In Kant's philosophy, in his own view, the valid logical part consists only of concepts or categories. Categories belong to the faculty of understanding (Verstand). They are the subjective, a priori elements of knowledge. Valid knowledge, i.e., synthetic a priori statements in Kant's parlance, would not be so but would be blind in the absence of the categories.

As Kant proceeded in his endeavour to explore the process of this valid knowledge formation, he was forced to introduce another faculty as an integral propeller behind the logical activity of understanding. This is reason (Vernunft). The reason is necessarily two-fold. It has a legitimate activity - logical employment which in turn is necessitated only because of its illegitimate activity - transcendental employment. We are basically concerned with this latter activity of reason.

The transcendental activity of reason gives rise to illusions. In Kant's prescription, reason which is subjective by nature should not have attempted to hypostatise itself to be
objective. According to Kant, the objectivisation of reason, very illegitimate for logic and epistemology, results in illusion. Kant calls the logic of this illusion dialectic.

This transcendental, dialectical, illusory activity of reason which Kant terms as the synthetic adventure of reason is what we find behind the ideas and inferences about psychology, cosmology and theology. None of these ideas and inferences constitute any object. So, these are not constitutive ideas. But in their regulative capacity, they (except cosmological ideas) are valid provided they are not taken as constitutive ideas. As we shall see in this chapter, the very transcendental employment of reason regulates the logical employment, the guiding role of reason in the activity of understanding. Similarly, Kant accords practical or ethical validity to the transcendental activity of reason. But, Kant excepts the cosmological ideas from being considered objective for regulative or practical (ethical) purposes because in cosmological ideas reason falls into antinomy making the objectivisation or the objective unity of the idea in question impossible.

We would bring in all these steps that lead us to the antinomy of reason. But importance would be given to the question of antinomy itself. While dealing with antinomy, our major concern would be to locate the question of
dialectical opposition, the characteristic of the first two antinomies (the mathematical ones), because this forms the basis of the new law of contradiction.

As secondary factors that express as manifestations of dialectic, elements of history, interconnection of categories and the origin of triadic usage in Kant's philosophy would also be discussed.

3.1 Usage of the Term 'Dialectic' in Kant

Kant calls dialectic logic of illusion.¹ This is different from analytic that is logic of truth.² The elements of dialectics in Kant can be explored only along with the exposition of what Kant himself means by dialectic.

Why Kant calls dialectic as logic of illusion? In history of philosophy, dialectic came to be regarded as sophistic, the art of argumentation. Plato and Aristotle considered sophistic to be a "dealing with that which is not".³ This common sense meaning of dialectic as an art of disputation, an art in which one is concerned more with the argumentation than with the truth, was what took Kant to consider

2. Ibid. p. 176.
3. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1026 b
dialectic as illusion. Kant's differentiation of dialectic (logic of illusion) from analytic (logic of truth) itself proves this. But this is only one side of the issue. The other side is that Kant started giving it a positive meaning.

Dialectic was used as an instrument to distort the objective assertions. Kant took caution against this and declared that this use as an "instrument (organon) that professes to extend and enlarge our knowledge can end in nothing but mere talk."4

Kant says that this is "quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy."5 So Kant positively asserts in his first critique:

The title 'dialectic' has therefore come to be otherwise employed, and has been assigned to logic, as a critique of dialectical illusion. This is the sense in which it is to be understood in this work.6

What is disputed through this logic is the objective validity of reason in its transcendental employment.7 Dialectic is

5. Ibid. p. 99.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. p. 176. "(The) transcendental employment of reason is not, it would seem, objectively valid, and consequently does not belong to the logic of truth..."
involved in that which is not,⁸ that which is "beyond the limits of possible experience".⁹ Dialectic is that which can neither be proved nor be disproved, a special kind of illusion called transcendental illusion. What is pertinent is that Kant does not discard this even though it is illusion. Instead, he considers this as logic, a very important business of reason.

3.2 **Transcendental Illusion as the Natural and Unavoidable Dialectic**

The illusion with which dialectic is concerned is transcendental illusion.¹⁰ Let us see first what transcendental illusion is not. It is not probability. Because probability is also 'truth' but known on 'insufficient grounds' and as such is 'imperfect' only, not 'deceptive'.¹¹

Transcendental illusion is not appearance. Appearance lies in object or sensibility or the representation of the senses;

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10. Ibid. p. 298.

11. Ibid. p. 297.
illusion, like truth or error, lies in the judgement or thought of these objects of senses. So illusion lies "only in relation of the object to our understanding", not in objects as such.

Again, transcendental illusion is different from empirical and logical illusions. Empirical illusions like the optical ones are due to "influence of imagination" that would mislead "the empirical employment of rules of understanding that are otherwise correct." Logical illusion arises from "lack of attention to the logical rule", and this disappears when attention is brought to it.

Now, what is transcendental illusion? This is an illusion that does not cease even after getting detected and its invalidity exposed. For example, "the illusion in the proposition: the world must have a beginning in time."

Transcendental illusion takes us "beyond the empirical employment of categories and puts us off with a merely deceptive

12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. p. 298.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
extension of pure understanding. Transcendental illusion lies in actual principles that "commands us to transgress" the empirical employment of concepts of understanding.

The essence of transcendental illusion lies in taking "the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts" for "an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves." The so-called fundamental rules and maxims of human reason have all the appearance of being objective principles, while actually they are not so.

Transcendental illusion is a "natural and inevitable illusion, which rests on subjective principles, and foists them upon us as objective." This is not an illusion "artificially created." So, we can say that there exists "a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason... one inseparable from human reason."

Though Kant took this only as illusion, he is aware that

17. Ibid. p. 298.
18. Ibid. p. 299.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid. p. 300.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
this illusion can never be dissolved.\textsuperscript{23} For Hegel, the illusion in Kant becomes a reality. When Kant exposes this illusion (as illusory and dialectical), Hegel accepts it as reality, as objective. Kant's credit, as pointed out by Hegel lies in granting this dialectic an "inevitable", "unavoidable" and "natural" existence.

3.3 \textit{Logical and Transcendental Employment of Reason}

As transcendental illusion is seated in pure reason,\textsuperscript{24} it is the reason that is involved in the illegitimate activity, i.e., dialectic. Reason has a legitimate realm of activity also. Kant divides reason into "a logical and a transcendental faculty."\textsuperscript{25}

3.3.1 What is the logical function of reason? As understanding secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, reason, in turn, secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles.\textsuperscript{26} Kant distinguished reason as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid. "That the illusion should, like logical illusion, actually disappear and cease to be an illusion, is something which transcendental dialectic can never be in a position to achieve."
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid. The subtitle itself says so.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid. p. 301.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid. p. 303.
\end{itemize}
"faculty of principles" from understanding as the "faculty of rules." Reason unifies the rules of understanding to the minimum number of principles. Thus reason never applies directly to experience or to any object. But it applies to understanding and judgement. Reason applies to understanding "in order to give the manifold knowledge of the latter an a priori unity." This can be called "unity of reason" and this unity is "quite different in kind from any unity that can be accomplished by the understanding." This unity of reason is through "inference of reason." The inference of reason is different from the "inference of understanding," which does not involve any mediation. So, inference of understanding is immediate, while inference of reason is mediate. Mediate

27. Ibid. p. 301.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid. p. 304.
30. Ibid. p. 303.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid. p. 304. In syllogism, determining the conclusion a priori through the predicate of the major premise is done by reason, while major premise is the rule of understanding and minor premise is the job of judgement.
34. Ibid. p. 303.
Inference is syllogism. Syllogism is a mode of deducing knowledge from a principle. The principle involved here is logical principle, and this is the logical employment of reason.

In this process, reason "endeavours to reduce the varied and manifold knowledge obtained through the understanding to the smallest number of principles (universal conditions) and thereby to achieve in it the highest possible unity." If the conclusion is subsumed under the given condition (major premiss), then the principle of reason involved is a priori and hence the employment is logical and legitimate.

This logical employment of reason works as the key to the transcendental employment of it. Because in this effort, reason also seeks to discover the universal conditions of its judgement. Its syllogistic spree can be ad infinitum. There is no reason that reason should stop with a particular syllogistic conclusion. It seeks "the condition of the condition" by means of prosyllogism. This is natural according

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35. Ibid. p. 304.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid. "(If) the object of the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then the conclusion is deduced from the rule, which is also valid for other objects of knowledge."
38. Ibid. p. 306.
to Kant because this is just an extension of its logical employment. This is "to find for the conditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion."39 This unity is essentially different from that of understanding which seeks "the unity of a possible experience."40 So, in its transcendental employment, reason is an illegitimate extension of understanding.

Reason assures that "if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another - a series which is therefore itself unconditioned - is likewise given, that is, is contained in the object and its connection."41 To think this way that the conditioned is related to the unconditioned, is to state a synthetic principle of pure reason.42 A priori principle of reason is logical and legitimate; a priori synthetic principle of reason is transcendental and illegitimate.

