Sartre developed from one phase to another phase in his philosophical 'crusades' against Marxian philosophy. By 'continuity' we mean the persistence of a philosophical tradition and not merely a repetition. We shall argue that, as a whole Sartre remained an existentialist, even in the Critique. But we must note that the existentialism of Being and Nothingness is definitely not the same as the existentialism of the Critique. In that way it is a development. The difference between the two texts is marked by 'discontinuity'. By 'discontinuity' we also mean that despite Sartre's sympathies for the working class, the goal of communism, the French communist party and his active 'radical' politics, Sartre remained a 'profound' non-Marxist in the realm of philosophy. What we note with admiration is that Sartre was not unaware of his status in the realm of philosophy and neither was he refrained from self-characterising in a total Marxian way. We noted at the beginning of the second chapter that Sartre had chosen for himself the label 'existentialist' as against to 'Marxist' and self characterised himself as belonging equally to the bourgeoisie as to the working class. We shall not dispute it.

Sartre, while commenting on existentialism's crusade against idealism (and materialism), wrote: "Thus,
Marx, rather than Keirkegaard or Hegel, is right, since he asserts with Keirkegaard the specificity of human existence and, along with Hegel, takes the concrete man in his objective reality. Under these circumstances, it would seem natural if existentialism, this idealist protest against idealism, had lost all usefulness and had not survived the decline of Hegelianism...... In fact existentialism suffered an eclipse. In the general struggle which bourgeois thought leads against Marxist dialectic, it gets its support from the post-Kantians, from Kant himself, and from Descartes; it never thinks of addressing itself to Kierkegaard. The Dane will reappear at the beginning of the twentieth century when people will take it into their heads to fight against Marxism by opposing it to pluralisms, ambiguities, paradoxes."  

The expression 'idealist protest against idealism' was important in two respects. It revealed to us from the above annotation that: 1) idealism had to organision itself and become more self-sufficant in order to adequacy and self sufficiency to be able to fight Marxian philosophy and 2) Sartre's Being and Nothingness was written against the Marxist dialectic with the above purpose in mind. Sartre, while participating in an interview cum discussion with Simone de Beauvoir, described his Critique of Dialectical Reason as 'idealistic'. Here, Sartre seemed to have assumed what in his own term could have been the 'lazy Marxist's'
simplification. Sartre, from Being and Nothingness to Critique of Dialectical Reason, did not have a method whereby he could differentiate between appearance and essence. Thus Sartre, instead of being a fine 'idealist' like he was in Being and Nothingness, in his multifaceted analysis of individual praxis - its facticity, practico-inert history, its scarcity posed the problem of history in a mechanical way as a crude "materialist" would pose it. But Sartre's proposals both in Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason were not without contribution.

Sartre, since the beginning of his career in 'professional' philosophy, addressed the philosophical problems with a clear sense of Marxian philosophy in mind either to pose questions about it or oppose it. In one of his first essays 'The Transcendence of the Ego' and in Critique Sartre generally agreed with 'historical materialism' and without any doubt rejected 'dialectical materialism'. According to Sartre dialectical materialism was an unnecessary companion of historical materialism, the consequence of the unfortunate friendship of Engels with Marx. Sartre's encounters with Marxian philosophy were not 'academic' in any sense of the term. Despite the non-academic and radical nature of Sartrean philosophy, Sartre became renowned in academic circles as there were Sartreans and anti-Sartreans just as there were Marxists and anti-Marxists. We have seen in the second chapter the
potential of Sartre's philosophy for controversy and interpretation. We shall attempt to show that Sartre could not be divided into 'early' Sartre and 'later' Sartre because Sartre, as the author of *The Transcendence of The Ego,* reflected on all the possible themes which he would be treating. This essay is, in a way, a proof of the unity and development of his philosophy. As we have defined our thesis to be the problem of continuity of themes in Sartre's philosophy, we shall, on the basis of the discussions in the previous chapters, trace continuity and discontinuity in Sartre's philosophical development. We shall term this development the continuity of discontinuity.

**THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO AND SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY:**

The years 1929-33 were marked by great world economic crisis, Gandhi's campaign in India, communist agitation in French Indo-China. Unemployment and great depression gripped the world. The years that followed were marked by the rise of fascism, the tragic price of revitalizing the economy at the outbreak of the second World War which set the material production in a certain way that even after the end of the war, what was it continued. Sartre, describing the situation then, wrote:

"From 1930 on, the world depression, the coming of Nazism and the events in China opened our eyes. It seemed as if the ground were going to fall from under us, and suddenly, for us too, the great historical juggling began. The first
years of the great world peace suddenly had to be regarded
as the years between wars. Each sign of compromise which
we had greeted had to be seen as a threat. Each day we had
lived revealed its true face; we had abandoned ourselves
to it trustingly and it was leading us to a new war with
secret rapidity, with a rigour hidden beneath its
nonchalant airs. And our life as an individual which had
seemed to depend upon our efforts, our virtues and our
faults, on our good and bad luck, on the good and bad will
of a very small number of people, seemed governed down to
its minutest details by obscure and collective forces and
its most private circumstances seemed to reflect the state
of the whole world. At once we felt ourselves abruptly
situated. The detachment which our predecessors were so
fond of practising had become impossible. There was a
collective adventure which was taking form in the future
and which would be our adventure.... The secret of our
gestures and our most intimate designs lay ahead of us in
the catastrophe to which our names would to be
attached. History flowed in upon us; in everything we
touched, in the air we breathed, in the page we read, in
the one we wrote; in love itself we discovered, like a
taste of history so to speak, a bitter and ambiguous
mixture of the absolute and the transitory." 3 This
historically tense context demanded that philosophers,
writers and intellectuals choose not on already obsolete
path of detachment but a path of commitment. Simone de
Beauvoir recaptured the intellectual life of Sartre when she wrote: "Sartre built theories, fundamentally, upon certain positions which we both adhered to with some passion. Our love for freedom, our opposition to the established order of things, our individualism and our respect for the working classes - all these brought us close to an anarchist position. But to be frank, our incoherence defined any sort of label. We were anti-capitalists, yet not Marxists; We glorified the powers of pure mind and perfect freedom, yet we rejected the spiritual approach; though our interpretation of man and the universe was strictly materialistic, we despised science and technology. Sartre was not bothered by these inconsistencies and refused so much as to formulate them. 'When you think of in terms of problems' he told me, 'you are not thinking at all'. He himself skipped from one conviction to the next, without rhyme or reason." From this passage we can understand the 'contradictory' role assumed by Sartre in the wake of historical realities. How the very 'inconsistencies' which Simone de Beauvoir suggested were characteristic of Sartre became elements of 'development' and originality is worth studying.

In The Transcendence of The Ego we note two important aspects which constitute leads to the discussion of the continuity of discontinuity. They are 1) Sartre related freedom or consciousness to action and projects in the real world.
2) Sartre's consciousness was not an individual consciousness but impersonal or non personal.

