CHAPTER IX
ELIMINATING DICHOTOMY: AN ARISTOTELIAN FRAMEWORK

A functionalist theory of mind based on Aristotelian framework argues for a naturalistic conception of 'Person', that is 'person' without any immaterial mind. It also argues that the so called mind and other mental qualities are nothing but results of the structural complexity of our brains.

It is natural to distinguish between a stone and a seed, between animate and inanimate objects. Although outwardly both the things, the seed and the stone look hard, but they are quite distinct with regard to their potentialities. The seed has got the potentiality to become a tree and produce more of its kinds, due to nutrition and reproduction.

This potentiality the sign of life is attributed to its complex physical structure and not to any immaterial element in the seed.

Thus the question, what is crucial for life? is answered in the naturalistic conception in the following way: 'a thing counts as being alive if it has certain potentialities, primarily those for nutrition and reproduction... in order to account scientifically for the potentialities of living things, it is not necessary to postulate any non-physical entities or processes. What makes a living thing alive is not an immaterial component or the presence of 'vital spirits', but the appropriate complexity of the organisation of its physical micro-components'.

A plant and animal - although both have got life - can be distinguished on the basis of the complexity of their physical
structure. Animals can perceive the environment and respond to it; they are capable of locomotion. Whereas plants cannot carry out certain functions which animals can.

In the functionalist theory perception plays an important role giving information on the basis of which we frame our beliefs. Peter Smith and O. R. Jones maintain that while responding to the environment it is natural to acquire beliefs and movements according to one's desires. Beliefs and desires are psychological states which constitute a simple mind. An animal, then, has the capacity for interaction with the environment. An animal with a mental life has still more capacity based on its more complex physical structure.

According to Smith and Jones to have a simple mind is to have potentialities and capacities. But these potentialities and capacities should not be postulated as immaterial entities just as to run a mile is in no sense an extra immaterial element in the body. One can provide similar functionalist explanations for desires and beliefs. The mental capacities of higher animals are to be attributed to the complexities of their neuro-physiologies. And the same can be said about human beings, with regard to their potentialities and capacities. Our capacity for rational thought and feelings (i.e. all our mental capacities) is dependent on our biological make-up. In analysing of mind, one should refer to the capacities that a person has, capacities which constitute a mind.

Peter Smith and O.R. Jones depend upon Aristotle's theory of form and matter to ground their functionalism. A substance for Aristotle is a particular individual entity. It is the compound of matter and form. Matter is simply the stuff out of which it
is made of. The form is not however the shape that the object has, but it is crucial in determining an object of a particular kind. Arranging the matter in a proper form determines the object of particular type or what it should be like. For Aristotle's account, natural bodies are substances, as "every natural body which has life in it is a substance. But since it is a body of such a kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it. Hence the soul must be ... the form of a natural body having life potentially with it".

Aristotle says that the psyche, the soul, is the form is the actuality, and is different from the body, which is the matter. It is by virtue of the 'soul', what that body is 'what it is to be what it is'. It is the form in the sense of 'capacity' related to the substance. Just as an eye, which has the capacity for sight, which is its essence, and if eye looses that, then it is no more an eye in the real sense and which will be equivalent to a painted eye. Likewise a dog's psyche is responsible for the dog's capacity, characteristically of a dog's life. The same is true in case of a man having a soul, which determines his capacities for various abilities including rational.

One notices in Aristotelian approach certain advantages over Cartesian one. First, one-many minds controversy does not arise. Secondly, it is consistent with the evolutionary theory. And thirdly, since there is no interaction of a material body with immaterial mind, problems with regard to interactionism do not arise.
According to Aristotle, a man's psyche determines his capacities for various abilities, including his ability to reflect. It is this that distinguishes man from animals. No animal can weigh the consequences and then choose to do the act. Our thinking and reflecting is the processing of information that is sent in through our perception. The appropriate bodily movements as a response to the stimulus comes in the form of our behaviour. Thus, the reflecting stage is the connecting stage between the perception and the behaviour.

