CHAPTER II

LINGUISTIC IDENTITY AND INDIAN NATIONHOOD: LANGUAGE AND REGION IN "HINDI HEARTLAND"

Language has emerged as one of the most controversial socio-cultural determinants of group-identity in Indian politics. Assertions of regional identities based on language have been interpreted as threat to our nation-state. These threats, though very great, have sometimes been both exaggerated and misinterpreted. This has occurred due to a tendency on the part of both scholars and policy makers in India to interpret the persistent demands of all ethnic and community groups as threats to the unity and integration of India. This dichotomy between national and subnational groups has often led to sterile debates and discussion.

Moreover, such a tendency also indicates a failure to appreciate the nature of 'Indian nationhood' and the process of nationality-formation in India and its duality. Conceived in any form 'regionalism' and 'subregionalism' are unavoidable in a country as vast and expansive as India. The concepts of 'nation' and 'region' are dynamic and contextual. Therefore, the relationship between language and Indian nationhood presents a problem of a different nature from that of Western Europe. The size of a country, the existence of a number of languages in a 'State' and historical experience that different speech communities/nationalities underwent during colonial period - ask for a language policy which, apart from catering to the need of easy communication throughout
the country, is also sensitive to the socio-linguistic realities of Indian life.

The relevant existing literature on nationalism in Indian context suffers from a confusing use of categories. More often than not, 'nationalism', 'patriotism', and 'anti-colonialism' are used interchangeably, thus hindering the very understanding of the essentials of the national process. Moreover, much confusion arises over the identification of the appropriate territorial base of the collective self-awareness that is called nationalism. Do the whole country and the entire Indian populace, provide this base? Or is it a relatively more homogeneous part of it having a separate collective self-awareness of its own that provides the base? Nationalism could have emerged on either basis. Either nationalism could co-exist with the other side by side or get mixed up.

It can be said that a conjuncture of certain objective conditions (such as a community of territory, language, economic life, mental make up etc. manifested in a common culture) is a necessary condition for the making of a nationality. A nationality is formed when a people sharing some common characteristics becomes collectively self-aware of this fact and allows itself to be mobilised on this basis for further emotional integration, unity and political advantages. Not only the stage of techno-economic development, but also the nature of its ideological legacy, political relations with neighbouring nationalities, the population size
and the universal tendency towards a degree of assimilation decide how a nationality grows.

**Language as a Criterion**

A mechanical application of Stalin's definition of nationality prompts some of Indian Marxists to argue that India is not a nation due to the absence of a common language. This is an erroneous view and it overlooks the 'extremely complex socio-linguistic situation in India'.

We can say that problem of Independent India is not that it is not a nation, but it is a different kind of nation as compared with other nations of the world. The dictum one language, one nation is not a workable proposition in the Indian context. Amalendu Guha says,

> ... despite a multilingual situation, the Indian we-consciousness is a fact of life co-existing with yet another relatively stable we-consciousness at the regional-linguistic basis. The nation in the making in India... is not just a sum total of the component ethno-linguistic nationalities but more than that. It transcends the latter and generates a nationalism built upon also on independent objective basis of its own.

At some other place, Guha argues that not only a nationality but also a union of nationalities/national groups could be transformed into a nation through its stable association with the ideal of a unified statehood desired or realised. He concludes,

> India... is a many-nationality state. Since the state unity is based on what is universally recognised as Indian nationalism there is no harm in saying that India's several nationalities together form or tend to form the Indian nation in the making.
Given this background let us see what does the term "region" mean.

**What is a Region?**

There is no universally accepted definition of the term region. Bernard S. Cohn discusses four types of regions in Indian context, i.e., "historical regions", "linguistic regions", "cultural regions", and "structural regions" (as here our main concern is with language we will discuss only "linguistic" and "cultural" region). According to Cohn,

> A linguistic region is one in which there is a shared and recognised literary language, the standardized form of which is known and identified with by the educated groups within the area.

