CHAPTER III

"THE DIALECTIC" OF BEING AND NOTHINGNESS

We have noted in the introduction that, Sartre divided Being into two realms - Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. The two realms, according to Sartre were radically opposed realms. Sartre used the terms phenomenon, being, Being-in-itself to refer to body but he simultaneously used the terms phenomenon, being, to refer to Being-for-itself or consciousness.

We shall argue in this chapter that Sartre proposed an alternative philosophy to dialectical materialism. As we have argued in the second chapter - section two - that Sartre presented his philosophy as the only alternative as he opined that both idealism and 'materialism' had failed. In this chapter we shall take up Being and Nothingness and show how Sartre counterposed his themes to the themes of dialectical materialism in an indirect fashion. Sartre did not quote extensively the themes discussed by Descartes, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, but he passed 'judgement' on those discussions. He did not quote Marx either. In Being and Nothingness Marx was referred to on four occasions and Descartes, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger on comparatively more occasions. In this work Sartre referred to Marxian philosophy as 'materialism', or 'philosophy of seriousness' or 'class consciousness'.
Before attempting a critical exposition of the philosophical themes of *Being and Nothingness*, we shall formulate 'the dialectical' principles with which Sartre not only contrasted his philosophy but with which he also raised a system of philosophy. These principles were:

a) The concept of matter must be determined from matter itself in its relations and in its development.

b) The contradictory nature of the thing itself is proof of the contradictory forces and tendencies in each phenomenon - thought or being.

c) The struggle and unity of opposites is not only true of the realm of thought, but also true of the realm of nature.

d) The break down of the separate parts of a totality and the summation of these parts into a totality forms the union of analysis and synthesis. Analysis and synthesis are dialectically dependent.

e) The relations of each thing are not only manifold, but general, universal. Each thing (or phenomenon) is connected with every other one.

f) Apart from the principle of struggle and unity of opposites we discover a transition of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other or into its opposite.

g) We have an endless process of discovering new sides, new relations and new modes of existence.

h) This endless process of discovering is an endless process of acquiring deeper knowledge of matter, of
phenomenon, of processes from appearance to essence and less profound to more profound essence.

i) Interpretation of thing or phenomenon is possible when we study it as co-existing, as caused, having connection with one and reciprocally dependent on the other.

j) In the process of development 'negation' plays an important role. Negation marks phenomenon to be this or to be that. Negation of negation is the principle of critical assimilation and resolution of the struggle of opposites.

k) 'Contradiction' is the fundamental notion of human life, thought and nature.

**The Method of Sartre:**

The first chapter of *Being and Nothingness* was entitled as 'The Origin of Negation'. Before going to the question of 'nothingness', Sartre formulated 'the question'. Sartre defined his method: "...it is not profitable first to separate the two terms of a relation in order to try to join them together again later. The relation is a synthesis. Consequently the results of analysis cannot be covered over again by moments of this synthesis." Sartre argued that the results of analysis and the results of synthesis could not tally and were mutually exclusive. Sartre considered, analysis and synthesis as abstractions. Abstraction for Sartre, was made when something was not capable of existing in isolation, and abstraction for him was pure thought.
concrete, in contrast, for Sartre, was something which could exist by itself alone. For Sartre (and Husserl) the color 'red' was an abstraction and could not exist without form. Different to this, Sartre had given us to understand that the concrete was a spatio-temporal thing, with all determinations which could exist without any dependence all by itself. On the basis of the differentiation of abstract and concrete, Sartre defined 'consciousness' as an abstraction which could not exist apart from co-existing as in man. For Sartre consciousness concealed within itself an 'ontological source' in the region of 'in itself'. Thus Sartre theorised that 'phenomenon was an abstraction since it must appear to consciousness. According to Sartre, concrete presented itself to consciousness as synthetic totality of which consciousness constituted only moments. So far, we have noted Sartre defining consciousness as 'concealing' and not revealing its "ontological source" in Being-in-itself and arguing that consciousness like Being-in-itself was an abstraction. Sartre defined Being-in-itself not from its own point of view but from an imposed point of view of Being-for-itself. Besides that it was clear that "the phenomena" were as "reflected" (Sartre's word 'to appear') in consciousness is not evaluated as phenomena in their relations and development, but only as "abstraction" because it was consciousness that "evaluates". Phenomena, like consciousness was not "concrete" but an
"abstraction". For Sartre (and Heidegger) the "concrete" referred to human reality or "Being-in-the-world".

The Question:

Sartre made it conditional that any enquiry into the relation between Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself, the two realms of Being, must rest upon a description of the specific union of man with the world-human reality or Being-in-the-world. For Sartre, the description of the totality, Being-in-the-world was possible on two lines: a) what is the synthetic relation which we call Being-in-the-world? b) what must be man and the world in order for a relation between the two to be possible? Sartre attempted to answer these questions not separately, because for him the phenomena and consciousness were 'abstractions' only when they were looked upon separately. Sartre's object of study was the totality of man and the world, man-world. Sartre seemed to understand the divergence in man's conduct as a definite mode of expression of man's relation with the world. Henceforth, Sartre studied human conduct in general (abstract), which expressed man's relation with the world in general (abstract). Here we shall attempt to present Sartre's argument that the 'Question' as a human attitude discloses the relation between being and non-being as the relation of being as such. This argument is crucial to Sartre's philosophy as he 'claimed' to overcome the
dualism of subject and object. We shall argue that Sartre's conception of 'the Question' as the relation between being and non-being essentially to be the relation of being as such his attempt at the 'dualism'. We shall attempt to show how Sartre's 'attempt' was without success. Sartre wrote: "At the very moment when I ask, "is there any conduct which can reveal to me the relation of man with the world?" I pose a question. This question I can consider objectively, for it matters little whether the questioner is myself or the reader who reads my work and who is questioning along with me. But on the other hand, the question is not simply the objective totality of the words printed on this page; it is different to the symbols which express it. In a word, it is a human attitude filled with meaning." Sartre argued that human being in the very "essence" of being was a questioner being. Sartre explained that in every question we stand before a being which we are questioning. Sartre elaborated that every question clearly demonstrated a being which questions and a being which is questioned. Sartre clarified that the relation between the two "realms" of being which "the question" demonstrated, could not throw light on the original relation between Being-in-itself, and Being-for-itself. It only showed that the relation was taken for granted. Sartre opined that the being which is questioned is in the form 'to question is to question about something'. We can note here that Sartre defined 'consciousness in line with Husserl in the form
consciousness is a consciousness of something'. Sartre pointed out that in every question, an "expected" reply was present in the very genesis of the question. This way Sartre defined question as a kind of "expectation". Sartre explained that expectation as the nature of the question became conditional as we have pre-interrogative "intimacy" with Being. For Sartre, replying to the question, whether it was yes or no, only revealed being as nihilation, the reasons being: a) The question as an expectation was "not" the reply b) The question when answered "yes" it was a negation of not only "not" but different other "yes" possibilities. c) The question when answered "not" presented itself as the nature of being, it was a negation of not only "yes" but also as different other "not" possibilities. d) Every question expressed objective existence of the relation between non-being and being.

Sartre explained that every questioner, by the very fact that he was questioning posited himself in a state of indetermination. Sartre wrote about the situation of the questioner: "...he does not know whether the reply will be affirmative or negative. Thus the question is a bridge set up between two non-beings; the non-being of knowing in man, the possibility of non-being of being in transcendent being. Finally, the question implies the existence of truth. By the very question, questioner affirms that he expects an objective reply, such that we can say of it "It is thus and not otherwise". In a word
the truth, as differentiated from being introduces a third non-being as determining the question - the non-being of limitation. This triple non-being conditions every question.... Sartre theorised that for the questioner, the being was presented as nothingness since "the permanent possibility of non-being, outside us and within, conditions our questioner about being." For Sartre, it is non-being and not being which puts limit to the questions about being. Sartre defined being as that which 'must', out of necessity, arise on the basis of 'what is it is not'. Sartre elaborated that being allows the formulation "Being is that outside of that, nothing". Sartre considered this mode of being - nothing as a component of "the real" or non-being.

We have already noted that, for Sartre, Being - in-itself was beyond affirmation as beyond negation. Sartre's Being-in-itself has an incapacity for "nihilation" and a capacity for "inertia". Sartre wrote: "Negation proper (we are told) is unthinkable ; it could appear only on the level of an act of judgement by which I should establish a comparison between the result anticipated and the result obtained. Thus negation would be simply a quality of judgement and the expectation of the questioner would be an expectation of the judgement-response. As for Nothingness, this would derive its origin from negative judgements; it would be a concept establishing the transcendent unity of all these
judgements, a propositional function of the type, "x is not". Here Sartre, demonstrated clearly the affirmative act and the negative as two objective "conducts" which were united in the same reality of fact. The negation, for Sartre was at the end of the "act" of judgement without any being "in" being. Sartre wrote: "It is like an unreal encompassed by two realities neither of which claims it; being-in-itself, if questioned about negation, refers to judgement, a wholly psychic positivity, refers to being since judgement formulates a negation which concerns being and which consequently is transcendent. Negation, the result of concrete psychic operations is supported in existence by these very operations and is incapable of existing by itself; it has the experience of a noema-correlate; its esse resides exactly in percipi. Nothingness, the conceptual unity of negative judgements, cannot have the slightest trace of reality, save that which the stoics confer on their "lection". As shown in the beginning, Sartre formulated the phenomenon and consciousness as abstractions, in line with his method. Sartre defined method as that which cannot have the "slightest trace" of reality, Being-in-itself "refers" to judgement rather than judgement reflecting Being-in-itself. Sartre took the discussion on "negation" from the level of human attitude to the level of "being" of negation. In this context, Sartre raised two questions: a) "Is negation as the structure of the judicative
proposition at the origin of nothingness?" \(^8\) and b) "on the contrary is nothingness as the structure of the real, the origin and foundation of negation?\(^9\) On the basis of these questions Sartre slightly altered his earlier position about negation (proper) being limited to quality of judgement. Sartre, now not merely discusses intra-human judgement or inter-human judgement as the former was a question to one's own self and the latter between a man and other men, but as, to question was to directly question the being. In the case of the discovery that I must be having Rs.1,500 but instead I can only count Rs.1,300 - here, for Sartre the question would be an intra-subjective phenomenon. In case I ask a colleague of Pierre whether I can see Pierre, the question would be inter-subjective phenomenon. But Sartre contended that, in posing the question, the questioner stands facing the being in a certain way and this relation to being was a relation of being. Here, being meant, for Sartre, nothing more than Being-for-itself. Sartre argued that the question as a judgement was only one 'optional' expression of the relation of being. Sartre explained that the question was marked by interrogative judgement, but it was not necessarily a judgement, but a pre-judicative attitude.