Consciousness, for Sartre, was not even social but general and universal. Despite Sartre's usage of expressions 'I', 'me', 'mine' consciousness remained non-possessive as pure designation. Sartre's criticism of Husserl was an important headway as Sartre had maintained a more or less similar critique of Husserl throughout his philosophical project. For Husserl, ego was a centre and subject of consciousness which determined the content and nature of consciousness. Sartre rejected Husserl's concept of Ego and described 'ego' as the intentional object of consciousness in the world. In order to co-opt 'ego' as linked by the world to consciousness Sartre adapted Heideggerian ontology. To suit his phenomenological as well as ontological requirements, 'ego' was made 'contemporaneous' with the world. This 'transcendence of ego' allowed the existential - phenomenological definition of consciousness as consciousness of 'something'. This definition of consciousness remained from The Transcendence of The Ego to Critique with different material facticities. Sartre's project was one of 'phenomenological ontology'. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre differentiated his approach from that of Husserl's in which pure phenomenology was 'subjective idealism' and from that of Heidegger in which phenomenology was 'brute objectivism'. This reflected Sartre's commitment to go
beyond 'subjective idealism' and 'objectivism'. Sartre defined being as it appeared and squashed the difference between appearance and essence. However, the impersonal consciousness of *The Transcendence of The Ego* gained the status of a personal and individual consciousness in *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre, while commenting on hatred, wrote: "...hatred is not of consciousness. It overflows the instantaneousness of consciousness, and it does not bow to the absolute law of consciousness for which no distinction is possible between appearance and being. Hatred, then, is a transcendent object.... Hatred is credit for an infinity of angry or repulsed consciousness in the past and in the future. It is the transcendent unity of infinity of consciousness. Thus, to say "I hate" or "I love" on the occasion of a particular consciousness of attraction or repugnance is to effect a veritable passage to infinity, rather analogous to that which we effect when we perceive an ink stand or the blue of the blotter." The above passage revealed Sartre as holding a theory of consciousness which was general and impersonal. Hatred, as human action because of its non-temporal reference to infinity of consciousness, becomes an abstraction. Here, Sartre argued the being and existence of the phenomena of hatred as one and the same. Sartre in his *Emotions*, defined phenomenology in a similar way when he wrote: "... phenomenology is the study of phenomena - not of facts. And by a phenomenon we are to understand
that which announces itself', that of which the reality precisely is the appearance. And this 'announcement of itself' is not a thing 'behind which' there is something else which 'does not yet appear'. Indeed, for the human reality to exist is, according to Hiedegger, to assume its own being in an existential mode of understanding. And in Husserl, to exist is, for consciousness to appear to itself...... Husserl, for his part thinks that a phenomenological description of emotion will reveal the essential structures of consciousness, seeing that an emotion precisely is a consciousness.⁶ Here we can see Sartre's integration of being with consciousness. For Sartre, existence and consciousness were one and the same in the sense of 'conscious existence'. Unlike in The Transcendence of the Ego, consciousness as emotion was not pure abstraction but emotion was a 'lived experience' of the world, 'a specific manner of apprehending the world. But both in The Transcendence of the Ego and in Emotions, emotion was not a thing object but a perceptual consciousness. To Sartre, a study of 'imagination' revealed an altogether different aspect of consciousness. Unlike emotional consciousness, imaginative consciousness was not linked to perceptual consciousness. But Sartre wrote: "There is therefore in perception the charm of an infinity of images; but these can arise only at the cost of the annihilation of perceptual consciousness".⁷ Here Sartre seemed to distinguish the act of perception with the actual perceptual consciousness. But he nevertheless
assumed that images were given in perception. For Sartre just as emotion had a magical being, imagination had a magical being too ... Sartre categorically stated: "the act of imagination is a magical one." Unlike in emotion, in imagination, the imaginative consciousness as a positional consciousness of its 'objects' was not undifferentiated as the annihilation of perceptual consciousness was always incomplete and reversible. In Being and Nothingness Sartre defined hatred as consciousness of a hateful 'object'. Man as a being-in-the world was, in emotion, in a certain way different from that of the emotion of The Transcendence of the Ego. The difference was due to difference of a more developed conception of consciousness in Being and Nothingness. Consciousness, in Being and Nothingness, was not merely pre-reflective consciousness of itself but a concrete nothingness. In The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre outlined three degrees of consciousness whereas in Being and Nothingness he offered two levels of consciousness - pre-reflective and reflective. Sartre was not defining consciousness in terms of negation and determination in The Transcendence of the Ego, he merely, unlike in the later works, from a 'common sense' point of view differentiated emotion from a 'thing' object. In his works on 'imagination', Sartre started defining consciousness as 'negative determination'. Sartre argued, in agreement with Heidegger and in disagreement with Hegel, that conscious
must be a nothingness in order to be 'is not' of something. According to Sartre, the 'is' of something was always 'negatively determined' by the 'is not' of something. In order for an emotion like 'hate' to be 'hate' and not 'joyful', according to Sartre, this 'negative determination' was necessary. Nothingness was in the very structure of human reality in order for consciousness to be consciousness of something at the 'same time', not something else. Sartre argued that being and non-being were contemporary and, thus, consciousness was 'concrete nothingness'. Sartre, while commenting on the 'rupture' between the self and the other, wrote: "He can never recapture what he has alienated; he has even lost the hope of acting on this alienation and turning it to his advantage since the destroyed other has carried the key to this alienation along with him to the grave. What I was for the other is fixed by the other's death, and I shall irremediably be it in the past. I shall be it also and in the same way in the present if I preserve in the attitude, the projects, and the mode of life which have been judged by the other. The other's death constitutes me as an irremediable object exactly as my own death would do. Thus the triumph of hate is in its very upsurge transformed into failure. Hate does not enable us to get out of the circle. It simply represents the final attempt, the attempt of despair. After this failure of this attempt nothing remains for the for-itself except to re-enter the circle and allow itself to be indefinitely tossed from one
to the other of the two fundamental attitudes. Here we see Sartre relating 'hate' as emotion as a fundamental attitude. Unlike in his earlier texts, he not only related it to the self and the other but also to alienation, death and failure. Sartre, here, described the transformation of one fundamental attitude into another. For Sartre a fundamental attitude was marked by 'quality' and could not have degrees and it was fundamental to the core.

