FOOT NOTES
INTRODUCTION

1. See U.S. State Department booklets (1958-1959)

2. The objectives and methods of the aid programme were closely scrutinised in Congress and the anti-communist bias of the aid programme was clear from the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub Committee.


3. The Hindu, November 10, 1956, report on the AICC resolution cited Ibid.

4. Interview with Madhu Limaye.
CHAPTER - 1

1. A host of theorists from the West and the Soviet Union have written extensively on the evolution, progress and working of Soviet foreign policy after the Second World War. But almost all of them are hopelessly influenced by the clichés of the cold war, as a result of which their work lacks the degree of objectivity as one would have expected. After Zimmerman's painstaking analysis of the Khrushchev period some light was thrown on the actual working of the Soviet political mind. Allen Lynch carried forward the idea by probing deep into what specialist observers of foreign policy within the Soviet Union have been saying since the early sixties. He shows how such phenomena as nuclear warfare, continued western prosperity and the Sino-Soviet split have forced analysts to move sharply away from the traditional Leninist jargons. As a result he has come out with an analysis of the Soviet interpretation of world politics that is much more complex and politically more mature than many would have imagined. In a multipolar world setting wherein the continued existence of the United States is a certainty, the USSR is visualised as an integral component of an international system, rather than a simplistic representation of its being the centre of a unique and expanding system of its own. See also William Zimmerman's Soviet Perspectives of International Relations 1956-67 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969)
See also Pravda, 26th February, 1986, p.3. cited Lynch, Op cit p.149.


Stalin was convinced of the ultimate triumph of the World proletarian revolution under the leadership of Moscow and that capitalism was in its dying gasp, about to collapse under its own contradictions.

5. The Soviet editors of a collection of Varga's works wrote in 1974 that Varga "leads the struggle in the name
name of the creative spirit of Marxism-Leninism". Nikolay Inozemtsev, late director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, wrote in 1970 that Varga's demonstration of the role of the state in the capitalist economy refutes the "erroneous notion of the early 1950s (i.e. Stalin's thesis) on the superficiality of such a phenomenon".


See also Werner G. Hahn; Postwar Soviet Politics, The fall of Zhadnov and the Defeat of Moderation 1946-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).

6. See Elliott R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), P.163. In summarising the effects of the theory of socialism-in-one country upon the Soviet doctrinal goal of a world state, the author states that although the theory "did not negate the goal of a world state, it implied a thoroughly pragmatic approach toward this goal."


11. Y.S. Varga. Twentieth Century Capitalism (Moscow: Politicheskoj Literatury, 1961). In this work it was recognised that the existence and even some of the policies of a powerful (that the existence and even some of the policies of a powerful) Soviet led bloc contributed, in a decisive way, to the greater harmony that characterized inter-capitalist relations in the post war world. Varga drew attention to the prolonged period over a decade long, of capitalist economic growth and concluded a relatively stable and prosperous future for the capitalist economics.

12. Ibid

13. Ibid


16. It would be pertinent to mention that Gorbachev's programme of Glasnost and Perestroika owed a great deal to ideas inherent in Varga's works.

17. Jerry F. Hough - 'The Evolution in the Soviet World View': *World Politics*, Vol: 32, No.4 (July 1980) p.129. He notes that, "It is a Marxism that fully accepts Varga's judgments about the ability of capitalism to survive for a long time".

18. Milovan Djilas, "At one point during the course of a dinner, he (Stalin) got up, hitched up his trousers as though he was about to wrestle or box and cried out emotionally, "the war will soon be over.... and then we will have another go at it." cited B.P. Jeevan Reddy. *Modern Power Politics*. *Cold War: A study* (Orient Longman 1970) p.58
19. Geoffrey Jukes. The Soviet Union in Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). In his work he states that if at all the Soviet Union uses any theoretical model, it is the theory of power and balance of power. He draws the image of a great Eurasian power determined to carve out for itself an equal status with the United States, to the lands and waters and the human and natural resources of the mother of continents. The message is clear - a new balance of power in which the legitimate interests of the new global power will have to be recognised by the old.


20. The concept of balance of power, denounced by the early Bolsheviks as a 'bourgeois' institution, found its manifestation in the Soviet policies in the 1930s when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 was signed. During the post-1945 era, Stalin persistently sought a new balance of power where the Soviet Union would have much say. Perhaps this contradiction in Soviet foreign policy has led critics to say that Russians speak in many tongues - the Great Imperialist War of 1939 was suddenly termed as the Great Patriotic
War when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the call was not to save communism but to save Mother Russia. Palmer & Perkins, International Relations (Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston, USA, 1969) p. 625


22. Zimmerman W, 'Soviet Perspectives on International Relations', 1956-1967, p. 275 (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1969). The years since the Twentieth CPSU Congress Soviet Union witnessed a significant transformation of Soviet perspectives on International Relations. This transformation involved the role of international relations specialists in Soviet Society and the systematic study of international relations on the one hand and the substance of Soviet international relations perspectives on the other. Thus during the Khrushchev years the period dating from the Twentieth Congress- at which the dominant faction of the presidium gave impetus to the revitalisation of the social sciences including international relations - to 1962 was one in which international relations became a legitimate area of inquiry for specialists below the apex of the party and Government apparatuses. The Institute of World Economy and International Relations was reconstituted in April 1956. After the scope of available information relevant to international
relations, inquiry was broadened considerably. After 1962 one could speak of the existence in the Soviet Union of International relations as a self-conscious discipline. Finally during the last two years of Khrushchev's rule there were indications of the onset of another stage in the development of international relations studies.

23. Ibid

24. Brucan, Dissolution of power, p.49. The underlying theme of most Soviet writings after Varga was that the fundamental principles of Marxism-Lenism were inadequate for the study of international relations. Passim.

