INTRODUCTION
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The basic principles underlying Indian foreign policy are reasonably well defined. In many respects though it is sufficiently flexible, it is also ambivalent at times to allow divergent interpretations as circumstances demand. These principles were first formulated and conceptualised by Prime Minister Nehru. Perhaps it was the ambivalent nature, inherent in Indian foreign policy that has led many to interpret it to be pro-Soviet. As such, copious literature exists on the evolution, development and working of Indian foreign policy. But in most cases, surprisingly enough there has been a very prejudiced analysis of that policy, suggesting that it and its profoundest contribution, Non-alignment, has been a corollary of Soviet foreign policy. Many writings also tend to depict the Soviet Union to be a benign benefactor of India and Indian interests were perceived to be best served by aligning itself with the Soviet Union.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the contribution of the Soviet Union to India's development in the economic and technical fields without attaching a 'price' or a political string for the help thus rendered. It also examines how far India benefitted from this help without losing vision of its basic principle of non-alignment. Thus a major objective in this study is to analyse Soviet political and economic interest in rendering aid to all less developed
countries in general and India in particular. The second objective is to stress that non-alignment did not imply an identification of all international issues with the Soviet Union. The third major objective is to stress that with the emergence of a Communist China as perhaps the Chief Security challenge of the USSR, the Soviet need for India became more than the Indian need for the Soviet Union. The work concludes with the inference that India had never subordinated its national interests to gratify Moscow. It was coincidental that the geo-political interests of the two countries converged to put them on the same side against an unhealthy combination of the Soviet betes noires USA and China, and India's prime security concern, Pakistan.

The priorities of the Soviet foreign policy remained constant till the death of Stalin - they entailed a race for supremacy with the United States made manifest through a mad arms race and a quest for the ultimate triumph of the world proletariat under the leadership of Moscow after the final eclipse of the capitalist system. Stalin's pre-occupation with the United States deprived him of the opportunities to cultivate friendship with other potentially strong and strategically vital areas of the world. The United States, on the other hand continued to befriend as many less developed countries - now called the third world - as possible. It was ironical indeed that most of these countries which had only
recently extricated themselves from colonial and imperial bondage, found the American economic aid and incentive too tempting to resist. Thus, Stalin's rigid, straight-jacket approach to capitalism deprived the Soviet Union of a huge constituency which would otherwise have gone a long way in expanding the Soviet sphere of influence. Stalin's death in 1953 cleared the decks for a new revisionist regime under Nikita Khrushchev in the Kremlin, to extricate the USSR from the compartmentalisation enforced by Stalin and his cohorts. Khrushchev perceived a dichotomy in the theory and practical operation of Marxism to be the only alternative for sustained growth of the Soviet economy. Material compulsions for outweighed the importance of enforcing a system that appeared to be more and more unworkable and obsolete. Khrushchev not only denounced the concept of the party monolith erected by Stalin, he also vehemently criticised Stalin's views on the inevitability of war with the capitalist system. In his zeal for expanding the Soviet base, Khrushchev visualised the third world to be a vast arena, which despite lavish economic aid by the United States were still against the basics of colonialism and imperialism. Besides, Khrushchev, had drawn lessons from many Soviet theorists of the Stalin era who propagated the underlying stability of the West and the capitalist system and prophesied a collaboration of the two
economic systems to be in the best interests of the Soviet
Union. While Stalin had casually dismissed the newly
liberated third world states as imperial appendages proxying
for the capitalist west, Khrushchev saw in them a great
potential to contain the ever expanding base of United States.