Sartre, in *Critique*, took a similar position. While commenting on 'violence' as the medium of human relations, he wrote: "In other words, the colonialist discovers in the native not only the other-than-man but also his sworn Enemy (in other words, the Enemy of Man). This discovery does not presuppose resistance (open or clandestine), or riots, or threats, of revolt. The violence of the colonialists itself emerges as an infinite necessity or, to put in another way, the colonialist reveals the violence of the native, even in his passivity, as the obvious consequence of his own violence and as its sole justification. This discovery is made through hatred and fear as a negative determination of the practical field." Here, Sartre raised hatred as violence of human relations to study it in the historic context of a colonial 'situation'. Sartre's use of the expression 'colonialist reveals the violence of the native' was quite 'unfortunate' as it made the 'natives' victims of their own existence. This expression logically led to a
proposition that the colonialist was violent in advance as natives were 'originally' violent. This would be not only contrary to Marxian theory that 'people's violence' is counter violence, but also contrary to Sartre's own practice. We shall note here that Sartre defended several liberation struggles going on then—for example the Algerian war of independence. He even appeared before 'committees' to defend his former Algerian students. In this way Sartre's participation in the 'French Resistance movement' against fascism, his role in the 'world peace movement', his active role in 'Russel's Tribunal' marked his progressive practice. Sartre even made Les Temps Modernes 11 the mouth-piece of the communist party in a situation where the general left was on defensive. The inconsistency between Sartre's practical relations with the French Communist Party and his theoretical relations with Marxian philosophy was glaring throughout sartres 'development'. Sartre's relations with the French communist party were not 'monolithic'. In response to several instances of Stalinistic 'atrocities' Sartre disagreed with the party and took individual positions.

Sartre was concerned with 'human failure' as the basic 'project' and the consequence of realisation of 'project' both in Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason. As he argued in Being and Nothingness, the emotion 'hate' was a failure. According to Sartre, 'hate' presented itself as the self's urge to 'abolish'
the other. For Sartre, hating the other was in another language, suppressing the other as consciousness. Sartre wrote: "My project of suppressing him is a project of suppressing others in general; that is, of recapturing my non-substantial freedom as for itself. In hate there is given an understanding the fact that my dimension of being-alienated is a real enslavement which is projected. That is why hate is a black feeling, that is, a feeling which aims at the suppression of an other and which qua project is consciously projected against the disapproval of others. I disapprove of the hate which one person bears toward another; it makes me uneasy and I seek to suppress it because although it is not explicitly aimed at me, I know that it concerns me and that it is realised against me." Here Sartre seemed to develop his phenomenological notion of hate to a different existential level of the self and the other - as 'complementaries' and as 'opposites'. As we have noted, for Sartre, consciousness, is not only a consciousness of something but also a consciousness of consciousness (in the sense of self consciousness or self-awareness). Thus, Sartre argued that 'being hateful' was not only a relation of the self with the other but also the self's relation with itself. Sartre held that 'being hateful' was simultaneously grasping the other as a 'hateful object' and the self as a 'hateful conscious' (or consciousness of hating). Sartre construed that one cannot surpass the existence of the other as
'hateful-object' because the other as hateful-object gave a temporal dimension to the self. According to Sartre, the other was 'engraved' in the self in terms of the 'past' which was rich for its potential for many more 'futures'. Thus, for Sartre, the death of the other resulted in the death of the other in the self and of the self. Sartre's concept of death that way was the only way one can 'understand', 'experience' - 'my-death' was from the death of the other. According to Sartre, the self was infected by the other for eternity and 'alienation' of the self was transcendable not in the sense of 'overcoming' but in the sense of 'overwhelming', by different, changed and a series of alienations.

In *Emotions* Sartre explained the unavoidable reality of 'hate' as an emotion and the futility of rationalizations. According to Sartre, there was no difference between the propositions 1) 'I find him hateful because I am angry' and 2) 'I am angry because he is hateful'. Sartre argued that both propositions indicated post-emotion rationalisations. Sartre opined that the former proposition was rare as reflective consciousness as it needed special motivation and the latter proposition was implicit in every passionate encounter of the self with the other. The above stated propositions, for Sartre, reflected the self's attempt to cope with the other in the situation. According to Sartre, though the post-rationalisations of a particular situation could not

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explain the nature of emotion, they presented emotional consciousness as the structure of consciousness. Sartre's concepts 'the me', 'the I' of The Trascendence of The Ego are of some help here. In proposition one, the expression 'I' was a reflecting-reflected where responsibility of emotion was subjective. In the second proposition the expression 'I' was used in the sense of the 'I' who has the sense of the other [the sense in which the other might view 'the I' in the view of 'the I'] where the responsibility falls on the other but still in a subjective way. The difference between the two propositions would be the self assuming opposite roles in a unified way - in one as 'I' and in the other as 'Me'. We shall note here that existentialism was not an irrationalism in form but dealt with 'irrational' elements of consciousness in a rational way. Sartre's concept of violence in Critique, thus, was limited by the self and the other structure, as he analysed social matrix or historical context in terms of the 'residues' of the self and the other. Sartre's acceptance of Marxian philosophy by pronouncement, thus, conclusively remained an existential choice.

Though Sartre considered freedom and consciousness as abstract and general conceptions, he studied them in real-life situations in Being and Nothingness. The man of Being and Nothingness was a man of action. However, unlike in Critique, the concrete
situations in *Being and Nothingness* remained outside the purview of 'history'. Despite Sartre's starting point being historical context, his 'epistemological' ideal remained the 'ontological' individual. To put it in a different way, the purport of *Critique* was the re-choosing of the 'ontic-individual' at a historical level. We shall formulate Sartre's continuities and discontinuities from *The Transcendence of The Ego* to *Critique* in a clearer way before attempting to discuss some important and particular themes.

a) Sartre's notion of 'Marxian philosophy' in *The Transcendence of The Ego* and in *Critique* were essentially the same; and the only difference was that in the former, he only mentioned the argument against it whereas in the latter he developed it.

b) Sartre's concept of Individual and impersonal cogito developed in *The Transcendence of The Ego* was assimilated and realised in the concept of man (in historical context) developed in expositions of regressive analysis. This can be put in another way as the historical man of *Critique* was a matured and materialistic (mechanical) version of the pseudo-cogito notion in *The Transcendence of The Ego*. In both works, Sartre had shown tremendous interest in the ontic structures of consciousness.

c) In *The Transcendence of The Ego* we find consciousness having three levels - first degree, second degree and third degree. In *Being and Nothingness* we find only two
levels-pre-reflective and reflective. The difference between the pseudo-cogito of *The Transcendence of The Ego* and the reflective cogito of *Being and Nothingness* was that the former was bound by the material order and was inauthentic and the latter, in form and content, was bound by reflective structure and was authentic. Pseudo-cogito's unification is brought about by 'objects' (thing) in line with a time-consciousness which was known as internal-time consciousness. The unification brought about by objects in the pseudo-cogito is known as the first degree consciousness. The unification brought about by the internal-time consciousness is known as the second degree consciousness. According to Sartre, this first degree unification was temporally sequenced (bound) with the internal-time consciousness and was incapable of the unification with first degree consciousness.