Most attempts to develop regional classifications for India have taken language as the criteria. Language diversity is assumed as the necessary pre-condition for most attempts, not only to establish the criteria of linguistic regions, but to differentiate the four types of regions, historical, linguistic, cultural and structural. Now, if one starts with the literary standards, e.g., Bengali, Tamil, Marathi, one can expand linguistic classifications into much wider areas, into language families, e.g., Indo-European, Dravidian; or, one may reduce the span and nature of regions by basing the classification on regional standards or regional dialects, e.g., Awadhi, Konkani, Bhojpuri etc.
Cultural Regions

A cultural region according to Cohn is one,
in which there are widely shared and recognised cultural traits and patterned behaviour, particularly among the common people. Descriptively, one or two kinds of behaviour, customs, or traits are taken as diagnostic of regional cultural. Gods, goddesses ritual, myths, and festivals are the most frequent diagnostic traits used to establish the 'reality' of particular regions.

Having given the definitions of linguistic and cultural regions, now, we would discuss some problems which arise in attempting to set up the definitions. For example, in linguistic classifications once having established the principal criteria of which level of the language was being used to establish the boundaries of the regions, it is assumed that the regions thus established are comparable. This, of course, ignores several central issues: the difference between literary and vernacular standards and their differential distribution between urban and rural areas or the presence of significant numbers of speakers of other than the dominant language within the circumscribed area. The assumption of ease of intercommunication within the region is also questionable. As Gumperz has shown, the level of mutual intelligibility within the 'linguistic region' at the village or rural level drops off rather rapidly, so that in many instances an illiterate villager speaking his local dialect is not understood when he travels one hundred miles and tries to communicate with his counterpart from that area. At the small town and bazaar level where a regional dialect is spoken by the
residents of the town, the spread is somewhat further than that of the villages. In the city, with the spread of education using the literary standards as the medium of instruction the educated city dweller has a speech community which is discontinuous but very widespread. Thus, question of the use of linguistic criteria to establish a regional classification becomes, mixed linguistic and social one. The distribution of a language alone does not necessarily establish a tightly bordered or circumscribed region, rather one must think vertically as well as horizontally.

This cursory exploration of the problems of establishing linguistic regions raises certain general issues about regional classifications. On the surface, the mapping of language distributions would seem simple and straightforward. Dialectologists and other linguists have simple techniques for going into the field, getting linguistic samples, and then plotting their samples on a map, but it is clear that where one draws his boundaries relates to how one defines a particular language.

Bernard S. Cohn points out that 'regionalism' is a cultural phenomenon, but it is not inevitable. It does not just happen, but arises when certain conditions are present. He mentions three such pre-requisites. These are:

(1) a symbol pool,
(2) selection, standardization and transmission of
symbols, (3) establishment of regional elites.

We will elaborate on these conditions as these points are important for the process of identity-formation among different speech communities.

I. A Symbol Pool

The first pre-requisite of regionalism is a pool of symbols which may be drawn upon and around which the content of the idea of regionalism can be formed for a particular region. In the Indian context the symbol pool has usually been made up of religions and/or literary and/or politico-historical symbols. The symbols may be couched in linguistic terms, that is, the language of particular region is believed to be the main carrier and, to many, the rallying point for the regional movement. When, however, one gets behind the identification with the language per se and looks at the content of the particular set of symbols that make up the regional identification, it is apparent that it is literature, religion, and political history that are being called upon, not the language itself.

II. Selection, Standardization and Transmission of Symbols

At any moment in the present or the recent past, or for that matter through much of the cultural history of India, the possible symbol pool in any region from which selection can be made seems to be vast. The formation and elevation of a relatively coherent view and articulation of one strand out of the symbol
pool (religious, cultural, literary, or historical) does not just happen, but are the results of complex forces. The late 19th century and the early 20th century were rich in movements which, in a significant fashion, standardized out of the symbol pool of various regions of the country various articulations of regional cultures.

III. Establishment of Regional Elites

The emergence in the late 19th century of distinctive regional elites, with connections to a forming educated national elite, in several regions led to counter-groupings in opposition to the emerging nationalist and civil service elites. The anti-Brahman movements in Maharashtra and Tamilnadu are examples of such movement. The situation of elites and counter-elites in relation to regionalism became even more complex in the 1920s with the reorientation of the Congress party, under Gandhi's leadership, into a mass-organisation when a new type of leadership was recruited. Appeals were made in vernacular and regional cultures were glorified, Nationalism began to develop a regional flavour.