During the 1950s, it was the United States which
gave most bilateral assistance to independent Governments.
Till Khrushchev had decided to enter the fray as an aid giver
to the newly independent nations of the third world, the
United States was virtually the only donor making capital
available to developing countries. It was obvious that the
U.S. had a strong bargaining position with these countries.
The emergence of USSR as a competitor and its comparative
success among the developing countries gave an entirely new
dimension to the cold war politics wherein the U.S. decided to
devide weapons to cope with this type of economic warfare. As
President Eisenhower of the U.S. remarked 'that if the purpose
of Soviet aid to any country were simply to help it overcome
economic difficulties without infringing its freedom, such aid
would be welcomed as forwarding the free world purpose of
economic growth. But there is nothing in the history of
international communism to indicate this can be the case.
Until such evidence is forthcoming, we and other free nations
must assume that Soviet bloc aid is a new, subtle long-
range investment, is directed towards the same purpose of
drawing its recipient away from the community of free nations
and ultimately into the communist orbit. One of
Eisenhower's major drawbacks as later cold warriors in the
United States pointed out was that despite his provocative
rhetoric, he steadfastly refused to engage the United States
in a direct collision with the Soviet Union. He refused to be
guided by the aggressive cold war legacy bequeathed him by his
predecessor Truman. The contrast in approach to the cold war
of the two Presidents belonging to two different parties was
that while Democratic rhetoric preached restraint, democratic
action was for intervention, but while Republic rhetoric
preached intervention, Republican action showed great
restraint. Thus, while Truman's actions left the United
States in a strong position in the cold war, Eisenhower failed
to carry forth the tradition and his cautious dealing seemed
to have given the initiative to Khrushchev. However, despite
differences in methods between the two Presidents, the primary
motive behind the American aid programme was to strengthen
the countries anxious to fight communism and it was natural
that those who refused to align themselves in this crusade
should suffer. While India received substantial amounts of
grants and surplus commodities from the United States before
1954, the U.S. Government and Congress made no secret of their
displeasure with Indian neutrality and on occasion Congress
reduced the aid appropriation requested. It was significant
that the U.S. supported India during the Chinese aggression of
1962 despite its SEATO connections with Pakistan on the ground that India had to be strengthened in the face of Communist China's aggression. Hence American reaction was understandable when the Indian Government seemed to challenge the very core of the proposed defence mechanisms of the United States - the military alliances that had come into being during the late 1940s. Thus, even in the pre-1954 period American policy makers did not feel embarrassed to let it be known that economic aid was dependent on good behaviour, that is, commitment and concrete action to oppose communism. It was apparent therefore that all recipients of American aid should in effect declare their alignment with the United States representing the 'Free World' and this became a source of irritation to the newly developing neutral countries.

Nevertheless, a bold effort was made by President Kennedy when he sought to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union. In his inaugural address he stressed that all people of the world should look to what the President of the United States was doing and not to what the USSR was doing. In his aid message to Congress in 1961, he tacitly recognised that a reason why the American aid programme had not been more successful in the past was the lack of emphasis on a long-term programme and he urged a commitment by the United States to this. In his opinion uneven and undependable short term finance had weakened the incentive for long-term planning and
self-help by the recipient nations which were essential to serious economic development. The ability to make long-range commitments had enabled the Soviet Union to use its aid programme to make developing nations economically depend on Russian support, thus advancing the aims of world communism. President Kennedy through the American aid programme hoped for a decisive turn about in the fate of the less developed countries. Though this aid programme failed to live up to the expectations of many third world countries, it was significant that the United States whose relations with India had never been steady, continued to be its largest trade partner and India also remained one of the largest recipients of American aid. Just as the U.S. had learnt from the USSR's experience of long-term economic aid planning, the USSR too had learnt from the initial reactions of developing countries, thus tailoring its aid programmes accordingly. The chief characteristics of Soviet economic co-operation were emphasis on 'equality' between partners. The newly liberated countries were very sensitive about their inferior status. The Soviet spokesman emphasized that it was an equal partnership and as a result what was offered by Moscow was not 'humiliating charity', but business-like loans. The second major advantage of Soviet aid was the co-ordination between trade and aid policies. The USSR looked upon this co-operation as a means of finding markets for machinery and equipment and obtaining
raw materials from developing countries. In the case of India, barter trade was encouraged, repayment of loans was made with rupees with very low interest rates which helped in the conservation of precious hard currency. Non-interference in the internal affairs of developing countries was another advantage of Soviet trade. The USSR scored a propaganda victory by underlining the fact that it offered no advice—political or economic regarding development strategy, priorities and policies. Thus the Soviet Union provided aid with 'no strings attached', and this aid was mainly directed towards the public sector industries. Since one of the objectives of Soviet policy was to reduce Western economic domination, it contributed to the liberation from such economic domination by supporting industrial development in third world countries.