In *Critique*, Sartre's notion of individual and group praxis were in continuity with the earlier version of Sartre's concept of consciousness as it developed from *The Transcendence of The Ego* to *Being and Nothingness*. Just as 'thing' objects unified and determined the first degree consciousness in *The Transcendence of The Ego* and pre-reflective cogito was determined by being-in-itself or other than consciousness in *Being and Nothingness*, in the same way, in *Critique*, individual praxis was determined by 'worker matter'. Just as consciousness was defined as
reciprocity and summation of the self and the other, in the same way, in *Critique*, Sartre transcribed individual, praxis, group, group in fusion, institution in the break-up of the self and the other. Unlike the consciousness developed in *The Transcendence of The Ego*, Sartre's notion of 'individual praxis' could effect an imposed unity on the material order.

d) Just as the 'I' was differentiated from the 'Me' in *Transcendence of The Ego* to interpret the relation of the self and the other, in the same way, Sartre differentiated between 'we subject' and 'us object' to interpret the relation between the self and the other. According to Sartre, 'we subject' was characterised by transce-ascendence and 'us object' was characterised by transce-decendence. According to Sartre, "we" could be the subject and, in this form, it was identical with the plural of the "I". Thus for Sartre, "we" included plurality of subjectives which recognized one another as subjectivities.

In *The Transcendence of The Ego* the conflict between the composition was exclusive of the "I" and the composition of the "other" self in *The Transcendence of the Ego* was both ground and battle ground for the other to be related ... to be related with the self. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre concentrated on the social dimension of the self. Sartre argued that, despite being located in the social situation, the self remained self, "we" was thus a social or psychological framework of the same self.
Sartre, while commenting on the genesis of the "we" structure, wrote: "...suddenly some incident occurs in the street; for example, a slight collision between a jeep and a taxi. Immediately at the very instant when I become a spectator of the incident, I experience my self non-thetically as engaged in "we". The remarkable advance Sartre made in *Being and Nothingness* as against *The Transcendence of The Ego* was to interpret the self's relations with the other as Being-for-others to Being-with-others. Though this was a development, Sartre retained the Being-for-others structure both in *Being and Nothingness* as well as in *Critique*. The ambiguity of the French language added to philosophical complexities. The French word "nous" can be both subject and object and this created problems of translation to Hazel E. Barnes, the celebrated interpreter and translator of Sartre. According to Sartre, "we" can be both subject and object but the former designation was more appropriate than the latter. Sartre, while commenting on the language problem of philosophy wrote: "To be sure, the parallel between grammar and thought is in many cases more than doubtful; in fact, the question should be revised completely and the relation of language to thought studied from an entirely new approach. Yet it is nonetheless true that the "we" subject does not appear even conceivable unless it refers at least to the thought of plurality of subjects which would simultaneously apprehend one another as subjectivities, that is as transcendences-transcending and
According to Sartre, though the experience as "we" was real this experience was not the foundation of our consciousness of the other. Sartre argued that "we" can be a consciousness of consciousness in the mode of either transcendence-transcending or transcendence-transcended and not as both at one time. Sartre opined that "we" formed the foundation of Being-for-others and preceded and founds Being-with-others.

Sartre presented two 'ontologically' different propositions which demonstrated two opposite meanings of the "we" framework. The propositions were: 1) we are looking at them and, 2) They are looking at us. These two propositions according to Sartre, were 'radically different' as the first explained the for-itself's Being-in-the act of looking experience and the second explained the for-itself's Being-looked-at experience. In Critique, Sartre used the notion of the third, just as he used it in Being and Nothingness in his explanations of 'us' object. The concepts of the Group in permanence and the Group-in-fusion of Critique were broadly comparable to the notions 'we-subject' and 'us-object'. Just as Sartre distinguished we subject... from 'us object' in Being and Nothingness, in the same way, he distinguished group-object from group-subject in Critique.
e) Sartre tried to interpret the being of classes (the oppressed as well as oppressing) in the language of "Being-with" when he wrote: "since the unity of the oppressed class stems from the fact that it is experienced as an us-object in the face of an undifferentiated "They" which is the Third or the oppressing class, one might be tempted to believe that by a sort of symmetry the oppressing class apprehends itself as a we-subject in the face of the oppressed class. But the weakness of the oppressing class lies in the fact that although it has at its disposal precise and rigorous means for coercion, it is within itself profoundly anarchistic. The 'bourgeois' is not only defined as a certain homo economicus disposing of a precise power and privilege in the heart of a society of a certain type; he is described inwardly as a consciousness which does not recognise its belonging to a class. His situation, in fact, does not allow him to apprehend him as engaged in an us-object in community with other members of the bourgeois class. But on the other hand, the very nature of the we-subject implies that it is made up of only fleeting experiences without metaphysical bearing. The "bourgeois" commonly denies that there are classes; he attributes the existence of a proletariat to the action of the agitators, to awkward incidents, to injustices which can be repaired by particular measures; he affirms the existence of a solidarity of interests between capital and labor; he offers instead a class solidarity, a larger solidarity, natural solidarity, in
which the worker and the employer are integrated in a Mitsein which suppresses the conflict. The question here is not, as so often said, one of manoeuvres or of a stupid refusal to see the situation in its true light; rather the member of the oppressing class sees the totality of the oppressed class confronting him as an objective ensemble of "they-subjects" without correlatively realising his community of being with the other members of the oppressing class". This long passage of Sartre from Being and Nothingness revealed, to a major extent, the oppressing class' point of view of the oppressed class. According to Sartre, in the view of oppressing class, the oppressed class could not determine itself as 'we subject'. In a similar way, Sartre, in Critique, opined that, because the bourgeois denies the existence of classes, the oppressed class cannot determine itself as 'we subject'. On the other hand, what Sartre supposed to be the bourgeois point of view in Being and Nothingness became Sartre's own point of view in Critique. Sartre, while commenting on the phenomenon of violence, wrote: "Violence as bourgeois exis, exists in the exploitation of the proletariat as an inherited relation of the dominant class to the dominated class (but we shall see that it is also a practice at this level); and violence as the praxis of this bourgeois generation, lay in colonisation. But the exis, in itself, was no more than a diachronic mediation between two cycles of praxis. And colonial
undertakings, as the temporalization of bourgeois violence (as the violence of one class against another within a community) is also its dialectical enrichment and expansion. In new condition when exploitation ... must start on the basis of oppression, this violence renews itself; it will extend to mass extermination and torture."²⁰ Here we can see Sartre upholding what he tried to pre-empt in Being and Nothingness, namely, the capacity of the oppressing class to oppress the expressed was a conflict within a community. As we have already noted, 'exis' is the stable and inert condition against 'praxis', the oppressing class' praxis (violence) cannot be bonded to 'exis' as there are opposing classes involved Sartre opined that, through violence, the oppressing class disclosed the nature of the oppressed class. This only meant that, whatever cruelty was shown by the oppressing class in using violence against oppressed class, there was not natural but assumed by the oppressing class due to the assumed view of the oppressed class. In both the texts, in Being and Nothingness and in Critique, Sartre, while dealing with class antagonisms, advocated 'class collaboration' mediated by 'Being-with' category.

f) As we have noted Sartre in the name of 'realism' gave primacy to 'bourgeois' in his notions of group-in-fusion, collective, class-struggle, history. This kind of 'unrealistic' standpoint in Sartre disclosed no opening towards an optimistic philosophy of history or a question
of 'completion' of history (in Marxian sense). Sartre gave no evidence of the possibility of the oppressed class determining itself as "we-subject" instead of being inert seriality of impotence (us object).

