Chapter 4

HEGEL'S DIALECTICS

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) is the most important philosopher who wielded great influence on modern philosophy. He lived contemporaneous to the philosophers Fichte and Schelling to whom Hegel is indebted (see chapter 5). Young Hegel was more preoccupied with Kant than with any other philosopher. Yet, he is not a Kantian. But his indebtedness to Kant is strikingly apparent. Hegel's negation of Kant is only a determinate negation. Without Kant, Hegel would not have been the Hegel we know now. Hegel's indebtedness to Kant is more profound in the case of developing his method. Same is told by one Hegel commentator, Carl J. Friedrich:

To be sure, Hegel would never have found his dialectical method without the transcendental dialectic delineated in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.1

In this chapter, our main concern is to delineate this great discovery of dialectics by Hegel. Within seven main sections (with its sub-sections), we would try to draw the picture of Hegel's dialectics. In the first section (4.1), as an introduction to the dialectics of Hegel, we will depict Hegel's argument for the need of a reconstruction of logic with a content, Hegel's objection to the method of mathematics and raisonnement, and the difference of Hegel's dialectic with the negative dialectic of the ancients.

In the second section (4.2), we would deal with the structure of Hegel's dialectics. This important part of the chapter comprises the three sides or phases of his dialectic, the concept of sublation which itself is mediation or determinate negation, the negation of negation and lastly the birth of the law, the dialectical law of contradiction or the identity of opposites.

In section (4.3), we will portray how Hegel refutes the formal laws of logic. This will be followed by a treatment of dialectical results in Hegel (4.4) which is more important to

* By raisonnement, Hegel means the ordinary modes of argumentation that arbitrarily suits to the speaker or the writer. See the last para in 4.14.
know his system than his method. The subsequent three sections
are about 'the usage of triad' (4.5), 'the movement of categori-
es' (4.6), and 'the history in Hegel' (4.7). All these together
would give us a substantial picture of Hegel's dialectics minus
criticism.

4.1 Towards Hegel's Dialectics

4.11 While presenting the Science of logic before the world
in 1812, Hegel, in its Preface, talks on the "downfall of
metaphysics." Even when metaphysics was faced with such a
fate, logic, however, was retained "for the sake of a certain
formal utility." Hegel says that the spirit of practicality
that retained logic cannot intend a better fate for it; logic
also will face the same fate suffered by its sister science,
i.e., metaphysics. What Hegel meant is that though logic is
being retained as part of the curricula and it is not attacked
as metaphysics is attacked, it at its present form would face
the same fate of downfall as metaphysics has suffered.

p. 25. By metaphysics, Hegel means philosophy and ontology.


4. Ibid.
Hegel's complaint is that logic has not developed in accordance with the developments in sciences, and that, in such a situation, the retaining of its earlier form would be utterly in vain; so, the same downfall is inevitable. On the one hand, "logic shows no traces so far of the new spirit which has arisen in the sciences no less than in the world of actuality"; and on the other, "once the substantial form of the spirit has inwardly reconstituted itself, all attempts to preserve the forms of an earlier culture are utterly in vain; like withered leaves they are pushed off by the new buds already growing at their roots."

The only way out from this paradoxical situation, Hegel suggests, is "to fall in with the new ways of thinking". In other words, go for "an altogether new concept of scientific procedure"; this is in fact the "reconstruction of logic" that is long overdue.

5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. p. 27.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
This is how Hegel presents the problem of the need for a revolution in logic. The discovery of the new logic is correctly presented here by Hegel as the resolution of an objective contradiction, a contradiction between an earlier form and new world of actuality.

4.12 It is Hegel who introduced content to logic so as to alter the formal logic. To Hegel, method is content itself as well as its reflection. He says:

... it can be only the nature of the content itself which spontaneously develops itself in a scientific method of knowing, since it is at the same time the reflection of the content itself...10

In Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel already went on record that "the method is nothing but the structure set forth in its pure essentiality".11 When form was given content or when the totality is taken as such without separating form absolutely from content, contradictions otherwise excluded by the formal logic got integrated as different or contradictory

10. Ibid.

aspects of the same. But, by this the entire character of logic changes. Contradictions not allowed by form get a place in it with the addition of content. With this, contradictions do not just remain part of the so called contingent world but get a logical status also. The principle of non contradiction that had its exclusive reign over thought for centuries since Eleatics and Aristotle was finally forced to accept its opposite, a new principle of contradiction, the very basis of dialectical logic.

4.13 Hegel differentiates his method from other methods. Dialectic is different from what he calls raisonnement and the mathematical method. The constructive, deductive method of mathematics, Hegel admits, is applicable in its own field. For Hegel, mathematics is an externally ordered abstract science whose subject matter is unmodifiable lifeless fixity. Many of its propositions are of "abstract identity and tautology." 

About the proposition $5 + 7 = 12$, Hegel remarks:

$5 + 7$ and $12$ are out and out the same content...
The $12$ is...a result of $5$ and $7$ and of an operation which is already posited and in its nature

is an act completely external and devoid of any thought, so that it can be performed even by a machine. Here there is not the slightest trace of a transition to another... 13

Regarding geometry, Hegel nurses the same grudge. Hegel:

... geometrical objects are abstract determinations of space; the underlying abstraction, so-called absolute space, has lost all further concrete determinations... 14

Mathematical activity is external to matter and thus subjective. In the preface to *Phenomenology of Spirit*, he expounds his ideas clear: "In mathematical cognition, insight is an activity external to the thing." 15

Again,

The movement of mathematical proof does not belong to the object, but rather is an activity external to the matter in hand... The way and the means by which the result is brought forth belong entirely to the cognitive process. 16

According to Hegel, mathematics dismember its aspects into lifeless entities; it discards the internal necessity; there is no "necessary connection arising through the nature of the thing

13. Ibid.
Hegel concludes that philosophy should despise this defective method of cognition.

The evident character of this defective cognition of which mathematics is proud, and on which it plumes itself before philosophy, rests solely on the poverty of its purpose and the defectiveness of its stuff, and is therefore of a kind that philosophy must spurn.18

By raisonnemement, Hegel means the ordinary ways of argument adopted in books and debates that suit the author or the speaker. There can't be any necessity and certainty in such haphazard methods. "They have presuppositions; and their style of cognition is that of understanding, proceeding under the canon of formal identity."19

4.14 Hegel differentiates his dialectic from the "negative type of dialectic" common among the Greeks including even Plato.20 By negative dialectic, Hegel meant "that

18. Ibid. p. 25.
dialectic which takes an object, proposition, etc., given to feeling or, in general, to immediate consciousness, and explaining it away, confuses it, pursues it this way and that, and has as its sole task the deduction of the contrary of that which it starts..."21 This dialectic regards as its final result "either the contrary of the idea with which it begins, or, if it is as incisive as the Skepticism of the ancients, the contradictory of this idea, or again, it may be feeble enough to be content with an 'approximation' to the truth, a modern half-measure."22 By all means, what is begun with in this dialectic is assumed as something false (not truth) or as apparence (not reality) or again as illusion (not existence). This dualism of beginning and end, of common sense and wisdom, or rather the separation of these that has infected all classical philosophies cannot be consistent with the "loftier dialectic"23 of Hegel. Hegel thinks that this ancient dialectic should not have stopped with these determinations and negations.

