CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This work is a critical reading of Jean-Paul Sartre's (1905-1980)\textsuperscript{1} philosophical writings. Not counting the fiction, plays and journalistic articles, Sartre's work in English comprises about 10,000 pages.\textsuperscript{2}

EARLY WRITINGS

Sartre's earliest publications were when he was just seventeen (1923).\textsuperscript{3} Sartre passed the entrance exam for University studies in philosophy in 1924. The first philosophical writing appeared in a tri-lingual University review bearing the title The Theory of The State In The Modern French Thought in 1927. The three part essay The Legend Of Truth\textsuperscript{5} written in 1929 was published by Nizan in 1931. Sartre in this essay denied universals a role in science as categories and sided with 'the concrete categories'. 'Truth', Sartre thought, was a byproduct of commerce. And commerce according to him is linked with democracy. Sartre in this essay argued the inadequacy of both 'science' and 'ideology' as intellectual consensus as a 'collective belief', as 'universality' and defended the necessity of individual judgement on the part of 'solitary men'- artists and philosophers.\textsuperscript{6} At the end of this published essay Nizan makes an interesting note which characterised Sartre as a young philosopher who was preparing a book on 'destructive' philosophy.\textsuperscript{7} Sartre was...
appointed as professor of philosophy at Le Havre in 1931. The years 1931-1933 were important in Sartre's life as the course of his 'philosophical development' was drastically affected by his discovery of 'phenomenology'. As he was teaching at Le Havre he began to work on *Nausea* as a 'pamphlet on contingency'. Sartre, like Aron, studied 'phenomenology' at the French Institute in Berlin in 1933-1934. Sartre's interest in 'phenomenology' coincided with his earlier pre-occupations about the ways of 'by passing the anti thesis of idealism and realism, affirming simultaneously both the supremacy of reason and the reality of the visible world as it appears to senses'.

For the first time Sartre read Husserl, Heidegger and Jaspers during his stay in Berlin.

**FIRST TEXT ON "IMAGINATION"**

After a gap of five years Sartre published *Imagination* in 1936. This book was a part of Sartre's diploma in advanced studies and was awarded the grade 'excellent'. This work bore the subtitle 'A Psychological Critique' and in it Sartre attempted an article review of different theories of the imagination which have been developed since Descartes. Sartre defined phenomenology as "a description of transcendental consciousness based on intuition of essences of these structures. This description takes place, of course, on the level of reflection; but reflection must not be confused with introspection, which is a special mode of reflection aimed
Sartre rejected the theoretical positions of Descartes, Hume and Leibnitz which argued the 'identical nature' of image and sensation. Sartre seemed to agree with Husserl on 'intentionality' to 'indigenously' develop a concept of image. Just as Husserl argued and Sartre agreed 'consciousness is a consciousness of something' and extended the principle and declared 'image is a certain consciousness' and an 'image is a consciousness of something'. Sartre published 'The Transcendence Of The Ego' in an yearly periodical Les Reserches Philosophiques in 1937. Sartre had written this long essay subtitled 'An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness' during his stay in the French Institute of Berlin, in 1934. In his work Sartre 'outlined - in Husserlian perspective, but contrary to some of Husserl's most recent theories - the relationship between the conscious mind and also established a distinction which Sartre was to maintain permanently, between the conscious mind and psyche'. Sartre argued that conscious mind constitutes clearly and apprehensibly an immediate reality and different from this psyche is a cluster of phenomena which must be grasped by a process of 'mental analysis'. Sartre in this long essay proposed that 'ego is not the
owner of consciousness' but, 'it is the object of consciousness'. But, Sartre's view of the nature of consciousness was this as expressed by him as: "consciousness cannot conceive of consciousness other than itself'.

The difference between I, Me, according to Sartre was possible in 'phenomenology' as the method of external observation and the introspective method were given the equal status in the inquiry into the transcendental sphere of consciousness. Sartre argued: "My I, in effect is no more certain for consciousness than the I of the other men. It is only more intimate." Different from this Sartre contended that 'transcendental consciousness' is an impersonal spontaneity and it determines its existence at each instant, without our being able to conceive anything before it. Thus, Sartre derived that each instant of our conscious life reveals to us not a 'new arrangement', but a new 'existence'. 'The Me' as it was formulated by Sartre suffered constant distress because it was 'to act this tireless creation of existence of which we are not the creators'. Sartre elaborated that since man is subjected to the creation of which he is not the creator gives him 'the impression that he is constantly escaping from himself and overflowing of himself'.

Consciousness, Sartre viewed was a spontaneity, 'I' as 'will' to emerge against 'Me', Sartre thought, was
possible. Sartre explained that the essential role of the ego is to mask consciousness from its spontaneity. Sartre while differentiating between voluntary spontaneity and involuntary spontaneity\(^\text{15}\) proved that a 'phenomenological' account of spontaneity indicates at the impossibility of the distinction between action and passion and an autonomy of will. These notions have meaning according to Sartre, 'only on a level where all activity is given as emanating from passivity which it transcends; In short, on a level at which man considers himself as 'at once' both subject and object. Sartre characterised 'Husserlian Phenomenology' 'unfortunately' as being an 'escapist doctrine'\(^\text{16}\) as long as the 'I' remained a structure of absolute consciousness, "pulling a part of man out of the world" and "turning our attention from the real problems". Sartre attempted to transcend this 'unfortunate' status of Husserl's phenomenology by making "the me" an existent strictly contemporaneous with the world, whose existence has the same essential characteristics as the world.

Sartre published an article with a title "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology" in La Nouvelle Revue Francaise in 1939. This article was written during Sartre's stay in Berlin. Compared to The Legend of Truth, this article marks not only a major development of his thought but also the first expression of his philosophic originality.\(^\text{17}\) Sartre in
this article attacked 'traditional psychologies' and condemned 'alimentary' philosophy.

EMOTIONS

The year 1939 is marked by the publication of another important text 'The Emotions'. This was the only published part of a major work on philosophical psychology 'The Psyche'. In this essay Sartre developed his theory of "psychic objectivity" which had been sketched out in the essay 'Transcendence of the Ego', in 'The Emotions'. Sartre made use of Heidegger's philosophy to come to terms with Husserl's. Sartre agreed with Heidegger's view that the 'notions of the world and of human reality (Descartian) are inseparable'. Sartre argued that we must 'differentiate between all research into man from other types of strict investigation' because human reality is ourselves. Sartre quoted from Heidegger's Being and Time: "The existent that we have to analyse is ourselves. The being of this existent is my own". Sartre redefined phenomenology in the light of his agreement with Heidegger that phenomenology is the study of phenomena and not of "facts".

By phenomena, Sartre meant that which "announces" its reality in appearance. Sartre elaborated that 'announcement of itself' as being of the 'existent' as not a thing 'behind which' there was something which does not yet 'appear'. For Heidegger to exist, according to Sartre, was 'to assume its own being in an existential mode of understanding'. Different from this was Husserlian
stance of which Sartre rejected 'to exist is to consciousness to appear to itself'. Sartre took appearance to be absolute and theorised that 'only this appearance has to be described and enquired into'.

Sartre defined emotion: "what is this we know from the beginning; an emotion signifies in its own manner the whole of the consciousness, or, if we take our stand on the existential plane, of the human reality." Sartre contended that it is neither contingent that human reality expresses itself as a particular synthesis of facts nor is it an effect of human reality itself that becomes the reality of emotion. Emotion, Sartre clarified: "It is the human reality itself realizing itself in the form of 'emotion'. Hence it is impossible to regard emotion as a psycho-physiological disorder. It has its essence, its peculiar structures, its laws of appearance, its meaning. It cannot possibly come from outside human-reality. It is man on the contrary who assumes his emotion, and emotion is therefore an organised form of human existence." In 1938 Sartre published 'Nausea' - the existentialist novel par excellence. The relation of the 'contingent self' to the world and the justification of its presence there form the problematic of this novel.
SECOND TEXT ON 'IMAGINATION'

Sartre published 'The Psychology Of Imagination' in 1940. This came as a sequel to Imagination: A psychological Critique. Sartre designed The Psychology Of Imagination as an essay in 'phenomenology'. Sartre initiated the study of imagination from the hypothesis derived from phenomenology that imagination is part of consciousness and this imaginative consciousness is directed upon some object. Sartre argued in this text about the 'emergence' of space between 'thinking subject' and that which is the object of its thought, between 'perceiving subject' and that which it perceives only to prove Being-For-Itself's distance from the world, from Being-In-Themselves. Comparing a photograph, a caricature and an Image under the head 'Image Family' Sartre said: "In the last two cases the material can be perceived for itself; It is not intended to function as the material of an image. This photograph taken by itself, is a thing; I can try to ascertain the duration of its exposure by its colour, the product used to tone it and fix it, etc., the caricature is a thing: I can take pleasure in studying its lines and colors without thinking that they were intended to represent something. The material of the mental image is more difficult to determine. Can it exist outside the intention? ....mental image must also have a material which derives its meaning solely from the intention which animates it." Sartre theorised that
'it is a matter of little theoretical importance whether we use a physical analogue (eg. photograph) or whether we use an analogue whose material is derived from the mental world. Sartre maintained that 'mental image is parasitic whose description cannot be made with reference to that of which it is an image'. What Sartre tried to study in this text was image having its existence, as an analogue of its object and made it comparable with any of the physical representations.

