 'mental' indicates that one should not expect to understand how the word 'mental' works and further that it is something mysterious, inexplicable and occult.

But Wittgenstein dispells this mysteriousness, as he maintains that one should look around and look at the context in which we utter the words. We get confused about the mental concepts when we look inside. This way of looking for 'mind', Wittgenstein says, not only misguides us but throws off the track and make you search for the mental in a wrong place.

Wittgenstein maintains that, it is a fundamental error, that mind is something inner or outer. The 'inner' and 'outer' are, as if the two horns of a dilemma and whichever way one chooses, it is not without objections. If we consider a mental event as an 'inner occurrence' then it has harmful influence, that mental may become occult. A mental event cannot be understood as something
The experience of joy is not equal to some grouping of gestures or some constellation of behavioural responses. According to Wittgenstein, joy designates nothing, it is neither inner nor outer.

In Malcolm’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s views on the mind, Wittgenstein would remark that ‘philosophy should try neither to identify nor explain the phenomena of mind. What should it do then? It should describe language. It should remind us of what we say. It should bring to mind how we actually use the mental terms that confuse us philosophically’.

Wittgenstein does not make it clear what the mental phenomena is. In *Philosophical Investigations* he often discusses the term sensation and the treatment of this term is understood as applicable to other mental phenomena. Wittgenstein’s emphasis is on language and linguistic puzzles, rather than understanding mental phenomena. Many philosophers call Wittgenstein a linguistic behaviourist. But in Malcolm’s interpretation Wittgenstein does not seem to be taking either reductionist or non-reductionist perspective.

**NOTES**


4. Ibid., note 256.

5. Ibid., note 258.


10. A. Vohra, op. cit., pp.75-76.


13. Ibid., p.60.


15. L. Wittgenstein, op. cit., note 293.

16. Ibid., note 304.


24. Ibid.


27. Ibid., p.47.


31. Ibid., p.44.

32. Ibid.


34. Ibid., p.104.

35. Ibid., p.103.

36. Ibid., p.109.

37. Ibid., p.70.


39. Ibid., p.177.

40. L. Wittgenstein, op. cit., note 212.

41. Ibid., note 195.

42. Ibid., note 199.

43. Alastair Hanny, op.cit., p.178.

44. Ibid., p.179.

45. Ibid., p.183.

46. Ibid., p.184.

43. Ibid.