Smith and Jones discuss the causal theory of perception, and reject the same as inadequate. It may be interpreted that, in this theory, the person who claims that he sees the cat, must be 'visually locked into it'. Similarly when X says he hears something he must be 'auditorily locked into it'. According to this theory, the thing that is perceived must exist and should make a difference to the perceiver. If there is no difference among the things perceived or heard then, there will not be a visual locking of the thing and hence no perception. In other words, the cat must causally affect Jack to have certain visual experiences. This is the necessary condition to have a perceptual experience, but not a sufficient condition. In order to perceive something one should have a perceptual experience such that it should be 'caused in the particular kind of way by the thing in question'. The causal chain begins with the object seen and ends with one's having a visual experience.

In another version of 'inner object theory', visual experience is believed to be the awareness of the inner object (or objects) in one's own mind in some way. If one introspects,
that is, looks at what is going on in one's own mind when one sees something, one finds that there is a sort of visual 'impression' or 'idea' of the object in the mind. These ('ideas' or 'impressions') are often termed as mental pictures and have no independent existence outside one's mind.

The third theory in the discussion, namely, the representative theory according to Smith and Jones, is the result of combination of the causal theory and inner object theory of perception. In this theory the perception a cat involves being aware of something other than a cat, namely some mental impressions (or whatever) which in some sense is understood as representing the cat. That is we perceive a cat via an intermediary representation of the cat. According to this theory what one is immediately aware of are the mental impression in ones mind. In other words those mental impressions make you perceive a cat. In this case, it is difficult to understand, how, from one's inner experiences one can conclude about the existence of things in the outside world.

The authors give following passages from Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding to suggest that Locke upheld a general representative theory for all kinds of perceptions:

1) Wherever there is sense or perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding.

2) It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them... the mind... perceives nothing but its own ideas.

3) It is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice of the existence of other things and makes us know that something does exist at that time without us which causes that idea in us.
George Berkeley attacked the causal theory of perception while accepting the representative theory arguing that in one's perceptual experience one is aware of ideas in the mind, imprinted by God.

The most consistent empiricist David Hume also accepts the representative—theory of perception. He considers that in our every experience we are aware of quick succeeding ideas of objects in our minds. The impressions in the perceptual experience exist for a very short period. The theory also had supporters like G.E. Moore holding the view that what we are immediately aware of in the perceptual experience, is some coloured patch, which is a mental object. Smith and Jones consider this as versions of 'inner object theory', and analyse the various arguments for the 'inner object theory'.

The first argument they consider is from science. In this argument an eye, is compared with a camera. But this analogy cannot be further stressed, as it does not explain what happens to internal images on some internal screen in the brain at the end of the visual process.

Another argument from science the supporters of the theory put forth is with reference to the time that is taken by light to travel from the object to the perceiver. It is understood that, if somebody is looking at a star right now, his 'seeing' does not exist now, but existed eight minutes ago. Therefore, what the person is aware of is existing sense-datum different from actual star.

Yet another argument that is given is from contemporary
physics. We know that a table is made up of atoms which in turn can be understood as molecular structures, with a nucleus, and positive and negative particles revolving round it. The fundamental building blocks of atoms are said to have properties such as mass, electric charge 'spin' - but atoms are colourless particles in ordinary sense of the term. The object occupies space and has weight, size, etc. When number of atoms come together. But the particles which are basically colourless, cannot be said to be giving a particular colour when they are grouped together. But in the case of table, it appears coloured. There must be something in the colourless particles affecting our visual equipment and thus one is forced to say what we are immediately aware of in our perceptual experience is not the colourless table but the sense-datum, representing a table, which is an internal phenomena. This argument appears to move from the agreed premise that the atoms which constitute a table are colourless to the conclusion that the table itself is colourless. It seems to rest on the earlier mentioned principle that if the constituents do not possess a certain property, the object itself cannot be said to have it. Smith and Jones point out that this principle cannot be applied to all the properties, such as, a person will not say, since one cannot swim in a water molecule, and water is made up of water molecules, one cannot swim in water. Thus, this argument appear to be based on absurd principle. But the supporters might come with a further complicated version of the above argument. He might point to the scientific principle that, in case of the surface of the table, there are gaps in between the colourless particles and hence the
The table is not coloured all over the surface but a small region of the table, containing few molecules. But, a small region of the table, containing few molecules, makes little sense to suppose that it is coloured. Therefore, the brown colour of the table is the property of the appearance or sensedatum presented to the mind, rather than the property of the table itself. The authors point out, that the supporters of the inner object theory deny that the table is brown all over. If they accept this, then they are forced to say that every region of the table whatever is chosen is brown. They overlook the facts at the microscopic level and hence the argument is a failure.