Sartre in this text, for the first time expounded concepts like nothingness, annihilation etc. Sartre in a Cartesian Husserlian way argued 'consciousness is quite unlike anything else and this in respect of its object'. Sartre realized the consequence of such assumption when he took a position that intentional consciousness 'disappears into nothingness' as awareness of its object at the very moment it realises 'it is in existence to be nothing in itself'. Sartre defined consciousness as grasping and positing of 'what it is not'. Sartre found 'a gap', a nothingness to be present in all awarenesses of objects both, mental as well as physical world. Sartre described image as a carrier of the non-existence of the object of which it is an image.

Sartre derived his concept of freedom from his theories of 'Not-being' or 'Nothingness'. Sartre insisted that 'man's freedom to act in the world is a function of his ability to perceive things not only as they are, but also as they
are not'. This concept of 'freedom' and concept of 'imagination' became Sartre's main concern in his philosophical works which were to follow The Psychology of Imagination.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 'IMAGINATION'

After the publication of Nausea, Sartre published The Wall a collection of short stories (1939). This collection marked the peak of Sartre's achievement as a writer of fiction continuing with old themes as well and introducing new themes like "authentic evil" in Erostratus, the inauthenticity of the ruling class in The childhood of a Leader.

BEING AND NOTHINGNESS

In 1943 Sartre published his monumental work Being and Nothingness. Sartre worked on 'existential phenomenology' for more than ten years. But Sartre had used certain analyses from his psychological treatise "The Psyche", rewritten and recasted to formulate certain themes of Being and Nothingness. Sartre had worked out a concept of insincerity or dishonesty (mauvaise foi) which explained all those phenomena, which Freud sought to explain with his theory of the Unconscious. 23 Being and Nothingness had brought together into a systematic form the sum of Sartre's philosophical preoccupations up to that point. This text subtitled 'An essay on Phenomenological Ontology' indicated more clearly Sartre's
Heideggerian point of view, than the Husserlian positions he had almost abandoned. The introduction of this text was meant to be the original thesis of the text. Though Sartre adopted the most abstract speculative style for elaborations in the text, this was basically a study of the 'human condition'. Sartre defined man as a being 'by whom Nothingness comes into the world' and by this Sartre meant that man was simultaneously a being and nothingness. Sartre adopted inductive as well as deductive methods to expound his theory of Being and Nothingness. Sartre was interested in real life 'situations' to study the original choice of Being by which real individuals have made themselves what they are. Sartre chose to describe, analyse, exemplify, synthesise the 'real', 'concrete' problems of man as love, hate, sex, the crises of anguish, the trap of bad faith, the fatality of freedom to prove or disprove authentic or inauthentic human behaviour and their affections on a general theory of consciousness or nothingness or human freedom.

Sartre adopted Hegelian terms to refer to being and consciousness. For Sartre unconscious being is termed as Being in itself and conscious being is termed as Being for itself. Sartre considered them as two realms of Being 'having a radical bipolarity' as a condition of their existence. Sartre in the introduction of the text explained the necessity of 'pre-reflective consciousness' as 'initiation' of any enquiry. Sartre contrasted his
vindication of ‘pre-reflective consciousness’ from the idealism of Berkley and the realism of Husserl and Heidegger. Sartre defined phenomenon: "what it is absolutely, for it reveals itself as it is. The phenomenon can be studied and described as such for it is absolutely indicative of itself." Sartre argued that the ‘appearance’ has full positivity and its ‘essence’ lies in ‘appearing’, which is no longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the measure of it.

Appearance or phenomenon for Sartre was not static but posited as successions, profiles. Sartre said: "The essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent; it is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series." Sartre rejected any idea of noumenal world behind phenomenon and ‘absolutised’ the reality of ‘appearance’. In contrast to this Husserl and Heidegger defined phenomenon as ‘relative-absolute’. The ‘phenomenology’ of both Husserl and Heidegger construed "the relative the phenomenon remained ‘to appear’ and somebody before it appeared ‘supposes’ its essence as ‘absolute’." According to Sartre, Husserl and Heidegger sought easy solutions to the ontological question whether phenomenon of being is identical with the being of phenomenon? Husserl showed how ‘eidetic reduction’ gave us a way ‘to pass beyond the concrete phenomenon toward its essence. This according to Sartre was to eliminate all ‘elements’ of consciousness, take them back to the world.
in order to study the relation between consciousness (pure) and world (real) and was idealism. Sartre explained how Heidegger's exposition of 'human-reality' was 'ontico-ontological' and places 'being' on par with 'essence'. His argument was that passage 'human-reality' 'beyond' phenomenon 'toward' being was a passage from homogenous to homogenous.27

Sartre questioned Heidegger's stance: "Is it the same for the passage from the existent to the phenomenon of being: Is passing beyond the existent toward the phenomenon of being actually to pass beyond it toward its being, as one passes beyond a particular reel toward its essence?".28 Sartre argued that existent or object neither concealed the being nor revealed the being. Being of the existent was not a 'hidden' essence to be revealed when all the particular qualities which made the totality of the existent possible. Sartre explained that the phenomenon of being is 'ontological' and any knowledge of this 'ontological' being would put the observer into the problem of knower-knowing. Sartre elaborated that 'known not only knows the object as known but he knows as knowing'. Whatever was the direction of this argument Sartre deduced 'abandonment' of the primacy of knowledge as a must if we wished to establish knowledge.

Sartre interpreted phenomenon as being. Sartre administered phenomenon to be meant as being requiring the 'trans phenomenal' as its foundation. For Sartre
"phenomenon of being required trance phenomenality" of being. What Sartre meant by transphenomenality of being is - knowledge overflows beyond 'being' and is a foundation of its limitation. With this complex set of argumentations and critical assimilations of what Descartes, Husserl and Heidegger had to say something about appearance and essence, being and knowledge Sartre theorised appearance as synthetic unity, which came into being as series and profiles and concealed 'nothing' behind it. In this pursuit of Being Sartre outlined three characteristics of Being: "Being is, Being in itself, Being is what it is." While differentiating between Being-in-itself and being-for-itself Sartre defined that Being-in-itself 'by itself cannot even be what it is not'. Sartre characterised Being-in-itself as it was 'qualified' positivity and had 'no' otherness. For Sartre, Being was 'beyond negation as beyond affirmation'. Sartre limited affirmation and negation as propertied by Being-for-itself which had capacity for instantaneous 'otherness'.

Sartre defined the scope of Being and Nothingness as limited to answering questions which were raised during his 'pursuit of being'. The questions were: "What is the ultimate meaning of these two types of being? For what reasons do they both belong to being in general? What is the meaning of that being which includes within itself these two radically separated regions of being? If idealism and realism both fail to explain the relations which in fact unite these regions, which in
theory are without communication, what other solution can we find for this problem?" 31 We shall come back to a discussion of how Sartre dealt with answering these questions in the third and fifth chapters. For now, we may note that Sartre answered these questions not in their own terms but in terms of the totality of his 'existential project'.