25. Zimmerman. Op cit p. 288-9. Zimmerman emphasized upon the primacy of states over classes, and social forces in general, the primacy of the political sphere over the economic sphere in relations among states and the "subjective" element in political relations among states.


27. Ibid.

28. Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier. The Soviet Union and the Third World : From Khrushchev's 'Zone of Peace' To Brezhnev's 'peace program' in Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry ed. op cit p. 3-8
29. Until the emergence of many new states in Asia and Africa in the Post-World War II era, Soviet doctrine divided the world into two hostile camps - the, "Socialist camp" headed by the Soviet Union and the "capitalist camp" led by the United States - and "no third road" existed. Now, however, the Soviets were very conscious of the existence of a Third World - the world of the emerging nations. There they aimed at competing not only with the "Capitalist" states of the West, but subsequently also with the other communist giant Red China.


It was in these areas national liberation movements were gaining momentum and Marxist-Leninist theory linked national liberation movements symbiotically with the socialist system and the World socialist revolution.


31. Proferring economic aid and agreeing to sell arms whether at concessionary rates or for hard currency, were but part of the net work of relations the USSR construed with the Third World. They complemented the active diplomacy of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin leadership seemed to conduct its diplomacy with a peculiarly Soviet style and that diplomacy itself was multifaceted. It included state-to-state relations, CPSU ties with the ruling, progressive and socialist oriented parties, activities in international arenas and the signing of friendship and cooperation treaties. The style of Soviet diplomacy was significantly different from that of other nations. On a general level Soviet diplomacy has been described as shrewd, deliberate and masterly.


32. Palmer and Perkins Op cit p. 606-607


35. Allen Lynch : Op cit p. 68

36. A host of Soviet theorists pledging support to the Zimmerman - Varga school brought about an entirely newly dimension in Soviet political thinking and it did have a great bearing upon the subsequent development of Soviet foreign policy. See V. Israelyan "The Leninist Science of International Relations and Foreign Policy Reality", Journal of International Affairs, (Moscow) No.6 (June 1967)p. 46-52.


38. Georgi Chicherin's frustrations with the constraints imposed on the conduct of early Soviet foreign policy by excessive ideological zeal are well documented.


40. Georgi Shakhnazarov, 'Effective Factors of International Relations,' International Affairs (Moscow) No.2 (February 1977) p. 79

41. Ibid

42. Ibid


44. Ibid


47. Inozemtsev, et al eds. cited Ibid.
48. This observation was made by V.V. Zagladin, candidate member of the Central Committee since 1976, deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee since 1967.

49. On the post-Khrushchevian development in the Kremlin, Zimmerman writes - The extent to which doctrine served to guide post-Khrushchev analysis was a bit more problematical since Khrushchev's successors were notably more reluctant than Khrushchev to engage in wholesale doctrinal alteration. A single answer was in all likelihood not possible for all the members of the ruling group. Nevertheless the elongation of Soviet revolutionary time perspectives and the growing separation of the realms of world politics and the world historical process tended strongly to suggest that while members of the post-Khrushchev ruling group were scarcely disinclined to use Lenin instrumentally, Lenin did little of their thinking for them. The limited role of ideology in influencing post-Khruschevian Soviet analysis of modern world politics was perhaps best seen in the remarkable parallelism of Soviet and Western approaches of the basic structural outlines of the international system, a phenomenon not to be inferred from the writings of these disposed to argue that Leninism on balance enhances Soviet insight into
international relations or those who assume that it seriously distorts Soviet analysis. Given the diminished role of ideology in analysis, it follows almost by definition that ideology served less as a guide to action than it had in previous Soviet analysis and that the conscious and purposive dimensions of Soviet ideology had been lessened. Khrushchev's successors while generally inclined to a less benign view of contemporary international system were probably as disenchanted with the prospects for relations among states ruled by purportedly Marxist-Leninist parties, and at least during 1966-67 were more tolerant of candor concerning the nature of relations within the contemporary world system of Socialist states. Given the time perspective of the post-Khrushchevian ruling group, furthermore, almost any policy could be and apparently was justified in terms of its contribution to building what was actually an ambiguous future. See Zimmerman W. Op cit p. 288.

50. Bhabani Sen Gupta : (An Approach To The Study of Soviet Policies For the Third World in Roger E.Kanet and Donna Bahry ed. Op cit p. 28. When the discovery was made by Stalin's successors, the new nations were overwhelmingly dependent on the metropolitan powers and completely linked with the capitalist system. But the bleak scenario of the mid-1950s changed within a span of
twenty years and in the mid-1970s the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc wielded considerable influence in the vast Asian continent in Africa and also in Latin America.

51. Ibid p.29
52. Ibid
53. Ibid
54. Ibid

Retrospectively, one finds that the actual evolution of Soviet Policy, its successes and failures have been influenced primarily by the goals, interests and concerns of the Soviet, Third World partners.

57. See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier: Op cit. p.5.

The degree of Soviet cordiality no longer was based on real or imaginary socio-political compatibility with the USSR.


It would be naive to suggest the success of Soviet strategies to a series of lucky accidents or to manipulations of the weaknesses of its adversaries.

It is interesting to observe that in the southern periphery of the Soviet Union, during the post-World War II period, Moscow did project concern as well as power.

60. Lynch - Op cit pp. 95 - 103

Brezhnev in his zeal for detente and peaceful co-existence had not been able to get over the basic concept of class-struggle. Though aware of the basic inferiority of the Soviet Union to the United States, he tried to fit in his policies to the fundamental Marxist-Leninst jargon.