The second argument for the inner object theory comes from the relativity of perception namely, things appear to have different colours, and shapes when seen from different angles and in different condition (such as in different lights or on wearing blue or red spectacles, etc.). The supporters of the theory maintain that, at least some of the properties, which, things when placed in different conditions appear to have, are relative to the conditions in which they are placed. And therefore, what one is immediately aware of in perception are rather changing appearances than the stable objects themselves.

Bertrand Russell argues for the inner object theory. It is true he says, that the table is colourless but when seen under different artificial lights, the table will appear to have different colours. Therefore, colour is not 'inherent' in the table and thus all the statements with regard to colour will be right, in a particular condition. Table for him is colourless,
but what we are immediately aware of are coloured sense-data which represent the table. Similarly, that a penny looks different from different angles shows that our sense-datum varies.

The third argument for the inner object theory, is from hallucinations. It is claimed that in introspection one is aware of inner objects that are in our minds. In hallucinations people experience and perceive objects, even when the objects are not there actually existing in the outside world. In case of hallucinations then, they already have some sense-datum in their minds. In case of actual sense-perception, there is the sense-datum as an internal experience, which represents the outside objects. In short internally both the experiences will be of the same intrinsic quality and due to this it is possible to mistake one for the other. If the fact that there is some inner object, in case of hallucinations exist in the mind it is true then, it must be true also in case of genuine experiences. Therefore, in either case, there is an awareness of mental object.

Smith and Jones construe the 'inner object theory' as a form of dualism in the broad sense, since it talks about inner object, mental object, or impressions, ideas - all relating to mind. As this involves the question regarding the causal relation between the sense-datum or mental object in the mind, and the actual physical object in the outer world. This is analogues to the problem that is faced with regard to the relation between mind and body.

The supporters of the inner object theory think that, immediate awareness of sense-datum or mental picture helps to
know the object that is perceived. This is as good as saying that the outside world is understood with reference to or by looking at the mental counterpart of the world in the mind. But if there are difficulties in understanding the outside world, then it implies that there will be also corresponding difficulties in understanding the mental world. By saying that to perceive means, to have immediate awareness of sense-datum or using other mental vocabulary, the problem cannot be solved. One can still ask, what is the meaning of perceptual experience, when one says that it is immediate awareness of sense-datum. This is as unclear as the earlier question, what is involved in sense-perception.

The authors maintain that perception is the prime link between the input of knowledge that is the information about the world and its objects through our sense-organs, and our actions. Sense organs respond to different stimuli because of 'causal mechanisms' in proper working conditions in them, involved in perception of the world. It is through perception that the distinction can be made between different objects with regard to their properties like colour, shape, etc.

It is through information, through perceptual process, that we come to frame beliefs about the objects in the world. In other words we acquire beliefs through perception. As Smith and Jones puts it, "perception consists in the acquisition of beliefs via receptors which provide a sufficiently reliable information transmitting interface between the believer and the world".

There is of course a distinction between initial and derived beliefs. Initial beliefs are first beliefs (forming the basis of
any additional derived beliefs) which are framed about an object and which give rise to other beliefs. For example, after perceiving something written on the paper (which is the first belief that we visually acquire) and after reading whatever is written on the paper (since we can understand the meaning of the words), we frame many other beliefs which are derived ones. Different senses give different initial information as in the case of eyes, the sense of sight, for instance, produces the beliefs about the colours of the objects. In case of sense of touch the belief that is initially produced is about the temperature of the object.

The 'belief acquisition theory' has two parts: the first one is the **causal aspect** that is in perception, namely the object perceived causally affects the perceiver in an appropriate manner; the second is the **effect aspect** in the perceptual process, and in this theory it is the belief or set of beliefs framed about an object.

Smith and Jones claim that this theory has certain advantages over the representative theory of perception. It does not have to explain the perception of outer world objects by referring to something like internal images of those objects in the perceiver's mind. And secondly, beliefs are not the mental images perceived on the mental screen, thus avoiding the difficulty faced by representative theory.