The text Being and Nothingness brought Sartre the popularity which was to 'subdue' him all through his life. The work which brought Sartre a name according to him was thoroughly misunderstood. Sartre set out to clear misunderstandings about the 'existential movement' in general and the text Being and Nothingness, in particular, in his celebrated lecture Existentialism is a Humanism delivered in 1945 and published in 1946. 32 Sartre intended this as a defence against charges which saw existentialism as defeatism, sordidness, antihumanism and the like. This was the period during which (when) existentialism mutated into a 'movement'. This small essay had become a good boon for 'lazy' critics who hesitated to read Being and Nothingness and happily attacked Sartre after reading 70 odd pages. 33

Sartre tried to apply the abstract, speculative notions of Being and Nothingness to real, concrete human situations in terms of man's freedom, abstract and concrete. Sartre defined: "Man simply is not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he
wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing - as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism." Sartre argued man to be essentially embodied by 'subjective life' while giving primacy to 'cartesian cogito', Sartre said: "Every theory which begins with man, outside of this moment of self attainment is a theory which thereby suppresses the truth for outside of the 'cartesian cogito' all objects are no more than probable, and any doctrine of probabilities which is not attached to a truth will crumble into nothing." Sartre interpreted being to be truth and intrinsically related to 'contingency'. Sartre gave a 'chance' to man to be eternally and infinitely free and historical when he said: "If, moreover, existence precedes essence and we will to exist at the same time as we fashion our image - that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves." Sartre defined that in fashioning himself man has fashioned man. When Sartre said: "Man is free, man is freedom", it was not merely a "charged" proposition but his ontological commitment. However definitive Sartre's theorizations of Man seemed, Sartre refuted "human nature" as a universal essence which covered all human beings. Sartre never was convinced about 'human nature' for a theoretical necessity that all a priori definitions of man denied to man freedom.
as 'fundamental project'. Sartre rejected 'human nature' when he said: "although it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of condition." Man fashioned himself just as he fashioned the epoch he belonged to, but Sartre found him to be the same - morality unchanged, 'freedom' identical. Sartre argued: "It is true in the sense that we do not believe in progress. Progress implies amelioration; but man is always the same, facing a situation which is always changing and choice remains always choice in the situation. The moral problem has not changed since the time when it was a choice between slavery and anti-slavery - from the time of war of secession, for example, until the present moment when one chooses between M.R.P. and the Communists." How Sartre were to like if God did not exist and, even if He existed, how man's being and freedom were unaffected we would take up in the second section of the introduction.

MATERIALISM AND REVOLUTION

Sartre published a 'lesser known but most important' article entitled 'Revolutionary Materialism' in 1946 in Les Temps Modernes. The same article was published in English in the journal Politics in 1947 with the changed title Materialism and Revolution, which was subsequently included in Literary and Philosopich Essays in 1955. Sartre in this article formulated his basic
Sartre interpreted 'materialism' to be metaphysics when he said: "It seems as though first step is to deny the existence of God and transcendent finality; the second, to reduce the action of mind to that of matter; the third, to eliminate subjectivity by reducing the world, and man in it, to system of objects linked together by universal relationships. I conclude in all good faith it is a metaphysical doctrine and that materialists are metaphysicians". Sartre placed this article as a direct challenge to 'orthodox Marxism' and refused 'dialectic of nature' in its strengths and weaknesses as a 'revolutionary myth'.

SEARCH FOR A METHOD

Sartre wrote an article with the title Marxism and Existentialism for a Polish journal in 1957. He was invited to write an article concerning 'where existentialism stands in 1957'. This was rewritten to suit the French readership in the same year and published under the title 'Search For a Method' in Les Temps Modernes. This was meant to be the preface of another monumental work of Sartre - Critique of Dialectical Reason. This text comprised three parts. In the first part, Sartre outlined existentialism's relationship with Marxism. Sartre declared "... the fact that an 'anti-
Marxist' argument is only the apparent rejuvenation of a pre-Marxist idea, a so-called "going beyond" Marxism will be at worst only return to pre-Marxism; at best, only the rediscovery of a thought already contained in the philosophy which one believes he has gone beyond.  
Sartre argued that Marxism remained the philosophy of our time, 'we cannot go beyond it because we have not gone beyond the circumstances which endangered it'.  
Sartre explained that only Marxism can be knowledge-authentic. But he elaborated that, due to certain unfortunate contingent historical reasons, Marxism had stopped developing and had been transformed into a rigid dogma. According to Sartre a dogma is incapable of grasping the lived dimension of human phenomena. Sartre explained that it was this failure of twentieth century Marxism which had given rise to the possibility of existentialism. Existentialism, for Sartre, was an ideology which would complement Marxism, a philosophy of historical materialism. Sartre reasoned existentialism being 'parasitical' over the edge of 'knowledge' - 'Marxism'. Sartre believed Marxism had seen its day and would have to be replaced by a philosophy of freedom. But Sartre confessed that we did not have the means, the concrete experience or the intellectual instrument to effect the replacement of Marxism by a philosophy of freedom-existentialism.  
In the second and third parts of this text, Sartre attempted to show how 'Orthodox Marxism'
rested on certain a priori claims pertinent to the 'Ontology' of Marxism. Existentialism sought to be 'more than a 'heuristic method' which borrowed its principles from Marxism, Sartre explained. Existentialism agreed to assimilate the new impetus and Sartre qualified it as 'regulative ideas', 'indicators of tasks' and not as 'concrete truths'. Sartre wanted Marxism to adopt American sociology since he felt that this would enrich the Marxist understanding of history and psycho-analysis in order to construct a wholesome view of the individual. These issues will be discussed in greater detail in the fourth chapter.

CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICAL REASON:

Sartre published 'Critique of Dialectical Reason' in 1960. Sartre's second major philosophical work was the result of his philosophical concerns of the fifties. During these years Sartre was pressed with the question of the relation between existentialism and Marxism and he attempted to explain the same in 'Critique of Dialectical Reason'. Sartre was always looking for a way to synthesise his basic approach of 'subjectivity' with the objective methods of 'dialectical materialism'. His writings during this period demonstrated although in no way rejected original philosophical position existentialism progressed towards 'Marxism'. The basic problematic Sartre with which wanted to deal when he formulated the questions: "Do we have means to constitute
"a structural and historical anthropology?" - is a philosophy of history. Sartre meant by a 'historical anthropology' a study where 'critical foundations' of 'Marxist historical dialectic' is vindicated. Sartre attempted to construct 'critical foundations' of 'historical dialectic' not by a study of the concrete development of actual history but by examining the formal conditions of possibility and intelligibility of the 'dialectic of history'. In the introduction Sartre identified the basic principles of 'dialectical materialism' as 1) negation of negation can be an affirmation, 2) it is in and through conflict inside a person or a group that the person or group makes history and 3) history operates at each instant by totalizations of totalizations. Sartre valued these principles as not being dogmas, as not being principles exclusive to dialectical materialism but found in some other approaches also. The other 'approaches' were a) comptian positivism b) social anthropology and c) psycho-analytic theory. Sartre, while appreciative of the 'dialectical elements' these 'approaches' demonstrated, rejected their 'monism of interpretation' as dogmatism in essence.

Sartre seemed to note that positivism and neo-positivism reject everything a priori and consequentially rejected a monism of interpretation. Sartre characterised positivism as necessarily a form of materialism and on the same count he inferred, without putting it
categorically, that positivism's rejection of 'monism of interpretation' was qualified and limited. Sartre explained positivism as a method which was striving to achieve the developmental unity of a single process but which would attempt to show several independent exterior factors as having effected the resultant event under consideration. Sartre, arguing on the basis of the inadequacies of the above listed approaches, said: "neither the exclusive appeal to analytical Reason nor the unconditional choice of dialectical Reason can be justified rationally." 59

Sartre, in sizing up the theoretical haphazards which would deter the 'growth' of a theory and fan stagnation, employed the conceptual tool 'dialectical hyper empiricism'. 60 For Sartre, dialectical-hyper-empiricism 61 would act as a remedial measure against 'dialectical dogmatism' or 'dialectical monism' or 'monism of interpretation' or 'dialectical materialism'. Sartre explained that 'dialectical hyper-empiricism' forced the movement of the method to the conclusion that 'dialectical universality' must be imposed 'a priori' as a necessity. Sartre clarified that 'a priori' here has nothing to do with any sort of constructive principles which are prior to experience. Sartre related a priori "to a universality and necessity which are contained in every experience but which transcend any particular experience." 62

We must note that though Sartre begins with approval of 'historical materialism' and relates it with
different principles of 'materialist dialectic' or dialectical materialism', Sartre in real terms criticised, interpreted and presented Marxism as he 'understood' it. But Sartre at different moments of his argument, took 'seemingly' contradictory positions.

STATEMENTS OF APPROVAL:

a) "Everything we established in The Problem Of Method follows from our fundamental agreement with historical materialism."63

b) "I have proposed certain methodological rules; but they cannot be valid, in fact they cannot even be discussed, unless the materialist dialectic can be assumed to be true."64

c) "Marx's originality lies in the fact that in opposition to Hegel he demonstrated that History is in development, that Being is irreducible to knowledge, and also, that he preserved the dialectical movement both in Being and in knowledge. He was correct practically."65

d) "Marx, however, began by positing that material existence was irreducible to knowledge in its real efficacy. Needless to say, this is my own position."66

e) "It should be noted that Marx - so clear and intelligible in his dialectical reconstruction of the capitalist process and in demonstrating its necessity
always refused, and rightly so, to present Marxism as 'a general historico-philosophical theory the supreme virtue of which consists in being supra-historical'.

f) "...Marx, the theorist produces a materialist and dialectical interpretation of History, it is because it is required by the materialist dialectic as a rule for working-class praxis and as sole foundation of true (that is to say future) universality."

g) "Marx was right, subject to the qualification that there is a circular process at work here and that the State, being produced and sustained by the dominant, rising class constitutes itself as the organ of contradiction and integration of the class."

h) "The Marxist future, however, is a genuine future: it is completely new, and irreducible to the present."

i) "Of course dialectical materialism has a practical advantage over contemporary ideologies in that it is the ideology of the rising class."

j) Sartre Quoting from Marx's Wage, Labour and Capital: "In production men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and
relations does their action on nature, does production takes place", "The relations of production in their totality constitute what are called the social relations, society." - Sartre said: "I entirely agree with Marxism on this point."  