61. B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Op cit, p.65


The effect of Soviet economic prowess is listed only
third, and last, after the growth of the foreign economic opportunities of the Soviet state, in the enumeration of the consequences of Soviet economic capacity for international relations.


66. Ibid. p. 97.

The difference, in Soviet minds, between the earlier and current power position of the United States, was that, whereas previously, the United States could rest confident in its ability to translate its enormous economic capacity and potential, and its favourable position in relation to a number of key events of world politics into political influence, the relative diminution of American power now made it a far more indeterminate proposition. Incontestably, however, American power remained the greatest influence in international relations.

67. Ibid pp.140-141

68. Ibid.


According to Wessell, the USSR's world position had weakened in the 1960s due to the disintegration of the socialist camp (China, Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania). Passim
According to Soviet analysts, this was not a momentary aberration in Chinese policy, for it continued after Mao's death and was intended for a relatively long period of time. passim.


It extended far beyond nuclear delivery weapons. The White House and the Pentagon co-operated in vastly increasing America's conventional war capability.

The article criticised Soviet Policy for having trailed behind fundamental changes that occurred in the world and for having missed chances to reduce tensions and enhancing understanding among nations.

During the Brezhnev years almost in every developing country where the Soviets did successfully establish a medium or long term relationship, it depended heavily on the Soviet ability to respond to the interests and
concerns of the developing states. Most significant during these years were the Soviet ability to provide to a large number of developing countries military and security support. A case in point was Egypt under Nasser and Somalia prior to 1977.


The history of post war disarmament discussions had been one of futility. With the explosion of its first nuclear weapon in 1949, the USSR strove to catch up with the United States in both conventional and non-conventional weapons.

77. Peter Calvocoressi - World Politics since 1945 (Longman, 19) pp. 28-41.

The two protagonists were concerned not merely to keep nuclear weapons out of use but also to keep them out of other nations' hands. With France and China graduating to the nuclear club and other nations inclined in the same direction, the two super powers sought to freeze the existing nuclear hierarchy. A Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was concluded in 1968 between the USA, USSR and Great Britain to which all others were asked to adhere.

79. The war in Vietnam had gravely compromised America's global status.


82. Interview with A.K.Damodaran.

83. All oppressed people in any part of the world represented one single class who had to be liberated from the tyranny of the oppressor. Hence when the less developed countries clamoured for freedom from their imperial-colonial masters, it was but obvious, that Soviet Union would render them all possible help.


See also Current History - March 1963 p. 142-145.

Polycentrism was contended to apply only to the capitalist world. The broader system of international relations was based upon relations between the two contending socio-economic systems, with a polarisation of forces around the Soviet Union and the United States.

85. Roy Allison : Stalin perceived Yugoslav non-alignment to have been formulated at the expense of the USSR. Under
Stalin, Soviet spokesmen had no real appreciation of the 'third way' and the orthodox, Stalinist conception of international relations being based on the idea of a continuous struggle between two divergent and irreconcilable socio-economic system, prevailed till Stalin's death. Moscow made it abundantly clear that the emergence of a large number of new states which were ideologically or politically committed to neither East nor West, made no difference to it and that Moscow would not be deflected from its basic postulates of an inevitable struggle with the West. Soviet Union and the strategy of Non Alignment in the Third World (CUP.1988)

86. Ibid.


As in many other parts of the world the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in India were assumed to be in conflict. When official Soviet organs attacked Gandhi as a "reactionary Hindu and depicted Nehru as the "Chiang Kaishek of India", the gap seemed unbridgable. In August 1953, (after Stalin's death), Malenkov spoke warmly of India's contribution to ending the Korean War and expressed the view that Indo-Soviet relations would continue to develop and grow in strength." Contrary to general impression, Nehru himself
during the period had few illusions about the objectives of the Soviet Union and its leadership in India. A few days after Stalin's death, the Prime Minister described Stalin to Chester Bowles as "the coldest human being" he had ever met. This shift in the Soviet mood, however, coincided with John Foster Dulles's decision in 1954 to provide military equipment to Pakistan and convinced a reluctant Nehru that India should accept some assistance from Russia to "keep its options open". It seems probable that although the outside world had no clear indication of the growing differences between China and Russia until a few years later, the possibility of a split must have been apparent to Soviet leaders by the mid-1950s. In February 1957, shortly before the Soviet-Chinese break became evident, Bowles had a lengthy discussion with Khrushchev in Moscow, most of which centred on India and China. When Bowles remarked that both Soviet Union and the United States might ultimately face a common problem in regard to China, Khrushchev did not disagree. The motivation of (apart from the expansion of the "social camp") the USSR in assisting India had since the mid-1950s been primarily based on the Soviet estimation of India's geopolitical importance as a positive balance to the political influence and potential military weight of China.
Interview with A.K. Damodaran

Santosh Mehrotra: India and the Soviet Union: Trade and Technology Transfer (Oxford University Press) P.24. The Indian Department of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia has a long history going back to Tsarist times. By comparison, the writings on Africa and Latin America were superficial and dogmatic until the late 1950s.

Ibid

Ibid

The Soviet view of the Congress Party had undergone a great change since the 1950s. During the 1970s it had a much more positive view of the party. See also Robert H. Donaldson: Soviet Policy Towards India pp. 61-268.

Jawaharlal Nehru regarded Non-Alignment as an effective instrument in the hands of the newly free nations with the help of which they could pursue an independent foreign policy. Such a policy provided the non-aligned states with the prerequisites for a free choice of positions on major international issues without associating themselves with the policies of the great powers. The interests of the struggle for independence, peace and progress were however an 'objective factor that brought the stand of India and
other newly free nations closer to world socialism which was fighting for the same aims. On the other hand, the foreign policy goals of the young national states came into conflict with the interests of the imperialist powers, which were trying to replace one form of domination with the other, that is instead of old colonialism to ensure the newly free nations in new forms of conial bondage. Non-alignment in Nehru's view did not mean that non-aligned nations had to be at an 'equidistance' from each of the two military camps confronting each other. Non-alignment according to Nehru meant refraining from joining blocs and from pursuing a bloc-oriented policy, that is, a policy that ran counter to the interests of the newly free countries.