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
Distinct from this negative dialectic,

(the) loftier dialectic of the concept consists not simply in producing the determination as a contrary and a restriction, but in producing and seizing upon the positive content and outcome of the determination, because it is this which makes it solely a development and immanent progress.24

Again,

this dialectic is not an activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically.25

From this account, two important aspects of Hegel's positive and loftier dialectic that make it different from the negative dialectic become crystal clear. One, it consists in "seizing upon the positive content" of the determinations, restrictions and negations. And two, it is "not an activity of the subjective thinking applied to some matter externally", but is rather the matter's very objective, inner, organic movement.

4.15 This Dialectic of Hegel is not an invention, but a discovery. He has brought to light what is going on. In fact, previous philosophers used dialectic, but not in the form as

24. Ibid.

was used by Hegel. One can see, as Hegel also sees, dialectic in the Eleatic argument against motion, in the Socratic irony of starting with a pretended ignorance and developing of correct definition through debate, in the Platonic development of ideas, etc. But taking it in its positive side and giving it a logical status is the revolutionary discovery of Hegel.

The concept of negation involved in the negative dialectic of the ancients gets a clear philosophical status in Spinoza. Hegel develops his concept of positive negation, an essential point of his dialectics, from Spinoza only.26 For Spinoza, all determination is negation (Omnis determinatio est negatio). Hegel takes its converse form:27 all negation is determination. Only negation as such is formless abstraction.28 Hegel says that speculative, dialectical thinking does not stop there. For it, nothing or negation is not an ultimate.29 Thought and extension (being) are the attributes, not self-subsistent beings of their own; they are but sublated moments of an infinite unity. For Spinoza, negation is finite, and determinate. But

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
Hegel concludes from this that negation is a determination and hence an affirmation also. That is, negation is positive, because negation is determinate. Here negation is not ultimate and it passes into its positive. If negation can be affirmation, if negative can be positive, then finite is infinite, and infinite is finite; they are related. Identity of these opposites gives the key to Hegel's theory of identity of opposites.

This identity of opposites is the contradiction or the antinomy that Kant was trying to grapple with. Hegel praises Kant in accepting the "necessary" and "essential" nature of contradictions, an advance made on his fore-philosophers. But Kant limits contradictions to human mind. Contrarily, antinomies of pure reason form facts of truth. Kant criticizes reason for these antinomies, the result of reason's trend towards totality. According to Hegel, if the natural and real trend of reason is towards unity and totality and towards the unconditioned, what right Kant has to stop this? The divisions he makes of the faculties of understanding and reason, of real things-in-themselves and the phenomenal objects of knowledge does not allow him to leave the reason with its trend of unity. Kant wanted to save thing-in-itself from human cognition; he wanted to save the Reasonable and the
Unconditioned from our 'conditioned' faculties. For this, he does not allow reason its full operation. He limits reason and keeps it negative which would have been positive otherwise. We will see that Hegel has taken this negative reason of Kant as the second phase of his dialectical triad.

Again, if reason and thought (for Hegel, Spirit also) can have contradictions, why can't things have? Hegel criticises Kant for not allowing this. Kant is rightly criticised for confining his antinomies only to a limited set of cosmological ideas. According to Hegel, antinomies are there in objects of all types and in all notions and ideas.

Hegel finds dialectic everywhere, in world, things and notions. There is dialectic in motions of the heavenly bodies, political revolutions and even in changes in emotional moods and expressions. Hegel doubts the existence of anything without contradictions. In his second preface (1831) to Science of Logic he raises this doubt emphatically. Hegel:

... it is the requirement and business of logical thinking to enquire into just this, whether such a finite without infinity is something true, or whether such an abstract infinity, also a content

without form and a form without content, an inner
by itself which has no outer expression, an externa-
ity without an inwardness, whether any of these
is something true or something actual. 31

Thus taking the cue from Kant, Hegel goes further; he brings
the transcendental dialectics of Kant down to the earth, to
the immanent level; the transcendental dialectics that is
"logic of illusion" is transformed into real logic and real dia-
lectics. Reason (speculative reason in Hegel) is set free
from Kant's negation and limitation, and allowed its full
operation. This is a real philosophical bourgeois revolution
similar to French bourgeois political revolution of 1789. If
Kant's was a background, Hegel's was the real messiah of the
revolution in logic and philosophy. Kant represented the con-
tradictions of the old logic in its fullness. The new took
birth in Hegel. The 'Copernican revolution' of Kant is taken
to its logical destiny by Hegel. And now, let us see what
this new logic is in its concreteness.

4.2 Structure of Hegel's Dialectics

As we have seen, for Hegel, dialectics is omnipresent. His
system is criticised of panlogism. In our view, this criticism

in fact arises from a mistaken notion that Hegel's dialectic is his logic only. Contrary to this, his dialectic is at once his metaphysics (ontology), epistemology, logic and method. If we have a bird's eye view of his works, we can see this. In epistemology ( Phenomenology of Spirit), knowledge develops dialectically towards Absolute Knowledge. In logic and method (Science of Logic), Absolute Idea develops dialectically from its being, i.e., from itself and to itself through categories. In ontology (Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences), the Absolute Spirit develops its otherness (Philosophy of Nature) and reveals itself and self-realizes through human mind (Philosophy of Spirit). History develops dialectically (Philosophy of History). Dialectic is all-pervading, and this dialectic is his logic, and hence panlogism for others. Even the divisions we made above cannot be strict. So interlinked and identical is the dialectic in Hegel. We will stress the logical aspect of his dialectic, though this is very much linked to the other aspects of dialectic.

4.21 Three Sides of the Logical Triad:

In Logic (of the Encyclopaedia), Hegel says:

... logical doctrine has three sides:
(a) the Abstract side, or that of understanding;
(b) the Dialectical, or that of negative reason;
(c) the Speculative, or that of positive reason.32

These three sides or phases of a single model dialectical stage (of every notion or logical entity) are often termed thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Fichte and Schelling use this set of terms frequently than Hegel does. The same triad is described as Genus-Differentia-Species in Phenomenology of Spirit. In Science of Logic, this appears in form of Being-Nothing-Becoming triad as the first set of categories in logic. Let us see the nature of these sides.

