"I have often remarked on the fact that an "anti-marxist" argument is only the apparent rejuvenation of a pre-marxist idea. A so-called "going beyond" Marxism will be at worst only a return to pre-marxism; at best, only the rediscovery of a thought already contained in the philosophy which one believes he has gone beyond. As for "revisionism", this is either a truism or an absurdity. There is no need to readopt a living philosophy to the course of the world, it adopts itself by means of thousands of new efforts, thousands of particular pursuits, for the philosophy is one with the movement of society. Despite their good intentions, those very people who believe themselves to be the most faithful spokesmen for their predecessors transform the thoughts which they want simply to repeat, methods are modified because they are applied to new objects. If this movement on the part of the philosophy no longer exists, one of two things is true. Either the philosophy is dead or it is going through a 'crisis'......in the second case the "philosophical crisis" is the particular expression of a social crisis and its immobility is conditioned by the contradictions which split the society. A so-called "revision" performed by "experts" would be, therefore, only an idealist mystification without any real significance."

Jean-Paul Sartre

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We have discussed in the previous chapter how Sartre raised a system of philosophy against the principles of dialectical materialism. As we have noted in the introduction, Sartre, after presenting the intimate nature of the problematic of existentialism and the problematic of Marxism, argued about the necessity of integrating existentialism (ideology) with Marxism (historical materialism). We have shown in the second chapter that Sartre rejected a dialectic of nature in his essay *Materialism and Revolution*. In the present chapter we shall discuss the problematic developed by Sartre in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. We find in his second monumental work *Critique*, Sartre's ability to dismiss or discuss the problems of 'Marxism'. The difference with *Critique* is that Sartre argued against certain tendencies in 'Marxism' and not against 'Marxism' as he qualified it. This appeared in the form of a 'Marxist' discussing Marxism.

Sartre was strongly of the view that Marxism must be flexible enough to transcend its methodological postures, as it was faced with new objects of study. We must note that we shall agree with Chiodi who said that the *Critique* contained as much existentialism as 'Marxism'. Sartre argued that Marxism lacked a child psychology. Sartre, following British psychiatrists, argued that certain forms of madness resulted from early childhood. Sartre opined that, unlike 'Marxism', in a
family context, psycho-analytic theory can examine the role imposed on the child by the parents and can answer the question whether the child was evading this role, whether it proved fatal to him, or whether the child assimilated it entirely. Sartre explained that this psycho-analytic study would be totally under the weight of the child's 'history'. Different from this, Sartre maintained that the traditional marxist interpretation 'might' view the child's insanity as resulting from the economic conditions and bourgeois goals of the parents. Granting this as the facticity and context of the child's madness, Sartre insisted on the uniqueness of the child's choice to be mad. Here, Sartre showed the intimacy of the problematics of existentialism and Marxism. Sartre opined that a mere construction of the facticity of the stick child in 'objective' terms might reduce the child to be a passive 'victim' and thereby leave the problem without humanising it. Sartre wrote: "And one would be entirely wrong in supposing that this discipline (the psycho-analytic theory -Tilak) is opposed to dialectical materialism. To be sure, amateurs in the West have constructed 'analytical' theories of society or of history which indeed end up in idealism². From this, Sartre made it clear that he was not going back on his criticisms of psycho analysis which divides consciousness into unconscious, sub-conscious and conscious, the latter two acting as the 'servants' of the former. Sartre, at the
same time retained the phenomenological principle of "going back to things" in the form of "going back to the world" as it was experienced by human beings. And, for Sartre, the pre-reflective awareness of an object and the phenomenological description of it were, however, indicative of the premise of "progressive-regressive" movement. We have noted in the beginning of this chapter, in a long passage quoted from Search For Method, that for Sartre 'going beyond' 'Marxism' will be at worst only a return to 'pre-Marxism'. Sartre, by coining the term "progressive-regressive" method, not only tried to present his theory of the relation between the individual and history 'relativeness of unique individual action and in its place in 'totalized history', but also the problems of marxism to induct into it any alien philosophy (ex. psycho-analytic theory). Sartre "reassured" Marxists that they had nothing to fear in the new methods of psycho-analysis and existentialism which simply reinstated some "concrete regions" of the real. Sartre wrote:

"Existentialism, like Marxism, addresses itself to experience in order to discover there concrete syntheses; it can conceive of these syntheses only within a moving, dialectical totalization which is nothing but history or - from the strictly cultural point of view - which we have adapted here - "philosophy - becoming - the world."3

Sartre argued that like marxism, existentialism gave primacy to existence, 'the primacy of existence over consciousness' in the case of the former and 'the primacy
of existence over the essence in the case of the latter. Unlike in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre, in *Critique*, tried to pre-empt the criticisms which put existentialism against marxism, by frantically reforming and reinterpreting his "earlier positions" to put 'existentialism' closer to 'Marxism'.

Sartre extensively argued on the basis of sociological studies made by the American sociologists Lewin Kardiner on the one hand and Lefebovre on the other that their research 'did not contradict the principles of dialectical materialism'. Sartre appreciated their study that the 'scarcity of women led to polyandry and homosexuality'. Sartre wrote: "The "scarcity of women", for example, is a genuine material condition, it is economic to the extent that economy is defined by scarcity; it is a quantitative relation which strictly conditions a need..... A woman is not only a companion for the bed, she is a worker, a productive force." Sartre, in the above manner, criticised the sociologists in question for putting 'the scarcity of women' as a natural fact. On the other hand Sartre criticised marxism for it might have interpreted 'the scarcity of women' and its various effects as a mere socially determined effects.

SARTRE, MARX AND ENGELS:

With this in the back ground, let us attempt to formulate the theoretical assumptions with which Sartre
attempted a critique of dialectical reason as a genuine criticism of 'marxism'. They were: 1) Sartre tried to integrate Comptian positivism, social anthropology, and psycho-analysis into 'dialectical materialism'. And dialectical materialism for Sartre was not a dogma but a coherent system of theoretical principles. These principles were - 'negation of negation can be affirmation', 'conflict inside a person or group culminates as history', 'each moment of a series must be understood starting from the initial moment, and is irreducible to it', and 'history operates at each instant by totalizations of totalization'. Sartre rightly argued that marxism must incorporate into itself the disciplines which have 'hitherto remained external to it'. Sartre wrote: "And this amounts to requiring Marxists to establish their method a priori; whatever relations are investigated, there will never be enough of them to establish a dialectical materialism. Such an extrapolation - that is, an infinitely infinite extrapolation - is radically different from scientific induction." Here, we shall note that Sartre not only was demanding a reconstruction of the dialectical method but was also indicating that such reconstruction was needed from time to time and several times. Another important feature of Sartre's argument was that the reconstruction of method had nothing to do with 'scientific induction'.

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2) For Sartre, 'Marxist theory' has become temporality arrested by inner contradictions that were at present not being resolved, but were being denied. Sartre compared this situation to research in the natural sciences when he wrote: "scientific research can in fact be unaware of its own principal features. Dialectical knowledge, in contrast, is the knowledge of the dialectic." According to Sartre, the dialectic was a method of knowing, and a movement in the object known. For Sartre, the structure of the real and our praxis were interlinked. Sartre explained how to construct dialectical reason when he wrote: "we cannot deny that a Critique (in the Kantian sense of the term) of dialectical Reason can be made only by dialectical Reason itself; and indeed it must be allowed to ground itself and to develop itself as a free critique of itself, at the same time as being the movement of History and of knowledge." Here, Sartre argued on two lines that dialectical Reason can be made only by dialectical Reason not even the practice of individuals or groups and 2) dialectical Reason was not in need of reality outside itself (the dialectic of nature). Sartre took up positions different from the above but only to interpret history as totalized intelligibility and this totalization was perpetual in terms of detotalizations and retotalizations. We have noted in the above quoted passage that dialectical Reason as a critique of itself was simultaneous with a movement of History as well as
knowledge. Despite Sartre's agreements with Marx on the issue of the Marxian critique of Hegel on this position of identity of being and knowledge and marxian critique of Kant's concept of 'Critique', Sartre remained Kantian in approach. But Sartre, on the ground that dialectical Reason must be by "nature" translucent, argued that analytical Reason could not throw light on dialectical Reason but dialectical Reason could interpret analytical Reason. This translucency, according to Sartre, led Marxism to theoretical egoism, self-righteousness and to eventual "sclerosis". Thus Sartre wrote: "Today social and historical experience falls outside of knowledge". Here, Sartre meant by knowledge not all the knowledge but knowledge mediated by Marxist method.

3) Sartre opined that Hegel's dogmatism (as monism) was superior to Marx's dogmatism (as monism) and the superiority lied in its idealism. But Sartre equally argued about Marx's originality when the latter held a position in opposition to Hegel that history was development and being was irreducible to knowledge. This "double standard" argument was necessary for Sartre, on the one hand, to interpret Marx's positions and the differences with Hegel and, on the other to illustrate how Marxism had stagnated. On the ground that marxism must be rejuvenated, Sartre adopted the Hegelian stance that 'Thought is at one and the same time being and knowledge of being and expected that dialectical materialism must
formulate a critique of itself on the basis of dialectical Reason. When Sartre approved Hegelian idealism he was in limited agreement with Hegel to be abundant in reforming Marxism.

Sartre, while admitting that Marxism was monism, commented in an antinomous way: "It is dualist because it is monist. Marx's ontological monism consisted in affirming the irreducibility of Being to thought, and at the same time, in reintegrating thoughts with the real as particular form of human activity." Sartre understood the relativity of the relation between knowledge and being as relativism and discovered Marx's propositions—'Being was irreducible to thought and theory and practice as two dialectical modes of transcending reality—as being 'inconsistent' and 'dogmatic truth' Sartre, while himself being antinomous, in argument accuses marxism of being antinomous.