The relationship between the rise of regional elites and their role in selection and standardization of symbols and values from the regional stock of symbols and values is a very complex one relating to technology, education, access to civil and political roles and the accidents of history and policy.
The regions are far from fixed, enduring things, especially if any historical perspective is taken. They are not absolutes and they are difficult, if not impossible, to define by objective criteria. Where one stands and for what purpose one is observing or studying will determine the boundaries of the unit one is studying.

Language as a Criterion for the Re-organisation of States: Hindi Heartland

During British rule the administrative units of provinces were organised in accordance with the principles which served imperial interests, i.e., administrative convenience and economy, and by reasons of military strategy and security. This led to the promotion of units with no natural affinity. The leaders of Indian freedom movement criticised as illogical the British provinces which cut across linguistic areas.

The Indian National Congress lent indirect support to the linguistic principle as early as 1905 when it backed the demand for annulling the partition of Bengal which had resulted in the division of the Bengali speaking people into two units. Yet another concession to the linguistic principle was the formation of a separate Congress province of Bihar in 1908 and of the Congress provinces of Sind and Andhra in 1917. This involved a deliberate departure from the normal organisational pattern which had so far followed the boundaries of the existing administrative provinces. At its 1920 session at Nagpur, the Congress accepted the linguistic redistribution of provinces as a clear political objective and in the following year the
principle was adopted for the purpose of its own organisation. In 1927 following the appointment of the Indian Statutory Commission, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing the opinion that the time has come for the redistribution of provincial boundaries on a linguistic basis. The question of redistribution of provinces was also examined by the Nehru Committee of the All parties Conference, 1928. The committee affirmed the support to the linguistic principle. Between the years 1928 and 1947 the Congress continuously reaffirmed its adherence to the linguistic principle.

There was a perceptible change, however, in the outlook of the Congress leaders on the subject with the partition and achievement of Independence. Now the prime importance was attached to 'security' and 'stability' of India.

The Linguistic Provinces Commission, known as Dar Commission, expressed itself strongly against any reorganisation being undertaken in the prevailing circumstances. Indian National Congress appointed a committee in December 1948 to consider the question of linguistic provinces and to review the position in the light of the report of the Dar Commission and the new problems that had arisen since Independence. The committee sounded a note of warning against the linguistic principle. The committee admitted that if public sentiment was insistent and overwhelming the practicability of satisfying public demand with its implications and consequences must be examined. The
States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) was appointed in 1953 to recommend the changes necessary for redrawing the political map of India. The broad principles which governed SRC were as follows:
1. Preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India.
2. Linguistic and cultural homogeneity
3. Financial, economic and administrative considerations.
4. Successful working of the national plan.

However, states were reorganised in 1956 predominantly on the basis of linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Reorganisation of states did not exhaust all the problems and it was discovered that even this regionalism had its subregionalism. The formation of linguistic states released certain social forces culminating in the growing assertion of the unrecognised local contact languages for recognition of their rights.

The reorganisation of states was a leap forward in effecting a co-terminality between administrative units and linguistic-cultural regions. Still many a linguistio-cultural regions were denied their autonomy and personality. Complexity was added due to the divergence which exists between the, what Oommen calls, "official" and "folk" perceptions of region and language. In India several hundred languages and dialects are spoken but Indian constitution recognises
INDIA
Socio-Cultural Sub-Regions
fifteen major languages. The numerical strength, development and distinctiveness of the languages seem to be the basis of according official status. Oommen argues that this situation created and perpetuates a distortion through which the underdeveloped and numerically weak languages got neglected and are facing the threat of extinction. Thus a substantial number of Indians lose their linguistic-cultural identity. This has occurred most blatantly in the so-called Hindi region. While for others, those whose mother-tongue is one or another of the 15 official languages, their cultural identity is defined and reinforced mainly in linguistic terms. In the defence of the fifteen constitutionally recognised languages the common people's own dialects and sub-languages were ignored and pushed aside. Thus, Bhojpuri, Maithili, Awadhi, Rajasthani etc. are treated as dialects of Hindi. Unlike most states in the Indian federation, the political and linguistic boundaries of the Hindi states do not co-incide. All of them are situated in North and Central India. Together they give the impression of being the largest single block of states with Hindi as a common concern.

