P.F. Strawson attempts to solve the mind-body problem in a way different from the other theories employing the concept of 'person' as central to the issue. He takes the concept of a person as a primitive concept and that of pure ego as non-primitive, in the sense that it can be explained only with reference to the concept of a person.

Strawson begins with the common experience that an individual does distinguish between himself and his states while identifying himself among others. Some conditions are required for this identification and distinction. And to reach these conditions Strawson refers to the picture of purely auditory world where "... the being whose experience it was - if any such being were possible at all might recognise sound universals and reidentify sound particulars and in general form for himself an idea of his auditory world;...".

But even in this situation he would not have any idea of his being the subject of his auditory experiences for two reasons. First, he would have become one item among his auditory experiences, and secondly, we cannot imagine, a sound being the subject of experiences.

Strawson considers it necessary, for any individual, to have an idea of the subject of the experiences, inorder to know or have an idea of himself. It not only looks difficult but also is impossible to have such an idea, for such an idea will be of his particular experience other than all experiences. And if it is an
item in his experiences then it cannot be the idea of what 'has' all the experiences.

While describing what we think of ourselves, in the ordinary sense in terms of things that we ascribe to ourselves, such as actions and intentions, sensations, thoughts and feelings, perceptions and memories, Strawson brings about, the two-fold division of a human being into body and mind. Strawson discusses the ascription of certain things to ourselves when he agrees: "We ascribe to ourselves, in two senses, position: location (I am on the sofa) and attitude (I am lying down). And of course we ascribe to ourselves not only temporary conditions, states, situations like these, but also relatively enduring characteristics, including physical characteristics like height, colouring, shape and weight. That is to say, among the things we ascribe to ourselves are things of a kind that we also ascribe to material bodies to which we should not dream of ascribing others of the things that we ascribe to ourselves".

The material thing to which physical characteristics are applied is the body and it is the same thing to which sensations, consciousness and other enduring characteristics are applied. Strawson raises two questions in this connection: "(1) why are one's states of consciousness ascribe to anything at all? (2) Why are they ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc?".

Answer to the first question can be given in terms of the unique role that a person's body plays in his experiences. Strawson mentions perceptual experiences in particular. For, a perceptual experience is contingent and complex and its character
(of perceptual experience) is dependent on the facts about one's own body, such as the way it is located and the state of certain organs of one and the same body. Further, Strawson says that, "... each person's body occupies a special position in relation to that person's perceptual experience, ... for each person there is one body which occupies a certain causal position in relation to that person's perceptual experience, a causal position which in various ways is unique in relation to each of the various kinds of perceptual experience he has; and - as a further consequence - that this body is also unique for him as an object of the various kinds of perceptual experience which he has."  

In the above given passage Strawson explains why a subject of experience has a special kind of relation with his body, why he thinks his body is more important than other bodies. But it does not answer the question why at all states of consciousness be ascribed to myself? That is, it does not explain the concept of a person.  

Strawson mentions two views concerning this issue: Cartesian and the no-ownership view. On the former view it is clear that there are two distinct substances, with their appropriate states and properties. The consciousness belongs to one of the substances and not to the other. According to Strawson, 'why at all states of consciousness are ascribed to any substance?' remains unanswered in Cartesian dualistic approach.  

Strawson refers to the linguistic approach as 'no-ownership' or 'no-subject' doctrine of the self.  

The 'no-ownership' theorists give importance to the "unique
causal position of a certain material body in a person's experience. The unique position of the body is sufficient for one to ascribe one's experiences to oneself as possessed by or owned by that thing. This misleading idea of ownership would make some sense if the possessor of the experiences was the body.

A question may be raised with regard to states of consciousness, as what states of consciousness will be contingently true as depending on the corporeal states of one's body where a body is identified in purely physical terms? To this question, if the supporter answers that they are 'my experiences', then it means, that they (no-ownership theorists) are re-introducing the 'ownership of experiences', the very same thing, what they want to avoid.

Strawson critically remarks that the attempt made by the no-ownership theorists, emphasising the logical transferability of experiences fails. In identifying experiences, they are referred to as 'experiences of some identified person' and therefore they are to be ascribed to that person and as such it is logically impossible that a particular state experienced by a person, should have been experienced by anyone else, as they are logically non-transferable.

Thus commenting on 'Cartesian dualism' and 'no-ownership theory' Strawson says that both the theories look at the notion of 'I' in two different ways. Also, in both the theories the question as to why states of consciousness should be ascribed to a physical body only, remains unanswered.