4) Sartre viewed that contemporary Marxism was paralysed by its paradox that if thought and Being were part of the historical process then no ideology was more relevant or scientific than the other. On the same count, Sartre argued that we were in the presence of the fact to estimate ourselves as knowing subjects and we further eliminate the act of elimination by a 'disappearing trick'. This was the consequence, Sartre thought, which would emanate from marxist determinism. Sartre wrote: "...the content of knowledge could not change the mode of
knowing. But if form and knowledge were modified together, and by each other, if necessity no longer belonged to a pure conceptual activity, but no perpetual, and perpetually total, transformation then it would have to be suffered in the realm of Being in order to be recognised in the development of knowledge, and it would have to be lived in the movement of knowledge inorder to be attributed to the development of the object. Sartre, here, took a Kantian position that just as phenomena and nomena were kept separate, the content of knowledge and the form of knowing have no relation. Sartre, while maintaining this position condensed this problem in Kantian terms that the unification of "sense experience" or the identity of the content of knowledge and the form of knowing were effected by formal and non-temporal principles. Sartre interpreted Hegel in Kantian terms when he wrote: "In Hegel's time, this seemed to imply the identity of knowledge and its object. Consciousness was consciousness of the other, and the other was the being-other of consciousness". Sartre, while presenting Hegel's notion of the relation between the self and the other correctly, interpreted the Hegelian notion of identity of knowledge and its object improperly. Hegel advocated the identity of knowledge and being not on the basis of any relation between the self and the other but on the basis of transcending alienated nature, world from the absolute spirit on the plea for absolute knowledge. In
Hegel's thought the alienation of the self from the other was not a fundamental alienation like nature and world as alienated aspects the Absolute spirit.

Sartre, thus, in turn misunderstood Marx's relation with Hegel when he equated both Hegelianism as well as Marxism as dogmatisms. Engels explained the nature of Hegelian dialectic when he wrote: "According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist - where unknown - from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the logic and which are included in it. Then it 'alienates' itself by changing into nature, where, without consciousness of itself, disguised as the necessity of nature, it goes through a new development and finally comes again to self consciousness in man." Sartre, on the basis of his Kantian understanding of Hegel, divided dialectic into: a) constitutive (thought, individual) and b) constituted (thought as group reality). Sartre, unlike Hegel sought natural sciences to be different from social sciences when he wrote: "Scientific research can in fact be unaware of its own principal features. Dialectical knowledge, in contrast, is knowledge of the dialectic." Sartre, while having a 'Marxian position' as his position, went further and wrote: "In particular, thought is both Being and knowledge of Being. It is the praxis of an
individual or a group, in particular conditions, at a
definite moment of History. As such, thought is subject to
the dialectic as its law, just like the historical
process, considered either as a whole or in its particular
particular details. Sartre, here, resembled Hegel in a
Hegelian way not in line with his pronouncement that
Marx’s position was ‘needless to say that it was Sartre’s
position.

5) Sartre accused Engels of criticising Hegel for having
imposed laws of thought on reality and of doing the same
himself. We have noted in the second chapter that Sartre
criticised Engels for he had "abstracted laws from the
nature" and made an argument that what Engels supposed to
be deduction was ‘induction’. Unlike Engels, Hegel thought
‘all development was development in concept’. Sartre
argued inferentially the same thing when he quoted Engels
and attributed it to Marx: "The materialist outlook on
nature means nothing more than the conception of nature
just as it is, without alien addition". Sartre argued
that, in this marxian conception man was placed in the
heart of nature as among its objects. Sartre opined that
in this way man could develop only according to the laws
of nature. Sartre’s mission of discovering the
inconsistencies of Marxism suffered from its an
inconsistency due to his wrong understanding of the
marxian position. Thus Sartre’s misinterpretation of
marxian philosophy was not incompatible with his

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misunderstanding of the same. This, we shall concede, was one of the important reasons why Sartre’s philosophy was not eclecticism. In eclecticism, interpretation and understanding were incompatible. Sartre couldn’t criticise the Marxian position on two different and opposite counts since criticising in this way would reveal the inconsistency of argumentation. Sartre on the one hand, criticised Engels for imposing laws of thought on reality (like Hegel) and, on other, for defining ‘materialist concept nature as understanding of nature as it is’. Here, going by the latter position, where was the question of imposing laws of thought on realities? Sartre’s ‘antinomous’ structure of argumentation enabled him to argue with Marxian philosophy on all the possible ways of re-establishing the lost ground to man which Sartre thought ‘Marxism’ dismissed. Sartre, criticising Engels, wrote: “The object of thought is Nature as it is, and the study of history is only a particular form of it. We must trace the movement that produces life out of matter, man out of the first primitive forms of life and social history out of human communities. The advantage of this conception is that it avoids the problem; it presents the dialectic, a priori and without justification as the fundamental law of Nature. This external materialism lays down the dialectic as exteriority: the Nature of man lies outside him in an a priori law, in an extra-human nature, in a history which starts with nebulae.” This was
clearly a misrepresented account of marxian philosophy as well as of Engels. When Marx-Engels argued that human history was a part of natural history and a form of it, they did not mean that it was a simple continuity and basis for empiricism of a study. Marx-Engels argued, on the contrary, that only by exploiting nature and only by using the natural power of human labour on nature did man become involved in the act production and thereby natural history was a given history and not a history in itself. This marked not only the difference of man from nature but also it presented man as a natural being. Sartre argued that natural science was an enterprise of natural scientists and as such it was a historical and social enterprise. We shall note that, here, Sartre was in agreement with Engels. But, unlike Engels, Sartre limited dialectical reason to be the motive force of two realms—historical and social. Sartre, in his usual way, argued that to 'transport' the dialectic into the natural world from which the natural scientist derived rationality was to deprive it of rationality. Thus, Sartre thought a dialectic of nature was no longer a dialectic that man makes in making himself. Sartre was wrong to state that, by establishing the dialectic of nature, man loses freedom because, by only uncovering natural processes to be law-bound, man can act upon nature and can make in making himself. By establishing the dialectic of nature, marxian philosophy did not take a position that laws of thought should be imposed on reality, on the contrary, it took the
position that laws of nature which would have primacy over laws of thought ought to be discovered.

6) Sartre wrote: "Scientific laws are experimental hypotheses verified by facts; but at present, the absolute principle that 'Nature is dialectical' is not open to verification at all. You may claim that some set of laws established by scientists represents a certain dialectical movement in the objects of these laws, but you cannot prove it.... Your problem is not whether light transmits energy particles to the bodies it illuminates, but whether quantum theory can be integrated into a dialectical totalization of the universal. You need not question the kinetic theory of gases, you need only to see whether it weakens the totalization. You are reflecting on Knowledge. And since the law discovered by the scientist, taken in isolation, is neither dialectical nor antdialectical (it is only a quantitative determination of a functional relation), the consideration of scientific facts (that is to say, of established laws) cannot furnish, or even suggest, a proof of the dialectic. Dialectical Reason can only be captured elsewhere, so that it can be forcibly imposed on the data of physics and chemistry. Sartre seemed to think that all science especially the physical sciences, were quantitative sciences. The dialectical relationships between quantity and quality with the one constantly changing into the other was not a fact for Sartre. Sartre said that though a
dialectic of nature was possible, it was but not necessary. Sartre simultaneously argued in the above passage that the dialectic of nature was beyond verification. But, Sartre seemed to agree that there were certain dialectical relationships in inanimate nature, when in the above-quoted passage, he talked about 'a certain dialectical movement in the objects of scientific laws'. But, for Sartre (like, for Kant) reason was meant to be regulative and not constitutive as Sartre compared the Hegelian-Marxian 'dialectic' with the Kantian 'ideas of Reason'. Sartre found Engels' was incorrect in adopting non-dialectical procedures like comparisons, analogies, abstractions, inductions in order to vindicate a dialectic in Nature. We have noted earlier that Sartre accused Engels of arguing for 'a notion of nature as nature as it is' and argued that the latter was wrong. And now Sartre alleged that Engels was 'applying to nature' some 'non-dialectical procedures' and argued that the latter was wrong. Sartre understood 'Marxian philosophy' unilaterally to counterpose one aspect of the dialectic over the other to his convenience.

7) Sartre argued that 'materialism was not the opposite of idealism', not as an eclectic would do it, but with a different contribution and in a 'qualified way'. Just as the materialist interpretation of idealism was possible, materialism, by way of lack of reflection and due to the erosion of consistency, was reduced to a kind of idealism.
We shall agree with Sartre, with reservation, when he wrote: "...in order to grasp materiality as such, it is not sufficient to discuss the word 'matter'. Language is ambiguous in that words sometimes designate objects and sometimes concepts; and this is why materialism as such is not opposed to idealism. In fact, there is a materialist idealism which, in the last analysis, is merely a discourse on the idea of matter; the real opposite of this is realist materialism—the thought of an individual who is situated in the world, penetrated by every cosmic force, and treating the material universe as something which gradually reveals itself through a 'situated praxis'. In the present case we are evidently confronted with an idealism which has appropriated the vocabulary of science in order to express ideas of such poverty that one can see straight through them. But the important point is this; if you are hunting for the Truth (as a human undertaking) of the Universe, you will find it, in the very words you use, as the object of an absolute and constituting consciousness. Sartre, here vindicated the primacy of consciousness over matter but, nevertheless, made it clear that truth depended on the use of language by which abstraction of reality was possible. Therefore our agreement with Sartre, here, was not without reservation. Sartre made an important point when he was 'idealising' the idealist's manipulation of language of science as a cover up of 'poverty'. Here Sartre
understood idealism as the opposite of materialism. Our argument with Sartre is limited to Sartre's reference to those materialists as being idealistic who could not better use 'materialism' and leave the ground for 'idealists'. Sartre's use of the categories 'idealism' and 'materialism' as opposites, we must note, was unaffected by his position in the above quoted passage.

8) Sartre argued that the universe would evaporate in a dream if man were purely subject to the dialectic coming to him from the outside as his unconditioned law. In one moment, man was subjected to the dialectic as an 'enemy' power and, in another, he created it. This second moment, according to Sartre, was the negation of the first which was the negation of man as such. Sartre made these comments on the relation between freedom and necessity in history, while quoting Marx from *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* which reads: "Men make their own History... but under circumstances.... given and transmitted from the past." The crucial sentences were conveniently kept unquoted by Sartre. The original reads: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living." Sartre understood that a refusal of both determinism and
analytical reason were possible from this kind of dialectical rationality as permanent and dialectical unity of freedom and necessity. From the original quotation of Marx, it may be noted that it was not the dialectic which becomes the 'enemy power' but 'the dialectic of circumstances' which was directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. Sartre, in order to establish man as the original freedom, criticised Marx by exaggerating one aspect over the other in terms of interpreting it, in such a way that it seemed that it was Marx's position that Sartre criticised.