The logical demand of reason, i.e., "multiplicity of rules and unity of principles",43 does not prescribe any law for

39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. p. 306.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid. p. 305.
objects; but, "it is merely a subjective law for the orderly management of the possessions of our understanding... it does not justify us in demanding from the objects such uniformity as will minister to the convenience and extension of our understanding." So, logically, the unity of reason is not applicable to the objective world. The principle, for instance, that everything has a cause is not a principle of reason, but a concept of understanding.

But reason, undaunted by any stricture, enters into the realm of objects and experience, and even seeks the cause of the uncaused; it seeks the unconditioned through the conditioned. Kant explains that "the conditioned is analytically related to some condition but not to the unconditioned."

To Kant, logic of truth is analytic. If the conditioned is related to the unconditioned, this cannot be analytic; then it is nothing but dialectic. So, \textit{a priori} synthetic principles of reason form the dialectic. And this is a transgression of logical reason.

\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid.]
\item[45.] Note that Hegel accepts the interrelation while Kant does not accept this to be logical (though he is accepting it to be natural and inevitable).
\item[Ibid. p. 306.]
\end{enumerate}
In its transcendental employment, i.e., in its quest for synthetic knowledge the trend of reason in Kant's view is (1) for total and complete unity ("highest possible unity" in its logical employment), and (II) towards applicability to experience, appearance, intuitions and objects (applicable only to "concepts and judgements" in its logical activity). The essential point is that reason transgresses its logical limits. The whole transcendental dialectic is, we find, a discussion of this transgression.

3.33 So, we have seen that the logical employment of categories by reason is often extended to the transcendental realm. Let us see how this is done. This is done by extension of logical syllogism beyond the limits by way of a series. Reason as the "faculty of inferring" is involved in

47. Ibid. p. 304.


49. Ibid. pp. 305-7. Some writers develop the trend (i) into concepts of totality as dialectic, and the trend (ii) into concept of hypothesis/amphiboly as dialectic. For instance, Nathan Rotenstreich, op.cit. (Note 8).

50. K.K. Smith, op.cit., p. 307. In this page, Kant frames a number of questions to be discussed.

51. Ibid. p. 320.
what is called *ratiocinatio pollysylllogistica*,\(^{52}\) which is a series of inferences that can be extended indefinitely on the side either of *the conditions* through prosyllogisms (ascending series) or of *the conditioned* through episyllogisms (descending series).\(^{53}\) The transcendental inference or the dialectical syllogism is concerned with the ascending series of syllogisms.

If the reasoning is in the descending order, the conclusion at each stage is again conditioned (as its condition is) and since the series is about the conditioned only, the employment of reason is logical.

In the descending order, the movement is towards the conditioned, i.e., in *consequentia*,\(^{54}\) where the "conditions are presupposed",\(^{55}\) i.e., considered as given along with the conditioned. This descending order of reasoning, whose movement is from the first consequence or the first appearance to further consequences, is called *progressive synthesis*.\(^{56}\) Since the conditions are presupposed (even though the question of the totality of series is not a presupposition) and since

\(^{52}\) Ibid. p. 321.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Ibid. p. 387.

\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) Ibid.
the order is towards the conditioned or the consequences in
the progressive (descending) synthesis, the syllogism of the
dialectic or the transcendental employment of reason that seeks
the absolute unity of the conditions and thereby the uncondi-
tioned, does not apply here. 57

The ascending order of syllogisms, where reason moves "from
the condition which stands nearest to the given appearance... to
the more remote conditions", i.e., towards higher conditions
or antecedents, and where the movement is towards the possible
(not given) conditions in antecedentia, is termed regressive
synthesis. 59 We are concerned here with the regressive syn-
thesis. Kant says that the concern of pure reason with the
progressive form of totality is "gratuitous and unnecessary" since
this is not required for "the complete comprehension of what
is given in appearance". 61 Because, for this comprehen-
sion, what we have to consider should be "the grounds, not

57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid. p. 388.
61. Ibid.
the consequences. Moreover, only conditions or totality of conditions can be presupposed. Only antecedents can be presupposed. Consequences are only in process of becoming, not presupposed. So, the synthesis for absolute unity of conditions and the unconditioned should be in antecedentia and regressive. Even if we form an idea of the absolute totality of consequences, it can be thought only arbitrarily; neither can it be a necessary presupposition, nor be one of transcendental ideas.

Where does the illusion lie in the syllogism of Dialectic? The illusion lies in the contradiction that, on the one hand, the truth of the conditioned depends on that of the unconditioned or the absolute totality presupposed from which the former can be inferred as a consequence, and on the other, the truth of the presupposition and the whole regressive (ascending) series depend on that of the conditioned from which the former series and absolute totality are inferred as antecedents. The essence of this illusion lies in stretching the

62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. p. 325.
64. Ibid. p. 321.
65. Ibid. p. 325.
66. Ibid. p. 322. Kant does not positively state this in unequivocal terms; one has to sift through the matter. Hegel resolves this by positing the unity of the conditioned and the unconditioned.
conditioned given in understanding beyond limits by reason.

3.34 We have seen that reason guides the categories of understanding towards a unity. Thus even the logical drive itself of reason is towards systematisation.67 Logically, reason posits a certain "collective unity as the goal of the activities of understanding."68 Reason prescribes the understanding to go for systematisation; as regards knowledge, it asks the lower faculty "to exhibit the connection of its parts in conformity with a single principle."69 This drive of reason towards unity as such is not transcendental. But, how this logical principle is possible? Because of a hypothetical employment of reason.70 The logical principle, i.e., the unity of reason/inference of reason/syllogism of reason, always presupposes a projected unity.71 This idea of the complete unity, a problematic idea, works behind the logical ordering of knowledge obtained by understanding.

67. Ibid. p. 534.
68. Ibid. p. 533.
69. Ibid. p. 534.
70. Ibid. p. 533.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
Such a projected idea is the presupposition or postulation of logical reason which in turn cannot work without the postulation of the former. This hypothetical employment of reason is only regulative, not constitutive. The idea of the systematic unity is only a mere idea. This helps the reason to approximate the rules of understanding to universality and works as the criterion of the truth of its rules. Thus, a special interest of reason is seen behind such ordering or systematisation of knowledge of the understanding.

3.35 Now, let us see when does the dialectic or, in other words, the transcendentalisation of understanding crop up? According to Kant, it is then, when we take this systematic unity "not only subjectively and logically, as a method, but objectively also". This is, when we think that understanding itself is capable a priori of such a systematisation, without the special interest of reason. This is to say that the unity of systematisation belongs to "the constitution of

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73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid. p. 536.
objects or nature" (of understanding) itself,77 and doing this would amount to a constitutive error. Kant strongly denies objectivity to this systematic unity.

3.36 At a certain point, he talks of the "maxims" of reason that carries specific interests of reason. There are maxims of manifoldness as well as of unity that engage in disputes.79 So, the unity is only an interest of reason, not an objective reality. The conflict, he thinks, is due to "the twofold interest of reason."80 This becomes real dispute when these maxims of reason are taken as "yielding objective insight."81 What Kant is particular about is that these disputes are not objective, but they are internal to reason. Because of the subjectivity of maxims, Kant even says that these are not strictly fit to be called 'principles'.82

77. Ibid. For Kant, objects means those given in understanding.
78. Ibid. p. 547. 'Maxims of reason' or 'maxims of speculative reason'.
79. Ibid. p. 548.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
The maxim of unity, i.e., "the method of looking for order in nature",\textsuperscript{83} can be, according to Kant, a "legitimate and excellent regulative principle of reason."\textsuperscript{84}

Reason prescribes the unity of the manifold knowledge of the understanding. So, knowledge presupposes the activity of reason. Because of the priority of reason, it has a dictating nature in its activities; it does command.\textsuperscript{85} Reason does not derive its maxims or principles from nature; on the other hand, it "interrogate nature in accordance with these ideas",\textsuperscript{86} i.e., with its own ideas. As knowledge or the conditioned presupposes the logical reason, the latter in turn presupposes a transcendental principle.\textsuperscript{87}

How this transcendental employment is possible? Transcendental principles are not constitutive, as there is no empirical employment of them and hence no schemata. But an analogon of such a schema (not schema as such) can be given.\textsuperscript{88} "This analogon is the idea of the maximum"\textsuperscript{89} and this makes the

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. p. 548.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. p. 549.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid. p. 539.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. p. 534.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid. p. 539.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. p. 546.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
greatest unity possible. So, the transcendental idea of totality, completeness or absoluteness is because of the idea of the maximum.

The idea of maximum gives rise to the economy of reason. The "parsimony in principles" shown by reason is its "economical requirement." Hence towards absolute unity.

3.37 Kant talks also of some "fundamental power" which takes us to systematic unity. Whatever may be the points behind the transcendental principle of reason, one thing is made clear that it is inevitable. First, reason is logical. Logical reason is possible because of the hypothetical employment of reason and the resultant projected unity. Then, this unity which is logical presupposes a transcendental idea of unity.

3.38 Now, Kant goes a step ahead in the transcendental realm of reason. He says that without assuming or hypostatising or postulating an object for the transcendental idea, reason cannot think of this unity even as an idea.