Thus the role of a single body or its unique position is not sufficient to explain, why states of consciousness can be
ascribed to that body, or to anyone. In other words it does not explain why, anyone should have the 'conception of a subject' one who possesses those experiences.

With regard to the notion of a 'subject' Strawson considers it a necessary condition, that in order to ascribe states of consciousness to oneself the way one does, one should also ascribe them to others, other than himself. Strawson maintains that "the ascribing phrases are used in just the same sense when the subject is another as when the subject is oneself".

Although we do not find in the dictionary the first person, second and the third person meaning of the word 'pain', yet philosophically there is difference in verification in two cases - that is, in the case of oneself and in the case of others. One cannot strictly talk about ascription of states of consciousness to oneself. A prior step before ascription is identification, and in one's own case, one does not identify oneself in the way we identify others.

If the states of consciousness are ascribed to others in the sense of Cartesian egos to which only private experiences can be ascribed in correct logical grammar, then Strawson says the problem is insoluble.

Ascription of states of consciousness to oneself requires one's ascription of those states to others. The latter task in turn depends on identification of other subjects of experience and identification is not complete only with identifying others as subjects of experiences.

Cartesianism as a doctrine cannot help in the identification
of subjects of experience. Even if it is supposed that bodies can
be distinguished from one another it is not possible to
distinguish between subjects of experience based on the above
criteria.

The explanation that a particular subject stands in a
particular relation to a body, just as 'I' stands in a particular
relation to 'my' body, is not sufficient for the above mentioned
purpose. For 'I' stands in a particular special relation to the
particular body in each one's case, giving that person an idea of
his being the subject of experiences. It makes him think that
these experiences are 'mine' and therefore a subject perceives
his body as unique among other bodies. In the case of others we
cannot just talk of uniqueness of the subject of experiences.

Strawson while commenting on Cartesian dualism expresses his
views on the uniqueness aspect of subjective experiences:
Strawson asks, "what right have we, in this explanation, to speak
of the subject, implying uniqueness? Why should there not be any
number of subjects of experience - perhaps qualitatively
indistinguishable - each subject and each set of experiences
standing in the same unique relation to body N (or to body M)?
uniqueness of the body does not guarantee uniqueness of the
Cartesian Soul".

The concept of a person as Strawson puts it, 'is the concept
of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of
consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics,
a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single
individual of that single type'.

Strawson maintains that it is a necessary condition of our
states of consciousness, that they are to be ascribed only to a body, with corporeal characteristics — that is they should and can be ascribed only to the 'person'.

We think of a 'person' as a compound of two — (1) body and (2) ego, pure consciousness or mind and assume that there are two subjects of experience. On reflection and careful thinking we reach the fact that there is only one subject and the other non-subject. This position makes it difficult and impossible to understand the idea of different, distinguishable and identifiable subjects of experience. And therefore one cannot assign either any experiences to oneself or to any other. So alone with the concept of ego or pure consciousness, the concept of 'person' cannot be explained. It has got meaning, only when it is treated as a 'secondary' 'non-primitive' concept, when it is explained and analysed in terms of the concept of a person.

Strawson comments on Hume with reference to his views on ego or pure consciousness. Hume, he says, vainly was searching for a principle of unity, but said that he could not discover in himself anything but perception. His search, as Strawson points out, was vague, as there is no principle of differentiation, so no principle of unity.

Strawson contends strongly for the view that the concept of person is prior to any ego concept, or pure consciousness as different from corporeal characteristics. Pure subject, pure consciousness cannot itself be the subject of any experience. 'I' refers to the 'person' as a whole.

Curiously enough, Strawson does not deny logical secondary
existence of the ego just as we talk and think of a dead body - a
dead person so one can think of a disembodied 'person' because a
person is not an embodied ego.

Strawson argues for the logical primitiveness of the concept
of a person.

(1) First, as he maintains that inorder to ascribe oneself the
states of consciousness, one should know to ascribe the same
to that thing, to which one ascribes the states of
consciousness in one's case.

(2) In order to term oneself as the subject of experiences he
also must term others as the subject, in the same way.

(3) This is possible only when 'oneself' and the other
individuals possess both the types of predicates (states of
consciousness as well as corporeal characteristics).

Karl Popper shares with Strawson the contention that one
gets an idea of a 'person' first, before one learns to use the
word 'I'. He favours Strawson's view that an individual should be
treated as an 'integrated person' first and then the physical and
mental properties can be distinguished. Popper offers the
following grounds to support his socialistic type of a theory.