A tentative suggestion that a kind of permanent secretariat be set up after the Belgrade Conference was rejected by an overwhelming majority of participants even though the secretariat would have a very limited area of jurisdiction. Not one attempt to coordinate foreign policy has been recorded nor has there been any attempt to scrutinize the behaviour of a non-aligned country on the basis of its obligations to others.
Newly liberated or materially weak or poorly developed countries were not at all enthusiastic about voluntarily renouncing freedom of action for fear of truncating their independence and their special identity; which in any case had not been sufficiently consolidated. Such an attitude was particularly in evidence where the process of national formation had not yet been completed. The feeling of insecurity was particularly strong in these cases, and so the disinclination to join any organisation which could jeopardise the formation of a sovereign nation. A military-politico alliance among them would have been unrealistic. What was more, it would have considerably restricted and weakened the political influence of these countries in the world and would have brought no compensation of increased efficiency in their activities. For these reasons they coped with their position in the world in a completely different manner.


This definition was used to develop the basic Soviet view that in international systemic conflict neutralism represented a form of anti-imperialist struggle.

98. Ibid. pp. 1-7
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.

110. Ibid

111. Ibid

112. In 1965 important journals of international propaganda appeal, New Times and International Affairs, for example, divided their coverage almost equally among the three continental areas. During that year International Affairs devoted 35 articles to Asia, 36 to Africa and 35 to Latin America. See J.F. Triska Op cit p. 257


Soviet literature claims that party congresses and Central Committee plenary sessions determined and establish the general line in foreign affairs and that the Politburo merely exercises day-to-day responsibility for policy according to the decisions handed down by the Congress and the plenums.
The U.S. Government never considered India to be of a major political significance to the future of Asia. India was seen as an impoverished nation struggling bravely but futilely to govern itself through democratic institutions which for humanitarian reasons Americans have felt obliged to assist. Lacking first-hand knowledge of the complexities of Indian society and the hopes and fears of its people, it was not surprising that the Kiplingesque impression of India as an ancient land of cobras, maharajas, monkeys, famines, polo players, overcrowded with cows and babies still persisted in the minds of many top officials in the 'American Government. Only a relatively small number
number of able south Asian specialists in American Universities had worked diligently to fill this information gap. But most of America's "Asia Specialists" were in fact Chinese, Japanese and South east Asia specialists and very few of them had had an opportunity really to know and understand India and to consider its relations to the rest of Asia.

122. After 1962 when India made a request for $500,000,000 (less than half of what had already been given to Pakistan by the United States), to be spent over a five year period was being discussed, the old Dullesian arguments soon began to be raised again in the State Department and the Pentagon, that is, if America helped India even modestly to build up its defence capacity, it would upset its "loyal ally Pakistan". (For several years Pakistan had been manipulating American policies in Asia with a skill matched only by that of the Nationalist Chinese).

123. Sisir Gupta :India and the Soviet Union in Current History, March 1963, p.144. On January 26, 1955, Pravda editorially endorsed India's internal policies and the editorial was promptly used by the ruling party in an election in India, where the communists were threatening to take over Kerala. And by February the
Soviet Union agreed to extend credit and technical assistance to India for a steel plant. Incidentally 1955, the year of great Indo-Soviet amity followed 1954, the year of great Indian-Chinese amity.

124. "Both we and our Indian friends would like to develop and strengthen our friendly relations in a way in which it would not change the friendly relations of India or of the Soviet Union with other States" - Khrushchev - Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Vol.VII, No.52, February 8, 1956.


129. Ibid

130. Ibid

131. Asha L.Datar: India's Economic Relations with the USSR & Eastern Europe 1953 - 1969


136 Link (August 15, 1962) p. 73 cited Ibid.


138. Pravda wrote its first editorial on the Sino-Indian war on 25th October 1962. It spoke of the "notorious McMahonLine" which has never been recognised by China" and which had been foisted on the Chinese and Indian People", and supported China's proposals. "As to the Soviet people they see in the statement of the Chinese Government (of 24 October 1962) a manifestation of
sincere concern over its relations with India and of its desire to end the conflict. The proposals made by the Chinese Government are constructive in our opinion. Without impairing the prestige of either side they provide the acceptable basis for the beginning of talks and a peaceful settlement of the disputed questions with due account taken of the interests of both the Peoples' Republic of China and India."

Chiding the Indian Communists for their "nationalistic behaviour, the editorial further stated that "A peaceful settlement of the conflict demands more active efforts on the part of progressive forces in India. One of course, must realise that when relations are strained, as they are now, even some progressively minded people may yield to nationalistic influences and more over to chauvinistic positions. However, one cannot do that when questions of the struggle for peace or the solution of international issues are at stake. In this case an international approach is called for."

The editorial was written after Cuban blockade had already come into effect and it clearly aimed at soliciting China's support in the Cuban crisis. However, an American correspondent stationed in Moscow, Mervin Kalb of CBS, held that faced with a choice between India and China, Khrushchev had leaned towards
On 5th November, however, the Soviet Government reverted to its original neutralist line. In an editorial on the border question, Pravda now maintained a complete silence about the Mc Mahon line and no longer extended support to the Chinese cease-fire proposal.