90. Ibid. p. 537.
91. Ibid. p. 536.
93. Ibid. p. 552.
94. Ibid. p. 556.
95. Ibid. "But reason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise than by giving to the idea of this unity an object" (p. 556); the idea of world is exempted from this as it involves antinomies (p. 552).
At the same time, objective reality of such a regulative principle ought to be assumed as having only "the reality of a schema" of it, not of the object itself. 96 The transcendental objects assumed should be regarded "only as analoga of real things, not as in themselves real things." 97

We have come from the logical function of reason in the realm of understanding to the transcendental function of it beyond understanding. In this, reason is objectivised into transcendental ideas, transcendental objects in the idea, and transcendental objects as such. Of these transcendental products, Kant accepts the first two as valid. He accords them regulative, practical and heuristic (methodological) validity. The last one, i.e., the transcendental objects, is taken invalid as these make the error of constituting objects. But in all these transcendental employments, reason becomes dialectical and illusory. This dialectic of reason is unavoidable because of its necessary connection, as we have seen, with logical reason.

3.39 The necessary nature of dialectic of reason points at another related nature of it. That is, the dialectical habit is a structural inherency to reason. The natural and

96. Ibid. p. 552.

97. Ibid.
unavoidable dialectic is "inseparable from human reason." The transcendental idea of systematic unity is "inseparably bound up with the very nature of our reason." This idea is legislative for us. Since this transcendental illusion or dialectic is legislative to us, "we should assume a corresponding legislative reason (intellectus archetypus), from which, as the object of our reason, all systematic unity of nature is to be derived." It is because of this legislative reason, reason is in a position to dictate or command the systematic unity of manifold knowledge through its maxim of unity, idea of the maximum, etc.

Let us sum up the advance of the logical employment of reason to its transcendental employment:

The logical employment of reason that helps the understanding to order the manifolds into knowledge proper according to its rules/categories is possible because of the basic trend of reason towards unity, completion and absoluteness. Corresponding to the logical operation of reason in understanding, a unity is projected. And this projected unity is a must to unify the manifolds in understanding. Kant calls this job of

98. Ibid. p. 300.
100. Ibid.
reason the hypothetical employment of reason. This projected unity works as the basis of transcendental employment of reason, and this leads to dialectic, the logic of illusions. Hence the necessity of dialectic. This is a necessary step for the logical employment even. The projected unity can be a 'transcendental idea' or a 'transcendental object in the idea' or a 'transcendental object as such'. Transcendental objects are not real objects, but analogon of schema of things.

Kant refers to the idea of the maximum and the parsimony of principles or economy of reason as the power behind the transcendental employment of reason.

3.4 Transcendental Ideas and Inferences as Dialectical Results

Both transcendental idea and transcendental inferences together constitutes the synthetic adventures of reason, the result of the transcendental employment of it.

Transcendental ideas are also called transcendental concepts of pure reason\(^{101}\) or the pure concepts of reason\(^{102}\) or ideas of reason. In the ideas of reason, reason seeks the "universality of knowledge",\(^{103}\) "totally of the conditions",\(^{104}\)

\(^{101}\) Ibid. p. 307.
\(^{102}\) Ibid. p. 315.
\(^{103}\) Ibid.
\(^{104}\) Ibid. p. 316.
"unconditioned",\textsuperscript{105} absoluteness\textsuperscript{106} or completeness. The three classes of these ideas are "the first containing the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general."\textsuperscript{107} In other words, these form the objects, respectively, of psychology, cosmology and theology; they form the transcendental doctrines of soul, world and God.\textsuperscript{108} Kant discerns the "connection and unity" among the transcendental ideas.\textsuperscript{109} The highest unity of the subject is the idea of the soul; from this, the idea of the world, and by combining both these, the idea of God are arrived at as if in a syllogism. Kant says that the "advance from the knowledge of oneself (the soul) to the knowledge of the world, and by means of this to the original being, is so natural that it seems to resemble the logical advances of reason from premises to conclusion.\textsuperscript{110}

\begin{itemize}
\item [105.] Ibid.
\item [106.] Ibid. p. 317.
\item [107.] Ibid. p. 323.
\item [108.] Ibid.
\item [109.] Ibid. p. 325.
\item [110.] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Like transcendental ideas, there are three classes of dialectical inferences. Being transcendental, these inferences are illusory, not logical. Kant calls them pseudo rational. But we are led to such results by way of "necessary syllogism" and the pseudo rational inferences "have sprung from the very nature of human reason."

The three kinds of dialectical syllogisms are (1) transcendental paralogism, (2) antinomy of pure reason, and (3) ideal of pure reason.

Transcendental paralogism deals with "the unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all representations in general (of the subject or soul)." Here, from the transcendental idea of the subject, i.e., the thinking ego (or the 'I think' or the transcendental unity of apperception or the transcendental unity of consciousness), we conclude the absolute unity of the subject or the soul.

From the transcendental idea of subject, we conclude its subsistence, reality, unity and existence. In other words, we

111. Ibid. p. 327.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid. p. 328.
115. Ibid. p. 384.
116. Ibid. p. 328.
conclude that (i) the soul is a substance, (ii) it is simple, (iii) it is a person (identity) and (iv) it is in relation to possible objects in space.\textsuperscript{117}

In Kant's system of thought, the discussion about paralogisms would be necessary. But, here, to be specific to our topic, any further dealing on paralogism is unwarranted. On another occasion,\textsuperscript{118} its difference with antinomies can be seen. What we should be certain about is the formal invalidity and "transcendental and yet natural illusion"\textsuperscript{119} in the paralogisms of pure reason stated above.

Antinomies come up when reason allows contradictory positions (thesis and anti-thesis) regarding the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for any given appearance.\textsuperscript{120} This dialectical inference deal with "the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the (field of) appearance."\textsuperscript{121} Kant discusses four antinomies, also arranged, as in the case of paralogisms, in tune with the table of categories. As antinomies form the basis of dialectical opposition, the crucial point of the later dialectics

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. pp. 330-31.
\textsuperscript{118} See 3.6 Antinomy of Reason
\textsuperscript{119} N.K. Smith, op.cit., p. 361.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid. p. 328.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. p. 384.
(Hegel and Marx), we will take up these in detail in coming sections.122

The third kind of pseudo rational inference is the ideal of pure reason. This inference deals with "the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general." Ideal is the conceptualisation most distant from reality; it is farther removed from reality than ideas are, while the ideas themselves are distant from reality as they are related to appearances or representations only through categories.124 Ideal, naturally, Kant thinks, does not have any corresponding reality.

What kind of idea is ideal? Kant says that by ideal he means "the idea, not merely in concreto, but in individuo, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone."125 For instance, God. Ideals have "practical power (as regulative principles)"126 that form "the basis of the possible perfection"127 of certain actions, i.e., moral behaviour. The ideals serve as the archetype,128

122. See sections from 3.6 to 3.9
124. Ibid. p. 485.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid. p. 486.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
supplying reason with a "standard which is indispensable" to it. Though "objective reality (existence)" cannot be conceded to ideals, they are not "figments of the brain" either. Ideal is different from the products of imagination that cannot be given in an intelligible concept.

Ideal always rests on "determinate concepts". Reason, in its ideal, aims at "complete determination in accordance with a priori rules." This ideal, the concept of God, as the sum total of all possibility, seems to be undetermined at first thought. But actually, this "excludes a number of predicates." Moreover, "of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can belong to a concept", i.e., to the ideal. So in this, the syllogism involved is

129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid. p. 487.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid. p. 489.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid. p. 488.
disjunctive.\textsuperscript{138} And, as only one predicate (one of the opposites) can belong to the ideal, the logic involved is that of 'this or that', i.e., the Aristotelian law of contradiction.

We have seen that both transcendental ideas and transcendental inferences are dialectical. Both these led us to transcendental psychology, cosmology and theology, and their interconnection. Because of the three kinds of ideas and inferences, Kant terms this as the threefold transcendental illusion.\textsuperscript{139} In all these three cases, "pure reason occupies itself only with the absolute totality"\textsuperscript{140} of the synthesis, i.e., with "that condition which is itself unconditioned."\textsuperscript{141} The basis of transcendental illusion or dialectic consists in taking the subjective condition of thinking as objective. "All illusion may be said to consist in treating the subjective condition of thinking as being knowledge of the object."\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. p. 491.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid. p. 488.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. p. 362. There are "only three cases of dialectical employment of reason."(p. 362). The three cases are "1. The synthesis of the conditions of thought in general. 2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking. 3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking."(p.362).
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid. p. 361.
3.5 **Regulative, Methodological and Practical Use of Dialectic**

We have seen that the dialectical results are illusory from a strictly cognitive or epistemological standpoint. Yet, in Kant's view, we have seen that dialectic is valid in various other respects as well. Dialectic is invalid and illusory for theoretical or speculative reason. Despite this, Kant unequivocally declares its regulative, methodological and practical (ethical) validity.

3.5.1 Transcendental ideas have an "indispensably necessary, regulative employment",\(^{144}\) i.e., that of "directing the understanding towards a certain goal."\(^{145}\) We have seen this in the previous sections, i.e., that, without the transcendental reason, logical reason cannot get its direction. So, transcendental ideas can be regulative ideas.