(1) With the inborn interest in the people around, the child
learns the 'persons' first leading to the conception that he is a
'person'. Thus, 'genetically' and 'psychologically', Popper
claims that first there is the understanding of a 'person', as an
integrated whole and later on of the self or mind. (2) His being
aware of the different organs of the body, what he has got and
also what he does not possess and at the same time learning that
all his actions are not permitted or rather are checked by people around, helps him to form the idea of his self.

To be more precise and to give a clear picture of his position Strawson mentions two types of predicates. M-predicates and P-predicates. M-predicates are those which can only be properly applied to material bodies whereas P-predicates can be properly applied to persons only. The fact that the concept of a person is primitive, only means that it is not to be understood in a certain way as considering it as a secondary entity to both the concepts - concept of a body and that of a mind. For this would lead to type-ambiguity on ascription of predicates, as they will mean different things when applied to material objects and when applied to persons.

Strawson inquires into the logical character of P-predicates. He says there is no sense in identification of an individual of a special type, unless there are principles by way of which we come to think that, that individual is of this type, and the same applies to P-predicates. And further, there must be some criteria, logically adequate to ascribe the particular P-predicate to that individual. If it is not adequate, then one has to go for relation between the criteria (the way of telling, how P-predicates can be ascribed) and what P-predicate ascribes, for, the telling, is only a sign of the presence of P-predicate in that individual. By way of correlation and observing that in oneself one can find out whether the ascription is a correct one or not.

But going back again, Strawson maintains that unless one learns to ascribe at least some states of consciousness to
others, one's ascription of states to oneself is not possible. Strawson asserts that, we ascribe P-predicates to others on the basis of observation of their behaviour and that the behaviour criteria one goes for are not simply signs of the presence of what is meant by the P-predicate, but are criteria of a logically adequate kind for the ascription of the P-predicate.

But this he regards only a partial picture of character of P-predicates. First, there are certain P-predicates which we ascribe to oneself on the basis of behaviour criteria. The way we ascribe P-predicates to others, it is not true in all cases of ascription of P-predicates to oneself. Yet there remains a distinct basis, entirely different from the mentioned above, that one ascribes P-predicates to oneself—when one reports about the felt tiredness, depression etc.

The problem to be faced is, how this can be reconciled with earlier criteria for ascription of P-predicates to oneself? While seeking a reconciliation between the two Strawson points out at one possibility of denying the real ascriptive nature of P-predicates and that they are to be taken as similar to those other forms of behaviour on the basis of which other P-predicates are ascribed to different individuals. But this way of reconciliation points to the failure of recognising the special nature of crucial class of P-predicates.

There can be more than one primary process of teaching oneself the inner private meaning of certain P-predicates and equal number of ways of learning how this is to be applied to others. In the other way also there can be more than one process
of learning how such predicates are to be applied to the others and how in one's case it is to be exhibited (form of behaviour), what Strawson calls P-utterances. Thus, these P-predicates in character, 'have both first- and third-person ascriptive uses'. That these P-predicates are such that, they can be unambiguously and adequately applied to the others that is "... on the basis of observation of the predicate and not on this basis, i.e. independently of observation of the subject: the second case is the case where the ascriber is also the subject".

Strawson cites a good example of the concept of depression to explain the nature of such P-predicates. We talk about one's behaving in a depressed way and also about one's being depressed (feelings). Feelings can only be felt or experienced but not observed. But the concept as it is understood covers both the aspects. As Strawson puts it, that X's depression is something, which is felt by X but not observed, by X, and which is observed by others but not felt by others.

According to Strawson, the problem of mind and other Philosophical problems arise when, only one aspect is taken into consideration as self-sufficient to explain the problem. There is oscillation between philosophical scepticism and philosophical behaviourism. Considering only one aspect leads to the logical gap between the criteria on the basis of which we say X is depressed and the actual state of being depressed.

Turning again to the concept of a person or the possibility of P-predicates, Strawson recognises the primitiveness involved in the concept of a person and therefore asserts the unique character of P-predicates. These predicates which usually involve
doing something necessarily imply a state of a mind or intention which is indicated by a particular form of behaviour (bodily movement). In such predicates although it is possible for the others to ascribe a P-predicate on the basis of observation, it is not possible for the person who is doing that, to ascribe states of consciousness on the basis of observing oneself. Yet, one will not deny the fact that he himself and the others did ascribe to him, the 'same' predicate. In doing so we are trying to understand the present and the future bodily movements by observation and inference, not only in our own case, but in the case of others also, that is we see others as self-ascribers.