9) Sartre argued that the dialectic as law was the law of totalization. Society (as collectives, as history) was an imposition on the individual. But society (as collectives, as history) was woven out of millions of individual actions. Thus Sartre argued that that which totalized history (as societies, as collectives) was the resultant of history. But Sartre construed that history here was not meant either as a 'passive vehicle' or as a 'transcendental fatality'. Sartre opined (in line with Hegel) that history (as societies, as collectives) could alone realize each instant and unify in its "praxis" the pull towards dispersion (analysis or analytical reason) and integration (synthesis or dialectical reason). Thus, without stressing the primacy of "practice" like Marx or Engels, Sartre, with his theory of praxis, demanded that dialectical materialism must in a Hegelian way discover
both its own necessity as well as the necessity of its object. Sartre seemed to be in agreement with Husserl when he wrote: "Husserl could speak of apodictic certainty without much difficulty, but this was because he remained on the level of pure, formal consciousness apprehending itself in its formality; but, for us, it is necessary to find out apodictic experience in the concrete world of History."

10) As we have noted Sartre argued the irreducibility of being and knowing to each other. And we have also noted that Sartre characterised this to be 'dualism'. But Sartre opined that this 'dualism' was in no way a disguised idealism. Sartre's main impetus was to argue the dialectical nature of the dialectic and thus he was faced with a problem of 'dualism' versus "monism" in a different way. Though Sartre rejected a 'dialectic of nature', the problem was presented to him again in 'dualistic' and 'monistic' terms. Sartre wrote: "The possibility that a dialectic exists is itself dialectical; or, to put it in another way, the only possible unity of the dialectic as law of historical development and the dialectic as knowledge in movement of this development is the unity of a dialectical movement. Being is the negation of knowledge, and knowledge draws its being from the negation of being." Sartre argued for a monism (identity of being and knowledge) when he defined Being as negation of knowledge and knowledge as having a borrowed Being from

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the previous negation of Being against the dualism (the
development of history and the development of knowledge)
which he retained. We have noted that Sartre condemned
'marxism' as simultaneously 'dualistic' as well as
monistic.

11) Sartre defined dialectic as the singular adventure of
each person's relations with the objects of his
experience. For Sartre, the dialectical method was not a
pre-established scheme which would be imposed on these
individual developments. Sartre construed that the
dialectic could not be imposed on historical man who lived
the contradictions of the time. According to Sartre,
instead of the sterile (external) dialectic of dialectical
materialism, the 'dialectical rationality' of 'scarcity'
and 'necessity' of the actions of men would explain more
about historic individual or individual 'praxis'. Sartre
conjectured that the dialectic, if it existed, existed
only as a totalization of concrete totalizations carried
out by a multiplicity of totalizing singularities. With
this language of ambiguity or tautology, Sartre attempted
to describe the movement of history, the movement of
society, the collective, the individual etc.

12) Sartre argued that one could not formulate the
dialectic from the point of view of analytical reason
because analytical reason posited its object as exterior
to it. According to Sartre, the passivity of the scientist
to the experimental system and the passivity of the experimental system to the scientist explained science as not grounded in 'dialectical reason'. The dialectic, according to Sartre, was revealed to an observer inside the experimental system. Sartre outlined the features of the dialectic to be: a) the dialectic was the living logic of action b) the dialectic was universal and necessary as possibility c) the dialectic was the adventure of all d) the dialectic was its own translucency e) the dialectic was the rationality of praxis, f) the dialectic was totalization, g) the dialectic was social future and h) experience of the dialectic was itself the dialectic by which it was made.

We have so far formulated important theoretical assumptions outlined in the introduction to Critique of Dialectical Reason. The introduction is sub-titled as 'Dogmatic Dialectic' and 'Critical Dialectic'. Sartrean formulations, in spite of their constitution of 'dialectical elements' and 'loud' agreements were clearly, and remained, unmarxist and Sartres contribution was unaffected by this, to which we shall come later. We shall note that these Sartrean formulations were methodological assumptions which set the movement of his argumentation in the Critique.

Following the questions Sartre's assumed endeavour in Critique was to answer: - 1) what are the conditions of the possibility of the knowledge of history?
2) what are the limits of the necessity of dialectical relationships that are in play? and 3) what are the units and the foundations of dialectical rationality?

**Dialectical Reason:**

Sartre, in the introduction to *Critique and Method* attempted to vindicate the dialectic as different from the Marxian and the Hegelian notions of the dialectic. We have noted that Sartre 'uncovered' different potentialities of the dialectic and defined it accordingly. But, nevertheless, all of Sartre's definitions of the dialectic had a necessary relation to praxis. Sartre's most fundamental definition of dialectic was dialectic as the intelligibility of 'praxis' at every level. According to Sartre, 'praxis' was the activity of an individual or group in 'organising conditions' with a goal in mind and in the light of some end. 'Praxis' is a German or Greek word for practice which is taken to mean 'theoretical practice'. Sartre seemed to mean by the term 'praxis' - consciousness on the verge of activity of an individual or group.

Sartre opined that dialectical reason was the exclusive feature of praxis in terms of totalization, detotalization and re-totalization. Before discussing in detail the question totalization, Sartre attempted to differentiate totalization from totality. Sartre defined totality as being radically different from the sum of its
parts. According to Sartre, these radically different parts are integrated into totality as totality. For Sartre, this integration was a kind of hypothesis of the totality in the offspring. A painting or a symphony were good examples of totality as Sartre discussed the intricacies of totalization on the basis of his theory of imagination outlined in *The Psychology of Imagination*. This hypothesis as integration, for Sartre was possible only as imaginary or as a co-relative act of imagination. Here, Sartre explained that dry paints and in-articulated sounds were aspects of Being-in-itself or inert. For Sartre, the painter or musician could not express himself without these inert media. Imaginaries were projected through the inert base. Sartre argued that in the situation of a painter or musician attempted to totalize the inertia of dry paints or inarticulated sounds by using imaginaries as analogues. Sartre explained that praxis brought synthetic unity of music or painting as being-in-exteriority. In this totality, according to Sartre, the integration of different parts of a whole was taken to its extreme.

Sartre distinguished a totality from a totalization. For Sartre, a totality was done, completed and this totality was formed into a pseudo-inert totality. According to Sartre, this pseudo-inert totality came into being as a contradiction to (of) praxis and interia. The individual parts of a totality may or may not have a
relationship, among themselves and with the whole. Different from this, Sartre explained, in totalization, all constituent parts, equal and synthetic knowledge of the process - totalization. Sartre explained that critical experience was possible within a totalization and it was both a totalizing act and its own totalization. Sartre argued that the act of totalization could not be autonomous from or external to that which it totalized. Totalization, unlike a totality, was a finality. Sartre, thus, on the basis of the differentiation of totalization from totality, concluded that the critical experience of the dialectic in action was therefore an experience of the dialectical interplay of the act of synthesizing and the synthesis. This led Sartre to an epistemological realm where the experience of the dialectical relation between the knower and the known was itself a dialectical experience. For Sartre, the pseudo-inert totalities and the inter totalities were formed as practico-inert and the practico-inert was the facticity of the 'praxis'. The totality on the other hand, according to Sartre, has the same 'statue' as the totalization by virtue of 'praxis' which has in turn a fundamental relation in the mode of labour. Sartre wrote: "if, indeed, anything is to appear as the synthetic unity of the diverse, it must be developing unification, that is to say, an activity. The synthetic unification of a habitat is not merely the labor which has produced it, but also the activity of inhabiting it; reduced to itself, it reverts to the multiplicity of
inertia. Thus totalization has the same statue as the totality, for, through the multiplicities, it continues that synthetic labor which makes each part an expression of the whole and which relates the whole to itself through the mediation of its parts\textsuperscript{22}. We shall agree with Sartre in so far as he defined part as being 'incomplete' whole or totality and each part of the whole was made to within the 'whole' or 'totality' as the painter or musician brought integration of radically different parts. As far as the painter or musician were concerned once they brought this 'integration' of their work to its extreme end, this totality became pseudo-inert. Once it was presented to the audience, this pseudo-inert totality formed the matter of totalization which would be brought out by the audience as multiplicity and 'praxis'. Here Sartre was right to mark totalization as a process, for any audience, even the best of them (art critics etc), takes time to uncover the being of the totality of the art product. This was mainly because, as Sartre explained, every totalization inherently splits into detotalization and re-totalization. The first totalization was negated by the detotalization and it was further negated by the re-totalization as the negation of negation.

Here we find the fine play of the dialectic between 'analysis' and 'synthesis'. In all these negations, (totalization $\rightarrow$ de-totalization $\rightarrow$ re-totalization), Sartre explained, an inherent affirmation
was manifested. Sartre argued, different to the above that in the 'practical field' of praxis all determination was negation. Sartre wrote: "...in the first instance the material universe may make man's existence impossible, it is through man that negation comes to man and to matter. It is on this basis that we can understand in its original intelligibility the celebrated law of 'the negation of the negation' which Engels erroneously presents as basically, an irrational 'abstraction' from natural laws. 23" Sartre, here clearly resumed his (Being And Nothingness) understanding of the concept of negation as had been presented in Being and Nothingness. As Sartre presumed, Engels never thought that the process of negation was in the same way effective in nature as well as in the realm of history. Sartre, on the basis of this wrong presumption, argued: "In reality, the dialectic of Nature - whether one seeks it in 'changes of state', in general or makes it the external dialectic in human history - is incapable of providing an answer to two essential questions. 24" Sartre's argument, here, was based on his wrong presumptions about Engels. The two questions Sartre posed to Engels were: 1) why should there be anything such as negation either in the natural world or in human history? and 2) why and in what specific circumstances does the negation of negation yield to affirmation? As we have noted in the second and third chapters, Engels did answer these questions in the mode of "how" and we have
also pointed out that the "why" pattern of questioning has a "metaphysical" field and not a concrete field. Marxian philosophy subordinated the question of "why" to the question of "how" in order to give "scientificality" to it. For Sartre, dialectic reality could borrow rules or laws from an outside reality but it realised its own laws as "translucency" of its "object".