Smith and Jones further say that to find out whether a child is sighted or blind a mother will observe the way the child reacts to the environment, for instance, how the child describes the things they are in normal conditions and so on. That the
child picks up information through perception is enough evidence to state that the child is sighted. In the representative theory, the mother, to find out the same, has to know the mental images on the mental screen of the child. This is impossible, and therefore one cannot decide whether the child is sighted or blind.

The 'belief acquisition theory' does not make any mystery of perceptual experience as is done in the representative theory. The 'experiential' involved in perception is explained as a function of our capacities for understanding and our background beliefs (e.g., our expectations about what we are going to see). For example, in case of a puzzle picture, the perception of that picture identified as a human face or something else, depends on one's capacity to understand that along with his past knowledge and past beliefs.

The neo-functionalist authors, namely Smith and Jones find that the general belief acquisition theory although fares better than the representative theory has some defects which they try to overcome. In this theory, it is maintained that we acquire beliefs through perception, along with our capacity to understand the thing based on prior beliefs in general and with reference to human beings. But when it is applied to the perception of animals, the question that is faced is, do they acquire beliefs in the same way? To answer this query, the authors suggest that a rather thinned-down version of 'belief acquisition theory' is to be adopted. They say that, animals acquire information through perception and they take it that there is an object in their
Secondly, perception is a passive process, that 'happens to you'; while belief acquisition is voluntary process, and therefore is not equal to perception. But the authors point out that except our sophisticated political and religious beliefs many of our beliefs are based on what the facts are. The authors to support their theory, at this point, quote Hume who says that, in general our belief, "depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters".

The third difficulty posed for the theory as authors maintain, is with regard to a static scene that is perceived. In the beginning through seeing he will acquire beliefs. But not after a little time since the scene has not changed he will still see the scene but will not acquire new beliefs. This leads to saying that seeing is not belief acquisition. This difficulty the authors say can be set aside, by saying that whatever beliefs are acquired in the beginning, they continuously hold until that scene changes. With the new perception new beliefs will be acquired, as a particular object causally sustains a particular belief.

Thus in the 'revised belief acquisition theory' it may be stated that, "perception involves (at least) the acquiring of various propensities to have appropriate beliefs. In other words, the change produced in you in perception may not be a change in your beliefs, but only a change in your propensities to believe various things about your environment". Even David Armstrong the defender and supporter of belief acquisition theory believes that
Perception leads to the acquiring of propensities to believe.

Peter Smith and O.R. Jones maintain that this revised version of the theory helps to account for those cases where the sense-organs are causally affected and the correlated internal state occurs but the appropriate belief is not the result. In these cases there is perception without beliefs. And with regard to wrong beliefs, the propensity to believe exist but the appropriate belief does not result.

The 'belief acquisition theory' with this improvement can account for the changes in colour or shades of a bus in different conditions. For example, under sodium lights and otherwise, as one will say that bus looks khaki under sodium lights because there is the propensity to believe in whatever perceived and the person probably accepts that otherwise, bus in front of his eyes looks red.

Perceptual process as Smith and Jones point out, involves one's having perceptual experiences which have a particular intrinsic 'phenomenological quality'. Perception is equated with belief acquisition in belief acquisition theory. But in acquiring beliefs the genuine 'experiential character' is not there. Therefore, it may be objected that belief acquisition as a theory of perception cannot account for the perceptual process as involving 'experiential character'.

The authors raise the above doubt with a view of modifying the theory. They hold that although the acquiring of belief does not involve experiential character it does not follow that picking up the belief is still 'non-experiential'. They maintain
that, "acquisition is an event which initiates a state"; and what is true of ensuing state will not necessarily be true of initiating event". Ones being on a moving train may be unexciting but jumping on the moving train is exciting.

The supporters of the belief acquisition theory reply that it is difficult to hold that on the one hand to acquire beliefs, even beliefs about one's own state of mind and to hold on the other hand, there is nothing experientially involved in it. There can be no distinction between belief acquisition or propensities to believe and 'experiential character' as a distinctive mark of perceptual process.

The authors point out that the analysis of perceptual process is important to understand the working and the nature of 'mind', since it is through perception, the 'information input' is supplied of which action is the output. Obviously all the movements that are done cannot be termed as actions, in the proper sense of the term. An action according to the authors is that which is done with some purpose or intentions in one's mind, intention thus becomes crucial in one's action.

