In Richard Rorty's 'eliminative' theory of mind, there are no minds and mental processes, no sensations but there are only brains. Rorty's philosophy of mind is influenced by his pragmatist and hermeneutic philosophy of science. Rorty finds the common sensical and intuitive distinction (that mind is a real entity existing separate from the body) as the basis for mind body relation problem. He attacks "incorrigibility" along with the other "marks of the mental" and the doctrine of the given. Rorty defends 'disappearance theory' (one form of materialism) and subscribes to functionalism.

The 'disappearance view', that there are no minds and mental processes, no sensations, but there are only brains, was advocated by Paul Feyerabend, a decade before, Herbert Feigl, J.J.C. Smart and U.T. Place expressed their views. It is this that is defended by Richard Rorty. Rorty feels, the view that there are no sensations, is a plausible view to hold because the developments in the neurophysiological theory, possibly might be successful in giving a complete scientific account of the human being.

Rorty perceives, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey finding new ways in constructing new set of philosophical categories. Each one in the trio found the earlier set-up as "self deceptive". As seen in Chapter II, Wittgenstein attempted to build a new theory of representation going away from mentalism. Heidegger's attempt to set up new philosophical
categories which has nothing to do with science and epistemology. And Dewey offering a "naturalised version" of Hegelian approach to history. The feature that is shared by all the above mentioned three philosophers is that they keep aside the intuitions about the Cartesian mind - its location, its nature and its processes.

Rorty thus is influenced by their spirit and efforts, and sets to attack the notion of Cartesian mind. Incoherent views, discussions and arguments in philosophy of mind, Rorty thinks has paved the way for a 'Scientific Psychology'. Therefore, one who is interested in understanding mind should study Cognitive Science.

One may observe Rorty arguing, "that it is not only consistent but inevitable that philosophers face the 21st Century with a science based not on epistemology but on hermeneutics and that human beings will be in principle, understood completely by a scientific account".

Thus employing science to play a prominent role in philosophy of mind, Rorty questions the common sensical and intuitive distinction (i.e. mind as an entity existing separately from the body) as the basis for mind-body dichotomy. These intuitions help Cartesian dualism to survive with the notion of mind as entity, which 'some how' can linger on even if body were destroyed.

Non-spatiality cannot be the criterion of mental states, since beauty and fame can survive bodily death but are not mental states. Thus, Rorty thinks the primary task is therefore knowing the meaning of the word "mental", as "... our so-called intuition about what is mental may be merely our readiness to
fall in with a specifically philosophical language-game. The term 'mental' for Rorty, cannot be defined as intentional because pains are not 'intentional' and they are not representing anything. 'Mental' cannot be defined as phenomenal as beliefs are not feelings and they lack phenomenal properties.

According to Rorty, the basis for treating 'intentional' as non-material is the fact that any amount of inspection of the brain stuff cannot reveal the 'intentional' and therefore to be treated as non-material. In other words any functional state which can only be known by finding its relation with other elements in a larger set up is treated as non-material. The denial of appearance-reality distinction accounts for, the reason why phenomenal is treated as non-material. Therefore, phenomenal properties cannot be physical properties. It is this epistemic privilege that we have which is incorrigible (about how things appear to us). This epistemic distinction reflects an ontological distinction which has been attacked by Wittgenstein and Ryle.

In making phenomenal immaterial, universals are hypostatised. For example, instead of discussing what is the cause of one being in pain - the 'painfulness' in general (that is, what is essential for something being pain) is discussed.

Rorty interprets the physical-mental distinction as parasitic on universal-particular distinction. He supports the 'nominalist view' to dissolve the mind-body problem. Not recognising 'mental' as having any ontological status, 'pain' and other terms (used as referring to immaterial mind) need not
appear strange. These words will not have any more ontological importance if we take words for what a person feels.

But before 'dissolving' the problem, Rorty explains how certain misunderstandings and confusions have led to the mind-body problem. The major source of the problem is Plato's and Locke's unfortunate mistake of treating adjectives as nouns.

The terms such as 'phenomenal', 'functional', 'intentional' along with certain 'features' which are regarded as the 'marks of the mental' form the vocabulary of recent discussions on mind. Rorty lists the following as 'features' that 'mark the mental' for the dualists: "(1) ability to know itself incorrigibly ('privileged access'), (2) ability to exist separately from the body, (3) non-spatiality (having a non-spatial part or 'element'), (4) ability to grasp universals, (5) ability to sustain relations in existent ('intentionality'), (6) ability to use language (7) ability to act freely, (8) ability to form part of our social group to be "one of us" and (9) inability to be identified with any object "in the world".

Dualists according to Rorty, attempt to bridge the gap between the 'intentional' and the 'phenomenal' by referring to 'incorrigibility' — the privileged access that we have to our experiences. It is this incorrigibility, which is deemed as the essential feature of mind by the dualists which is the cause of mind-body dichotomy.

Rorty observes that Ryle's attempts to dissolve the mind-body problem are based on 'analysis of meanings' and language is considered as behaviour. A particular behaviour, in such an approach Rorty feels, can be considered as satisfying necessary
and sufficient conditions for the ascription of raw feels. Since what is stressed upon and is the language it amounts to saying that our language licenses the inference to the presence of raw feels and this type of interpretations resisted Ryle's logical behaviourism alongwith other drawbacks of the theory.

Like Ryle, Wittgenstein also made an attempt to dissolve the mind-body problem in the discussion of 'sensations' when he argued, "...that sensations are private non-dispositional accompaniments of the behaviour by which they are naturally expressed". But Wittgenstein refused "to recognise those accompaniments as processes that can be named and investigated independently of the circumstances that produce them and the behaviour by which they are naturally expressed".

According to Rorty, behaviourism and Cartesianism share a basic premise, that is, the doctrine of the 'naturally given'. Cartesians take mental process as immediately present to the consciousness whereas behaviourists take the states of physical objects as 'directly present' to consciousness. The behaviourist view that some things can be known directly than the other, falls back on Cartesian epistemology. Philosophers on both the sides claim what can be best known 'and knowing a process means either knowing it that way or else showing that it "really is nothing but" something else which is known that way'. And thus, Rorty claims that the problem is not dissolved inspite of lengthy debate.

Thus Cartesian intuitions about mind claims Rorty, are such that they make materialistic and naturalistic theories about
mind-body dichotomy useless. These features create a wide, unbridgeable gulf — **ontological, epistemological and linguistic** — such that with whatever the materialists laboriously try to fill that it falls short of because of these varied features the separation between mind and body has been argued in various ways.

The diversity in the treatment of mind-body problem is well brought out by Rorty in "The Antipodeans" depicted as materialists. On the one hand what the materialist can see is only a brain process and nothing else. On the other hand the dualists on the basis of 'incorrigibility' and the phenomenal properties claim the mental experiences, internal experiences like feelings and pains as different from the brain states creating the **ontological gap** between the two.

The materialist philosophers think of an identity between the 'mental' and the 'physical'. The materialists, for Rorty, may be divided into two groups — one of reductive materialists and the other of eliminative materialists. J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong are reductive materialists offering a topic neutral account or analysis of mental terminologies and assign them causal roles. But the success of this topic neutral account is doubted by many philosophers. Another difficulty for materialists identification of sensations with brain processes is that sensations appear to have properties which corresponding brain processes lack and therefore, by Leibnitz's law, they cannot be identical. Herbert Feigl realised this major difficulty in his position.

In **eliminative reductionism** there is the denial of sensations — more explicitly, there is the denial of existence of
mind. According to this view there are no minds - there are only brains. The eliminative reductionist view advocated by Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty and Quine, is that there exist only 'neural states' what we misleadingly call sensations. 'Eliminationg' thus, is 'explaining away' without offering any revisionary explanation of the terms reduced. In one sense, according to eliminative reductionists, there are no sensations, yet in another sense what we term a sensation, i.e., a 'neural state' does exist. A strict Leibnitzian identity is not claimed by eliminative reductionists, between the mental and the 'physical' allowing the claim that whatever is true in case of one need not necessarily be true in case of another.