The most important and decisive factors influencing the Indian planning mechanism were Nehru's personality and convictions. There could be no doubt that his radical economic thinking was deeply influenced by his visit to the USSR in 1927 and by the impact which the Russian Revolution and USSR's subsequent history made on him and his generation. From his study of the Russian Central Planning System he was convinced that planning was essential to solve the twin problems of unemployment and poverty. The phrase 'socialist pattern of society' gained currency in the mid-fifties at a time when Indo-Soviet relations were just being consolidated.
When the second Plan was prepared and the strategy of developing heavy industry in the public sector was adopted, the USSR offered a credit for a steel plant and that marked the beginning of an enduring friendship between the two countries. Since the USSR was the first country to adopt centralised planning as the tool for development, it was natural that Indian planners should have studied the Russians' experience and learnt from it. Nehru's and the noted economist Mahalanobis's views coincided in the sense that both were equally enthusiastic about heavy industry and were impressed by what they saw in the USSR. The basic reason why Nehru thought the experience was relevant to India was his firm commitment to the goal of economic independence and his belief that development had to be financed by Indian efforts. Hence Nehru laid great emphasis in building certain basic key mother industries in India out of which other industries would grow. Significantly, however, Nehru's enchantment with the Russian economic model did not blind him to the benefits of a thriving private sector in India, and like Mahalanobis, Nehru became a proponent of a two-sector economic model for India. Thus, Nehru's socialist ideas did not vitiate his judgement of what was in the best national interest of India.

In this context, it would be pertinent to observe that Non-alignment was conceived by Nehru, not as an adjunct
of the Soviet foreign policy, but it was essentially a demonstration to the cold-war riven world that there existed a viable and respectable third alternative to either the United States or the Soviet Union. In a sense, therefore, as some believe that Indian foreign policy has been reactive much more than it has been innovative for undeniably Soviet and American policies have shaped much of the substance of what is meant by Indian non-alignment. In any case it was true that non-alignment could not have been conceived as a pro-Soviet affair especially when Stalin had shown scant regard for the idea of neutrality. Very much like the Dullesian dictum, Stalin too had rejected the idea of a third alternative to the capitalist and the socialist world. It was entirely coincidental that in subsequent developments the NAM found an ideological proximity with the Soviet Union when their views on anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and apartheid converged.

Indo-Soviet political relations could best be appreciated against the background of the post-Stalin foreign policy towards developing countries and the role assigned to India and India's own attitude towards international relations especially with great powers. For the Soviet Union, its relations with India formed part of a larger campaign to expand its constituency and make friends among the developing countries. Moscow rightly gauged the mood in most newly
liberated countries which though, still economically dependent on the west for markets, technical know-how and capital, longed to break free from capitalist clutches. To gain a foothold among these countries, Moscow merely had to support their aspirations for independence and economic liberation which coincided with Moscow's own interest for expansion, its base.

While Indo-Soviet relations conformed to this general pattern India was given special treatment for a number of reasons. Primarily, India was among the first countries to have raised its voice against colonialism and after attaining independence had adopted an independent stand on world matters. India's views incidentally, were close to those advocated by the Soviet Union. Its size and stable leadership had earned it a special place among the developing countries. Most important, however, was India's geographic condition which prompted the Soviet Union to keep India on its side in case of a possible confrontation with an aggressive communist China.