Thus Sartre limited negation, totalization, knowledge as mere products, processes produced by 'praxis' in the mode of 'immanence-in-transcendence'. Though, in Being and Nothingness, Sartre was arguing the primacy of ontological over epistemological he still had an epistemological point of view with 'consciousness' as the fundamental element. Similarly, in Critique, Sartre argued that consciousness was the 'apodictic certainty' of itself and, as consciousness of such and such object was necessary for an epistemological start. Sartre wrote: "If dialectical Reason exists, then, from the ontological point of view, it can only be a developing totalisation, occurring where the totalisation occurs, and, from the epistemological point of view, it can only be the accessibility of that totalisation to a knowledge which is itself, in principle, totalizing in its procedures"25.

Sartre raised four questions before going to explain the 'practico-inert' as the facticity of the individual 'praxis'. They were: 1) what is the nature of praxis as experience of necessity and of freedom? 2) How
are totalities totalized? 3) what is historical future? 4) what is the materiality of praxis and of other forms of materiality?

As we have noted, Sartre defined man as thingified by things as much as things were humanised by man. For Sartre, this was an example of the circularity of dialectical thinking which was not the truth. Nevertheless, Sartre opined that this truth was necessary to explain the 'human scene'. Sartre explained man as a material being who indulge in totalizing his being with the material world. For Sartre, this original totalizing relation of man with material world was 'nee', Sartre wrote:

'Everything is to be explained through need (le besoin); need is the first totalising relation between the material being, man, and the material ensemble of which he is part. This relation is univocal, and of interiority. Indeed, it is through need that the first negation of the negation and the first totalisation appear in matter. Need is a negation of the negation in so far as it expresses itself as a lack within the organism; and need is a positivity in so far as the organic totality tends to preserve itself as such through it. The original negation, in fact, is an initial contradiction between the organic and the inorganic, in the double sense that lack is defined in relation to a totality, but that a lacuna, a negativity, has as such a mechanical kind of existence, and that, in the last analysis, what is lacking can be reduced to

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inorganic or less organised elements or quite simply, to
dead flesh etc. From this point of view, negation of this
negation is achieved through the transcendence....
transcendency of the organic towards the inorganic need
is link of univocal immanence with surrounding materiality
in so far as the organism tries to sustain itself with
it\textsuperscript{26}. The above quotation revealed 'need' as something
that was lacking or missing or scarce. Sartre explained
that need detotalized the full, indifferent, persisting
totality of the inorganic. According to Sartre, this
detotalization, this injection of 'nothing into the world'
was a univocal, non-reciprocal relation. Sartre explained
that the unity of 'praxis' was totalized by the unity of
resources and means to satisfy needs. Sartre construed
that this totalization was brought (by and) as unity of
the plurality of resources and means, grasped as unity of
instrumental field.

Sartre while presenting 'need' as totally human,
forgot to discuss 'need' as scarcity as perpetuated by a
dominant class in a class-divided society. Sartre's
interest was limited to present the 'need' as poser to
'scarcity' and consequential structures of 'praxis'.
Sartre's concept of anti-dialectic was inadequate to
discuss the problem of 'need' as an expression of unequal
distribution because 'anti-dialectic' was a "fetishised"
self-opposing of 'praxis' in the wake of practico-inert.
SCARCITY, NEED AND VIOLENCE:

Sartre defined scarcity as the foundation of the possibility of human history. This generalisation, according to Sartre, was qualified by two limitations. They were 1) for a historian living at any juncture of history cannot realise all history as it were grounded in scarcity and 2) scarcity discovered the possibility and not the reality of human history and other factors were necessary in order for history to occur. According to Sartre, scarcity forms an 'exis' that was both physiological and social determinism of human beings. Sartre argued that history was born out of a sudden imbalance which fissures society at every level. Thus, for Sartre, scarcity was the foundation of the possibility of human history as lived by human beings in terms of internal adaptations within certain limits as an 'equilibrium'. This was only a seeming 'equilibrium' when Sartre related struggle and scarcity as he wrote "it would be quite wrong to think that the aim is the annihilation of the adversary or, to use Hegel's idealist language, each consciousness seeks the death of the other. The origin of struggle always lies, in fact, in some concrete antagonism whose material condition is scarcity (la rarete), in a particular form and the real aim is objective conquest or even creation, in relation to which the destruction of the adversary is only a means. 27".

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Sartre seemed to understand scarcity as having two opposite expressions 'equilibrium' and 'struggle'. Unlike Marx or Engels, Sartre depended on 'scarcity', a negative category (even according to Sartre), to interpret 'the possibility' of history. The basis of Sartre's problematic of history in terms of its "possibility" can be found in the general "why" (metaphysical - which excludes "how"?) structure of the Sartrean critique of marxian philosophy (both dialectical materialism and historical materialism). The "why" of history, for marxian philosophy, meant a metaphysical problem and in turn was a false problem. While seeking answers to metaphysical problems posed by him to marxian philosophy, Sartre, more or less was confined to construct 'dialectical reason' not on the basis of the "why" question, but on the basis of the "how" question. Sartre's "why" questions were thus limited to his critique of marxian notions. With this big difference, Sartre, unlike Marx-Engels attributed to "conditions" more than to human practice - (history as constant victory over nature and history as the history of class struggles). Sartre explained 'scarcity' as the 'negative unity' of the multiplicity of men. Sartre construed that the first totalization brought by the condition 'scarcity' was the possibility of the common destruction of human beings. According to Sartre, this destruction by matter was realised by an individual through the "praxis" of other men. Sartre argued that this first aspect of 'scarcity'
could condition the union of group. Sartre explained that this union of group collectively viewed could organise itself for a collective reaction against any aspect of 'scarcity. Sartre wrote: "Destruction by Nature is imprecise: it leaves little islands, even whole archipelagos Human destruction is systematic....". This illustrates that Sartre was not unaware of class antagonisms and their weight on the human mind.

**CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE:**

Sartre opined that 'scarcity' as inverted praxis presented itself as the ground of violence. Sartre wrote: "violence always presents itself as counter-violence, that is to say, as a retaliation of the violence of the Other. But this violence of the Other is not an objective reality except in the sense that it exists in all men as the universal motivation of counter-violence; it is nothing but the unbearable fact of broken reciprocity and of the systematic exploitation of man's humanity for the destruction of the human. Counter-violence is exactly the same thing, but as a process of restoration, as a response to a provocation: if I destroy the non-humanity of the anti-human in my adversary, I cannot help destroying the humanity of man in him, and realising his non-humanity in myself.". Here we can see Sartre conceptualising as 'God' would have conceptualised. Sartre opined that violence assumed the 'Statute' of practico-inert as it was present.
as a Threat to the human species. According to Sartre, each human individual experienced a general threat to be ‘annihilated’ by the rest of human beings, Sartre wrote:

“man is objectively constituted as non-human, and this non-humanity is expressed in praxis by the perception of evil as the structure of the other. The somewhat confused clashes, whose origin is highly ambiguous, which take place between nomadic tribes when they happen to encounter one another, have for this reason been interpreted by historians and ethnographers as a challenge to some of the elementary truths of historical materialism. It is certainly true that the economic motive is not always essential and is even sometimes not to be found at all.”

According to Sartre, lack of concrete economic reason, brought violence a virtual dehumanisation of human nature. For Sartre the question was posed as a question of ‘the nature’ of human nature. Sartre construed that in a human being the strength of violent mode of conduct, his hatred were situated in ‘need’. Sartre, while commenting on antagonisms in human relations, wrote: “....it is undeniable that what I attack is man as man, that is, as the free praxis of an organic being. It is man, and nothing else, that I hate in the enemy, that is, in myself as the other; and it is myself that I try to destroy in him, so as to prevent him destroying me in my own body.”

Sartre, here, could not apply the notion of class struggle or class consciousness for he remained idealist in defining the self’s relations with the other. It will not
be the same 'ethical force' at work which makes 'criticism' as 'self-criticism' (not simply due to translucency of consciousness but due to the nature of the content of criticism to immediately fall back on self in the manner of self-criticism) and the manner in which man is fighting himself as he founds himself in the enemy (the other). Sartre adapted a humanism, alien to marxian philosophy, in order to make it more appropriate or up-to-date.

LABOUR :