Rorty believes that brain processes are not sensations - these processes are the things which are (wrongly) called 'sensations'. If one were to say 'brain processes' and 'sensations' are same, it would mean that, there is no 'pain sensation' as is experienced, but there is only a brain state. As Rorty argues:

"There is is an obvious sense of 'same' in which what used to be called 'a quantity of calorific fluid' is the same thing as what is now called a certain mean kinetic energy of molecules but there is no reason to think that all features truly predicted of the one may be sensibly predicated of the other. The translation form of the theory holds that if we really understood what we saying when we said things like 'I am having a stabbing pain' we should see that since we are talking about 'topic-neutral' matters we might, for all we know, be talking about brain processes. The disappearance form holds that it is unnecessary to show that suitable translations (into 'topic-neutral' language) of our talk about sensations can be given - as unnecessary as to show that statements about qualities of Calorific fluid, when properly understood, may be seen as topic-neutral statements."13.
But, it is possible to recognise the pain sensations in terms of 'less painful' or 'more painful' for the person one who is experiencing pain. It is this 'pain-sensation' that Rorty wants to deny and says that what we are aware of, non-inferentially is a brain state.

It appears absurd to say that the person who is in pain, experiencing pain sensation is wrong as far as certain determinate features that can be recognised by that person. Secondly, any amount of empirical and scientific evidence that could be given to doubt the existence of such experiences is not sufficient compared to the 'direct awareness' of such experiences by the person. Thirdly, since most of the information that we get is through our sensations, and if sensations are treated as fictitious, the whole programme of theorising becomes fictitious.

The above three consequence not only makes Rorty's position strange but also help to raise objections against his theory of eliminative materialism. Along with Rorty, Paul Feyerabend also defends the disappearance view or eliminative reductionism.

Feyerabend says that 'a new theory of pains will not change the pain; nor will it change the causal connections between the occurrence of pains and the production of 'I am in pain', except perhaps very slightly. It will change the meaning of 'I am in pain'. Now it seems to me that observational terms should be correlated with causal antecedents, not with meanings'.

Feyerabend's above explanation of 'pain' excludes the experiential aspect of pain. What we find is (1) the occurrence of pain; (2) the person making a statement 'I am in pain'; (3) the meaning of the statement; and (4) the cause, stimulus, what
made him to utter that and response to it.

In the case of mentalistic theories the occurrence of pain and its experiencing, is the same thing. According to eliminative reductionism there is nothing over and above the occurrence of pain, the mentalistic 'sensation' element is abolished and pain is identified with the brain process. If existence of the brain states is not dependent on its being experienced, one may ask "... what is that brain state's being experienced, over and above its occurring. There is nothing intrinsic about a brain process that can be identified with the feeling of a pain - 'hurting' is not a property to physical theory; thus we want to know what it is about this brain state which is its hurting".

Thus to whatever extent the eliminative reductionist goes in eliminating mental experiences and sensations, he cannot do so. That such states are ineliminable, can be seen from the fact that there is a stimulus or causal antecedent and an appropriate response to that stimulus. Thus in the eliminative view, the things which are there to be explained are neglected. The dissolution of the mind-body dichotomy problem, the possibility of which Rorty talks about, seems to recede further, as the materialists await for the overthrow of 'incorrigible' mental states. Evidence that will be obtained by electroencephalograms about the nature of mental states along with a powerful brain-theory is materialists' 'hopes' of winning the battle.

To win the battle they look forward to science. Rorty in particular, wants science to play a prominent role in philosophy. Rorty feels that the recent discussions in philosophy of mind
have led to the view that, if one wants to understand 'mind' one should study 'Scientific Psychology' or cognitive science or neuro-psychology. But, as Furlong points out, "any science is a specialised, well entrenched type of hermeneutic discourse. Therefore Scientific Psychology is a form of hermeneutics".

And, how can hermeneutics be scientific?

Rorty discards the traditional distinction between hermeneutics and epistemology as opposites and argues that the distinction is one of degree and not of kind. As he puts it:

"The difference is purely one of familiarity. We will be epistemological where we understand perfectly well what is happening but want to codify it in order to extend, or strengthen, or teach, or "ground" it. We must be hermeneutical where we do not understand what is happening but are honest enough to admit it, rather than being blatantly "Whiggish" about it. This means that we can get epistemological commensuration only where we already have agreed upon practices of inquiry..."

This pragmatist view leads Rorty to assume that all inquiry and research in physical sciences and 'human sciences' is on the same footing. He "views science as one genre of literature - or put the other way around, literature and the arts as inquiries, on the same footing as scientific inquiries. Thus it sees ethics as neither more 'relative' nor 'subjective' than scientific theory, nor as needing to be made scientific. Physics is a way of trying to cope with bits of the universe; ethics is a matter of trying to cope with other bits".

In other words, according to Rorty, a certain 'pragmatic tolerance' is to be shown as far as the casual inconsistencies
and the imprecise use of technical terms are concerned (in ethics, arts and different disciplines).

But there seems to be a serious inconsistency in his views as far as his philosophy of mind and 'hermeneuticised science' is concerned. He would have been consistent, if he had observed, the distinction between the 'mental' and the 'physical' as only 'conventional' resulting in some form of monism. In other words, saying that 'mind-talk' and 'brain-talk' is on the same footing and remaining 'neutral' as far as the materialistic theories about mind are concerned. Reduction of mind-talk to brain-talk would have only pragmatic value.

But, inconsistent with his, pragmatised and hermeneuticised science, Rorty favours and accepts 'functionalism' because he believes it to be a more satisfactory theory. He believes that "functionalism comes down to saying that anything you want to say about persons will have an analogue in something you can say about computers, and that if you know as much about a person as a team consisting of the ideal design engineer and the ideal programmer know about a computer, then you know all there is to know about the person".

Again it would have been consistent with his hermeneuticised science, if Rorty, had not eliminated the ascription of desires, pains and beliefs to oneself and others (whatever is included in folk psychology) because it is useful in social practice. There is no guarantee that the elimination of such talk in folk psychology would help more accurate predictions.

But Rorty makes the ascription of desires, beliefs, and
pains to oneself and others, as functional states. He discards in a catalyst fashion, folk psychology, talk about intuitions, beliefs, desires as groundless and insignificant in a scientific explanation. One finds Rorty employing science to play a confused and ambiguous role in his philosophy of mind. According to him, whatever mind-talk fits in the 'explanatory scheme' is appropriate, what cannot be integrated in the scheme becomes a wheel which does not play any role in the machine.

The principal thesis of Rorty in, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, is to show that 'mind is an ontological entity' is a misleading cartesian 'invention'. A sub-topic from the book 'The Antipodeans' depicts the materialists in the form of a science fiction story. The story begins with the Antipodean's important features:

"Far away, on the other side of our galaxy, there was a planet on which lived beings like ourselves — .... wrote poems and computer programs. These beings did not know that they had minds. They had notions like "wanting to" and "intending to" and "believing that" and "feeling terrible" and "feeling marvelous". But they had no notion that these signified *mental states* - states of a peculiar and distinct sort - quite different from "sitting down", "having a cold" ..."21.

"Neurology and biochemistry had been the first disciplines in which technological breakthroughs had been achieved and a large part of the conversation of these people concerned the state of their nerves. When their infants veered toward hot stoves mothers cried out, "He'll stimulate his C - fibers" .... Their knowledge of physiology was such that each well formed sentence in the language which anybody bothered to form could easily to correlated with a readily identifiable neural state"22.