In a series of articles in August 1963, Pravda denounced Chinese aggression against India and blamed Peking for its failure to seek a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute. In 1964 it was stated that no matter how the Chinese leaders try belatedly to justify their behaviour they cannot escape responsibility of the fact that by their actions, they essentially helped extreme circles of imperialism thereby aggravating an already complicated and dangerous situation in this world."

Pravda : April 3, 1964
143. Subimat Dutt, With Nehru In The Foreign Office. op cit
144. S.P.Singh - Op cit p. 73
145. Ibid.
151. S.P.Singh : Op cit p. 91
153. Citations for these slogans may be found in Donaldson, Soviet Policy Towards India ideology and strategy (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974) p.301 See also Some Problems of the Non-Capitalist Development of the Liberated Countries - Kommunist.Na (1966) p.112, cited Ibid.
Op cit p. 20-26


156. See Saivet § Carol R. & Sylvia Woodby : Op cit. Also see Kanet Roger E. & Donna Babry (Ed); op cit


158. Within two years from the issue of the first slogan for Pakistan the slogan for India which remained unchanged both in wording and placement, (it was next to slogans for socialist countries). Within a decade after Khrushchev's first memorable visit to India, was changed, made identical with that of Pakistan and was brought down to be placed just above the one for Pakistan.


160. Robert C. Horn - Soviet-Indian Relations (New Delhi, Praeger Publisher, 1982) p. 12

161. Taking advantage of India's troubled economic situation, particularly at a time when Western economic aid to India was not forthcoming, Kosygin sought to dispel Indian fears of a shift is Soviet policies by continuing with the economic aid to India.
In the 1970s, the Soviet share remained high for two complementary reasons: the USSR was replenishing Indian stocks during and after the 1971 war, at the same time, the USA stopped all military assistance along with economic assistance.

173. Memorandum Dean Rusk to the President, 'Briefing papers for the visit of India's Prime Minister 21 March 1966. Deptt. of State released under Freedom of Information Act to S.Mansingh Op cit p. 79.

174. Ibid P.79


177. Interview with A.K.Damodaran

178. Ibid.

179. S.Mansingh Op cit P.70

180. Interview with A.K.Damodaran

181. Ibid.


184. Interview with A.K.Damodaran


186. Interview with A.K.Damodaran

187. Lok Sabha debates - Vol.9 No.14, 28th Nov. 1967, Col. 2740-2741
188. Interview with Madhu Limaye

189. Ibid
1. "India at this juncture was critically dependent upon the Soviet Union and though there was a perceptible lack of warmth on the Soviet side for India, yet Moscow did not give up its policy of bolstering the defence mechanism of a major third world nation. See Soviet Third World Relations Tools of Soviet Investment Carol Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby. (Westview Press Boulder and London, 1986).

2. Surjit Mansingh India's Search For Power (Sage Publications New Delhi, 1984) PP68-85.

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

5. Ashok Kapur. 'Strategic Choices in Indian Foreign Policy,' International Journal Summer 1972, PP448-68. See also Ashok Kapur. 'Indian Security and Defence Politics under Indira Gandhi' [Extracts from a paper produced at the University of Waterloo Canada, 1985]

6. It seems quite probable that a shaky start that she had made, Mrs. Gandhi had not been able to grasp the nuances or the significance of nuclear diplomacy. There was indeed every possibility of her being trapped by the nuclear blackmail of the superpowers.

7. Interview with T.N. Kaul.

10. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See L.I. Brezhnev 'Pages from his Life,' (Written under the auspice of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Allied Publisher Limited, New Delhi)
17. Ibid.
25. Economic and Political Weekly October 5, 1968, The total loss incurred was 8.9 million rupees in 1968.
See also Kuldip Nayar Between the Lines (Allied Publishers Bombay 1969) p.126
28. Ibid
29. Robert C.Horn Op cit 24
32. Indira Gandhi 'They would not ask me. They knew my views already. We do not give foreign bases' as reported to Sujit Mansingh op. cit.p.
33. Indian Express February 6, 1968.
34. Times of India January 25, 1968.
35. See Amrita Bazar Patrika, April 11, 1968.
As Stein points out (pp. 85 97) in 1956, Nehru hesitated to express disapproval initially due to the uncertainties of the Hungarian uprising for East West relations. In the UN General Assembly, India generally abstained on resolutions dealing with Hungary, being particularly opposed to any condemnatory tone in the resolutions. Later, India did call for the entry of UN observers into the country and self determination for the Hungarians. See also R.C. Horn Op cit. 201.

38. In the Security Council, India supported all operative clauses of the resolution except those that condemned the Soviet Union. Mrs.Gandhi emphasized in Parliament that India's concern was for the withdrawal of foreign troops, restoration of the legitimate Government to power and the restoration of the sovereignty of the people.
40. The Times of India, September 26, 1968.
42. The Statesman, September 24, 1968, 'A Chill contact between India and Russia.'
44. Information on these visits and negotiations comes from G.W. Chowdhury, 'India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (New York: Free Press, 1975) p.56 57. Chowdhury was at this time head of the Research Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and he accompanied Ayub to Moscow. He later was communication Minister in President Yahya Khan's cabinet and accompanied Yahya on a visit to China. See. R.C. Horn Op. cit 24.


