"Philosophers do not spring up like mushrooms out of the ground; they are products of their time, of their nation, whose most subtle and valuable juices flow in the ideas of philosophy. The same spirit that constructs railways with the hands of workers, constructs philosophical systems in the brains of philosophers. Philosophy does not exist outside the world, any more than the brain exists outside man because it is not situated in the stomach. But philosophy, of course, exists in the world through the brain before it stands with its feet on the ground, whereas many other spheres of human activity have long had their feet rooted in the ground and pluck with their hands the fruits of the world before they have any inkling that the "head" also belongs to this world, or that this world is the world of the head."

- Karl Marx

Sartre is a philosopher and of the existentialist kind. The word existentialism or existentialist did not figure in any of Sartre's early works until he wrote "Existentialism and Humanism". Heidegger did not like such a characterisation of his philosophy. The term existentialism is well known now, as it refers to the thinking of Kierkegaard, and publicised works of Heidegger. However, Simone de Beauvoir records
her ignorance of the term "existentialist", when asked by a friend whether she can be characterised by such term, which was coined by Gabriel Marcel.

In the year 1975, to a question whether he still accepted the label "existentialist", Sartre replied in the half-negative: "The word is ridiculous. Besides, as you know, it was not I who chose it; they stuck it on me and I accepted it. These days I would not. But no one calls me "existentialist" any more except in text books, where it does not mean anything". When asked which one of the terms was more acceptable to Sartre - "existentialist" or "Marxist", he replied he would prefer the former. Historians of philosophy regard the 'early' works of Sartre as existentialism (phenomenological) and the 'later' works of Sartre as Marxism (existential). This thesis does not accept any such compartmentalisation of Sartre's works. Sartre's philosophy will be presented as a "unity" of development, whatever status it has achieved. In this way, the thesis takes up the problem of continuity of themes in Sartre's philosophy as a whole. The purpose of the thesis is therefore not to present a critical evaluation of evaluations presented by Sartre's valued critics. When we talk of continuity of themes, we do not mean that there is no novelty or development in Sartre's philosophy. Contrary to this, the entire of development of Sartre's
philosophy, suffered the 'dialectical reciprocity' of continuity and discontinuity, negation and assimilation, identity and difference, differentiation and divergence, unification and polarisation and negation of negation. In spite of streams of opposition in the development of his philosophy Sartre "progressed" in his coming to terms with Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and Marx. Just like any other thinkers philosophical development in the history of philosophy, Sartre's development is both continuous and discreet. Development has two opposite meanings - progress and regress. In some conditions "progress" and "regress" are present as mutually exclusive, and in others they are mutually determined processes. Just as the history of philosophy as history is 'unalterable' and inexhaustible, Sartre's philosophy is explored by interpreters in countless ways. Different from these criticisms of his critics, we have Sartre's self-interpretations in the form of interviews. We find interesting revelations and self-characterisations about a particular change of opinion as different from its exposition in a text or popularisation of an idea which was hidden in the text or misunderstood by the readers. Important among his interviews are those by Michel Contat, Michel Rybalka, Simone de Beauvoir and Benni Levi. Interviews are simultaneously quasi-biographical as well as quasi-autobiographical and quasi-historiographical. Interviews give directly the relation
of a thinker to his autobiography, biography and historiography.

Sartre would not like to be labelled in a simple way. Sartre, in one of his finest self characterisations said: "Actually, it is not that simple: every intellectual has what can be called his ideological interests. For a writer, this means the totality of his work so far. Even though I have always protested against the bourgeoisie, my works are addressed to it, are written in its language, and contain elitist elements - or at least the earliest ones did. For the last seventeen years I have been engaged in a work on Flaubert which can be of no interest to the workers, since it is written in a complicated and definitely bourgeois style. Furthermore, the first two volumes of this work were bought and read by bourgeois reformists, professors, students and the like. It was not written by the people or for the people; it was the product of a bourgeois philosopher's reflections over the course of most of his life. Two volumes have appeared, the third is at the printer, and I am preparing the fourth. I am committed to it - meaning that I am sixty seven years old. I have been working on it since I was fifty, and before that I dreamed about it. .......And since I am challenging myself, since I refuse to be an elitist writer who takes himself seriously, I find myself among those who are struggling against the bourgeois dictatorship. I want to
reject my bourgeois situation. There is thus a very special contradiction within me. I am still writing books for the bourgeoisie, yet I feel solidarity with workers who want to overthrow it. Those workers were the ones who frightened the bourgeoisie in 1968 and who are the victims of greater repression today. As one of them, I should be punished. Yet as an author of Flaubert I am the enfant terrible of the bourgeoisie and should be co-opted.12

If we have to assess a thinker on the grounds of his latest work, Sartre's life mission was clearly formulated when he sets out to integrate existentialism with Marxism in Search For A Method. Sartre in his 'most recent work' Critique of Dialectical Reason, attempted to push 'Marxism' above stagnation by treating it with existentialism, 'the ideology'.

Commentators differ on whether Sartre's integration of existentialism with Marxism is a valid one or not. Some were unanimous in their agreement that Sartre failed in his attempt to synthesise existentialism and Marxism. Some others agreed that Sartre's 'Critique of Dialectical Reason' was a 'healthy infusion of vitality' into Marxism. Critics of Sartre were divided on whether a 'radical conversion' took place or not. Mary Warnock contended that Sartre's later philosophy consisted of the death of existentialism. Pietro Chiodi argued that Sartre's 'Critique of Dialectical Reason' was not just a 'simple displacement' of existentialism by Marxism because
the 'Critique' contained as much existentialism as Marxism. As the "later" Sartre was the source of controversy and disagreement, the "early" Sartre was no different. Commentators differed on whether Sartre was a 'rationalist' or 'irrationalist', or 'empiricist', Heideggerian or Husserlian, neo Cartesian or neo-Kantian, idealist or realist. After the appearance of Sartre's 'Critique Of Dialectical Reason' the whole debate centred around whether Sartre was an existentialist or a Marxist. As already noted our task here is not to pass critical judgements on all possible commentators in order to conceive an objective picture of Sartre. But, on the weight of this, we shall discuss certain questions of methodological importance. Do all these commentators give Sartre an objectivity in their critical appraisals? What is objectivity in determining the system of philosophy of a particular philosopher? What is objectivity in the history of philosophy? What is the nature of philosophical influence? These questions would be relevant in the light of the fact that the majority of commentators, in different different ways, accuse Sartre of having "borrowed" so much from his predecessors - Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and Marx.

Schroeder, while commenting on the relation between Sartre, Husserl and Heidegger said: "Like Heidegger, Sartre believes that the nature of lived experience is systematically concealed. Much philosophical
theory, and especially Husserlian phenomenology, issues primarily from a reflective standpoint. Reflection alters and veils the real characteristics of pre-reflective experience. Sartre seeks to recover the realities of lived experience by purifying the reflective act and carefully describing the results. Sartre's phenomenology is rigorous and rooted in description, but he refuses to adopt the transcendental standpoint which is the hallmark of Husserl's enterprise. In this passage we understand that Sartre is in agreement with Heidegger and on the same basis as he argues limitedly with Husserl he disagrees with Husserl. This passage from the valued critics work Sartre And His Predecessors is taken from a chapter on Sartre and from the introduction which is subtitled: The aims and conclusions of Being and Nothingness. This passage is typical of the whole book where Schroeder presents Sartre in comparison to Descartes, Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger in terms of "agreements" and "disagreements" without explaining how "agreements" and "disagreements" are "mutual" towards Sartre's own conceptualization. This kind of comparative approach cannot develop the problematic as it is developed in the history of philosophy. This "comparative approach" lacks "criticality" as essence and thus, undermines the necessity of disagreement as a source of development in interpreting the history of philosophy. Mark Poster in his work Existential Marxism In Post War France: From Sartre to Althusser, has one full chapter dealing with 'The Early
Sartre', but only to refrain from a discussion on the ground that a 'purely philosophical discussion' is needed. Nevertheless, he said: "Sartre's dependence on previous existentialists, Keirkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger .....can not be discussed here".14 Mark Poster by using the phrase 'Sartre's dependence' reveals his affinity to Schroeder, though he is not adopting a comparative approach as Schroeder. Ronald Aronson in his work "Jean-Paul Sartre: Philosophy In The World" writes: "Thus, it was Heidegger who influenced Sartre to break with Husserl, to liberate intentionality and throw it in the world. Being and Nothingness bears the traces of Being and Time on virtually every page. It begins as Heidegger did, by describing the question as a basic and characteristic human posture. Heidegger's Dasein becomes Sartre's Pour-Soi, inauthenticity becomes bad faith, facticity and thrownness become contingency. Sartre also takes over Heidegger's distinction between fear and anguish and his notion of Dasein existing in terms of its possibilities.

Heidegger emphasised Being -in -the -world, Husserl emphasised consciousness and its intentionality. Sartre's self-appointed task is to integrate the most fruitful themes of each into a total analysis, using each as a corrective to the other. Husserl is criticised for having 'shut himself up in the cogito' while Heidegger is taken to task for avoiding 'any appeal to consciousness in his description of Dasein'. Sartre's goal is to study
intentional consciousness in the world among objects, amidst life struggles. Here Aronson like Schroeder and Poster is not explaining the necessity of Sartre's disagreements in order to realize the "identity" of Sartre's own positions. On the contrary, Aronson outlined how Sartre is using different terms for Heideggerian concepts and only as of secondary importance, mentioned important disagreements in Sartre's own language. Thomas R. Flynn in his work *Sartre and Marxist Existentialism* said: "Appeal to implicit awareness has been a hallmark of Sartre's thought since *The Transcendence Of The Ego*. At the early stage it was based on the concept of the pre-reflective. To this was added the Heideggerian notion of 'pre ontological comprehension' in *Being and Nothingness*. By this Flynn means that Sartre's theory is an admixture of Sartre's predecessor's concepts and has no unity of development. Commenting on Desien Pietro Chiodi in his work *Sartre and Marxism* said, "It is clear here that Sartre is substituting to the Heideggerian theory of existence as project but, under Husserl's influence, giving it a Cartesian interpretation. Hence he sides against Heidegger in disputing the legitimacy of the quarrel with Husserl the outcome of which was the existentialist secession from the phenomenological school in 1926. In other words, in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre favours an interpretation of the existential project as a project of the cogito, while the significance of
Heidegger's distance from Husserl lies in his vindication of the pre-eminence of the sum over the cogito.\(^{17}\) Chiodi in his disagreements presents Sartre as having "rigorous polemic" with Heidegger and going closer to Husserl. Here Chiodi is offering a description of his version of the theoretical sources of Sartre's existentialism rather than offering explanations. J.P. Fell in his work *Emotion in the thought of Sartre* said "Sartre shares with Heidegger this quest for a "broader view" of emotional phenomena. The root of this attempted reorientation lies in Husserl's rejection of "psychologism"."\(^{18}\) Fell also indicates that, much before the appearance of "The Emotions" of Sartre Heidegger had already argued the 'radical inadequacy' of traditional theories of emotion, and on this count Sartre and Heidegger 'found psychological interpretations wanting. This position qualifies itself as equal to other positions which hold that Sartre "borrowed" from Heidegger.