The earth philosophers visiting the Antipodeans, in their conversation with them, talk about mind and other mental experiences what the Antipodeans cannot understand.
Assuming that the term "science" in the illustration will have the similar meaning, as what we understand by science (science of neurology and biochemistry), since it is presented by Rorty as (earth man) and not by any creature so called anti-podean. The Anti-podean observation of nerves then, will be similar to our actually perceiving a nerve as a neurophysiologist might do, while observing a patient or we may refer to the inferred causal generator or the observations that a physiologist has. The illustration cannot stand because if we assume that the Anti-podeans observe their own neural processes then they observe both, the brain-state as well as the resulting sensation, may be pain, which is something difficult to understand and believe in, as it is unlike our own experience.

According to Rorty, it is a completely different experience. But it is not the difference in the experience, rather the language that they use to refer to their experiences. In their talk about a person's C-fibres being stimulated, they are speaking of the event not as they observe it, but as they have learned to understand it. It is much as we, having learned some rudimentary anatomy, would say under certain conditions, "my nerves are on edge" or "my stomach is upset". Moreover, the Anti-podean child has to learn the neural terminology. Unless he learns that, the statements about neuron firings, he will have no meaning. The earth child can refer to his stomach, in case he is asked about his stomach ache. But before he could reply, he should learn to associate the meaning with the organ. In case of an Anti-podean child, to what he will apply the words 'C-fibers'? The child then has to presume that there is C-fiber stimulation
on the basis of something that is directly observable to him, and
on the basis of that correlating C-fiber stimulation. The obvious
question that can be raised, is that, what is directly
experienced by the Anti-podean child?

When the Anti-podean child learns what the C-fibers are and
their stimulation, it is possible that, he may explain his 'pain
experience' in terms of C-fiber stimulation. He will understand
both the stimulus and response, in terms of neural terminology,
that is he will use different neural referents. It is obvious
that he should notice, that the 'original' referent escapes the
physiologist's observation, with the help of which he inferred
the stimulation of C-fibers.

Thus, the C-fiber stimulation itself is not awkward or
unpleasant - at least to the physiologist observer - it is
neutral, as other fiber stimulation in the brain. The
physiologist does not find C-fiber stimulation unpleasant because
this feature is not presented by C-fiber firing to the observer.
The feature that is present in our experiences is missing in the
neural terminology. Rorty's suggestion of Anti-podean's
describing their experiences in a different way because of their
advanced neurology and biochemistry, cannot yield to Rorty, what
he expects. In other words, what Rorty awaits for is the
advancement in neurology, revealing the nature of mental
experiences. But to whatever extent it advances, in case of pain
it is true that, the unpleasant feeling which is experienced by
the person who is observed, is absent in the observer. The
distinction one can make, is only in terms of feelings, namely,
'my feelings' different from 'your feelings' the difference between observed and the observer.

Rorty maintains that the language that we use to communicate our pain-experience can be replaced without any detectable loss by language about neural states. And in case of Anti-podeans, Rorty says "their knowledge of physiology was such that each well-formed sentence in the language which anybody bothered to form could easily be correlated with a readily identifiable neural states". An Anti-podean thus can alternatively say: "It looked like an elephant, but then it struck me that elephants don't occur on this continent, so I realised that it must be a mastodon" or "I had G-412 together with F-11, but then I had S-147, so I realised that it must be a mastodon". In other words, according to Rorty, our thoughts can be reported in terms of neural states. Kenneth T. Gallagher objects to Rorty's claim that Rorty's Anti-podeans already cannot correlate any sentence or thought with a neural state. He says nobody including Rorty will deny the possibility of infinite number of sentences in a language. It is this very possibility which suggests that the correlation between every sentence, every thought and the neural state is impossible. Correlations cannot be given in tabulated form and on the spot correlation, by Anti-podean cannot be imagined, since it will require some scientific means. If the correlation is discovered by scientific means, then it cannot be made by any speaker with regard to the novel sentences that he has just pronounced. Further, in order there to be a correlation of thoughts with neural states, a thought should be available as well as a neural state should also be available. Granting that
the ordinary speaker might take somebody's (scientist's) word for the neural state, Rorty cannot talk about the correlation of thoughts with neural states. The neural state should be directly available, in which case, the ordinary speaker would not have to rely on somebody's word, as it (somebody's word) cannot be the correlating neural state. Kenneth Gallagher maintains that one cannot learn about one's thoughts on the basis of empirical observations of one's neural states. Our thought experience is not an indirect experience, such that others around us can tell what thoughts, a particular person is experiencing.

Further, criticising Rorty's correlation of thoughts with neural states, Gallagher says that the process of 'correlating' itself, will be a thought. If so, then for that thought one has to look for a neural state, which cannot be listed in the tabulated form. Nor, on the spot correlation is possible, on the assumption that we cannot observe our own neural states.

Even if it is maintained that, later we could find out this correlation, it generates another correlation, which cannot be expressed, leading to infinite regress. It shows the impossibility of our every thought to be correlated with neural states. Thus, Gallagher comments that the Anti-podean illustration does not seem to be doing what Rorty intended it to do.

Rorty attacks the traditional epistemology on the ground that research programmes based on this have failed. Therefore, instead of epistemology, a form of hermeneutics should be pursued. According to him, hermeneutics helps to overcome the
incommensurability of various discourses. Knowledge has social agreement as its basis. Knowledge, then is "the sort of statement which can be agreed to be true by all participants whom the other participants count as 'rational'." Rorty's Philosophy is thus therapeutic and aims at edification. In his revision of the world there is "the project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking".

Peter Blum aptly sums up Rorty's objective when he writes:

"Rorty means this project to stand in stark contrast with the Cartesian/Kantian project of finding ultimate foundations and adjudicating truth claims in terms of them. Rorty's notion of 'better' ways of speaking is elaborated in terms of pragmatic considerations rather than epistemic ones. The place of philosophy qua hermeneutics in the human conversation is that of informed participant, and not that of judge or referee.... To put this yet another way, Rorty's "post philosophical" philosophy has no set goal other than helping to ensure that no one becomes too entrenched in any particular way of thinking.".

On the other hand "with whom Rorty repeatedly likes to trace his own philosophical lineage", Heidegger for example, for him (Heidegger) 'the end of philosophy' has a different meaning. In general, according to Heidegger, 'the end of philosophy' means the completion of meta-physics. For Heidegger, "the development of philosophy into the independent sciences, which however, inter dependently communicate among themselves, even more markedly, is the legitimate completion of philosophy".

The meaning of the phrase 'end of philosophy' for two philosophers differs. While Heidegger perceives the philosophy's
triumph in finding its place in scientific attitudes whereas Rorty's hermeneutical pursuit in philosophy and Mirror of Nature, seem to aim at deconstruction in philosophy. According to Henry Veatch "... the thesis of that book boils down to the contention that it is singularly wrong headed for philosophy to try to be, much less to go on any longer claiming to be, anything like a mirror of nature. And what is this if not an effort at deconstruction on Rorty's part, and of deconstruction with respect to one of the most ancient and honorable theses of western Philosophy - the thesis viz., of what might be called a traditional Aristotelian realism and empiricism?"

In Rorty's philosophy of mind, he employs science to play an ambiguous and confused role, which leads to serious inconsistencies in his position.

Consistent with Rorty's hermeneuticised science one may draw certain features of his philosophy of mind. One may consistently think that Rorty will be a monist and a non-reductionist. Since he upholds pragmatism, one expects Rorty to remain 'neutral' as far as materialistic approaches about 'mind' are concerned. Again, one expects Rorty to be soft on folk psychology as it is useful in social practice.