We have noted that Sartre defined 'scarcity' as the occasion for the realignment of social groups with the project of combating it: Sartre, in the same way, defined 'labour' as man's project of coping with the condition of 'scarcity'. Sartre wrote: "They constitute and institutionalise themselves not because scarcity appears to everyone in need through the need of Others, but because it is negated, in the unified field, by praxis, by labour. This obviously means that labour, as we have seen, is primarily the organism which reduces itself to a controlled inertia so as to act upon inertia and satisfy itself as need. Sartre made labour a mechanism for coping against 'scarcity' unlike Engels, who defined labour as the condition of human existence. However, Sartre's discussions about the mechanisation of the human being with the introduction of specialised machines were
quite a contribution. Sartre wrote: "...society develops the division of labour to the point of specialization of machines. The process is then inverted: the semi-automatic machine defines its environment and constructs its man, so that the inorganic comes to be characterised by a false but effective interiority, and the organic by exteriority." Sartre, in a dialectical way, tried to interpret the situation of an industrialised society in terms of his notion of 'instrumentality'. Though, here, Sartre did not claim any discovery of dialectic as historical moment, he lived up to interpreting man's relation with materiality in a materialistic way. For Sartre, labour was a primitive relation which constituted nature by man and man by nature. According to Sartre, though labour was a project of transcending the condition of it cannot transcend 'scarcity' could not to the level of destruction of it. Sartre opined that, in order for labour to be the natural capacity of man to continue, labour must preserve scarcity while simultaneously opposing it. This naive view of Sartre ignored the marxian notions of capitalist demand-supply (scarcity created), exploitation (of one class by another class), surplus-value (result of labour appropriated by a dominant class), while claiming to be 'Marxist' up to the mark.
Sartre construed that his 're-discovery' of scarcity in experience was not to point out at any lacuna of Marxist theory. According to Sartre, the essential discovery of Marxism was to present labour as a historical reality and the utilization of tools as the basis of social relations. Different from the Marxian stance, Sartre maintained that the possibility of social relations became contradictory when human beings reinteriorised what they negated - 'scarcity' by a never ending labour process. Sartre opined that, here, he was not opposing the Marxian explanation of social relations as a contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production was correct. Sartre explained that 'Marxian theory' was not interested in how these 'external forces' (external dialectic) were interiorised by human beings as 'violence' for example. Sartre opined that the reification of man was possible in several ways - as scarcity of product, as scarcity of tool, as the scarcity of worker, as the scarcity of consumer etc. According to Sartre, as long as 'labour' remained a human project against transcending anti-human 'scarcity' there was a permanent possibility of 'reification' of human relations. Sartre seemed to be in agreement with Marx as he differentiated 'reification' from 'objectification'. Both understood 'reification' as an explanation of social relations as relations between things. For both 'objectification' meant explaining social
relations as relations between persons. Though, unlike Marx, Sartre defined scarcity as having a formal dialectic, (production process for Marx was not but historical) the latter argued that when scarcity become relative it assumed a historical dialectic. In that way, what Marx saw in the production process was seen by Sartre in scarcity, relative or otherwise. Sartre argued only 'scarcity' as relative created the possibility of an institution in a class-divided society. Thus, Sartre defined, unlike Marx, political economy as the analytic study of the relations of 'scarcity'. Marxian theory, as political economy, is an 'analysis' of capitalist society. But this 'analysis' is not the same as in Sartre's 'analytic study' since the marxian method is a dialectical method. Sartre defined 'praxis' as instrumentalization of material reality and matter as 'inverted praxis'. According to Sartre, praxis enveloped an inanimate thing in a totalizing project which imposes a pseudo-organic unity upon it. Sartre explained that, at this level, the practice absorbed by whose 'material' became the material caricature of the human. The manufactured object, according to Sartre, dictated to man the ways of using it. Sartre argued man on the ways of using it. Sartre argued that it was essential to construct a general theory of meaning so as to uncover the meanings of signs engraved on 'things-human'. For Sartre, this was the only way to graduate from the 'things-human' stage to the 'human-things' stage. Sartre opined that the decoding of a particular sign-meaning would simultaneously make
possible a relation of the human being with the universal as it was a characteristic of the 'materiality'. Thus, according to Sartre, the inert-praxis (reified praxis), as permeating matter, transformed natural forces without meaning any quasi-human practices would will into passified actions or simple reactions. For Sartre, 'matter' alone carried meanings and these meanings were retained by matter as evidence of the truth that things were humanised as much as humans were thingified. Sartre construed that 'future comes to man through things to the extent that it has come to things through man'. Here, Sartre seemed to fall into inconsistency with his earlier position that the reciprocity cannot be attributed to the non-praxis realm not even to pseudo-inert totality. Man was defined by Sartre as man of need, of praxis and of scarcity. Sartre explained that, in so far as man was dominated by matter, his activity no longer was derived from need even though that was its fundamental basis. According to Sartre, praxis awakened in man was from without, by processed matter, as the practical requirement of the inanimate object. For Sartre, object overpowered man while designating him his behaviour. Sartre, like Marx, did not study man as an abstract individual but man as an abstract individual, but man as living among other men and among things produced by him, for him. But, unlike Marx, different from our expectations, Sartre in terms of his facticity than his 'practical activity'. Sartre
defined a tool as crystallised and inert 'praxis' which sustained it. What in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre proposed against Marx in the name of 'seriousness' became Sartre's own position in the way he defined the human condition in the name of materiality.

**ISOLATION:**

Sartre explained that isolation was given for understanding as the plurality of isolations and not as a singularity. Sartre exemplified this in the situation of a 'group' of people standing in a bus stop (as plurality of isolations) and wrote: "To begin with, it should be noted that we are concerned here with a plurality of isolations: these people do not care about or speak to each other and, in general, they do not look at one another; they exist side by side alongside a bus stop. At this level, it is worth noting that their isolation is not an inert statute... rather, it is actually lived in everyone's project as its negative structure." According to Sartre, the plurality of isolations at a bus stop, revealed the impossibility of unification of human individuals in a group. This explained for Sartre, due to the extent of 'massification' in a society, an individual was designated with a particular time, space, and a conduct of nihilation in relation with the other. We shall agree with Sartre that 'massification' brings a kind of 'paralysis' to the sensibilities of the people. But Sartre's argument on this was not conclusive but ad hoc.
Unlike Sartre, Marx argued that along with the development of favourable conditions, the quantitative growth of 'massification' exposed human beings to their conditions in a qualitative way. Sartre was aiming at exposing the dehumanisation that capitalism brought—but in an improper way. Sartre's theory presented man as 'enslaved' rather than as man in the process of breaking enslavement. People who assembled in cinema houses, in play grounds to watch cricket or who were watching cricket on the Televisions at home were not merely isolated individuals 'without looking at each other' but were part of a 'mass consciousness'. In as much as bourgeois ideology isolated human individuals into enemies, it also united them as 'mass consciousness' without intending to do so. In a cinema house, though each individual watched the film for himself, the way the idea of the film was translated for the audience in a visual language from the film's point of view was similar for each member of the audience. The audience suffered a temporary 'paralysis' of their thinking faculty so that the film was allowed to decipher its meaning. We shall disagree with Sartre when he argued the non-existence of a common ground from within the situation of 'massification'. But Sartre argued that there were factors from without which brought unification of the plurality of isolations in a group. According to Sartre, common 'interest' was one such factor. Interest for Sartre, was having man's project as a being having its being outside itself. Thus, Sartre opined that 'isolation' did not lift
one out of the visual and practical field of the other. The people who were standing in a bus stop, for Sartre, were in a process which was characterised by 'alterity'. According to Sartre, 'alterity' presented men in the 'series' as opposed to each other. But, for him, 'series' by existence was characterised by 'reciprocity' as men in the 'series' were bound by their common interest. The existence for the other, for Sartre, in the situation of 'series' meant the availability or non-availability of a seat in the bus. Sartre wrote: "..to the extent that the bus designates the present commuters, it constitutes them in their interchangeability; each of them is effectively produced by the social ensemble as united with his neighbours, in so far as he is strictly identical with them. In other words, their being-outside (that is to say, their interest as regular users of the bus service) is unified, in that it is a pure and indivisible abstraction, rather than a rich differentiated synthesis; it is a simple identity...". Elsewhere, while discussing the concept of 'need', Sartre argued that regular experiences of hunger (eating once in a day or eating once in two days), could not present eating or hunger as a need. But, Sartre argued differently in the above-quoted passage that in spite of the fact that commuting was a daily experience, commuters were united by their common interest. Here, the repeated experience of commuting for Sartre could not destroy 'common interest' as 'need'. Sartre, by splitting man's ideologial existence into
different practico-inert structures, neglected their articulation of an 'ideological existence'.

**ALIENATION**

Sartre gave two choices of the relation between the self and the other. According to Sartre, either man was primarily himself, or he was other than himself. For Sartre, any philosophy which subordinated the human to what was other than man, whether it be existentialist idealism or Marxist idealism, was to have hatred of man as its basis and its consequence. According to Sartre, the definition of man as other than himself was making man a victim and accomplice of 'concrete' alienation. Sartre wrote: "...alienation presupposes that man is primarily action. Servitude is based on freedom; the human relation of exteriority is based on the direct bond of interiority as the basic type of human relation." Sartre, here, seemed to infer a brute contradiction between necessity and freedom in the sense that 'need' was interiorised 'exteriority' and 'scarcity' was exteriorised 'interiority'. Sartre's definition of man as primarily action forced him into a theory of 'praxis' as facticity of the dialectical play between scarcity and need, both at one and the same time, exterior and interior. However, Sartre wanted to limit alienation to man alone, man himself. Sartre's reluctance in defining 'man as outside himself in the other' was not so much because he disagreed with Heidegger (as he quoted Wachens and not Heidegger...
himself) but because he wanted to put existentialism on par with Marxism by attributing 'idealism' to existentialism and marxism in the same way. Sartre's notion of violence was one example of understanding 'man as other than himself in the other'. Writing about the factory or the workshop as unification of labour, Sartre wrote: "...this unification, which relates him both to Others and to himself as Other, is quite simply the collective unity of labour (of the workshop, the factory etc.) to the extent that he can grasp it correctly only from the point of view of his own labour... But he lines in his own labour as labour of Others, of all the Others of whom he is one, to the extent that the general movement of collective praxis awakens the practical meanings which were given to the tools by labour which was completed in other times and places." From this we shall note that Sartre adopted 'contradiction' in a logical sense as method and was not willing to avoid 'inconsistency'. When Sartre used the expression 'a particular labour living his own labour as labour of others' he was not committed to his definition of 'man as not other than himself. Sartre maintained the same definition of man when he wrote: "It becomes an uncertain, other object when the common praxis, embodied in a single, untranscendable mediator, works as an individual activity on the reciprocal relation: in fact, communication may always be broken (by a break of any origin) or altered; reciprocity may return to everyone
in the form of a task laid down by the central power on the basis of reciprocal relations, that is to say, in so far as they are revised and corrected by a third party. Thus the relation of the same returns to everyone as Other. From this it was clear that, for Sartre, man was a being whose being was always outside its being, he was able to seek the relation between 'reciprocity' and 'alterity' as two linked forms of alienated 'praxis'. We must note that Sartre understood by alienation - the condition of praxis which was taken over and controlled by the other or 'practico-inert'. According to Sartre, the future represented the freedom and necessity of man as necessities formed the facticity of the present and freedom formed the future engraved in the practico-inert. Sartre construed that, in the way of 'destiny', freedom and necessity were related and in exclusive (absolute) cotradiction. Sartre classified: "two extreme opposed relations on the one hand, alienation to the totality and the false bond of interiority which constitutes the group through everyone as inter-subjective substance whose Being is defined both by inertia and the relation of true interiority through mediated reciprocity". According to Sartre, 'reciprocity' reflected man's co-existence with other men. Sartre opined that man affirmed his co-existence in the field of 'scarcity', either in a negative way or in a positive way. Sartre argued that reciprocity in the positive form gave rise to exchange of goods or a 'group' mentality and in
the negative form a 'violent' attitude towards others. Thus, Sartre made 'reciprocity' (co-existence) a condition for 'alterity' (alienation). For Sartre, praxis 'project' was characterised by the subject-object relationship. This raised two important questions: 1) to what extent can praxis 'project' be characterised by the subject-object relationship? and 2) to what extent can the notion of reciprocity be the meeting ground of Marxism and existentialism in terms of an implicit conception of a subject-object relation? Sartre argued that contemporary Marxists had forgotten that however alienated, reified, mystified man was, he still remained a man. Sartre, while taking leads from Marx, said that when Marx spoke of reification he did not mean that humans became things. On the contrary, Sartre interpreted that, by reification, the Marx meant man living humanly the condition of material things. Sartre attempted to criticise 'Marxism' by criticising certain Marxists to be unMarxist and by alleging the philosophy of Marx was different from what they were advocating. The problem was how to understand the problem of subject-object relation in a dialectical 'situation' of 'reciprocity' and 'alterity'. Sartre gave primacy to the subject over object both in Being and Nothingness and in the Critique and interpreted Marx differently in the two texts. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre accused Marx of proposing a theory of 'seriousness' there by making man sub-ordinate to the object or thing.
But in the introduction to the *Critique, Search For A Method* Sartre interpreted Marx as giving primacy to the subject as the object was only a condition of man's being. As Sartre would think, if man were bound by the situation how could he at once go beyond the situation? Sartre charged Marx that, with his base and superstructure theory, man was determined to the extent of 'disappearance', Sartre thus proposed an alternative to marxian determinism in his theory of 'situation' where man was assumed as originally free, because only free man can be possibly 'alienated' or chained. There was a 'dialectic' in operation, for Sartre, within the realm of reciprocity. According to Sartre, a human being by natural expects from the other human beings a human relation. This, according to Sartre, led human beings to realize the 'shameness' of their existence to form a fused group or group in fusion. Sartre explained the group in fusion as an effect of positive 'reciprocity' and a negation of reciprocity as mere 'sameness'.