The trend of understanding is to have hard and fast, fixed prepositions, to have static presuppositions, to separate off ideas or notions. Concepts are taken, at this level, totally independent, not at all interdependent. The penumbrae of the notions that shade into each other are cut off; they are handicapped of their interpenetrative abilities. Usual common sense notions are at the level of understanding. At this level, the concept is more abstract and less concrete.

In the Dialectical phase, the notion is in its negative stage. The concept at the level of understanding passes into its

32. William Wallace, op. cit. p. 113. Here alpha, beta, gamma are replaced by a, b, c.
opposite at the dialectical stage. This opposite is inherent in the understanding itself. As understanding does not allow its dialectical side, the opposite is suppressed. When the Dialectic asserts, the understanding is suppressed. Both are taken incompatible. At this level also, notions are of the same nature as is in the understanding except that these are at their negativity; they are abstract, independent, cut off from each other. Usual nihilist and sceptic notions are at the level of Dialectic or negative reason.

The third phase, the phase of Speculative (or Positive reason or Reason or Speculative reason or Speculative thought) consists in integrating the two earlier opposing phases. The exact nature of this integration, or the identity of these opposites is very complex and its revelation brings in a number of concepts. Speculative thought contains the abstraction of understanding and also the contradictory element of dialectic.

A one-sided proposition therefore can never even give expression to a speculative truth.33

In speculative thought the unity of the two is pronounced and stressed, and at the same time they are different also.

33. Ibid. p. 120-21.
If we say, for example, that the absolute is the unity of subjective and objective, we are undoubtedly in the right, but so far one-sided, as we enunciate the unity only and lay the accent upon it, forgetting that in reality the subjective and objective are not merely identical, but also distinct.34

While being 'is', and nothing 'is not', becoming 'is and is not'. In Hegelian language, becoming is "the truth of" its "moments" being and nothing.

4.22 Sublation

How becoming becomes "the truth of" its "moments"? Through sublation. Before going to explain it, we should note the fact that in Hegel the terms sublation, mediation, determination and negation mean the same process. In Hegel, negation is determinate negation. Let us take becoming as the model to explain this process of sublation.

The German word aufheben is translated as "to sublate".35 To sublate means to negate as well as to preserve. Hegel explains

34. Ibid. p. 121.

35. 'Sublate' is commonly used; many other words though not very proper are also used in different translations. Eg: overcome, supersede, overreach, transcend, put aside, set aside, negate-and-preserve, transcend-and-preserve. The process is aufhebung (sublation).
this in a remark in *Science of Logic*. He says:

'To sublate' has two fold meaning in the language. On the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative element, namely something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.

For instance, in becoming, being and nothing "sink from their initially imagined self-subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same time are sublated." Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing; a determinate unity in which there is both being and nothing; but in so far as they are unseparated, each is not; therefore, in this determinate unity, they are only as vanishing sublated moments. The unique case of becoming is that two determinations at the same time, one of nothing towards being, i.e.,

36. German Language.


38. Self-subsistence is the term used to show the so called independence of stages or concepts. 'Abstract' 'understanding' only can accept the self-subsistence. When these become 'concrete' in the 'speculative', they are 'moments' of the speculative that in turn is 'the truth of' of these 'moments'.

'coming-to-be', and the other of being towards nothing, i.e., 'ceasing-to-be', are taking place. Becoming is thus in a double determination, a double sublation.40

The self-subsistent being and nothing gets transformed into the moments ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be in becoming. So also, sublation is not external; it is an 'immanent determination'. Of the sublations of being and nothing in becoming, Hegel says:

They are not reciprocally sublated - the one does not sublate the other externally - but each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself.41

The importance of sublation or negation becomes more clear when we see that pure being before sublation is indeterminate and just nothing. Being is pure being when it is without any determination, without any qualification, without being bound by conditions. Being is being in its "indeterminate immediacy". That means being can be something else only if it is determined or mediated. Otherwise, being is "pure indeterminedness and emptiness"; "it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards".43 Nothing is also the same; it is

40. Ibid. pp. 105-06.
41. Ibid. p. 106.
42. Ibid. p. 82. "In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal to itself."
43. Ibid.
"complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content"; "it is simply equality with itself", "undifferentiatedness in itself." 44

Thus, both are not determined, but indeterminate; both are neither mediate nor mediated, but immediate; both are not negated, nor qualified, but unnegated. Both do not have undergone any determination or mediation or negation. At this stage they are same only. 45 They get meaning only in their sublatedness. Hegel says:

What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being - does not pass over but has passed over - into nothing, and nothing into being ... Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself. 46

That is, nothing and being cannot stand in their abstractness. They are 'moments' in 'the truth of' becoming. They are in their negatedness, determinatedness, mediatedness in this becoming. This way, every step in their movement is a determination or mediation or negation or sublation. Thus, we have

44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid. pp. 82-83.
seen the working of sublation in a single model triad, the being-nothing-becoming triad. Similarly, in synthesis, thesis and antithesis are in their sublatedness. In Reason or speculative thought, understanding and negative reason are in their determinateness.

Negation or sublation does not lead things into nothing, because the negation is only partial or determinate. In a remark, Hegel reiterates this:

To sublate and the sublated (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially distinguished from nothing. What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation;...47

Thus, the result of negation is something positive only.

Overall, this phenomenon of negation or sublation is firstly, immanent or internal, secondly, partial or determinate, and thirdly, positive and not negative. This negation forms the unit process of all movement, contradiction and self-development. This is the key of the dialectical process, and this forms the basis of Hegel's law of dialectics, the identity of opposites.

47. Ibid. pp. 106-7.
4.23 Negation of Negation

Since we have a picture of negation, negation of negation is also within our grasp. It is a sublation of sublation, a mediation of mediation; a determination of determination. This is mainly used by Hegel to explain the sublation of the model becoming itself. This is the conversion of synthesis into a new thesis; or the sublation of becoming into a new being, the determinate being. The negation of negation can be clearly explicated if we take again becoming and its sublation.

In the sublation of becoming, becoming is and is not. "Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result."48 The sublation of becoming is "the vanishing of becoming or the vanishing of the vanishing itself."49 The sublated result is "the vanishedness of becoming, but it is not nothing."50 Thus, negation of negation is not a relapse back into its past; the sublated result in neither the old nothing nor the old being which are all immediate, indeterminate, but a mediated result that carries in itself all the determinatenesses of its past; it is a new being, and it is a non-being also because this is a form of being, a determinate being.