In the Hindi belt a very complicated situation has grown up. Here, the regional populations have not yet developed unambiguous awareness of national-identity. Dyakov noted in 1963 that they regard themselves as Indians but if a more specific question is asked they name their state. In fact, what developed in the Hindi heartland was only a pan-Indian consciousness.
The nationality formation process amongst the Hindusthanis has remained extremely halting, weak and problematic. The ambiguous nature of nationality formation process in vast Hindi region poses a thorny problem to social scientists. There are in fact several questions which should be addressed: What is Hindi? the language of which ethno-historic community? Is there a Hindi nationality or various nationalities in the making? Writes Kluyev,

Turning to an analysis of the ethno-linguistic situation with regard to Hindi, the author is aware that in today's India, Hindi is a rather complicated phenomenon from the standpoint of socio-linguistics and poses one of the most difficult problems concerning the relationship between language and society.

Young also writes,

The Hindi question deserves our closer attention, for it lies close to the heart of the integration crisis in India and stands at the intersection of the currents of linguistic identity, Hindi revivalism and the Brahmanical tradition.

The claim of Hindi to official language status derives from the unacceptability and impracticality of English as a national language, the numerical preponderance of Hindi and its strategic location at the heartland of the country.

The more closely one looks at Hindi the more evanescent it becomes. It can be seen in relation to Sanskrit, Urdu and Hindustani; to the village, bazaar and the cloisters of the literati. Sanskrit is the classical language of the great Hindu tradition, to which Hindi bears a genetic relationship. Urdu form, because of its linkage to the Mughal court and, through it, its ties
to the Persian and even Arabic scholastic legacies, came to be associated with the Muslim community. Hindustani was a concept of Indian nationalism, promoted by Gandhi. Hindustani in Gandhi's view, was the popular speech used by the masses of north India, freed of the constraining classicism which the sectarian literati in both camps kept trying to inject.

Village Hindi remains highly dialectical, with an internal dislossia reflecting the caste hierarchies. A Muslim in the village will refer to his speech as Urdu while Hindu will claim to speak Hindi. Bazzar Hindi is a more standardized, simplified code usable as a medium for trade interactions by persons. The dialectical forms, functionally viewed serve as affirmations of particular roles and statuses in the microcommunity. For many rural persons, these roles are the everyday behavioural garb and the meaning of the language issue does not penetrate beyond.

The literary tradition of Hindi is very long yet sparse, and according to Seling Harrison, "can not compare in literary development to at least three of its rivals, Bengali, Tamil and Marathi". The hostile symbiosis of Urdu and Hindi explains many of the peculiar features of Hindi as a national language. As conflict relationships sharpened between Hindu and Muslim, the literati who served as censorial custodians for the two languages were moved to symbolize their hostilities through strengthening the differences between the languages. Muslim ulemas pursued the Persianization of Urdu while their Hindu counterparts Sanskritized Hindi.
After partition the tradition of standardization through Sanskritization of Hindi continued. Thus, Hindi was subjected to a continuing tugging toward the esoteric which separated it from the spoken version in common use in lingua franca form. Hindi region is very vast in terms of size and population. The region lacks a historically formed centre. Boris I. Klyuev says that Hindi area is marked by 'polycentrism'. The absence of an ethno-national centre suggests that the process of national consolidation of the given ethnic community is at an embryonic stage and faces serious difficulties.

It is a fact that the range of dialect variation is enormous and on grammatical grounds many of the speeches such as Awadhi, Braj and Bhojpuri etc. have as good a claim as Punjabi to a separate status from Hindi. So far no movements other than those for Punjabi or Urdu have been successful in achieving a significant political status for any of the regional dialects.