An action is the result of an internal cause - a mental cause - where one's mind plays an active role in doing certain actions, becoming itself a necessary condition for that action. Mental cause constitutes only a necessary condition of a genuine action. For example, in raising one's arm as an action the muscles will contract only on some nerve impulse within the body. If it is otherwise, that is because of some external factor, then it is merely a bodily movement.

But it may be said that in all cases, where movements are
caused by internal causes cannot be termed as 'actions' for example, jerk reflexes, trembling of hands when one is anxious, etc. Because reflex actions occur or happen irrespective of whether one want it to happen or not.

Smith and Jones while developing the theory say that when one makes effort to find out the constituents of a mental antecedent, one very obvious finding will be that of a desire. We do things because we want to do them. But some of our desires are even beyond our control, like that of feeling thirsty or hungry. Like wise, we acquire beliefs through perception, in which there is the causal influence, from the object to the perceiver. Actions, if we say are the results of our desires influenced by our acquired beliefs then, the action becomes the outcome of those factors over which we cannot exercise any control. In this case there is no intervention on the part of the individual and therefore may be taken as implying that our actions are not intentional.

The authors introduce the term 'volition' or 'act of will' as the immediate mental cause of any of our action. The authors give different accounts of 'volition' by various philosophers, in the light of which the meaning of the term may be understood.

According to Thomas Reid, a desire is not a volition. Reid maintains that a volition is an act of will and when we wish or will to carry out an action, the volition is accompanied with our effort, to execute that, what we wish or will. Thus, we have here a three-dimensional view of our action, in which first comes the desire along with our beliefs that influence the will but do not
causally determine its activities. Second, there is volition or our will acts and third, the efforts are made to produce the action (activity of the muscles). Thus, it is the volition that initiates the mental causation and the authors say that this popular volitional theory is upheld by Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume.

Thomas Hobbes mentions that "in deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the act, not the faculty of willing".

Locke distinguishes between desiring and willing and asserts that, "we must remember that volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it".

Berkeley states that, "I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition". Hume maintains that, "when a person is possessed of any power, there is no more required to convert it into action, but the exertion of the will".

It may be stated that, it is not possible to know the 'volition' because one cannot know just by reflecting over what is going on in his mind, just before the 'action' takes place. The authors say that, the difficulty lies in understanding exactly how the 'act of willing' can be identified among other mental activities which may be going on simultaneously in one's mind. Peter Smith and O.R. Jones uphold a view similar to Rylo, that of namely that introspection and observation cannot reveal or help pointing out his or her 'act of will' in volition. They
say that the questions raised by Ryle go unanswered.

The authors point out that some mental events merely passively happen, which we cannot choose either to do or not to do. If bodily actions and other passive happenings are distinguished, then it should also be possible to distinguish between mental actions and passive mental happenings. One cannot presuppose an act of will or mental action as the cause of an act, as it will lead to infinite regress we cannot assume that any action requires us to perform that act mentally.

The authors, Peter Smith and O.R. Jones state that the popular volitional theory fails to provide an account of the antecedent of action. They critically comment that, "we cannot pre-suppose the notion of a mental action for that simply raises the question 'what's the difference between performing an act of will and merely finding that one's will has undergone a certain change?' Plainly, we can't say that acts of will are distinguished by being caused by yet further mental acts, for that would be to set off an entirely vicious infinite regress: if performing any act requires us already to have performed a prior act, how could we even get started? In short, then, appealing to inner acts in the theory of action is no more explanatory than appealing to inner perception in the theory of perception."

The authors point out that 'trying' cannot be the intervening factor, as we do many actions without trying. Again, we 'try' only in case of some difficult performance or in cases where 'doubt' involves. With regard to 'intention' as the intervening factor, we know that many actions that we do are
without any deliberate intentions but not without a purpose. Our behaviour on the spur of the moment are without any settled intentions, yet they are actions.