We have noted in the second section of the second chapter that Sartre accused Marx of the original dogma or philosophy of seriousness, where man is serious when he takes himself to be an object. Sartre, as we have noted, held the view that there were theorised two characteristics of the spirit of seriousness. They are:
1) it transfers the quality of "desirable" from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution, and
2) it considers values as transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity. In this way Sartre made the spirit of seriousness as the spirit of Marxian philosophy on the one hand and the general predicament of mankind as in bad-faith. Sartre suggested a remedy for "the spirit of seriousness" in his theory of 'existential psychoanalysis'. Sartre declared that freedom was the end product of existential psycho-analysis when he wrote: "But ontology and existential psycho-analysis (or the spontaneous and empirical application which men have always made use of these disciplines) must reveal to the moral agent that he is the being by whom values exist. It is then that his freedom will become conscious of itself and will reveal itself in anguish as the unique source of value and the nothingness by which the world-
exists. As soon as freedom discovers the quest for the being and appropriation of the in itself as its own possibles, it will apprehend by and in anguish that they are possibles only on the ground of the possibility of other possibles." According to Sartre, freedom has become a possible possibility in the wake of nothingness and in the bad-faith structure of consciousness.

In Critique, as we have noted, Sartre presented the reification of man in the following terms: 'humans are thingified in as much as things are humanised!' and 'human beings are historicised by things mediated by man'. Just as Sartre fought materialism in general and dialectical materialism in particular when he described Marxian philosophy as the spirit of seriousness in Being and Nothingness in the same way, Sartre fought dialectical materialism (despite his rejection) in Critique when he described man in terms of things and things in terms of things and things in terms of man with a mechanical materialist approach. Here we can see the resurrection of the phenomenological point of view of the relation between things and man after Sartre had abandoned it in The Psychology of Imagination and in the The Transcendence of The Ego. We must note here that Sartre distorted 'Marxian Philosophy' when he accused it of being characterised by a spirit of seriousness. It is unbelievable that Sartre could go to the extent of interpreting 'Marxian
Philosophy' which, as a world outlook, as a method of 'materialist interpretation', to be the philosophy of man who is bound by things devoid of freedom. Sartre, in Critique, unlike in Being and Nothingness presented man and things in pseudo-contexts, namely the context of scarcity, the context of need, the context of group-infusion, without taking into account the productive forces and the relation of production as the native force of history. Sartre was trapped in a circle of thinking when he defined humans through things and things through humans. Sartrean philosophy incorporated appearance as an 'exclusive' principle and moreover, its rejection of the dialectic of nature caused it to be "blind" to the fact that causal-phenomena, concrete history, dialectical interdependency of phenomena, man's intervention in nature, man's manipulation of nature were law bound. Sartrean philosophy could not retrieve man's natural existence in thought thanks to industrialisation as it considered man unilaterally social. Thus, just as, in The Transcendence of The Ego Sartre needed 'thing' objects for unification of consciousness, in the same way in Critique, he needed an abstract matter (a matter with which the physicist deals and non-dialectical) in order for words to have meanings. Sartre, in Critique, made use of worked matter (the matter reshaped by the worker through labour) whose 'scarcity' as social dimension presented itself to individual praxis in the form of 'need'. Thus Sartre made his 'historical man' a victim of 'materialist illusion'.
which he accused philosophers like Husserl and Heidegger were victims of by his own argument.

g) Sartre, in Critique suggested psycho analytic theory to be appended to Marxian philosophy as it contained dialectical elements. This is exactly in line with Sartre's proposal of existential psycho analysis as a remedy for the original 'dogma' of Marxian philosophy as a spirit of seriousness. Sartre was anti-Freudian in both Being and Nothingness and in Critique. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre was against psycho analysis as an intellectual method, but, in Critique, he was positively towards a human psychiatry. Sartre argued that in certain madnesses the patient, in order to cope with a difficult reality (unwanted) chooses to behave in a certain way. The persistence of hardship was directly proportional to the strength with which the person resisted the hardship and the erosion of the hardship with the emergence of the 'abnormal' conduct of the person was directly proportional to the disappearance of strength to fight the hardship. Sartre's transcendence of ego, his concept of emotion, his concept of Imagination, his concept of bad-faith in 'summation' converged into his notion of human psychiatry. Sartre, while commenting on the ambiguity and the rationality of the psychic patient's situation, wrote: "...this logic is not entirely Hegelian either, since it is concerned with reciprocity of conditioning rather than
with totalization. However, to the extent that, for such a logic, a particular action is an expression of the circularity of the conditions and of the individual history. The truth is, however, that his being is passivity, at least in 'classical psychoanalysis'. The fact that Freudian analysts have been led to attribute greater and greater importance to the functions of the ego scarcely affects this. The simple fact that Anna Freud (following so many others) can refer to these functions as 'defence mechanisms' imprints upon the work of the ego an a priori inertia. In the same way physics speaks of 'forces' and of 'work' without ever abandoning the terrain of exteriority."22 Sartre argued, contrary to his notion of 'worked-matter' and the notion of 'spirit of seriousness', that psychoanalysis must not treat madness simply from its exteriority, as a thing but as an insider and as the freedom of the patient.

We have presented certain discontinuities and continuities in the development of Sartre's philosophy, not as mere mentioning or repetition but as a gradual development. We shall now attempt a discussion on particular themes which are given importance by Sartre in Being and Nothingness and in Critique. The proposed themes are concrete relations (love, sexuality), alienation, bad-faith, knowledge and freedom and instrumentality. We shall note that our rigorous way of presenting themes would not undermine the importance given
to these themes by Sartre. Our/not/mentioning some in the
earlier chapters of the themes like love and sexuality or
knowledge and freedom was due to the fact that the former
set has no bearing on the way we have set the problem to
discuss (the problem of continuity of themes in Sartre in
the light of Sartre's criticisms of Marxian philosophy)
and latter the set was reflectively discussed which needed
explicit argumentation.

CONCRETE RELATIONS (LOVE, SEXUALITY ETC):

Sartre opined that we can have two conflicting
relations with the other. They are

1) either we can attempt to assimilate other's freedom
   into our freedom while simultaneously trying to
   preserve other's freedom and our otherness,

2) or we can attempt to reduce his freedom into an
   object. As we have noted the idea of failure was
   favourite idea for Sartre, he presumed both opposing
   relations to be failure.