Roy Wood Sellers in his work *Neglected Alternatives* said: "Sartre starts from Husserl who focusses on a descriptive logic rather than on theory of knowledge. What he takes from Husserl is the thesis that consciousness is always intentional and is awareness of something other than itself. He then takes the step of seeking a pre-reflective stage that will free consciousness from self-consciousness. At this level, the self becomes an object along with other, one escapes the
trap of an isolated subjectivism." Sellers argued that Heidegger had a similar starting point. By saying that Sartre made the self object among objects Sellers not only distorted Sartre, but also deliberately refrained from studying the basic differences not only between Husserl and Heidegger themselves but also with regard to their relationship with Sartre. Sellers advocated a "marriage" between empiricism and existentialism without realising the meaning of both. Here we can see an "eclectic" in "good faith" accusing Sartre of "eclecticism" in "bad faith". Walter Kaufmann in his work "Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre" said: ".....Sartre's comments on commitment and decision, dread and death are charged with life. It is often said that he accepted all these themes from Heidegger and that his thought is second hand. Yet Heidegger's treatment of the same themes is more often than not, abstract to the point of being neither "evident" in Husserlian sense nor even possible; we are aware of the relations between words which have the same roots, but much less clear about the connections between the phenomena which he describes the thought process seems determined by the words. In Sartre's work too there are many highly abstract pages and at times he is misled by words and writes what is no longer meaningful. Yet many of his pages on the central themes of existentialism have the plausibility and contact with experience which are lacking in the similar analysis of Heidegger." This paragraph exposes the true colour of the assessment made by
Kaufmann, who under the cover of being both "critical" and "appreciative" is conveniently evading "differentiation" and "divergence" between Sartre's concepts and Heidegger's concepts. Herbert Spiegelberg, in his work The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, commenting on Sartre's relationship with Heidegger said: "The influence of Heidegger's Being and Time in this regard can hardly be doubted. But beginning with Being and Nothingness his writing also shows the impact of Hegel."^{21} Unlike other commentators, Spigelberg contributed to the criticism of Sartre in terms of his relationship with Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger which will be discussed later. The impression we get from the above citations, if at all we agree, is that Sartre was an imitation of Heidegger. Without understanding conflicting positions in the realm of philosophical theory, Sartre adopted his predecessor's concepts. In philosophical language this is termed "eclecticism". Apart from Spiegelberg, the rest of the critics cited above are accusing Sartre of "eclecticism" without explicitly stating so. Alfred Stern in his work Sartre: His philosophy and psychoanalysis presented Sartre's thinking as an admixture of concepts borrowed from Nietzsche, Kafka, Salacrou, Heidegger, Croce, Marx, Caldwell, Faulkner, Adler, Schnitzler, Malraux, Bachelard. Stern accused Sartre of wilfully concealing the source and he does not agree to call Sartre an 'eclectic'. In the Dictionary of Philosophy, in a
section on Sartre read: "However on the whole the conception of Sartre was eclectic. It sought a middle way between idealism and materialism, in an attempt to transcend both." Theodor Schwarz in his work *Jean Paul Sartre and Marxism* commented that Sartre's thought was a subjectivist and idealist doctrine of man and *Critique of Dialectical Reason* was an eclectic melange of existential idealism and fragments of Marxism. Pietro Chiodi was principally not opposed to a "compromise" between existentialism and Marxism. Because he considered Sartre's existentialism as caught in-between Cartesian and Hegelian idealism and hence a "bad existentialism", he advocated the compromise between Heideggerian existentialism and Marxism. Heideggerian existentialism, unlike Sartrean existentialism, Chiodi argued, transcended subjectivity and dualism. Istvan Meszaros in his book "The work of Sartre: Search For Freedom" commented: "Heideggerian purists would no doubt describe the way Sartre inserts the adopted concepts into the context seen above as 'eclecticism'. In fact, such 'eclecticism' constitutes Sartre's exemplary originality and philosophical significance". Meszaros's passionate appreciation of Sartre does not mind such categories as 'eclecticism' to be referred to Sartre. Let us examine different meanings of the concept 'eclecticism' in order to disagree with the above cited critics and 'restore' originality to Sartre. The Random House Dictionary of the English language describes the meaning of the term 'eclectic' as 1)
selecting; choosing from various sources 2) made up of what is selected from different sources; 3) not following any one system, as of philosophy, medicine etc., but selecting and using what are considered the best elements of all systems 4) noting or pertaining to works of architecture, art decoration etc produced by a certain person or during a certain period, that derive from a wide range of historical styles. 'Eclecticism' is meant to be 5) "The use or advocacy of an eclectic method. 6) an eclectic system." Excepting meaning no.4, all the meanings are relevant to the present discussion.

The meaning of the term 'eclecticism' defined in the Dictionary of Philosophy reads: "Eclecticism is a deliberate confusion of different, very often diametrically opposed ideas, philosophical views, theoretical premises, political assessments etc. It shows up in various attempts to marry materialism to idealism, in revisionist aspirations to combine Marxism and empirio-criticism, dialectical materialism and so on. Eclecticism is also typical of modern bourgeois philosophy. The chief methodological defect of eclecticism is its inability to identify the principal connections of an object, or of a phenomenon, in their concrete historical conditionality, from the sum total of connections and relations of the objective world, a mechanical combination of different qualities and properties of objects or phenomena. In practice and politics Eclecticism brings about errors and
miscalculations, because it hampers the search for the main link in a chain of events and prevents the planning of appropriate measures to solve the most topical problems in a concrete historical field".  

While making critical comments about Hegel’s concept of Being-in-general and its logical consequence Being is identical with not-Being, Lenin rightly commented that “all sided, universal flexibility of concepts, a flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites, - that is the essence of the matter. On the basis of this Lenin classified two kinds of flexibilities - a) flexibility when applied subjectively leads to eclecticism and sophistry and b) flexibility when applied objectively - reflecting the all sidedness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics. T.I.Oizerman in his work "Principles of the Theory of The Historical Process in Philosophy" wrote: "The struggle of materialism and idealism is the principal form of philosophic development, since the manifold differences are dialectically sublated by this active antithesis (i.e. are mastered, and a general alternative - materialism or idealism - thereby developed and sustained). The philosopher who has not come to the recognition of this alternative or who ignores it (as often happens in present day western philosophy), interprets the pluralism of philosophies (i.e. the external semblance and one-sided expression of the essence of philosophy) as its universal and richest expression.
content wise. Such a philosopher is an eclectic, incapable of comprehending the fundamental significance of the theoretical sequence, which is specially essential and important precisely in philosophy. He remains an idealist, as a rule, but an idealist of a kind, who is not aware of (or even denies) the real essence of his doctrine.26 We would agree with Oizerman in all his comments but disagree when he equates idealism with eclecticism. We hold that the history of philosophy proved that differentiation, divergence, and polarisation of philosophical concepts and eclecticism must be differentiated from idealism. Eclecticism was taken to be the opposite of dogmatism or sectarianism by the French materialist Diderot. Rationalism and empiricism are considered to be contending dogmatisms or sectarianisms. In the eighteenth century the word 'dogmatism' and the words 'eclecticism' and 'scepticism' were sometimes used to name the alternative answers to the supposed question about the source of 'development of philosophy'. Kant used this terminology to define his own 'critical philosophy'. Thus Kant claimed to be neither a rationalist nor empiricist. Kant is neither dogmatist nor sceptic. He viewed Locke and Aristotle as empiricists, and for Kant the opposite of empiricism was 'neo-logism' represented by Plato and Leibniz. For the first time the distinction between rationalism and empiricism was made by Bacon and Leibniz. However, rationalism and empiricism were systematically developed
in the works of nineteenth century historians of philosophy. Hegel used the words 'empiricism' and 'rationalism' to distinguish between two tendencies within 'idealism'. Unlike Kant, Hegel considered Locke as a rationalist rather than an empiricist. Some time later it was agreed that Locke, Berkley and Hume were the main empiricists and Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz were the main rationalists. Russell while acknowledging this polarisation in the history of philosophy said: "It has now become possible to decide with some confidence as to the truth or falsehood of these opposing schools". Promptly Russell sided with rationalists. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the word 'materialism' had not been used in an epistemological sense. Materialism signified the idea of a reductionist, mechanistic physical science as having a complete account of the physical world or world-out look. In those days materialism was regarded as the thinking of Berkley. Leibniz first used the word idealism to refer to Berkley's immaterialism. In those days he was referred to as idealist not for his argumentation that the only thing people can know is their own 'ideas'. In this way Berkeley resembled the image of Descartes. Only much later were Berkeley's pure empiricism and subjective idealism are clearly differentiated and related. The epistemological dimension of 'materialism' led its principal forerunners to join the idealist camp. Kant regarded Berkeley and Descartes as different kinds of idealists. Only much later
were the dualism, rationalism, materialism and idealism of Descartes differentiated and related. Kant pronounced that his critical philosophy destroyed idealism, but much later Kant himself was qualified by the term idealist. Neither Kant’s rationalism nor his empiricism was related to his transcendental idealism. Hegel, while being appreciative of speculative philosophy did not use the term ‘idealism’ in a critical way. Hegel considered that only idealism deserved the name philosophy. But Hegel uses the term ‘idealism’ in the same dismissive way as Diderot did when he referred to Berkeley or Hume. The difference is that Hegel used the term ‘idealism’ not as the opposite of ‘materialism’ but as the opposite of ‘realism’. The idea of struggle between ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’ as the motive force of the history of philosophy started with Marxism. In an excellent section ‘The Speculative Cycle Of Absolute Criticism and The Philosophy of Self-Consciousness’ Marx and Engels in their work The Holy Family said: "The world is a manifestation of the life of self-consciousness which has to alienate itself and take on the form of a slave, but the difference between the word and self-consciousness is only an apparent difference. Self-consciousness distinguishes nothing real from itself. The world is, rather, only a metaphysical distinction, a phantom of its ethereal brain and an imaginary product of the latter. Hence, self-consciousness does away with the appearance, which it conceded for a
moment, that something exists outside of it, and it recognises in what it has "produced" no real object i.e., no object which in reality is distinct from it. By this movement, however, self-consciousness first produces itself as absolute, for absolute idealist, in order to be an absolute idealist, must necessarily constantly go through the sophistical process of first transforming the world outside himself into an appearance, a mere fancy of his brain and afterwards declaring this fantasy to be what it really is, i.e., a mere fantasy, so as finally to be able to proclaim sole exclusive existence, which is no longer disturbed even by the semblance of the external world". Here Marx and Engels are analysing a few passages from the work of Herr Bauer a right Hegelian who, interpreting with "spell bound" logic, tried to prove French materialism to be idealism. Marx and Engels are not only relating their ideas to Hegel but also to French materialism when they reproached Bauer for having reformed 'French materialism' in a Hegelian way. Marx in his afterword to Capital Volume I said: "My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human-brain i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "The Idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the idea". With me on the contrary, the ideal world is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and
translated into forms of thought." 28 With this it is clear that Marx is not Hegelian in the Hegelian sense. Engels in his work "Ludwig Feuerbach: And the End of German Classical Philosophy" said: "The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being. .... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit ... to nature and therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other - among the philosophers, Hegel for example, this creation often becomes still more intricate and impossible than in Christianity - comprised the camp of idealism. The others who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism". 29 We can clearly see the polarisation of philosophical concepts in a final form.