The authors maintain that intention plays an important role in ones deciding to act in a particular way. They adopt Elizabeth Anscombe's distinction between intentional acts and rest of the actions. Anscombe thinks that questioning 'why' the particular act was done and its positive answer, should give a reason for the action that is done, explains the action. The authors adopting Anscombe's distinction maintain that reason, along with relevant desires and beliefs, explain the appropriate action that is done. In simple and ordinary circumstances, the belief part may be taken for granted, stressing only the desire for the appropriate action. In circumstances where, merely desire cannot explain, the action, a complete explanation by referring to one's beliefs is required.

But all our actions need not necessarily arise out of desires in the strict sense. The authors suggest the term 'Pro-attitude' (a wider term which covers one's moral views, urges and values as the person understands, and those are things which direct the person when placed in particular situation), can be used in place of desires.

In order to explain someone's action, it is not enough that we point out to his desire and beliefs, but that his action should be because of those desires and beliefs. The authors mention that we have different 'packages of beliefs and desires' and a particular set of desires and beliefs may go to explain a particular course of action. Only the full-fledged explanation of
those beliefs and desire which are - 'actually operative' in bringing about that action will explain the action. In the causal theory of action the mental cause of behaviour which is treated as intentional action is simply belief and desire. When a belief is acquired that belief is believed to be true and the authors say that the same is true of a desire, as when one desires something, he 'desires-it-to-be true'.

Only declarative sentences which are propositions can be termed as either true or false. To believe in and to desire something makes sense only when they are expressed in the declarative sentences like X 'desires-it-to-be true that P' or X 'believes-it-to-be-true that P'. Therefore, Smith and Jones maintains that beliefs and desires can be termed as 'basic propositional attitudes'.

Smith and Jones comment that Hume's distinction between belief and disbelief is superficial, because if one is given two different language reports of the same events, the ideas produced in the mind will not be changed. The authors point out that Hume's ideas about mental images and impressions are unclear, in the sense they (ideas) do not explain in what way they are causally related to the outer world. According to Hume ideas have fleeting nature. If beliefs are treated as ideas in the mind, then they also appear and disappear like ideas in the mind. On the contrary Smith and Jones maintain that beliefs are more or less settled in our pro-attitudes and it is not necessary that we should be aware of it every moment.

The next theory the authors discuss is Ryle's theory of
beliefs as dispositions.

The authors raise an objection against Ryle's view. It is not explained, they say, as to how having just a belief can explain the particular behaviour that results. To believe in something, involves a number of 'iffy' statements about one's behaviour and one 'iffy' behaviour, cannot become the cause of other 'iffy' behaviour just as Descartes could not explain how a mental event can cause a physical one, in Ryle's logical behaviourism talk about 'beliefs' is just talk about the 'iffy' behaviour, cannot explain the resultant behaviour. That is, when belief statement is substituted by 'if statement' it becomes uniformative. As the authors illustrate in the example below:

"(E) It is true that, if circumstances $A$ were to obtain, Jack would get in the washing, because Jack believes that it is about to rain".

On substitution of the 'if statement' in place of 'Jack believes it is about to rain' we get,

"(E) It is true that, if circumstances $A$ were to obtain, Jack would get in the washing, because, if $A$ were to obtain, Jack would get in the washing, if circumstance $B$ were to obtain, he would take his umbrella, if circumstances $C$ were to obtain he wouldn't start watering the garden, and so on".

These two statements are into equivalent. The first one is informative, the second one is not.

The second objection they raise is in the form of asymmetry argument. It is clear and natural to hold a distinction between the way, a person knows his beliefs and the way he knows that
another person has got certain beliefs. In Ryle's view there is no such distinction. As according to him, to possess a belief means the 'iffy claims' about ones behaviour. Without referring to one's internal states. Therefore, nothing special is involved in knowing one's beliefs as they will be available to other people along with oneself. Peter Smith and O.R. Jones say that Ryle's view is wrong, as each one of us, we have a direct access to our beliefs and our other internal states which can be known by others only indirectly.

The regress argument against Ryle's view is a very serious objection to his theory of belief. To repeat the example of Jack, he believes that it is about to rain, therefore he should get his washing in. But in turn, what if Jack did not know that his washing is out? This shows that Jack further believes that his washing is out. Thus a belief gives rise to 'background' beliefs and desires, these will involve in more and more 'iffy' statements and therefore 'beliefs' as just the talk about 'iffy' behaviour cannot be accepted.