STATEMENTS OF DISAPPROVAL:

a) "...this amounts to requiring Marxists to establish their method a priori: whatever relations are investigated, there will never be enough of them to establish a dialectical materialism."  
b) "The attempt to ground the Marxist dialectic on anything other than its content, that is to say, the knowledge which it provides, might be denounced as idealism."  
c) "The supreme paradox of historical materialism is that it is at one and the same time, the only truth of History and a total determination of the truth."  
d) "...we do not know what it means for a Marxist historian to speak the truth. Not that his statements are false - far from it; but he does not have the concept of truth at his disposal."  
e) "The source of this dogmatism lies in the basic problem of 'dialectical materialism'."  
f) "Marxists have played the positivist game."  
g) "But if dialectical Reason creates itself (rather than suffering itself), how can one prove that it
corresponds to the dialectic of being with relapsing into idealism? ... No doubt it will seem surprising that I refer to Marxist monism as a dualism: it is in fact both monist and dualist." 78

h) "When dialectical materialism claims to establish a dialectic of Nature it does not present itself as an attempt at an extremely general synthesis of human knowledge, but rather as a mere ordering of the facts. ... This gigantic - and, as we shall see, abortive attempt to allow the world to unfold itself by itself and to no one, we shall call external, or transcendental dialectical materialism." 79

i) "However one looks at it, transcendental materialism leads to the irrational, either by ignoring the thought of the empirical man or by creating a noumenal consciousness which imposes its law as a whim, or again by discovering in Nature 'without alien addition' the laws of dialectical Reason in the form of contingent facts." 80

j) "A materialist dialectic will be meaningless if it cannot establish, within human history the primacy of material conditions as they are discovered by the praxis of particular men and as they impose themselves on it. In short, if there is any such thing as dialectical materialism it must be a historical materialism, that is to say, a
materialism from within; it must be one and the same thing to produce it and have it imposed on one, to live it and to know it. Consequently, this materialism if it exists, can be true only within the limits of our social universe.81

However 'inconsistent' and 'self contradictory' these above listed statements of approval and disapproval of 'Marxism' of Sartre may at first instance appear, they are deep rooted, well-thought-out, theoretical strategies towards his argument of 'dialectical Reason'. Sartre's fundamental argument which will come out 'clearly' and 'distinctly' mediated through his approaches and reproaches towards 'Marxism' has been: nothing can ground the dialectic except the dialectic itself. Sartre, in taking up critical stances against Marxism to assimilate as well as negate certain positions, sought to explore the limits, the extent and validity of 'dialectical Reason'. The task taken up by Sartre is clear when he said: 'we cannot deny that a critique (in the Kantian sense of the term) of dialectical Reason can be made only by dialectical Reason itself; and indeed it must be allowed to ground itself and to develop itself as a free critique of itself, at the same as being the movement of History and of knowledge.' Sartre contended that 'dialectical Reason' is walled up in 'dogmatism' and needs to be liberated. By 'dogmatism' Sartre meant a theoretical system's ability to retain itself or to
interpret the world from a singular point of view. As we have noted earlier, Sartre used the terms 'dialectical materialism', 'monism of interpretation', 'dialectical monism', 'dialectical realism', as a predication to Marxism. Sartre declared: "...dialectical Reason extends beyond analytical Reason and includes within itself its own critique and its own transcendence." Sartre considered 'historical materialism' as the only valid interpretation of human history. The 'historical materialism' Sartre advocated was not historical materialism which had as its foundation dialectical materialism. The 'dialectical Reason', Sartre sought to construct was constituted in 'historical materialism'. Sartre argued that if we are to attain knowledge of 'historical dialectic', there are some conditions to be fulfilled. These conditions are:

a) The dialectic must be vindicated in our daily experience. This grounding of historical dialectic must sustain the contradictory relation between 'daily experience' and 'rational necessity'. Though there is no 'historical necessity' in each particular moment of everyday life, yet 'historical necessity' arises from individual facts. According to Sartre, Kant maintained that mind imposes necessary structures on facts and, different to this Husserl claimed that essential structures of facts are revealed by their relation to the pure consciousness after expulsion of 'things' or
'elements' of consciousness. Sartre exploited the 'truth' from the above posited 'contradiction' revealed by Kant and Husserl that 'the dialectical method works with in the contradiction that necessity exists in our contingent, historical experience'. 83

b) The 'dialectic of nature' as demonstrated by orthodox Marxism according to Sartre has shown that knowledge vanishes when reduced to one modality of being among others. The resolution of the dualism of being and knowledge is attempted by 'marxism', but without success might lead to some kind of disguised spiritualism. This consequential spiritualism must be rejected in order to sustain the irreducibility of knowledge to being. Sartre codified: "Being is the negation of knowledge draws its being from the negation of being." 84

c) Sartre quoted Marx: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past." Sartre assumed to have been in agreement with what Marx has said and understood it, as a categorical rejection of 'determinism' and 'analytical Reason'. Analytic Reason treats history as an average of innumerable 'individual' actions of individuals. Determinism as an opposite of 'freedom' and transcendence claims that history results from completely prior conditions. If 'historic dialectic' exists, the scope to find a 'dialectical rationality' is more than average and
yet not produced by blind 'necessity' or 'laws'. Individual praxis must be revealed as totalization of totalizations which can complicate into 'concrete' expression of history which in turn can produce 'human reality'. This process of history according to Sartre "is not a transcendent fate", and "how it can bring about the unity of dispersive profusion and integration?" - is the question. Dialectical rationality must be seen as a permanent dialectical unity of freedom and necessity. Sartre employs 'materialist dialectic' strictly from an epistemological point of view. Sartre said: "...thought must discover its own necessity in its material object, at the same time as discovering in itself, in so far as it is itself a material being, the necessity of its object." But this kind of reciprocity when applied to history Sartre argued must not be misunderstood as Hegelian idealism or Marxist materialism either. Just as events shape human beings, human being can reshape events. Here the 'problematic' graduated from thought to action. In the process of shaping and reshaping individual 'praxis' enters into a relation with universe of things. Sartre said: ".....a relation must be established, by and through the other, between each praxis and universe of things, in such a way that in the course of a perpetual totalization, the things becomes human and man realizes as a thing." Man's relations with things and with other men are always accidental but the former is the relation of exteriority and the later is the relation interiority.
d) The dialectic if it is to be reason must appear as 'untranscendable intelligibility'. This 'untranscendable intelligibility' is governed in its entirety by the basic conditions, the structures of materiality, the continuous action of the relations of exteriority and the relations of interiority, and the balance of forces involved. Sartre defined: "The dialectic if it exists, can only be the totalization of concrete totalizations effected by a multiplicity of totalizing individualities." Here dialectic is 'nominalism' or it can be named 'dialectical nominalism' or 'dialectical realism'. But 'nominalism' must validate 'intelligibility' and 'necessity' in order to realize the contexts for the analytic meaning of 'necessity'. The 'dialectical Reason' must show 'analytic Reason' is a moment in its own development. The dialectic must be shown to be perfectly transcendent because this is not mystifying experience but simply our dialectical understanding of ourselves.88

By formulating these conditions, Sartre attempts to "purify" marxism and the nature of Sartre's methodology which acknowledges 'good' and 'bad' side of marxism without attempting to see how the "bright" side and "dark" side are organically linked, will be taken up in the second chapter in a critical way.

POSTUMOUS PUBLICATIONS:

Among three posthumous publications only "War Dairies" is available in English. The other two are not
translated into English. They are 1) Cahiers pour une morale, 2) Critique of Dialectical Reason vol II. 'Cahiers pour une morale' is written as a sequel to Being and Nothingness. This is a record of Sartre's concerns about ethics of the years 1947-48. A portion of the volume of 'Critique Dialectical Reason' was published in New Left Review with the title 'socialism in one country'. Sartre never prepared this for publication, thus he 'left undeveloped many key themes, left unresolved many problems of conception and left intact many blind allies'.