Sartre opined that one could question by a look, by a gesture or in some situations by refraining from reacting. Thus, Sartre extended the argument to hold that the "question" as a relation of being need not be nor need
not necessarily be "known" in the dialogue form. Sartre gave excellent examples in dialogue free forms of questioning to argue his case. Sartre wrote: "If my car breaks down, it is the carburetor, the spark plugs, etc., that I question. If my watch stops, I can question the watch maker about the cause of the stopping, but it is various mechanisms of the watch that the watch maker will in turn question. What I expect from the carburetor, what the watchmaker expects from the works of the watch, is not a judgement, it is a disclosure of being on the basis of which we can make a judgement. And if I expect a disclosure of being, I am prepared at the same time for the eventuality of a disclosure of a non-being. If I question the carburetor, it is because I consider it possible that "there is nothing there" in the carburetor. Thus my question by its nature envelops a certain prejudicative comprehension of non-being; it is in itself a relation of being with non-being, on the basis of the original transcendence, that is in a relation of being with being."10 As this was an excellent example to elaborate on a point, the language Sartre used was a little ambiguous. Being, for Sartre, is both Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. But in the above quoted passage, Sartre, without differentiating, uses the term being with different connotations. Let us evaluate the 'idea' of the passage. When Sartre uses the phrase 'disclosure of being', he uses it in the Being-in-itself
sense, of the carburettor being faulty, of the watch having stuck somewhere etc. Sartre used the expression disclosure of non-being in the sense of Being-for-itself, making or extracting judgements as "nothing" has been wrong with the carburettor or with the watch. When Sartre interpreted this kind of dialogue free questioning, there the question disclosed itself as a relation between being and non-being and between being and being and being in which the former relation is relation between Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself and the latter between Being-for-itself and Being-for-itself. The strategy of the example is to first establish Being-in-itself's independent nature as it is related to Being-for-itself and then make it dependent on Being-for-itself for it to become a relation of Being. For Sartre, a relation of being is "known" when we grasp it as its 'esse is in percipi'. This is to argue, while not committing himself to it that though a relation of being as a question has 'pre-judicative', 'ontological' 'intimacy' with the being, it is for Being-for-itself to abstract, to 'translate' it into the quality of a judgement. Sartre maintained that Being-in-itself's incapacity for negation or affirmation puts it as passivity in the "heart" of seeing. Sartre explained that Being-for-itself interprets, qualifies Being-in-itself 'as this and not that'. According to Sartre, Being-for-itself helps Being-in-itself to be able to participate in the question-questioner-questioned relation.
THE "QUESTION" OF DESTRUCTION:

Sartre made a comparative study of the nature of question and the nature of destruction and come to the conclusion that both question and destruction have similar "judicative" structures. Just as the entire meaning of a question whether judicative or pre-judicative is accomplished by man, Sartre argued that man was the only being through whom destruction can be accomplished. Sartre wrote: "A geological plication, a storm do not destroy - or at least they do not destroy directly; There is no less after the storm than before. There is something else. Even this expression is improper, for to posit otherness there must be a witness who can retain the past in some manner and compare it to the present in the form of no longer." Sartre, here, must have thought about a physical law, the law of conservation of mass and energy when he contended that destruction by storm can "merely" 'modify the destruction of beings and there was no less after the storm than before'. But he corrected himself, stating that the use of such an expression was improper, in the sense that his objective of study was not to place destruction in the nature proper but to see how Being-for-itself mediated, such negations. For Sartre, without a witness who related present with past, determination of destruction was not possible. According to Sartre, if a cyclone had brought death to certain living beings, this death would be destruction if it were experienced like...
that. In the absence of a witness who can recapture and represent the experience of destruction, destruction could not "exist". Sartre, to support his argument, illustrated the example of the gunner. Sartre wrote: "The gunner who has been assigned an objective carefully points his gun in a certain direction excluding all the others. But even this would be still nothing unless the being of the gunner's objective is revealed as fragile. And what is fragility if not a certain probability of non-being for a given being under determined circumstances. A being is fragile if it carries in its being a definite possibility of non-being."12 Here Sartre made two important advancements over his earlier positions. 1) Man is not only a witness who can 'accomplish' meaning to destruction, but who also carries "destruction" in the "heart" of his being, in the "language" of non-being. 2) Man's being as questioner or witness to destruction is not only an expression of relation of being but also its non-being. We shall make it clear here that man's being or non-being as such, for Sartre, has an exclusive reference to Being-for-itself. Sartre, so far, discussed the question - structure of nililation or negation of man's being or being-in-the world through which nothingness comes in the world. Let us read what Engels had to say on the subject: "....what is the negation of negation? an extremely general - and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important - law of development of nature,
history and thought; a law which, as we have seen, holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy.... It is obvious that I do not say anything concerning the particular process of development of, for example, a grain of barley from germination to the death of the fruit-bearing plant, if I say it is a negation of negation. For, as the integral calculus is also a negation of negation, if I said anything of that sort I should only be making the nonsensical statement that the life process of barley plant was integral calculus or for that matter that it was socialism. That, however, is precisely what metaphysicians are constantly imputing to dialectics. When I say that all these processes are a negation of the negation, I bring them all together under this one law of motion, and for this very reason I leave out of account the specific peculiarities of each individual process. Dialectics, however is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought."13 We can know from this that, unlike Sartre, Engels presented "negation" as a real process in nature, man, history and philosophy and in every development. Unlike Sartre, Engels did not limit the capacity for negation to Being-for-itself but extended it to Being-in-itself. Engels argued that negation was neither limited to the dialogue nor to man but was evident in every process of development. For Engels to negate a sentence 'a rose is a rose' and say 'a rose is not a rose'
than to negate it further to say 'a rose is a rose' cannot demonstrate "objective" negation, it is not even "subjective" negation as Sartre would have come forth with the question of structure of question of being structure non-being. We shall note from this that Engels was against mixing up of two different realms of negations. We shall argue that Sartre mixed up the nature of non-being posed by "the gunner" and the nature of "destruction" caused a storm or a cyclone. Sartre wrote: "It is necessary then to recognize that destruction is an essentially human thing and that it is man who destroys his cities through the agency of earthquakes or directly, who destroys his ships through the agency of cyclones or directly. But at the same time it is necessary to acknowledge that destruction supposes a pre-judicative comprehension of nothingness as such and a conduct in the face of nothingness."¹⁴ We shall analyse this passage carefully. We would agree with Sartre if he were arguing in any way that man conquers nature and constantly manipulates nature and so nature takes "revenge" in the form of an earthquake. We know that whenever some nuclear tests are conducted in one country this may create an earthquake or environmental hazards in another country. Just as man "opposes" nature, nature "avenges" in the form of an earthquake or cyclone. These destructions might occur without any manipulation by man - quite naturally. Engels wrote: "Let us not however, flatter ourselves over much
on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different unforeseen effects which only too often cancel the first. Manipulation of unforeseen effects would not only bring a particular mastery over nature, but also a few unforeseen effects might give scope to man for future mastery of nature. This struggle of man with nature would only bring man closer and closer to nature as his knowledge and mastery over nature graduate into higher levels.

But Sartre's use of 'natural calamities' like cyclones, storms or earthquakes in the argument is to make them pure 'human calamities'. We shall not agree with Sartre, for unlike Engels he is not giving nature independence from human witness. That apart, Sartre did not differentiate between a 'human calamity' (war) and a 'natural calamity' (earthquake or cyclone) on fundamental grounds that the former was accomplished by man and the latter was accomplished by nature. In giving primacy to the role of Being-for-itself Sartre forgot the internal relations between the components of a watch or carburettor, which would be "questioning" each other within one totality. Sartre was not interested in how oil energy in a carburettor was transformed into mechanical energy mediated by electrical energy and that this was
proof of man's manipulation of nature to enable a system capable of negation within the purview of the system. These negations within a carburettor exemplify man's capacity for "abstraction", for he has known 'negation' proper in an "abstract" way to manipulate it into the carburettor in a concrete particular way. We have shown that for any negation or affirmation to be possible for Sartre, Being-for-itself would be conditional. In the example of the gunner, Sartre made a dialectical observation but only to remain conclusively metaphysical. Sartre opined that once the direction of the gun was determined, the rest of the angles or sides as possibilities of direction were negated. For Sartre in this sense all determination was negation and would be "limitedly" dialectical (in the following pages Sartre would lead us to the existential position that all negation is determination). When Sartre argued that the gunner's objective revealed the object as fragile and the being of gunner has relation with possible non-being would become a metaphysical conclusion, in the sense that it excluded a chance situation that the mechanical failure of the gun would not disclose the object as fragile. As we have seen when Sartre argued that even with a look one could question, Sartre was actually presenting the other as the "robber" of all possibilities, I can possibly make possible. Sartre's famous dicta 'hell is other people', and 'every dead person is a prey for the living' would tell us a lot about Sartre's notion of the relation
between the self and the other. Here, we find, that Sartre's position in this context of destruction fits into his general subjectivist framework. By proclaiming that since there is no motion in nature and nature is incapable of destruction and all destruction is due to human activity, he not only abolishes distinction between natural and social calamities but subjugates nature to man. In this context Sartre's methodological approach is the same as namely his extension of his argument regarding the subjugation of material to the ideal, and his rejection of 'dialectics in nature'.

Before examining the existential theory of nothingness, let us underline the meanings of words Negatite, Nihilation and Nothingness. Negatite is a Sartrean term for types of human conduct which not only obviously involve negative judgement but somehow contain 'negativity' or 'negation' as an integral part of their structures. Sartre explained that experiences involving absence, change, interrogation, destruction are certain examples of negatite. Nihilation is a word coined by Sartre to define consciousness in a certain way. Consciousness, for Sartre, exists as a certain nothingness which is raised between consciousness and the object of which it is consciousness. Sartre explained that nihilation is the process by which consciousness exists. Nothingness is something about which Sartre has to write 'all about' in Being and Nothingness. Sartre argued that
though Nothingness does not itself have a being, nevertheless it is supported by being. Sartre understood by Nothingness that it comes into the world by the **For-itself** and is the recoil from the fullness of the self-contained being which allows consciousness as such.

Sartre formulated the question of "question" as involving man and the world and the relation between the two. Sartre seemed to suggest that these are two kinds of nothingnesses, one within world and another within the human reality. Before attempting to describe 'nothingness' in general and its particular aspects as Sartre understood it, let us first attempt to show how Sartre contrasted his theory of Nothingness with Hegel's and Heidegger's on the one hand and with Husserl's on the other. Our attempt has two 'expectations': 1) we shall attempt to show how Sartre 'disagreed' with Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger and to show that whatever his 'agreements' with them, these were based on his 'disagreements' with them. In the history of philosophy, disagreements mark development of philosophy and agreements are in Sartrean terminology 'immanence in transcendence'; and 2) to construct Sartre's own exposition of Nothingness.

**HEGEL, HEIDEGGER, SARTRE AND NOTHINGNESS** :

Sartre presented Hegelian dialectic as the relation between being and non-being. Being, for Hegel, according to Sartre includes all positive qualities of all
things that are there. By the same count, Hegel, according to Sartre defined Being as the most undifferentiated constitution of all perfections. According to Sartre being for Hegel contains no distinctions and for a being which can distinguish from others is still a being. Hegel argued according to Sartre, on the basis of this generality and indefiniteness and it is close to nothingness. Sartre wrote: "We are immediately tempted to consider being and non-being as two complementary components of the real-like dark and light. In short we would then be dealing with two strictly contemporary notions which would somehow be united in the production of existents and which it would be useless to consider in isolation. Pure being and pure non-being would be two abstractions which could be reunited only on the basis of concrete realities."¹⁶ We must note that both Hegel and Sartre defined being as whatever 'is' and nothingness "is" whatever 'is not'. In Hegel, according to Sartre, being and nothingness were resolved in a higher "reality" - 'becoming'. 'Becoming' (or change or transcendence) was a higher quality because it was closer to the concrete existent in its continual change. In Hegel, according to Sartre, 'becoming' was more definite and determined than either being or non-being, since 'becoming' was applicable to only "existing" things whereas being and non-being were applicable to logical constructions (circle or square circle) also. Individual existent, for Hegel, according to Sartre, existed as
neither being nor non-being. A tree for example, while it is a tree, is a tree, but while as becoming "what is not" for example coal. For Hegel, according to Sartre, dialectic constantly repeated itself as it advances from the indefinite earlier stages to the more concrete later stages. According to Hegel, the movement of history and being, as well as logic, is from the abstract to the concrete. At each stage of the dialectic, for Hegel, some indefiniteness was left behind and reality approaches more and more the definite individual existent that is the goal of the dialectic.

We have noted in our Introduction (p.13) that being is not subdued in knowing or in meaning but the being of phenomenon is transphenomenal. According to Sartre, being overflows all knowing. Consequently, Sartre argues that the relation between being and nothingness is "not" on the level of the epistemological but on the level of the phenomenological and ontological. In the view of the above Sartrean assumptions we have to evaluate the Sartrean critique of Hegel. Sartre mainly criticises Hegel's view that being and nothingness are logically contemporary. Sartre would define being and nothingness as opposites, whose unity and identity, as understood and misunderstood, by Hegel have no relevance for existential project. Sartre argues that, in Hegel, just as being is the empty concept that perfectly includes all that is, non-being is an equally empty concept that perfectly
denies what is included in being. Sartre explains that in Hegel Nothingness would be considered as emptiness and in the same sense being is said to be emptiness. For Hegel, according to Sartre, if Nothingness is perfect emptiness, it is, as being, perfectly identified with itself. Sartre gives the example of a tree and a square-circle to demonstrate being is what is and non-being is what is not. Sartre explains that a square circle does not exist as a square-circle with the same undifferentiatedness as a tree exists as a tree. For Sartre, being and non-being function as opposites rather than merely as logical contemporaries. According to Sartre, Hegel’s notion of nothingness as simply an abstract negation of being can give adequate explanation for empty notions such as square-circle, but not for "concrete" nothingness like "absence" of Pierre in the cafe. For Sartre "concrete" nothingness is positive emptiness of something. Sartre gives the example of a sign board of a museum which says 'Do not touch anything'. Sartre explains that this obviously means do not touch things in that room. Sartre presents Hegel’s notion of negation and determination as Hegelian-Spinozian "all determination is negation". But Sartre seems to reverse this proposition to 'all negation is determination'. Sartre thus understands Hegelian-Spinozian notion in a particular way. Sartre explains that we must understand the interpretation of Spinoza’s statement in terms of identity and difference but also as
determinations or negations which are possible only as a backdrop of void or nothingness. To make things clearer, Sartre reversed the Hegelian-Spinozian proposition to 'all negation is determination'. From this Sartre makes another stricture against Hegel that concrete nothing is not only not contemporary to being but subsequent to it. Both Sartre as well as Hegel would agree that being has no need for nothingness, it is not the same for nothingness. Nothingness needs being as a support. If being were destroyed both Hegel and Sartre would agree that nothingness would not exist. Sartre explains that this non-being which 'haunts' being exists only on the periphery of being. Nothingness according to Sartre is 'is not' in the sense that it haunts being. In the process it makes being, a nothingness from a Being-for-itself's point of view.