Researching on a particular thinker is connecting two "socio-historically" different "temporalizations". Though Sartre is a twentieth century philosopher, we cannot escape from the problem of difference of temporalizations. With this short review of how different "qualifications" and "determinations" developed in the history of philosophy we note that it is highly necessary to characterise a particular philosophy as 'this' or 'that' but with restraint, extreme care and sufficient vindication. To go back to the question why 'eclecticism' and 'idealism' cannot be equated, we state
a) idealism, just as materialism, has unity of form and content of development. b) idealism, just as materialism, holds a particular point of view, does not lack a point of view. c) eclecticism is not idealism because unlike the latter it cannot realize the 'reflective' and 'dialectical' interaction between different categories and concepts of its system, because it is not a product of unity of form and content of development. d) eclecticism opposes materialism not because it lacks an unity of argument as self expression or an anti-marxist takes up such an approach or a mediocre academician adopts such an approach. e) To label someone as an eclectic as well as an idealist is not only a contradiction in terms but it is being hasty in criticising or being simplistic. f) If eclecticism is borrowing from different sources, (which are usually opposite in nature) 'idealism' is developed through one and the same source. g) Kant's neither rationalism nor empiricism is known as transcendental idealism and not as eclecticism. Hegel's neither only 'object' nor only 'subject' dialectic is known as dialectical idealism and not as eclecticism. Marx's neither Hegelianism nor Feuerbachianism is known as dialectical materialism and not as eclecticism. 1) we cannot classify Kant or Hegel as eclectics because the former is a consistent idealist rather than a pure idealist while the latter is a pure idealist and both have expressed an ability for world outlook. 2) we cannot call
Marx an eclectic because Marx has revolutionised the hitherto existing philosophy. Not even a single element of his philosophy is adapted without being studied as a development.

We cannot append the label 'eclectic' to Sartre because Sartre understood the struggle between 'idealism' and 'materialism' as an expression of class struggles. Sartre used such categories in the very same sense as Marx and Engels used them in polemicising and popularising their ideas. We find that not only 'turned out' 'marxist Sartre' but also 'existentialist Sartre' had a clear polemic with Marxism. Before tracing polemic of the author of Being and Nothingness and group of writings let us formulate some methodological assumptions for clarity and critical use.

a) The historian of philosophy is a 'historian' in the full sense of the term. He must not only study social conditions that give rise to a certain philosophical doctrine but he must also understand that doctrine critically. The latter is important since it simultaneously attempts to fix the doctrine's relations with other doctrines and also its conceptual inner relations. In this sense depends on the former task of historian of philosophy.

b) It is quite impossible to treat the history of philosophy purely "historically", or "empirically", without being instructed by a general and
dialectical "scale of categories" derived from the very history of philosophy itself.

c) No exposition of a philosophy can be a word-for-word repetition of what a particular philosopher wrote. At the least it will be a restatement of the philosopher in one's own words, but not without elements which can lead to an approach. Our approach would be to arrive at an understanding of Sartre. Understanding and interpreting are inseparable and we shall aim at a "scientifically objective" understanding of Sartre which is quite incompatible with the refusal to take up any definite theoretical conceptual position.

d) Even the application of the term "development" to the history of philosophy brings certain obvious assumptions that there are certain irreversible processes of change and progress which occur in the development of philosophy.

e) Science is impossible without the criterion of "scientificality", but in philosophy and the history of philosophy there is no unanimity on this question. Therefore, we have to work out a criterion of evaluation of Sartre which must proceed from making "critical generalistions" to relating them to historico-philosophic process.
f) If the fundamental question of any philosophy is ultimately the question of the relation thinking to being, is not the question 'what is philosophy?' the fundamental question of the history of philosophy?

g) The significance of the question 'what is philosophy?' is explicitly clear when we try even in a general form to differentiate philosophy from special sciences. The fact that why different philosophical systems existed and continue to exist, while there are no fundamentally, incompatible systems of mathematics or physics co-existing reflects that significance.

h) Philosophy's most dangerous enemies are from within. Neo-positivists who declare that all the historically evolved problems of philosophy are illusory and non-existent in reality. They present the historicophilosophic process as a history of continuous misapprehension. Eventually neo-positivists failed to recognise that the mistakes of great philosophers were great mistakes.

i) We hold that to reject problems of philosophy as "development" is to reject development in philosophy in the history of ideas. Consequently it is a relapse into scholastic approach to history of a philosophy or into a militates irrational approach which sets against any systematization of
philosophy.

j) By rejecting history and development in philosophy neo-positivism and existentialism failed to see the living link between the development of philosophy and the development of science throughout the history of mankind. This is how, while rejecting metaphysics, and ultimately metaphysics and Sartrean 'existential Marxism' cannot be metaphysics.

k) In the history of philosophy one philosopher advances beyond the other. Advancement can be seen within one philosopher in terms of gradual development. In the history of philosophy one philosopher tries to improve the preceding philosopher. This determines the importance of how a philosopher evaluates the preceding philosopher as being inadequate or as committing an error and how the philosopher presents himself as overcoming or correcting such an error.

l) It is true that philosophical errors and the overcoming of such "errors" form the motive force of the history of philosophy. But we have to see how both "error" and "overcoming" are historically bound, limited as well as elevated. We have also to see whether a philosophical error is a real "error"; or an understanding of "the error" from
an epistemological approach is important to realise and "qualify", progress in the history of philosophy.

m) Every philosophy is an advancement over preceding philosophy and carries within core elements, influences and momentum of previous philosophies. Here comes the important question - why a particular philosopher carries within his core, the philosophies of recent past and a discussion on the historical necessity of those live form, the method.

n) Any conception of philosophy is invariably linked to a conception of the human being, society and nature. Any conception of the human being, society and nature involves human history and natural history. History of human beings or history of nature involves the problem of human freedom.

o) The history of philosophy is the history of struggles between idealism and materialism, a reflection of class struggles of different epochs.

It is not widely discussed that Sartre did not begin his dialogue with *Search for a method* or *Materialism and Revolution*, but since the beginning of his philosophical works. In his first essay *The Transcendence of The Ego* we can see Sartre using concepts the idealism and materialism. A careful study of this article discloses
how Sartre is in the "making" while defining his relations with "critical philosophy" (Kant) and "phenomenology" (Husserl). Sartre defined what he considered the phenomenological procedure to be: "phenomenology is a scientific, not a critical study of consciousness. Its essential way of proceeding is by intuition. Intuition, according to Husserl, puts us in the presence of the thing. We must recognize, therefore, that phenomenology is a science of fact, and that the problems it poses are problems of fact, which can be seen, more-over, from Husserl's designation of phenomenology as a descriptive science. .....Husserl, too, discovers the transcendental consciousness of Kant and grasps it by the epoch. But this consciousness is no longer a set of logical conditions. It is a fact which is absolute. Nor is this transcendental consciousness a hypostatization of validity, an unconscious which floats between the real and the ideal. It is a real consciousness accessible to each of us as soon as the "reduction" is performed." Here Sartre indicated both his agreements with "phenomenology" as well as requirements which would "radically" make it appropriate. Phenomenology is significantly different from critical reflection in terms of grasping real "evidences".31 Though, Sartre did not understanding the cognitive dimension consciousness, he found some philosopher's enthusiasm to presume that the aspect of the consciousness they are investigating is the essence of
consciousness. Phenomenology does not subscribe to this view, for it takes up the "intuitive" approach to consciousness. Sartre understands phenomenology as a methodological priority of the epoch or reduction as "intuition", of "facts" and not of prejudices. This problem is framed by critical philosophy as, - "how does consciousness know of reality? "It must be subordinated to the phenomenological question : "How does consciousness experience reality?"