SARTRE AND ATHEIST EXISTENTIALISM

Existentialist tradition has been traced back to St. Augustine, the father of Christian Theology and Pascal, the tormented, doubting seeker of faith in God. Existentialism has drawn inspiration from the writings of S.Kierkegaard (1813-55) and F.Nietzsche (1844-1900), who belonged to the last century. Some important names of the existentialist movement of this century are K.Jaspers (1883-1969), G.Marcel (1889-1973), M.Heidegger (1889-1976), and M. Merleau-Ponty (1908-61). However much it is rooted in tradition, existentialism is essentially a twentieth century phenomenon. Existentialism is a later arrival in philosophy than Marxism. Existentialism is divided into theistic and atheistic kinds, Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel belong to the former and Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty belong to the latter.
Philosophies that are based on the rational and 'scientific method' aim to represent the universe in clear, consistent and connected conceptual terms. Existentialism resisted any systematization of its order of concepts, the way they acquire new meanings in new situations. It is thus difficult to give a "definite" summary of existentialism as it rejected the necessity of thought and action to correspond with the objective reality outside the individual.

The primary concept of existentialism is 'existence' which is defined as the immediate 'lived' experience of the individual and has priority over 'essence'. The second important category of existentialism is 'essence'. 'Essence' Sartre defined as rational abstraction, reflecting the laws, properties and relations of 'objective reality'. Existentialism argued that 'man must choose to will to act than be conditioned to be led to act'. Existentialism opined that the 'will to act' or 'freedom of choice' makes man authentic, irrespective of the consequences of a particular 'choice' or action. Existentialists have diverse views about philosophy, human nature and the concept of God. They belong to one tradition not because they have basic agreement on different aspects of their philosophy but because they have a common 'subjectivist' approach to reality. Existentialism opposes rationalism, determinism and materialism.
A fundamental characteristic of all existentialism whether of theism or atheism is that it unfolds a particular problem from the standpoint of 'individual subjectivity'. In an epistemic situation existentialism holds that transformation of consciousness is not required from the standpoint of 'individual subjectivity' to that of a detached, impersonal spectator. Existentialism insisted that only by consciously adopting and maintaining the phenomenological standpoint of 'concrete' subjectivity as basic and irreducible, could we have access to authentic philosophical truth. The existentialist commitment to subjectivity must be differentiated from philosophical subjectivism or solipsism. 'Existential subjectivism' sought to show how each individual could come to an enriched 'self-certainty' through personalised reflection upon 'structures' and 'forms' of typically human experience as a subject 'incarnate' in a world with other people.

EXISTENTIALISM vs POSITIVISM AND IDEALISM:

Existentialism constituted an 'immanent' critique of 'materialism', of positivism and the intellectualism of 'transcendental idealism'. Existentialism argued that each of these philosophiccal alternatives represents a 'detotalization' of reality as they are inadequate and one sided accounts of reality.
Existentialism construed its own approach as a means of disclosing and overcoming the inadequacy of positivism and idealism as approaches towards reality.\textsuperscript{100} Positivism, as existentialism maintained, treats the whole of reality including man as simply a system of data or things or objects. These objects and things are amendable to the method of science. Positivism, as existentialism viewed it, explains man empirically as one 'thing' or a 'thing' among 'things' and at the best it treats him as only a complicated aspect of the world. Existentialism criticised positivism for ignoring the 'truth' that man is essentially a subject and not merely an object and that he is a 'first person' event and not simply a 'third person' event. Existentialism accused positivism for making man merely a part of the world only to forget that man is also an originator of meaning and value in the world. Existentialism explained that positivism failed to appreciate that the world of 'objectivity' could present itself as such only because man is not merely an object but primarily a subject.

Existentialism characterised idealism as an inadequate philosophical account of man. Existentialism agreed with idealism as an emphasis of man's power to 'subjectivity' as constituting the reality of the world as object. But existentialism differed from the idealist perspective of understanding 'subjectivity' as universal, disembodied, all embracing spirit. In idealism according
to Sartre, the individual, finite subject and the independent reality of material things are denied within the self-sufficient subjectivity and thought. Existentialism viewed idealism as taking reality and man in particular to be rarefied to the extent of a modification or manifestation of 'comprehensive' self or absolute spirit. The development of this tendency to ground the being of man in a self-enclosed and self-sufficient 'subjectivity' can be traced through the philosophy of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. This self-sufficient 'subjectivity' was expounded in a complete way in the philosophy of Hegel which gave rise to the thinking, that every aspect of reality was a moment in the progressive self-manifestation of absolute, divine and utterly rational mind. According to existentialism, this exaltion of man in idealism was in fact a radical dehumanization of him. Existentialism construed that idealism, by dismissing man's authentic freedom, creativity and responsibility, reduced man's concrete, personal and embodied existence to merely a 'moment' in the elaboration of an eternal inexorable logic.

Existentialism presented idealism as having highlighted the impotence of man as 'subjectivity' but, also as having neglected the truth that this was not a self-endorsed 'subjectivity' but rather a 'subjectivity' grafted through a body in the physical world. According to Sartre Positivism interpreted that man is what he is only on the basis of materiality, as existentialism would
understand, but underestimated the significance of human "subjectivity". Existentialism's fundamental, irreducible starting point of authentic philosophical reflection was the description of man as the 'incarnation' of freedom. Existentialism held as its basic philosophical perspective the view that 'man is a unique reality who is not just a thing in the world', and 'not a pure 'subjectivity' but a free subjectivity' which is present in a world involving other people.

The theistic existentialism of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel was an expression of truly appropriated human freedom to be represented as a 'personalised openness', 'commitment' and fidelity to God. Theistic existentialism made God's freedom a pre-condition for human freedom. Jaspers presented man, the free 'Existenz' not as a mere empirical being but as the exclusive source of future possibilities. For Jaspers, Existenz was a gift of 'Transcendence'. Different to this, the defence of human freedom took the form of rejecting all reference to God since this was incompatible with freedom in atheistic existentialism.

SARTRE AND NIETZSCHE:

Nietzsche's well known proclamation 'God is dead' was his philosophy of the 'will-to-power'. Nietzsche drew inspiration from Schopenhaur's improvement of the Kantian 'thing-in-itself' into a postulate that all
phenomenal reality was an expression of an underlying restless 'will to live'. Nietzsche's philosophy gave man an unrestricted self-assertion, a fundamental primacy to his 'will' which consequently led to the postulate of the 'death of God'. Nietzsche opined that belief in God and universal moral values was cowardice and an obvious escape from the challenge to be 'fully free'. This postulatory atheism of Nietzsche found a close parallel in the philosophy of Sartre. Sartre advocated human freedom as 'one and indivisible'. Sartre defined man as having absolute freedom and denied him a human nature which would be universally preponderant and subsequently denied God as an intelligent creator of human nature.

According to Sartre, the only human freedom worthy of this name was that which could authenticate itself as an absolute creative source. Sartre argued that man became truly man only by virtue of that continuous self-surpassing through which all his actions which were qualified by a quest for freedom. Sartre explained that his kind of atheism did not gravitate around proofs for the non-existence of God. Sartre maintained that even if God existed it would not make any difference from his point of view. For Sartre, whether or not God existed the only thing that counted was the commitment of man as total freedom. Sartre viewed a man as one who willed only his freedom whatever was the situation-adverse or convenient. Though Sartre adopted an argued disproof of God as incidental to his rejection of Him, he made the existence
of God incompatible with the conception of man as total freedom. Sartre differentiated the free human condition from that of an artefact such as a book or a paper-knife. Sartre offered these two examples to elaborate on his kind of atheism. First of all we shall illustrate the example of a paper-knife. A paper-knife is made by an artisan in accordance with his prior-conception. It is made in a certain way to be of a particular use and to serve a definite purpose. If the conception of a paper-knife is to be taken as its 'essence', Sartre argued that its 'essence' preceded its 'existence' and determined its existence. Sartre inferred was that it was fundamental to theism that this priority of 'essence' over 'existence' be extended to men. Sartre explained that when God is defined as a creator, it means that He is a supernatural Artisan. Sartre elaborated that just as the paper-knife is manufactured by the artisan in line with a pre-conceived formula, so each individual man is a creation of a certain conception which dwells in the divine understanding. This view, Sartre thought had dangerous repurcussion in that 'human existence' including 'human freedom' was composed and determined by a divinely bestowed human nature. For theistic existentialism, the only way of truly being a man was by being in conformity with God's conception of man. In rejecting the theistic conception of man, Sartre defined man to be-not like all artefacts, had the being whose 'existence' preceded 'essence'. Sartre explained
that man first of all existed and only subsequently defined himself through his choices. Sartre argued that man was initially not definable because, to begin with, he was nothing. Sartre accepted no predetermined human nature or a priori system of moral values to instruct man to help him make his choices, because, there was no God. In the second example, the book vindicated a somewhat different conclusion though to giving primacy to 'human freedom' (just as the denial of God on the basis of a distinction between man and a paper knife is made to affirm 'human freedom'). Sartre explained that till the book was complete, the author remained a 'creator'. As soon as the book took the final form, it no more belonged to the author, but it belonged to the readers to whom it was addressed. We have noted in this section that it made no difference to Sartre's atheism, whether or not God existed. Sartre reasoned that just as the author (creator) looses his grip on the work after he has finished writing the book, similarly God has no hold on human beings even if His existence is assumed to be true. Sartre said: "The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with him all the possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that 'the good' exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only
men... Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist. Man in a Godless world, for Sartre was condemned to be free. Sartre held that man was thrown into this world, prolongs out of weakness and died out of chance. Sartre explained that though man's power was limited, his freedom was unlimited. We have already noted that Sartre did not offer proofs for non-existence of God in the way Descartes offered proofs for the existence of God. However we shall present 'the nature of God' whose existence Sartre denied and the nature of arguments in support of his denial. From this we shall demonstrate how Sartre did not graduate into 'materialist atheism' from 'idealist atheism', but remained an 'idealist atheist'. Whatever Sartre's popularity as an atheist he was not free from using religious phraseology. This was evident from two important passages from the 'introduction' (The Pursuit of Being) to Being and Nothingness. Sartre defined Being-in-itself: "Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible, it is. This is what consciousness expresses in anthromorphic terms by saying that being is superfluous (de trop) - that is that consciousness absolutely cannot derive being from anything, either from another being, or from a necessary law uncreated, without reason for being, without any connection with another being, being-in-itself is de-trop for eternity". Sartre, here used opposing terms in a 'negative' way to elucidate the positive, passivity the
being-in-itself. Sartre seemed to view being-in-itself as having 'original' incapacity for being to be possible or impossible because it was superfluous to eternity. 'Eternity', here, cannot be taken in the sense of temporality as Sartre limited its meaning to the 'life' of 'for-it-self', in its project of nihilating the 'in-itself'. For Sartre, temporality was a subjective process since he defined time as flowing over things, but not the inner core of things. Let us see how Sartre defined Being:

"Being is equally beyond negation as beyond affirmation". The reasons why Sartre viewed Being as 'beyond affirmation' would be: a) affirmation was always affirmation of something and b) the act of affirming was distinguished from the thing affirmed. Here Sartre was trying to avoid a possible confusion between that which was affirmed and the act of affirming itself. Apart from this apparent reasoning and argumentation, in the above discussion Sartre clearly gave a fundamentality to Being. Sartre said: "......being is isolated in its being and that it does not enter into any connection with what is not itself. Transition, becoming, anything which permits us to say that being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it is not - all that is forbidden on principle. For being is the being of the becoming and due to this fact it is beyond becoming. It is what it is. This means by itself it cannot be even be what it is not; it can encompass no negation". To maintain that being was the being of becoming was to extract from the relative
'being' an absolute 'Being'. Sartre defined Being as beyond becoming. Sartre also argued that Being could not be 'what it is not as it already becomes-became'. By formulating the nature of being as 'Being is the Being of becoming' and 'Being is beyond becoming', Sartre was not indicating two different Beings but a Being within Being or two levels of Being. This kind of metaphysical discussion cannot have the meaning of an 'ontological metaphysical - why?' but only a 'religious metaphysical why?' This was clearly evident when Sartre defined man as a desire to be God. And for Sartre, this passion of 'being-for-itself' to be one with 'Being-in-itself' was doomed to fail. Sartre concluded that man was a useless passion and God was a contradiction in terms. Sartre titled the fifth section of the introduction (The Pursuit Of Being) to Being and Nothingness 'The Ontological Proof'. This reminds us of St.Anselm's and Descartes' argument in support of the existence of God. St.Anselm argued that even an atheist must agree that God was that being greater than, which one cannot conceive, then only would the atheist be able to reject what the believer believed. But according to St.Anselm as the greatest being conceivable God must be perfect to exist, since a non-existing God was nothing. St.Anselm argued that mind can clearly conceive of many things more perfect than nothing - for example, the existence of an ant. For St.Anselm, the concept of an existing ant was more perfect than the
concept of a non-existing God. Descartes adopted a similar argument but in a technically more complicated way to hold; 'It is not within my power to think of God without existence (that is of a supremely perfect Being devoid of a supreme perfection) though it is in my power to imagine a horse either with wings or without wings'. We must understand, Sartre, with the above positions of Descartes and St. Anselm in mind, we must understand Sartre, as having adopted religious terminology to say no to God. But Sartre's ontological argument was different from St. Anselm's and Descartes' in a fundamental way. Sartre was using an 'ontological argument' to make certain ontological comments on the relation between Being and Nothingness or consciousness and not for any analysis of concepts. Sartre considered that the demand of the consciousness as 'which is what it is not and which is not what it is' must be met while denying the 'ontological proof' for the existence of God. Sartre said: "...consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself. This is what we call the ontological proof". While acknowledging Husserl's discovery of 'consciousness as consciousness of something' as essential, Sartre criticised Husserl for having been unfaithful to this principle. According to Sartre, 'the 'something of which consciousness becomes a consciousness' cannot exist in consciousness in the form
of 'to be is to be perceived'. Sartre explained that this Husserlian pure 'subjectivity' not only could not transcend itself to posit the objective but it disappeared. So Sartre inferred that this 'pure' subjectivity or consciousness of being consciousness must be qualified as revealing intuition or else it was nothing. Sartre, here, applied a dimension to consciousness similar to Heidegger applied to Dasein (human reality). Sartre thus interpreted 'human reality' as a being whose being was in question in its own being.

Sartre rejected the theory of 'creation' where 'God' is placed as central to a theory. Sartre argued:

"Since people supposed that God has given being to, being always appeared tainted with a certain passivity. But creation ex-nihilo cannot explain the comming to pass of being; for being is conceived in a subjectivity, even a divine subjectivity, it remains a mode of intra-subjective being. Such subjectivity cannot even have the representation of an objectivity, and consequently it cannot even be affected with the will to create the objective."¹⁰⁷ Acknowledging Liebniz, Sartre said that if being put outside itself it is put immediately as opposed to its creator. If they (those beings put outside the 'creator' being) cannot differentiate from the creator they dissolve in Him. Leibniz's monads are given freedom for self-reflection and self sufficiency but not freedom to act among each other, or on one another. This part,
however is taken care by 'monad of monads' by a pre-established harmony. Sartre asserted: "If being exists as over against God, it is its own support; it does not preserve the least trace of divine creation. In a word, even if it had been created, being-in-itself would be inexplicable in terms of creation; for it assumes its being beyond the creation". And Sartre explained that it was equivalent to saying that being is uncreated. Sartre argued that if being had to self create it meant that there was a prior being to the created one and it could not be causa-sui in the manner of consciousness.

Sartre differentiated between Descartes', Kant's and Leibniz's concepts of temporality as they proposed a non-temporal divine entity - God as unifier of time. According to Sartre Descartes and Kant thought that unity of time could not be furnished by time itself. Descartes' God was involved in continuous creation and time was unified by its material content, which, according to Sartre, was 'maintained in existence by a perpetual creation ex-nihilo'. According to Kant, the dimensions of temporality, the present, the past and the future were connected with the 'I think' of Descartes as it formed a synthetic unity. Sartre explained that, in both Kant and Descartes, God as extra-temporal being provides non-temporal instants with their temporality. Sartre said: "Either we will implicitly and surreptitiously temporalise the non-temporal; or else if we scrupulously preserve its
non-temporality, time will become a pure human illusion, a
dream. If time is real then even God will have to "wait
for the sugar to dissolve ". He must be both down there in
the future and yesterday in the past in order to effect
the connection of moments, for it is necessary that he
take hold of them there where they are".\textsuperscript{109} From this we
can make out how Sartre was presenting an argument against
the necessity of existence as it was proposed by Descartes
and Kant. For Sartre either time was real or God was real.
If time is real God would have no escape from it and it
would be inconsistent to any perfect conception of God.
Sartre argued that even in the case whose God is defined
as omniscient and where He does not have to ‘wait till the
sugar dissolved’ temporality becomes an illusion as a
result of human finitude. Sartre thus defined subjective
temporality: "the chronological order is only the
confused perception of an order which 'is logical and
eternal'.\textsuperscript{110} Sartre seemed to link and define the finitude
of temporal order as an ever-existing stage of infinitude
of temporal order - 'eternal'. Sartre criticised Kant’s
objections to Descartes’ notion of God as time keeper that
the unity of time was brought out by the extra-temporal in
an a priori form. Sartre thought that Kant misunderstood
the problematic of Descartes as an accounting for the why
of the unity of time while it actually was an accounting
for the why of the intra-temporal connections of ‘before
and after’. Sartre contended: "...the very idea of
unification is here altogether incomprehensible. We have
in fact supposed two in-itselfs isolated each at its own place and date. How can we unify them? Are we dealing with a real unification? In this case either we are merely playing with words - and the unification will have no hold on the two in itselfs isolated in their respective self-identity and completeness; or else it will be necessary to constitute a unity of a new type - namely, ekstatic unity in which each state will be outside itself down there in order to be before or after the 'other'\textsuperscript{111}