Perhaps as a sop to developing countries the USSR refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of these countries and in the case of India particularly, the Soviet Union was interested to make sure that India was not only acting completely independently but was also seen to be acting independently. India's reputation as an independent non-
aligned country was in itself an asset for the Soviet Union because the two governments held similar views on many contemporary world problems. Thus India sided with the Soviet Union during the Suez crisis of 1956 against the British and the French and also opposed the American landing in the Bay of Pigs in Cuba though India still received substantial financial assistance from these countries. Though India had moved much closer to the Soviet Union after Pakistan's entry into the American sponsored SEATO, it did not, however, represent a fundamental departure in India's policy either towards the USSR or others, nor was it influenced by the Russian's willingness to offer credits. The fact that Nehru cherished a friendship with the USSR did not mean, as was often suggested, that his policy became pro-Soviet. It is true though that India's handling of the Hungarian crisis in the United Nations came in for bitter criticism since there was an obvious contradiction in the Indian treatment of events in the Suez and in Hungary. But then, two plausible explanations could be offered in defense of India's policies. Primarily, the leader of the Indian delegation, V.K. Krishna Menon was an uncompromising admirer of the Soviet Union, second and more important, there were talks in the United Nations that a Soviet withdrawal from Hungary would be followed by a plebiscite in that country. India had every reason to fear that Pakistan might use this vote as a precedent in reopening
the Kashmir question. Of significance, however, was Nehru's personal reaction to Soviet action in Hungary, when he expressed in unambiguous terms that 'we see today in Egypt as well as in Hungary, both human dignity and freedom outraged and the force of modern arms used to suppress people and to gain political objectives', and again at an AICC meeting he supported the right of the Hungarian people to decide the form of Government without external pressure. Khruschev never condoned Nehru's "misdemeanours". During the Chinese aggression of India in 1962 the Soviet Union adopted an ambiguous pro-Chinese neutrality.

Nevertheless, between 1954 and 1956, Indo-Soviet cooperation increased very rapidly backed by exchanges of ideas, goodwill missions and visits by senior political dignitaries of both countries. The Socialist countries were among the first to accept Prime Minister Nehru's five principles of the Panchashil. It would be pertinent to observe that Nehru's Panchashil suited Soviet ends. In the same spirit it could also be argued that the Soviet Union, did not interfere with Indian foreign policy or in its internal affairs not because of any exaggerated regard for India, but because it suited Soviet interests best. The goal of Soviet policy was to promote friendly relations with the developing countries and this necessarily involved supporting the local bourgeoisie as the leaders of the movement for independence who generally
formed the Government. Indo-Soviet relations being dominated by foreign policy considerations, the history of the Indian Communist Party (CPI) shows that the USSR not only did not exert any pressure on the Indian Government, but did not also hesitate to side with the latter, thus embarrassing the CPI (For example, prior to the Soviet endorsement of the Indian foreign policy, the CPI had been very critical of it and had to reverse its stand only later. What was more embarrassing was the fact that none of the Indian communist leaders were held in such high esteem in the USSR as Nehru. In fact, Nehru openly ridiculed the loyalty of the CPI 'to other powers' and the CPI was not granted any favours because of Indo-USSR friendship). Hence in its effort to perpetuate the momentum that had picked up in the relations between the two countries. Moscow deliberately avoided any interference in the internal affairs of India. The Soviet support for India over the crises in Goa and Kashmir were extremely well-received. Particularly, India's need of a consistently reliable friend in the UN Security Council to veto resolutions on Kashmir were taken care of by the Soviet Union.

Indo-Soviet military and economic co-operation are discussed in the following chapters and need no elaboration here. However, it would suffice to say that the most significant aspect of the Soviet aid was that unlike American
aid it was not offered or withheld as a price for good or bad behaviour, and that was what gave Soviet aid its lasting character.