The Sartrean critique of Heidegger is not to be evaluated separately as it is closely linked to the Sartrean critique of Hegel. This is seen when Sartre, while appreciating Heidegger for making advances over Hegel, does not spare the former for remaining abstract like the latter though in a different way. It is clear that Sartre considers Heidegger's description of nothingness as a concrete phenomenon, as an advance over Hegel's concept of nothingness, in the sense that unlike Hegel, for Heidegger, nothingness is not an abstraction. For Heidegger, according to Sartre, nothingness is marked by numerous human attitudes like hate, prohibitions and
regret. Sartre is overwhelmed by the centrality given to "human reality" in Heidegger's philosophy. For Heidegger, according to Sartre "human reality" while experiencing anguish, confronts nothingness - 'face to face'. Sartre wrote while pointing out Heidegger's position: "There exist....numerous attitudes of human reality " which imply a "comprehension" of nothingness : hate, prohibitions, regret etc. For 'Dasein' there is even a permanent possibility of funding one self "face to face" with nothingness and discovering it as a phenomenon. This possibility is anguish."17 According to Sartre, Heidegger proposes that the "world" arises from a concrete tension between being and nothingness. Sartre wrote: "We know that for Heidegger the being of human reality is defined as "being-in-the world". The world is a synthetic complex of instrumental realities in as much as man makes himself known in terms of this complex which he is. This means that both that "human-reality" springs forth invested with being and "finds itself" (sich befinden) in being - and also that human reality causes being, which surrounds it, to be disposed around human reality in the form of the world."18 For Heidegger, apart from being-in-general the world is "caused" by human reality in order to find "himself" in it. We have noted that the Sartrean reversal of the Hegelian-Spinozian proposition 'all determination is negation' into "all negation is determination" gave fundamentality to non-being. Different from this, for
Heidegger, according to Sartre all determination is surpassing as surpassing would mean withdrawal from taking a particular point of view. However Sartre argues for Heidegger, human reality by way of its presence can make being appear as an "organized totality" in the world only by surpassing being. The human reality of Heidegger, according to Sartre, presents itself as an "anti-world" while "being-in-the world. Sartre wrote: "This passing beyond the world, which is the condition of very rising up of the world as such, is effected by the Dasein which directs the surpassing toward itself. The characteristic of selfness (selbstheit), in fact, is that man is always separated from what he is by all the breadth of the being which he is not. He makes himself known to himself from the other side of the world and he looks from the horizon toward himself to recover his inner being. Man is "a being of distances". In the movement of turning inward which traverses all being, being arises and organises itself as the world without there being either priority of the movement over the world, or world over the movement. But this appearance of the self beyond the world - that is, beyond the totality of the real - is an emergence of "human reality" in nothingness. Here, Sartre made a list of Heideggerian propositions. For Heidegger surpassing beyond the world is movement toward "inward" the self. The movement into the self beyond the world is traversing all the being. Sartre identifies clearly as Heideggerian the position that 'being arises and organises
itself as the world without there being either priority of the movement over the world or world over movement'. We must remind ourselves here that Sartre presents his position as 'neither idealism nor materialism' (we have discussed it in the second chapter). According to Sartre, Heidegger explains his version of nothingness by defining man as a 'being of distances'. The Notion of distance, Sartre explained that as it is presented by Heidegger, discloses simultaneously determination of a location as well as the localization of a point. For Heidegger, distance possesses negative movement. Two points are 'distant' when they are separated by length. Sartre wrote: "The length, a positive attribute of a segment of a straight line, intervenes here by virtue of the negation of an absolute, undifferentiated proximity, some one might perhaps seek to reduce distance to being only the length of the segment of which the two points are considered." In our view Heidegger's concept of distance was correctly interpreted by Sartre. Just as by way of certain length distance surpasses the whole, the undifferentiated proximity, human reality surpasses the world in order to make the world as well as in order to make the Dasein to be Dasein. Sartre puts Heidegger's contribution as discovering the truth that: ".....the contingency of the world appears to human reality in so far as human reality has established itself in nothingness in order to apprehend the contingency." Sartre argued that
Heidegger is right in insisting on the fact that negation derives its foundation from nothingness. But Sartre criticised Heidegger for regarding concretizations either through human reality or through the world nothingness as presented by the latter remained empty and abstract. In order to place the nothingness in the well of human reality Sartre assumed the necessity of concrete nothingnesses. As we have noted for Heidegger human reality was a Being-in-the-world. For Sartre, the difference of nothingness which is emanated from the human reality as concrete nothingness and against the nothingness, which is emanated from the world, as abstract nothingness, has gone inconsistent with Heidegger's concept Being-in-the-world. And thus Sartre criticised Heidegger for not properly placing nothingness in the human reality. Sartre explains that Heideggerian nothingness is an emptiness which is one with itself as "not" is still not placed within the human being. Sartre thinks that because Heidegger placed nothingness outside being as well as outside human reality, as abstract nothingness it will be useful in interpreting 'abstract negations'. The Heideggerian definition of human being as 'a being of distances' remains an "analogy" for Sartre without anything to do with the nature of human reality. Unlike Heidegger, according to Sartre, we find Hegel placing 'negation' in mind. Sartre wrote: "In this sense Hegel is right rather than Heidegger when he states Mind is negative."22 Heidegger's drawback according to Sartre
lies in describing *Dasein* by using analogy which is a positive terms. Sartre understands that the use of positive terms like analogy conceal implicit "negations". Sartre while pointing the inconsistency in Heidegger's notion of distance said: "we will willingly admit with Heidegger that "human reality" is "remote-from-itself; that is, that it rises in the world as that which creates distances and at the same time causes them to be removed (entferned). But this *remoteness-from-self*, even if it is the necessary condition in order that there may remoteness in general, envelops remoteness in itself as the negative structure which must be surmounted."23 Sartre argues that surpassing is not surpassing in distance and distance is not distance as measurement. Sartre thinks that Heidegger made nothingness a sort of intentional cover of transcendence, forgetting that the latter had already inserted it into the original structure of transcendence. Sartre, while differing with Hegel as well as with Heidegger, asks two different but related questions to Hegel and Heidegger. Question to Hegel: "It is not sufficient to posit mind as mediation and the negative; it is necessary to demonstrate negativity as a structure of being of mind. What must be mind in order to be able to constitute itself as negative?"24 Question to Heidegger: "If negation is original structure of transcendence, what must be the original structure of 'human reality' in order for it to be able to transcend
the world? Here we can see a clear link between the Sartrean critique of Hegel and the Sartrean critique of Heidegger.

Sartre referred to the Hegelian concept of nothingness as intramundane nothingness and to Heidegger’s concept of nothingness as extramundane nothingness. By intra-mundane nothingness Sartre meant whatever is ‘mind’ bound nothingness, and by extramundane nothingness Sartre meant whatever is ‘being-in-the-world’ bound nothingness. For Sartre, unlike Hegel non-being is not the opposite of being but it is its contradiction. This brings Sartre to say that non-being is not logically contemporary to being, but an ontological subsequent. Sartre explains that this is because Hegel’s mind is negative, but not mind’s being or more appropriately but not being of mind. Thus, Sartre characterises Hegel’s concept of nothingness as limited for it is intra-mundane nothingness. Sartre argues that there are innumerable negations which have their inner structure in human being such as absence, change, otherness, repulsion, regret, distraction etc., which prove the Heideggerian concept of nothingness as inadequate for the purposes of explanation. These mundane day-to-day negations reveal the structures of non-being in human totality. Sartre, unlike Heidegger, argues that nothingness cannot arise from the surging up of Dasein but in some way nothingness must be within both being and consciousness. Let us examine five propositions given by
Sartre regarding to 'mundane' nature of 'non-beings' we encounter in our daily life. They are: 1) I know nothing 2) Pierre is not there 3) I have no money 4) There is no reason for him to be late 5) The ancient Greeks did not practice polygamy. In all these propositions of negative judgement, nothingness is revealed as concrete as being's relation with non-being. In the proposition 'I know nothing' Sartre explains that one is referring primarily to a particular collection of 'objects' of knowledge and not abstractly to nothingness in general or empty nothingness or surpassed Dasein. In the case of propositions 2, 3, 4 and 5, the negative judgement is presented in the form "I know" just as in the case of the first proposition 'I know that I know nothing'. In the case of propositions 2 & 3 negative judgement is marked "absence" as concrete absence. Sartre explain that the whole cafe is filled with absence or nothingness Pierre. For Sartre, in case Pierre were there, it would bring all that is missing now as the relational existence of Pierre. For Sartre, having no money is not merely "external", one experiences the absence of money as an "experience" of money as "not". The Fifth proposition for Sartre not only explains that history is unalterable (immanence in transcendence), but it has a different "I know" structure. Sartre describes this Heideggerian limitation of not being able to deal with 'mundane nothings' or 'pools of nothings' as "extra-mundane nothingness".
Let us now clearly formulate the link between the Sartrean Critique of Hegel and the Sartrean Critique of Heidegger. Sartre's agreement with Hegel that mind is negative is rooted in his rejection of the Hegelian concepts that a) nothingness is empty and b) being and non-being are contradictions within themselves. Similarly, Sartre's agreement with Heidegger that non-being comes to existence through the concrete relation of the self with being is rooted in his understanding of Heidegger's philosophy that later allows nothingness to evaporate between full beings-man and world into an emptiness. Thus, for Sartre, Hegel considered abstract nothingness as emptiness a priori and Heidegger turned his 'concrete' nothingness into emptiness a posteriori.

We have noted in the introduction that we find the first trace of Sartre's concept of nothingness in The Psychology of Imagination. In The Psychology of Imagination Sartre while taking leads from Husserl to formulate his critique of Heidegger wrote: "For, if the negating function belonging to consciousness - which Heidegger calls surpassing - is what makes the act of imagination possible it must be added that this function can manifest itself only in an imaginative act. There can be no intuition of nothingness just because nothingness is nothing and because all consciousness, intuitive or not, is consciousness of something. Nothingness can present itself only as an infrastructure of something. The
experience of nothingness is not strictly speaking an indirect one, it is an experience which is in principle given 'with' and 'in'.\textsuperscript{28} As we have seen in the propositions offered by Sartre with "I know", structure persuades us for a pre-reflective Cogito. As in the case of the five propositions, we "see" more than we perceive. According to Sartre we can "see" more than we perceive, because perception is negated in order to facilitate imagination and not because it is the nature of perceptual structure. For Husserl, according to Sartre, in perception consciousness puts itself in the presence of a temporal spatial object. Husserl argued, according to Sartre that though perception is limited to visible aspects of an object, by the way of pure or empty intentions motivate perception to those invisible aspects of an object. Sartre explains that, for Husserl, these empty intentions supply perception with its fullness and richness. Sartre wrote: "Without them as Husserl rightly observes, mental contents would remain 'anonymous'. But they are not less radically Heterogenous in imaginative consciousness; they do not become formulated, posit nothing apart and limit themselves to projecting into the object as a constituting structure qualities which are hardly determined, all but simple possibilities of development."\textsuperscript{29} For Husserl empty intentions play an important role in perception, but they have an indirect bearing on imagination. This is where Sartre disagrees with Husserl. Sartre's proposition 'Pierre is not there'
is explained by Sartre to directly reach the object. We reach Pierre directly. According to Sartre, the image of Pierre presents Pierre as a perpetual "elsewhere". Sartre finds a double negative judgement in this: "subjectively, to signify that the image is not a perception; objectively, to deny that the Pierre of whom I form the image is here at this moment." For Sartre this doubly negative judgement has two implicit 'ontological' negations. As Sartre explains that image posits its object as existing elsewhere or not existing, it carries within itself the negation of the world and the negation of image "in itself". Sartre writes: "It carries within it a double negation: first it is the nililation of the world (since the world is not offering the imagined object as an actual object of perception), secondly the nililation of the object of the image (it is posited as not actual), and finally by the same stroke it is the nililation of itself (since it is not a concrete, full psychic process)." Sartre opines that in order to explain how one apprehends the "absence" of Pierre in the room we need not take help from Husserl's "empty intentions" as Husserl commits the fallacy of "materialist illusion". Husserl, according to Sartre, seems to have filled "empty intentions" taking them in the mode of things. According to Sartre, it is an error because intentions, empty or full, are "psychological" not material things. To put the Sartrean Critique of Husserl
in clear terms is to assume that Sartre's agreement with Husserl that consciousness is always consciousness of something is rooted in his criticism of Husserl for committing the error of 'materialist illusion' we shall now on the basis of Sartre's critique Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger a Sartrean concept of Nothingness.