48. Ibid. p. 106.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
This negation of negation is also a process throughout in Hegel whereby the categories develop towards the Absolute Idea. By each negation of negation, the being acquires more and more concreteness. So the concreteness of each negation of negation also will be different. For instance, after the sublation of becoming, the determinate being, i.e., the sublated result gets as such qualified. Hegel calls this determinate being 'determinate being as such', and its determinateness as quality. Again this quality in their being and nothing forms are reality and negation. In their sublatedness, i.e., in their becoming form, the determinate being is something, a determinate being. But the negation of negation here is distinct. Here, the sublatedness is in "determinate being's own determinateness"; the being here is "being-within-self"; negation here is in the form of "self-relation". So, the negation of negation is unique in each case.

Another important point is that the negation of negation is used at various levels. First, when the sublation in synthesis or becoming undergoes again a sublation or negation in order to settle itself to another sublated, to the new thesis, then the total steps together is negation and negation.

52. Ibid. p. 115.
Secondly, the being itself is a negation of negation of being. For instance, in the above para, we have seen that something is negation of negation of reality. Thirdly, there can be any number of negations of negations grouped under a higher level of negation of negation. For example, the same something that is the negation of negation of reality is again the negation of negation of being in another level: that is, being is negated in determinate being and again negated in something which is a determinate being. In fact, negation of negation applies to every structure of triads. At the same time we should bear in mind that Hegel's divisions are not always triadic.

4.24 Identity of Opposites or the Law of Contradiction

We have already stated in the sub-section on sublation (4.22) that negation is the key of this law. Every negation represents contradiction. The same is the identity of opposites. How is it? For instance, becoming is the identity of being and nothing. Nothing and being are opposites. In becoming is their identity as well as difference. If we stress only identity, it is part of the truth. To stress both is the whole truth. "It is not only an identity of opposites; it
is also an identity of opposites", as Stace remarked.53

Traditionally, conceiving opposites as separate is not difficult. The difficulty lies in conceiving the identity of 'separate' opposites. This difficulty, a very irrational predisposition, is negated through identity of opposites. A is not A. Traditional dualism is resolved through this. Infinite is finite as well. A is A as well as not A. This is a contradiction in the view of principle of non-contradiction (Aristotelian formal logic). Yes, this is a contradiction. And contradictions are a reality. Contradictions of one and many, finite and infinite are reality. Contradiction is identity of opposites. Thus, with Hegel, a new principle of contradiction is added to the existing law of logic. This is the law that dialectical materialists have developed further.

It is interesting to note that Spinoza and many of the traditional philosophers like Eleatics, Plato, Plotinus (neoPlatonists) had resorted to the principle of contradiction, but negatively. They have drawn conclusions opposite to Hegel. Zeno points out contradiction in movement, but unfortunately

concludes that movement is not reality because of the contradictions within it. Hegel also observed contradictions in motion, but he concluded just the opposite: movement is a reality, so also contradiction. A moving arrow is at rest as well as not at rest. See the obvious identity of opposites that was left for a philosopher more than twenty centuries after Zeno to state. There are contradictions in "all objects of every kind, in all conceptions, notions and Ideas."54 "Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality."55 Hegel does not think contradiction a real or logical mistake. So, against Zeno, he says that "motion is existent contradiction itself."56 See how he resolves the riddle of Zeno.

Something moves, not because at one moment it is here, and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this 'here', it at once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction itself.57

56. Ibid. p. 440.
57. Ibid.
Ordinary thinking dominated by formal logic cannot hold fast the contradictions; it sinks immediately into one of its opposite determinations. It is one of the "fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking, that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a determination as identity." But Hegel rightly thinks that, out of these two determinations, identity and contradiction, contradiction is "the profounder determination and more characteristic of essence."  

Formal logic and ordinary thinking considers contradiction "as a contingency, a kind of abnormality and a passing paradox of sickness." For it, contradiction is "a blemish, an imperfection or a defect." Usually, contradiction is not accepted in things, in the first place; secondly, it is used in the subjective realm though its existence is not granted there even. About this, Hegel writes:

In the first place, contradiction is usually kept aloof from things, from the sphere of being and of truth generally; it is asserted that there is nothing that is contradictory. Secondly, it is shifted into subjective reflection by which it

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58. Ibid. p. 439.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid. p. 440.
61. Ibid. p. 442.
is first posited in the process of relating and comparing. But even in this reflection, it does not really exist, for it is said that the **contradictory** cannot be imagined or thought.62

As Hegel remarked, not only that the existence of contradictions is not granted, but the confusion created out of the transformation of opposites is considered an error. This is made clear where Hegel deals with the unity of positive and negative.63 Hegel:

... the superficial thinking that does not consider the positive and negative as they are in and for themselves, can, of course, be referred to comparison in order to bring to its notice the untenability of these distinguished sides which it assumes to be fixed in their opposition to one another. Even a slight experience in reflective thinking will make it apparent that if something has been defined as positive and one moves forward from this basis, then straightaway the positive has secretly turned into a negative, and conversely, the negatively determined into a positive, and that reflective thinking gets confused and contradicts itself in these determinations. Unfamiliarity with their nature imagines this confusion to be an error that ought not to happen, and ascribe it to a subjective mistake. This transition also, in fact, remains a mere confusion, where there is no awareness of the necessity of the transformation.64

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64. Ibid. p. 436.
Hegel then argues that, even on a consideration of external reflection, each is contained in each other. Thus, contradiction is not an error, but it is "necessity of the transformation." Hegel stated that

even for external reflection... the positive is not an immediately identical, but... and opposite to a negative, having meaning only in this relation, so that the negative itself is contained in its notion;... Similarly, the negative which stands over and against the positive, has meaning only in this relation to its other; it therefore contains this in its notion.

Actually,

every determination, every concrete thing, every Notion, is essentially a unity of distinguished and distinguishable moments, which, by virtue of the determinate, essential difference, pass over into contradictory moments.

Not only that these opposites are related, but that they are self-related. They are not just externally related. By establishing the identity of these opposites, Hegel could undo the law of excluded middle. Hegel analyses the examples light and darkness, vice and virtue, truth and error, etc. to show

65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid. p. 442.
that there are 'in-betweens' between these opposites.

Light which is usually taken as positive is seen also as negative.

(light) as such is reckoned as the pure positive and darkness as the pure negative. But light essentially possess in its infinite expansion and in its power to promote growth and to animate, the nature of absolute negativity. Darkness, on the other hand, as a manifold or as the non-self-differentiating womb of generation, is simply self-identical, the positive.68

That is, as expansion and growth is through negations, light is negative. As darkness is identical with darkness itself, it is positive.