When it comes to desires the similar difficulties are faced as 'beliefs are to be analysed in terms of 'iffy' propositions which mention desires, and desires are to be analysed in terms of 'iffy' propositions which mention beliefs'.

The authors find that both the theories of belief cannot explain the nature of belief playing a crucial role in understanding 'mind'.

The Rylean reductionist account of cashing out beliefs into simply behavioural patterns is attacked first and than altered by the authors supporting more Armstrong's views on mind. Armstrong
comments that "it goes profoundly against the grain to think of the mind as (mere patterns of) behaviour. The mind is rather what stands behind and brings about our complex behaviour".

Contrary to Rylean analysis of belief, a causal role is assigned to beliefs which 'underlie behaviour'. Armstrong further says that "a mental state (is) a state of a person apt for producing certain ranges of behaviour".

The authors earlier views on 'propensity' and definition of it 'as someone has a propensity to be, if he is in a state such that he will be' is compared with and found similar to 'Armstrongian disposition'. That is, a particular neuro-physical state of a person resulting into a particular behavioural pattern. Since beliefs are not simple 'propensities' or 'dispositions' as giving rise to a fixed pattern of behaviour since they can be 'manifested' in various ways, they can be termed as 'multi-track dispositions' as suggested by Ryle.

A particular belief state can be explained with the help of or by referring to other mental states, which causally explains the resulting behaviour. To repeat the example, Jack's getting in the washing, his behaviour can be explained by referring to his beliefs and desires to get his washing dry, that if it is kept out, it will be wet and so on. Unlike Ryle's theory there is no reduction of one's beliefs to one's behaviour and the explanation of the 'iffy' facts about a particular behaviour, thus avoiding the difficulty that Ryle's theory faced.

Another objection raised against the Ryle's theory that in the form of asymmetry argument that is, there is distinction
between first person and third person account of knowledge of beliefs does not apply to the new Armstrongian theory as the distinction between two accounts is accepted in the new theory. That is one's knowledge of belief states in case of oneself is through one's 'looking inside' whereas in case of others it is only based on the external observable behaviour.

The new theory also escapes the explanation argument advanced against Ryle's theory as belief states, are distinct from the behaviour that results and thus explain the behaviour.

The belief states are both the mental as well as physical states - they are neuro-physiological states, which are responsible for a particular behaviour. In Smith-Jones' language: "To identify a state as a belief state is to identify it by way it causally functions in co-operation with other states to produce behaviour. Physical states which are, neuro-physiologically speaking, of different kinds can still play the same functional role at different times or in different people. So we can't identify believing that it is about to rain (for example) with a particular type of physical state, picked out in neuro-physiological terms. That is, we can't assume that everyone who believes that it is about to rain must always satisfy one and the same neuro-physiological description. But this does not mean that belief states are not physical states: it only means that different particular instances of believing that it is about to rain can be constituted by instances of different kinds of physical states." 

Thus, the functionalist theory which has the origination in Armstrong's theory and Ryle's dispositional theory lays
emphasis on the 'functioning' of the brain states under different neuro-physiological conditions.

The problem of 'iffy' claims about belief which is causally responsible for a particular type of behaviour, on the new theory is rejected by introducing some 'common-sensical general principles' to show and explain the interaction between the beliefs and desires resulting in behaviour.

The fundamental principle may be stated thus: "if someone desires that \( P \), and believes that \( P \) will come about only if he does \( X \), then in the absence of countervailing desires, he will as a result usually do \( X \)". And the consequence principle may be stated thus: "in that people normally believe the most obvious and immediate logical consequences of their other beliefs".

Thus the two principles can link one's belief to one's action as in the example Jack desires that his washing should get dry and that is possible only when he brings it in. And also believes that it will get wet if it remains out and there is nobody to bring it in, results in bringing the washing inside.

The general principles in common sense explanations help to understand the behaviour of each other. The fundamental and the consequence principle belong to folk psychology which are common sensical generalisations about one's desires and beliefs, the perceptual principles relating their perceptual environment. But these principles are not absolutely precise ones. Since there can be sudden neuro-physiological malfunctioning because of various factors and therefore it can be stated that a person normally would do things in a particular situation instead of saying that
he will definitely do.

In the functionalist theory a belief state and a desire state are both physical brain states. But what gives rise to one's behaviour is not the 'intrinsic physical constitution' but the function that is carried out along with other interacting states.