One of the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy was non-alignment and opposition to military alliances. Non-alignment as was misinterpreted by many, did not imply neutrality. On the contrary the constant aim of Indian foreign policy was to maintain friendly and co-operative relations with all nations and to avoid entanglements in military alliances which tended to divide the world thus, endangering world peace. Though in a broader sense non-alignment sought to maintain equidistance from the power blocs, it was by no means a state doctrine. As Nehru himself time and again stressed, non-alignment was a dynamic doctrine and the working of its principles largely depended on the issues pertaining to India's national interest. Thus, if a particular issue enhanced India's national interest but appeared to be pro-Soviet or pro-American, India would not hesitate to accept it. The essence of non-alignment therefore was not rigidity but a combination of flexibility and adaptability, if such a combination was beneficial for India's national interest. In the long run, therefore, India's working of the concept of non-alignment was justified on the basis of its serving India's own interest. Political and economic constraints on India being almost endemic, India
found in the Soviet Union an ally which helped it in laying a strong economic infrastructure. This, however, did not imply a outright hostility to the United States. In fact the basic democratic structure of the two countries went a long way in the continuation of the relationship which otherwise might have snapped in the immediate aftermath of India's refusal to support American sponsored military alliances. Whether grudgingly or by consent, the U.S. continued its aid to India and the latter on its part never tired in making efforts at improving bilateral ties with the United States.
In this thesis, Chapter I deals with the traditional bases of the Soviet foreign policy. Wherein its evolution and progress have been highlighted in three distinct phases from Stalin's obsessive preoccupation with the U.S. to Khruschev's flirtation with the third world to Brezhnev's embroilment with China, Soviet foreign policy has been a saga of continuity with change. The chapter also brings out the subtle but sure change in the perceptions of the Soviet political mind of the difference between theory and working of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine in a changing world scenario. Gradually, as it became evident that the Stalinistic interpretation of the Marxist-doctrine was outdated, a reinterpretation of the doctrine under Khruschev justified its dealings with the third world in the name of championing national liberation movements. The chapter also deals elaborately with Soviet relations with third-world non-aligned countries and places particular emphasis on Indo-Soviet relations, since India was perceived to be a vital third-world non-aligned country. The reciprocity in relations between the two countries is also adequately highlighted. The advent of Brezhnev in the Kremlin witnessed certain changes in the priorities of the Soviet Union, in its dealings with third world non-aligned countries, especially India after the Tashkent declaration. Soviet ambitions seemed to be whetted after a virtual American withdrawal from the subcontinental politics and the Soviet
Union made a persistent effort to extend its influence over both India and Pakistan. With Mrs. Gandhi's becoming Prime Minister, a fresh look at the priorities of Indian foreign policy was made. India resented the equal treatment meted out by Moscow to it and Pakistan. In her state visit to the Soviet Union, Mrs. Gandhi expressed her dissatisfaction and cautioned the Soviet Union of India's importance in Soviet strategic considerations.

Chapter II begins with the General Elections of 1967 when the Congress was routed in many states and held on to a thin majority in the Lok Sabha. Mrs. Gandhi's position seemed to be shaky, particularly in the backdrop of a sustained campaign against her leadership by the 'old guards' of the Congress Party. Though inexperienced, Mrs. Gandhi demonstrated consummate skill in managing India's foreign relations. Neither did she allow India to be a subordinate of the United States nor did she accept a subservient status to the Soviet Union. If on the one hand she supported Vietnam on the other, efforts were made to improve relations with China. The Soviet decision of supplying arms to Pakistan was vehemently protested by India, yet Mrs. Gandhi's government did not openly condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev's Asian collective Security scheme was given casual treatment by Mrs. Gandhi who asserted India's needs were economic and not military. In a confused scenario the Soviet
Premier Kosygin offered Mrs. Gandhi a friendship treaty which was carefully studied but kept in abeyance because of the overwhelming preoccupation of Mrs. Gandhi in internal political developments. The Congress was split and Mrs. Gandhi had a precarious majority in the Lok Sabha with the support of the C.P.I. The period witnessed the development of Indo-Soviet relations in many areas, particularly in the cultural field. The Sino-Soviet conflict convinced Moscow of India's utility as a powerful beneficial ally to counter China. Hence against the evolving nexus between Islamabad, Peking and Washington, India and the Soviet Union came close to one another.

Chapter III provides an account of developments in the sub-continent in the early 70s. The genocide is erstwhile East Pakistan was matched by the rancour that President Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shared for Mrs. Gandhi. A reluctant Moscow was made to sign a treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, largely through Indian initiative. The period demonstrated the great leadership qualities of Mrs. Gandhi and her unflinching determination to carry the crisis to its logical conclusion despite hostile Sino-American reaction and even a hesitant Soviet Union.