In this context, it is easier to understand, how one can and does see oneself and others as persons. One will agree that we each one act, and act on each other and our actions are in accordance with a common human nature.

Strawson considers the common human nature as an important condition for the individuation or the concept of a person. The relation between a part and a whole, can be properly understood, in case of a machine or in case of different organs in a living body. But a human being, a person is a 'whole' himself, is related to the society and acts according to the common human nature, in an entirely different manner, from a machine.

Strawson grants a (logically) secondary existence to the pure consciousness or mind. As stated earlier, pure consciousness itself alone, is not sufficient to explain the concept of a person. Imagining oneself in a disembodied form is possible if two conditions are satisfied - (1) One is to imagine that one is
not experiencing that he has a body, (2) to imagine as not having any power to introduce any changes in the world, which a person with a body is doing.

He should feel and imagine disembodied in the sense that as far as people are concerned, there should be no reactions to him as a person. This leads to two consequences. The first one, is that he will be living a solitary life and the second in order to retain in himself the idea of being an individual, in this disembodied state, he has to remember his earlier experiences as a person.

Strawson takes the concept of person as primitive, that is a 'person' should not be thought as a compound of mind and body. If so, then both the predicates ascribing conscious states and ascribing physical attributes become applicable to the 'person' himself. But, then if the physical attributes are ascribed to 'person' and the material body which he possesses, strange consequences follow. We are forced to say that John Smith and his body have identical physical attributes which occupies a certain spatio-temporal position. As C.B. Martin says: "The body of a person is six feet tall and weighs 180 pounds. It seems a needless duplication of effort to say that the person possessing the body also is six feet tall and weighs 180 pounds. The consciousness of a person is in some conscious state. It seems a needless duplication of effort to say that the person possessing the consciousness is also in that mental state. Indeed, this duplication of effort seems not only needless, but incomprehensible. Surely the physical and conscious state predicates that apply to the person... apply simply in virtue of
the fact that they apply to the body and consciousness that (he) possesses. Otherwise, it would be an incomprehensible coincidence.

This difficulty, Strawson can overcome, if he accepts dualism abandoning his view about the concept of a person as logically primitive. Another alternative is to say that a person has a material body.

Strawson lays down the following criteria to identify one's body among others. He says that the body which one calls one's body is a material thing such that it can be picked out from others and identified by ordinary physical criteria, and which can be described in ordinary physical terms.

But the same criteria can be used to identify the dead material bodies. Therefore, we do not refer to persons simply as material bodies. Norman Burnstein while criticising Strawson says, "we would not say that it was John Smith's body which was standing at a certain spot, S, which moved from S at a certain time T, and which was six feet tall and weighed 180 pounds; we would say that it was John Smith who was standing at S, who moved from S to T, and who was six feet tall and weighed 180 pounds". Thus it shows that, a particular material body and a particular person are two distinct particulars.

A person can be distinguished from any other material body, in so far as, he will have conscious experiences along with physical attributes whereas a material body will have only physical attributes.

However, it is a conceptual truth that when we talk about a
person, we do not refer to that person only as having conscious experiences but that he has got a material body too.

Considering that a person 'X' as a material entity will have material parts (different organs), one can without any difficulty say that, a material entity and its parts are at the same place, at the same time. One can say then, Mr. 'X' stands in the same place, where his legs are. But we cannot say the same thing about Mr. 'X' and his entire body, as his body is not, as per Strawson's theory a part of Mr. 'X'. It is also denied that a person has a material body. So Burnstein says that Strawson has to specify in what different sense can we say of a person as having a material body.

To avoid this difficulty, if Strawson abandons the conceptual truth that "a person has a material body then a living person's body, like his consciousness, is not an independently identifiable particular; its identification ultimately rests on the identification of the particular person to whom it belongs". A corpse can be identified in both the ways, as a dead body and a person who no longer exists. Living body then is not a 'basic particular' whereas a corpse can be. There is unclarity saying as Strawson has done in case of the concept of person as 'primitive', that it cannot be applied to animals. Strawson does not refer to this restriction.

Ayer notes the similarity between Strawson's views and Professor Hampshire's views. Prof. Hampshire also suggests that persons are to be distinguished primarily in terms of their capacity to act and that further the concept of action also solves the problem of personal identity. They can be
distinguished only in the fact that, the latter envisages the concept of action at least partially physical so that the notion of existence of disembodied ego is self-contradictory whereas Strawson grants a 'logically secondary existence' to disembodied ego.