Regulative ideas have "their own good, proper, and therefore immanent use."\(^ {146}\) Kant goes to the extent of saying that "it is not the idea in itself, but its use only, that

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144. Ibid. p. 533.
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid. p. 532.
can be either transcendent or immanent. In so far as these ideas are not attributed to any object, i.e., in so far as we don't commit the constitutive mistake, the transcendental employment of reason remains an immanent principle of regulative and practical use.

Kant clearly differentiates between constitutive and regulative principles. In explaining the difference, he resorts to simile. The difference lies in as between something being given to reason "as an object absolutely" and that "as an object in the idea." In the latter, no schema of any object is directly given; it is "only a schema constructed in accordance with the conditions of the greatest possible unity of reason." This is the regulative principle. This is different from the former case where the concepts are employed "to determine the object." This determining of objects beyond experience is the constitutive principle of reason.

147. Ibid.
149. Ibid. p. 550.
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid.
Even the positing of something as an object in the idea is not allowed in the case of cosmological ideas. The soul or mind can be taken as if it is simple, substance, and with personal identity.  

Similarly in the domain of theology, everything can be viewed as if they followed from "completely dependent and sensibly conditioned unity", and at the same time, as if this unity follows from a "self-sufficient, original creative reason." But, in cosmology, the completion should never be allowed "as if the series of appearance were in itself endless, without any first or supreme

So also, we need not deny, in Kant's view, that there are purely intelligible grounds behind these appearances; but we have no knowledge of these whatsoever. So, we must never make use of them in our explanations of nature.

For regulative use, we can hypostatise the transcendental unity of systematisation of appearances except those in the

152. Ibid. p. 551.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid. We will see this in detail when we deal with antinomies (3.6 - 3.9).
155. Ibid.
realm of cosmology. That is, we can assume the psychological and theological ideas as objective for regulative use,\textsuperscript{156} while in the case of cosmological ideas, this is impossible since reason falls into antinomy here.\textsuperscript{157}

3.52 The endless series in the cases of cosmological ideas can also be broken. But, this is possible only in the case of practical principles. As far as theoretical reason and knowledge is concerned, such a transcendental positing in the case of cosmological ideas is invalid. This can be allowed as far as practical (ethical) principles are concerned.\textsuperscript{158} For instance, freedom is a disruption of the causal series in the field of cosmology. In the sphere of theoretical reason (i.e., in antinomy), freedom is just thesis only; i.e., freedom cannot be accepted beyond doubt. But in practical reason, freedom is a necessary postulate.

If we sum up, for the time being, then we can say that all transcendental ideas except cosmological ones are of regulative use, and that all transcendental ideas including the

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid. pp. 551-52.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid. p. 552. "The psychological and theological ideas contain no antinomy and involve no contradiction."

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid. p. 559.
cosmological one are of practical (ethical) validity.

3.53 These regulative ideas can work as 'heuristic' principles also.\textsuperscript{159} We derive things "as it were" or "as if" they received their existence from a highest intelligence.\textsuperscript{160} The idea is only a heuristic, not an ostensive concept.\textsuperscript{161} That is, it does not show us how an object is constituted, but, it does show how, under its guidance, we should seek to determine the constitution and connection of the objects of experience.\textsuperscript{162} This is the methodological import of the synthetic a priori principles of reason.\textsuperscript{163}

3.54 In the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, the problematic, hypothetical postulates of speculative reason becomes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{159} Ibid. pp. 545-46; 550.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid. p. 550.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
necessary postulates of practical reason. The dialectic in pure reason becomes analytic in practical reason. That is to say that illusion in pure reason becomes truth in practical reason. A postulate of the former gets the status of a law in the latter; i.e., the problematic achieves the apodictic nature.

How does Kant achieve this? In giving practical (ethical) importance to ideas, Kant takes Plato as his predecessor. Though Kant is critical of Plato for his "mystical deduction" of ideas and his resorting to hypostasis of them (in the theoretical level itself), he appreciates Plato's enterprise:

If we set aside the exaggerations in Plato's methods of expression, the philosopher's spiritual flight from

164. Immanuel Kant (Tr. Lewis White Beck), Critique of Practical Reason, Liberal Arts Press, USA, 1956. This aspect is constantly referred to throughout the book. Reason, in Kant, is logical as well as transcendental; i.e., to Kant, it is subjective as well as objective. The former is legitimate and the latter illegitimate. This illegitimate transcendental reason is again theoretical or practical. Kant uses pure reason, pure speculative reason, speculative reason and theoretical reason synonymously. Similarly, practical reason and pure practical reason are same. Legitimacy is accorded to the latter for ethical reasons.

165. Ibid. pp. 4-5.

166. N.K. Smith, o.cit., p.311.
the ectypal world-order to the architectonic ordering of it according to ends, that is, according to ideas, is an enterprise which calls for respect and imitation. It is, however, in regard to the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, where the experience, in this case of the good, is itself made possible only by the ideas - incomplete as their empirical expression must always remain - that Plato's teaching exhibits its quite peculiar merits.167

Kant also resorts to similar ordering according to ends. Defending Plato as well as preparing ground for himself, he says that "(Nothing) is reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circumscribed."168 This distinction between "is" and "ought" is a must to defend Kant's transcendental ideas in their practical use. Here, Kant thinks, one cannot just say disparagingly that "it is only an idea."169 "On the contrary, just because it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible ends, it must as an original, and at least restrictive condition, serve as standard in all that bears on the practical."170

167. Ibid. p. 313.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid. p. 319.
170. Ibid.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, freedom of will is given a status of law. When reason was objectivised in pure reason, reason which in Kant's view is really subjective, became dialectical or illusory. The idea of freedom had the same fate in theoretical reason. Freedom became part of the antinomy of reason. This freedom got revived, got a priori certainty, got subjective necessity in the faculty of pure practical reason. In speculative reason, objective reality of freedom was not assured. Kant says:

For speculative reason, the concept of freedom was problematic but not impossible: that is to say, speculative reason could think of freedom without contradiction, but it could not assure any objective reality to it. Reason showed freedom to be conceivable only in order that its supposed impossibility might not endanger reason's very being and plunge it into an abyss of skepticism.171

Once the concept of freedom is approved by an apodictic law of practical reason, all other concepts related with freedom also get certified. Kant says:

The concept of freedom, in so far as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason. All other concepts (those of God and immortality) which, as mere ideas, are unsupported by anything in speculative reason now attach themselves to the concept

171. Lewis White Beck (Tr.), Critique of Practical Reason, p.3.
of freedom and gain, with it and through it, stability and objective reality. 172

Freedom in practical reason is the principle of autonomy of moral will. Heteronomy of choice is not considered freedom, because it is not consistent with the law of moral duty and obligation. 173 Freedom is necessary; it is causality at the noumenal level. Kant calls it causa noumenon. Being "independent in origin from all sensous conditions, it (freedom) is in itself not to be restricted to phenomena." 175 That is, the objective reality of free will is given a priori, and thus the autonomy of reason regarding freedom is resolved. Kant does "couple the concept of causality with that of freedom." Freedom is inseparable from the moral law as its determining

172. Ibid. p. 3. In p. 57 also, Kant says the same thing. "This objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding in the field of the supersensous once ushered in, gives objective reality to all the other categories, though only in so far as they stand in a necessary connection with the determining ground of the pure will (the moral law)."

173. Ibid. pp. 33-34; 43-44.

174. Ibid. p. 57.

175. Ibid.
ground. Here, we can see the primordial of the dialectical overlapping of opposite categories.*

Kant himself is aware of his advantage to Hume in accepting causality. Unlike Hume, Kant accepts causality as a category in theoretical reason. Causality is real in relation to objects of senses (appearances). Causality (as freedom) is problematic in relation to intelligible objects, but only in speculative reason. It is asserted in practical reason. We have no intuition of it in speculative reason. In practical reason, even though we do not have intuition regarding freedom, it has a "real application exhibited in concreto in intentions or maxims; that is, its practical reality." 178

As the origin of practical concepts are a priori, not empirical, practical reason does not have intuition of objects; nor is it concerned with the knowledge of objects. So, objectivity of practical reason means something different. Unlike the analytic of pure theoretical reason, "practical reason is concerned not with the objects in order to know them but with its own capacity to make them real (according

176. Ibid.

* More of this later in section 3.11

177. Ibid. p. 58.

178. Ibid.
to knowledge of them), i.e., it has to do with a will which is a causal agent so far as reason contains its determining ground. Consequently, it does not have to furnish an object of intuition, but as practical reason it has only to give a law (for objects) of intuition.179

So, if theoretical reason is concerned with the knowledge of the transcendent thoughts, practical reason's interest lies in the necessary positing of them in reality.180 Thus the transcendental idea of soul or the transcendental paralogism becomes the immortality of soul; cosmological idea or the antinomy becomes the free will; and the theological idea or the ideal of pure reason becomes the existence of God. Hence all the three postulates of morality.