Similarly, intermixing of light and darkness to get different quantitative and qualitative alterations is also shown.

(It) is a familiar fact that light is dimmed to grey by darkness; and besides this merely quantitative alteration it suffers also the qualitative change of being determined to colour by its relation to darkness.69

Thus, these determinations are no more fixed oppositions as is usually thought of. It is not that either there is darkness or there is light. But, there is one in the other.

68. Ibid. p. 437.
69. Ibid.
That is why middles like grey are possible. Thus, principle of excluded middle cannot stand to the test of change and motion.

So also, light is light not only in comparison with darkness, but it is in its own self a negation of itself; i.e., light is darkness too. Hegel, in the same way, has taken up the example of virtue also. 70

Even ordinary thinking, if unmasked, contains contradictions, despite its prejudice against them. Ordinary thinking is not aware of them; it remains "an external reflection". 71 Hegel takes us to examples:

The most trivial examples of above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on ad infinitum, all contain opposition in each term. That is above, which is not below; 'above' is specifically just this, not to be 'below', and only is in so far as there is a 'below'; and conversely, each determination implies its opposite. Father is the other of son, and son the other of father, and each only is as this other of the other; and at the same time, the one determination only is, in relation to the other; their being is a single subsistence. The father also has an existence of his own apart from the son-relationship; but then he is not father but simply man. 72

70. Ibid.
71. Ibid. p. 441.
72. Ibid.
From all these contradictions, Hegel concludes that contradiction is "the principle of all self movement."\(^{73}\) Self movement proper is "nothing else but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and deficient, the negative of itself."\(^{74}\) That means, that the self movement is a contradiction proper. Something is and is not in one and the same respect. "Something is therefore alive only in so far as it contains contradictions within it, and moreover this power to hold and endure the contradiction within it."\(^{75}\) If anything is unable to hold its contradiction within it, it is dead abstract being.

Ordinary thinking holds the opposite determinations "over and against one another", but not "their transition, which is the essential point and which contains the contradiction."\(^{76}\) Intelligent reflection consists in "grasping and asserting contradiction."\(^{77}\) This brings the opposite determinations "into a

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73. Ibid. p. 440.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid. p. 441.
77. Ibid.
relation that contains their contradiction and allows their Notion to show or shine through the contradiction."\textsuperscript{78}

Thus, the truth of the opposing determinations consists only in their relation to one another, in their identity. This is the identity of opposites. Hegel goes to the extent of saying that "without this knowledge, not a single step can really be taken in philosophy."\textsuperscript{79} And this law of identity of opposites or contradiction became the scathing weapon that Hegel brandished everywhere.

\textbf{4.3 Refutation of Formal Logic}

From the above detailed discussion, it is clear that Hegel could establish the law of contradiction as a principle of things and thought. Without bringing in the way he refuted the laws of formal logic, our discussion cannot be given a finish.

\textbf{4.3.1 Hegel refers to the law of identity as the "first original law of thought."\textsuperscript{80}} The law, in its positive expression $A = A$, is "nothing more than the expression of an empty

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. p. 442.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid. p. 438.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid. p. 413.
tautology."  

That is why this law of thought has no content. It is thus the "empty identity." Identity is identity; identity is not difference; "identity and difference are different." Does it not imply that "identity is different from difference"? Yes. It implies that "identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very nature, is this, to be different." So, identity in itself is difference.

Moreover, the advocates of the law of identity clings to this "unmoved identity" which as such has no truth except that it has its opposite in difference. So, the law of identity contains only "formal truth, a truth which is abstract, incomplete." Then, it is implied that "truth is complete only in the unity of identity with difference." Lack

81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid. pp. 413-14.
88. Ibid. p. 414.
89. Ibid.
of awareness of the negative movement of identity caused by the imperfection in seeing identity in its incompleteness.

Then there is the appeal of this law to experience. When "this proposition $A = A$, a tree is a tree, is made, (one) immediately admits it and is satisfied that the proposition as immediately self evident requires no further confirmation or proof."

90 But actually this appeal to experience is an appeal to every consciousness. This experience, a concrete application, to arrive at a universal law implies all, a manifold that is different from identity.91 As experience contains identity in unity with difference, this refutes the abstract identity as the truth.92 So even experience does not accept that $A = A$, that identity is identity.

Again, for instance, if 'a plant is a plant', or if 'God is God', it is clear that this "absolute verbiage" reveals nothing, and that an expectation of a different determination is not met as well. As these propositions have set out to say something, some other determination, and but at the same time the same thing is repeated, nothing has happened. That

90. Ibid.
92. Ibid. p. 415.
is, instead of the same thing, the opposite, i.e., nothing has emerged. Thus the talk of identity contradicts itself.\textsuperscript{93} A = A, and A = not A at the same time.

Hegel says that A is A (A = A) only as "a beginning that hints at something different to which an advance is to be made."\textsuperscript{94} But, in the law of identity this different does not happen or is not allowed to happen. But it remains hidden. Hence the contradiction. This hidden other in the law of identity is open and explicit in the Hegelian law of contradiction.

4.32 The negative expression of the law of identity, called the law of contradiction in formal logic is also analysed by Hegel to lay bare the contradiction in it. To this law, "A cannot at the same time be A and not A" as is in the law of identity.\textsuperscript{95} Being the negative expression, identity is expressed as its "negation of negation"\textsuperscript{96} in this law. That is, A cannot be not A; A is not not A. Hegel finds an advancement in this form (of law of identity). A and not A

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid. p. 416.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
are at least distinguished, although they are related to one and the same A. Not A (or $A = \text{not } A$) represents the hidden negativity in the positive expression of the law of identity. In the negative expressions of the law, this hidden aspect gets expressed. This is precisely its advancement over the former. 97

But still, the propositions $A = \text{not not } A$ and its opposite $A = \text{not not } \neg A$ cannot go together, according to this law. Here also, as we have seen in the case of law of identity, each contains in itself its opposite, and each develops into its opposite. So naturally, $A = \text{not not } -A$ and $A = \text{not } -A$ at the same time. Hegel concludes:

what emerges from this consideration is, therefore, first, that the law of identity or of contradiction which purports to express merely abstract identity in contrast to difference as a truth, is not a law of thought, but rather the opposite of it; secondly, that these laws contain more than is meant by them. 98

4.33 Now, take the so-called law of the excluded middle:

something is either A or not $A$: there is no third. 99

This law actually implies that "everything is an opposite, is

97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
determined as either positive or negative."¹⁰⁰ But, this is usually understood as to state that, of the particular predicates, either itself or its non-being (i.e., its opposite) belongs to the thing. Hegel characterizes this understanding as "so trivial that it is not worth the trouble of saying it."¹⁰¹ Something is sweet or not sweet, green or not green, and so on and "this is a triviality leading nowhere."