However, one finds that, this extra-polated version is inconsistent with Rorty's actual philosophy of mind. One observes serious inconsistencies in Rorty as he adopts a reductionist approach and favours a particular materialistic approach, namely, functionalism. He is also seen as inconsistent in his views with regard to folk psychology and ascription of
beliefs and desires to oneself and others are concerned. He eliminates the talk about folk psychology in his theory.

Rorty maintains that there are no sensations but here are only brains. Thus in Rorty's eliminative reductionism, he attempts to eliminate 'mind' in case of mind-body problem, instead of explaining the relation between the two and thus he goes beyond the debate in mind-body problem.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p.5.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p.492.
7. Anybody can be mistaken about attributing a physical property to anything but one cannot be mistaken about how the pain feels one who has the pain.
10. Ibid.
12. "Ontological Gap" between two entities such that the two entities cannot be identified by empirical means.


19. Pragmatic tolerance: The faults like "minor disputes in exegesis, the causal inconsistency, the occasional imprecision in the use of technical terms" --- according to Rorty should be tolerated so that there would be no inhibition in the "Conversation of Mankind". John Furlong; "Scientific Psychology as hermeneutics? Rorty's Philosophy of Mind", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.XLVIII, No.3, 1988, p.489.


22. Ibid., p.71.


25. Ibid., p.72.

26. Ibid., p.320.

27. Ibid., p.350.


29. Ibid., p.226.

The present chapter attempts a three-fold task: review the major arguments analysed in the critical studies preceding this chapter; suggest a methodological framework to study the varied perspectives, and justify why functionalism is the most acceptable position within such a framework.

(A) Dualism upholds the view that mind is distinct from the body and that mind is a real entity. This two component view seems to be going against the contemporary scientific view, according to which every human behaviour in principle can be explained without referring to any non-physical entity. A man is subject to physical, chemical and other bio-chemical laws as are other things in the world. His behaviour therefore, is causally determined and one need not postulate a 'free-will' to account for actions.

The attractive dualist version of mind-body turns out to be highly problematic when confronted by questions such as: what precisely is meant by a non-physical entity? Where is it located in the body? What is its nature? What is its relation with body? The problems regarding identification of mind, existence of one mind in one body, continuity of the mind in a body etc. remain unsolved.

It is a scientific fact that from simple more complex has evolved. Dualism gets a serious blow when number of questions go unanswered. If evolution is true then there are no gaps in between the two extremes, say animals on the one hand and human
being on the other. The chain is filled by various other species of organisms. If this is true then a dualist has to answer where and what stage mind evolves. Further, one cannot say, in case of chimpanzees there is no mind at all and all of a sudden in case of man it exists. Such sharp demarcations at any level of evolutionary process are ruled out and therefore a dualist cannot account for his claim that only humans have got minds. Again, a dualist cannot hold that in case of evolution of physical things there are no gaps, but in case of evolutions of non-physical entity like 'mind' there is a 'sudden-jump'. Interactionism, as a relation between mind and body, as maintained in the dualist thesis is also objected. Mind being immaterial and body material, the two distinct entities, one observable and the other abstract, poses a serious difficulty, as to how this two can interact and where do they interact.

A dualist as he maintains that physical events have immaterial causes goes against the scientific principle that this world is 'causally closed', neural events in the brain are responsible for all our behaviour. In turn, these mental events, as per dualist account, are caused by mind or immaterial principle. But 'closure-principle' does not allow for any immaterial event to be the cause of a physical event.

The inadequacy of Cartesian dualism to provide a satisfactory solution to mind-body problem, serves as a background with reference to which each perspective is developed in various reductionist and non-reductionist interpretations of mind.
In order to grasp the nature of mental phenomena, Wittgenstein considers that, understanding and analysis of language is very important. The discussions of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind includes the discussion of quite general issues about the nature of mind rather than the discussion of particular mental states like beliefs, thought, emotion etc. In *Philosophical Investigations* he often discusses the term sensation and the treatment of this term is understood as applicable to other mental phenomena, thus ignoring the distinctive features of various mental processes.

Wittgenstein's claim that sensations are communicable through outward responsive behaviour (reaction to some sensation) forced many philosophers to call him a 'linguistic behaviourist'. J.J.C. Smart Comments that "inspite of his own disclaimer, Wittgenstein is in fact a sort of behaviourist". One may find Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind unsatisfactory as he has not been able to address himself to the specific question 'what is mind'? His *Philosophical Investigations* appear to be 'dogmatically negative', since every attempt made to analyse fundamental mental states is disposed off alongwith the refusal to admit that there exist private phenomena.

Don Locke critically comments that, although Wittgenstein refutes the sceptic's claim (that the sceptic only can know whether he is in pain), Wittgenstein himself commits the same mistake. Wittgenstein, at the initial stage, to argue against the possibility of private language, accepts that if 'pain' is understood as a private sensation, then only the person who is experiencing that 'pain' can know that he is in pain.
Wittgenstein does not notice that, it is on the basis of above assumption, a sceptic argues for his claim. Wittgenstein's failure to notice this is partly because of his basic desire to show that philosophical puzzles arise from the misunderstanding about how language works and partly because Wittgenstein fails to distinguish between the two claims: that 'pains' and similar things which only one person can feel and the claim that 'pains' and similar things which one person can know.

In refuting scepticism Wittgenstein neither argues that it (scepticism) is absurd because it is based on a mistaken theory of language nor he says the theory of language is mistaken because it leads to an absurd sceptical conclusion and therefore thinks that the theory of language which commits us to it must be mistaken. One may observe Wittgenstein as mistaken in his thinking that it is the theory of language which commits us to scepticism about other minds.

Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of 'private language' and 'memory' as a criterion cannot escape from severe criticisms levelled by various philosophers, in their discussion of Wittgenstein's 'beetle's argument' and 'diary argument'.

Wittgenstein repeatedly remarks that nothing can be said about the mental. Norman Malcolm interprets Wittgenstein as considering the mind as neither something 'inner' nor 'outer' and further holding the view that whichever way one chooses, it is not without objections. Based on Malcolm's interpretation, it may be said that Wittgenstein does not seem to be taking either reductionist or non-reductionist perspective.
Gilbert Ryle understands 'mind' in terms of appropriate behavioural responses given as the actualisation of a disposition. Disposition, the key term in Ryle's philosophy of mind means the tendency to behave. Thus mind and other psychological concepts are reduced to 'dispositions' or 'tendencies to behave'.

Ryle's approach of providing clarification in case of language confusions has been objected to, as only one-sided solution. All problems in philosophy need not necessarily be, because of language confusions. Therefore, linguistic analysis can be only a method to solve certain philosophical problems and should not be treated as the sole aim of philosophy.

Ryle can be criticised for his identification of the 'meaning' with the 'method' of verification with reference to the term 'intelligence'. The meaning of the term is sought in the activities done. Positivists with the verification method emphasised 'facts' of life whereas Ryle without going to the 'facts' of nature which are essential to understand the meaning of the words we use in language, seeks meaning only to find out to what use they can be put.

Although Ryle talks about the category mistake he does not bother to define, in his Concept of Mind, what a category is. Warnock critically comments that Ryle is not entitled to employ the term category, because "if one is not prepared and indeed is deliberately unwilling, to say what a category is, and what categories there are, can one really be entitled to employ the term category?".
Though Ryle says that he does not want to increase our knowledge by introducing a new theory of mind, yet he does so by introducing theory of dispositions. His account of dispositions can be questioned: can there not be a disposition which is not manifested in overt behaviour, but by virtue of which that person has private experiences, private experience of a certain type?

Again, Ryle's criteria of certifying the presence of any ability in a person is fallible although it is true to some extent that the presence of any ability is manifested in at least some of his acts. The 'leap' in Rylean inference from one's overt behaviour to the presence of ability in a person is not as guaranteed as Ryle thinks. Besides, Ryle has not distinguished between human dispositions and dispositions of other non-living objects. When difficulties arise while reducing psychological concepts to dispositions, Ryle is forced to term them 'semi-dispositions' which cannot replace mind.