Sartre thought that the primacy of the phenomenological point of view was necessary to differentiate between reflective and non-reflective levels of consciousness. Critical philosophy makes all conscious activity as reflective activity only to lose non-positional consciousness of consciousness, as Sartre would put it, first degree consciousness. Sartre said: "It must be remembered that all the writers who have described the cogito have dealt with it as reflective operation, that is to say, as an operation of the second degree. Such a cogito is performed by a consciousness directed upon consciousness, a consciousness which takes consciousness as an object. Let us agree the certitude of cogito is absolute, for as Husserl said, there is an indissoluble unity of the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciousness (to the point that reflecteing consciousness could not exist without reflected consciousness). But the fact remains that we are in the presence of a synthesis of
two consciousnesses, one of which is the consciousness of the other." Sartre goes on to argue that the essential principle of phenomenology 'consciousness is the consciousness of something' is preserved. But Sartre contends that it is not as an object that the reflecting consciousness looks at it. Sartre pointed out that in-so-far as it was my reflecting consciousness of itself, it was a non-positional consciousness. It became positional only by directing itself upon the reflected consciousness and the condition is when one effects the 'cogito'. Thus, Sartre said: "...the consciousness which says I think is precisely not the consciousness which thinks. Or rather it is not its own thought which it posits by this thetic act. We are then justified in asking ourselves if the I which thinks is common to the two superimposed consciousnesses, or if it is not rather the I of the reflected consciousness." Sartre maintained that it would not be an "infinite regress" if consciousness needed a third degree consciousness to posit unreflected reflecting consciousness. So far, Sartre had problems of interpreting phenomenology with Husserl. Sartre redefined consciousness as that which "cannot conceive of a consciousness other than itself. Thus we can distinguish, thanks to our conception of the me, a sphere accessible to psychology, in which the method of external observation and the introspective method have the same rights and can mutually assist each other, and a pure transcendental sphere accessible to phenomenology only". In re-defining
consciousness Sartre was redefining phenomenology. Sartre rejected the Husserlian "ego" as a unifier of different degrees of consciousness. For Sartre, it was "the object" and it was in "the object" that we could find the unity of consciousness. Sartre said: "The ego is not the owner of consciousness; it is the object of consciousness".35 "I" for Sartre was an object of consciousness; just as the "I" of the other was also an "object" of the consciousness with the former being more intimate.

According to Sartre "I" had four characteristics: 1) "I" is a concrete existence different from mathematical truths, meanings, spatio-temporal existents, but not unreal. The "I" presents itself as transcendent. 2) "I" is also known through a special kind of intuition, where existence and consciousness are identical, however inadequately secondary to a reflected consciousness. 3) "I" never appears except on the occasion of a reflective act. The transcendent object of the reflective act is the "I". 4) The transcendent "I" must be subservient to the phenomenological reduction. The problem is that of the "pseudo-cogito", whose content will not be "I have consciousness of this chair", but "There is a consciousness of this chair". With these four characteristics of "I" which indicates its rejection for a better phenomenology. In the whole of the discussion, Sartre is not posing the question in terms of the real chair and its relation to consciousness but conscious of a
chair to reflecting consciousness as well as to non-positional consciousness of such unreflected-reflecting consciousness. This is why one consider Sartre's philosophy constitutes more of elements of idealism than of materialism. He is not an idealist of the kind who would reject materialism in a consistent way.

"I" or object of consciousness, for Sartre, is "no less" real in its concrete existence than "spatio-temporal" existents. Criticising the theorists of the "extreme left" for criticising phenomenology, Sartre said: "The theorists of the extreme left have sometimes reproached phenomenology for being an idealism and for drowning reality in the stream of ideas. But if idealism is the philosophy without evil of Brunschvieg, if it is a philosophy in which the effort of spiritual assimilation never meets external resistances, in which suffering, hunger and war are diluted in a slow process of the unification of ideas, nothing more unjust than to call phenomenologists "idealists". Sartre argued that it was not necessary that the "object" precede the "subject" for spiritual pseudo values to vanish. On the contrary, Sartre said that it was enough that the "me" is made contemporaneous with the world to solve the subject-object dualism which is purely logical. Sartre redefined the history of philosophy when he said: "...for centuries we have not felt in philosophy so realistic a current". Here Sartre's usage of the term "realistic" can be taken
as "realism" which, in the history of philosophy according to Sartre can explain different divergent trends. Sartre thought that as long as the "I" remained phenomenology it could be interpreted as "escapist" or "idealist" doctrine, and thus he replaced "I" with "me". For Sartre, "Me" was a mode of transcendence-transcending-transcended where existence and consciousness were equalised. Sartre was fully aware of the theories of the extreme "left" when he said: "It has always seemed to me that a working hypothesis as fruitful as historical materialism never needed for foundation the absurdity which is metaphysical materialism". It does not need any probing to confirm that Sartre, here, is hitting at dialectical materialism while interpreting historical materialism as "fruitful" and dialectical materialism as "absurd", "metaphysical materialism".

We must note that Sartre turned out to be more phenomenological when he said: "unreflected consciousness must be considered autonomous. It is a totality which needs no completing at all, and we must acknowledge with no qualifications that the character of unreflected desire is to transcend itself by apprehending on the subject the quality of desirability. Everything happens as if we lived in a world whose objects in addition to their qualities of warmth, odour, shape, etc; had the qualities of repulsive, attractive, delightful, useful etc., and as if these qualities were forces having a certain power over us".
Sartre, while differentiating between an emotion and an ink-stand, argued that the determination of a perceived object but qualifying intentionality in terms of "first degree" consciousness. Speaking about the thing as object, Sartre said: ....this object is outside consciousness, and the very nature of its existence implies its "dubitability". Reflection too has its certain domain and its doubtful domain, a sphere of adequate evidence and a sphere of inadequate evidence".40 By adopting a metaphysical approach Sartre attained certain advances over Husserl and Heidegger but only to remain in essence "a phenomenologist" and unable to resolve the subject-object "dualism". Thus Sartre's content and subject of research is internal "structures" of consciousness. Sartre seemed to give consciousness a primacy. Whether as an idealist giving primacy to consciousness we shall discuss in the fifth chapter.

We have noted that Sartre proposed "me" to be contemporaneous with the world and that "emotion" was different from a thing-object like an ink-well and had a different "object" which sources "emotion". Sartre in his "Emotions" said "If emotion is play-acting, the play is one that we believe in".41 Sartre gave an example where a person tries to reach a bunch of grapes by stretching his hand to reach for the grapes as project. Unfortunately, they are beyond his reach. So the person shrugs his shoulders as if to say 'they are too green' and he gives up the "project" of reaching for the grapes. Sartre
explained that the grapes present themselves at first as 'ready for gathering' but this quality of attraction soon becomes intolerable when one cannot reach them. So the person effects a "greenness" over grapes and thereby justifies the withdrawal of "project" through "transcendence". The grapes become 'transcendent object' of consciousness which can "transcend" grapes by transcending its own self. Sartre said: "what is important here is only to show that activity, as spontaneous, unreflecting consciousness, constitutes a certain existential stratum in the world, and that in order to act, there is no need to be consciousness of oneself as acting - quite the contrary. In a word, unreflective conduct is not unconscious conduct. It is non-thetically conscious of self; and its way of being conscious of self is to transcend and apprehend itself out in the world as a quality of things".42 Emotional consciousness has no power over the world. Sartre wrote: "I can suppress it as an object of consciousness, but only by suppressing consciousness itself".43 The Annihilation of a fearful object according to Sartre is nothing but annihilation of a fearful object as an object of consciousness. Sartre defined emotion: "It is that human reality itself, realizing itself in the form of 'emotion'..... It has its own essence, its peculiar structures, its laws of appearance, its meaning. It cannot possibly come from outside the human reality. It is man on the contrary, who
assumes his emotion, and is therefore an organized form of human existence." 44 Here we can clearly see Sartre taking up the stance he formulated in "Transcendence" "Existence" and "consciousness" as being equal. Sartre argued that by suppressing our consciousness in a situation of emotion, we resist the emotion to become a finality. Sartre said: "In the majority of cases we are struggling in our conscious spontaneity. Sartre uses to refer to same level of consciousness as 'voluntary spontaneity' against the development of emotional manifestations we are trying to master our fear, to calm our anger, to restrain our weeping. Thus we have not only no consciousness of any finality of emotion, we are also rejecting emotion with all our strength it invades us inspite of ourselves". 45 Sartre defined emotional consciousness as a consciousness which surges up against itself to the extent that it wants to see the world from a different "point of view". 46 Sartre said: "The emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world..... The subject who is seeking the solution of a practical problem is outside in the world, he is aware of the world at every moment throughout all his actions. If he fails in his attempt and grows irritated, the irritation itself is still away in which the world appears to him. And it is not necessary that the subject, between his failure in action and his anger, should turn back upon himself and interpose a reflective consciousness. There may be continuous passage from the non-reflective consciousness 'instrumental world' (action)
Sartre seemed to appear like an idealist; but because of phenomenological primacy given to consciousness as unwarrantedness he essentially, in our view, remained an idealist. But the materialist elements due to their inarticulateness and subordination to consciousness remain silent without determining the nature of his theory. Even though Sartre at various places opposed idealistic position, yet one finds that when we analyse his philosophy objectively the elements of idealism overtook the element of materialism. We will also like to emphasise Sartrean idealistic position does not fit into any classical notion of idealism. Sartre's own claim was that his position transcended both idealism and materialism to the non-reflective consciousness 'hateful world' (anger). The latter is transformation of the former. This transformation takes place "as the means themselves appear to us potentialities that lay claim to existence. "Thus we can clearly see Sartre giving primacy to consciousness, but we also see Sartre putting an effort to maintain the thing-object independent of consciousness and have Sartre appears to be more of a "realist" than an idealist or materialist.

CONCEPT OF IMAGINATION: INFLUENCE OF FLACH OVER SARTRE

Sartre seemed to take interest in the analysis of words and meanings, to some extent, in Emotions and, substantially, in The Psychology of Imagination and Being
and Nothingness. Our interest here is limited to his analysis of one word - the "proletariat" - we do not propose to develop Sartre's philosophy of image. Sartre said: "I seek to grasp the essence of the proletariat through the word 'proletariat'. But the linguist studies the word proletariat in so far as it means proletariat and will be worrying himself about the vicissitudes of the word as a transmitter of meanings". Let us see how Sartre differentiates an illustration and the symbolic nature in defining proletariat as imagery: Sartre quoted Flach: "Proletariat: "I had a strange image, a flat and black area and below it, a sea flowing vaguely, an endless wave, something like a dark and thick mass rolling with unwieldy vagueness. What did this mass signify? Extension in the entire world; something like a latent dynamism". In this way Sartre acknowledged the "outstanding" but "little known" Flach for having provided a way in which "we endeavour to give expression to and define in words the essence of an objective content that we have precisely lived subjectively (internalised) and that we nevertheless possess in some way the more or less intuitive condition."