According to Sartre, our attempt to preserve
the freedom of the other despite our good faith is bound
to fail because in the process of preserving we make
other's freedom an object. For Sartre, when we make the
other into an object we recognize the other as subject in
this objectivised freedom. Sartre construed that depending
on the For-itself's capacity to exercise freedom all the
relations of the self with the other are either in good faith or bad faith. In Being and Nothingness all relations depend for their continuity or discontinuity on the freedom of the For-itself. In Critique, however, Sartre took seemingly "materialistic approach". Sartre while differentiating his account of human relations wrote: 
"...the habit of skipping the abstract discussion of the human relation and immediately locating ourselves in the world of productive forces, of the mode and relations of production, so dear to Marxism; is in danger of giving unwitting support to the atomism of liberation and of analytical rationality. This error has been made by several Marxists: individuals, according to them, are a priori neither isolated particles nor directly related activities; it is always up to society to determine which they are through the totality of the movement and particularity of the conjecture. But this reply which is supposed to avoid our 'formalism', involves complete formal acceptance of the liberal position; the individualistic bourgeoisie requires just one concession: that individuals passively submit to their relations and that these are conditioned in exteriority by all kinds of other forces; and this leaves them free to apply the principle of inertia and positivistic laws."
Sartre while rejecting Marxian view of human relations as it was sometimes positivistic as evident from the argumentation of certain Marxists (who remain anonymous, since Sartre never
mentions their names). Sartre by accusing certain Marxists to be unMarxistic graduated in accusing Marxism that it is originally 'other than itself'. Sartre describes human relations as "historical" but it was a sort of history individuals ignorant of each other. Sartre wrote: "History determines the content of human relations in its totality, and all these relations, even the briefest and most private, refer to the whole. But History itself does not cause there to be human relationships in general. The relations, which have established themselves between those initially separate objects, men were not products of problems of the organisation and division of labour on the contrary, the very possibility of a group or society depends on the permanent actuality of the human relation...at every moment of History, even between two separate individuals belonging to societies with different systems and entirely ignorant of one another."24 Just as in Being and Nothingness Sartre in Critique made human relations grounded in alienation. Sartre's existential term for human context is 'situation'. Man in 'situation' according to Sartre was simultaneously in and out of the 'situation'. Thus according to Sartre in situation man is not only 'bound' by the situation also can of 'beyond' the situation. Thus according to Sartre, in situation man is not only bound by the situation but also can go 'beyond' the situation.
According to Sartre, in love man aims at obtaining from his beloved a free and absolute acknowledgement of his being. Sartre argued that for the belonged man would not be the contingent and unjustifiable upsurge. Sartre opined that in love man desires the beloved freely to return to me my very objectification that came to be my relation of the other. Sartre while commenting on the status of freedom in a love situation wrote: "The notion of ownership by which love is so often explained, is not actually primary, why should I want to appropriate the other if it were not precisely that the other makes me be." Sartre makes everything of the self as this or that the responsibility in the other. Sartre, here, not only inconsistent with his notion of the self as central to his theory, ever he seemed to be absurd and non-scientific when he wrote: "If I have hepatitis, I avoid drinking wine so as not arouse pains in my liver-is in no way distinct from that other goal-to obey the prohibitions of the physician who revealed the pain to me. Thus another is responsible for my disease." Here we can see Sartre making the doctor responsible for the disease as the doctor discloses the disease to the patient. Doctor was taken to be the other disclosed the body of the patient as a support of the "illness" and as a "substance" of the disease. Sartre seemed to have made doctor's intervention more what the "third" as witness can "intervene". In Being and Nothingness, Sartre while illustrating the concept bad-faith described the situation.
of a woman whose hand becomes "a thing" when taken by her potential lover. The woman would not recognise either facticity or transcendence of her situation. This for Sartre meant the ultimate finality of love situation where the conflict between the facticity and the transcendence had a 'magical' effect that the hand of the woman becomes 'thing like! She can understand that 'this ' hide and seek would not last long and neither she refuses to express her intuitive fear nor she resists the advances made by the potential lover.

Unlike in Being and Nothingness Sartre in Critique did not place failure of love in the individual but in the social institutions and structures which limit individuality of praxis. That way just as in Being and Nothingness, Sartre, in the same way, in Critique presented love as conflict beyond. In being and Nothingness just as good faith is a form of bad faith in the same way love is an expression of another failure of self's attempts to objectify the other or recognise the subject as the other. In Critique Sartre argued that one loves at the cost of being alienated from history. Love among human individuals meant their general hatred against inhumanity. Unlike this in Being and Nothingness love becomes valueless perpetually when it turns into its opposite hate or counterpart sadism. Sartre while writing about the feeling of solidarity between individuals of a particular
group in Critique wrote: "in the developing praxis (that as to say during the execution ) every one feels at one with everyone in the practical solidarity of the risks run and of the common violence. I am a brother in violence to all my neighbours ; and it is clear that any one who shunned this fraternity would be subject. In other words, anger and violence are lived both as terror against the traitor and (if circumstances have produced this feeling) as practical bond of love between the lynchers. Violence is the very power of this lateral reciprocity of love." Sartre seemed to discuss the failure of a individual relation as reflection of the failure of social institution as his project in Critique to link individual to history.