Sartre recognized the fundamentality of the Marxist conception of alienation as eliminable. Sartre realized that, if alienation were ineliminable, the praxis and the project would lose all meaning as human endeavours. For Sartre, alienation was ineliminable, not on the ground of his own theory, but on the ground of 'Marxian theory'. Sartre's interpretation in this regard, had two assumptions about Marxian positions - 1)
ineliminability of alienation was pre-supported by the ineliminability of the identity between 'alterity', 'objectification' and alienation and 2) elimination of alienation was not of necessity implied by the elimination of the capitalist production. Sartre assuming the second proposition to be his position, argued that in a 'metaphysical' sense alienation was ineliminable. Sartre's argument thus involved a reversal to Hegelian theory of the coincidence between alienation and objectification. For Hegel, in exteriorizing itself in the object, the subject loses its self-identity and it becomes other than itself. The reincorporation of objectivity by subjectivity, in the latter's final integration caused the disappearance of alienation in the case of Hegel. In the case of Marx, with their end of capitalist production, alienation was eliminable. Sartre was neither a Hegelian nor a Marxian in his discussions on alienation in Critique. But, unlike Hegel, and more like Marx, Sartre was concerned with, in the Critique, the concrete relations of men with matter and among themselves. Sartre agreed with Marx's concept of exploitation, but differed with the later view that exploitation was the basis of alienation. For Sartre, exploitation was a form of alienation but not the basis of alienation. Sartre argued that alienation could be located in worked matter and 'multiplicity' or social 'alterity'. Unlike Sartre, Marx as a true Marxian-Hegelian 'confirmed the identity between objectification and alienation when he writes: " The
worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things. Labour produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a commodity, and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in general. This fact expresses merely, that the object which labour produces - labour's product - confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer (the worker-Tilak). The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object which has become material; it is the objectification of the labour. Labour's realization is its objectification under these economic conditions this realization of labour appears as loss of realization for the workers, objectification as the loss of object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation. 40

As Marx attributed exploitation to be the source of alienation, the elimination of alienation was linked, in Marx, to the elimination of exploitative system. For Sartre, alienation (alterity) and objectification (de-alienated reciprocity) were separate, but "historical". We have seen in the quotation by Marx how he identified creation of wealth (appropriated wealth by few) and creation of poverty (workers as producers
devalued by capitalist economy) as caught in the one and the same process. In Marx, objectification and alienation were dialectically 'identified' as the identity was brought about by two opposing classes (the proletariat and the capitalist). For Sartre, unlike Marx, the notion of class was not 'functional' as it would presuppose man as ontologically a 'hating' being and in turn a 'hateful' being. Thus Sartre's enthusiasm to make existentialism one with 'marxism' forced him to remain with his earlier existential position that alienation was ineliminable. Sartre, however, did attempt to make alienation eliminable with his concepts of de-alienated reciprocity, fused-group, spontaniety (all against the Marxian notion of 'party') but without success. Sartre's theories of practico-inert, scarcity, need, worked-matter overshadowed his attempts towards the eliminability of alienation.

THE GROUP:

We have noted earlier Sartre's notion of the series as a collective (as collection of individuals at one place, or with one need or under one idea) of human beings closely monitored by a monitored materiality. Sartre argued that these 'collectives' were transformed into more internally coherent and externally unified bodies as 'groups'. A 'group', according to Sartre, was characterised by a common 'praxis' as a reflection of 'sameness' of existence as well as a reaction to an impending danger at every level of materiality. For
Sartre, the 'group' as a social module indicated a conspicuous non-identity between class existence and class consciousness which made possible such social realities as the 'petite bourgeoisie'. Sartre argued that in spite of common need, common praxis, common scarcity being the common conditionality of the being of a group or community, that was not all. Sartre, while differentiating a group from a collective, wrote: "... the necessity of the group is not present a priori in a gathering. But we have also seen that through its serial unity (in so far as the negative unity of the series can, as abstract negation, oppose seriality) the gathering furnishes the elementary conditions of the possibility that its members should constitute a group. But this remains abstract. Obviously, everything would be simpler in a transcendental, idealist dialectic: the movement of integration by which every organism contains and dominates its inorganic pluralities would be presented as transforming itself, at the level of social plurality, into an integration of individuals into an organic totality. Thus, the group would function as a hyper-organism in relation to individual organisms.41 We have earlier discussed Sartre's notions of totality and totalization. Sartre's notion of the collective was comparable to his notion of totality and his notion of the 'group' to totalization. In the above quotation, Sartre's use of the expression 'transcendental', 'idealistic
dialectic' was not pointed to any particular thinking or thinker. By the use of such a expression, Sartre was differentiating his position from the pre-emptive one. The idealist dialectic, according to Sartre, argued that individual human beings, by virtue of 'integration' with other individuals, dominated inorganic pluralities and this was taken as self-transformation. Sartre construed that the 'idealist dialectic' ignored the individual orgism's social aspect of the individual but not conclusively. Though, Sartre presented the individual being with due materiality, for Sartre, it was an ontological - historical 'need' but not a dialectical-historical 'need'. Such conceptions of social structures led Sartre to define history as an interpretation of the individual primarily rather than of the society directly. While discussing 'the group', Sartre tried to probe common praxis and common need. Sartre argued that if only common need or common praxis were the condition of a group to be formed, in the event of scarcity of food, why did the individuals of a group not quarrel among themselves like dogs over food? We have noted earlier that common object as a producer of 'serial unity' was always outside the common praxis as a double 'determination'. On the one hand, there was an implicit reciprocity (as unconscious condition) and, on the other, there was explicit 'alterity' (as anti-dialectic of reciprocity). This double determination, according to Sartre, constituted the anti-dialectical structure of the collectivity or otherness.
Sartre argued that the group characterised an original with all and with each person. This, according to Sartre, was the life of 'the group' than it was like inverted 'praxis' or objectified 'need'. Sartre, while commenting on the complex process of the 'group' formation, wrote: "This is how the set of means of production, in so far as they are the property of Others, gives the proletariat an original structure of seriality because it produces itself as an indefinite ensemble of objects whose exigencies themselves reflect the demand of the bourgeois class as the seriality of the Other. Conversely, however, it is possible for the investigation to consider the common objects which constitute by themselves, and in the practico-inert field..." Sartre, in this passage, argued the relation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as comparable to the simple relation of the self and the Other.

This was not consistent with his notions of totality and totalization in the sense that the former, in a lesser way, and the latter, in a larger way were closer to any notion as 'universal' and not lenient to 'reduction'. Sartre could not sustain a consistency of argument and dialectical disposition of different concepts within the system of philosophy in Critique because his agreements with Marxism were largely unrelated. This led Sartre to waver between 'existentialism' and 'marxism'.
without demarcating them before 'invoking' an integration between them.

Sartre, so far, argued the existence of a group transphenomenal to common need or common praxis as each member of the group was in a 'one for all and all for one' relation. How was this structural intelligibility possible?

According to Sartre, each person was absorbed into the totality as the 'third'. But the 'third' was not the totality the person totalized. For Sartre, the threat that menaced the person along with the others made the person realize that he was integrated into the totality he had totalized. Sartre argued that this was simultaneously a realization that the person was a third among thirds. Sartre opined that the relation of third to third was not 'seriality' but 'reciprocity'. According to Sartre, there was a double mediation which constituted the group as a group of thirds, each third's relation with the group and the group's relation with each third. The two moments of mediation were:

1) The group acts as a mediator between third and third.

2) The third as a creator of an objective for the group or the third as governing agent and governed subject of the group.