Strawson has outlined the consequences of the ego existing in a disembodied form - first one is leading a solitary life and secondly in order to experience oneself as an individual in the disembodied form one is required to remember the past experiences.

Strawson allows in his 'person' theory, the possibility of existence of disembodied ego. Sommers in an objection to the possibility of disembodied spirits says: "... Strawson does admit into his ontology ghosts outside of machines, bodiless spirits. Of such ghosts it is essential that they should once have been persons, that they should be disembodied ... Thus, in Strawson's ontology, we have three things, spirits, persons and rocks, such that the predicate weighs a hundred pounds applies to rocks and to persons but not to spirits, while the predicate thinks applies to persons and to spirits but not to rocks. But if these predicates are univocally predicated, there can be no such three things. Yet if we are to make sense of any belief in immortality, we must predicate some predicates univocally of persons and immortal spirits".

Among the two consequences outlined by Strawson, only the latter is objected by Ayer in the following way. If it is possible for the disembodied ego, to have experiences similar to
those, it had with the condition that non of experiences will
establish the existence of his body, then there is no need for
him to retain his earlier experiences. This is equal to a
person's survival after the bodily death. Strawson's contention
that personal identity can be held on through the retaining of
one's experiences - that is memory, cannot be accepted - as it is
well known that memory of a person is not sufficient for the
above Purpose.

Ayer is more inclined to accept the fact that it is the
identity of body that is important in personal identity and that
a person is said to own certain states of consciousness, as they
stand in a special causal relation to the body, with which that
person is identified. Ayer attempts to show that there is no
internal incoherence in the 'no-ownership' doctrine of the self.
Ayer remarks that Strawson should not have named it no-ownership
document because it allows a body to own experiences by way of a
causal relation. Ayer says that the theory needs a contingent
proposition - stating that one's experiences are causally
dependent on one's body; but merely by virtue of this dependence,
all of one's states on one's body, thought of as causally
dependent becomes an analytic one. Ayer says both are to be
treated as distinct propositions and there is no contradiction
and inconsistency in this.

Ayer argues for the 'ownership-doctrine': "The Position is
that a person can be identified by his body; this body can be
identified by its physical properties and spatio-temporal
location as a contingent fact there are certain experiences which
are causally connected with it; and these particular experiences
can then be identified as the experiences of the person whose body it is. There is nothing inconsistent in this.

Ayer comments that Strawson is probably being misled by illegitimate questions like, which of the experiences are to be assigned to a particular body, as dependent on a particular body. The question is illegitimate because the experiences are identified earlier, independent of the body. Rather one should see what experiences are dependent on a particular body, as belonging to a particular person's body at a given time.

The argument from analogy is used by many Philosophers to prove the existence of other minds. Strawson puts it in the following way for critical consideration: "That it is necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way that one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself".

Strawson attacks the argument from analogy, by saying that it is based on the assumption, of the very thing which it is supposed to justify. Strawson thinks that, even granting the case that 'my' experiences are associated with 'this body' which is distinct from other bodies does not prove the fact that other bodies are owned by other subjects with their experiences. Strawson's above mentioned contention, according to Ayer, leads to the denial of the body, as a 'subject' of experiences. Ayer critically comments that, Strawson in turn discusses, the 'hybrid theory' of no-ownership doctrine of the self.

Ayer, refers to Wittgenstein's criteria to understand
mental experiences. Wittgenstein held the view that every inner experience has an outward manifestation, and only then the statements about it (mental) becomes meaningful. But it can be objected that, if the outward manifestation is deceptive and this possibility is always there, then our attribution of certain experience to other person is a mistaken one. Therefore, they are not to be treated as identical with one's inner experience. Yet they cannot be treated logically distinct either as then it seems that there is only one-way entailment. The entailment must be from experiences to their outward manifestations but, along with outward manifestations there must be something else and this something remains a problem.

The physical states are a criteria to infer the inner states in question. The logical adequacy of such criteria, as discussed by Strawson one can understand in his example of a card. The card gets this logical adequacy for calling a particular card, by way of different marks on it. But in addition to this, it is in the context of the game that over and above the markings on it, properties are ascribed to it. In the similar way, when predicates are applied to others on the basis of physical criteria, they should bring out fully the meaning of that predicate, which physical criteria alone cannot do and hence it is logically inadequate.