Sartre's concept of love is related to his notions of desire and sexuality. According to Sartre, language is a proof of the non-objectified freedom between a lover and the beloved. The importance of language for Sartre is disclosed when he wrote: "In a universe of pure objects language could under no circumstances have been "invented" since it presupposes an original relation to another subject. In the intersubjectivity of the for-others, it is not necessary to invent language because it is already given in the recognition of the other. I am language." In the same way Sartre defined desire to be wholly body and sexuality to be entirely "desire". Sartre while describing the fate of desire wrote: "...pleasure
is the death and failure of desire. It is the death of desire because it is not only its fulfilment but its limit and its end. This, moreover, is only an organic contingency: it "happens" that the incarnation is manifested by erection and that the erection ceases with ejaculation."29 Here Sartre identified desire as a failure as he argued that it realises its being in between transcendence and facticity. Sartre while describing the sexual act in existential terms wrote: "At this moment the communion of desire is realised; each consciousness by incarnating itself has realized the incarnation of the other; each one's disturbance has caused disturbance to be born in the Other and is thereby so much enriched. By each caress I experience my own flesh and the other's flesh through my flesh and I am conscious that this flesh which I feel and appropriate through my flesh is flesh-realized-by-the-Other.30 Despite Sartre's seeming importance given to body as flesh-realized-by-the-Other, located the centrality of sexuality in desire. Unlike in Being and Nothingness Sartre in Critique discussed the situation of praxis in the wake of social structures. Sartre while comparing the reflective nature production of an individual worker with the workers repetitive nature of sexual imagination wrote: "men have less tendency to indulge in erotic fantasies; this is because they are the 'first sex', the active sex; if they were to think of 'taking' a woman, their work would suffer; conversely, work, by absorbing their total activity, cuts them off
from sexuality. The woman worker thinks about 'sexual abandonment', because the machine requires her to live her conscious life in passivity in order to preserve a flexible, preventive vigilance without ever mobilising herself into active thought....the woman may recall the pleasure of the night to come, or constantly relive her troubled feelings while reading a book or magazine; or she may avoid sexuality and ruminate on the bitterness of her social condition instead. Nevertheless, it is essential that, the 'object' of her daydreams should also be the subject... the work will stop or slow down."31 Sartre in Critique unlike in Being and Nothingness presented sexuality as not itself. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre advocated interchangeability of love into hatred and into sadism, and interchangeability as a necessary evil. On the relation between love and hatred Hegel held a different view when he wrote: "Active love - for love that does not act has no existence and is therefore hardly intended here - aims at removing an evil from some one and being good to him. For this purpose I have to distinguish what is bad for him, what is the appropriate good to counter this evil, what in general is good for him; i.e. I must love him 'intelligently'. Unintelligent love will perhaps do him more harm than hatred."32 Here we can see Hegel differentiating love from hatred unlike Sartre whose phenomenological notion of consciousness and existential notion of the relation between the self and the other
enabled interchangeability of love and hatred. Unlike Sartre, Marx described man and woman relationship as a natural and species relationship when he wrote: "the relation of 'man' to 'woman' and in the manner in which the direct and natural species - relationship is conceived. The direct, natural and necessity relation of person to person is the relation of man to woman. ..... the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man's natural behaviour has become human, or the extent to which the human essence in him has become natural essence...." Unlike Marx, Sartre placed man in the well alienation which is ineliminable. As this destiny of man is ineliminable. As this destiny of man works on every moment of his argument Sartre instead of humanised the dehumanised man was content with mere description of such dehumanisation and not in its resolution.

ALIENATION AS BAD-FAITH:

Sartre's discussion of bad-faith, we note, is a discussion on alienation. According to Sartre bad-faith as well as the look brings about the objectification of the subject in the mode of denial of freedom. Sartre explained that there is a subtle difference between bad-faith and look in the former objectness is self imposed and the freedom denied takes the form of conscious refusal of freedom and in the latter the objectness is brought on from the outside by the other under whose supervision I
lose my freedom. The person in bad-faith conveniently hides the separation from himself but by the look of the other, - the person faces the unavoidability of it. Sartre contended that both look and bad-faith opposite modes of consciousness which is anything other than consciousness and consciousness of something. We have noted that consciousness for Sartre is no-thing. Sartre thus while placing the other as an element of facility of the self or Being-for-itself designated alienation as inclinable. Sartre while maintaining general purport of the notion of the look of Being and Nothingness, in Critique used the notion of look to explain alienation differently. Sartre

"From my window, I can see a road mender and a gardener working in garden. Between them there is a wall with bits of broken glass on top protecting bourgeois property where the gardener is working. Thus they have no knowledge at all of each other's presence; absorbed as they are in their work, neither of them even bothers to wonder whether there is anybody on the other side. Meanwhile, I can see them without being seen, and my position and this passive view of them at work situates me in relation to them. I am 'taking holiday' in a hotel; and in my inertia as witness I realise myself as a petty bourgeois intellectual; my perception is only a moment of an undertaking...."34

Sartre here is using look as self objectification. The workers by way of their life at work deposit the petty bourgeois's self. Where as in Being and Nothingness due to other's look self is objectified. Though Sartre in some
way essentially discussed human relations as the relation
between the selves and the others throughout has
philosophy.

KNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM:

We have noted that Sartre defined consciousness as consciousness anything other than itself. Sartre argued that consciousness is always a consciousness of something other than itself and 'no-thing'. We have also noted that Sartre argued primacy to Cartesian Cogito. Sartre argued that in Descartes' proposition 'I think therefore I am' the 'I' which thinks is not the same as the 'I' in 'I am'. While contending that Descartes mistook commonsense doubt as methodical doubt Sartre wrote: "The examination of negating conduct and of bad-faith has enabled us to approach the ontological study of the 'cogito', and the being of the 'cogito' has appeared to us as being-for-itself. This being, under our observation has been transcended toward value and possibilities; we have not been able to keep it within the substantial limits of the instantaneity of the Cartesian 'cogito.' But precisely for this reason we cannot be content with the results which we have just obtained. If the 'cogito' refuses instantaneity and if it is transcended towards its possibilities, this can only happen within a temporal surpassing. It is "in time" that the for itself is its own possibilities in the mode of "not being"..." Sartre here questioned the
instantaneity of commonsense doubt as there was a
difference between the consciousness which says 'I think'
and the existence of consciousness which "it is".

One is a consciousness as self consciousness or
non-thetic (consciousness) awareness and another is
reflecting consciousness. For Sartre there are no
divisions in consciousness as it is a unity of singular
consciousness. According to Sartre consciousness presents
itself as consciousness of consciousness. Sartre's
'epistemic' starting point cannot be 'Cartesian cogito' in
the sense that his fundamental project was 'Ontological'.
As we have noted earlier the Cartesian proposition 'I
think therefore I am' presents its meaning as 'essence
precedes existence'. Sartre in order to make it
appropriate for existential project altered the Cartesian
Cogito 'I exist I think therefore I am' is to mean
'existence precedes essence. According to Sartre this
'Ontological start' can soothe the otherwise 'tedious'
enquiry into the relation out of Being-for-itself with
Being-in-itself. This is where Sartre's claims to have
gone beyond materialism and idealism is disclosed black
and white. The term 'existence' being a reference all
that which exists seemed exhaustive of all the
materiality. Sartre, as we have noted, accuses Marxism of
being victim of the spirit of seriousness in Being and
Nothingness. Sartre gave primacy to Being-for-itself as
he made the other as witness, as look conditional to any
subject-object-contact.