46. The Times of India, July 11, 1968.

47. Peoples' Democracy July 14, 1968


49. For details see R.C. Horn Op cit 25.


51. Ibid.


53. The Times of India, September 26, 1968.


55. R.C. Horn, Op cit 25 30 p.137.

56. Interview with A.K. Damodaran

57. Interview with Madhu Limaye.

58. Surjit Mansingh: 'India's Search for Power', p. 139-141.
61. Surjit Mansingh Op cit.
64. Interview with A.K. Damodaran. In his opinion this Soviet commitment in later years assumed a great significance, for it literally left Moscow without alternatives.
65. In an excellent analysis made by K. Subramanyam on the compulsions that may have induced Soviet Union to offer a teaty to India in 1969, he refers to several factors. Within a few weeks of assuming office President Nixon ordered a review of U.S. China policy and made tentative approaches to China. Shortly after this Nixon announced his Guam Doctrine in July 1969. Significantly these moves were initiated after China had test fired a large number of MRBMS in 1968-69. The manner in which these were conducted left the impression that these were about to be deployed. These strategic factors served to emphasize that the international power game was being transformed from a two power adverse
partnership game into a more complex one which was likely to be more unfavourable to the USSR than to the USA or to the newcomer China. Consequently it was likely that the Soviet Union, being extremely sensitive about its national security could have decided to initiate steps to counter this game. The offer of a treaty to India appears to have been one of the steps in this direction.


66. S.Mansingh, Op cit 140

67. P.N.Haksar in his letter dated March 25, 1993 has refused any knowledge of the offer of the treaty being made by Kosygin. However S.Nihal Singh states in "Yogi and the Bear" that the offer of a treaty was made. His version is based on an account given to him in New Delhi on April 26, 1980 by an official who participated in the discussions on the treaty. (Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1986) p.67 and 267.

68. Interview with Madhu Limaye.

69. Ibid

70. Pravda, July 11, 1969.

71. Peter J.S.Duncan: 'The Soviet Union and India' (London, 1989)p.61 The Principal aim of the foreign
policy of the Soviet Union, as of any country was to seek to guarantee the security of the Soviet State. Despite differences with India during the late sixties, India's political and strategic importance remained constant and it arose from its geographical position near to the southern frontier of the USSR and sharing borders with China and Pakistan. In addition to the geographical position, India surrounded as it was by the Indian Ocean and being close to the unstable Gulf region, gave it particular importance. Beyond these geographical factors prompting Moscow to seek New Delhi's support in the Asian context, Soviet diplomacy also looked for Indian assistance in the broader, global context. It did have a considerable weight and prestige in international forums and also had the capacity to assist Soviet aims in the Non Aligned Movement, the UN General Assembly and the Commonwealth. When India shared positions with the Soviet Union, it was of considerable political and ideological value to Moscow. The support of a significant non-socialist country, indeed the largest non-socialist country in the world was of considerable psychological importance. Moreover, from an ideological viewpoint, such support had its internal propaganda uses as well.
From the Soviet Point of view, however, it was unlikely that the Russians would withdraw their small but continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly at a time when the United States was retrofitting its Polaris submarines with Poseidon missiles (with ranges exceeding 3000 miles) and had announced plans to build deeper water and more silent submarine with longer range missiles. See K. Subramanyum op cit p.183.
Bhabani Sen Gupta, however, points out that the Prime Minister of India (a country that had consistently kept out of the American System) had done some "loud thinking" on regional security. Speaking at Canberra on May 22, 1968, Mrs. Gandhi suggested that "international guarantees" for the neutrality and independence of the Asian countries would "allay" the "understandable" fear of some countries about their security. Thus it would be wrong to infer that Brezhnev was speaking in a vacuum in June 1969. The question of Asian security was already troubling the Asian minds in view of the anticipated dismantling of the American System. See Bhabani Sen Gupta, 'Soviet Thinking On Asian Collective Security' IDSA Journal Vol.V No.2 October 1972 pp.173-195.

88. Hindustan Times, June 19 and July 1, 1969.
89. Reported in Hindustan Times, June 1, 1969.
91. NCNA, July 13, 1969, cited R.C. Horn Op cit
92. Ibid
95. Chowdhury G.W. Op cit. 141 42
96. Interview with Madhu Limaye.
97. S. Mansingh Op cit. p. 140
98. Ibid.
100. Dilip Mukherjee Indira Rules Supreme. FEER, September 15, 1969.
101. Surjit Mansingh, Op cit 179
102. Ibid
103. Morning News, December 1, 1975
104. Hindustan Times, September 7, 1969
105. Hindustan Times, September 11, 1969
106. Hindustan Times, September 12, 1969
107. Pravda, September 16, 1969
108. Times of India, September 20, 1969
109. Times of India, September 11, 1969
Over the issue of closure of cultural information centres of foreign countries with the exception of the Soviet Cultural Centre, Member of Parliament Piloo Mody raised the issue in the Lok Sabha. He demanded, 'I would like to know whether it is the declared policy of the Government of India to close its doors to all ideas to all cultural exchanges from abroad in spite of the assurances given to the contrary. Is this Government aware that the number of people that utilize these centres and put them to very good use and that these centres are the only centres which are available to hungry people thirsting for knowledge? In spite of the fact that there are something like 62 publications that 'our friends' over here seem to be distributing in this country nobody objects to it and they are permitted to distribute them. So why is it that recognised organised centres (American) as these are discriminated against? I want to know whether this was motivated because of what happened in Trivandrum where the Soviet Union tried to open a centre without the permission of the Government of India, a permission which I do not know why was not
given, but nevertheless it was done without the permission of Government of India and it was therefore rightly brought to the notice of the Government, fortunately because a slab fell down killing some people. It is really shameful. When the Soviet Union commits a fault and breaks the law who is penalised? The Americans. This is what I call 'the socialistic justice of the Indira Government". Lok Sabha debates. Fourth Series Vol.XXXVI, February 20 to March 3, 1970, Nos.1-10, pp 228-230.

The Soviet underplayed the controversy so as to minimize as much as possible the embarrassment to Mrs. Gandhi's Government. See R.C. Horn op cit p.47.