Paul Brass maintained that Hindi movement has been enormously successful in north India in absorbing speakers of minority languages and dialects during the past century and that this was an historic process of assimilation of great intrinsic and theoretical interest. On the basis of his study he concluded that, language was actually a secondary line of cleavage everywhere in north India, in contrast to the situation in other parts of the subcontinent and other parts of world, and that the priority given to religious conflict in the north had profoundly affected processes of language change.
This impression in our mind of assimilation of various dialects in the region by Hindi has led us to assume by and large that no problem, regarding linguistic identity, exists in the 'Hindi heartland'. The homogeneity of the region, in this respect has been taken for granted. This has not been true. Our census has some very interesting points to reveal.

One is struck by the proliferation of Hindi in the 1951-61 decade. During 1951-61 the variants of Hindi proliferated and tried to crystallize in Bihar. This tendency brought down the population of Hindi speakers in Bihar from 81 per cent in 1951 to 44.3 per cent in 1961. Number of Hindi speakers registered a decrease of 34.6 per cent during the decade when compared with the overall population growth rate in the region (19.8 per cent). This amounts to a dramatic decline of more than half of the 'Hindi speaking' population without any mass exodus of Hindi speakers or any influx of non-Hindi speaking population into the state during the decade. This change is due primarily to the re-emergence of various Bihari dialects as distinct from the previously affiliated Hindi group, and also to speakers of these languages asserting their distinct identity from one another within the region. Similar trends were also noticeable in M.P. and Rajasthan. However, such a 'linguistic displacement' did not take place in U.P.

Such glaring instances of oscillation in the census returns regarding mother-tongue have been a major
source of tension affecting policy-making processes in many states. The assertions of exclusive identity noted in the census claims of mother-tongues of Bihari, Rajasthan, and Pahari have a particular bearing on Hindi as official language of these states.

It is important to note that not two census have been consistent in classifying speeches under the head of Hindi. These inconsistencies are meaningful. Under the 1971 reclassification scheme the canvass of Hindi was further widened by incorporating vernaculars under Bihari, Rajasthani, and Pahari. As a result Hindi growth rates during the 1961-71 present a radically different picture. The claims of Hindi recorded a substantial gain in all the states (except in Delhi). What does this signify?

Most of the thinking on 'Hindi question' has been done from the angle of national integration. It is assumed that if Hindi is not projected as the language spoken by the largest number of speakers it would weaken the "national solidarity" and thereby our nation will be in danger. This notion of 'nation' reflects an inadequate understanding of the relationship between language and nation in Indian context which has been distinct from the historical experience of Western Europe which crystallized in nation-state. Somewhat less than critical application of conceptual categories, like nation state, region, language, drawn from Western political science and sociology to social and political problems faced by post colonial Indian state, have led to erroneous conclusions. In fact
understanding of identity formation at sub-national level is germane to our understanding of Indian nationhood. The process of linguistic identity formation in Hindi region has been influenced by a number of historical and political factors.

Taking note of the oscillating trends in the census declaration of mother tongues in North and Central India, Khubchandani terms the region as Fluid Zone. Population in the fluid zone have other than linguistic criteria for determining in-group/out group identity. Because of its subjective definition language identity is particularly susceptible to manipulation by groups and the state.

Given this scenario, we, in our thesis, propose to study the dynamics of linguistic identity formation among Bhojpuri speech community. Bhojpuri speech community is divided between U.P., Bihar and M.P. Many of scholars today may cast doubt on the relevance of studying the process of linguistic-identity formation in a region like Bhojpuri (or Chathisgarh, Awadh, Bundelkhand for that matter) for according to them no problem exists in these regions. It is customary to comment on the strength of nationalism in the Hindi heartland. This needs a careful study. Gellner points out,

The number of potential nationalisms which failed to bark is far, far larger than those which did, though they have captured all our attention.

Smith also points out that "hardly any attention has been paid to the cases of failed nationalism and the
reasons for their failure” Paul Brass also underlined the theoretical importance of studying cases of failed nationalisms,

One weakness in the body of literature on nationalism and regionalism is the excessive emphasis given to great movements of history which either have succeeded or have caused sufficient political turmoil to attract wide attention. We know more about the conditions for the success of national movements than we do about the conditions for their failure. In other words, social science theories of nationalism have not provided controlled tests of their hypothesis.