But Ayer points out that, "the reason why the appearance of the card is a logically adequate criterion for its function is that the connection between them is established by the conventions which allot to cards of various designs their respective powers in the game".
And further he says that, the connection between a mental experience and its bodily expression is not on par with the connection which is conventionally established between the appearance and function of a token in a game.

Ayer says that, there can be a weaker form of analogy between a mental state and its manifestation in one's own case and attributing states of consciousness to others in their physical states. Weaker because there can be a gap between the outward manifestation and actual experience, that might lead to incorrect attribution in one case. But over all, the behavioural criteria are not fallible, and to a large extent success is guaranteed.

Ayer considers the distinctness between the inner states and outward manifestations, and poses the question: can one say that they are identical? An identity between the mental and the brain-states, cannot be sought. It is not proper to hold the view according to Ayer that experiences are literally located in brain, yet he says that one can hold that they are causally dependent on the conditions of the brain.

To treat them as identical is to reduce mental to the physical, and this in turn is based on psycho-physical laws, whose validity one might try to understand in one's own case and then apply to others but this again is a case of analogy.

Strawson finds the argument from analogy as circular. That in order to ascribe experiences to oneself - one has to learn how they are to be ascribed to others.

Ayer reacting to Strawson's views says that, there is no
circularity, if one maintains that, our knowledge as a conscious subject is possible without knowledge of others being there. But it might be objected that, as while ascribing states of consciousness to others one sees first the justification for doing so. This justification in turn is based on one's own experiences, and so it appears circular. To this Ayer replies that, one's belief in justification and one's really being justified can be distinguished. Just as one's belief in a proposition can be justified, irrespective of that statement being true or false. Ayer comments that MR. Strawson's argument needs a more stronger premise than what he states - to refute the argument from analogy.

Ayer defends another objection to argument from analogy. The objection is that as a result of argument from analogy, one is led to have good reasons to believe in one's own experiences only, if the physical criteria for any mental act in case of others do not constitute logically adequate criteria. Based on this logical inadequacy one may well claim that our ascription of states of experiences to others is useless.

This argument from analogy in turn is based on the assumption that as Strawson puts it, one's ascription of states of consciousness to others, is dependent on one's ascribing of the same thing to oneself. Ayer says that once this assumption is removed the objection can only be said to be with reference to interpretation of verification principle.

Strawson's distinction between P-predicates and M-predicates is open to criticism. The basis of this distinction is to be found in Descartes philosophy says B.A.O. Williams. Descartes
maintained that, "everything that we discover in ourselves, which we see could also be in completely in animate bodies, should be attributed only to our body; on the other hand, everything that is in us, which we could not conceive of as possibly belonging to a (physical) body, should be attributed to our Soul".

Descartes thought that they are really complex attributes and as such can be divided into its physical part and mental part.

In discussing the ascription of P-predicates Strawson uses the terms 'states of consciousness'. He introduces the terms to mean some subclass of P-predicates, but does not explain properly what are these, there is unclarity about what predicates are being discussed and also about the concept of a person. Williams points out the confusion, in the following: "a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and (Strawson's emphasis in both cases) predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics ... are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type".

There is unclarity not only in the distinctions between different types of P-predicates but also between P-predicates and M-predicates. As many P-predicates are highly corporeal, it is difficult to see which are really M-predicates. B.A.O. Williams critically comments that, "this initial unclarity in the distinction between the two sorts of predicates is not a matter merely of roughness or vagueness. Strawson lacks any criterion for the notion of 'same predicate' - in this connection. He can scarcely hold that it is a sufficient condition of the same
predicate's being applied to persons and to material objects that
the same words are applied to both. If this were the condition,
the distinction would fall in some odd places - thus 'walk' would
seem to be a P-predicate, but 'run' would not'. Moreover, the
class of P-predicates would be unacceptably small. A vast range
of words which to persons, ascribe actions, can without any
hesitation be applied to machines, which Strawson would
Presumably count as material objects, with the development of
computers, the range of words that can be so applied becomes
notoriously more and more 'psychological' . Williams comments
that, Strawson should presuppose some position in the philosophy
of mind, to make the ascription of predicates clear.