Ryle's attempt of replacing consciousness by dispositions result in absurd consequences. Thus an intelligent man's body is disposed to behave intelligently under certain conditions, without that man's being conscious of his intelligent doings which is absurd and unacceptable. Ryle's contention that we are not aware of our mental life through consciousness can be questioned, if consciously experienced mental processes, are not able to reveal the 'hidden' how can our outward behaviour expose the mental? Ryle's inquiring into the logical behaviour of words in sentences containing mental concepts, adopts a reductive approach, to reduce mental concepts to dispositions.

H.P. Rickman criticises Ryle saying that his criticism
implied in the 'ghost' metaphor does not hit the target. Rickman comments that the ghost metaphor misdescribes and misrepresents dualism. This is, because Ryle misread the nature of dualism, according to Rickman. He says that "the derisive thrust of Ryle's metaphor lies in the word 'ghost' because most of us consider belief in ghosts a superstition".

According to him a 'ghost in the machine' theory shifts the problem of mind-body dualism to two tier materialism. Rickman points out that just as ghosts are understood as comprising of thin matter since 'mind' is compared with a ghost, mind is also a kind of thin matter.

(D) The supporters of the identity theory maintain that it is possible to give a physicalist account of human beings and their actions. In identity thesis, an identity is sought between brain-processes and mental states. It is asserted that there is the correlation between the brain events and mental events. Though there is a great dependence of mental processes on brain functioning, the assertions of the identity theory that there is a correlation between mental experiences and brain events go beyond the evidence provided by empirical research.

J.T. Stevenson objects to the 'strict-identity' saying that the supposed identity falls short of evidence. That is, there is no exact correspondence between the mental experiences and brain-processes such that from observation of a person's brain states one can arrive at the knowledge of his experiences.

Roland Pucetti treats the materialistic interpretation of mind as fallacious. According to him our mental states can
always be distinguished from physio-chemical processes going on in our brain. He firmly believes that irrespective of advanced scientific research and knowledge the distinction between the mental and the physical will remain. An argument based on mental structure is put forth by J.J. Clarke to maintain the distinction between mind, as an integrated whole and brain, physically functioning organ, like a machine. Multiple thoughts, feelings, experiences go to make up a person's mental life. Although individual perception and experiences are distinguishable, they are only episodes in one integrated whole.

Armstrong's thesis is critised by W. Keneale for supporting Place-Smart's view even after observing that they have paid little attention to the analysis of mind.

The identity thesis may be observed as inconsistent. Those who claim an identity between the mental and the physical, do not consider an individual as identical, under the light of two different descriptions, but consider as two different kinds of things.

The identity theorist's usage of philosophical terminology can be questioned because of their claim that the identity is contingent and can be understood only through scientific researches.

Thomas Nagel criticising materialism in general and Armstrong's theory in particular says that, mental states are assigned the causal roles without giving an account of their intrinsic nature which is necessary since we experience them directly.
A materialist denies mental experiences and after-images, what we normally accept as taking place. Because of his denial of mental experiences he is like an unconscious person who is not aware of anything, a materialist while giving a materialist account of the mental experiences, sensations etc., must pretend to be anaesthetised. If he is conscious he would comment that the theory is false. Therefore, we may say that a materialistic theory is not correct inspite of strong arguments that may be advanced in favour of the theory.

The identity thesis may be questioned that, how can one hold an identity between two different things belonging to two different categories? Mind belongs to one category and is unobservable whereas body is observable. In order to identify both the things, we should be able to pick out both the things. One cannot pick out 'mind' as it is not a physical organ or something concrete. In turn the identity thesis may be taken as suggesting positively, that there is mind.

Jerome Shaffer contends that our mental experiences cannot be located. He says, when there is a 'pain' in the leg, the state of awareness that he is in pain, is neither in the leg nor in the head. Therefore, he doubts the contention of the identity theory as it cannot meet the "co-existence requirement". Though the materialists uphold the 'closure principle', in their reductionist account of the mental experiences like after-images, they face the difficulties, which shows that our subjective experiences are irreducible.

Popper comments that the identity between a mental state and a brain-state based on gene-DNA analogy is not only unwarranted
but even misleading. For the latter has the empirical evidence in its support whereas in case of former, the corresponding physical change in the brain is not sufficient to explain some triggered behaviour in an organism.

Thus, the identity theory rejects 'mind' as an ontological entity only to reduce it to physico-chemical brain processes.

(E) Strawson maintains that the concept of 'Person' is logically primitive. That is, it is not to be understood in a certain way --- as considering it a secondary entity to both the concepts --- concept of a body and that of a mind. In other words, concept of 'persons' is not the compound of the mind and the body.

If we accept Strawson's contention that the concept of 'person' is not the compound of the mind and the body, then strange consequences follow. that, the physical characteristics will be attributed to the 'person' as well as the material body. And we are forced to say that John Smith and his body have identical physical characteristics which is nonsense. This difficulty can be avoided if Strawson either accepts dualism or abandons his view that the concept of 'person' is logically primitive.

A person has conscious experiences as well as it will be a material entity. In Strawson's theory, the material body is not a part of the person, therefore, Strawson has to specify in what sense can we say of a person as having a material body.

Criticisms can be raised against Strawson's distinction between P-predicates and M-predicates. B.A.O. Williams observes
that the above distinction is rooted in Descrates' thought the division of complex attributes into the physical and the mental. Further, as many P-predicates and highly corporeal, it is difficult to see which are really M-predicates. Hence, Williams criticises Strawson's ascription of P-predicates and M-predicates as unclear.

Strawson's contention that personal identity can be held through the retaining of one's experiences -- that is memory, cannot be accepted -- as it is well known that memory of a person is not sufficient for the above purpose.

H.D. Lewis points out that in the very statement of the problem of ascription of predicates there appear "unwarranted assumption". Lewis maintains that for the ordinary purpose we do ascribe states of consciousness and physical characteristics to the same entity, but we cannot allow this to be decisive in philosophy as is done by Strawson.

Strawson's contention that identification of others is possible through the observation of their bodily movements is objected to by Lewis. He points out that if we accept above mentioned Strawson's contention, then one finds it difficult to understand one's functioning independent of our bodies. Lewis further comments that Strawson's explanation of 'depression' is mystifying. Lewis criticises Strawson for his failure to distinguish between the two senses of language, ordinary sense and philosophical sense, such that the linguistic convention becomes the head of the corner in Strawson's arguments and is made to bear the weight of all his far-reaching contentions in
his book.

J.O. Urmson criticises Strawson's criterion of ascription of predicates saying that the observation of other's which involve doing something is not a sufficient criteria for ascription of predicates. Strawson's assertion and criteria to identify one's own body from the other bodies is also criticised. It may be observed that Strawson's usage of the term 'person' comes close to ordinary usage of the term which also invites criticisms.

Davidson upholds 'mechanism' and at the same time maintains that our subjective experiences are irreducible. For Davidson, sensation is a brain process, but he denies that there are strict laws governing this process. Further, he holds that reliable psycho-physical generalisations are incapable of being refined into strict laws. Davidson names his position as 'anamalous monism'.

Davidson accepts three principles: (1) he holds a causal interaction between the mental and the physical, (2) he holds the principle of nomological character of causality and (3) the non-existence of precise psycho-physical laws.