A belief state can be distinguished from a desire state, in the sense that 'beliefs are states of a class many members of which can be picked up by perception, whereas desires are states of a class some members of which can be engendered by deprivation. Putting it crudely beliefs are the sort of things you get when you look at the world, desires are what you get when you go without things you need like food or sleep'.

Functionalism, like behaviourism, can be split into hard and soft type. Armstrong's view is a hard functionalist one, since every mental concept must mean the 'physical behaviour'. The theory that is expounded by, Smith and Jones involving the principle of folk psychology is soft functionalism, where the interpretation of beliefs and desires as relating to one's action that is 'behaviour proper' must fit well.

Based on the Aristotelian framework and supporting the naturalistic theory, the authors Peter Smith and O.R. Jones, discuss sensations, perceptions, actions, beliefs, thinking and freedom within the perview of functionalist approach.

The Cartesian 'two component view' is criticised and the naturalistic conception, 'which maintains that a person is an organism without any immaterial components or additions, and which regards the mind as being (in some sense which needs to be
further explained) grounded in the structural complexity of our brains is upheld. While doing so, clear distinction is not made between conceptual questions and scientific questions. A sharp division between science and philosophy may or may not be done, but surely a distinction between the two would be an important one, especially because of the misunderstandings. Traditional Cartesianism and scientific naturalistic conception are formulated as two options, in the philosophy of mind, which may be 'potentially dangerous'.

David Cockburn criticises this version of functionalism saying "the 'naturalistic view' sounds too much like a piece of science. The danger lies in the fact that one might accept naturalism, as thus explained, and yet still hold on to what the authors identify as the fundamental philosophical confusion in Cartesian dualism, namely, the idea that 'the mind is a component of a person' - special kind of entity - namely, the brain".

Moreover, the scientific naturalistic conception of the 'person', may make one to feel that it leads to the denial of a 'value', a unique value, which a human being had before the advent of science. This sort of degradation cannot be accepted as we believe that, science can never 'misplace' our attitudes which express our ideas (for example, that person has a unique kind of value).

The authors, Peter Smith and O.R. Jones aim at presenting a theory of mind through the conceptual analysis. They maintain that "something counts as an-animal-with-a-mental-life if it has the capacity for some rather more complex sorts of interaction
with its environment". In the light of above statement, without any hints or warning there is the possibility of, in the light of above statement, thinking of another person "as a system which has the capacity for complex interactions with its environment". Along with this possibility the questions that arise are: How do we explain or can account for our attitudes and reactions towards other people and in a slightly different sense towards animals? Is it the mere increase in complexity of our brain structure, responsible for the feelings of gratitude, remorse, pity, respect or love?

Smith/Jones' theory of mind is based on the Aristotelian framework, namely the distinction between form and matter is used to illustrate the mind-body relation. The authors accept that ".... the mental capacities constitutive of the soul are dependent on the immensely more complex structural arrangements of brain-matter". It is true, as has been established by science, that mental capacities are 'dependent' on complex brain-structure. But there is another sort of 'dependence' as has been argued by many philosophers, that our capacity and ability to think is dependent on our possessing something, which may be called as human form. The authors give more importance to the former (scientific) type of 'dependence' then the later.

In physicalism an attempt is made to give a complete physiological account of our behaviour, involving the use of scientific terms. But Peter Smith's and Jones' theory of functionalism does not involve the use of scientific terms. Rather the authors resort to every day action description in their functionalist theory. An action is taken as a bodily
movement. But the two may be different because, the factors that explain a bodily movement may not explain an 'action'. By emphasising naturalistic conception, although the authors have not positively encourage science, to determine what a human being, a person is, they have not discouraged it either.

NOTES


4. Peter Smith et al., op. cit., p.105.

5. Ibid., p.108.


7. Peter Smith et. al., op. cit., p.113.

8. Ibid., p.116.


13. Peter Smith et. al., op. cit., p.127.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p.150.
18. Ibid., p.75.
20. Ibid., p.169.
21. Ibid.,
22. Ibid., p.171.
24. Peter Smith et. al., op. cit., p.73.
26. Ibid.
27. Peter Smith, et. al., op. cit., p.82.