In speculative reason, we advance from the causes or appearances in antecedentia to a transcendental ground which is the need for the inquiring reason. Such transcendental grounds like God are only of methodological and regulative use. We don't assert their objective reality. At the most, according to Kant, they can be "reasonable opinion" for us. 181

179. Ibid. p. 92.
181. Ibid. p. 147.
In practical reason, the need is the "duty to make something (the highest good) the object of my will so as to promote it with all my strength." In doing this we must presuppose the postulates of morality. The duty is based on the apodictic moral law. Here, the speculative reason is not helpful in proving positively the postulates of morality. But the moral law does this job for Kant. 182

When theoretical reason is extended to practical reason, the speculative interest of reason is not extended. Because, the positive use of transcendental objects is not meant for theoretical purpose. But this is what is taking place in practical reason. So, no speculative interest lies with practical extension of reason. 183

3.55 Kant talks of the primacy of practical reason over speculative reason. After taking much precaution, he arrives at it.

If reason's capacity in theoretical level is "not sufficient to establish certain propositions positively (which however do not contradict it), it must assume these propositions just as

182. Ibid. p. 148.
183. Ibid. pp. 139-40.
soon as they are sufficiently certified as belonging imprescriptibly to the practical interest of pure reason." In such combinations, practical reason has primacy. 184

Kant, who started with the intention of exposing the false pretensions of reason, changes his mind, on the way, finding the danger of skepticism. *Critique of Practical Reason* was the result of this. When he wrote the preface for the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*, he declared this change of mind in a famous remark that he has "found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith." 185 However, on questions of epistemology and logic Kant does not accept as valid the intrusions of reason beyond its subjective realm.

3.56 Kant also deals with the main constitutive errors and the possible teleological correction. To him, the constitutive error is similar to the mistakes of amphiboly186 in which sensibility and understanding are confused; concepts applicable to appearances are confused with those to things-in-themselves, or conversely. Here, the concepts used in regulative


186. Ibid. pp. 281-88.
sense are erroneously taken in constitutive sense.

Kant lists what he considers to be two errors in case we overlook the restriction of the dialectical ideas and inferences to only regulative use. The first error is that of ignava ratio.187 This is to make the error of forcing us to consider our investigation absolutely complete (by positing a complete unity in reality), "disposing reason to cease from further enquiry, as if it had entirely succeeded in the task which it has set itself."188

The second error is that of perversa ratio.189 This is to take reverse procedure of presupposing and hypostatising a purposive unity, instead of approximating to such an unattainable completeness that can be verified in an empirical fashion. This is "to impose ends upon nature, forcibly and dictatorially" in an "anthropomorphic manner", instead of finding the purposive unity, and with it proving the existence of the supreme intelligent cause.190 Instead of carrying out this latter task, the error of perversa ratio forces reason to abrogate the purposive unity. For instance, we arrive at the

187. Ibid. p. 561.
188. Ibid. p. 562.
189. Ibid. p. 563.
190. Ibid. This is different from the commanding, dictating nature of reason.
disputed point (eg. God) by assuming it and imposing it instead of proving it, when we commit the constitutive mistakes. On the other, to be right, it is through the purposiveness that "the idea of an Author of the universe" has to be sought.  

From this, it is clear that these errors can be avoided if we adopt a teleological point of view, a purposive unity tending towards perfection. This purposive unity is "the training school for the use of reason."  

This teleological or purposive unity is a concept of reason which regulates understanding or logical reason. By this the concepts of nature are freed from "blind mechanism." At the same time, these cannot be credited with an act according to design, as that would amount to a constitutive principle. How this subtle nature of reason is made possible? Kant discusses this in The Critique of Judgement.

191. Ibid. pp. 563-64.
193. Ibid. p. 565.
195. Ibid.
While broadly dividing philosophy into theoretical and practical (Kant calls these divisions as Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Morals respectively), Kant identifies mainly two kinds of concepts - "those of nature and that of freedom." 196

These are the two realms of the entire faculty of cognition. 197 But, both are concerned with "the same territory of experience." 198 The former, the laws of which are discharged by understanding, represents its objects in intuition, not as things-in-themselves, but as phenomena. The latter, a jurisdiction of reason, represents in its object a thing-in-itself, but does not intuit. In both the cases the thing-in-itself or the supersensible - the idea of which forms "the basis of the possibility of all those objects of experience" - remains inaccessible to theoretical cognition. 199 Even then, the transition of reason from concepts of nature (theoretical) to the concept of freedom (practical), i.e., the transition from logical reason to transcendental reason, takes place. This advance

197. Ibid. p. 12.
198. Ibid. p. 13.
199. Ibid.
of reason towards the supersensible is, for Kant, because of the activity of another faculty, that of judgement.

The faculty of judgement works as a "middle term" between understanding and reason; Critique of Judgement connects the two parts of philosophy into a whole. "Finality of nature" is the concept or principle of judgement. This finality can be just formal or subjective, estimated by the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, as in the aesthetic judgement. Or, it can be real, objective finality, estimated by understanding and reason, as in the teleological judgement. Here, we are concerned with the latter. In the teleological judgement, the finality of nature is not formal, but real or objective; it is expressed as natural end.

This teleological judgement is the middle term in the syllogism of dialectic where reason is inferentially realized from understanding. In Critique of Pure Reason, the teleological unity is a synthetic adventure of reason; it is legitimised in its regulative use. The objectivisation of a subjective reason is done in the dialectic of Critique of Pure Reason.

In Critique of Teleological Judgement (the second part of the

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200. Ibid. p.15.
202. Ibid. pp.34.
203. Ibid.
Critique of Judgement), the teleological unity is objective. In both the cases, this objectivisation is restricted to be a regulative principle.

3.57 A very related concept is the architectonic of reason which Kant talks of towards the end of his first Critique. As we have seen, the dialectical results of reason owe their origin to the inherent drive of reason towards system and totality. Kant says:

Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all our knowledge as belonging to a possible system, and therefore allows only such principles as do not at any rate make it impossible for any knowledge that we may attain to combine into a system with other knowledge.204

While the basic nature of reason is so, it falls into antinomy also. The propositions of antitheses (in antinomies) go counter to the architectonic. That is why, as we would see very soon, Kant tried to resolve the antinomies. The propositions of the first two antinomies are taken illusory (and dialectical) while the last two are resolved of the antinomy by introducing the concept of heterogeneity.

In 'the architectonic of pure reason', Kant differentiates architectonic unity from technical unity. A 'schema which originates from an idea (in which reason propounds the ends a priori, and does not wait for them to be empirically given) serves as the basis of architectonic unity.' That means, the architectonic unity is teleological as we have seen just above (3.56).

3.6 Antinomy of Reason

So far, we have seen, in and through all the above sections, that reason which is formal and subjective crosses its limits and goes beyond the epistemic realm. Reason's advance towards ontic realm, its option to be objective and real also, is the essence of dialectic in Kant. To be the former is formal and logical. To be the latter is not acceptable to epistemology and logic in Kant. Theoretical cognition in Kant, does not allow the latter to be valid in the strict sense. But to be practical and so on, the latter applies. This reluctance of Kant is overcome only in Hegel. Hegel introduces content into logic. The 'formal only' nature of logic is done away with.

205. Ibid. p.654.
We saw that Kant prepared the background for this revolutionary leap. More than this, Kant pointed at the necessary contradictions of human thinking. Antinomies, contradictions and dialectical opposition together occupies the most important position in our search for the genealogy of the atomic elements of dialectical logic. Let us see this.

3.61 Antinomies are concerned with what Kant calls cosmical concepts. The antinomy of pure reason is the second type of transcendental inference or dialectical argument that follows "the analogy of the hypothetical syllogisms." This has as its content "the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the (field of) appearance." 

Let us see how this antinomy of reason is significantly different from other inferences like paralogisms and ideal of pure reason. Being categorical syllogism, paralogisms produce "a purely onesided illusion." So, in paralogisms, despite "a favouring illusion," reason for Kant cannot disclaim

206. Ibid. p. 385; 393. These are called cosmological ideas also, as the title shows (p. 386)

207. Ibid. p. 384.

208. Ibid.

209. Ibid.

210. Ibid.
"the radical defect through which in the fiery ordeal of critical investigation it dwindles into mere semblance."211 In antinomies, reason becomes self-aware of its limitations.

Ideal of pure reason, the product of the analogy of disjunctive syllogism, i.e., the third dialectical inference, also accepts only onesided attributes due to its very disjunctive nature. That is, its disjunctive nature accepts either this or that. So, here, the formal law of contradiction fully applies. That is, this will not allow dialectical opposition. Thus, in both cases, i.e., in the first as well as in the third cases of dialectical illusions, the illusion does not give a chance to repudiate the illusion itself.

Antinomy of reason has different results. This part of dialectic helps Kant to deny the epistemological and logical validity of dialectic itself, and to resume the formal law of contradiction in its full validity by pointing out the futility of the 'pretensions' of antinomy. But this conflict of reason and the resultant 'pretensions' are taken useful as a positive "sceptical method" that "aims at certainty."212

211. Ibid. pp. 384-85.
212. Ibid. p. 395.
Otherwise, as such, the antinomy of reason gives rise to dialectical opposition* that shows the falsity of both the dogmatic onesided pretensions and hence the shallowness of disputes. Reason becomes self aware of this through its antinomy and Kant claims that what is called "the euthanasia of pure reason",\textsuperscript{213} i.e., a literal suicide of reason, is successfully avoided. "Reason, which does not in abstract speculation easily become aware of its errors, is hereby awakened to consciousness of the factors (that have to be reckoned with) in the determination of its principle's."\textsuperscript{214}

In the attempt of objective synthesis of appearances, reason inevitably falls into antinomy.\textsuperscript{215} This new phenomenon of human reason - an entirely natural antithetic\textsuperscript{216} "guards reason from the slumber of fictitious conviction such as is generated by a purely onesided illusion",\textsuperscript{217} and at the same time, "subjects it to the temptation of either of abandoning itself to a sceptical despair, or of assuming an obstinate

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* Only in first two antinomies, in the last analysis.