Sartre, while being doubtful about the mode of unification of temporal instants unless as ekstatic unity, argued that non-temporal unity of 'I think' could effect 'this decompression of being'. Sartre raised questions such as how is the non-temporal going to unify non-temporals of a 'succession'? and - if time is time to be perceived, Where does one constitute the perceiver? Sartre judged: "Leibniz in reaction against Descartes and Bergson in reaction against Kant have in turn tried to see in temporality only a pure relation of immanence and cohesion\textsuperscript{112}. Sartre explained that Leibniz's critique of Descartes considered the problem of the passage from one instant to another and its solution, continuous creation, as a false problem and a useless solution. According to Leibniz Descartes ignored the continuity of time. Sartre accused Leibniz of ignoring that 'before-after was also a form that separated. Sartre inferred that only for-itself could exist as ekstatic unity of self (I think) can bring
about the unification of time. But Sartre recognised the problem when he wrote: "if the chronological order is continuous, it could not "symbolise" with the order of identity, for the continuous is not compatible with the identical".¹¹³ Sartre criticised Bergson for not being able to see in the concept of "duration" as it is an organization of multiplicity which would presuppose a "unifying act". For Sartre, Bergson was right in contrast to Descartes, as he undermined the instant (temporal). And Sartre acknowledged Kant to be right, unlike Bergson, in claiming that there was no "given synthesis". Different from Descartes' "continuous creation", from Leibniz's "monad of monad's capacity to regulate pre-established harmony among monads", from Kant's God as necessity of faith", and from Bergson's "creative evolution", Sartre developed a concept of temporality which would give no scope to any concept of God. Sartre defined temporality: "Temporality exists only as the intra-structure of a being which has to be its own being; that is, as the intra-structure of a For-itself. Not that the For itself has an ontological priority over temporality. But temporality is the being of the For-itself in so far as the For-itself has to be its being ekstatically. Temporality is not, but the For-itself temporalizes itself by existing".¹¹⁴ According to Sartre, "For-itself" has as its intra-structure - the temporality which effects unification of time as its "nihilation". Sartre explained that For-itself as "nihilation" can bring
about the unification all at once in three ways: a) to not to be what it is (past) b) to be what is not (present) c) to be what it is not and to not be what it is (future). Sartre argued that For-itself was a being which existed in all the dimensions of temporality, because it was impossible to imagine For-itself devoid of temporal dimensions. Sartre said "Each dimension is the For-itself’s way of projecting itself vainly toward the self, of being what it is beyond a nothingness, a different way being fall of being, this frustration of being which the for itself has to be". Sartre used the expressions such as: 'the being what it is beyond a nothingness', 'a different way of being this "fall" of being' were quite akin to religious expressions though the general argumentation of Sartre was toward a positive rejection of God. Sartre criticised Kant and Liebniz for defining "necessity" as "posibility" in defining God as self-caused-as a necessary conception. According to Sartre, this conception of "necessity" was inadequate because it converted "necessity" into terms of "possibility" not from the point of view of being but from the point of view of knowledge. Sartre explained that conceiving the idea of being which would be a foundation of its being would mean defining being as contingent. This would, for Sartre lead to the conception of Being-for-itself as a foundation of its own nothingness. Sartre argued that the act of "causation" by which God was self
"caused" was a nihilating act like every recovery of the self by the self, to the extent that the original relation of necessity was a return to self, a reflexivity. Here Sartre explained how God becomes imperfect as he causes Himself to look at Himself from a distance. Therefore Sartre was pointing to the replacement of 'non-being' of God with 'non-being' of nothingness. This was how Sartre understood that possibility could appear to us as an 'ontological structure' of the real. For Sartre 'Being-for-itself', could be synthetically external and it belonged "to certain beings as their possibility; it is the possibility which they are, which they have to be. In this case being sustains its own possibilities in being; it is their foundation and the necessity of being cannot then be derived from its possibility. In a word, God, if He exists, is contingent". 116 Sartre's rejection of God as existing conditional to his exposition of 'Being-for-itself' as absolute freedom or nothingness. Sartre rejected God on the grounds that:

a) If God's existence is accepted, man is free from his responsibility of shaping his life in one way or other. In the event of the non-existence of God, the death of man is neither determined by God nor by man himself unless it is a case of suicide. Sartre established the power of contingency and rejected the existence of God.

b) Sartre said: "For if God is consciousness, He is integrated in the totality. And if by His nature He is a being beyond consciousness (that is, an in-itself which
would be its own foundation) still the totality can appear to him only as object (in that case he lacks the totality's internal integration as the subjective effort to reapprehend the self) or as subject (then since God is not this subject he can only experience it without knowing it). Thus no point of view on totality is conceivable, the totality has no 'outside' and the very question of the meaning of the 'under ide' is stripped of meaning. We cannot go further. ¹¹⁷ Sartre rejected the existence of God because God cannot be an intelligent being who can both transcend and include totality.

c) As we have already noted, that Sartre defined 'Being-for-itself' as a being who lives with the constant desire to become God. For Sartre, this desire to become God founds its expression forever not successful synthesis of In-itself-For-itself. For-itself, as defined by Sartre, is a power of "nothingness" where it presents itself as a process of becoming as - to be - about - to be. For the existence of For-itself Sartre reasoned that lack of Being and 'For-itself' to be one with the 'In-itself' would be to gain 'fullness' of being. But this kind of identification of Being and non-Being was impossible because it was self contradictory. By taking up such an argument Sartre simultaneously exposed the importance given to God by scholastics and critically assimilated 'God' as an important, ultimate goal unachievable in
formulations of contingency, nothingness and For-itself. Sartre remained an 'idealist atheist' for the reasons:

1) While arguing against Descartes and Kant that God was unnecessary to unify of time Sartre instead of making time an invaluable condition of the materiality of the world, limits it to the nature of Being-for-itself or Nothingness.

2) By positing the question of relation between body and mind as a question of man's desire to become God, Sartre tried in vain an already known, doomed to fail - identity of thing in itself - for itself.

3) Similarly, Sartre instead of studying the relation between the self and the other as a dialectical relationship, presented the self as the violation of the other and the other as the violation of the self and as radically separated realms of Being. He raises the problem of identity of the For-it-self with the other by using a philosophical category "being-for-others", than discussing the problem as a dialectical interaction between the self and the other. Sartre said: "To be other to one self- the ideal always aimed at concretely in the form of being this other to oneself - is the primary value of my relations with the other. This means my being-for-others is haunted by the indication of an absolute being which would be itself as other and its being as other as itself, would be the very being of the ontological proof - that is God. This ideal cannot be realised without my surmounting the
original contingency of my relations to the other; that is by overcoming the fact that there is no relation of internal negativity between the negation by which the other is made other than I and the negation by which I am made other than the other. We have seen that the contingency is insurmountable; it is the fact of my relations with the other just as my body is the fact that of my being-in-the world. Unity with the other is therefore, in fact unrealizable. It is also unrealizable in theory, for the assimilation of the for-itself and the other in a single transcendence would necessarily involve the disappearance of the characteristic of otherness in the other. Thus the condition on which I project the identification of myself with the other is that I persist in denying that I am the other. This long passage reveals one thing, Sartre is presenting the "ideal" of unity of the self and the other as a failure. Because the "contingency" of a situation where this "ideal" has to be realised is insurmountable. This "contingency" is beyond necessity or freedom in the sense that it is twined with ultimately the fundamental desire of man to be for itself-in itself-God. In the process of replacing "God" with "Individual" Sartre simultaneously derived the possibility of God as well as necessity of human relations.

4) For-itself according to Sartre projects being as for-itself, a being what it is, that the for itself projects
being what is. It is as consciousness that it wishes to have the impermeability and infinite "destiny" of the in-itself. It is, according to Sartre, as a being which is what it is not, and which is not what it is, that for-itself projects being what it is. Consciousness, Sartre theorised is a nihilation of the in-itself and a perpetual evasion of contingency and of facticity that it wishes to be its own foundation. In this context Sartre said: "whatever may be the myths and rites of the religion considered, God is first "sensible to the heart" of man as one who identifies and defines him in his ultimate and fundamental project. If man possesses a pre-ontological comprehension of the being of God, it is not the great wonders of nature nor the power of society which have conferred it upon him. God, value and supreme end of transcendence, represents the permanent limit in terms of which man makes known to himself what he is. To be man means to reach toward being God. Or if you prefer, man fundamentally is desire to be God."119 "God" as an ideal according to Sartre not only sets a goal for the human being but also gives realization of the limitedness of human project. The power of "God" as an idea is pre-ontological and man never derived it either through his "primitive" ignorance of nature or through "overflowing" knowledge of "being" of a society. For Sartre just as the power of "negation" of consciousness "nihilates" being-in-itself, "God" is assimilated and negated. Nature and
society are made into categories subordinate to consciousness, which has exclusiveness to negation. Sartre does not posit nature and society in the place of "God" he rejected.