Distinct from this usual understanding, Hegel says, we should grasp this proposition in the fact of its necessity that identity passes over into difference, and this into opposition. This is important. The negation that is hidden in the first law and gets expressed in the second law is positively asserted as one of the choices in this third law. But the demerit is that the two opposites are not allowed at the same time. That is why this is again another form of the law of identity. Opposition is accepted here; but a contradiction that accommodates the identity and difference as its moments is not accepted.

¹⁰⁰. Ibid.
¹⁰¹. Ibid.
¹⁰². Ibid.
Hegel tries to bring out the contradiction of this law. The third that is indifferent to the opposition is in fact given, namely A. "This A is neither +A nor -A, and is equally well +A as -A."\textsuperscript{103} Thus, something that was supposed to be related to only one of the two is really related to both. This something is therefore "the third which was supposed to be excluded."\textsuperscript{104} So, this law also contains "more than is meant" by it.\textsuperscript{105} This third which is dormant here becomes lively in Hegel's law of contradiction. There, mediations allow innumerable thirds.

What "more than is meant" by the different forms of this law of identity of traditional logic is positively expressed in Hegel's new law of logic. This we have seen earlier(4.2). The important implications of this dialectical law in Hegel's system should be seen now.

\section*{4.4 Dialectical Results in Hegel}

To Hegel, the total content of the motion is dialectic. The form of this motion is also dialectic. This is the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} Ibid. pp. 438-39.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid. p. 439.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid. p. 416.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
unity of content and form in Hegel. This itself is also an example of his dialectical law, identity of opposites. Hegel expresses their inseparability:

...what logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition.106

But the movement towards the 'end', with every additional step, becomes more and more concrete. By every step of sublation, thing at hand becomes less 'abstract' and more 'concrete'. And in each step the beginning point is immediate and the end point is mediate. This goes on. The beginning point of a step is the end point of another negation, and this end point is a beginning for a new negation. Dialectic of beginning and end is throughout the dialectic. Dialectic of abstract and concrete is throughout it; dialectic of immediacy and mediacy is throughout it. Then, being the 'first' category is the most abstract, and Absolute Idea, the 'last' category is the most concrete. As dialectic develops, as implicit contradiction becomes explicit, the concepts become less and less

106. Ibid. p. 43.
abstract, and more and more concrete or rich in 'sides'.

This goes against the common perception that the more you go away from being or reality, the less concrete and more abstract you end. In Hegel this is not so because the so-called 'last' is already the 'first', and the so-called 'first' is already within this real 'first', i.e., Absolute Idea. In Hegel the first and last, the beginning and end are really connected; it is only for our purpose of survey, they are separated. In the usual Hegelian way, they are identical as well as different. They are one, one in the sense of differentiated oneness, not undifferentiated abstract oneness.

What is the Absolute a differentiated oneness? Because it includes all its lower categories, all its determinations. All these determinations are negated as well as preserved, i.e., sublated in the Absolute. All is one; one is all. Absolute is "the truth of" all these moments. The difference is that all these determinations have lost their "identity" (in the old sense) or "self subsistence" in the Absolute. Absolute is not abstract, but enriched and concrete with all these determinations which are otherwise separate, partial and abstract.

So, this concrete whole includes all the abstractions as lively 'moments'. That means, higher categories contain lower ones. In Hegel's terms, they contain lower categories explicitly. Similarly, higher categories are implicit in lower categories. Becoming is implicit in being; being is explicit in becoming. Becoming is implicit in being as its truth; being is explicit in becoming as its moment.

In Hegel, there is no beginning and end in the usual sense. For the subject, to conceive the object, there is a beginning. For the object also, in its relation to the subject, there is beginning because the subject itself is part of the object that in turn is itself a subject, a subject in the sense of an object mind. Otherwise, there is no beginning in the usual Cartesian or empiricist senses. Being is already explicit in Absolute Idea. Hegel calls absolute idea the foundation. Being presupposes its foundation. Thus, Absolute Idea is there from the very 'beginning', a beginning that commences with being which is relevant as far as our grasping of it is concerned. In other words, Absolute Idea is logically prior to the so-called beginning. And this whole is the real and rational that is pregnant with all diversity including the unreal and irrational.

This unity or identity of the beginning and end cannot entertain the usual objections regarding teleology in Hegel. Because
only division between end and beginning and the resultant pro-
jection of end in a preconceived fashion is susceptible to
criticisms against teleology. Enough of this for the time being
as we shall come to the details of this in the last chapter
of the present thesis.

Another point connected with the identity of beginning and
end is the question of deduction. Firstly, the coming to be
and ceasing to be of categories in Hegel is not a question
of just axiomatic deduction which Hegel asked the philosophers
to spurn. On every point of the dialectical motion, Hegel ind-
ucted something new. Secondly, the so-called deduction itself is
not a one way process. As such being stands undeduced and
from it is deduced the Absolute Idea. But as the foundation
of all, Absolute Idea stands undeduced and from it only can
being be deduced. Such a system is made possible in Hegel
because and only because of his principle of identity of op-
posites. This he uses to solve all dualities, to explain the
interconnection between all the opposite categories.

We shall see two of the most important unities that Hegel
explained. They are the identity of being and knowing and that
of the rational and actual. The former is important in respect
of its revolutionary significance in philosophy, and the latter
in respect of the criticism it earned for Hegel.
In Hegel, being, the Reason, the object-reason is identified with knowing, the subject reason. The faculty of knowledge is identified with the object of knowledge itself. This looks strange at the outset. But, with this Hegel solved the relation of thought to being, the reality. He identified epistemology with ontology. This attacked the metaphysical basis of earlier philosophies. This principle is later taken up by Marxist materialists as we have seen already (second chapter).

The metaphysical separation that the subject mind assumes in the beginning before any enquiry into the objective world is the basis of Cartesian dualism and of the empiricist and positivist subjectivism.

Actually the subject mind is part and parcel of the object; in Hegel, the object mind. That is why, in Hegel, the Spirit, the Idea self-realizes itself in human mind.

With this, Hegel positively asserts that it is possible for the human mind to know the objective world. Agnosticism is given a scare. Thing-in-itself of Kant is knowable according to Hegel. The reasonable, the unconditioned, the infinite, the Absolute becomes accessible to the finite mind.