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid. p. 385.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid. p. 395.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid. p. 385.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
attitude, dogmatically committing itself to certain assertions, and refusing to grant a fair hearing to the arguments for the counter-position." 218 This antithetic, therefore, does not deal with onesided assertions; this treats only of "the conflict of the doctrines of reason with one another and the causes of this conflict." 219 The antithetic or "conflict of reason" 220 becomes the real positive dialectic in Hegel that we would see in the next chapter.

3.62 The dialectic or antinomy or conflict or antithetic of pure reason* should be distinguished from sophistical attempts. This differentiation is made on two counts. First, "(it) must not refer to an arbitrary question... but to one which human reason must necessarily encounter in its progress. Secondly, this conflict "must involve no mere artificial illusion..., but a natural and unavoidable illusion." 222 Both these aspects together point at the unavoidablity or necessity

218. Ibid.
219. Ibid. p. 393.
220. Ibid. p. 386.
221. Ibid. p. 394.
222. Ibid.

* All these terms are used more or less in the same meaning in the chapter on antinomy.
of reason going through illusion or conflict in its progress; this is clearly different from an arbitrary sophistical case of reason, argues Kant.

3.63 How do antinomies occur? We saw the essence of this process in the syllogism of the dialectic (Section 3.3). We saw that the synthesis into cosmical concepts is possible only if it constitute "a series of conditions subordinated to, not co-ordinated with, one another, and generative of a (given) conditioned", 223 and that the synthesis should be in ascending order (i.e., regressive), etc., etc.

In the cosmological concepts, i.e., in the antinomies, reason demands the absolute totality of the series of conditions and the absolutely unconditioned. This works according to the principle that "if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned (through which alone the conditioned has been possible) is also given." 224

This mechanism of antinomy is effected by reason by freeing a concept of understanding from the unavoidable limitations of possible experience, yet keeping it in terms of its relation to

223. Ibid. pp. 386-87.
224. Ibid. p. 386.
the empirical.  

So, here, a category/concept is transformed into a transcendental idea. These ideas of reason are "simply categories extended to the unconditioned." 

In an antinomy, two factors are jointly involved - one, "the unity of reason in mere ideas," and two, the synthesis according to rules of understanding. A paradox of harmony between understanding and reason results. In other words, the conflict of reason itself, that between its logical and transcendental employments, comes up. Kant says that "the conditions of this unity are such that when it is adequate to reason it is too great for the understanding; and when suited to the understanding, too small for reason. There thus arises a conflict which cannot be avoided, do what we will." 

In the antinomies, two points have to be borne in mind. First, this idea of absolute totality is concerned only with "the exposition of appearance." Secondly, what reason is seeking here is "solely the unconditioned." These two 

225. Ibid.  
226. Ibid.  
227. Ibid. p. 394.  
228. Ibid.  
229. Ibid.  
230. Ibid. p. 390.  
231. Ibid. p. 391.
points, emphasised by Kant, together suggest that the legitimate knowledge is about the appearances, and that the concern of reason is always towards the absolute and the unconditioned and hence the antinomy of reason.

3.64 As antinomies are basically categories (of course, their illegitimate extensions), they can be arranged in a table.

At the same time all are not fit for such employment. Only those categories which can constitute a series in the synthesis of conditions are fit for it.232 Thus, there are "four cosmological ideas, corresponding to the four titles of the categories:

"1. Absolute completeness of the Composition of the given whole of all appearances

"2. Absolute completeness in the Division of a given whole in the (field of) appearances

"3. Absolute completeness in the Origination of an appearance

"4. Absolute completeness as regards Dependence of Existence of the alterable in the (field of) appearance."233

Let us brief these four antinomies, i.e., the cosmological ideas. We will not go in details of the antinomies, but we

232. Ibid. pp. 386-87; 390.

233. Ibid. p. 390.
will try to reach to the points that are relevant for the present discussion.

The first antinomy is as follows:

"Thesis: The World has a beginning in time and is also limited as regards space.

"Antithesis: The World has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space,"

Proof can be given for both; but the proof of the thesis depends on the antithesis, and vice versa. One is proved by disputing the other; and both can be disputed this way. So, both the assertions are illusory, and the principle involved is dialectical opposition, not contradiction (formal contradiction).

If we assume that the world has no beginning in time, then unto the very given present, an infinite series of eternity should have elapsed. But, the infinite is not supposed to have elapsed. Since it elapses, the world has a beginning in time. Similarly, if the world is an infinite whole in space, and such a quantum that cannot be given in intuition can be thought of only as a synthesis of its parts or units, then, actually every successive completion of this synthesis is not an infinite whole. So, world is limited in

234. Ibid. p. 396.
In this way, antithesis is also proved. If we assume that the world has a beginning in time, an empty time preceding the beginning is also automatically presumed. But empty time is non-existence or impossibility. So, in respect of past time, world is infinite; though finite things have beginning and end, world itself is infinite and hence it has no beginning in time. Similarly, if the world is assumed to be finite in an unlimited space, we are making the empty space an object. But empty space is not an object but impossibility and non-existence. Thus, world is infinite in respect of extension also.236

Kant argues that the infinitude when given cannot be infinitude. The given infinitude cannot be the true transcendental concept of infinitude. Similarly, a series completed in reality, i.e., a given totality, cannot be the absolute totality, a transcendental concept. Thus, in reality, the thesis is illusory.237

In the argument on the side of antithesis, we abstract and separate space and time which are really a priori conditions of the possibility of appearances (in Kant's philosophy). When we do so, in reality, the sensible world disappears. What

236. Ibid. Proof of antithesis. pp. 397-98.
remains is the intelligible world of which we have no right to make synthetic propositions. So, antithesis also is illusory.

Thus, as we have seen earlier (3.63), the conflict between understanding and reason is at the root of antinomies. Since we understood the basis of one antinomy, we will state the rest of antinomies without going into their proofs and other details.

The second antinomy is:

"**Thesis:** Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is composed of the simple.

"**Antithesis:** No composite thing in the world is made up of simple parts, and there nowhere exists in the world anything simple."\(^{239}\)

This antinomy essentially means that the world cannot be divisible infinitely (thesis) and it can be (antithesis). Here also, as in the case of first antinomy, both the assertions are illusory and hence this antinomy is a case of dialectical opposition.

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238. Ibid. Observation on the antithesis. pp. 399-402.
239. Ibid. p. 402.
The third antinomy is:

"Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearance of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.

"Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature."^{240}

That means, there is freedom; not only determinism, but a spontaneity also; there is a prime mover (or God) as the thesis. And, as antithesis, there is only determinism.^{241}

In the case of third antinomy, Kant differentiates the two realms - that of appearances and things-in-themselves. Here, he dissolves the illusion by doing this differentiation; both the assertions can be true, but from different angles. Thesis applies to things-in-themselves, and anti-thesis to the appearances. Without differentiating the series as if in two different levels, the first two antinomies are kept as strictly cosmological ideas, and the dialectical opposition is maintained in them. While in the last two, dialectical opposition is

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240. Ibid. p. 409.

removed and the principle of contradiction is brought into life (see section 3.8).

Following is the fourth antinomy.

"Thesis: There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.

"Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause."242

The thesis states the existence of the unconditioned as a necessary condition which can explain the temporal series of appearances or alterations. A transcendent being outside the series cannot be thought of as this belongs to a transcendent philosophy.243 What is possible is a being within the series as "the supreme condition",244 i.e., as "the highest member of the cosmical series."245 The question of the necessary nature of this being is kept open by raising doubts about it being disputed; its impossibility is questioned. By bringing in a distinction between empirical contingency and an intelligible one in which the contradictory opposite is possible, Kant points at the possibility of contradictory opposites in an

242. Ibid. p. 415.
244. Ibid.
245. Ibid. p. 419. Observation on the thesis.
empirical realm of necessity too, though we are not sure about it. 246 What Kant tries to say is that in the empirical realm or the realm of appearances, we are not in a position to categorically deny the possibility of necessity because necessity is a concept, an intelligible one. Thus, the thesis can be a true proposition from a point of view of necessity. The illusion lies to the extent of the subjective intelligible necessity becoming the objective empirical one about which we lack cognitive access.

In the antithesis, necessary being is denied both inside and outside the world. So far as the conditioned is contingent, the whole series and the cause of the series have to remain conditioned as well as contingent. So, there is no question of any necessary being. This argument of antithesis "takes into consideration the contingency of everything which is determined in the temporal series..., and from this point of view everything unconditioned and all absolute necessity completely vanish." 247 Thus, the proposition of antithesis also can be true from the point of view of contingency.