To see things in the proper light, let us digress a bit. Engels, in defining the relation between the word and its meaning, said: "Religion is derived from religare and meant originally a bond. Therefore, every bond between two people is a religion. Such etymological tricks are the last resort of idealist philosophy. Not what the word means according to the historical development of its
actual use, but what it ought to mean according to its derivation is what counts. The importance of this analogy of argument has another important dimension, that is, that such an idealist trend was adopted by a French reformer Luis Banc in 1840's. However, Sartre's appreciation of Flach is not without reservation. Sartre questioned Flach on the nature of symbolic schema, especially on its relationship to "pure". Knowledge and to the "pure" act of "comprehension" and "comprehension" as realised by intermediary - symbolic schema, for having not attempted to resolve. Sartre explained that Flach's contribution is to flash the meaning of the word "proletariat" by using persuasive "imagery" without describing it by using words. Though, unlike Flach, Sartre did not agree with the division of comprehension into a) pure comprehension is simple epistemic comprehension b) imaginative comprehension is possible by using images, metaphors similar etc.

Sartre unlike Flach retains the division with in comprehension as pure and imaginative at autistic level necessitated in a chance situation. Where the latter division of comprehension is limited at epistemic level. However, according to Sartre as well as Flach, both comprehensions have to be "lived subjectively". Mary Warnnock in the celebrated introduction to The Psychology Of Imagination said: "The negative act is constitutive of the image. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance
which Sartre attaches to the power of denial, of negation, of asserting not only what is, but what is not the case, and in *Being and Nothingness*, of asserting both what is and what is not the case at the same time, thus embarking on "self-deception". Here Warnock by using the term self-deception "is not referring to a Sartrean concept - bad-faith - but is only critical of Sartre for making the power of imagination a negative power which ultimately could be taken as "self-deception". While conceiving the idea of writing *The Psychology Of Imagination* Sartre had taken a Psychotic drug - a mesclain injection. The idea behind taking a drug was for the drug to induce hallucinations so that Sartre would be able to observe the phenomenon himself. But the question is how can a person, having induced hallucinations, observe these hallucinations?

Sartre outlined imagination as having characteristics:

1) Image is a consciousness and image-object cannot be compared to the thing-object. Since we are accustomed to thing in terms of space, we tend to attribute spatial qualities to image-object. Sartre named this tendency as "illusion for immense". Sartre rightly criticises Hume for being a victim of illusion of immense when the later cannot differentiate between the idea of a chair and the chair as an idea. Hume’s inability to differentiate between an "image-object" and "thing-object", according to Sartre, was based on the thinking
that to have an idea of a chair is to have a chair in consciousness and what is true of an object is also true of an idea. Sartre criticised Hume for believing that 'the object must have a determined quantity and quality, and so must the idea'.

2) Image is grasped through a phenomenon of quasi-observation. The very use of the term quasi-observation illustrates the limitation of the Sartrean position as against Hume's position because 'observation' as a category is an empirical fact and image is not an empirical fact. To use Sartre's own argument, only perceptual objects can be empirical in nature. Sartre differentiated perception and imagination when he said "....the object of image is never more than the consciousness one has of it; it is limited by that consciousness: nothing can be learned from an image that is not already known". Sartre explained that "image gives everything in its possession all at once." Sartre argued that objects present themselves in the image as a multiplicity of synthetic acts and thus image is like a "phantom". Sartre examined image on the ground of this synthetic nature and argued that it "does not involve either essences or generating laws but only an irrational quality, it gives the impression of being an object of observation; from this point of view the image appears to be more like a perception than a concept." Sartre held the view that intention is at the centre of consciousness and
it helps in the "animation" of images to be determined as this or that. Unlike in the case of induced imagination, according to Sartre the consciousness as reflecting - reflected or transcending - transcended determines the "image-object" through quasi-observation. In the case of induced imagination one experiences or one "lives" experience but one cannot quasi-observe or observe.

3) Imaginative consciousness posits its object as nothingness. It is because "object" is presented as nothingness, Sartre said: "This is ....the reason why the world of images is a world in which nothing happens. I can at will develop this or that object into an image, make a cube turn, make a plant grow, make a horse run, without producing the least shift between the object and consciousness." With this we understand that Sartre's critique of Hume and Berkeley is not only against their "illusion of Immanence" but also against the inability of the latter to grasp the "thing-object" as independent of consciousness and the inability of both to see the "causal process" as independent of relations between "ideas". Sartre gave an example of Peter whose image presents itself as an intentional synthesis which carries within itself a mask of past experiences. We may now, in the context of the discussion of imagination bring out the distinction between an actual object and an image object. Sartre exemplifies this in the following way: "This form is necessarily intuitive; what my actual intention grasps is the corporeal Peter, the Peter I can see, touch, hear,
if I did see him, hear him or touch him. It is a body
which is necessarily a certain distance from mine, which
necessarily has a certain position in relation to me. But
at this moment I know that the Peter whom I could touch is
not being touched by me. It is of the very nature of him
not to touch him or see him, a way he has of not being at
such a distance, in such a position. In the image, belief
posits the intuition but no Peter. The characteristic of
Peter in not to be non-intuitive, as we might be tempted
to believe, but to be 'intuitive absent', given to
intuition as absent. In this sense it can be said that the
image involves a certain nothingness. Its object is not a
simple portrait, it asserts itself. But in doing so it
destroy its self. However lively, appealing or strong the
image is, it presents its object as not being. This does
not prevent us from reacting as if its object were before
us. From this, Sartre developed a theory of concrete
nothingness in Being and Nothingness.

4) Imaginative consciousness presents itself as
spontaneity. As we have noted (in the first
characteristic) imaginative consciousness is a non-thetic
awareness of itself. Imaginative consciousness is thus a
consciousness of consciousness. Sartre argued with
Descartes on the question of the self-awareness of the
thinker. This can according to Sartre translated in the
form of: 'I cannot think that I am speaking without
knowing that I think I am speaking.' Here Sartre
introduced the concept of "introspection" and explained that it was devoid of any Descartean "inwardness" or Bergson's "expectation" or Husserl's "of something" or Brentano's "intentionality", but it was a pure spontaneity, whether voluntary or involuntary. But we must observe that for both voluntary and involuntary deeds of imaginative, consciousness is grasped through "imaginative comprehension".

Sartre understood the Descartean distinction between ideas and recollection of ideas and that the latter formed the "substance" of knowledge. Sartre explained that the Descartean concept of knowledge "moves" from knowledge to action because knowledge as 'recollection of ideas' was empty, referring either to past or future understanding. Flach, according to Sartre, was adopting a similar approach when he dealt with words like "the proletariat" in order to posit "understanding" as non-knowledge. Sartre, unlike Flach would not consider the imagery functions as a sign or illustration. On the basis of the characteristics of imaginative consciousness outlined, Sartre rejected the Flachian belief that the "imagery" constructed to mean the word "proletariat" was symbolic of the word or an "analogue" of the word. Sartre said: "But the scheme itself is no longer an analogue: it itself is an object having a meaning. That 'flat and black area' with the 'vaguely flowing sea' is neither a sign nor a symbol for the proletariat. It is the proletariat in person. Here we reach the real meaning of the symbolic
schema: the schema is object of our thought giving itself to our consciousness ....we expressly declare, using an indispensable neologism, that the role of the schema is that of presentifier."57 Though Sartre's stances against Flach were generally agreeable, Sartre still would not take up the question of the content of the meaning of the word "proletariat". We shall agree with Sartre in his criticisms against Hume and Berkeley for their 'illusion of immanence'. But our agreements with Sartre would face the problem of inconsistency when Sartre poses imagination as annihilation of perception and vice-versa. Sartre said: "There is, therefore, in perception the charm of infinity of images, but these can arise only at the cost of the annihilation of perceptual consciousness."58 For Sartre, perception had an important role in thought or thinking and imagination was no less important. Images cannot affect the mode of thinking: just as words cannot affect the process of thinking since Sartre argued that both words and images were "chosen" and "animated" by the particular thinker. Sartre, while differentiating a percept, an image and the word neglected to see that the "choices" and "animations" were not connected to the nonthetic level of consciousness but to the materiality of the environment of the thinker. For Sartre it did not "matter", when he said: "In fact the object under consideration (essence, relation, a complex of relations, etc.,) does present itself only as an ideal structure: it
is also a material structure. Or rather ideal and material structure are but one. But the material structure implies certain determinations of space, certain symmetries, certain relations of position, and sometimes even the existence of things and persons.... While the evolution of these determinations remains governed by the ideal sense of the image, while the transformations of the schema remain commanded by those of thought, the development of the idea is not altered. But this subordination of material structures to ideal structures is possible only if the material structures are grasped as not exhausting the ideal structures, as if a relative independence were posited between the two. These "ideal structures" of the "unreal" world of imaginative consciousness are, according to Sartre, originally unreal. Sartre wrote: "A world is a unit in which each object has its fixed place and bears the certain relationships to the other objects. The very idea of a world implies the following twofold condition for its objects: they must be rigorously individualised and they must be in equilibrium with a milieu. It is for this reason there is no unreal world since there is no unreal object can meet this twofold condition." That apart, Sartre explained that the process of individuation in image expressed itself as "essential poverty". Sartre argued that imaginative consciousness can achieve what the will could not achieve and it consisted of a) knowledge, b) movement and c) affectivity. Image is a phantom and, according to Sartre,
images in consciousness "occur" as "indivisible wholes, as absolutes, at once ambiguous, impoverished and dry, appearing and disappearing in a disjointed manner, they invariably occur as perpetual elsewhere", as perpetual "evasion" Sartre described this "elsewhere" and "evasion" not only as an "escaping" from actuality but also as a negation of the condition of the being in the world as an "anti-world". We can clearly see how Sartre by giving such a rich differentiation between imagination and perception, forgot the important dimension that imagination bases itself on perception and that imagination and perception are interchangeable.