H.D. Lewis points out that in the very statement of the
problem of ascription of predicates, there appears 'unwarranted
assumptions'. Lewis questions the assumption that, is it the case
that we ascribe, physical characteristics and states of
consciousness, to the same thing? He says that, in case of
ordinary purposes, for example, when one says 'I am writing', we
do ascribe, physical characteristics and states of consciousness
to 'I', as writing involves both the physical and the mental
activity. In such cases Lewis says that, we do not distinguish
between the physical attributes and the mental attributes
"because the two activities are peculiarly closely linked and
because it would be cumbersome and pointless to be always noting
the distinction between them. It would be much too troublesome to
say, for example - 'I was intending to open the door and my body
moved towards it; it is neater and apter, for ordinary purposes,
to say simply 'I went to the door' or 'I went to open the door'.

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But while this is the best thing to say, as a rule, we cannot allow that to be decisive in philosophy, and I fear that is ultimately just what Strawson does.

Lewis maintains that, strictly we cannot ascribe physical characteristics and mental characteristics, to the same thing. A person saying that, 'I am tall' is only saying something about his body and not saying anything about his mind, which may affect his mind in different ways. Mind cannot be said to be heavy or light, short or tall. It is only metaphorically, we may say that someone has a 'big mind' or 'small mind'. In this sense, one may observe that, Descartes was right in maintaining the view that our minds are non-extended.

The fact is that our physical bodies are extended in space, can be located as filling a particular space, help in specifying the location of a particular physical body. It is true that our experiences are conditioned in certain ways by our physical body, depending on its location. But, when someone says that, 'I am in this room' it does not follow that his 'mind' is also in that room. Neither we can say that, it is outside the room, since "to deny that I was here, in any sense that implies that I was elsewhere, would be absurd. But the strict truth is that my mind is nowhere, location simply does not apply to it. My thoughts are not extended, although they are affected in many ways by extended substances, including specially my body."

Strawson insists that the identification of others is possible through the observation of their bodily movements. H.D. Lewis reacting to Strawson's views says that, identification of
others seems difficult if we do not consider the role of our knowledge about others, that is acquired in the ordinary way. Further Lewis points out that "if we allow this and if it is also asserted, as is done by Strawson, that we cannot identify or know ourselves except in a process which essentially and directly involves the identifications of others, then it seems impossible to ascribe experiences to ourselves at all except in ways in which our bodies have an indispensable part ... we cannot, in other words, conceive of ourselves at all except as beings with 22 physical characteristics".

If the above mentioned Strawson's contention is accepted, the one finds it difficult to understand our functioning independent of our bodies. Moreover Lewis says, our mind, being causally dependent on our body it is implausible to hold that our mind can function independently of our body.

But Strawson may take these difficulties as superfluous, since in his theory, an attempt to conceive oneself independently of his body is not allowed on logical grounds. That is strawson makes the concept of person 'logically primitive', logically prior to the concept of mind or that of body.

Lewis says it is hard to discover Strawson's thought, that there is a temptation to think of a person as a compound of 'two subjects', where ultimately we take one as the subject and the other non-subject. Lewis says that our reference has always been to one subject and one non-subject. He says, we ascribe corporeal Characteristics to our body "but it is only in a highly elliptical sense that this may be described as ascribing them to myself". He further says that, our body is not a part of our
self but is something to which we are specially related. We do not think of the body, as a 'subject of experiences'. If this is not the way one should understand the notions of subject and non-subject, Strawson does not indicate, how it is to be understood in any other way. Strawson merely repeats that, a pure individual consciousness or pure ego cannot exist as a primary concept, in terms of which, the concept or person may be analysed. Lewis finds that this is merely a reaffirmation of Strawson's original statement. He questions, "if the additional argument pre-supposes the earlier one, what point is there in the reference to the 'two subjects' and so on beyond saddling those who sympathies with Descartes with an impossible, and perhaps ridiculous, position very far removed from what they really maintain?"

Lewis finds Strawson's explanation of depression mystifying. He says that, it is true that in case of every day experiences, in the ordinary sense, we say that, we can observe other's depression. But in the philosophical sense it can be analysed further. According to Strawson, it is merely on the basis of physical behaviour that we infer the depression of a person. But depression as an experience does not belong to the behaviour of the person, such that we can observe. On the basis of the physical movements, we infer that a particular person will be or is in a particular mental state. Lewis says that this unavoidable logical wedge is hard to drive because of its obscurity in the language that we use for ordinary purposes. Strawson, in other words, does not distinguish between the two senses of language,
ordinary sense and philosophical sense and Lewis comments that the "linguistic convention becomes the head of the corner in his argument and is made to bear the weight of all the far-reaching contentions he makes in his book"

