Critical studies of the contemporary articulations of the problem of mind and consciousness reveal that inspite of the anomalies and inadequacies, they constitute progress and advancement to the understanding of mind. This is particularly so when one evaluates contributions of L. Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong, P.F. Strawson, Donald Davidson, Karl Popper, Saul Kripke, Peter Smith - O.R. Jones and even Richard Rorty.

The discussions on mind when evaluated in terms of three perspectives, namely, the ontological (an inquiry into the existence or reality of entity called mind), the conceptual (an inquiry into the reducibility or irreducibility of the concept of mind) and epistemological (an inquiry into the satisfactoriness of the explanation of 'mind' in mentalistic terms), reveal that most of these philosophers tend to commit 'category mistake' as they attempt to refute arguments 'outside' the perspectives or frameworks within which their articulation is embedded.

Although each perspective is a significant contribution to the understanding of mind as it reveals 'some truth', it does not mean that all contributions, however 'laissez-faire' they may be, are philosophically significant. And even within those that are regarded as serious articulations like the above critical studies, there is a considerable amount of conflicts. And taking into account the logic of argumentation, the recent advances of empirical psychology and neuro-physiology and the criterion for the acceptance of a theory in philosophy of science, the researcher accepted functionalism (with the required modifications) as the most acceptable articulation of mind and consciousness.