In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre discussed theory of knowledge under the heading 'transcendence'. We have noted that Sartre attempted to resolve the subject-object dualism without relapsing into idealism or materialism. For Sartre knowledge discloses a relation between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. We have noted in the introduction that Sartre's distinction between knowledge of being and being of knowledge is actually a distinction between knowledge and being. Sartre on the basis of this ontological 'divide' between knowledge and being has an implicit distinction between empirical and reflect to knowledge. According to Sartre all these distinctions have no relevance before the fact that human reality is essentially a knowing being. Unlike in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre in *Critique* is not interested in one particular individual as a knowing being but number of individuals as a group as knowing beings. Unlike in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre in *Critique* brought a new relation between Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself in terms of practice and theory. For Sartre knowledge is both theoretical as well as practical. The consciousness situated in epistemic context in *Being and Nothingness* and the consciousness situated in a similar context in *Critique* are not the same. In the sense that Being-for-itself in *Being and Nothingness* is not equipped with a human capacity labour in order to convert Being-in-itself
into Work to matter. Being-for-itself has not co-existence being except as abstract and self projected being of Being for the others or Being-with-the-Others. Unlike in Being and Nothingness in Critique individual praxis as a living soul of Common praxis or group praxis is an undifferentiated being of knowing. According to Sartre praxis transcends the divide between the being of a group praxis and the intelligibility of history at work. The status of the problem of knowledge in Being and Nothingness is largely an analysis of consciousness as ontic being. Different from this in Critique knowledge is an analysis of concrete social, historical situations. But both in Critique and Being and Nothingness Sartre presented knowledge as a 'negative determination'. Sartre in Being and Nothingness opined that consciousness can arise as an awareness of Being-in-itself only by that nihilating act in which being of consciousness is negated as identified with Being-in-itself. Sartre while commenting on knowledge as a relation of non being between Being for itself and Being in itself wrote: ".... before all comparison, before all construction, is that which is present to consciousness as not being consciousness. The original relation of presence as the foundation of knowledge is negative. But as negation comes to the world by means of the for-itself and as-thing is in the absolute indifference of identity, it cannot be the thing which is posited as not being the for-itself." Sartre, here, by
defining consciousness as not, understood consciousness as a self awareness. Similarly Sartre in Critique while describing the nature of the Group assigned it apart from common praxis an intelligibility. That way Sartre's definition of consciousness as translucency is preserved in a more developed way in Critique. Sartre wrote: "In the reflexive context of the group, however, this structural relation also must arise as reflexive knowledge; in other words the individual action of the common agent cannot realise itself as a determination of the indetermination without conceding function negatively in the transcendent object as exigency and as negative adumbration (esquisse en creux) of behaviour and positively, in interiority, as duty and power." Just as the genesis of the group is due to a common need in the similar way the group as an idea is a reflection of common need. Sartre in Critique is not interested in subject object dualism (as in Being and Nothingness) but presented dialectical reason as a resolution of the 'paradox' of theory and practice (as he accuses Marxism to be struck by this 'paradox')

Sartre's concept of freedom in Being and Nothingness is entirely different from his concept of freedom in Critique. In Being and Nothingness freedom is a freedom of choice and choice is abstractly abundant. In Critique freedom is the opposite of necessity and divisible. Unlike in Being and Nothingness, in Critique
freedom is not a pure and absolute choice. But both in Being and Nothingness and in Critique knowing is equivalent to freedom.

INSTRUMENTALITY:

Sartre from his early years of philosophisation to Critique is interested in the concept of instrumentality in several divergent ways. Sartre in Search for a Method explained that the problem of how theory is related to action is analogous to that of using instruments. According to Sartre just as a nail is related to the hammer as necessity in the same way theory and practice are inter-related. This being a teleological explanation of the relation between theory and practice Sartre's method of comparison in this respect is superfluent. For Sartre, the point is not merely that we need a hammer to drive a nail into a wall in order to hand a picture. But it is the fact that the hammer is bought and manufactured by workers and the picture is luxury in a private apartment that exists within a world were majority or under nourished. This reminds us of Plato's distinction between a chair made by a carpenter and painting of the chair by an artist. Just as Plato lived in world of slaves and slave owners, in a similar way Sartre lived in a class divided society. Though unlike Plato, Sartre is 'conscious' of social contradictions by bringing the analogy of instrumentality, he stressed the
"Unity of opposing classes rather than focusing the 'struggle' aspect of it.

Sartre in *The Transcendence of The Ego* was lacking any concept of instrumentality. Sartre's definition of consciousness in *The Transcendence of The Ego* has no need of analogy like instrumentality in the sense that the unitification is brought by 'thing objects'. Sartre takes entirely a different position in *Critique* when he defined as bringing pseudo-unity of world objects. We have noted that in his texts on 'imagination' argued the identity of ideal structures and material structures. In this context Sartre's 'the pseudo-unity' as imposed by individual praxis will be a shift from subjectivist position to objectivist position.

In "Emotions" Sartre defined emotion as having as correspondence to man's sense of success or failure (both in being and doing) Sartre wrote: "Consciousness can 'be-in-the-world' in two different ways. The world may appear before it as an organized complex of utilizable things, such that, if one wants to produce a predetermined effect, one must act upon the determinate elements of that complex. As one does so, each 'utensil' refers one to other utensils and to the totality of utensils, there is not absolute action, no radical change that one can introduce immediately into this world. We have to modify a particular utensil and this by means of
another which refers in its turn to yet another, and so on to infinity." We can see in this passage Sartre explaining the world of action and world of things in a materialistic way. But simultaneously we can see Sartre being pessimistic of changing the world which is an instrumental complex, the reason being without effecting a change on the instrument one cannot effect a change on the world. According to Sartre, to effect change on one instrument one needs another instrument and one another and so on. A similar kind of apathy was shown by Sartre in Being and Nothingness and Critique in different ways. The need of one particular instrument for one act to be performed is actually an expression of the need of instrument as a lack. This lack, according to Sartre, is simultaneously a lack felt in the being of consciousness, as it is a lack of a particular instrumentality outside consciousness. Sartre wrote: "This lack cannot be grasped thetically and known by the unreflective consciousness (nor does it appear to the impure, accessory reflection which apprehends it as a psychic object - i.e as a drive or as a feeling." Thus for Sartre both emotion and imagination are a failure as the reflective and affective structure of these feelings are analogous to different and corresponding instrumentalities.

A similar argument in Critique takes place when Sartre writes: "Thus he constantly makes himself the instrument, the means, of this future statute which will
realise him as other; and it is impossible for him to treat his own present as an end. In other words, man as a future of man is the regulative schema of every undertaking, but the end is always remoulding of material older which by itself will make a man possible." Sartre while continuing the argument that man cannot effect a real change because instruments are infinitely required one upon the other before actually intervening in the affairs of the world and invertly effecting the Transcendence of the self.

Whatever Sartre has brought to the fore in the form of diologue and monologue with Marxism about the necessity of integration of 'alien methods' of 'ideologies'. We understand Sartre raised the problem effectively but consequently wished the death of Marxism. But contrary to our understanding of Sartre, he writes: "And since I am to speak of existentialism, let it be understood that I take it to be an "Ideology". It is a parasitical system living on the margin of knowledge, which at first it opposed but into which today it seeks to be integrated."
REFERENCES


8. Ibid., p. 141


13. Ibid., p. 413

14. Ibid., p. 414

15. Ibid., p. 413

16. Ibid., p. 415: also see J.P. Sartre *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 367

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22. Ibid., p.627

23. Ibid., p.97

24. Ibid., p.96


26. Ibid., p.356


29. Ibid., p.397

30. Ibid., p.396


34. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p.100

35. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p.104

36. Ibid., p.174


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40. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op.cit., p.112

41. By alien methods we mean methods alien to Marxism

42. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Methods*, op.cit., p.8