This is true that we know more about the Urdu and Punjabi movement or about separatism in Nagaland than we do about the processes of integration and assimilation which have been taking place in the North Indian states involving the absorption by the Hindi movement of the diverse languages and dialects of the North.

Can we say that Bhojpuri offers us a case of failed nationalism? At present hardly we see any of the leaders of 'Bhojpuri movement' making a demand for a separate province for Bhojpuri speaking population. Bhojpuri scholars (or 'Cultural Entrepreneurs' as Young would call them) are extremely cautious in their approach. As a way of abundant caution they have made it clear from their platforms that Bhojpuri movement does not have any political ends/ambitions, whatsoever. Theirs is a purely cultural movement for the development of their mother tongue and preservation of their culture. They are clamouring for an identity (Bhojpuri identity) as distinct from Hindi and at the same time declaring their unconditional support to
Hindi as the "national language" of the country. Is it that never a demand for Bhojpuri province existed? In the 1940s the situation was different. Rahul Sanskritiyayan had strongly favoured the carving out of provinces on the basis of regional dialects on the pattern of Janpadas at the time of Buddha.

After Independence Hindi was declared as the official language of the union and popularised as "Rashtra Bhasha". The political ("nationalist") leaders from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh had championed the cause of Hindi right from the days of freedom struggle. In fact, during the days of freedom struggle under the leadership of Gandhi, Hindi had become an emotionally charged symbol of our national identity. After Independence Hindi was made the official language of U.P., Bihar, Rajasthan, M.P., Himachal and "regional dialects" were pushed in the background for the cause of "national language". In such circumstances when Hindi was articulated as a symbol of the "national unity", to talk of any rights for Bhojpuri, Maithili etc. was stigmatised as "parochialism" and "anti national". Hindi was made the medium of instruction in this region even at the primary level of education, ignoring the constitutional promise of primary education in mother-tongue. This kind of language policy may lead to the erosion of cultural-linguistic identity and ultimately may result in the death of a language. Bhojpuri language is a testimony to this process. And this aspect brings us to important question underlying throughout our thesis, i.e., what
should be the relationship between state and culture in a country like India. In fact, the task itself involves our attempt to encapsulate the relationship between culture and State.

A society can conceptualise the relationship between its culture and its state in two ways,

1. state oriented,
2. culture oriented.

The first approach looks for the means by which culture can be made to contribute to the sustenance and growth of the state. Elements of the culture which help strengthen the state are seen as good; those elements of the culture which do not help the proper functioning of the state or hinder the growth are seen as defective. The second approach may regard the state as a protector, an internal critic or a thermostat for the culture but not as the ultimate pace-setter for the society's way of life. The state here is made to meet the needs of survival or enrichment of the culture; it is never allowed to dictate terms to the culture. Since the nation-state system acquired its global predominance in the last century most political analysis in the West has followed state oriented approach. And since a global science of politics became fully operational after the second World War, the state oriented attitude to culture has become the dominant way of looking at culture the World over.

Cultural policy in India has to deal with the complex question of relation between national, regional and
ethnic cultures. It has to take account of the seemingly contradictory character of the process of national unification on the one hand and assertion of regional and ethnic identities on the other.
1. For example, agitations for the inclusion of Nepalese in the VIII schedule of the constitution and a separate province for its speakers, to recognise Konkani as the sole official language of Goa have given rise to the fear of 'balkanisation' of India.


3. A wide range of problems associated with the relations between constituent states of India and central state authority have come to the fore, these have been approached from a variety of theoretical positions. For example see, Barun De, 'National Question in India Today', Mainstream, Vol. 20, No. 10 (Oct. 31, 1981), pp. 15-20; S.P. Punalekar, 'Ethnic Identities and Integration: An Overview of Indian Experience', Mainstream, Vol. 22, No. 34, (April 21, 1984), pp. 11-15; T.K. Oommen, 'Insiders and Outsiders in India: Primordial Collectivism and Cultural Pluralism in Nation-building', International
Earlier the debate on the subject was premised on 'nation' versus 'region' dichotomy. Therefore, those espousing the cause of the so-called unity of the nation consider any attempt to support or defend local, subregional and regional interests as pejorative, divisive, fissiparous and disintegrative. This position has been questioned by a number of scholars. For the development of the argument see, Paul Wallace (ed.), Region and Nation in India (N. Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co. 1985); Satish Chandra, K.C. Pandey & P.C. Mathur (eds.), Regionalism and National Integration (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1976); Paul R. Brass, 'Pluralism, Regionalism and Decentralising Tendencies in Contemporary Indian Politics' in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds.), The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration (London: Hurst, 1982) pp.223-64; Amalendu Guha, 'The Indian National Question: A Conceptual Frame' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 17, No. 31 (July 31, 1982);