Armstrong contends that the three principles accepted by Davidson are incompatible. Armstrong asserts an identity between the physical and the mental, and should also assume that the extra properties of the physical events in question go to constitute mental and are of a non-physical nature. But these extra properties should give causal power to the mental and in case if this does not happen then this goes against the principle of causal interaction on the one hand and on the other, if they
do bestow a causal power, then these properties should bestow a law-governed power, leading to the conclusion that there must be precise psycho-physical laws which is contrary to one of the principles accepted by Davidson. In an objection to Davidson's theory, Howard Robinson not only names it as a 'Dual Aspect Theory' but also calls it 'epiphenomenalism', since the necessary and sufficient conditions should be only physical. Consequently, the 'mental' becomes an 'idle by-product' of the physical system.

Robinson critically comments that the interactionism supposed in the theory is entirely 'empty'. There cannot be any interaction at all as the mental part does not bring about any effect. It means then, even if the mental had been absent, the effect would not have been different. The fact that mental events and states are present is not sufficient to say that it interacts with physical.

Robinson further observes that Davidson's claim about supervenience of the mental on the physical is useless to his non-reductive materialism.

J.J.C. Smart points out that Davidson does not treat occurrent experiences seriously. Experiences such as, having of an itch or a memory image, these occurrent experiences are not touched upon by a materialist and Davidson being a materialist, if his argument is taken for materialism in general, then it will have a serious lacuna in it. Since it is these occurrent experiences are understood as providing greatest difficulty for the materialist. Again, Smart points out that Davidson's talk about 'psychology' is not about the 'scientific psychology' which avoids reference to intentional states.
K.V. Wilkes comments that in philosophy it has become a fashion to talk about 'psychology'. Further, she critically comments that the theories of action and perception discussed by philosophers, with reference to common sense psychology are 'arm chair' theories and therefore they "are and will be going nowhere". Davidson argues for irreducible psychical aspect of our experiences and yet upholds materialism.

(K) Karl Popper accepting the existence of the 'self' says that the individual who feels, hopes, fears, enjoys etc. is a 'self'. He maintains that we get the knowledge about self when we learn, react, experience and observe world 1, world 2 and world 3. According to Popper the changes in self are dependent on physical as well as on one's intellectual ability to invent and to develop. Popper understands individuals as the product of psycho-physical interactionism which takes place between the three worlds.

It may be said that, allowing Popper's psycho-physical interactionism in science is detrimental to the progress of Science. Since the success of science is attributed to its method, the assumption of non-physical entities, if not contradicting science, at least will initiate a change in its method leading to statistical and probabilistic laws.

Popper's view that all processes in living organisms are in accordance with the laws by physics and chemistry, makes his theory as a type of physicalism where the notion of 'organism' is not properly explained. That is, there is no room for the 'specialities' of an organism.
Tom Settle comments that although it is true that, World 3 objects are necessary for thought in Popper's psychophysical interactionism, they can contribute as causes without being dynamic, for example, we see the collapse of social institutions when people stop supporting that. Settle arguing against interactionism says that it cannot be accepted as it bifurcates a human being into interacting parts. And we do not experience ourselves as bifurcated into a body and a mind.

Objections are raised against the Popperian claim that man is not a machine. It is said that the matter out of which the machine is made is unimportant. A particular device is called a machine on the basis of how it functions, operates, changes its states and so forth. If this is true, then a man can be called a machine. Further, the possibility of the successful functionalistic computational programs for describing and explaining human psychology and behaviour, may prove fatal to Popper's view that man is not a machine.

It is said that a computational programme can be realised by various devices including non-physical things also. And if the same programme is performed by a computer and a human being, possessing a non-physical mind, then human beings can also be called as machines.

Popper's view that the physical world is not causally closed, leads to the conclusion that there is a contradiction in ethology, in which the assumption of interactionism in evolutionary theory is discussed. J. Van Rooijen points out that there is no such contradiction between evolutionary process and
the assumption that the universe is causally closed. Rooijen explains that, though mental events are seen as influencing the material, they are understood as causes or effects of physical processes. Rooijen explains further, that mental experiences are seen as adaptations, as secondary properties and are adaptively neutral. Rooijen in his critical comments says: "Because it is not correct that only things that make a difference have emerged during evolution there exist no contradiction between evolution and the assumption of a causally closed universe. Although the assumption of a causally closed universe is not necessarily correct this conclusion implies that Popper's argument for interactionism does not hold".

Popper's rejection of the deterministic view of psychology is criticised by saying that even though mind is considered as non-physical, one can still hold determinism. In that case non-physical entities will be subject to physical laws. And that 'non-physicality' of mind cannot be taken as establishing indeterminism as far as mental events are concerned.

Herbert Feigl and Paul E. Meehl, criticise Popperian contention about the 'closure principle' and Popper's rejection of deterministic principle. Feigl and Meehl point out, Popper's contention that, it is impossible to predict the properties of the complexes based on their constituent parts, cannot be taken as an argument against the possibility of deterministic theories.

Interactionism thus presupposed in the three worlds includes the mental and the physical interaction. But Popper may be criticised, for not explaining what is fundamental in the process of interactionism. Or how it takes place within a person, that
is, how his mind and body interact?

(H) Kripke accepts the Cartesian intuition that mind is distinct from the body and argues for it in a novel way. Kripke adopting a non-reductionist approach maintains that the mental cannot be reduced to the physical. However, he rejects mind in the sense of Cartesian substance.

Kripke arguing against the identity thesis maintains that, claimed identity between the mental and the physical cannot be a contingent one, but it has to be a necessary identity. Further, he claims that it is impossible for the identity theorists to show that the identity is necessary. Since they cannot provide a 'contingent associated discovery' Kripke concludes that mental is not identical with the physical.

Kripke's argument involve 'rigid' and 'non-rigid' designators. Kripke's assumption that a 'pain' is a rigid designator can be doubted. Since in the functionalist doctrine a 'pain' will be anything that plays a functional role and it is possible for many things to play such a role, 'pain' ceases to be a rigid designator.

Michael Levin argues against Kripke's contention that the reference of pain can be fixed only by 'pain-sensation'. Levin 9 maintains that 'Australian descriptions' which hold contingently of 'pain' can be used to fix the reference of 'pain'. He critically comments that 'over concentration on this example has made him' (Kripke) "over look the other ways to fix reference than by causal effects on the human senses" .

William G. Lycan points out that Kripke's view of necessary
identity is based on an argument from 'imaginability'. Lycan says, Kripke does not accept the argument as it stands and that his 'imaginability' argument is of a notably fragile and ephemeral type.

Lycan mentions the analogy of genes with DNA molecules and says that they are distinguishable, though they are necessarily identical, against Kripke's view that, the two things if they are necessarily identical, then they are indistinguishable.

Against, criticizing Kripke's assumption that 'pain' is a 'rigid' designator, we may say that, we cannot decide to refer to 'pain' by saying to oneself 'this is what henceforth, I will call pain'. In other words, we may say that 'pains' cannot be identified with the help of references, in turn we can do so by a description, where 'pains' are not referred to as something. Therefore, it may be said that 'pain' cannot be fixed by any designator at all.

Colin McGinn finds that Kripke's argument holds against 'type-type' identity, but it does not hold against 'token-token' identity. McGinn maintains that in the case of 'token-token' identity, the required criteria of epistemic counterpart clearing the illusion of contiguity is possible. Thus McGinn not only thinks that the challenging requirement put forth by Kripke can be met in 'token-token' materialist theories but also that these theories are rather strengthened by such considerations.

(1) Peter Smith and O.R. Jones develop a functionalist theory of mind on the basis of Aristotelian framework. In this theory, perception plays an important role, since, it is through
information, through perceptual processes, that we come to frame beliefs about the objects in the world. A belief state is a physical state in this theory. But what gives rise to one's behaviour is not the 'intrinsic physical constitution' but the function that is carried out along with the other interacting states.

It may be objected that, since any 'functionalism' aims at reduction of the mental to the physical, Smith and Jones' functionalism is a form of physicalism according to which we are entirely composed of 'physical stuff'.