Lewis questions Strawson's contention about ascription of predicates 'which involves doing some thing'. He asks, can one strictly know that he is going for a walk without observation? Lewis says that, what we know is our intention to go for a walk. It is only when we notice the position of our limbs along with other things, that one can know that he is going for a walk, according to Lewis. He further adds that, we learn about our intention only through the experience of intending. Lewis points out that, if we allow Strawson's contention, then it follows (for Strawson) that "in the case of bodily movement we have something which can be known only by observation and also without observation, and from this it is deduced that in observing the bodily movement of others we 'see such movements as actions', the force of this being, apparently, that in observing the actions of others we observe what they themselves know without observation". According to Lewis, the meaning of the word 'see' in Strawson's argument can be questioned. It is only the physical movement, all that we can observe. On the basis of the observed physical movement, we learn about the private intention, that is inferred. Beyond this, Lewis says, "there is nothing in the situation to suggest that there is some one thing which is both visible movement and intention".

J.O. Urmson in his review of Strawson's _Individuals_,
comments that the Chapter on persons though most rewarding, is least conclusive. Strawson rejects Cartesian dualism and no-ownership theory, as he thinks that they are logically absurd. According to Strawson there can be the distinction of persons, only if there are predicates which we can apply either (to others) on the basis of observation of behaviour or (to ourselves) without observation such that there should be things called persons who bear such predicates. Urmson calls the above argument, the transcendental argument, used to show that there are predicates which we can ascribe to others and to ourselves. Urmson criticising Strawson's criterion of ascribing predicates says that "it surely is intuitively obvious that there cannot be predicates P such that O (observation) can be sufficient condition of ascribing P and E (one's own unobserved experience) a sufficient condition of ascribing P but O is not in any way equivalent to E, except in an incoherent conceptual scheme. This is as intuitively obvious as that the other theories are logically incoherent in their ways".

Robert Hoffman points out that, the criteria given by Strawson to ascertain that, a particular body belongs to 'me' or oneself, does not work. To show this, Hoffman introduces the notion of 'putative physical body' and 'an out-of-the-body experience'. Hoffman explains that, "a person sometimes has what appears to him at the time he has them to be ordinary visual experiences of actual thing and persons (including his own physical body), from a point of view located in what he then takes to be the ordinary space-time continuum but outside his physical body". In this out-of-the-body experience the person
generally seem to be having a secondary body which is much more plastic and less ponderable. Further, Hoffman says that "on these occasions the person's main consciousness seems to be centered in the secondary body, in the sense in which it ordinarily is felt to be centered in his putative physical body. The person ostensibly sees his own putative physical body as it would normally be seen by a putative other-person whose physical body were situated where the secondary body is situated; and he does not see his putative physical body as if he were situated where it is. He also sees other things from the point of view determined by the position occupied by his secondary body and not by his putative physical body". Thus, Hoffman says that, on these occasions the three kinds of dependence, as related to one's visual experience, as shown in the above account, are shown by a body, that a person cannot take to his own physical body. Hoffman points out that, the dependence-condition, as laid down by Strawson, cannot be the criterion, with the help of which a person can ascertain that, a particular body is his own.

It may be said that the basis for Strawson's distinction between P-predicates and M-predicates, is to be found in Cartesian thought. One may observe that Strawson's concept of 'person' comes close to ordinary usage of the term. The term 'person' in the ordinary usage, is thought of as incomprehensible by scientists, with reference to the known laws of physics and chemistry. And in this sense, the term 'person' is indeed primitive and irreducible. Similarly Strawson's concept of 'person' is also irreducible. Secondly, the ambiguity in the
usage of the term 'person' in ordinary language also serves to define persons, in Strawson's theory, in the meta-physical sense. That is, in ordinary language, a person is a body, when he becomes a victim of a crime; a person is the appearance; is the self-conscious and rational individual; is one who takes certain roles and discharges functions, etc. For a layman, 'person' is a composite of mind and body. However, for Strawson, the concept of 'person' refers to an entity of which both body and mind are predicates. Thus, Strawson's theory of dual predication seem to depend upon dual language rather entities.

NOTES
2. Ibid., p.89.
3. Ibid., p.90.
4. Ibid., p.92.
5. Ibid., p.95.
8. Ibid., p.102.
9. Ibid., p.108.
11. Ibid., p.450.

15. Ibid., p. 86.


21. Ibid., pp. 149-150.

22. Ibid., p. 157.

23. Ibid., p. 159.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 160.


27. Ibid.


29. Ibid.


31. Ibid.