247. Ibid. p. 419. Observation on the antithesis.
By bringing in an analogy of a controversy in astronomy, Kant points out that both the arguments for and against the necessary being can be true, but when considered from two different points of view. One astronomer argued that the moon revolves on its own axis because it always turns the same side towards the earth. Because of the same observation, another reached the opposite conclusion that the moon does not revolve on its own axis.\(^{248}\)

The "strange situation"\(^{249}\) in the fourth antinomy is that the same ground is used to assert (thesis) as well as to deny (antithesis) the existence of a necessary being. In the thesis it is argued that "a necessary being exists because the whole of past time comprehends the series of all conditions and therefore also the unconditioned (that is, the necessary)."\(^{250}\) In the antithesis, it is argued that "there is no necessary being" because "the whole of past time comprehends the series of all conditions (which therefore are one and all themselves conditioned)."\(^{251}\) Here, the same object is considered from "two different points of view."\(^{252}\) There is no

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248. Ibid.
249. Ibid. p. 418. Observation on the antithesis
250. Ibid. Observation on the antithesis.
251. Ibid. Observation on the antithesis.
252. Ibid. p. 419. Observation on the antithesis.
real contradiction between the two conclusions in the fourth antinomy. Both of them may be true from different points of view. That means, the principle involved here is not dialectical opposition.

3.7 Two Kinds of Antinomies

We have seen that all the cosmological ideas were entitled "cosmical concepts" by Kant. But, later, he introduces a distinction within these four cosmological ideas, and he maintains dialectical opposition in the first two antinomies only. Through this division, antinomies become either mathematical or dynamical.

The first two antinomies are mathematical; they signify "the mathematical sum total of all appearances." Kant uses the expression world to signify their realm. He maintains the name cosmical concepts for these two antinomies.

The last two antinomies are called dynamical ones. They signify "the unity in the existence of appearances." The expression nature is taken to be appropriate here. Kant calls

253. Ibid. p. 392.
254. Ibid.
255. Ibid. p. 393.
256. Ibid. p. 392.
257. Ibid.
the dynamical antinomies the **transcendent concepts of nature**.  

In mathematical antinomies, series is infinite, and the absolute totality remains only an idea, a problematic concept.  

In contrast to this, in the dynamical antinomies, the appearances stand "in virtue of an inner principle of causality, in thoroughgoing interconnection."  

In mathematical antinomies, the series is homogeneous.  

"On this view all the dialectical representations of totality, in the series of conditions for a given conditioned, are throughout of the same character. The condition is always a member of a series along with the conditioned, and so is homogeneous with it. In such a series the regress was never thought as completed, or if it had to be so thought, a member, in itself conditioned, must have been falsely supposed to be a first member."  

258. Ibid. p. 393.  
259. Ibid. p. 392. Note-a  
261. Ibid. p. 462.  
In the dynamical antinomies, the series is heterogeneous. A heterogeneous synthesis is allowed in cases of the antinomy of causal connection and freedom (3rd one) and that of the necessary and the contingent (4th). That means, a member that is not part of the series, but outside it - a heterogeneous condition - is introduced.

Now, as the series is homogeneous in mathematical antinomies, "no other than a sensible condition is admissible." On the contrary, "in dynamical series of sensible conditions, a heterogeneous condition, not itself part of the series, but purely intelligible and as such outside the series, can be allowed."  

3.8 Resolution of Antinomies, and the Resumption of the Formal Law of Contradiction

The above differentiation of antinomies is used by Kant for resolving the antinomies. He does this either by considering them illusory and as a case of dialectical opposition, i.e., not as analytical opposition (as in the case of mathematical antinomies) or by accepting the difference in level of the

263. Ibid. p. 463.
264. Ibid.
265. Ibid.
266. Ibid. p. 447.
series, i.e., the heterogeneous element in the series (as in the case of the dynamical antinomies). In the former, he denies the antinomy by defining it as an analytical opposition. We get a dialectical opposition in the former case; we are aware of its illusory nature; this is more than and different from a "simple contradiction"\(^\text{267}\) of analytical nature that is true. In the latter, the antinomy is lacking in the final analysis; here, an opposition or contradiction is absent as the members of the series belong to two different levels - the introduction of the heterogeneous condition does all this.

In the mathematical antinomies, in Kant's own terms, "we were obliged to denounce both the opposed dialectical assertions as false."\(^\text{268}\) For Kant, strictly speaking, only analytical opposition can be true, because this comes in the purview of logic of truth (analytic is logic of truth, and dialectic is logic of illusion). So, the formal law of contradiction, i.e., the principle of non-contradiction is not applicable in the case of dialectical assertions of the mathematical antinomies. The first two oppositions are dialectical because the denial of one's contradictory opposite need not assert the truth of

\(^{267}\) Ibid.

\(^{268}\) Ibid. p. 463.
the first; that is, neither of the exclusive opposites be true. Why? Because, "one is not a mere contradictory of the other, but says something more than is required for a simple contradiction." Here, the law of contradiction (a la Aristotle) does not apply. This law is applicable in the case of a simple contradiction where one of the exclusive opposites is true. Such an opposition, an opposition of contradiction is what is called by Kant *analytical*.

When dialectical opposition is being discussed the prime law of thought resorted to by Kant was the Aristotelian law of contradiction. Only by resuming this law, he could ignore the dialectical opposition as something illusory.

The same law was in operation, when Kant concluded that there is no real contradiction in the dynamical group of antinomies. The apparent contradiction in this set of antinomies dissolves when we come to know that the members of the series belong to two different levels. In the dynamical series, a heterogeneous condition, a member outside the conditioned series, an intelligible condition that is different from the *sensible* conditions is introduced. In this way,

269. Ibid. p. 447. Both emphases are mine.
270. Ibid.
"the unconditioned is set prior to the appearances"\textsuperscript{271} without cutting short the series and without hurdling "the invariably conditioned character of the appearances."\textsuperscript{272} So, the unconditioned introduced is empirical though non-sensible. Thus, both reason and understanding obtains satisfaction.\textsuperscript{274} Hence the antinomy is resolved.

In the dynamical antinomies, the assertions (i.e., of both theses and antithesis) "may both alike be true."\textsuperscript{275} Regarding the third antinomy, Kant says that "this antinomy rests on a sheer illusion, and that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature."\textsuperscript{276} Regarding the fourth, he says that "there is no real contradiction between the two assertions"\textsuperscript{277} and that "both may be true."\textsuperscript{278}

In introducing an element of difference and thus resolving the contradiction involved in order to resume the status-quo law of thought, Kant, in a single stroke, resumes all the

\textsuperscript{271. Ibid. p. 463.} 
\textsuperscript{272. Ibid.} 
\textsuperscript{273. Ibid.} 
\textsuperscript{274. Ibid.} 
\textsuperscript{275. Ibid. p. 464.} 
\textsuperscript{276. Ibid. p. 479.} 
\textsuperscript{277. Ibid. p. 482.} 
\textsuperscript{278. Ibid.}
dualities of metaphysics like the empirical-non empirical, sensible-non sensible, appearance-non appearance (reality/essence) etc. The fact that Kant denies the dialectical opposition as illusory and false, though inevitable and necessary, keeps him along with formal logicians. At the same time, the difference of Kant, when taken in relation with other formal logicians, is that he pointed out the inevitability of dialectical opposition. So, he is not just a formal logician or metaphysician, but more than that. Even then, he cannot be a dialectical logician proper. Hegel is the beginner of dialectical logic*

3.9 Dialectical Opposition in Kant Becomes the Premiss for Dialectical Law of Contradiction in Hegel

Now, our odyssey of tracing back to the origin of the basic element of dialectic has come to a fruitful stage. We have seen that the dialectical opposition is something inevitable, despite it being illusory and false. So also, we came to know that the dialectical opposition says something more than a simple contradiction.

* Old dialecticians like Zeno, Aristotle, Plato and Spinoza based their arguments in formal logic. Kant is a transition to dialectical logic.
Kant distinguishes two kinds of opposition. One is the analytical opposition in which out of the two contradictory opposites only one is true. Of the "contradictory opposites", if one is false, the other must be true; the denial of one itself is the assertion of the other. And this is what is called contradiction by Kant. The other kind of opposition is the dialectical one in which none of the opposites need be true; "of the two dialectically opposed judgements both may be false."

Contradiction is a case of logical disjunction in which the range of possibilities is complete. That is to say that there are only two possibilities - either A or not A. Distinct from this, in the case of dialectical opposition, the disjunction is meaningless and illusory. Here, the range of possibilities is incomplete.

The law of contradiction (formal) entertains only contradictions or analytical oppositions. That is, only when the range of contradictory judgements is meaningful, real contradiction takes place and the law of contradiction becomes applicable, i.e., when A is true not A is false, and vice versa.

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279. Ibid. p. 446-7.
280. Ibid. p. 447.
281. Ibid.
In the dialectical opposition, the range is not limited to A and not A; it comprises more than this; possibilities different from A and not A are existing. That is why Kant considers this dialectical opposition as meaningless and illusory. Such a conclusion is a must in order to uphold exclusively the old law of contradiction. In upholding the monopoly of law of contradiction, Kant was forced to denigrate the dialectical opposition as meaningless and illusory. On the other hand, if dialectical opposition, a new challenge to the concept of contradiction, is also accepted as real (not illusory), then we get a law of dialectical opposition. Kant did not take such a brave step. This is left to Hegel.

