CONCLUSION

We have already spelt out in the introduction of this thesis that the conclusion will be no more than a sum up. To be less wouldn't be self-contradictory. Thus, we shall have something called a selective sum up.

(1) The philosophical problem of method which generally expresses as an epistemological-ontological riddle or the "gnoseo-ontological circle" is due to the metaphysical separation of the theory of knowledge and theory of reality, and the neglect in understanding the aspect of their unity. A proper methodology is a dialectical one, implicit in Hegel and positively suggested by Lenin, i.e., the unity of logic, epistemology and ontology. An open end in method is always useful as a point of entry for the newer, so-far-unknown elements of truth. The method recommended in the thesis is a method of materialist dialectics.

(2) We can see 'dialectics' in ancient Greek philosophers, and also in modern philosophers. But, dialectics as a law of logic was first introduced by Hegel. This is the law of identity of opposites, a new law of contradiction vis-a-vis the old, formal law of contradiction. Marx and his colleagues have given this
idealistic law of Hegel a materialist base. Content-wise, Hegel's law was turned upside down; Hegel was made to stand on his head.

Dialectics is omnipresent. Dialectics is there in history, subject, object, subject-object relation, and everywhere. And law of contradiction is the logic of dialectics; contradiction is the nucleus or the central category in it. As Hegel has pointed out all the three laws in Aristotle are in essence a single law of identity or non-contradiction (in formal logic). Likewise, the law of contradiction is the essential law in dialectics. This is the law of 'identity of opposites' in Hegel, 'interpenetration of opposites' in Engels and 'unity of opposites' in Lenin.

Possibility of new laws in dialectic is also conceived. As formal logic is part of and under the overall hegemony of the dialectical logic, and as the motion and also the tool to grasp it are eternal necessitating the dialectic also to develop, it would be a Hegelian kind of mistake (of ending dialectic with his own philosophy) to be complacent with the present law of dialectic. Possibilities of new laws that may engulf the existing one at each stage of the dialectic exist.

Formal logic is given a dialectical answer by accommodating the former within the frame of the dialectical logic. Formal
logic is taken a moment in the truth of dialectical logic. New developments within the formal logic have also hinted at the tenability of dialectical logic. For instance, Godel's theorem. This has proved that there is an inherent contradiction in the so-called systems of non contradiction deduced from 'axiomatic' truths. While dialectics is getting vindicated from this side, metaphysics is entering in dialectics from the quarters professing dialectics. These thinkers accept dialectics either in society or in nature, but not in both or between both.

Contradiction is not given a logical status by certain thinkers. They think that there can be dialectic, but not in logic. This is self contradiction, a logical mistake, and is against science for thinkers like Popper. These formal thinkers are able to grasp only logical contradictions, but not the 'logic of contradiction'.

(3) In Kant, the bud of dialectics lies in his treatment of antinomies. Kant does not allow the mathematical set (first two) of antinomies to settle. In the other set (last two) of dynamical antinomies, the introduction of the heterogeneous, qualitatively different member helps Kant to divide the series into those belonging to two different levels, thus making two different absolutes where law of contradiction (formal) is not applicable. This is applicable only if the thesis and antithesis
remain as two sides of a contradiction. Kant thus 'saved' law of contradiction from being defied. But in reality, unintend-edly Kant bridges the theses and antitheses of the series of homogeneous sensible conditions by introducing the heterogeneous intelligible condition, thus introducing a content to contradic-
tion and that way uniting the thesis and antithesis, the two 
sides of the same contradiction. This is the new dialectical law of contradiction that entered from behind in Kant. This can be treated as the negative evidence of dialectics in Kant.

In the case of mathematical antinomies, Kant positively asserts the possibility of dialectics. This is in the concept of 'dialec-
tical opposition'. Here also, Kant defends the formal law of contradiction by asserting the antithetic/conflict between theses and antitheses. Contradiction usually means the analytical contradiction that accepts either this or that as in the case of a disjunctive syllogism. Again, assertion of one is the denial of the other because only two possibilities are conceived in this syllogism, and this is a meaningful contradiction in the language of formal logic. In the mathematical set, theses cannot ex-
clude antitheses; nor is it possible for antitheses to exclude the theses. So meaningful contradiction, characteristic of the dis-
junctive syllogism, i.e., an analytical contradiction in the for-
mal law of contradiction does not apply here. Both the theses and antitheses are taken illusory by Kant; illusory but in the eyes of
the formal logic, as we think. That means the old law of contradiction is the only correct logic, and this is not applicable in the mathematical set of antinomies. This is how Kant defends the formal law. But, then what is applicable here? This is dialectical opposition. Here the opposition/contradiction is dialectical, i.e., illusory. Analytical opposition choses between truth and untruth, the two exclusive opposites. Dialectical opposition is not left with two exclusive opposites; Hegel took this positively conceiving the possibility of innumerable middles, instead of only two opposites. This is the strand of dialectics that took root from the opening positively left by Kant. This can be treated as the positive evidence of dialectic in Kant.

(4) The hidden possibility of unity between opposites in Kant is the dialectical law of identity of opposites in Hegel. The hidden possibility of middles between the exclusive opposites in a unit of contradiction in Kant is the concept of mediation/sublation/negation in Hegel. Kant could not clasp the opposites in the contradiction and assimilate the various determinations. Hegel could do this and his is a determinate negation. Hegel not only perceived the identity of opposites, but also understood the identity of various disciplines.

(5) The pursuit for a monist principle in Fichte helped Hegel and Schelling to conceive the identity of various
disciplines. The pursuit of Schelling for non-contradictory principle of identity took him to Bohmean mysticism and that way again to the neglect of dialectics. The 'identity' conceived by Fichte and Schelling comes from a formal position. Only Hegel could achieve a break from Kant, Fichte and Schelling in conceiving the identity of non-identicals.

(6) Reason expressed in the dialectic assumes various shapes in its development. Reason is subjectivised in Kant, again objectivised and ontologised in Hegel to be soon de-ontologised in dialectical materialism. This de-ontologisation is not a subjectivisation seen in Kant, but a dialectical progression. The message of dialectical reason is a call for practical-critical participation in all its mediations.

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