David Cockburn criticises this version of functionalism saying that this 'naturalistic view' appears too much like a piece of science. He further says that Smith/Jones have not clearly distinguished between conceptual questions and scientific questions, a distinction that is rather important. Cockburn feels that this "naturalistic alternative to dualism is degrading; that it commits us to the denial that human beings have the kind of 'value' which, before the advance of modern science, we might have supposed them to have".

Smith and Jones in their functionalist approach give more importance to the 'scientific' type of dependence (mental dependent on physical as maintained by science) rather than another sort of 'dependence' as has been argued by many philosophers, that our capacity and ability to think is dependent on our possessing, something called as human form. It may be objected that Aristotelian form-matter distinction has not been properly applied to human beings.
This theory does not explain, how mere increase in complexity of our physical brain stuff, can affect our attitudes, feelings of love and emotion. Again, in this theory, an animal will have a mental life if it has got the capacity for complex interactions with the environment. The problem however remains regarding our attitudes and reactions towards other people and still different towards animals as they are marked off in our thought from other portions of nature.

This functionalist theory may be criticised as not maintaining a distinction between an action and a bodily movement. All bodily movements may have physical causes, but all bodily movements are not actions because the factors that explain a bodily movement may not explain an 'action'. This form of functionalism can be criticised for their enforcing the view that it is the business of science to determine what a 'person' or 'mind' is.

(J) Richard Rorty's philosophy of mind is influenced by his pragmatist and hermeneuticised philosophy of science. Consistent with Rorty's pragmatic and hermeneutical approach one may draw certain features of his philosophy of mind. One expects that Rorty will be a monist and non-reductionist in his philosophy of mind. Since Rorty upholds pragmatism that he will be neutral as far as materialistic approaches about mind are concerned, John Furlong says that consistent with his pragmatism Rorty will be soft on folk psychology since social practice is the form and utility is the telos of human endeavour, it would be inconsistent to urge throwing out the set piece of social practice --- the
ascribing of beliefs, desires, pains and mental images to oneself and others.

However one finds that this extra-polated version is inconsistent with Rorty's actual philosophy of mind. One may observe serious inconsistencies in Rorty as he adopts a reductionist approach and favours a particular materialistic approach namely, functionalism. Rorty in his eliminative theory of mind maintains that there are no minds and no mental processes, but there are only brains. Rorty would have been consistent if he had maintained the distinction between 'mental' and the 'physical' as only 'conventional' resulting in some form of monism. Again Rorty in his real philosophy of mind accepts functionalism because he maintains that it is the "pragmatical attitude towards persons and minds". Furlong criticising Rorty says that, Rorty cannot plead for functionalism on the ground that it has a superior fit with reality, even 'psychological reality', though Rorty's Antipodean thought experiment in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature comes close to it. Furlong says that the Correspondence is out, and therefore, is the availability of the most powerful arguments for functionalism.

Rorty shows inconsistency in his thought by eliminating the ascription of desires and pains, to oneself and others. One may find Rorty employing science to play a confused and ambiguous role in his philosophy of mind.

Kenneth T. Gallagher criticises Rorty's Antipodean thought experiment, saying that there cannot be the type of correlation between the brain processes and mental experiences as Rorty
expects. And that Rorty's Antipodean thought experiment remains only a fiction.

Rorty maintains that a form of hermeneutics should be pursued instead of epistemology. Criticism of Rorty can best be summed up in Furlong's words: it (hermeneutics) "wins on the analysis of grounds and loses on the analysis of its favourite phenomenon". And it is this that brings about a contradiction between Rorty's philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.

The debate concerning mind, seen in the above critical studies, has varied frameworks within which the perspectives be understood. Our option regarding the kind of metaphilosophy adopted, namely, defensive rather than aggressive, reveals to us that there are three frameworks within which inquiry has been conducted by various exponents. There are those who are committed to a conceptual analysis and for whom the question of paramount importance is what do we mean when we use the mind vocabulary and concepts. Secondly, there are those whose primary concern is to know how do we know 'mind' exists. In other words, theirs is a commitment to an epistemological inquiry regarding mind. And finally, there are those who address themselves to variety of questions but are committed to an inquiry regarding the nature and status of entity called mind. Theirs is an ontological concern. In short, the ontological perspective is an inquiry into the existence or reality of entity called mind. The conceptual perspective inquires into the reducibility or irreducibility of the concept of mind. The epistemological perspective is an inquiry into the satisfactoriness of the
explanation of 'mind' in mentalistic terms.

These three perspectives or frameworks within which the inquiry is articulated, although distinguishable may not be separable in a particular tradition. But one can and does observe the primariness if not exclusiveness, of the concern in the above critical studies. One, however, observes great deal of confusion regarding the perspectives in individual thinkers. This coupled with philosophical polemics purported to be refutations of a particular theory lead to serious 'category mistakes'.

Many of the polemics or 'lines of arguments' are noticed to be illegitimate shifts, i.e. an argument in the ontological is regarded as refutation of the conceptual analysis and vice-versa. Similarly, attempted conceptual analysis and clarification has conclusions which reject the epistemological approach and vice-versa. Again, epistemological articulation has claimed rejection of ontological concerns and vice-versa.

The 'perspectives on mind' is a scenario full of arguments and counter arguments, logical and non-logical refutations, linguistic and conceptual disputes, epistemic arguments and fallacies, ontological presuppositions and illusions. The resultant maze is really complex -- not necessarily insoluble. What is attempted in the present study is not final solution but a direction in which a plausible solution is available. The confusion among the 'perspectives' is due to acceptance of a framework and method and the ontological/epistemic/conceptual commitments of the philosophers in the debate which can be known if the problem presented are delienated and their presuppostions
Dualism (particularly Cartesian type) concentrates on the ontological perspective when arguments are put forth to support the view that mind exists in the body and is real. The exclusive emphasis on the ontological perspective leads to an inadequate account of mind-body relation and the justification for the existence of other minds. Karl Popper does not discuss the problem from the conceptual or epistemological point of view. However, he accepts the existence of self. Popper talks about an interaction between psychological and physical in a 'scientific' style, readmitting dualism. He avoids discussing 'what is' questions about mind, which for him is the product of evolution. He does not enter into an ontological inquiry regarding the reality of entity called mind, he simply accepts it.

The identity theorists and physicalists ('reductionists' in general) find their epistemological framework explanation of 'mind' or mental processes in terms of concepts referring to physical things, quite satisfactory. One notices, however that both J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong seem to work at two levels -- conceptual and epistemological. There, however, seem to be an unjustified leap from the epistemological to ontological framework when they deny any non-material status of 'mind'.

Wittgenstein begins with the conceptual analysis in order to clear the linguistic confusions and misunderstandings about mind and mental processes. For him mind is a name given to all mental capacities of a person which are revealed in our linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour --- it is not mysterious something. Although Wittgenstein's inquiry begins as a clarification of
linguistic concepts, it ends up rejecting epistemological approach to mind. Gilbert Ryle, like Wittgenstein begins with the clarification of concepts when he analyses mind and associated concepts such as intelligence, consciousness and introspection. His concluding reductionist account of mind, in terms of disposition to behave, results in both epistemological and ontological conclusions. Saul Kripke rejects the perspective of conceptual analysis in case of mind-body problem. He doubts the success of 'reductionist' programme. He places mind beyond all this and strongly attacks the identity thesis. He maintains that although a 'capacity' can be said to be housed in a particular body, it is neither identical with the body nor it can be realised in the same body. Kripke's 'minimal mentalism' provides a conceptual analysis to reject conceptual approach to mind-body problem.