Sartre is committed to the idea that Being-in-itself is beyond affirmation and negation. Therefore nothingness cannot be produced by Being-in-itself. Sartre wrote: "...the notion of being as full positivity does not contain nothingness as one of its structures. We cannot even say that Being excludes it. Being lacks all relation with it. Hence the question which is put to us now with a particular urgency: if Nothingness can be conceived neither outside of Being, nor in terms of Being, and if on the other hand, since it is non-being, it cannot derive from itself the necessary force to "nihilate itself", where does Nothingness come from?" Sartre's way of self-questioning leads him to utmost clarity of philosophising. But in raising "abstractions" to philosophical heights, Sartre does no less than Hegel or Heidegger. Let us see in the power of "abstractions" Sartre determines "no-nothingness". Firstly, Sartre cannot grant nothingness the property of "nihilating itself" for the reason that in order to nihilate itself, it must "be". But nothingness is not. The expression for nothingness as it can nihilate itself according to Sartre gives a
deceptive impression of removing from nothingness even the last trace of being. This deception is possible, according to Sartre, because nothingness possesses an appearance of being or a borrowed being. Therefore Sartre infers that there must exist a Being of which the property is to nihilate nothingness, to support in its being, to sustain it perpetually in its very existence, a being by which nothingness comes to things. Sartre categorically denies Being-in-itself a chance to effect the nihilation of "no-nothingness". Sartre argues that Being-for-itself whose being is borrowed by no-nothingness cannot remain possible in its relation with Nothingness and it immediately nihilates it. Again, through another "Being" nothingness borrows its being and this continues into infinite regress. Sartre explains that the Being by which nothingness comes to the world cannot produce nothingness as a 'detached observer'. Sartre wrote: "It would be inconceivable that a Being which is full positivity should maintain and create outside itself a Nothingness or transcendent being, for there would be nothing in Being by which Being could surpass itself toward Non-Being." Sartre interprets the risk of infinite regress of borrowed beings of nothingness to be the ontological structure of Being-for-itself which is limited to its deceptive appearance. But Sartre argues that the Being by which Nothingness arrives in the world must nihilate Nothingness in its being in order to present itself as immanence in transcendence.
As we have pointed out, for Sartre, nothingness comes to the world through man. Let us then formulate as Sartre apprehended different modes of nothingness within man. a) The human being-in-the-world's nothingness is its consciousness b) consciousness or consciousness of consciousness (pre-reflective cogito) is a nothingness in the sense that consciousness is not perfectly one with itself or its object. c) Consciousness is not thereby separated by nothingness from its object, for then consciousness would in no way be one with itself d) The questioning nature of human being demonstrated that the ability to question one's own self is a sign of basic lack of identity with my self. It is a sign of constant slipping away from perfect self-identity, this tendency is nothingness within me. For Sartre nothingness is "concrete" not abstract and "concrete" nothingness is perpetual "elsewhereness" of consciousness.

We shall discuss the "concrete" nothingness of Sartre in the light of his reversal of the Hegelian-Spinozian dictum into "all negation is determination". To put it in a different way, let us enquire how concrete is Sartre's "concrete" nothingness ?

SARTRE'S CONCEPT OF NOTHINGNESS:

Hegel appreciated Spinoza's dictum "all determination is negation" because it tells us that a) things are different from each other but not indifferent
from each other, b) a thing is determinate and has its own identity only by maintaining its distance from other things and by opposing other things, c) and the opposition between determinate things is not external and accidental but essential and necessary. Hegel used the concept of contradiction to interpret determination and negation. Hegel wrote: "Thinking reason, however, sharpens, so to say, the blunt difference of diverse terms, the mere manifoldness of pictorial thinking, into essential difference, into opposition. Only when the manifold terms have been driven to the point of contradiction do they become active and lively towards one another, receiving in contradiction the negativity which is indwelling pulsation of self-movement and spontaneous activity."\textsuperscript{34} Hegel has made contradiction the root of all movement and vitality and that contradiction for Hegel is conditional in order for a thing to have an "urge" to move. Sartre, unlike Marx, has not developed this aspect of determination and negation. This is where we shall find the difference between the Sartrean critique of Hegel and the Marxian critique of Hegel. The Marxian Critique of Hegel sources itself to develop a dialectical concept of contradiction to determine the relation between determination and negation, whereas the Sartrean critique of Hegel is limited to "determination" of negation. Hegel's concept of "determination negation"\textsuperscript{35} gives us the exact nature of the concreteness of 'negation'. Concreteness of negation
or nothingness is in the concrete unity of opposing opposites. Hegel uses expressions 'to sublate', 'to overcome', 'to transcend' and 'to supersede' to interpret "determinate negation". Hegel explains that there is no English equivalent which captures the contradictoriness of all these expressions. Hegel wrote: "'To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language. On the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated. It is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one and the same word for two opposite meanings." From this it is clear that for Hegel, in order for something to be concrete it has to constitute within itself "contradictoriness". For Hegel to pursue "pure nothingness" is to be metaphysical in approach. Hegel wrote: "This is just the scepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness its result and abstracts from the fact this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results. For it is only when it is taken as the result of that from which it emerges, that it is, in fact, the true result, in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has content. The scepticism that ends up with the bare
abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss. But when, on the other hand, the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of itself.38 Here we can see how clearly Hegel is differentiating his dialectical approach from the metaphysical approach of scepticism. Let us now turn to Sartre and see how he argues for "concrete nothingness" and the consequences of his reversal of the "Hegelian Spinozian" dictum into 'all negation is determination'. If we take Sartre's arguments to their conclusion then it will have the following implications. Sartre by adopting an approach where "negativity" is given all primacy leads his "explicit" critique with Hegel and an "implicit" critique with Marx only to co-opt a theory of non-contradiction. Sartre wrote: "...where consciousness was not what it was: in other words, where negation exploited in the homogeneity of one and the same existence, and where the negated referred back from itself to that whereby it was negated - since it was one and the same being. But here - behind the appearances of the simple principle of non-contradiction - the problems grow more complicated, since consciousness is now what it is not."39.

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Sartre disputed the idea of "contradiction" itself, apart from limiting it to "subjectivity".

We shall note here that though being-in-itself somehow has reference to the concept of matter, Sartre deliberately avoids presenting a concept of matter in Being and Nothingness. Even Being-in-itself is defined as facility of Being-for-itself or as related to Being-in-itself. For Sartre, negation or nothingness is limited to Being-for-itself and Being-for-itself apart from a witness is a self-witness. Sartre demonstrates his concept of concrete nothingness with the help of excellent examples. In the proposition "paper is 'not' porous", according to Sartre we are not positing negation to the paper which in itself cannot have any relation with "porosity". For Sartre, this negation is entirely located in the mind. But Sartre explains that the nothingness advocated by mind as a relation between the being of the paper and the being of the paper not being porous is not a constitutive structure of mind. The relation between being (paper) and non-being (porosity) according to Sartre, is 'neither mind', nor in the mind, nor in paper, nor in porosity. This nothingness does not exist as a 'repulsive force' between porosity and paper either. Sartre argues that 'co-operation' from my consciousness is requested in order to produce negation of the inherent porosity of paper because it is not in the being of the paper not to be porous. This nothingness is localised more within the being-in-the-world. According to
Sartre we find entirely a different 'negation' in the proposition "consciousness" is "not" "extended" the same way, Sartre argues that, extension is negated in consciousness, just as porosity is negated in paper. Sartre explains that consciousness is its own nothingness of extension. Sartre wrote: "there is no third party here to observe that two inert substances consciousness and extension - have no relationship of inherence. But it is in the being of consciousness not to be extension. In other words, the not is an existential characteristic."40

The propositions predicted through consciousness, for Sartre, are different from propositions which do not contain consciousness as a subject. The difference can be better understood - when we say ...."extension is not consciousness ...." Sartre opines that in this proposition we find a presupposition of the relation between extension and "not" consciousness which is mediated as after event contemplation. Sartre argues that it is not for extension to be or not to be consciousness because it is simple extension. In this light we can better understand the proposition "consciousness is "not" extension". The relation between the proposition "consciousness is "not" extension" with the proposition "extension is "not" consciousness" as it appears is not a relation between being-for-itself and being-in-itself but a Being-for-itself with Being-for-itself. Sartre defined Being-for-itself as consciousness of consciousness. On this basis we shall comment that Sartre’s reversal of all "determination
is negation" is only a failed attempt to give consciousness to pure nothingness by adopting a theory of 'non-contradiction'. We can outline what Sartre means by nothingness into the following expressions: a) nothingness is not b) nothingness is "brought-to-be" by the human reality as its own nothingness c) nothingness does not nihilate itself in the way 'void' or 'force' would do d) nothingness is nihilated by man who is his nihilation.

NOTHINGNESS, FREEDOM, CONSCIOUSNESS:

Nothingness for Sartre is freedom of consciousness. But for Sartre nothingness, consciousness and freedom are not identical. As components of the totality being in the world, freedom, consciousness, nothingness question each other in order to exist their separate identities. Sartre argues that nothingness, consciousness and freedom are constantly in question in order to be, or otherwise they collapse into identity with themselves and become opaque, muddy, in itself. To demonstrate how these three fundamentalities of consciousness are in a "workable" relation in order to be Being-for-itself, Sartre distinguishes anguish from fear and both from freedom. Sartre defines: "it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of freedom or if you prefer, anguish is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself". Anguish for
Sartre is anguish before one self but fear is fear in the presence of the other. Anguish, according to Sartre, is a reflective apprehension of the self whereas fear is an unreflective apprehension of transcendent. Anguish before oneself, according to Sartre, is to face nothingness face to face. He explains that it is not merely future which is not yet, but more fundamentally it is because when the future is "present" one may not want to be then what one wishes to be now. Anguish is experienced, according to Sartre, not only as "not yet" (future) but also as "no longer". Therefore nothingness as expressed through anguish or lived through anguish always puts human reality as "is been". This is not a problem according to Sartre, of grammar of a philosophical language but language of ontology of temporality with which Being-for-itself can be better described. From a Being-for-itself point of view Sartre defines temporality as: "past as what the For-itself has been. The past thus becomes Being-in-itself and is For-itself's essence and substance as well as part of its facility. This is the only sense For-itself has either essence or substance since in its living present "it is what it is not and is not what it is" and "The future is what for itself has to be".

Sartre is against conceiving consciousness as void which separates motives from actions Sartre held that though nothingness is nothingness of something it is not itself something. Nothingness for Sartre, as we have
noted, is not. But nothingness is made-to-be as a void, as Sartre would vindicate, pre-reflective cogito is empty of all content and its objects exist as motives. Sartre explains that these motives are "inturn" negated by a consciousness which is by nature other than what it is to be (consciousness is contrasted with pre-reflective cogito. This second consciousness is a consciousness of consciousness or consciousness as awareness). Consciousness as awareness leads to the problem whether consciousness is constantly aware of its own nothingness and freedom. If anguish discloses consciousness as freedom how often do we experience anguish? Sartre answers the first question affirmatively and the second negatively. Though one does not often experience anguish, in Sartre's view a permanent possibility of occurrence of anguish remains. Sartre elaborates on why we are rarely anguished in terms that anguish discloses the nature of consciousness in which freedom and nothingness are constantly in question. Therefore there is a permanent possibility of anguish or permanent possibility of ignoring this "lived experience" of anguish.