Analytical opposition is the content of old law of contradiction. Hegel considers all the three Aristotelian laws together as basically a single law. This is in fact a law of non-contradiction rather than law of contradiction. The new dialectical law of contradiction of Hegel conceives contradiction as constituting dialectical opposition instead of analytical opposition. The advantage of the new conception is that the range of logical disjunction is exhaustive; it is not just A and not A, but more than these; there can be many middles, and middle is not excluded; this logic is not just formal, but it has content; the range of possibilities here includes not only these opposites A and not A but various unities of these opposites. With Hegel, the unity/identity of
opposites acquires the status of a law of thought. Kant becomes the forerunner of this when he says that dialectical opposition means more than a simple contradiction.

3.10 Elements of History in Kant

Though we have already traced the basic element of dialectic, this does not stop us from exploring other points of manifestations of dialectic. For instance, the elements of history in Kant.

Though Kant did not develop a comprehensive theory of history as Hegel did, we can see that Kant has shown the seeds of it. Here, we are not obliged to have a detailed study about this. Even then, we will base our outline on two of Kant's works - Idea For A Universal History With Cosmopolitan Intent (1784) and the later parts of the Critique of Pure Reason especially the chapters on 'The Architectonic of Pure Reason' and 'The History of Pure Reason'.

In the words of Yirmiahu Yovel, the 'Copernican revolution of rationality' rejected the platonic model of reason. The

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283. Ibid. p. 4.
'historization of reason' in Kant is only implicit and without dialectical logic. Moreover, at the outset, Kant's theory of time is at odds with this concept. So, majority of critics have accepted a Kant without history. In closer analysis, we can see that Kant's concept of time is not at loggerheads with his idea of history. Kant is not concerned with the empirical history. His is the 'rational' or 'transcendental' element of history. And this explains the dualism of rational and empirical history in Kant. Kant even contrasts these. This rational a priori element of history is not inconsistent with his theory of time, as time is also a priori (though sensible) form of intuition. And all the outer and inner intuitions are expressed in this form of intuition, i.e., time. That way everything is temporal. But this temporality is not the common empirical temporality. That means, the temporality in Kant is not usual historicality. The inner flow of everything including reason according to ends is the rational a priori

284. Ibid.

285. N.K. Smith (Tr.), *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Macmillan, London, 1958. p. 655. "By reason I here understand the whole higher faculty of knowledge, and am therefore contrasting the rational with the empirical" (ibid.).

286. Kant uses the term 'historical' synonymous with 'empirical'. "... all knowledge .. is either historical or rational." (ibid.).
element of history or "the history of pure reason".  

In 'Architectonic', Kant talks of the gradual "attaining to completeness" and even the "self-development of reason." In 'Antinomy', we saw that the reason becomes self-aware of itself. In Kant, this self explication of reason applies only to the subject. In Hegel, it is equally to the object also where the actualisation of rationality itself in history (or the object, the world) takes place.

In nutshell, the architectonic and teleological nature of reason displays the developmental, historical (not the empirical) element in Kant's philosophy. Then, again, while the empirical history (to use Kant's term, the historical element) is contrasted with the rational or the transcendental and kept out in Kant, the same works as an active mediating factor, intervening in the rational element of history in Hegel.

Kant's endeavour to bring in all aspects of knowledge in a single architectonic frame plus his attempt to view the whole history of philosophy within "the history of pure reason" (last chapter of The Critique of Pure Reason) point at the element of history in him. Moreover, throughout this

287. Ibid. p. 666. Title of the last chapter of The Critique of Pure Reason.

288. Ibid. p. 655.
chapter (of the thesis), we met constantly with his metaphilosophical attempts to accommodate clashing philosophical viewpoints. This shows his faith in no permanent system. The last sentence of The Critique of Pure Reason is very revealing. He says:

... it may not be possible to achieve before the end of the present century what many centuries have not been able to accomplish; namely, to secure for human reason complete satisfaction in regard to that with which it has all along so eagerly occupied itself, though hitherto in vain.289

A spirit of completion also is evident here. In the beginning also of the chapter of the history of pure reason, the same spirit is projected. The chapter starts: "This title stands here only in order to indicate one remaining division of the system, which future workers must complete."290

This element of ending history can be seen even in Hegel who made history the subject of philosophy. Only metaphysics and idealism left in Kant can explain this element of retreat in him.


290. Ibid. p. 666. Emphasis is mine.
In *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent*, Kant talks of a "hidden plan of nature"\(^{291}\) behind the history of mankind. Though the main point in this work is the evolution of man and society in accordance with man's own reason bestowed on him by nature, the facts that man's generations are historical, that the development of man and its continuity through their species is immortal,\(^{292}\) etc. are also well established; instead of unhistorical creation, historical evolution is suggested. These point at Kant's dialectical vision of history.

### 3.11 Interconnection of Categories in Kant

We have already seen (in 3.9) that the basic element of dialectical logic is the unity/identity of opposites. In the hands of Engels, it is the 'interpenetration of opposites'. Though we don't get such a clear development in Kant, we get surely its primordial forms in Kant. Instead of 'interpenetration' we get interconnections in Kant. But these are only manifestations of the basic trend we noted in 3.9. Even then, this is worth-mentioning.

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Though Kant does not explain the relation between the four groups of categories, he does state the interrelation of the three categories in each set. In his table of categories, "the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first." Allness or totality is "plurality considered as unity." Limitation is "reality combined with negation." Community is "the causality of substances reciprocally determining one another." Necessity forms "the existence which is given through possibility." Here, Kant does not consider that the third category is just a derivative that comes up out of the combination of the first two. But it needs a "special act" of understanding as needed in the first two. In Kant, though these categories are related, there is no interchange of them by way of development as in the case of Hegel where being becomes nothing and vice versa.

294. Ibid.
295. Ibid.
296. Ibid.
297. Ibid.
298. Ibid.
In the Dialectic (second part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*) the opposite categories meet which Kant considers illegitimate. A case of clear interrelation, that between causality and freedom, is already explicated in this chapter (see 3.54). While causality is phenomenal, freedom is causality at the noumenal level, 'causa noumenon'. In dialectic, the finite is trying to reach to infinite; the conditioned seeks the unconditioned. What is to be pointed out here is that Kant does not approve this dialectic though he shows its very existence and necessity.

3.12 The Origin of Triadic Usage in Kant

The rationalist-empiricist polemic before Kant is part of the continuation of history of what can be called the 'dyadic' ontology.\(^{299}\) The challenge taken up by Kant is that of ending such a dichotomy in philosophy (though in the final analysis, he is also a victim to it). Hence, he tries to reconcile empiricism and rationalism. To do such a job and at the same time to be faithful to the reign of the old logic became a difficult affair for Kant. On the one hand,

he follows the thinking that "all a priori division of concepts must be by dichotomy."300 On the other, he has to put a stop to only this. His attempt to do this without accepting a new logic is the fact behind the origin of the triadic element in Kant.

One should not take the triadic usage as the essence of dialectic.301 But, this is, without doubt, a manifestation of dialectic. Later on, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Marx and Marxists used triads in their analyses.

Kant uses threefold divisions; he searches as well for third things or third faculties or middle terms which are third. Kant is aware of it and at one point he asks us not to be "suspicious" about it.302 The third critique itself is meant to be a "middle term" between the first two. Judgement mediates between understanding and reason. Imagination operates between sensibility and understanding. Here, the third things are all used to reconcile two distinctly


different entities. In fact, Kant is inventing them on the way itself whenever needed.

We should bear in mind that the usage of triads is possible due to the dialectical opposition, and we know that only dialectical opposition entertains opposites and their in-betweens. Thus both the points developed in 3.11 and 3.12 are subordinate to the basic element of dialectic that we stated beyond doubt in 3.9.

Conclusion

In tracing the genealogy of the basic element of dialectical logic we have traversed through a very complex edifice built up by Kant. In Kant, dialectic is illusion in terms of knowledge. In terms of 'practical' life, dialectic acquires apodictic certainty. Despite his disapproval of dialectic, Kant keeps dialectic, in his dealing, as part and parcel of logic and it is made one of the activity of reason. Both these acts of Kant, though self-contradictory in formal metaphysics

gives him the credit of becoming the forerunner of dialectical logic. It is better that Kant got into 'self contradiction' than to be blind to the real contradictions. Kant, along with the previous thinkers, considers reason as subjective and formal. Its becoming objective and synthetic in his own dialectic is undoubtedly a big leap in history of thought. That is why Kant is equally a milestone like Hegel and Marx\textsuperscript{304} in the history of dialectical logic.

Dialectical opposition which has an exhaustive range of possibilities, distinct from the analytical opposition (contradiction or contradictory opposition) that has only two possibilities (disjunctive syllogism), forms the basis of dialectical logic. Old law of contradiction was that of non-contradiction. The new law of contradiction is that which allows contradiction, and dialectical opposition forms the content of this new concept of contradiction.

\textsuperscript{304} Marx cannot be complete without Engels. So, treating them together as Marx-Engels would be better, though the present fashion is to dehyphenate them.