115. R.C. Horn op cit p.48
The Joint Statement issued after the conclusion of the visit testified to the success of the meeting. It asserted that on most of the issues discussed there had been identity of views or proximity of approach.

119. An External Affairs Ministry report stated that the Brezhnev proposal would serve as a bulwark for
protecting states like India from China and even from the United States. The report hailed the Brezhnev declaration on collective security as "a declaration of the fact that the Soviet Union is as much an Asian as a European power" for details see R.C.Horn op cit p. 51.

120. See Stateman June 28 and 29, 1970.

There were reports that the Soviets were planning to supply Pakistan with SU-7 bombers and missile boats.


The author has analysed Mikhail Kapitsa, a Soviet Asian expert's views on Pakistan. Inherent in Kapitsa's discussions is a warning to Pakistan of the consequence of drafting too close to the United States and China.


123. Statesman, July 12, 1970


Though analysts stressed that there were no basic policy differences between Mrs. Gandhi and Dinesh Singh it was likely that Mrs. Gandhi wanted to 'Punish' Dinesh Singh for his political behaviour
domestically, particularly in the State of Uttar Pradesh where his 'political freelancing' upset the Prime Minister. See R.C. Horn op cit p.54.


126. During 1970 opposition groups in the Lok Sabha had challenged the Government on the issue and in each early September the External Affairs Ministry finally agreed to draft a strong protest to the Soviets on their "cartographic aggression" R.C.Horn op. cit p 56.

127. His favourable change was accepted by Moscow after T.N. Kaul met Firyubin in Moscow in October 1970.

128. Statesman, October 21, 1970

129. New York Times, November 12, 1970

It was one of the biggest welcomes Peking ever accorded a foreign Chief of state on a visit to Communist China. It far outdid those he received either in Washington or in Moscow.

130. See Morning News, November 12, 1970.
1. In general, the reasons for the Soviets to be optimistic about the prospects for spreading Soviet influence in the Third World outweighed the setbacks that may have led to pessimism. Though Egypt proved to be faithless and the overthrow of Allende in Chile by a military coup in 1973 made it appear that the peaceful road to socialism was not possible in the Third world after all, yet Soviet successes in Indo-China and Africa were heartening indeed. Mark N. Katz. The Third World in Soviet military thought (London, Croom-Helms, 1982).


3. For details see Ibid PP 3-8.


6. The Soviets were said to have played a crucial role in mediating the 1973 Vietnam peace pact: New York Times June 3, 1974.

Besides, the stability of Soviet influence in the Middle East was conceded by the U.S. Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger when he addressed a press conference in Washington in June 1974 - "Obviously the Soviet Union is a major power with global interests, obviously the Middle East is an area of great concern to the Soviet Union. Therefore, we have no intention, in fact we have no capability of expelling Soviet influence from the Middle East", New York Times, June 7, 1974.


10. During the Arab-Eracli War of 1973, Moscow though, supplied Egypt with arms, it did consult the United States and contributed a great deal to Kissinger's
negotiations by keeping the Arabs interested in these talks.


12. On the foie of the CPI in supporting Mrs. Gandhi, Chester Bowles maintained that "the tactics of the CPI following Mrs. Gandhi's election in March 1971 have been shrewd. The first step was the announcement and later the introduction into Parliament of an appealing programme to promote greater economic and social justice which generally reflects the liberal philosophy on which Mrs. Gandhi based her sweeping victory. If the new Congress Party adopts or supports all or part of such a programme the CPI can claim credit, if it fails to adopt the proposals the CPI can charge that Mrs. Gandhi is still in the grip of "reactionaries" (This was exactly what happened, when the CPI which had supported the Emergency, denounced Mrs. Gandhi as a reactionary after she lost the elections in 1977). See Chester Bowles America and Russia in India, Foreign Affairs-An American Quarterly Review, Vol.49, Nos.1-4, October 1970 July 1971.
13. J.A. Naik, 'India, Russia, China and Bangladesh' (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1972), p. 133-34.

14. See Statesman, July 1, 1971, 'Big Powers Evading the Truth, Mrs. Gandhi said in New Delhi that India could not regard developments in Bangladesh as an internal problem of Pakistan irrespective of what the world's comity of nations thought about it.


16. Henry Kissinger: White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979) Chapter XXI PP. 842-918. See also Christopher Van Hollen: Extracts from The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics And South Asia, Asian Survey Vol.XX No.4, April 1980, 339-40. Christopher Van Hollen's observations are based on the excerpts from the secret meetings of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) which began to appear in Jack Anderson's syndicated columns in mid-December 1971. On January 4, 1972, Kissinger charged that Anderson's quotations were out of context, where upon Anderson released to the press the full text of the minutes of the WSAG meetings of December 3,5,6, and 8. These and other secret documents became known as "The Anderson Papers". The WSAG minutes are contained in Marta R. Nicholas and Philip Oldenburg, Comps. Bangladesh: The Birth of a
17. Statesman, July 2, 1971, 'Documents Speak of Pak Crime' - Large scale looting, rape arson and indiscriminate killing of innocent people had been an inseparable part of the Pakistani campaign of genocide in Bangladesh. Independent observers from all over the world had borne testimony to this inhuman aspect of the West Pakistani military's intervention in East Bengal.

18. President Nixon later used Pakistan as well as Romania as secret channels through which to pass several exploratory messages to China. Of the two the White House had a "slight preference for the Pakistani channel. When Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly delivered a reply to Nixon from Zhou Enlai the White House opted for the Islamabad link. Henry Kissinger op cit. P. 704.


20. Statesman, July 2, 1971, 'Spotlight on Arms Issue' - The Government of India reacted sharply to the
disclosure that U.S. arms were supplied to Pakistan after March 25. The U.S. disclosure came when Swaran Singh was talking in terms of having been assured in Washington that no aid would be given to Pakistan unless a solution to the Bangladesh problem was found.