The Concept of Value: Let us now examine Sartre's views on values in the context of his framework his basic concepts. Sartre extends this argument to "values". The argument is that though one does not often experience value, for Sartre a permanent possibility of occurrence of value remains. For Sartre, "values" do not have an independent being. Sartre
argues that objective norms, for example, do not grant respectability to those accepting them. Sartre wrote: "The bourgeois who call themselves "respectable citizens" do not become respectable as the result of contemplating moral values. Rather from the moment of their arising in the world they are thrown into a pattern of behaviour the meaning of which is respectability. The respectability acquires a being, it is not put to question values are sown on my path as thousands of little real demands, like the signs which order us to keep of the gross." Just as Sartre adapted a theory of non-contradiction in the context of the relation of Being to nothingness, similarly Sartre assumed value system to be conflict free. For Sartre, values cannot have independent being because Being-for-itself chooses them. Sartre seems to argue that the bourgeoisie freely decides to let themselves choose to arise and become invested with respectable morality. What he seems to ignore is that "bourgeois respectability" depends so much for its being as an anti-thesis of "proletarian dignity". And the bourgeois self-image as the image of the social value system is not built in as simply as Sartre puts it (in terms of signboards in a garden which instruct us "to keep off the grass" having being in the motives and expectations of human beings).
Dialectic or Metaphor?

"Philosophy is a matter of borrowing and inventing concepts which progressively, through a kind of dialectic, bring us to a broader awareness of ourselves on the experiential level. Ultimately philosophy is always designed to cancel itself out. What this amounts to is that philosophy must continually be destroying itself and being reborn. Philosophy is thought in so far as thought is invariably already the dead moment of praxis since, by the time it occurs, praxis is already framed. To put it another way, philosophy comes after, while none the less constantly looking forward. It must not allow itself to dispose of anything other than concepts, i.e. words. Yet even so what counts in philosophy's favour is the fact that those words are not completely defined. The ambiguity of the philosophical word does after all something which can be used to go further. It can be used in order to mystify, as Heidegger often does, but it can be used for the purposes of prospecting, as he uses it also..... Philosophy is concerned with the creator of the sciences and it cannot deal with him in scientific words, it can only deal with him in ambiguous words."

- Jean-Paul Sartre

Though Sartre clearly denied having adapted dialectics dealt in Being and Nothingness, he was hopeful
of to study the possibility of an "affective dialectic". By 'affective dialectic' Sartre means the analysis of human consciousness as Being-in-situation, Being-for-others and Being-with-others in terms of emotional and imaginative 'irrationalities' with the help of a 'dialectical principles'. We shall note only contrary to the Maximum dialectical principles which we outlines in the beginning of the chapter, but in essence idealistic. Apart from this Sartre tried to understand and supersede the dialectical concept of Hegel's nothingness in order to formulate existential concept of nothingness. In this section, we shall attempt to discuss certain ambiguities which are unavoidably persist through the metaphorical use philosophical language by Sartre. We shall show that these ambiguities are expressed through metaphorical use of philosophical language, but they are nourished by the antinomous structure of Sartre's philosophy. Antinomy is a term which has exclusive reference to Kant and our attempt is not to present Sartre as a Kantian in the classical sense of the term but to vindicate a fundamental feature of Sartre's philosophy. Antinomies have an important place in Kant's philosophy but antinomies are not all of Kant's philosophy. As presented in the second chapter, we are not to understand Sartre as an "eclectic". That apart, Kant had a different ontic-epistemic structure which cannot be useful in understanding Sartre's philosophy. Kant wrote: "no one can think a negation determinately, save by basing it upon the opposed affirmation. Those born blind cannot
have the least notion of darkness, since they have none of light. The savage knows nothing of poverty, since he has no acquaintance with wealth. The ignorant have no concept of their ignorance, because they have none of knowledge, etc. All concepts of negations are thus derivative, it is the realities which contain the data and so to speak, the material or transcendental content for the possibility and complete determination of all things.... But the concept of what thus possesses all reality is just the concept of a thing in itself as completely determined; and since in all possible (pairs of) contradictory predicates one predicate, namely, that which belongs to being absolutely, is to be found in its determination...... It is therefore a transcendental ideal which serves as the basis for the complete determination that necessarily belongs to all that exists. This ideal is the supreme and complete material condition of the possibility of all that exists - the condition to which all thought of objects, so far as their content is concerned, has to be tried back."46 We have noted how important was the dictum "all negation is determination" for Sartre. Unlike Sartre, Kant cannot think of a negation determinately, even by basing it upon the opposed affirmation. If we were to formulate the Kantian negative determinations, namely, a) Having been born blind a person cannot have the least notion of darkness since he has none of light b) The savage knows nothing of poverty since he
has no acquaintance with wealth. c) The ignorant have no concept of their ignorance, because they have none of knowledge] into Sartrean negation determinations all three examples would be treated with "I know" structure. So, in Sartrean terms, they would be: a) the blind is not blind to his blindness with or without darkness or with or without light, b) the savage is not savageous enough to his poverty (as awareness) with or without wealth and c) the ignorant is not ignorant of his ignorance. Kant's "I think" level of self-consciousness cannot be compared with Sartre's "self awareness" level of consciousness of consciousness. And unlike Kant, Sartre's pointedness is not all exhaustive materiality of the thing-in-itself but Being. For Kant, determination is absolute and for Sartre, negation is determination which is absolute. Sartre defined freedom: "...my freedom eats away my freedom." Here "eats" is used metaphorically though "eating" is a commonsense usage also. Let us see whether this going-beyond commonsense leads to good sense or not. Sartre, while connecting the particular and the global, wrote: "it is necessary to consult each man's history in order to get from it a particular idea with regard to each individual for itself. Our particular projects aimed at the realization in the world of a particular end, are united in the global project which we are. But precisely because we are wholly choice and act, these partial projects are not determined by the global project. They must themselves be choices; and a certain margin of
contingency, of unpredictability, and of the absurd is
allowed to each of them although each project as it is
projected is a specification of the global project on the
occasion of particular elements in the situation and so is
always understood in relation to the totality of my being-
in-the world.... freedom is freedom of choosing but not
the freedom of not choosing. Not to choose in fact, is to
choose not to choose."47 Here we see Sartre arguing in
opposing ways - a) the particular is united with the
global  b) the particular is not united with the global
as the global cannot determine the particular and  1) we
are free and we are freedom  2) we are not free and we are
not freedom in so far as contingency is "allowed". To
"advance" the existential message these antinomous factors
are kept together without any attempt at resolution.
Therefore ambiguity is kept to mean meaningless as meanful
in the sense that man's being-in-the world is conceived
in "absurd" situations. Sartre is conceived in "absurd"
situations. Sartre gave the example of a gambler who has
resolved not to gamble to explify the necessity of
repetitive resolving to maintain himself not to gamble and
its absurdity and bad faith. Sartre gives the example of
a gambler who has resolved not to gamble any more.
Whenever he passes by the table where the play is on he is
free to join the game and break his resolution, but in
order not to play the gambler must translate his
resolution into "is been" structure. Sartre termed the
process with which the gambler restrains himself from playing as "synthetic apperception". Sartre here, unlike Kant, is not indicating a passive 'I think' kind of a 'self consciousness' but a transcendence effected by a consciousness. In this example, gamblers resolution not to gamble as "has been" of consciousness where "has been" is brought from the state of "no longer" into what it is not as "is been". The transcendence of what "it is not" to "is been" is a difficult transcendence. The difference between Kant and Sartre which we are trying to bring out, here, rests upon the difference in their basic notions of consciousness. Consciousness for Kant is a spiritual substance (whity of aperception) which is linked with the past and the future dimensions of the self. For Sartre consciousness is no-thing and this implies that 'concrete' unification of temporality is not possible. In our view Sartre can only accept consciousness as exclusive 'present'. Sartre's expression "is been" thus denotes only the present. We thus see the gambler in the "difficulty" where not choosing to resume to play is choosing not to choose. It logically implies that self will be making a choice the gambler in the example. Sartre had no control over this proposition meaning not choosing is equivalent to choosing.

Sartre tried to give a "passionate" touch to his philosophising on when he said we are "wholly choice". The use of metaphor defends ambiguity as a different kind of
knowing. For Sartre (like Kant) the determinations of the empirical world cannot condition or contradict my freedom which asserts, despite all evidence to the contrary, its absolute indivisibility. Sartre wrote: "Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free or he is not free at all." In Sartre (unlike in Kant) freedom is contradicted by itself without invalidating, in the least, the indivisibility of freedom. Sartre defined freedom: "Since freedom is a being-without-support and without-a-spring board, the project to be must be constantly renewed. I choose myself perpetually and can never be merely by virtue of having-been-chosen; otherwise I should fall into the pure and simple existence of the in-itself. The necessity of perpetually choosing myself is one with the pursued-pursuits which I am. But precisely because here we are dealing with a choice, this choice as it is made indicates in general other choices as possibles. The possibility of these other choices is neither made explicit nor posited, but it is lived in the feeling of unjustifiability; and it is this which is expressed by the fact of the absurdity of my choice and consequently my being. Thus my freedom eats away my freedom." Here we can identify two antinomies - 1 (a) freedom is not limited by something external to it (b) but yet freedom is totally negated. 2 (a) Absolute validity of freedom is categorically asserted (b) but yet the conditions of realization of freedom as contingency and facticity are given full weight. Within this antinomous context of
situation, Sartre proclaimed that "my freedom eats away my freedom." We shall now see how the antinomous structure of Sartre's freedom enables a categorical assertion and simultaneous negation. In this context the metaphorical exploration of freedom in Sartre's philosophy has raised to the level of a concept.

VALUE AS VALUELESS:

While terming "values" as "ambiguous" realities of Kierkegaard, Sartre wrote: "it is in its being the missing totality toward which a being makes itself be. It arises for a being, not as this being is what it is in full contingency, but as it is the foundation of its own nihilation. In this sense value haunts being as being founds itself but not as being is." Sartre, here is depicting the "double play of unilateral oppositions" as being the relation of Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. In this relation reciprocity is banned. Hence the relationship between Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself is also antinomous. Value "haunts" being in the sense, for Sartre, as the impossible possibility of the synthesis of For-itself and In-itself. Sartre wrote: "value is everywhere and nowhere; at the heart of the nihilating "reflection-reflecting", it is present and out-of-reach, and it is simply lived as the concrete meaning of that lack which makes my present being." Value as an impossible synthesis which presents as possible - For
itself - in itself - can exist only as "unrealisable totality. And this unrealisable totality, according to Sartre, must only be posited "everywhere and nowhere". We have, in an earlier section, noted that value has no independent being and Being-for-itself which lends being to nothingness is lending being to value also. Sartre here has no control over this proposition meaning "everywhere" is equivalent to "nowhere". But the metaphor in "value haunts being", and in "value is everywhere and nowhere", value is present and out of reach pose antinomous structure of Sartre's philosophy in fact. Thus, ambiguity's original nature of "concealing" is immediately turned into "revealing". Let us turn to how Sartre defined the relationship between For-itself and Being. Sartre wrote: "the For-itself is immediate presence to being and yet at the same time it slips in as an infinite distance between itself and being." This paradoxical relation between For-itself and Being becomes more paradoxical when Sartre describes it in terms of simultaneous 'immediate presence' and 'infinite distance'. There is a conceptual irreconcilability between the 'immediate presence' and the 'infinite distance' as Sartre poses them antinomously. Sartre's metaphorical cover effectively communicates the impossible unification (infinite distance between For-itself and Being) and possible separation (immediate presence of For-itself before Being) of For-itself and Being. Sartre compared this impossible unification to the "predicament" of an
ass trying to reach a carrot tied, beyond his reach, to the shaft of cart he is pulling. Sartre wrote: "Every effort on the part of the ass to seize the carrot results in advancing the whole apparatus and the cart itself, which always remains at the same distance from the ass. Thus we run after a possible which our very running causes to appear, which is nothing but our running itself, and which thereby is by definition out of reach. We run toward ourselves and we are - due to this very fact - the being which cannot be reunited with itself. In one sense the running is void of meaning since the goal is never given but invented and projected proportionately as we run toward it. In another sense we cannot refuse to it that meaning which it rejects since in spite of everything possibility is the meaning of the for-itself. Thus there is and there is not a meaning in the flight." This passage gives the gist of what existentialism means.