9. For a detailed discussion on 'National question' in Indian context see Social Scientist, Vol. 4, No. 1 (August 1975) (articles by Partha Chatterjee, E.M.S. Namboodripad, Amlendu Guha, Prakash Karat etc.).


14. ibid.

15. ibid.


18. ibid.

19. ibid.

20. ibid.

21. ibid, p. 32-33.
22. See 2nd chapter, 'Rationale of Reorganisation'.

   Report of the States Re-Organisation Commission

23. ibid.

24. ibid. p. 25.

25. K. Seshadri, 'Language and Regionalism', in A.
   Poddar(ed.), Language and Society in India (Simla:

26. a. H.C. Hiremath, 'Problems of Unrecognised Local
    b. Independence, in fact, led to the growth of
    some linguistic regional identities and attempts
    were made to convert cultural frontiers into
    political frontiers. This has received a range of
    interpretations from social scientists. Salig S.
    Harrison presented a thesis about the possibility
    of 'balkanisation' of India in the post Nehru era
    due to the new vitality of regional languages. He
    argued that India, after reorganisation of states
    in 1956, faced the prospect of disunity with many
    a regional languages face to face in a single
    state. See his India: The Most Dangerous Decades
    (Madras Oxford University Press, 1960); at the
    other extreme is Nihar Ranjan Ray who viewed the
    formation of linguistic states after Independence
    as a step in the right direction which released
    new social forces that would have otherwise
    remained pent up and acted like smouldering fire.
    Ray sees in it a creative aspect of our
Independence, and as the symptom of proto-nationalism which when it finds the fullest expression, is likely to contribute towards the fulfilment of Indian nationalism. See his Introductory Address in Poddar (ed.), op. cit.

27. Khwaza Ahmad Abbas, 'A Link Language for the Common Man', in Poddar (ed.), op. cit., p. 35. In the same book this point has been made by S.M. Katre, 'The official Language and the National Languages of India'; Ashok R. Kelkar, 'Problems of Unrecognized Speech Forms in India' & Jayakant Mishra, 'The case of Maithill'.


29. The Eighth Schedule (under articles 344-1 and 351) indicates the following 14 languages in their alphabetical order: Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Panjabi, Sanskrit, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu. Since April 1966 Sindhi has been included in this Schedule making a total of fifteen.


33. According to some scholars this is because of relatively late penetration of capitalist market forces and lesser intensity of capitalist transformation in the Hindi region. Moreover, the region did not have much of an indigenous trading community. There was no local trading class that could have an interest in carving out a regional market, through the spread of a regional/national consciousness. See, Guha, 1982, op.cit., p. PE. 5; Karat Prakash, *Language and Nationality Politics in India* (N. Delhi: Orient Longman, 1973); T.V. Sathyamurthy, "Centre and Periphery in Contemporary Indian Nationalism", in *Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives* (London: Frances Pinter Limited, 1983) pp. 189-211; D.N., op.cit., p.455.


36. Six states of Indian Union: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Haryana are Hindi speaking. The 1951 Census showed 42 percent population in the Hindi speaking group, a figure that was then frequently cited in
misleading fashion in the polemics of the national language policy.


38. Harrison, op.cit., p.305


42. See, Ashish Bose, 'Some Aspects of the Linguistic Demography of India', in Poddar(ed.), op.cit., p.38-42

43. For an elaborate discussion see Joseph E. Schwartzberg, 'Factors in the Linguistic Reorganisation of Indian States', in Wallace(ed.), op.cit.


46. *ibid.*