ANALYSIS OF CONCEPT: SERIOUSNESS AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

With this brief discussion of Sartre's use of Marxist terminology such as historical materialism, "metaphysical materialism", "the proletariat", idealism, materialism, dualism, we have seen how he used them only to counterpoise or to contrast his philosophy with Marxist Philosophy. Now we will deal with Sartre's concept of "seriousness" as marxism underplay of importance of the subject over object is Being and Nothingness. Here, Sartre "reformed" the Marxian position and then subjected it to his criticisms. Sartre wrote: "The serious attitude involves starting from the world and attributing more reality to the world than to oneself; at the very least the serious man confers reality on himself to the degree
to which he belongs to the world. It is not by chance that materialism is serious, it is not by chance that it is found at all times and places as the favourite doctrine of the revolutionary. This is because revolutionaries are serious. They came to know themselves first in terms of the world which oppresses them, and they wish to change this world. In this one respect they are in agreement with their ancient adversaries, the processors, who also come to know themselves in terms of their position in the world. The serious man is "of the world" and has no resource in himself. He does not even imagine any longer the possibility of getting out of the world, for he has given himself the type of existence of the rock, the consistency, the inertia, the opacity of being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. It is obvious that the serious man at bottom is hiding from himself the consciousness of his freedom; he is in bad faith aims at presenting himself to his own eyes as a consequence; everything is a consequence for him, and there is never a beginning. That is why he is so concerned with the consequences of his acts. Marx proposed the original dogma of the serious when he asserted the priority of the object over subject. Man is serious when he takes himself for an object. Here Sartre based his argument on one issue—"Marxian primacy of matter over consciousness" as being "rock", "consistency", "inertia", and the "opacity" of being-in-midst-of-the-world. Sartre "abstracts" and argument from this to contrast his position on "freedom" and we shall
comment that Sartre construed that, by reversing the primacy of matter into its opposite, one would not need consistency in argument. So, in the situation of the primacy of consciousness, if freedom is possible, for Sartre, Marxism need not change the world nor "assume" such goals. If freedom is immanent in such an ideal situation, Sartre's limited acceptance of 'historical materialism' devoid of 'metaphysical materialism' falls into an epistemological suspension. Let us see what more Sartre had to say in "reforming" Marxism in order to place it against itself.

For Sartre, the characterisations "the master", "the feudal Lord", "the bourgeois", "the capitalist" are referred to oppressing class exists. So far so good. Sartre, after applying his concepts of self and the other to oppressing class and oppressed class, concluded that: "Thus oppressed class finds its class unity in the knowledge which the oppressing class has of it, and the appearance among the oppressed of class consciousness corresponds to the assumption in the shame of an us object." Sartre understands by "class consciousness" as a member of the oppressing class. Sartre said: "It matters little here how we define this situation: what interests is only the nature of the "us" which is assumed. If a society, so far as its economical or political structure is concerned, is divided into oppressed classes and oppressing classes with the image of the perpetual Third
who considers them and transcends them by his freedom. the pure and simple comparison which the members of the oppressed collectively can make between the harshness of their conditions and the privileges enjoyed by the oppressing classes cannot in any case suffice to constitute a class consciousness; at most it will provoke individual jealousies or particular despairs; it does not possess the possibility of unifying and of making each one assume the responsibility for unification.  

In this entire argument Sartre seemed to use the Hegelian master-slave dialectic in a "more" Hegelian way - to say that the "truth" of the slave and the "truth" of the master are identical but not opposite. Thus Sartre presented a kind of Hegelian-Marxian view for criticism and not the Marxian view. The argument about "seriousness" and "class consciousness" is presented as by-product arguments of "seriousness" as a form of bad faith, "class consciousness" as "nothingness".

So far we have seen how the "early Sartre" dealt with Marxian categories. Now let us see how the "later Sartre" dealt with the question of idealism and materialism, dialectical materialism and historical materialism. The focal point of this discussion would be to assess Sartre's arguments against a dialectic in nature (directly referring to Engels and subsequently to Marx). We shall argue that Sartre, from his first published philosophical work up to his posthumous publication Second Critique, argued against a dialectic of nature while at
the same time pronouncing his agreements with historical materialism. In this critical exposition, while defending Engels against Sartre's criticisms, we shall show how dialectical materialism and historical materialism are dialectically interlinked and cannot be separated. We are going to argue that the rejection of dialectical materialism leads to the rejection of the other.

SARTRE AND DIALECTIC OF NATURE:

On December 7, 1961 six thousand young people gathered in a Paris auditorium to follow a debate on the topic: "Is the dialectic solely a law of history or is it also a law of nature." Jean-Paul Sartre and Jean-Hypolyte argued that dialectical processes were created by men and man clone was capable of "development" through his theory and practice. Roger Garanudy and Jean-Pierre Vigien defended the Marxian position that the laws of dialectics were universal in scope and applied to all phenomena in nature, society and thought. Simone de Beauvoir, commenting on Sartre's participation, said: "...He could not really give more than a summary account of his thought in mere twenty minutes, and I would rather he had not made the attempt." The question of the debate was framed by Sartre and Hypolyte more pointedly as whether Marxism was dialectical materialism or whether it was restricted to historical materialism. Though Simone de Deauvoir was not impressed by Sartre's participation in the debate, Sartre
raised a series important of questions. They were:

1) Does the unity of knowledge, in the area of historical materialism, demand the unity of knowledge as totalisation which constitutes the movement of historical being, of its reality, be conceived with dialectical materialism which would reintegrate it in the dialectical unity of nature?

2) Does one find outside human history, in organic and inorganic nature, at the origin of the movement and the history of this nature the explanatory elements of historical materialism? What one might call the categories of dialectical thought, the transformation of quantity into quality, the interpretation of opposites, the negation of negation, the category of development etc.?

3) Is dialectical comprehension on the physical-chemical level? Can we accept such a limited idea or partial totality in terms of the applicability of dialectics as science proves particular truths and not general truths?

4) If a theory of the divergence of the applicability of dialectics to different particular aspects of nature is accepted how can we account for the transition from one level to another - from organic to conscious? Perhaps science will soon discover it for us, but, for the moment, we can only postulate that this transition exists dialectically. Does the theory derived from particular natural phenomena contradict general dialectical laws. Does not in their intelligibility and
their necessity? Must not one recognize in this case that one is constructing a dialectic from the outside on the model of a real dialectic and that it is nothing but a working hypothesis?

5) Is it not necessary to see in the dialectic of nature a group of postulates derived from the apodictic and concrete principles of the historic dialectic? These postulates will always be less rich, less intelligible, more empirical than what results from the totalization of historical materialism. Does not the intelligibility of human history show that the unity of knowledge does not in any way exclude the irreducibility of the sectors and that therefore historical materialism is sufficient for whatever progress of natural sciences may have made? What this prohibits in any case is the conception of a dialectical dogmatism which would pretend to condition to human history in its specificity?

These five questions are important enough for us to follow. Before beginning a discussion, let us now construct the theoretical ground on which Sartre formulated the above questions against a dialectic in nature.

We have already seen that Sartre in The Transcendence of the Ego commented that 'historical materialism' never needed a 'metaphysical materialism'. We have also noted how in The Psychology Of Imagination,
while giving independence to 'material structure' for its existence 'ideal structure' Sartre subordinated it to while equating the two. We have also made note of how Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, with the concepts 'serious', and 'class consciousness', rejected Marxism as 'original dogma'. During all these years of philosophising and to formulate a 'revolutionary philosophy', Sartre wrote: "Thus the philosophy of revolution, transcending both idealist thinking which is bourgeois and the myth of materialism which suited the oppressed masses for a while, claims to be the philosophy of man in the general sense. And this is quite natural; if it is true it will indeed be universal. The ambiguity of materialism lies in its claim to be a class ideology at one time and the expression of absolute truth at another time." Here, the term materialism refers to dialectical materialism. For Sartre, dialectical materialism is a) to deny the existence of God and transcendent finality, b) to reduce the action of mind to that of matter, and c) to eliminate subjectivity by reducing the world, and man in it, to a system of objects linked together by universal relationship. By defining dialectical materialism in these terms Sartre in "good faith" concluded that dialectical materialism was a metaphysical doctrine.

Sartre readily accepted a 'dialectic' in the realm of ideas far him as ideas are naturally graduated by synthesis, analysis and synthesis. Sartre argued that Hegel had inverted this to propose a dialectic for reality
as a characteristic of matter. And Sartre realised that the matter Hegel referred to was a matter with which scientists deal. Sartre defined matter: "The fact is that matter is characterised by inertia. This means it is incapable of producing anything by itself. It is a vehicle of movements and energy, and it always receives these movements and this energy from without, it borrows them and relinquishes them. The mainspring of all dialectics is the idea of totality. In it phenomena are never isolated appearances. When they occur together, it is always within the high unity of a whole, and they are bound together by inner relationships, that is, the presence of one modified the other." Sartre understood science on the weight of the concept of matter as he linked it to science, which is quantitative. And for Sartre quantitative is the direct opposite of dialectical unit which is qualitative. Sartre wrote: "Science is, by means of its innermost concerns, its principles and its methods, the opposite of dialectics." Sartre argued that 'dialectical materialism' set science against metaphysics and unknowingly a metaphysics against science. 'In this way, Sartre construed that materialist rationalism passes into irrationalism.

Sartre argued "if the psychological fact is rigorously conditioned by the biological, and the biological fact is, in turn, conditioned by the physical state of the world, how he human mind can express the
universe as an effect can express its cause, but not the way a though expresses its object."70 Here Sartre is explicitly making a criticism against Lenin. Sartre quoted Lenin defining consciousness ‘as the reflection of being, in the best of cases an approximately exact reflection’ and asked the question - who is the ‘best of the cases’? We may mention here, that in the above stated quotations Sartre’s criticism about Lenin cannot be valid because Lenin or for that matter dialectical materialism does not reduce conscious human phenomena to physiological or physical phenomena. Such reduction implies the denial of qualitative transformation, which to our mind constitutes the case of dialectical materialism. It is the quantitative to qualitative change which, in fact, constitutes the basic difference between mechanical and dialectical materialism, to bring out this difference and to expound his position.