Being-in-the-world-the human reality's being is always recreated and reinvented in order to present itself not as givenness but as an act of a choice. According to Sartre, the separation For-itself from Being is necessary by definition in order to preserve the 'categorical assertion' of freedom. As Sartre performs negative determination of freedom, it is not surprising that its logical extreme is running toward ourselves. We have already noted that for Sartre anguish is a reflective apprehension of self as nothingness or total freedom.
Flight from anguish is one good example Sartre can give for "running toward ourselves". Authenticity, for Sartre is localised in the act of running though it is "meaningless meaning or "meaningful meaninglessness". This kind of generalising by leads problems of differentiation as Sartre imposes a forcible identity on particularities as devoid of distinctions. Sartre wrote: "Many men, in fact, know that the goal of their pursuit is being; and to the extent they possess this knowledge, they refrain from appropriating things for their own sake and try to realise the symbolic appropriation of their being-in-itself. But to the extent that this attempt still shares in the spirit of seriousness and that these men can still believe that their mission of effecting the existence of the in-itself-for-itself is written in things, they are condemned to despair; for they discover at the same time that all human activities are equivalent (for they all tend to sacrifice man in order that the self-cause may arise) and that all are on principle doomed to failure. Thus it amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations.56

This passage from the conclusion of Being and Nothingness is crucial to the thesis. We are proposing that, even if Sartre does not quote or refer to Marxism extensively, he is proposing an alternative to Marxism and we can take Being and Nothingness as Sartre's "invisible" dialogue with Marxism. We have noted earlier that Sartre
alleges marxism to be the philosophy of seriousness which
cannot grant freedom of choice to man. Here Sartre's use
of the phrase 'the spirit of seriousness' is to refer to
Marxism as "crude materialism". Sartre's existential
psychoanalysis "self claims" as a revelation of man's real
goal. The real goal of man is to "realise" being as a
'synthetic fusion' of the in-itself with the for-itself.
According to Sartre 'existential psychoanalysis' is going
to acquaint man with his "passion". Sartre, in the above
quoted passage, is posing two antinomous choices -
appropriation of things vs symbolic appropriation of
things as Being-in-itself. Here Sartre seem to argue that
those men who have the knowledge that their pursuit is
being would refrain from appropriating things in favour of
symbolic appropriation of thing-in-itself. However,
Sartre's conditional permission for one to symbolically
appropriate 'objects' independent of consciousness would
not led the act beyond suspicion of being limited by the
"spirit of seriousness". The appropriation of things as
well as the symbolic appropriation of things involve the
'spirit of seriousness directly or indirectly. Thus,
Sartre's advocating one thing and distinguishing another
is not to be consistent in the sense that both replace
each other or occur together. The antinomous structure of
the argument crumbles but in order to retain a more
fundamental antinomous structure that a) objects or
things have independent existence - independent of
consciousness, and simultaneously the antithesis b) that
the independent existence of objects or things need a
witness, a human mind to recapture lived experience and in
the absence of it, neither ontic nor epistemic dimensions
of either things or the nature of knowing is known. In
this crucial passage, Sartre, on the basis of the non-
destructive nature of appropriation of "things" and
"symbolic appropriation" of the thing-in-itself, assumes
identical nature of all human activities. In vouch of
absolute freedom, Sartre is committed to believe that 'all
men are self made' (Sartre's saying that for they all tend
to sacrifice man in order that the self cause may arise).
This consequently lead Sartre to equate two human
"situations" 'whether one gets drunk alone' or 'one is a
leader of nations'.

We may note that the genesis of 'metaphor', in
Sartre, is not rooted in the use of "figures of speech"
but in his philosophising itself. Sartre simply compared
in plain language (without using metaphorical language)
two human situations. The inference of the proposition
worked out by Sartre that all human activity is equal or
'all men are self-made' has unavoidable, unconcealable
consequences of argumentation. Apart from Sartre's
recognition and continuous acknowledgement and "critical"
use of the categories "idealism" and "materialism", there
are real oppositions and contradictions in a society. To
say all human activity is equal is to close one's eyes to
contradictions, conflicts and oppositions in a society or to transcend them at a metaphysical level. As we argued, Sartre is presenting an alternative to Marxism, so that when he says that ‘all human activity is equal’ he is replacing the ‘class struggle’ concept of Marxism with his own concept of ‘class collaboration’ and in this way Sartre’s "metaphor" is presented as an alternative to Marx’s "dialectic".

Let us see how Sartre presents his concepts of causality, motion, space and time as opposed to Marxist concepts. Sartre defined causality as: "the apprehension of the "appeared" before it appears, as being already there in its own nothingness so as to prepare its apparition. Causality is simply the first apprehension of the temporality of the "appeared" as an ekstatic mode of being. But the adventurous character of the event, as the ekstatic constitution of the apparition, disintegrates in the very perception; the before and after are fixed in its nothingness-in itself, the "appeared" in its indifferent self identity non-being of the appeared that prior instant is revealed as an indifferent plenitude of the being existing at that instant, the relation of causality disintegrates into a pure relation of exteriority between the "thises" prior to the "appeared" and the "appeared" itself". Sartre makes it clear that the ideal of causality is not the negation of the "appeared" 'as such'. But at the same time, Sartre defines causality
as the "apprehension" of the "appeared" before it appears and this "apprehension" is in ekstatic (Temporal, Reflective and Being-for-others) terms placed in nothingness-in-itself. Just as Sartre conceived "negation proper", it follows from this that he conceived "causality proper" not as abstraction but as ontic mode of Being-for-itself to be its own "nothingness". In line with the concept of causality, Sartre defined time: "universal time is revealed as present vacillation, already in the past it is no longer anything but an evanescent line, like the wake of a ship which fades away; in the future it is not at all, for it is unable to be its own project. It is like the steady progression of a lizard on the wall. Moreover its being has inapprehensible ambiguity of the instant, for one could not say either that it is or that it is not; in addition it no sooner appears than it is already surpassed and exterior to itself." Sartre clearly states that universal time belongs to the "present" of Being-for-itself (present vacillation). Universal time or time for Sartre is always mediated, expressed through the "is" and "is not" nature of Being-for-itself as perpetual present. According to Sartre, Being-for-itself always presents itself as "consciousness as self-consciousness". Not even for a moment does he argue that consciousness can have a different mode than this except in "death". Death, for Sartre, transcends all temporality of the human being into "essence", (whose existence is like a statute, can never again in who's
being existence precedes essence), into "past" (which for ever is past, which can gain no more "supplies" from "future" or "present", whose essence is freezed), into nothingness-in-itself (or concrete nothingness, an ontic abstraction, devoid of extension or thought). Thus, temporality is the capacity of the "witness" to be able to "observe" the steady progression of a lizard and, at the same time, to be able to "sense" the inapprehensible ambiguity of each instant of the lizard's progression. To put it in short Sartre's example of a moving lizard explicitly brings out his basic distinction between Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. Being-in-itself for Sartre is characterised by intertia cannot any temporality. Thus the temporality is projected on the lizard through the apprehension of Being-for-itself. Sartre, on the one hand, poses the witness (conditional, necessary) as capable of apprehension of the steady progression of the lizard on the wall. On the other hand, he also poses each instant of the progression of the lizard as inapprehensible ambiguity which is to be witnessed by the witness For-itself. Thus the antinomous structure of Sartre's argument of universal time, with its unilateral oppositions 'apprehension vs ambiguity' (these elements neither infer from each other nor interact) lead to such expression as 'the ambiguity of apprehension' or 'apprehension of ambiguity'. In either of the metaphorical expressions, epistemic clarity is not possible because of
Sartre's complicated knitting of antinomy, metaphor and ambiguity.

Sartre defined space as exteriority which is not consciousness and motion as non-being or motion as having "no more" being. Sartre wrote: "The only relation which the For-itself can originally apprehend on these thises (from this to this as motion -Tilak) is the relation of exteriority to self. For since exteriority is nothing, a being must exist which is to itself its own relation in order that there may be "exteriority to self". That exteriority can be discovered only by a being which is already to itself over there what it is here - that is a consciousness. This exteriority-to-self, which appears as a pure disorder of being-that is, as the impossibility which exists for certain "thises" simultaneously to be themselves and to be their own nothingness - this must be indicated by something which exists as nothing in the world; that is as a substantiated nothing. Since exteriority-to-self is in no way ekstatic, the relation of a moving body to itself is a pure relation of indifference and can be revealed only to a witness,...... This nothing which measures and signifies exteriority - to self is the trajectory, as the constitution of exteriority in the unity of a single being. The trajectory is the line which is described - that is, an abrupt appearance of synthetic unity in space, a counterfeit which collapses immediately into the infinite multiplicity of exteriority, when this
is at rest, space is: when in motion space is engendered or becomes the trajectory never is, since it is nothing, it vanishes immediately into purely external relations between different places that is, in the simple exteriority of indifference or spatiality. Motion has no more of being, it is the least being of a being which can neither arrive nor be abolished nor wholly be. Motion is the upsurge of the exteriority of indifference at the very heart of the in-itself. This pure vacillation of being is a contingent venture of being. The For-itself can apprehend it only across the temporal ekstasis and in an ekstatic permanent identification of the moving body with itself. This identification does not suppose any operation and in particular no "synthesis of recognition", for the For-itself it is only the unity of ekstatic being of the past with the present."58 Here in this passage we can clearly see how motion, space, time and causality are related to For-itself in Sartre's philosophy. Sartre proposed a concept of "thises" to explain Being-For-itself's tendency to be nothingness-in-itself, when it is to grandeur through different processes causality, motion, time, space etc. Much akin to the fundamental antinomous structure of the 'bipolarity' between Being-For-itself and Being-in-itself, Sartre seemed to argue that a) exteriority is 'discovered' by consciousness and b) exteriority is nothing (no-thing). Here the unilateral "opposition" between "exteriority" being independent of consciousness - discovered consciousness, and exteriority
being consciousness - as consciousness in its being nothingness (and exteriority is nothing) melts into non-epistemic identity between existence of exteriority and existence of consciousness. But Sartre denies such "synthetic recognition" of identity without positing the "reciprocity" of the unilateral oppositions. Sartre's cover up of this lack in his argument is evident when he denies ekstatic being to exteriority as independent of self. Causality, motion, time and space, for Sartre are only particularities of nothingness-in-itself. Sartre's expressions before and after, appeared - before appearing, neither abolished - nor wholly be - are different ways of notifying-is-ness and is not-ness, everywhere-ness and nowhere-ness of Being-for-itself. For Sartre, space has a being when motion rests and when motion is in motion space becomes.