Chapter IV examines Mrs. Gandhi's compulsions in continuing with the Soviet connection though a deliberate attempt was made by her not to make the Soviet Union feel
itself indispensable for India's security. Indo-Soviet relations during this period formed part of the complex mosaic of International relations. Hence persistent efforts were made throughout the 1972-76 period to improve bilateral ties with the United States and China to the great disappointment of the Soviet Union. The high water mark of the period, however, was the visit of Brezhnev to India. Differences of opinion between the two countries became apparent over issues such as Asian collective security, the Indian Ocean and even in the context of China. It became apparent that the Soviet Union despite India's independent thinking was in no position to give up its friendship with India particularly after the failure of Soviet policy in Egypt and Somalia. During the emergency, however, Mrs. Gandhi again turned to the Soviet Union and the CPI for support, which though shortlived was of significance.

The initial part of Chapter V deals with Indo-Soviet economic relations (1972-1977). The benefits of the bilateral barter trade is highlighted but more important was the ongoing controversy between the rupee-double exchange mechanism. The Soviet Union proved to be a hard bargainer and India rejected the unilateral alteration of the exchange mechanism by the Soviet Union. Yet, it was during this period that a vast stride in economic cooperation was made and a number of joint projects for mutual benefit were taken up. The latter part ventures into a very sensitive aspect of the
relartionship, that is, the military cooperation between the two countries. The Soviet Union provided India with its latest military weaponry to counter Sino-American military aid to Pakistan. Almost the entire MiG series was offered to India to India's great satisfaction and often many of them under license for production in India. The most significant aspect, however, was that some of the weapons technologies provided India had not yet been offered to Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies. Yet, from the Indian point of view there was a persistent effort to diversify its ammunition industry.

Throughout the period 1972-77, Mrs. Gandhi was making efforts to convey to Moscow that the treaty between the two countries was essentially in response to extraordinary circumstances and that nothing more was to be read into it. In other words, Mrs. Gandhi's efforts were concentrated on pointing to Moscow and the world that the treaty in no way had altered India's non-aligned status and by no means had made India a surrogate of the Soviet Union. A constant theme of all her speeches was that India stood for friendship with all.

The advent to power of the Janata Party and its initial hesitation in choosing its foreign policy priorities forms the basis of Chapter VI. Prime Minister Morarji Desai's talk of 'genuine nonalignment' brought about a sense of alarm in Moscow. In right earnest, the Soviet Union sought to woo the new Government in New Delhi by promising lavish economic
aid. During this period a sincere effort was made by the United States to improve bilateral ties with India, but in the final analysis nothing outstanding was achieved for matters got stuck over the refusal of the Desai Government to sign the NPT. An effort was also made during this period to improve ties with China and Foreign Minister Vajpayee's visit to that country assumed great significance. But the Chinese aggression in Vietnam left India thoroughly disillusioned. The Janata Government came round to the view that the Soviet Union was by far India's most trust-worthy ally. The linkage that existed between the two revolved on two vital issues - economic cooperation and military dependence. Hence even the Janata Government admitted the justification of Mrs. Gandhi's Soviet policy.

The final chapter deals with Mrs. Gandhi's return to power. India was left in a quandry over the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. There were efforts by Mrs. Gandhi to liberalise the Indian economy and to open out to the West and the United States. The Chapter also shows the Soviet Union seriously wooing India to influence the NAM for its support of the Soviet position in Afghanistan. Brezhnev's visit to India in December 1980 was the high water-mark of this period. His launching of the Persian Gulf Plan in New Delhi, however was not given enthusiastic reception by Mrs. Gandhi. Both the non-aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference and the 7th Non-
Aligned Summit at New Delhi failed to live up to Soviet
Expectations - India was criticised by the Soviet Union for
not having repaid past Soviet help. Even so, the period
witnessed a great economic, military, scientific and
technological co-operation. Brezhnev's successors Andropov
and Chernenko carried forward the tradition left by Brezhnev.
Mrs. Gandhi left behind a legacy of strong friendship with the
Soviet Union while also conveying a message for co-operation
with the West and inaugurating an era of liberalisation.
As mentioned earlier, an extensive literature exists on the making and working of the Indian foreign policy as well as on the ties between India and the Soviet Union. However, observations on Indo-Soviet relations during Mrs. Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister tend to swing between two extremes. One group - a majority of writers - feel ecstatic about India's Soviet connections, implying there could not have been anything better for India or even, there never were any strains in the relations between the two countries, fail to carry conviction. A dispassionate evaluation seems to have missed them. There is yet another group which vehemently criticised Mrs. Gandhi's Soviet policy and masks her appear almost a mendicant at Soviet doors. This group equates Mrs. Gandhi's internal policies with her foreign policy and opines that the two merged in her only to perpetuate her own position as Prime Minister. This view again seems too far-fetched for, there did exist a clear dichotomy between her internal policies and her handling of external affairs. As mentioned later in this work, one of Mrs. Gandhi's critics in Parliament, Mr. Madhu Limaye himself states that while 'she failed to stem the rot in domestic affairs, she conducted superbly India's foreign policy. Perhaps no other leader could have done better, particularly in the circumstances and the situation through which India was passing since 1971. Of all the references and literature made use of in this work,
Surjit Mansingh's and Bhabani Sen Gupta's authoritative works are the most objective and balanced. Extensive references have been made to their work.