Sartre criticised Engels questioning whether Engels was ‘irresponsible’ or ‘dishonest’? We can divide the Sartrean critique of Engels into two parts - the first deals with the question of the validity of natural history and the second deals with the question of whether the movement of science is dialectical in the sense of moving from the quantitative to the qualitative? a) Sartre wrote: "It is obvious that the notion of natural history is absurd. History cannot be characterised by change nor pure and simple action of the past. It is defined by the deliberate resumption of the past by the present."71
Sartre quoted Engels as saying 'natural sciences prove - in the last analysis, nature proceeds dialectically. For Engels, does not move in 'identical circles' but has a real history. Sartre was critical of Engels for having taken Darwin's help whose application of dialectics, was 'mechanical'. Leaving Engels, Sartre engaged in a criticism of Darwin who extended the principals of the struggles for existence and natural selection to the social realm in terms of class struggle. Let us go on to the second part of the Sartrean Critique of Engels which is directly related to the first part. b) Sartre argued that by applying the law of quantitative to qualitative change as a dialectical transition to the realm of physical sciences, Engels is "misleading" us. Sartre quoted Engels: "In physics every change is a transition from quantity to quality, from the quantity of movement of any form whatever - inherent in the body or communicated to the body. Thus, the temperature of water in the liquid state is, at first, unimportant, but if you increase or diminish the temperature of the water, there comes a moment when its state of cohesion is modified and the water is transformed, in one case into vapour and in another into ice."72 The "trick" according to Sartre is what Engels assumes science assumes to be doing science is not doing. Sartre explained that scientific investigation is least interested in demonstrating the transition from quantity to quality, on the contrary, it proves the
transition as quantity to quantity. Sartre argued that science disproved the 'illusory appearance' of a qualitative change. Sartre wrote: "For the scientist, quantity gives rise to quantity, the laws are quantitative formulas and science possesses no symbol for the expression of quality as such. What Engels claims to present as a scientific procedure is the pure and simple movement of his mind which passes from the universe of science to that of naive realism and back again to the scientific world and the world of pure sensations." For Sartre, because the transition is from quantity to quantity there is no progression in science. The movement in science is symbolised by Sartre as a "cycle". The movement of the dialectic on the same count, for Sartre, becomes the reverse of the science. Sartre did not give up the argument there, but he extended it to the whole of the history of science to say that all that science deals with is 'generality' and not 'particularity' or concreteness'. Sartre wrote: "Whether the scientist be Newton, Archimedes, La Place or Einstein, he studies not the concrete totality but general and abstract conditions of the universe." Just as according to Sartre science cannot reflect 'progression', nature cannot express any 'development'.

We shall now attempt a critique of the Sartrean position that there is no 'dialectic in nature'. Our criticism is limited to the arguments advanced by Sartre in their particularity because, in Sartre's whole
philosophical enterprise, his criticisms in this regard occupy a limited space. However, our contention that Sartre, since the beginning of his philosophical works up to the most recent ones, is presenting a philosophical alternative to Marxism holds correct.

We shall argue that however small a space the Sartrean argument against a 'dialectic in nature' may occupy in the general exposition of his philosophy, this forms the basis or foundation in all its continuity and discontinuity.

I) When Sartre questioned Lenin on who is to verify which one of the reflections is approximate to the reality, Sartre forgets that the question indicates an 'insolvability' rather than a 'resolution'. Even if someone verifies a particular reflection to be 'approximate' to the reality - the question 'who is to verify' still persists. Hence the question suffers from the fallacy of 'infinite regress'. This question itself, endlessly. On the other hand this question is based on the 'misunderstanding' that dialectical materialism excludes the importance of the subject. Lenin wrote: "Man's consciousness not only reflects the world, but creates it."\(^{75}\)

II) When Sartre criticises Engels on account of the latter's ideas on natural history, he only limitedly presents the problem and passes judgement without sufficient vindication. Let us read Engels on the subject,
before arriving at conclusions for Sartre presents him as the one who cannot differentiate natural history from human history. Engels wrote: "with man we enter history. Animals also have a history, that of their descent and gradual evolution to their present position. This history is however made for them, and in so far as they themselves take part in it, this occurs without their knowledge and desire." History, as defined by Sartre, is the resumption of the past by the present. Engels argued that Geology as a discipline arose and pointed out not only that terrestrial strata formed one after another and deposited one upon another, he also explained that, with these terrestrial strata, shells, skeletons of extinct animals and the trunks, leaves and fruits of no longer existing plants were preserved.

From this we shall argue, in agreement with Engels, that not only the terrestrial strata had history in time, but also these animals and plants. From "digging" the earth we can 'dig' history in archeological excavations or paleonto-logical excavations. In the case of the former, one is aiming at 'primitive' or 'medieval' societies (social history) which "merged" within earth, or in the case of the latter, one is aiming at a 'missing link' or 'fossil' (natural history). It is definitely the resumption of past by the present, 'natural history' is definitely a 'history' in this sense. The difference is that man, the historian resumpts this knowledge of the
past into the present. Sartre’s misreading of the problem is based on his inability to see man as the 'finest product' of nature and man and nature as inalienably, dialectically interdependent and are in unity.

We may note here that Sartre separated the philosophy of Engels from that of Marx. Where Sartre criticising Engels for distorting Marx as he claims to appreciate Marxis position. We on the other hand maintain that Sartre’s demarcations of the position of Engels position from Marx is invalid. Our evidence lies in Marx own acceptance regarding the identity of his position with Engels. This is perhaps the motive and convenience of Sartre to accept historical materialism and reject dialectical materialism. Sartre is proven wrong when we read Marx quoted reviewer of Das Capital which reads: "Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence. If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self evident that a critical inquiry whose subject matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting point. ....According to him ....abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own ....as soon as society has

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outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomena analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more through analysis of phenomena shows that social organism differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals."77 Marx approves of the reviewer for presenting his ideas "strikingly" and "clearly". From this, we shall point out that, for Marx, like, for Engels, human history is an extension of natural history and not because man has no freedom or is subjected to the same laws of nature but because natural history precedes human history chronologically.

III) Sartre's criticism of Engels and Sartre's criticism of Darwin are not identical and connected. Rather, Sartre does not present Engel's critique of Darwin which would clear up whether Engels is a Darwinean or Marxian. Let us read Engels on the subject, "struggle for existence": "...in regard to nature it is not permissible one-sidedly to inscribe only 'struggle' on one's banners. But it is absolutely childish to desire to sum up the whole manifold wealth of historical evolution and complexity in the meagre and one-sided phrase "struggle for existence" that says less than nothing."78 and Engels explained: "Darwin's mistake lies precisely in lumping
together in "natural selection" or the "survival of the fittest" two absolutely separate things." For Engels, unlike Darwin, each advance in organic evolution is at the same time a "regression", fixing a one-sided evolution and excluding the possibility of evolution in many other ways. Here we can see Engels, unlike Sartre, giving natural history the scope for 'possibility' which the latter limits to human history. Sartre wrote: "...if Darwin has shown that the species derive from one another, his attempt at explanation is of mechanical and not dialectical in order. He (Darwin-Tilak) accounts for individual differences by the theory of small variations and he regards each of these variations as the result of not of a "process of development" but of mechanical chance"; and Sartre argues that Darwin's struggle for existence "cannot produce a new synthesis through fusion of opposites; it has strictly negative effects since it eliminates definitively the weaker elements. In order to understand it, all we need do is compare its results with the really dialectical ideal of class struggle. In the latter case, the proletariat will absorb the bourgeois within the unity of classless society. In the struggle for existence, the strong simply cause the weak to disappear." Let us see what Engels has to say on the question of 'struggle for existence' vs 'class struggle': "...the so-called struggle for existence assumes the form: to protect the products and productive forces produced by
bourgeois capitalist society against the destructive, ravaging effect of this capitalist social order, by taking control of social production and distribution out of the hands of the ruling capitalist class, which has become incapable of this function, and transferring it to producing masses - and that is the socialist revolution. From this it is crystal clear that Engels is neither 'irresponsible' nor 'dishonest' but clearly differentiating his positions from the positions of Darwin and has disapproved application of natural laws to the realm of society much in common with Marx. We must also note that Engels, like Marx, limited the law of "struggle for existence" exclusively to plants and animals. We can see that Sartre's critique of Darwin is marked with pronouncements on logical grounds or give the impression that Darwin's mistakes were also Engel's.

We shall now attempt to illustrate Engel's appreciation of Darwin for having provided objective proof of dialectics.

a) "The proof which Darwin provides is that the stock of organic products of nature surrounding us today, including man, is the result of a long process of evolution from a few originally unicellular germs. And these unicellular germs have arisen from protoplasm or albumen which came into existence by chemical means."  

b) The Darwinian theory has provided a proof of Hegel's account of the inner connections between necessity
and chance. We shall disagree with Sartre who characterises Darwinian 'chance' as 'mechanical' and we shall see how it is dialectical. In the history of philosophy Engels saw two trends regarding the relation between chance and necessity, one trend advocating the identity of chance and necessity and another advocating the absolute difference of chance and necessity. Hegel is the first one to provide the idea of "chance" as an expression of "necessity". Here the metaphysical nature of the above-stated two trends about chance and necessity is corrected to formulate a dialectical concept of 'chance' and 'necessity' where 'identity' and 'difference' of both the categories are dialectically retained. Engels wrote: "Darwin in his epoch-making work, set out from the widest existing basis of chance. Precisely the infinite, accidental differences between individuals within a single species, differences which become accentuated until they break through the character of the species, and whose immediate causes can be demonstrated only in extremely few cases, compelled him to question the previous basis of all regularity in biology, viz., the concept of species in its previous metaphysical rigidity and unchangeability. Without the concept of species, as a basis: human anatomy, comparative anatomy embryology, zoology, paleontology, botany etc., what were they without a concept of species?"
As Sartre would have "understood" or interpreted Darwin - as describing individual variations within the species as caused by a "without" process we shall say Darwin would not be Darwin but Lamark. We agree with Engels for placing "necessity" in the species and "chance" in individual variation as both are linked in a particular member of the species.