Sartre's conceptualisation is clearly alternative to the Marxist conceptualisation of causality, time, space, motion. Engels defined motion as "the mode of existence of matter". Marx and Engels argued that space and time are necessary forms of material existence, independent of consciousness. The Marxist conception of causality is that causality is posited on natural processes, it is not abstracted from mere thought. Engels wrote: "The first thing that strikes us in considering matter in motion is the interconnection of the individual motions of separate bodies, their being determined by one
another. But not only we find that a particular motion is followed by another, we find also that we can evoke a particular emotion by setting up the conditions in which it takes place in nature, that we can ever produce motions which do not occur at all in nature .... In this way by the activity of human beings, the idea of causality becomes established, the idea that one motion is the cause of the another. True, the regular sequence of certain natural phenomenon can by itself give rise to the idea of causality: the heat and light that come with the sun; but this affords no proof, and to that extent Hume's scepticism was correct in saying that a regular port hoc can never establish propter hoc. But the activity of human beings forms the test of causality. We find in this passage the difference between the Marxian notion of causality and the Sartrean notion of causality. Sartre places causality's entire weight in Being-for-itself or human consciousness. Marxism places causality in nature as independent of consciousness in a different dialectical sense. For Sartre, human being is a passive witness to "causality" as the apprehension of the "appeared" before "appearing". But unlike Sartre, Marxism gives human practice as a vindication of causality, as a natural process. For Hume, constant occurrence and reoccurrence of certain phenomena in repetitive manner cannot from the proof of causal connection as a necessary one. Both Engels and Sartre agreed with Hume that the repetitive
occurrence of events given in sense experience cannot constitute the basis for universal, necessary, causal connections. Much in the spirit of Engel's agreement with Hume, Sartre wrote: "Each impression on the mind is in itself what it is; it is isolated in its present plenitude and does not allow any trace of the future or any lack. Hume, when he issued his famous challenge, was concerned with establishing this law, which he claimed to derive from experience; one can at will examine any impression strong or weak; one will never find anything in it but itself so that any connection with an antecedent or a consequent, no matter how constant it may be, remains unintelligible." But unlike Engels, Sartre limits causality as "apprehension" of "appeared" before appearing in consciousness. For Sartre, unlike for Marxian philosophy, transcendence is purely an act of For-itself or directly or indirectly referred to For-itself. In marxian philosophy, causality, motion, space-time are natural laws with whose knowledge man continuously manipulates nature to his favour. Space and time, in Marxism are inseparable and they are necessary conditional forms of materiality. In Sartrean philosophy, space and time acquire a false unity not as transcendent beings but as "sounded" in nothingness-in-itself. Sartre, unlike in Marxian philosophy assumes motion and rest as 'unilateral' oppositions. Engels argued that rest is also a form of motion and motion is always absolute, relative to rest, which is always relative motion.
We have so far studied how antinomous pairs of Sartre's philosophy Being - Nothingness, In-itself - For-itself, self-other, Freedom-contigency, possibility-necessity, authenticity-Bad-faith, give rise to necessary ambiguities in a metaphorical way. We have not discussed metaphor in Sartre to disapprove of metaphor, but to understand how metaphor is necessary to put antinomous structures of his philosophy in an effective, emotive, language. It seems to us that Sartre's use of metaphor is a way of philosophising against Marx. We may point out here that Marx also makes use of metaphors but of an expression of dialectical apposition. It may not be irrelevant here to illustrate an example from Marx. Marx, while defining religion, wrote: "Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also a protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people." Without metaphor (sigh, heart, opium) Marx could not have expressed his thought with unlimited reflection within a small paragraph. We agree with Istvan Meszorás who argued that, in Sartre, metaphor was a necessary evil and definitely not taughtology or advocated meaninglessness. But we shall additionally argue that Sartre choose antinomous structure to his philosophy so that it appears to be "dialectical" and as an effective way of proposing an alternative to Marxist philosophy. We
can understand the influence of Marxist philosophy on Sartre in the context of the writing *Being and Nothingness* in Sartre’s own testimony: "Since I have broken my inferiority complex vis-a-vis the extreme left, I feel a freedom of thought which I never had before. Also vis-a-vis the phenomenologists. It seems to me that I am well on the way of finding myself."64

**SELF AND BEING-WITH-THE-OThERS**

According to Sartre, self can have opposed relations with the other. For Sartre, this opposition has two modes - 1) Either the self attempted to assimilate the other’s freedom into our freedom while simultaneously trying to preserve his freedom and the self’s otherness or 2) the self attempted to reduce the other’s freedom into ‘objectified’ object. For Sartre, human relations are a failure, because each self which tried to concretely relate with the other was bound to contain the relation in the above-stated two modes and each mode necessarily implied the other. Sartre, in his characteristic way of generalising through particularising and particularising through generalising, forgot to the posit general as general and the particular as particular. Sartre, while expounding man’s freedom as failure and failure as freedom, extended it to a temporal-free history of human beings. Sartre wrote: "The history of a life whatever it may be, is a history of failure."65 According to Sartre,
whether the self was in good faith or in bad-faith, the very attempt of the self to preserve the other's freedom implied the danger of turning the other's freedom into an object. The only consolation in this failure according to Sartre was that we can always interpret that this objectified freedom was the freedom of the other as subject. Nevertheless this was a failure of For-itself's project because 'recognition' of the other as a subject was through analogy and not through pre-reflective cogito's 'lived experience'. Sartre perceived the self's relations with others as conflict-bound. This did not mean that Sartre had no conception of co-operation of self in its concrete relations with others.

SHAME, LOOK AND BAD-FAITH:

As we have noted earlier that the negative conduct of human reality made it distinctive from the Being-in-itself. According to Sartre, human reality was its own time and possibility. To put it in a simpler way, human-reality for Sartre is For-itself. Sartre defined anguish to be anguish before oneself and revealed consciousness as non-thetic consciousness being-freedom. Different to this, Sartre presented shame as shame before the other, was not a pure external relation. For Sartre, shame revealed the self as a view of itself before the other. Sartre explained that shame indicated both our responsibility for our actions and the immediate relation of our actions to "others".

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Sartre's concept of look explained his concept of shame in a better way. Sartre interpreted the self's relationship with the other through the look 'as disintegration of self's universe contained within the limits of the same universe'. Sartre explained how a world was opened up by the look, when he wrote: "Rather it appears that the world has a kind of drain hole in the middle of its being and that it is perpetually flowing off through this hole. The universe, the flow and the drain whole are all once again recovered, reapprehended and fixed as an object. All this is there for me as a partial structure of the world, even though the total disintegration of the universe is involved."66 According to Sartre, the self's intimate experience of the other and the self's hypothetication of the other's view of the self, reveals the self as being-seen-by another. For Sartre, to be looked at by the other was the truth of the self looking at the other. Sartre wrote: "Being-seen-by-the other" is the truth of "seeing-the-other"67. Sartre argued on this basis that the notion of the other cannot aim at an extra-mundane consciousness. Sartre was committed to the truth that man can be known through his relations with the world and with others in the world. But, after conceiving the world as objective ground of man, Sartre turned this ground into human reality incarnated and human-reality as exclusively Being-for-itself. Sartre gave an excellent example for explaining
the "necessity" of the other in order for the self to be
the self. Sartre wrote: "Let us imagine that moved by
jealousy, curiosity or vice I have just glued my ear to
the door and looked through a keyhole. I am alone and on
the level of a non-thetic self consciousness. This means
first of all that there is no self to inhabit my
consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer my
acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way known;
I am my acts and hence they carry in themselves their
whole justification. I am a pure consciousness of things,
and things, caught up in the circuit of my selfness, offer
to me their potentialities as the proof of my non-thetic
consciousness (of) my own possibilities. This means that
behind that door a spectacle is presented as "to be seen",
a conversation as "to be heard". The door and the key hole
are at once both instruments and obstacles; they are
presented as "to be handled with care", the key hole is
given as "to be looked through close by and a little to
one side" etc. Hence from this moment "I do what I have to
do". No transcending view comes, to confer upon my acts
the character of a given on which a judgement can be
brought to bear. My consciousness sticks to my acts, it is
my acts; and my acts are commanded only by the ends to be
attained and by the instruments to be employed. My
attitude, for example, has no "outside"; it is a pure
process of relating the instrument (the key hole) to the
end to be attained (the spectacle to be seen), a pure mode
of losing myself in the world, of causing myself to be
drunk in by things as ink is by a blotter in order that an instrumental complex oriented toward an end may be synthetically detached on the ground of the world. The order is reverse of causal order. It is the end to be attained which organises all the moments which precede it. The end justifies the means; the means do not exist for themselves and outside the end. 68 This long passage was typical of the Sartrean way of philosophising. Sartre, under the cover of metaphorical language (to be drunk by things) proposed these following "oppositions" a) The door, the key hole were at once both instruments and obstacles. b) The attitude of the person watching through the key hole had no "outside" but only inside. c) The end justifies the means; the means do not exist for themselves and outside the end. These three "oppositions" were oppositions in relation to the (self) non-thetic consciousness of the key hole watcher. Sartre, in order to argue the identity of the existence of the key hole watcher with consciousness adapted different "opposed" principles which might appear as "dialectical" principles. Sartre placed instrumentalities like the key hole or the door as mere "slaves" of the non-thetic consciousness, which cannot determine the possibilities of the non-thetic consciousness. Besides that, the attitude of the key hole watcher, according to Sartre, had only inwardness but not outwardness. This denied the otherwise Sartrean proposals that the key hole watcher was "drunk in by things" and
that "the spectacle to be seen" was the end and not the means. This being the "climax", Sartre brought an "anti-climax" to this when he introduced the third being who gave a sense of shame to the key hole watcher. The non-thetic consciousness of the key hole watcher, according to Sartre, immediately turned into the positional consciousness of self. Here the universe which was disintegrated by things (drunk in by things), was brought back by the sense of shame. This simultaneous disintegration and regeneration of the universe, as effected by For-itself in Sartrean interpretations was 'limitedly' dialectical (in the sense that it was placed within the realm of Being-for-itself). For Sartre, the whole process of which the look undergone was a process entirely ontological and not epistemological. Sartre wrote: "... originally the bond between my unreflective consciousness and my ego, which is being looked at, is a bond not of knowing but of being. Beyond any knowledge which I can have, I am this self which another knows. And this self which I am - this I am in the world which the other has made alien to me, for the other's look embraces my being and correlatively the walls, the door, the key hole." In a sense the my whole watcher was caught by a third person and for Sartre there was no need of the full presence of the third person, it was enough if the sound of the footsteps was noticed by the key hole watcher. Sartre defined key hole watchers as being shameful before the other, fulfilling the general criterion of Being-for-
itself as being "what it is not and which is not what it is". Sartre explained the situation of a key hole watcher to be a situation where he was incapable of any definition of himself. In Sartrean language, the key hole watcher 'is what he is not' because 'he is not what he is'. Thus, the key hole watcher, for Sartre, becomes his own nothingness. Sartre argued that the key hole watcher refused to define himself as a key hole watcher. This, according to Sartre, was the genesis of bad-faith.

Sartre defined bad-faith as lying to one-self within the unity of a single consciousness. Sartre explained that through bad-faith a person sought to escape from the responsible freedom of Being-for-itself. According to Sartre, bad-faith made Being-for-itself vacillate between transcendence and facticity. Bad-faith enabled Being-for-itself to recognise either facticity or transcendence or to synthesise both. We have noted earlier that Sartre defined consciousness as being, whose nature of which was to be conscious of the nothingness of its being. Bad-faith situation, according to Sartre, indicated conflict-oriented situation where human persons tried to take away each others freedom. Sartre described consciousness as: "It constitutes itself in its own flesh as the nihilation of a possibility which another human reality projects as its possibility. For the reason it must arise in the world as a Not; it is as a Not that
the slave apprehends the master, or that the prisoner who is trying to escape sees the guard who is watching him. There are even men (e.g. caretakers, overseers, goalers) whose social reality is uniquely that of the Not, who will live and die, having forever been only a Not upon the earth. Others so as to make the Not a part of their subjectivity, establish their human personality as a perpetual negation."  

This was, according to Sartre, normal people experiencing bad-faith and they 'announce' that they were. In lying, according to Sartre, a man by "affirming truth within himself, denying it in his words, and denying that negation as such" cannot put to into the play the inner structure of present consciousness. For Sartre, bad-faith, different unlike from a lie, required an ontological foundation, Sartre argued that one could not lie about what he was ignorant of or when he was mistaken or when he was spreading an error about which he himself was duped. Thus Sartre placed the lie as representing an intermediary between falsehood and bad-faith. Sartre explained that lie was a behaviour of transcendence whereas as bad-faith was a refusal to identify either with transcendence or facticity. In being-with-the other situation, lying became a normal phenomenon and Sartre construed that the lier must possess complete comprehension of the truth which was being altered. Lying, Sartre argued, was always lying to the other whereas bad-faith was a lie to one's own self.  