Surprisingly not very extensive work has been made in India on Soviet motives and strategy in befriending Third world non-aligned countries. Almost all work on Indo-Soviet relations are confined to Soviet appreciation of non-alignment and Indian reciprocation of this gesture. In other words Indo-Soviet relations are analysed in a straight-jacket made-for-each-other approach. Fortunately, however, a vast, intelligible and thought provoking literature on Soviet intentions in the third world exists among western writers of great repute. Roy Allison, Alvin Rubinstein, Carol Saivetz, Roger Kanet, Donaldson to mention a few, have produced brilliant analysis which are extremely helpful and important for any student working on Indo-Soviet relations and on the long-term strategic planning of the Soviet Union.
An entirely new issue that has been incorporated in this work is an analysis of the working of Soviet theorists who in fact have made a great contribution to influence the politico-economic development in the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin period. It is interesting to note how Soviet economists like Ye geniy Varga and his disciples like A.A. Arzumanyan have looked so far ahead of their times. To have foreseen a catastrophic collapse of the communist economic system in the heydays of Stalin, especially at a time when the Soviet system of planning looked attractive to many newly liberated countries, was a work of genius, Varga's predictions of an inner resilience of the capitalist economy, his conviction on the futility of nuclear war and his cautioning to the communist system that prudence lay in coexisting with the capitalist world, came to ring true in the eighties with the ascendency of the Gorbachev team in the Kremlin. What is striking is that theorists such as Varga did exist in the Soviet Union and who had the vision to conceptualise the fundamental weaknesses inherent in the communist politico-economic system which were so fanatically pursued by Stalin.
Availability of primary sources for this work have been difficult. In the absence of archival material and declassified documents one can only fall upon the speeches and writings of Mrs. Gandhi and of Leonid Brezhnev for primary sources. However, I have also used the oral testimonies of eminent persons and diplomats who have been closely associated with Mrs. Gandhi's formulation of the Indian foreign policy and have known her from very close quarters. Not all those contacted were co-operative. Some have refused interviews on the ground that they would not divulge official secrets. Some have refrained from making any comments on the treaty that was offered to India in 1969 by Premier Kosygin. The former Foreign Secretary and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and the United States, Mr. T.N.Kaul has been a great source of information. Mr. A.K.Damodaran, First Secretary in the Indian embassy at Moscow in 1971 and former Ambassador to Sweden has given extensive and extremely important information on Mrs. Gandhi's personality and her Soviet policy. Veteran parliamentarian Mr. Madhu Limaye too, is a rich source of information. All have been quoted and referred to extensively. Apart from oral sources microfilms provided by the Indian Defence Studies and Analyses on Indo-Soviet economic relations have been useful. Newspaper reports, articles, journals and a number of books on Mrs. Gandhi and
her Soviet policy have of course been valuable. For information from the Soviet side a wide coverage of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press has been made for this work. Collection of material for such a wide and diverse topic has been difficult, but then, an effort has been made to systematise the largely scattered documents and information and present them in a cohesive comprehensive form.

Mrs. Gandhi has been one of the most fascinating personalities of our times and her success is largely attributed to the deft handling of India's foreign relations. It is hoped that this work would make an interesting reading.

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