IV) Let us now take up the Sartrean criticism of Engels for 'tricking' us when he discusses the question of water having three states-liquid, solid and vapour-under different condition. These states are qualitatively different states for Engels and for Sartre they are only quantitative states. Engels takes a lead from Hegel to formulate the law of quantitative to qualitative" by quoting Hegel’s 'water example'. Just as Sartre would say that science has no programme of presenting a physical change as quantitative to qualitative we shall say that Engels would not say science has any such programme either, especially in the physical sciences. But Engels would certainly say that by "abstracting" a general dialectical law of transition from quantitative to qualitative from any particular change would not harm science as conception. On the contrary, it enriches science as conception. Engels would say: "every change is a transformation of quantity into quality, a consequence of the quantitative change of amount of motion of one form or another that is inherent in the body or communicated to it." The difference between the Sartrean position and
the position of Engels is that in the former the conception notion is lacking. For Sartre matter is characterised by inertia', for Engels matter is characterised by motion, and rest is also a form of motion. The most fundamental difference between Sartre and Engels is that in the former we see a lack of dialectical notion of the relation between quality and quantity. Regarding the relation of matter and motion, Engels wrote: "The indestructibility of motion cannot be conceived quantitatively; matter whose purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under favourable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical action and life." Motion according to Engels, is the mode of existence of matter, internal not external. The law of conservation of mass and energy has confirmed the general law of the transition from quantitative to qualitative from a scientific point of view. Engels gives the simplest example of oxygen and ozone ($O_2$, $O_3$), where 2:3 produces qualitatively different properties even with regard to smell. This is not just a difference of number (quantity) of atoms in a molecule, but at the same time a difference in the chemical properties also. Quality and quantity cannot exist without each other. A particular quality exists among different qualities and it co-exists as a relation of quantitative in degree and level. For Engels, quantity and quality coexist and from this he formulated the concept of contradiction or law of unity.
and struggle of opposites. Engels wrote: "Attraction and repulsion polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited on one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally in organic life the formulation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as polarisation of the living protein material and from the simple cell onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the complicated plant on the one side and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaption. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like "positive" and "negative", one can conceive of heredity as the positive conservative side, adoption as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited but one cannot just as well take adaption as the creative, active, activity and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity.

Engels argued that dialectics—the objective dialectic prevails throughout nature and the subjective dialectics or dialectical thought is only a reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature. For Engels upholds the theory of 'continual conflict' of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms as the life of nature."
Engels had rightly shown the validity of the law of the contradiction in explaining the developments in nature from one stage to another. Sartre can counter Engels only when he could disprove the validity of law of contradiction. Though in *Materialisms and Revolution*, Sartre dogmatically and categorically rejected the validity of the principle of dialectic in nature in his Critique, he leaves some 'scope' for its vindication. He held that the present day science does not prove a 'dialectic in nature'. Yet, in future science might show its validity and applicability. Thus, in Critique, he wrote that "there is no such thing as dialectical materialism, at least for the time being". He wrote: "Nothing is gained by proclaiming that the evolution of the species or the appearance of life are moments of the 'dialectic of nature', as long as we are ignorant of how life appeared and how species are transformed. For the present, biology, in its actual research remains positivist and analytical. It is possible that a deeper knowledge of its object through its contradictions will force biology to consider the organism in its totality, that is to say, dialectically, and to consider all biological facts in these relations of interiority. This is possible. But not certain." Thus here the Sartrean position is marked by shift from there is no 'dialectic of nature' to it "is possible" but "not certain". However, Sartre's dilemma remains inspired by a non-dialectical approach. Analysis,
unlike what Sartre presents, is nothing without synthesis, induction is nothing without basing itself on deduction.

In the light of the above discussion, let us get back to the questions raised by Sartre in the debate. While answering the questions we shall make it clear that we are not pretending to give a prof of dialectic in nature but our attempt so far is to present Marxian positions and do justice to it. We shall answer all the five questions raised by Sartre in the debate with an affirmative 'yes'.

1) Man's 'mastery' of nature, man's relation with nature proved that historical materialism demands all knowledge as unity of natural processes. Labour is as much a 'power' of man as it is a 'natural' power. Labour marks man's 'affinity' with nature not only because he uses labour while mastering nature but also because man himself is a product of labour. Labour creates man, according to Marxian philosophy, as social labour distinguishing man from the rest of nature. It is through labour in the process of transforming reality that man cognises the world and acquires abstract thinking consciousness, imagination, including his self-consciousness.

2) Man's relations lies with nature is so close that we cannot thrive or conceptualise one without the other. Just as amoebiasis causes problems of concentration so too ecology is as much 'natural' as it is human. Environment has a direct bearing on health. The problem of AIDS, for
example, is not just a problem of disease management but of logical management. The very fact that we "oppose" a particular disease-causing organism with a drug and that we are concerned about the side-effects of a particular drug reveals 'opposition' inherent in nature but our knowledge of it. In the process not only do we use such knowledge but also we take it to its limits and transcend those limits for higher knowledge. Everything is historical, true, - but nature is not excluded. Thus historical is "dialectical" and dialectical is "natural".

3) The difference between the particular truths of particular branches of science such as physical and chemistry is certainly an expression of particular laws operating in relation to each branch. Such branch of science as 'electrochemistry' emerges between physical and chemistry as having inner conflict and development in order to give rise to a new discovery, 'social medicine' is one such branch. Though the particular laws operating in society and medicine are different, out of "social necessity" they needed a unification in a general law. Diversity of particular discoveries of science is a proof of dialectics and the necessity of general truths.

4) The answer to the fourth question will be same as that of the third question. We shall note in addition that in the evolution of nature, as a proof of transition, we still have a plant with animal behaviour (carnivorous plants like Drosira and Nepenthis) and an animal with plant composition (Chlamidomonas). Therefore, we would say
that the difference of particular truths and laws to different realms of nature is a product of series transitions, leaps and breaks.

5) Even going by the historical materialist's point of view, one cannot think of absolutely ignoring the development of science and its impact on different other realms of society within one "history" or within a series of "histories". Thus dialectical materialism as a theory of 'objective dialectics' includes "subjective dialectics", the theory and practice of marxism, historical materialism. The impact of science on philosophy is not different from philosophy's concept of nature this is the truth of Marxism.

So far we have shown how Sartre tried to present his philosophy as neither materialism nor idealism in essence. Thus, Sartre's criticism of Marxism has turned out to be fallacious because it lacks a "point of view". Sometimes, Sartre is an idealist and at other more times, a materialist whose criticisms therefore, have come to be classified as an anti-Marxian criticism by an insider. With all this diverse argumentation Sartre summarises with reference to the "obvious ???: "The circle is obvious, and the whole system remains suspended in air, perpetually floating between being and nothingness."93
REFERENCES


2. This instance is supposed to have happened in 1943 at the time Being and Nothingness is not yet published, but Simone de Beauvoir had read the manuscript thoroughly. See Prime of Life, pp.547-548.

3. 'Self-Portrait at Seventy' interview with Michel Contat, full text appeared in Le Nouvel Observateur, June 23, June 30 and July 7, 1975, quoted from Life and Situations, p.60.

4. 'If a label is absolutely necessary, I would like 'existentialist' better', Ibid, p.60. We must note that the author of Critique of Dialectical Reason who has self commented like this.

5. Just as Oizerman argues the unity between 'early Marx' and 'later Marx' rejecting such comparat mentalisation. See T.Oizerman, 'Debates about Marx's Early Works, Socialist Humanism, Culture, Personality. p.8


7. Ibid., p.254.

8. Answering a question by Benni Levi on his opinion about concept of despair Sartre argued that his concept of despair was never the opposite of the concept of hope. And said 'I was influenced by Kierkegaard. His words seemed to have a reality for others. So I wanted to take them into account in my philosophy. It was a fashion.' Sartre to the surprise of many and contrary to the central nature of this concept in Being and Nothingness call it a fashion and not 'fundamental'

9. 'Existentialism and Humanism' is a lecture given particularly given to clear the 'image-construction' against existentialism. Image as 'bad' image.

10. The controversial interviewer of Sartre: Sartre's last and lengthiest interviews was prepared by him. So shocking is the content of Sartre's answers Simon de Beauvoir commented 'I was horrified', see Adieux, pp.118-119.

11. Apart from, Flaubert Sartre had written biographies of Giacometti, Jean Genet.

12. Sartre clearly analyses his situation just as any marxist could have analysed him. See Sartre, Justice and State, quoted from Life and Situations, pp.185-186


30. These assumptions are extracted from Teodor Oizerman’s works as we are in agreement with his anti-Stalinist construction of Marxian Philosophy (for pointed reference see Bibliography)
31. See Suman Gupta, ‘‘Quest for Truth’’, a felicitation volume in honour of Prof. S.R.Canal, ‘‘The socially relevant functions of philosophy are of two kinds: 1) Conceptual analysis; and ii) Evaluation and construction of an ideal state of affairs. Both these functions are inter-related. Both assumes the commitment of the philosophers but the commitments though inter-related are of different kinds’’., p.41
33. Ibid., p.45
34. Ibid., p.96
35. Ibid., p.97
36. Ibid., p.105
37. Ibid., p.105
38. Ibid., p.105
39. Ibid., p.58
40. Ibid., p.64
42. Ibid., p.61
43. Ibid., p.66-67
44. Ibid., p.28
45. Ibid., p.55
46. Sartre uses the term Spontaneity to refer to the same level of consciousness as ‘voluntary’ spontaneity as discussed in *The Psychology Of Imagination*, See pp.18;101 of *The Transcendence Of The Ego*.
47. Sartre, *Sketch For A Theory Of Emotions*, p.58. op.cit.,
48. Ibid., p.30

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54. Ibid., p.10
55. Ibid., p.13
56. Ibid., p.175
57. Ibid., p.109
58. Ibid., p.140
59. Ibid., p.133
60. Ibid., p.150
61. Ibid., p.155
63. Ibid., p.421
64. Ibid., p.421
65. Ibid., p.420
67. see, George Novack, (ed.) *Existentialism versus Marxism*, A Delta Book, 1978. These questions are reformulated from Jean-Pierre Vigier’s account of ‘Dialectics and Natural Science’.
69*. Ibid., p.204
69**. Ibid., p.205
70. Ibid., pp.202-203
71. Ibid., p.206
72. Ibid., p.207
73. Ibid., pp.207-208
74. Ibid., pp.208-209
76. Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p.34
78. Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, op.cit., p.307
79. Ibid., p.307
80. Sartre, ‘‘Materialism and Revolution’’ in his *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, op.cit., p.206
81. Ibid., p.206
82. Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, op.cit., p.308
85. Ibid., pp.220-221
86. Ibid., p.65
87. Ibid., p.37
88. Ibid., p.294
89. Ibid., p.211
90. Ibid., p.211
92. Ibid., p.34
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