Bad-faith, for Sartre, was simultaneously hiding a displeasing
truth and presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. Unlike in lying, Sartre described that in bad-faith the deceiver-deceived dualism did not exist. Bad-faith, according to Sartre, was a single unity of consciousness. The question Sartre attempted to answer against the limitations of interpretation (Freud's for example) was - whether a person in bad-faith experience was in his self awareness or what was the status of non-thetic consciousness in bad-faith situation? To this, Sartre answered that there was no autonomous consciousness between unconscious and consciousness. Here, Sartre seemed to refute the Freudian divide of consciousness as conscious-unconscious and subconsciousness in defending unity of single consciousness. Sartre wrote: "All knowing is consciousness of knowing." Bad-faith did not suppress consciousness as a non-thetic awareness of itself and Sartre argued that a psychic patient also reflected this primary mode of consciousness as a foundation of its self awareness. Sartre, while disagreeing with Freud for placing bad-faith in the unconscious, appreciated a Viennese psychiatrist Steckel who discovered that 'the crux of psychosis was conscious'. Sartre defined bad-faith as 'The very essence of the reflexive idea of hiding something from oneself implies the unity of one and the same psychic mechanism and consequently a double activity in the heart of unity, tending on the one hand to maintain and locate the thing to be concealed and on the other hand to repress and
disguise it." Sartre, thus, argued against any compartmentalisation of consciousness and maintained that bad-faith, though a lie to oneself, was nevertheless a consciousness. We have noted earlier that according to Sartre bad-faith was a refusal to identify either with transcendence or with facticity. But, for Sartre, that was only from a Being-for-itself point of view. But from the point of human reality as a Being-with-the-others, for Sartre, a human being who was in bad-faith, was at once a facticity and a transcendence. Sartre, while defining bad-faith as `double property human being', wrote: "It is a certain art of forming contradictory concepts which unite in themselves both in idea and the negation of that idea. The basic concept which is thus endangered, utilizes the double property of the human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcendence. These two aspects of human reality are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination. But bad faith does not wish either to coordinate them nor to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their differences. It must affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends the one, he can find himself abruptly faced with the other." Sartre described the bad faith situation in the above quoted passage striking way. Whether in seemingly "dialectical" language or in passionate metaphorical language, Sartre tried to present "unilateral" opposition
as "dialectical" opposition. Sartre rightly placed the lie as well as bad faith as forms of human conduct in the wake of human reality's Being-with-the others. As we noted, in the above quoted passage Sartre, used two "dialectical" expressions that a) 'bad faith seeks to affirm the identity of facticity and transcendence while preserving their differences' and b) 'bad faith affirms facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity. As propositions these were clear "dialectical" propositions. But they quickly boiled down to remain unilateral oppositions when Sartre defined good faith or sincerity as a form of bad faith. Agreeably, bad faith, as Sartre presented it, was a fact of life and equally so was good faith. Sartre's inconsistency can be identified as he presents his concepts - shame, look, bad-faith, as forms of human conduct which depend on 'nothingness' nihilation and negation and not their counterparts.

Sartre, in order to define good faith as a form of bad faith must first of all prove the primacy of bad-faith as an intimate structure within consciousness. This proof was inevitably linked with the question whether the genesis of bad faith was free from the genesis of good faith. Or to put it in a different way, why cannot good faith negate bad faith? The answer was obvious - Sartre while pre-positing the primacy of negation and the primacy of self in self's relation with the other assigned not only a negative structure to consciousness but also a
"negative morality". Sartre defined self's relations with the others as abstracted from the "nuances" of the self itself. Therefore whatever oppositions Sartre tried to present in his theorizations remained unilateral and not dialectical. Sartre distinguished good and bad faith when he wrote: "Good faith seeks to flee the inner disintegration of my being-in the direction of the in itself which it should be and is not. Bad-faith seeks to flee the in itself by means of the inner disintegration of my being. But it denies this very disintegration as it denies that it is itself bad faith." This difference was for Sartre over shadowed by identity between the two. Both good faith and bad faith were presented essentially as fleeing from one's own self and, for Sartre, Being-for-itself took refuge in the case of the former and in the case of the latter in "not-believing-what-one-believes". Thus Sartre made inauthenticity (bad-faith) as the permanent structure of alienated human existence. At the cost of all virtues of human being, Sartre committed to existential project in presenting 'concrete nothingness' as revealed by self's relations with the others.

EXISTENCE OF OTHERS: SARTRE, HEGEL, HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER:

Sartre understood that the Kantian concept of the other presented the other as a regulative principle. Regulative principle, according to Sartre, for Kant was a
helper in organising one's experiences which actually need not be. Sartre argued that even Kant's concept of causality could not bridge the gap between the self and the other. Sartre pointed out that for Kant, causality was meant to unify the phenomena of one and the same experience and cannot unify the temporal flow of one's consciousness with that of the other. Post-Kantian idealists, according to Sartre, while insisting on the reality of the other reverted to Cartesian realism. Sartre made the distinction between idealism and realism as logically dependent upon the assertion of the existence. And he held that once god's existence is negated the distinction between idealism and realism also disappears. He advocated that just as the self and the other turn into each other, in the same way idealism and realism get transform into each other. But for Sartre, the principle of God was self-contradictory and the relation between the self and the other was not external (the self and the other were not separated by bodies or the self's relation with the other was a relation in space).

Hegel, according to Sartre, interpreted the self's relation with the other on the level of being. For Hegel, the self in its decisive determinations as selfhood was necessitated by an invariable relation with the other. But in Hegel the necessity of the other as a relation to the self in order for the self to be self was not a brute identity. The Hegelian dialectic indicated through its
"moments" a progressive realization of the self as that was not the other. For Hegel, the very being of consciousness as self-consciousness was constituted by consciousness "thrown back" to itself as not the consciousness of the other. The Self's recognition of the other as self-consciousness would not redeem the self's realisation that its right was in opposition to the other. The other as the self's being forced the self to represent itself as being elsewhere and this problem in Hegel, according to Sartre, was due to the subject-object dichotomy and the consequence - the impure reflection. Sartre argued that in spite of Hegel being an advance beyond Husserl, Hegel remained on the level of knowledge rather than on the level of being. Sartre, quite correctly opposed the identity of being and knowledge, for this would present both subject as well as object as "given".

A century later than Hegel Husserl attempted to interpret the relation between the self and the other as a necessary structure of consciousness which made intersubjectivity possible. For Husserl, the objectivity of an apple, as the synthetic unity of all possible appearances depended on self's relation with the other minds. But this self, according to Sartre, was understood by Husserl as transcendental self and not as empirical self. For Husserl the relation of transcendental self to the other was on the level of meaning and could not
guarantee the empirical existence of the other. According to Sartre, even at the level of meaning, Husserl stagnated with the problem of the impossibility of knowing the other as the other knows himself. For Husserl, the other was known through the self’s presence and the other’s absence which was embodied in an empty intention and not in an internal relation of concrete nothingness.

According to Sartre, Heidegger, in *Being and Time* accomplished what Hegel and Husserl failed to accomplish. Heidegger, according to Sartre, had rightly characterised the existence of the other as a false problem. For Heidegger, the human reality or Dasiens was part of that synthetic relation - *Being-in-the-world* and was related to the instrumentality of things and the world through a more primary relation to other Dasiens. This ontological link, according to Sartre, for Heidegger was conditioned by our freedom as well as the responsibility of the mode how were related with the other. Sartre adapted Heidegger's notion "Being-with" (Meisteim) in a slightly different way. According to Heidegger, when self realises "being-with" as impersonal relation (vs object) realised its inauthenticity (transcendence). In a similar way, for Heidegger when self realises "being-with" as a personal relation (we subject) realised its authenticity (transcendence). Heidegger’s philosophy, according to Sartre suffered from the general difficulty of passing from the universal to the particular. We have noted
earlier that Sartre advocated that the self be made contemporaneous with the world. Thus, for Heidegger the freedom and the possibilities of the self constituted the reality of the world, but this 'pure reflection' could not guarantee the existence of the others. Sartre rightly accused Heidegger of being Kantian in approach for Heidegger made a priori description of a universally, necessary, transcendental subject, as conditional. It is conditional in the sense that in order for the self to have any relationship with the other transcendental subject is necessarily presupposed. Sartre explained that, for Heidegger, the transcendental subject's experience of the world was important, regardless of what existed. Sartre argued that Heidegger's concept of transcendence was in bad faith resulting in the notion that there was no intrinsic immediate relation to reality other than that of the self. In our examination of Sartre's concepts of shame, look, bad faith we find, different from Sartrean critique of Heidegger, - the self being made all reality for itself.

BODY AND MIND:

Sartre, unlike the realists did not present body as a medium of relation between the self and the other. For Sartre, body had three meanings for human reality. They were a) the body was Being-for-itself's past and a concrete way of its existence b) self's attempts to objectify the other by treating his body as one subject
among others meant that the self understood its body by analogy with the other’s body and c) self’s objectification of its body and the other’s body was often an attempt to escape both transcendence of self and self relation with in-itself caused by the factual existence of others. A human being by nature, according to Sartre, is a there being. Sartre used a special term "il y a" (there is) to indicate the world as objects rather than as a "meaningless", undifferentiated Being-in-itself. This Sartrean position must not be taken as a recognition of the independent nature of the world of objects, but on the contrary, Sartre defined "il y a" in terms of Being-for-itself only. This "il y a" (there is), for Sartre resulted from the upsurge into being ‘on the part of the For itself’. Thus Sartre consistently maintained the for-itself’s capacity to nihilate In-itself. Sartre explained that body was Being-for-itself and its facticity. Sense perception for Sartre, constantly undertook nihilations of whatever was perceived. Without a human body and its sensory power, Sartre rightly construed that Being-for-itself could not self-impose itself on all perceptions as ‘negative’. Unlike the realists who made sensory knowledge as comparative and relative knowledge, Sartre viewed knowledge through the senses as an ‘upsurge of consciousness’ by which the For-itself was maintained as not In-itself. For Sartre, the assertion of consciousness is always through a negation. Thus, in Sartre’s view when in sense perception sound or odour we perceived,
consciousness presents, itself as not-colour, not sound not odour etc. Since for Sartre consciousness is always a consciousness of something and yet it itself is nothing. Therefore, its assertion can be possible only through negation. And consciousness is aware of itself only through transcendent determination of colour, odour, sound, etc. Here, we can see Sartre being to be consistent with his position 'all negation is determination'. According to Sartre, by virtue of the senses the body exhibited a two fold contingency - necessity relation in the mode contingency - necessity - contingency. Just as Being-for-itself was marked by the primacy of negation, for Sartre, the being of body was marked by the primacy of "contingency". Though contingency deceptively appears to be necessity, Sartre argued that the nature of the body as a tool was known to the self as it realized by analogy of the other's body. Sartre construed that the body revealed human reality as instrumentality, as place etc. Sartre wrote: "Thus my body is indicated originally by instrumental complexes and secondarily by destructive devices. I live my body in danger as regards menacing machines as for manageable instruments. My body is everywhere. The bomb which destroys my house also damages my body in so far as the house was already an indication of my body. This is why my body always extends across the tool which it utilises; it is at the end of the cane on which I lean and against the earth; it is at the end of
the telescope which shows me the stars: it is on the chair, in the whole house; for it is my adaptation to these tools." Sartre while arguing the concept of 'instrumentality' as a nature of human reality consistently crafted the existentialist idea that "human beings are thingified as much as things are humanised." Sartre defined body as facticity not only as instrumentality but also as precipitated past. Sartre described that the very being pre-reflective cogito surpassed itself towards the future as it equally was the lived experience of the body. For Sartre, things within For-itself's point of view were objects, but body was not an object. Sartre argued that body was the context of all our awarenesses of things and still body was not an object. Sartre explained that body could not become an object because 'we exist our bodies'. For Sartre, to exist meant to exist as body. Here when Sartre proclaimed that one exists through one's looks apparently his position appears to be a materialistic one. This is the reason we do not classify him as idealist in the classical sense. The chain of arguments in that dependant upon viewing Sartre's philosophy in its totality and thus we argue that the idealist elements are dominant. Body has another important dimension - being-for-others. According to Sartre body has a Being-for-others. This was demonstrated by Sartre when he presented his concepts shame, look and bad faith. Sartre explained that in the situations of shame, look and bad faith, self realises how its body is a being
for others and through the examination of other’s body is being-for-me. Sartre seemed to propose a thesis as follows: Primarily, consciousness was For-itself and the body was the precise way in which consciousness existed its facticity. We have noted that for Sartre human reality was For-itself and the phenomena of shame, look, bad faith demonstrated that there was no hidden outwardness or something of which we were not conscious. Sartre wrote: "The perception of my body is placed chronologically after the perception of the body of the other." For Sartre, the body was the instrument of the self and it was self’s facticity of being "in-the-midst-of-the world". Sartre defined self’s potential to be "in-the-midst-of-the world" depending on its capacity to surpass body as facticity. Sartre wrote: "But why is it so astonishing that certain structures of my body, without ceasing to be a centre of reference for objects of the world, are ordered from a radically different point of view as compared with other objects in such a way that along with the objects they point to one of my sense organs as a partial centre of reference raising itself as a figure on the body-as-a-ground?" Sartre answered this question that because 'my eye by nature cannot see itself' there was a difference of reference of objects to the sense organs and of the body to the objects. Sartre gave primacy to consciousness than to body as its facticity. Sartre while committing himself to the fact of contingency as
fundamental to existence of all knowing and being wrote:

"......the necessity of for-itself to arise as a concrete point of view on the world as if it were an ideal obligation strictly reducible to knowable relations between objects and to simple rules for the development of my achieved knowledge. But instead we ought to see here the necessity of a concrete and contingent existence in the midst of the world." By regarding body to be contingent and dependent on perception, Sartre seemed to oscillate it between idealism and materialism.
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