According to Sartre, the being-in-the group of each was thus a bond of interiority mediated by the 'praxis' of a regulating third. Sartre argued that each
third, by its regulating 'praxis', brought about a singular synthesis which in turn synthesised into a universal synthesis. Sartre opined that at this crucial moment of the group each third operated as himself and not as the other in synthesising, totalising and unifying the group as a totality. Sartre wrote: "Earlier we said that the series was nowhere, that it is always elsewhere; the group in contrast, is always here and in so far as we know it to be elsewhere too, it constitutes this elsewhere." Sartre explained the circularity of the group. According to Sartre, the circularity of the group came from everywhere into this here-and-now so as to be constituted as the same everywhere and at the same time as free and real activity. Sartre, commenting about the status of individual praxis in the group praxis, wrote: "My praxis is in itself the praxis of the group totalized here by me in so far as every other myself totalises it in another here, which is the same, in the course of the development of its free ubiquity." Sartre argued that the intelligibility of this new structure-unity as ubiquity which was interior to each and every synthesis rested on two principles: 1) This ubiquity was a ubiquity of praxis, of acts in progress, not of substance and 2) This ubiquity was therefore a ubiquity of freedom: the group in fusion was resurrection of freedom. My freedom in the group in fusion was simultaneously my singularity and my ubiquity. It dissolved the elsewhereness of alterity.
into a here-everywhereness. If this general way, Sartre proposed an alternative to Marx's theory of class. Sartre made it very clear that it was not his intention to study a particular class, working class or bourgeoisie, as opposed to one another but to study class in general as totalization and detotalization. Sartre explained that he was opposed to conceptions which advocated pre-formed human essences. Sartre argued that if one were not thief or a coward, one could not label him as bourgeois. Different values, according to Sartre, were simple resumes of sedimentation of complex activities and nothing to do with any class nature. Different from value positing, for Sartre, the class indulged in passive synthesis of materiality, the precipitated praxis of preceding generations, the general context to social activity, the immediate and brutal aspects of our objective conditioning and its pre-determination in general. Sartre gave the example of a woman worker who using semi-automatic machines at her work place, was at once an 'explosive mixture of unconsciousness and vigilance'. Sartre, commenting on her social being as identical with class being, wrote: "when the woman in the Dop shampoo factory has an abortion in order to avoid having a child she would be unable to feed, she makes a free decision in order to escape a destiny that is made for her, but this decision is itself completely manipulated by the objective situations; she realises through herself what she is already; ..... passed on her which deprives her of free
motherhood. Sartre, here, was found to be clearly Hegelian in the sense that he defined past as essence and as transcended being. We must note that Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* took an identical position as this. According to Sartre, the being of the worker primarily was pre-fabricated by already preformed and crystallized labour in a capitalist society. Here, Sartre, on the basis of meaning of a class to be 'pre-formed human essence', identified the limitation of 'Marxian Philosophy' only to overcome the limitation by seeking the integration of existentialism with 'Marxian philosophy'.

**CONSTITUTED DIALECTIC AND CONSTITUTIVE DIALECTIC:**

We have noted that unlike Marx, Sartre defined essence as the past whose existence was always a 'future of the present'. Marx wished to bring about a social revolution to transcend the imbalance between the existence and essence of the working class. Marx, unlike Sartre, was not focussing on the working class attributed essence (as the oppressed class) but on the humanised essence whose roots were always in the future. Sartre defined constituted dialectic as the group praxis and constitutive dialectic as individual praxis. But sometimes Sartre used 'constituted dialectic' as referring to practico-inert, as objectified 'praxis', as past and so on. Being-in-the group for an individual 'praxis', according to Sartre, was simultaneously constitutive and constituted. Thus, Sartre defined thought as, at one and
the same time, being of knowledge and knowledge of being. We have already noted that, for Sartre, 'dialectic' was transluscent and a method of application by which nature falls back on its own self reflectively. Sartre, by identifying knowledge of being and being of knowledge as thought, was refuting the validity of the dialectic as universally applicable. By implication, Sartre was aiming at a supposed 'concrete' dialectic (existential dialectic based on real life border line situations) against dogmatic dialectic (marxist dialectic as materialist dialectic of nature as well as historical dialectic) on the plea that the principles of enquiry were determined by the object of enquiry. As Sartre rejected a 'dialectic of Nature' as the ontology of the 'dialectic' what remained for him was a 'dialectic' critically 'assimilated' and analytically 'constructed'.

The identity of the being of knowledge and the knowledge of being affected Sartre's theory of 'constitutive dialectic' and 'constituted dialectic' in quite a decisive way. This was clearly seen in the fusion of individual praxis with the common praxis resulting in the 'confusion' of individual praxis being unable to maintain its identity against common praxis in the context of a major disagreement. Sartre wrote: 'Comprehension is not a faculty, or some kind of contemplative intuition; it is reducible to praxis itself to the extent that it is homogeneous with every other individual praxis and that it is situated by reference to any action performed in the practical
field, and therefore in an immediate practical relation to it. This implies, therefore, that common action and individual praxis exhibit a real homogeneity. The individual would be unable to understand either his own common action in terms of the totalising praxis of the group, or that of a group external to himself, the structure of common praxis were of a different order than those of individual praxis.'

Sartre argued that, in the event of a difference of perception about what must be the common praxis, this difference of perception reflected a different 'ordering' of practico-inert as it was revealed to a group in the formation within a group. Sartre pre-supposed a practico-inert as inverted praxis for every structure of 'intelligibility'. Thus, Sartre proposed his conception as more materialistic than any other as his conception claimed to have taken care of subjected as well as object, determination as well as negation. This positive aspect of his conception was limited to the reciprocity and not to the hidden alterity of the group.

This was revealed in Sartre's example of a 'public opinion poll' as an index of lack of community. Sartre construed that the 'serial' object while being the being common to each member of the 'series' was the condition of its unity, was immediately an index of separation of its members also. A public opinion poll revealed groups within groups, classes within classes as Sartre rightly argued. But opinion poll was not an original disclosure of the different beings within a being in the sense that, by the introduction of different scale of values as prior choices,
one could only end up in empiricism. The ontic status of these fictitious groups directly depended on stasticality of manipulation of scales of value. According to Sartre, apart from constitutive and constituted dialectic, dialectic can be classified into dialectic and anti-dialectic. The latter classification of dialectic was the question of how praxis determined practico-inert and in turn how it was determined by praxis. According to Sartre, both constitutive dialectic as well as constituted dialectic operated in the face of anti-dialectical movement of practico-inert field. Sartre assumed five modes of how anti-dialectic was transcended dialectic and how dialectic was determined by anti-dialectic. They were: 1) The univocal relation of interiority was at the heart of the free praxis as unification of the field. 2) The equivocal relation of a multiplicity of practical activities, of which each one steals the freedom of the others by transformations which it makes their objectifications undergo. Practical activities were at the same negative reciprocal relations, relations of interiority and by mediation of the inert object, indirect relations of exteriority. 3) The transformation of all free 'praxis' into 'exis' (by 'exis' Sartre meant an inert stable condition opposed to praxis). 4) The transformation of each 'exis' into passive activity by the free 'praxis' of the other, whose projects and perspectives were the other. 5) The transformation of each into a passive activity by the passive activity of the object.
We shall note here that Sartre was committed to the idea that man was a project co-existence with other men in society. With the same commitment, Sartre tried to forge unity with Marx but, as we see, Sartre posed the problem of human relations in the language of the self and the other, Being-for-himself and being-with-the group. Sartre wrote: "...in the simple case of a fused group, my being-in-the group is my integration into it through all the regulative third parties in so far as it is the same free support of a common action within the interiorised multiplicity; and at the same time or alternatively, it is my belonging to the totalisation which I effect, and which is the same; in so far as I cannot totalise myself. It is this presence-absence which is always realised for the Other who is myself but unrealisable for me, who am nothing other than him, it is this contradiction, this abstract separation within the concrete which characterises me in the individual tension of my being-in-the group." 47 Here Sartre discussed the 'fraternity terror' which was simultaneously transcendence as well as immanence. According to Sartre, the interiority of the being-in-the group was sculptured by the 'intelligibility' which comes through both the Third inside the group as well as third, as the other, and outside of the group. Sartre, construed that each member's pledge to the group as each one's future was the genesis of all institutions. Sartre, by way of a sweeping generalisation, equated an 'old women's book circulation library' with a 'revolutionary party of the working
class’. But, for Sartre, whether it was a circulation library or a party, it was only an appearance of the objective totality as the being-in-the group of the individual was a double failure. Sartre explained that this failure was authenticated by each individual in the group. According to Sartre, the first failure was on the part of the individual to be ‘powerless’ to leave the group and the second failure lay in being ‘powerless’ to dissolve in the group. Sartre opined that this double determination was as much a source of ‘practical unity’ as it was in contradiction with the ‘ontological unity’ of the group in question. For Sartre, was kept above by concerted ‘praxis’ and not inverted ‘praxis’ or reduction to inertia.

According to Sartre, the group has undergone two basic transformations in the transition from organisation to institution.
1) The transformation of the mediated reciprocity outlined in respect of the pledged organised group into a new form of institutional seriality.

2) As the organisation is transformed into a sovereign institution, the power that was lost to the individual in his subordination to this new form of serial impotence was lodged in an institutional locus of power. Sartre explained that the ‘institution’ was an inorganic unification of a serialised multiplicity. For Sartre, the individual, by his ‘praxis’, sustained the
'institution' as much as he was himself a product of inert institutionalised relations. This contradiction, according to Sartre, brought the 'institution' 'seriality' (practical unity) and 'impotence' (ontological unity). The incarnation of the group in fusion necessitated the reincarnation of the individual in the group and according to Sartre necessitated 'fraternity-terror' of the individual praxis. This fraternity-terror was, for Sartre, the expression of a double failure of the group, the organisation, the institution.

Sartre concluded, on the basis of his discussion on different social structures, that, due to the perpetual re-emergence of inertia, were a perpetual failure. According to Sartre, the social structures which began their lives as free realisation of the individual freedoms, sooner or later, turned into manipulated inertias or worked matters.

As we have noted, in Being and Nothingness Sartre argued that a 'history of human being was a history of human failures'. And in the Critique Sartre promptly argued that history was a useless passion in terms of collapsing institutions.

THE PLACE OF HISTORY:

The genesis of history according to Sartre, as object of 'praxis' was in three modes: 1) other groups mediated or not by series, 2) inorganic
circumstances, mediated or not by other groups, and
3) worked matter mediated or not by series and by
groups. Sartre explained that the praxis of the group
whose being, as outside itself, was objectification
of its own self revealed three fundamental characteristics.
They were: 1) contingent and unifying practical
realities in the social and physical materiality
constituting its practical field were created as soon
as the group acted outside itself. Changes in the other
groups could be direct or indirect. Sartre wrote:
"What is obvious is that the efficacity of a praxis
is directly linked to its concrete objective and that
the different actions which it performs here are all
unified within the common field at every level of
investigation and by all groups present." It was not
quite clear what was Sartre’s purpose in
simultaneously holding a conception of the general
group nature (where different, individual actions of
different groups were unified to form knowledge) and
in holding the opposite of it that if a particular group
(class) were to stop manipulating knowledge, it would
immediately become an ‘object’ for its enemy (it would
immediately become manipulable as an ‘object’ for its
enemy group) group as manipulable).