The identifying of rational and actual earned criticism for Hegel from all quarters. In the preface to *Philosophy of Right*,

Hegel writes: "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational."\(^\text{108}\) The criticism mainly is that this proposition can be a justification for anything going on. On this basis, some have taken Hegel's philosophy as the ideological forerunner justifying the inhuman Nazi deeds under Hitler. But one can see that it is the same Hegel whose revolutionary method is inherited by the progressive politics of emancipation. So, it is a different thing to use one philosophy in the way that suits some. Let us concentrate on the rationality and reality of the statement.

In Hegel, Idea is the Reason, and it is the reality. So when we say the rational is real,\(^\text{109}\) there is no self-contradiction. This comes up in the dictum identifying the actual and the rational. In the usual metaphysical consideration in philosophy, reason gets a place hidden behind as well as away from actual things. This separation is the basis of the objection. So also, in reading Hegel one may think that rational is something that we arrive at after a laborious dialectical


\(^{109}\) The German word "Wirklich" is often translated as actual as well as real. That is why, the confusion of using real instead of actual comes up.
movement. But this is not so. In this section itself we saw that it is the foundation of everything; it is implicit in all, and for that matter, even in the irrational. Irrational is part of the Reason in Hegel. Reason is there in all actual things even if they are partly irrational. Ideal is not just ideal but actual also. Ideal is universal; actual is both universal and particular. In a lecture, Hegel says: "Actuality is always the unity of universal and particular." In Science of Logic, actuality is considered the synthesis of essence and existence. If the essence is to exist it is through the actuality. Universal exists through particular. Reason exists in actual things. What is rational is actual. And what is actual is also rational. Sean Sayers' explanation that Hegel is against utopias is very correct. The second part, i.e., what is actual is rational, can again be objectionable. But, here also we

110. T.M.Knox (Tr.), Philosophy of Right, Additions from Lecture notes. p. 283 (Addition to para No. 270).

know that actual is not something static for Hegel. Hegel
does not see actual as status-quo. Reason is in the process
of getting actualized, and the actual is getting rationalised
(not justified).

Now, we have got a fairly substantial understanding in gen-
eral about Hegel's system also, through our treatment of the
implications of his dialectical law.

4.5 Usage of Triad in Hegel

There is no question of tracing the triadic usage in Hegel,
because this itself forms the major usage in Hegel, unlike the
scanty elements of it in Kant. In Kant, the triadic usage
is not a conscious one, and he was not for it. Hegel says
that Kant's discovery is just instinctive.112

Hegel actually inherits the usage of triad from Fichte.
Schelling also used it. However, here, regarding Hegel's concep-
tion and usage of triad, we shall note an important fact.
That is, he is against a lifeless schema of triadic form. In

Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel:

Of course, the triadic form must not be regarded as
scientific when it is reduced to a lifeless schema,

112. Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 29.
a mere shadow, and when scientific organisation is
degraded into a table of terms.\textsuperscript{113}

This is the reason behind his non insistence for triads
always. In Hegel, there are many irregularities in the triadic
arrangement. That is why, Stace exclaims that: "There are
even cases of "triads" which contain four terms!"\textsuperscript{114}

4.6 Movement of Categories

Hegel's categories are not just logical. They have not only
form but content also. They are not just attributes, but subst ance itself. In Kant categories means only epistemology and
logic. In Hegel, it is ontology also. So, movement of categor ies means movement of Idea or the objectivity itself.

In Kant, we traced the interrelation of categories, and found
it very limited. For instance, freedom and causality are rela ted (freedom is causa noumenon); the third category in all the
four groups of Kantian categories emerges out of the unity of
the first two in each respective groups. Except these hesitant
relations, overall the categories in Kant are distinct, independ ent and rigid.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.

p. 97.
In Hegel, they are dynamic, not only interrelated, but internally related. In one, another is. One is and is not. That is, in one category, another develops and the previous one changes into the new. Here, the connection between categories is internal, logical and necessary. All categories are necessarily related. Through this interconnection, we arrive at the whole or totality through traversing all possible categories. This necessary connection between categories is important because only through this we get the idea of the whole. This necessary connection is the basis of contradiction, the logical unit of Hegel. Because contradiction is the necessary connection between two categories. It is the identity of two categories, i.e., identity of opposites. This two come from one itself, because one itself develops into the other. This implies that they are not externally related.

So also, categories are not limited to twelve as in Kant. Categories are innumerable. Every mediation brings in a change and the category gets changed into another. This is possible because all other categories are either implicit or explicit in one category. Suppose, there is an object, a toy. Toy is; so its 'being'. Toy is broken; so, its 'nothing'. Now it is just a plastic piece, so, its 'becoming'. Its quality, reality, limitation, quantity, alteration, difference, opposition, contradiction, so on and so forth to the Absolute Idea.
A very important advancement in Hegel's concept of categories is that it alludes to history. Categories developed through history. The development of categories in *Science of Logic* corresponds roughly to the emergence of categories in history of philosophy. For instance, being of Eleatics; then becoming of Heraclitus, and 'being-for-self' of Atomists.\(^{115}\) But this is very rough. Hegel himself admits this. But history does not develop by chance; there is a definite rhythm in which the Idea unfolds through its categories and history (in time). This way all the previous philosophies are absorbed in Hegel's philosophy, according to Hegel. Like categories, they are moments in Hegel's system.

As a sum up, we can say that categories develop, develop dialectically through a necessary connection that works as the essence leading to the totality or the whole. And categories have a history.

\(^{115}\) William Wallace, *Logic*, Section 86.Z.
4.7 History in Hegel

Just now, we saw that the categories have history, and that Hegel's philosophy itself is the consummation of the whole history of philosophy. And this is the history of self-realization of the Spirit itself. For Hegel, this Spirit itself is the Reason and God.

Hegel takes reason as the basis of history. History develops rationally, because reason is the law of the world. Hegel:

The sole thought which philosophy brings to the treatment of history is the simple concept of reason: that reason is the law of the world, and that, therefore, in world history, too, things have come about rationally.

The idea that reason is behind history is something demonstrated by philosophy and so this is a presupposition for history, says Hegel. He puts:

This conviction and insight is a presupposition of history as such; in philosophy itself it is not presupposed. Through its speculative reflection

116. The Philosophy of History (We are using the edited version of The Philosophy of History given in Carl J. Friedrich (Ed.), The Philosophy of Hegel, The Modern Library, New York, 1953, p. 3. See that the title of the page itself says this.