5) Sartre's refusal of God is on an ontological basis and not on "factual" basis. Thus Sartre is not placing God as central to any particular religion or essence of a universal religion and so his refutations remain ontological without anything to do with "epistemological", "logical" or "historical".
REFERENCES

1. Renowned Sartre "scholar" Ronald Aronson in his Sartre's *Second Critique*, The university of Chicago press, Chicago and London, 1987, P.8, while commenting on Sartre's posthumous publications and Sartre's death under the head 'Life after death' said that Sartre died 'too late' only to 'err' or to overlook a printer's devil about Sartre's year of death: "...even if tens of thousands turned out for his funeral, the literary, philosophical, and political/intellectual worlds mourned his passing in 1979 with sad retrospection than grief confirming thought to be found in what follows, that we die too early or too late. In Sartre's case it was too late....".


3. 'The Angel of Morbidity' (a short story). 'Jesus The Owl', 'Small Town School Teacher'. (Several chapters of the two novels).

4. 'Ecole Normale Superieure' and Sartre passed the exam along with Paul Nizan, Ramond Aron, Daniel Lagache etc.

5. The three parts are 1) The Legend of the certain, 2) Legend of the probable, 3) The Legend of the solitary man. Commenting on the essay Simone de Beauvoir wrote: "It was almost impossible for him to state directly ; since he placed no faith in the universals or generalisations he denied himself the right even of formulating this repudiation in generalised terms... He admired those myths to which Plato, for similar in reasons, had had recourse.........". See Simone de Beauvoir, *The Prime Of Life*, Penguien Books, England, 1981 p. 45.

6. "'He kept his sympathy for those thaumaturge like characters who, shut off from the city with its logic and the evidence of their own eyes as a guide towards knowledge. Thus it was only to the artist, the writer, or the philosopher - those whom he termed the solitaries' - that he granted the privilege of grasping reality." Ibid, p.45.

7. 'The Legend of The Truth' was published in extracts in the periodical 'Bifur' and in the same number the periodical French translation of Hidegger's 'What is Metaphysics' appeared. Ibid., p. 79.

8. Simone de Beauvoir reported that Aron initiated in Sartre an interest in phenomenology. Once having a cocktail in a restaurant pointing to a glass Aron told Sartre 'you see my dear fellow, if you are a phenomenologist, you can talk about this cocktail and make philosophy out of it. Ibid, p. 135.
9. Ibid p. 135


11. Sartre maintained that all history of study of imagination is a tale of monumental error - the error being the assumption that images are things between imagining and perceiving....'. Ibid, V.

12. In the same number of the periodical an essay on 'being-in-situation' by Gabriel Marcel and an article on Ideology by Raymond Aron are included. The *writings of Jean-paul Sartre, Vol. I.*, Translated by Richard C-Mecleary, North Western University Evanston Compiled by Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, p. 47.


15. See Ibid., p. 101. It is an essential necessity that 'one not be able to distinguish between' voluntary spontanity and involuntary spontanity.' This proposition cannot be taken at its 'face value' because Sartre is on the one hand trying to hold that 'the being of the world is not separate from being of the world' (Hidggerian) on the other he retains the principle of 'going back to things' Husserlian). And the very use of the two terms voluntary and involuntary indicate at opposite processes which 'essentially necessiated' into spontanity of consciousness.

16. Sartre not characterised Husserlian phenomenology as 'escapist doctrine', but he uses this term while understanding a point in criticism of phenomenology which might have adopted such terminology about which Sartre never mentions 'who' and 'where'. But elsewhere Sartre applauded appearance of Husserl's works as a 'great event'of the pre-world-war-I Philosophy, see *Imagination* Op. Cit. p. 127.


21. Ibid., p. 28.
25. Ibid, p.xlvi
27. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Introduction, P. xlvi
29. Ibid., p.l.
30. Ibid., Introduction, p. lxvi.
31. Ibid., Introduction., p.lxvii.
32. The Writings of Jean-Paul-Sartre edited by Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka., p. 132.
33. There seems to be an edition of this text with 141 pages. See Ibid., p. 133.
35. Ibid., p. 44.
36. Ibid., p. 29
37. Ibid., p. 34
38. Ibid., p. 46.
39. Ibid., p. 50.
40. The Writings of Jean Paul Sartre, Edited by Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka., p.
42. Ibid., p. 200.

43. The Writings of Jean-Paul-Sartre, Edited by Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka., p. 339.

44. Sartre, Search For A Method, p. 7.

45. Ibid., p. 30.

46. Ibid., p 14.

47. Ibid., p. 8.

48. Ibid., p. 9.

49. Ibid., p. 6-21.


52. Ibid., p. 370.

53. Ibid., p. 371.


55. Ibid., p.15,17. In p.No. 2 Sartre comments 'Marxists played the positivist game'.

56. Ibid., p. 16.

57. Ibid., p. 17. See foot note no.6.

58. Ibid., p. 15.

59. Ibid., p. 17.

60. Ibid., p. 17.

61. Sartre acknowledges Sociologist Georges Gurivitch from whom he borrowed this concept.
Sartre explains that Gurivitch calls his hyper-empiricism 'dialectical', but this hardly matters since all he means is that his object (social facts) presents itself to investigation as dialectical. This dialecticism is thus itself, an empirical conclusion. Sartre uses phrases 'totalising moments', 'reciprocities of conditioning' and 'reciprocities of perspectives' for his interpolation of approaches which are not necessarily complimentary.
85. Ibid., p. 35-36.

86. Ibid., p. 36.

87. Ibid., p. 36.

88. Ibid., p. 37.


90. Ronald Aronson, Sartre's Second Critique., p. xv. op. cit.

91. "Tradition" as concept is a balance or equation between "continuity" or "discontinuity" in a system of philosophy in its development. See fifth chapter where a small discussion on "The Continuity of Discontinuity" in terms of continuity of themes in Sartre.

92. Patrick Masterson in his work Atheism and Aleination devoted a chapter for atheist existentialism with a title "Existentialism and the Rejection of Idols", but refrained from discussing Heidegger as an atheist or theist. Sartre in his "Existentialism Is A Humanism" qualified Heidegger as an atheist.


94. Sartre in exposition in Being and Nothingness unlike in his The Transcendence of The Ego, Emotions or two texts on "Imagination" a complex style of philosophising. We can not differentiate between a proportion and an analogy, a dialectic and a metaphor, the theoretical and the empirical etc.

95. In the case of Sartre, laws are not external to Being-for-itself, laws are not imposed on Being-for-itself, but it is the nature of Being-for-itself to impose laws on Being-in-itself. ‘existence and consciousness are one and the same’.

96. In the case of Heidegger ‘it is an absence of God’, in the case of Sartre it is the presence of an absent God’.

97. Sartre self qualify his thinking in Being and Nothingness as "subjectivist" and noted commentator of Sartre Istvan Meszoras finds this "label" appropriate. Sartre not only fights idealism, materialism (the term 'realism' is used by Sartre) and rationalism eventually enters into a fight with his own self within the frame work of thinking. See second chapter 'differentiation and divergence' of philosophical categories as a necessary condition for any development’ in the History of Philosophy
98. Existentialism as a "subjectivist approach" opposed different kinds of "objectivist approaches".

99. The unity of consciousness is seen in external "objects". Thus the unity of consciousness is "concrete" unity. Sartre by adopting a Heideggerian-Sartrean concept of relation of thing-object to the transcendent-object in general relation of thing to consciousness looked anti-Husserlian. "I" is the death consciousness. See The Transcendence of The Ego p.40., op.cit.

100. See Patrick Master Son's Atheism and Alienation p.131-134., for an excellent discussion on how Sartre rejects positivism and idealism.

101. The term 'incarnation' runs through Sartre's philosophy from The Transcendence Of The Ego to Critique Of Dialectical Reason. It means generally 'what man is what he makes of himself. He makes of himself by changing himself to be made by himself what he is. His existence always presupposes freedom in the sense that even his choice in a certain way.'Anguish is awareness of man as incarnation of freedom'. 'Avatar' is one such religious term which runs through all of Sartre's philosophy. The term avatar is used in the same sense as incarnation.

102. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism., p. 33-34.

103. Sartre, Being And Nothingness., Introduction, p.lxvi.

104. Ibid, p. lxv.


110. Ibid, p. 150. Sartre gave an elaborate explanation of subjective temporality.

111. Ibid, p. 133-134.


115. Ibid, p. 137.
118. Ibid., p. 365-366
119. Ibid, p. 566.