2) Through the group’s alterity, its synthetic
achievements were necessarily alienated. Every and
any ‘object’ produced by the group was itself
multi-dimensional. The common condition of the group
was its insecurity in multiple ways. Sartre while
commenting on ‘insecurity’ as a reflection of scarcity
and common ground for praxis wrote: "This does not mean that we have to return to historical scepticism on the contrary; but we must recognize that these multiple significations can be integrated only from a point of view in which it is possible to integrate all the groups of the common field and all its practical determinations from a historical point of view." 49

Sartre in *Search For a Method*, different from the substance of above quotation, made the freedom as the opposite of necessity. Sartre illustrated his argument with the tragic episode of a colored member of an airport ground crew who was prevented from becoming a pilot because he was a black. Sartre explained that as a protest against humiliation he stole the plane and due to lack of flight experience was crashed to death. Sartre argued that the individual revolt of the aeroplane thief was a particularisation of a collective revolt. But for Sartre, the death of the 'air-plane thief' brought a different totalization. Sartre wrote: 'This death expresses at the same time the impossible revolt of his people, hence his actual relation with the colonizers, the radical totality of his hate and refusal, and finally the inward project of this man—his choice of a brief, dazzling freedom, of a freedom to die.' 50 Sartre, here, viewed death as third-other to give all meaning to the action of the 'air-plane thief' whose individual revolt was the reflection of a collective revolt. This, we shall argue, was not consistent with the Sartrean kind of argumentation either as an existentialist or
proclaimed marxist. The reasons being:

1) Existentialism posted the view that choice of action was not determined by the consequence of the action as choice otherwise opted for would be 'inauthentic' and

2) Marxism defined freedom as the realization of necessity. According to Engels, freedom was the 'capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject' and the knowledge of the subject was precisely understanding of history, of classes, of struggles (both potential as well as limitation).

3) The group, in the bid to flush 'inertia' from within itself, stamps it outside of the group and in doing so it again is recaptured by inertia. Sartre wrote: "The group was constituted in opposition to recurrence; and it becomes the means of determining a serial process through the knowledge and application of laws of alterity. We have seen how the paralysis of seriality rises from other-directed gatherings towards the sovereign (free praxis - Tilak). But the embodiment of powers is a special case. As a general rule, the group develops counter-finalities which elude it in so far as it acts on the inorganic, either directly or through the mediation of collectives, and in so far as it acts indirectly on groups and brings about a serial process in a gathering. Such, ultimately are the limits of its praxis; born to dissolve series in the living synthesis of a community, it is blocked in its spatio-temporal development by the untranscendable statute of organic individuality and finds its being outside itself, in the passive determinations of inorganic exteriority which it had
wished to repress in itself. It is formed in opposition to alienation, in so far as alienation substitutes the practico-inert field for the free practical field of the individual; but it cannot escape alienation any more than the individual can, and it is thereby relapses into serial passivity. The meaning of the above passage is that a group's identity (inertia) was not manipulated by the group itself but the third as the other in another group which would be the same in the vicinity of another third of another group. class struggle as clash of opposing rationalities? Sartre described class struggle as invoked by exploitation and oppression. According to Sartre, in such 'apparent' disposition of class struggle, there were three modalities of human action: 1) individual, 2) group and 3) praxis-process. Sartre argued that, with this composition of human action, it was possible to envisage the equality of 'statute' of expression and exploitation with praxis and process. Sartre construed that in the context of 'intellectual idealism' of the analytical reason of the bourgeoisie the worker must reconstruct dialectical reason to oppose the bourgeois-intellectual criterion of truth. According to Sartre, the petty bourgeois intellectual and the proletarian intellectual were bound to generate mystifications of their own. Sartre opined that, on a certain level of abstraction, the conflict of rationalities. Sartre wrote: "Dialectic and praxis are ... one and the same, in their indissolubility, they are the reaction of the oppressed class to oppression." Here Sartre
was holding a dialectical account of the relation between knowledge and being which could have been closer to Marxian understanding of the relation between knowledge and being if it were dialectical enough in other related concepts. Marxism, as dialectical materialism as the philosophy of the working class, does not mean that it is merely knowledge of the conditions of the working class but it is the world outlook with which the working class can change its reality by transforming the conditions that preserve its reality as 'sub human'.

Sartre, while arguing about working-class consciousness, wrote: "This practical comprehension of workers' activities by workers (however cloudy it may be and however erroneous it may remain) is actually the objective spirit of the working class in so far as it is created as an extreme need and necessary negation of its de-humanity." Here Sartre seemed to theorise that the working class, as 'existence', was conscious of itself. He went on to say that the intellectual who told the worker that he was sub-human, due to some historic and contingent reasons, was a traitor and was only rationalising as an 'outsider' of the working class situation. Sartre, in an interview-discussion with an Italian journal, Il Manifesto adopted a position that the working class can organise itself out of spontaneity, without a communist party along with other sections of the society as 'masses' and not as a singular class.
The above discussion discloses how several Sartrean conceptions are contrary to Marxian counterparts and show the inconsistency of Sartre in adopting a certain position of Marx as his without relating a particular agreement with Marx to his general disagreement with Marxian philosophy. Thus Sartre's agreement with the Marxian doctrine of historical materialism without dialectical materialism was only a 'disguised' rejection. We have already noted in the previous chapters Sartre's argument against a dialectic of nature. Sartre's agreements with historical materialism would have been genuine if Sartre had not defined a) 'Marxist historical materialism as having everything' except its own existence. b) Scarcity as the condition of genesis of all history. Let us elaborate on this. Firstly, Sartre's misinterpretation of dialectical materialism was quite evident from his double-tongued argument.

He argued against the dialectic of nature assuming (accusing) the marxian position to be stating: 1) natural laws were abstracted from nature and 2) that the conception of nature was nature 'as it is' without any 'alien addition' would make man thing among things without any possibility for freedom. This led him to conceive a 'historical materialism' which borrowed its principles not from any outside agency but resolved its principles 'reflectively'. Sartre was correct to differentiate the social or the historical from the natural but was wrong to attribute
non-differentiation to Marxism. We have shown, in our second chapter, that Marx and Engels differentiated the natural and the social and for them neither the natural nor the historical nor the social was 'abstraction'. Historical materialism, in the Marxian sense, is the application of the principles of dialectical materialism to history and society and nature is not excluded. Therefore, unlike Sartrean theorisation, historical materialism, in a Marxian sense, depends not on 'inner principles' of the outlook but on social and historical realities for the vindication of those very principles. Secondly, Sartre argued that scarcity and not exploitation was the basis for history. According to Sartre, the basic contradiction in society which 'exploitation' created was merely a framework of events but was insufficient for a valid explanation. For Sartre, scarcity was the root cause of all problems. If, for Marx, history was the history of class struggles, for Sartre, "origin of struggle always lies, in fact, in some concrete antagonism whose material condition is scarcity."54 Thus, Sartre's Critique was caught up in the circularity of need (which unites people as human interiorization scarcity) to need (the condition of scarcity which unite people for social action towards 'transcendence' of their condition). Sartre, while defining the relation between the individual and history, wrote: "Subjectivity then appears, in all its abstraction, as the verdict which compels us to carry out, freely and through ourselves, the sentence that a 'developing' society has pronounced upon us and
which defines us a priori in our being. This is the level at which we shall encounter the practico-inert.’\textsuperscript{55} Scarcity, though a general condition of society in the capitalist era, for Sartre individual subjectivity as practico-inert (as the facticity of individual praxis). Scarcity (rarete) was social lack or inadequacy of means to satisfy human needs. Sartre tried to argue that the problem of scarcity was a marxian notion when he wrote: ‘our description of the relation of scarcity will be brief, because there is nothing new to say about it. In particular, historical materialism as interpretation of our History, has provided the necessary explanations here. But what has never been attempted is a study of the type of passive action which materiality as such exerts on man and his History in returning a stolen praxis to man in the form of a counter finality. The point must be emphasised: History is more complex than some kinds of simplistic Marxism suppose; man has to struggle not only against nature, and against the social environment which has produced him, and against other men, but also against his own action as it becomes other. This primitive type of alienation occurs within other forms of alienation, but independent of them, and in fact is their foundation.’\textsuperscript{56} Sartre not only assumed scarcity to be the foundation of all alienation and all attempts to overcome it but also attributed it to be the case with Marxian philosophy. This is nothing but social Darwinism which Marx-Engels fought in their lifetimes. Sartre made economic scarcity the foundation of all social development including the
"class struggle". This indicates that due to surplus population, the problem of scarcity manipulates all human-relations into antagonistic human relations of fierce competition. Social Darwinism and Malthusianism are related. Malthusianism, according to Engels, was a vulgar illusion created by the capitalist crisis in terms of unemployment and other shortages. As Engels puts it, the size of the population was directly proportional to 'immeasurable productive power' which was distorted as the source of scarcity.

Thus Sartre remained alien to Marxist theory in his intellectual abode from Being and Nothingness to Critique of Dialectical Reason, in the former as 'open opponent' and in the latter as 'well wisher'. 
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26. Ibid., p.80

27. Ibid., p.113

28. Ibid., p.163

29. Ibid., p.133

30. Ibid., p.132

31. Ibid., p.136

32. Ibid., p.136

33. Ibid., p.240

34. Ibid., p.256

35. Ibid., p.259

36. Ibid., p.181

37. Ibid., p.186

38. Ibid., p.614

39. But for Sartre these opposed relations not essentially relations of 'opposition'


41. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op.cit., p.345

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42. Ibid., p.351
43. Ibid., p.394
44. Ibid., p.394
45. Ibid., p.235
46. Ibid., p.509
47. Ibid., p.408
49. Ibid., p.665-66
50. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method*, op.cit., p.109
51. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op.cit., p.668
52. Ibid., p.802
53. Ibid., p.803
54. Ibid., p.113
55. Ibid., p.71
56. Ibid., p.124