Davidosn, like Strawson and other analytic thinkers, begins with a conceptual perspective. His rejection of 'type-type' reduction and strict psycho-physical laws governing brain processes help him assert that although all events are physical, some processes have irreducibly psychical aspects. The question however, remains whether Davidson's 'minimal materialism' is conceptual or ontological. Strawson's 'dual predication' instead of resolving the problem of dichotomy, seems to reintroduce it at a different level. He seems to introduce dual language of speaking about human beings.

Peter Smith's 'functionalism' as a theory of mind is an attempt to eliminate the dichotomy of mind-body, and takes the
perspective of conceptual analysis. Using Aristotelian framework, he claims that mind is constituted of capacities which are dependent on highly complex brain structure. Although a belief state is a neuro-psychological state, what gives rise to behaviour is not the internal brain-stuff but the function that is carried out along with other interacting states. Thus functionalism reduces mind to capacities and functions of the physical, it rejects the view that mind is an entity and is real. Smith's functionalism although has similarities with Ryle's definition of mind (mind is the way the body functions), avoids the 'strayings' observed in Ryle. Richard Rorty 'explained away' 'mind' and 'mental processes' by saying there are no 'brain-sensation' but 'brain-state'. Rorty's 'eliminative reductionism' subscribes to some form of functionalism. He employs science to play an ambiguous and confused role in his philosophy of mind which leads to inconsistency in his position.

The different perspectives in the philosophy of mind reminds one of the traditional story of an elephant and the five blind men who formed their opinion from their individual experiences. That each of the blind man arrived at 'some truth' but not the 'whole truth' is paradigmatically important for the debate in the philosophy of mind. Each perspective is a significant contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon --- 'mind'. There seems, however, a significant difference that may compel a philosopher of mind to believe that the debate regarding 'mind' will always remain inconclusive.

If the five blind men in the story were to recover their sight they would correct themselves and commit no fallacy of
composition. However, in the case of perspective of mind there seems to be no way of analysing the perspectives in terms of 'some' and 'whole' truth. And it may be due to this that some philosophers believe that irrespective of the advances and researches in scientific psychology and neuro-physiology, it will never be possible to reveal the true nature of mind. As Joseph Margolis puts it: "there is no reasonable sense in which we may claim straightforwardly to discover what we should correctly pose it as 'mind', 'self' or 'person'. We seek a reasonable and manageable convenience, hospitable to what we suppose to be the most fruitful lines of inquiry regarding very large, promisingly, coherent accounts of the central questions of epistemology, the methodology of science, psychology, the cognitive sciences the human and social sciences, linguistics and the various interpretive discipline".

Philosophically significant difference between the blind men-elephant story and philosophy of mind should not be regarded as a licence for laissez-faire philosophy regarding the problem of mind. That the final word regarding 'mind' has not been said does not mean that all perspectives are equally acceptable. Larry Laudan while discussing the problem of truth in science has pointed out that although we do not know what the truth is and we cannot claim that science is approximating the 'truth', progress consists in solution of increasing number of important problem. In philosophy of mind, a perspective or theory that has capacity to overcome the largest possible problem, deserves greater consideration.
Among divergent perspectives one should accept an approach that would explain the mind-body problem most satisfactorily. Taking a cue from the discussions on theory in philosophy of science one tends to conclude that 'functionalism' is the best available theory to explain the complex human activities commonly attributed to 'mind'.

It may be said that the functioning of a living being (human being as well as animals) is grounded in the complexity of our physical brain structure. One may observe that in the evolutionary process the capacity to carry out different functions in the evolving beings is dependent on the degree of complexity of their brain-structure. Thus the complexity of brain-structure directly determines one's capacity to carry out functions. In this sense even animals are to be attributed with a mind as opposed to Cartesian thought that animals are mere automata.

This version of functionalism may be accepted because it helps avoiding difficulties faced in the Cartesian approach. First, the question whether mind is an entity does not arise and the related problem of knowledge of other minds which may lead to solipsism can be avoided in this theory. Secondly, it is consistent with the evolutionary theory showing a superior fit with reality. And thirdly, since there is no interaction of a material body with immaterial mind, problems with regard to interactionism do not arise. The functionalist approach seems to be the most acceptable one, though it has got certain drawbacks. In a functionalist theory memories, beliefs, desires, pains and characterised in terms of their causal relationships among
themselves and are understood as 'abstract functional states'. K.V. Wilkes expresses the functionalist approach as follows: "Functionalism can be seen as 'reiterated behaviourism': It opens up the black box -- to put inside it a postulated system of smaller black boxes. Each of these is treated just like the behaviourists big black box: one does not go inside them but explain their output in terms of the states they are in and the input they receive. Each box is an abstractly characterised function that transforms input into output; the input may be a stimulus from outside, or the output of another box in the network... The system as a whole, receiving input from outside and giving as output certain kinds of behaviour as a complex 18 products of several internal functions".

Human behaviour then is the output of the sensory input (for example perception) as well as the output of network of each of 'mini-boxes' -- desires, memories, intentions, -- causally related to each.

This theory in general would not explain 'mind' as either reducible or irreducible, unlike what we find in conceptual analysis. Since in this theory the "mental states types consists not only in relations to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs 19 but also in relations to other mental states".

Two different versions of functionalistic approach can be given (1) 'weak' functionalism and (2) a version that can be named 'new dualism'. 'Weak' functionalists are happy with the assertion that it explains 'what mental states are' they do not aim at either reduction or explanation. But the terms pain, and
perception puts a 'weak' functionalist in trouble. Although a machine sensitive to different light waves may discriminate between different shades without experiencing, whereas we human beings experience that. 'Weak' functionalism cannot explain the 'experiential' aspect of the mental.

'New dualism' is a popular version of functionalism insisting that mental states are 'multiply-realisable' and should not be reduced to physical as such a reduction will be 'parochial' and 'chauvinist'. Type-type correlations are denied as it is maintained on this version that mental states correlate with various physical states of the brain.

The supporters of this version are dualists in so far as they believe that psychological generalisations with regard to the study of the 'mental' should be independent of research in neuroscience as these generalisations hold whatever the hardware may be and researches in neuroscience does not contribute much to psychology and therefore psychology should be autonomous.

By looking at the different perspectives that are taken in the philosophy of mind one finds that people beforehand stipulate that such and such objects will be called minds and then consider what these objects are. For instance, it is often thought that mind is an agency responsible for inner performance. 'Mind' is the name that we give to that agency. But the question remains unanswered whether that is what 'mind' is.

At present, the conception of mind, does not refer to the conceptual aspect as to which entities are minds but emphasises empirical aspects as to which entities explain our abilities to do various things. But the basic difficulty in understanding mind
still remains. As J.F.M. Hunter put it: "we give various lists of the putative functions of mind, and we will generally, conclude a list with 'and so on'. This covers up the fact that none of us knows how to complete the list --- certainly not in such a way that we might say that to be a mind, anything must explain all of these, and only these, capacities".

Thus, in a world of conflicting theories in the varied perspectives, the theory that has greatest explanatory power tends to be the most acceptable one.

NOTES


4. Jerome Shaffer maintains that, if consciousness is to be identified with brain-process, then both must be located in the same place. However, in the identity theory, this 'co-existence requirement' cannot be satisfied, because, our 'pain' is in the leg but it is not the case that our state of being aware of our pain is in the leg. Jerome Shaffer, "could mental states be brain processes?", in The Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1970, p.115.


7. Tom Settle comments that Popper's psycho-physical interactionism does not accommodate what is 'special in organisms. He feels that the metaphysical space between physicalism and vitalism cannot be fully filled by interactionism (as it bifurcates a human being into two components) and there is still room for 'organismism'. That is, certain features of human beings can be explained in a
better way, if a human being is understood as an 'organism' as a 'whole'.


9. Australian descriptions: is a 'topic-neutral' explanation of our experiences. In this type of explanation one can say that, there is something going on and that it (something) can be described only in terms of the sort of stimulus which characteristically brings it (something) about.