117. Ibid.
philosophy has demonstrated that reason... is both substance and infinite power; in itself the infinite material of all natural and spiritual life, as well as the infinite form, the actualization of itself as content.118

By speculative reflection in Philosophy, Hegel means his own philosophy that identifies form and content, and here, as is quoted above the substance and power. In fact, this is the identity of history and logic; that logic is dialectical and historical; also that history is logical, i.e., dialectical. This is the identity of the transcendental or logical or rational element with the historical or empirical or temporal element that we saw contrasted and counterposed in Kant. Hegel puts a curtain to this dualism.

Hegel argues that reason should not be separated from reality, real events and history. To think that it is separate leads us firstly to arrive at that the reason is peculiar to few people only, and secondly to consider that history grows by freak events and chance. This is to separate the ideal and the ought from the real. Firstly,

... reason is not so impotent as to bring about only the ideal, the ought, and to remain in an

118. Ibid.
existence outside of reality... as something peculiar in the heads of a few people.119

Secondly,

... the world is not abandoned to chance and external accident but controlled by Providence.120

We will go later to this allusion to theodicy; but let us be clear on one thing now that reason is behind history. Then, what this reason is. Hegel wants to be concrete. He says,

One always speaks of reason without being able to indicate its definition, its content, which alone would enable us to judge whether something is rational or irrational.121

Hegel identifies reason with Spirit, God, the Idea. This is how he gives content to reason. But regarding 'God' and 'Providence' Hegel is not very insistent.122 He says that the mere belief in Providence is not sufficient.123 In this introduction to The Philosophy of History itself he specifies that he is not insistent on God also.

One may have all sorts of ideas about the kingdom of God; but it is always the realm of Spirit, to be realized and brought about in man.124

119. Ibid.
120. Ibid. p. 7.
121. Ibid. p. 11.
122. Ibid. pp. 10-11; p.12.
123. Ibid. p.10. Hegel thinks that 'nous' of Anaxagoras and 'Providence' in theology are also Reason, but its lower forms. The realm of spirit is important.
124. Ibid. p.12.
That means, regarding Spirit he is very particular. At the same time, it is a fact that for Hegel all are one and the same differentiated oneness, i.e., the Spirit. "The realm of Spirit is all-comprehensive",\textsuperscript{125} says Hegel. For Hegel, this is God itself.

Once the identity of history and the all-comprehensive Spirit is pronounced, everything follows suit. This he establishes as the basic principle before he starts analysing history. Hegel defends this by saying that even the so-called neutral historian does this and this is justified. Hegel defends:

\begin{quote}
Even the average and mediocre historian, who perhaps believes and pretends that he is merely receptive, merely surrendering himself to the data, is not passive in his thinking. He brings his categories with him and sees the data through them. In everything that is supposed to be scientific, reason must be awake and reflection applied.\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

Now history also has to grow rationally, dialectically. Even the fact that reason is behind history develops through history only. Anaxagoras was the first to note that 'nous', an intelligent principle rules the world.\textsuperscript{127} However this 'intelligence'

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid. p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
was not a self conscious reason. It was Socrates who developed
this principle further. "Only Socrates took the first step in
comprehending the union of the concrete and universal."128 This
is great advancement over 'nous' and 'Providence'. Hegel him-
self uses the dialectic of 'universal' and 'particular' in
analysing history. In Phenomenology of Spirit, he divides his-
tory into 3 epochs - the ancient world with Greek city states
at its apex, the feudal world, and the modern period inaugu-
rated by French Revolution. Universal was assertive in the
first period, while particular got expressed in the 'self-estr-
anged' feudal world. The modern world witnesses the synthesis
of both these. The particular analysis and frame in Hegel can
be wrong. But the universal fact that Hegel tried to see his-
tory in a frame of logic remains right and important.

It is commonly opposed that the rendering of just the chro-
nological content of history in logical terms, in terms of
necessary connection is just an imposition on history; chronolo-
gical change or progress cannot be logical progress. Precisely,
this is the point that Hegel warded off in the beginning
itself. Even illogical, irrational aspect and chance elements

128. Ibid. p. 7.
are considered by Hegel part and parcel of the dialectic of Spirit itself. In terms of logic it is difficult to attack Hegel for both the sections who either criticise him of resorting to empirical history or attack him of not being empirical enough, because he synthesizes both the rational and empirical elements in him.

Some even points out the regressions in history and doubts that how then history can be a logical progression as Hegel claims. But one should not forget that these regressions and progressions are just negation and affirmation moments in the truth of dialectical movement of history. Apart from this pious wish of separating history from logic, there are other related criticisms too raised against Hegel. An important one of these is that Hegel is a futurist; he predicts history. Once Hegel is connected with Marxists, this criticism gets more strengthened. Popper is the main proponent of this view.

As Hegel is the philosopher of the whole, the all-comprehensiveness, we cannot say that his philosophy is not concerned with future at all. Past, present and future all belong to


Hegel's thought. But we can point out factors that counter such a criticism. Firstly, as a philosopher of history he depended on the past; that is why he is criticised of resorting to empirical history. Secondly, Hegel thought that philosopher is always late; philosophy "paints grey in grey." His famous simile that the owl of Minerva begins its flight when dusk is falling speaks a truth that philosopher can only understand, not create history. Here, Hegel does not follow marxism, and in fact even Marxism does not take itself to any astrological dimension. See what Hegel says:

One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed... When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.

Nothing more is needed to show that Popper's is nothing but a distortion of Hegel.

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Let us note one important aspect of the Hegelian identity of the logic and history. This is the mystic part; the revelation of God through history. History is realization of Spirit; it is theodicy. He connects this with the idea of freedom which is considered the rational, final purpose of the world. But this is only "the work of God". Hegel says:

"Word history, with all the changing drama of its histories, is this process of development and realization of the spirit. It is the true theodicy, the justification of God in history. Only this insight can reconcile the spirit with world history and the actual reality, that what happened, and is happening every day, is not only not "without God", but is essentially the work of God."

This mystic tangle is basically because of Hegel's conception of objective world as the Spirit or God. Despite this characterisation of the object as spirit, the identity that Hegel offers between subject and object is a great step forward from the previous philosophers.

Another aspect of demerit of his conception of history is that Hegel ended history with his philosophy. Idea self-realizes in human mind; the whole history of philosophy consummates in Hegel's philosophy. With all its demerits, one

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133. Philosophy of History, op. cit. p. 158.
should say, Hegel conceived the dynamic aspect of history through its own thread of necessity.

**Conclusion**

Now, let us sum up. Hegel reconstructed logic by giving a content. His dialectic is different from that of the ancients and Kant. Negation is the unit of motion and the identity of opposites is the law of motion in Hegel. This law is the key to his identity of being and knowing or ontology and epistemology. The law of dialectic explains the movement of categories; history also develops dialectically.