21. New York Times, February 5, 1972. Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts used the figure of 50 million on several occasions and this figure was given prominence by the Indian press. But a General Accounting Office study undertaken at Kennedy's request later reported that 3.8 million in military supplies were exported between March and September 30, 1971 on licenses issued before March 25. It is unlikely that arms shipped after March 25 exceeded 5 million.


23. Times of India: 'The Old Nixon', July 12, 1971. There could be no doubt that President Nixon was too deeply committed to the cold war clichés and there was no way he could extricate himself from it. Despite
detente with the Soviet Union he could not come round to accept India's dependence on Moscow.


25. The Times of India. 'The Old Nixon': July 12, 1971 P. 8.

26. For details see Henry Kissinger: op. cit.

27. Ibid.


See also Statesman July 4, 1971, 'Talks with Kissinger to be wideranging and Statesman July 8, 1971, 'Peace in Danger. Kissinger told so far Washington had not reacted to the Yahya Plan.' The caution perhaps showed its dissatisfaction but how this feeling was to be conveyed to Pakistan and with what result was to be seen. India
obviously took the line that a Government of Quislings and breakaway sections of the Awami League was hardly the way out of the impasse and that it would not lead to the return of the refugees. The other point of interest was whether U.S. disappointment over the Yahya Plan would affect its arms supplies policy. The main feature of the American policy had been the desire to do business with General Yahya while simultaneously expressing displeasure over the happenings in East Bengal. Both Mrs. Gandhi and the External Affairs Minister told Kissinger in emphatic terms that they did not accept the American interpretation that only non-lethal weapons were supplied or that was the result of bureaucratic bungling. Unless credible guaranters were given to the refugees the situation would lead to 'serious consequences'. Even Ambassador Kenneth Keating's resignation threat over the U.S. arms policy to Pakistan seemed to have little impact on the Nixon-Kissinger combine.

32. Times of India, July 8, 1971, See also Chopra - India's Second Liberation P. 84.

33. After the China announcement and before the Indo-Soviet Treaty was signed and at a time when both the State and the CIA judged war not imminent, Kissinger was exhorting the bureaucracy to tilt
toward Pakistan and discouraged the serious efforts to move Yahya Khan toward political accommodation. Hence India's fears were justified. See C.V. Holler op. cit. P. 347.


36. Ibid.

37. C.V. Hollen citing from Anderson paper and White House Years op. cit. 340-41.

38. Van Hollen's inferences are drawn from informal notes of the Senior Review Group (SRG) meeting, March 6, 1971. He states there were no formal agreed minutes of either the SRG or the NSAG meetings. Representatives of individual departments took their own notes. The Anderson papers for example, were based on Defence Department Notes. Van Hollen refers to such notes recorded by one or more members of the State Department as 'Informal Notes'.

39. New York Times and the Baltimore Sun cited in Times of India. 'Nixon's Stand on aid to Pakistan
challenged, August 10, 1971.
The paper said America's self-respect as well as its interests in genuine stability on the subcontinent call for the immediate suspension of aid to Pakistan.
The Sun said the non-condemnation of the action of the Pakistani government in East Bengal by America meant there was in this a deep moral question involved. Text of Senator Frank Church's Statement in Times of India, August 10, 1971. "...... it had taken eighteen weeks of widespread hunger, pestilence and bloodshed and victimisation of Bengalis for the President of the U.S. to take notice of their unprecedented tragedy....".

41. See also Statesman, July 3, 1971, (Reported in New York, July 2, 1971), One More Arms Ship For Pakistan: A suit was filed in a Federal Court seeking to prevent the departure of a ship believed to be carrying arms to Pakistan in a vessel shipped by the port of Newark. The ship was Kaptal, a 10,000 ton freighter.
A Republican spokesman at a press conference denounced the official policy of the U.S. Government. Mr. Bradford Morse said, 'In my judgement each time one of those ships leaves American shores the USA will face a major diplomatic crisis with the parties involved as well as serious political controversy in
this country." However, Christopher Van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs told a Senate sub-committee that the shipments were not contradictory to U.S. policy. He said in addition to the three ships which recently sailed from New York laden with spare parts "it is likely that additional items could be shipped".

'Senator's concern over strain in Indo-U.S. ties. See Times of India, August 9 and 31, 1971.

Senator Percy emphasized that 'today relations between India and the U.S. had reached an all time low and we must fully take into account this factor.

42. See also Statesman August 14, 1971: 'Warm welcome To Kennedy'

Senator Kennedy noted that various nations had come out with pledges of aid totalling millions of dollars some of which were already in the pipeline. The USA had made its contribution but "I think considering the humanitarian needs all this assistance has been very small. Times of India, August 14, 1971, 'Greatest human disaster, say Kennedy, New Delhi, August 13, 1971.

See also Statesman July 2, 1971. 'Unsafe Now For Refugees To Return, U.K. Mps call for Political A ceord : The British Parliamentary Delegation headed by the former Secretary for Commonwealth Relations
Mr. Arthur Bottomley expressed its shock at some of the things he saw during the delegation’s extensive tour of strife torn Bangladesh and the refugee camps in India.

43. See Lok Sabha debates, fifth series, Vol.II, No.6, Monday, May 31, 1971: Jyotirmoy Basu, S.M. Banerjee, Tridib Choudhury and Atal Behari Vajpayee question Raj Bahadur, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs on the whereabouts of Sheikh Mijibur Reham. See also Lok Sabha debates, Fifth series Vol.III, No.16, Monday June 14, 1971, P. 121, Samar Guha, "I want to know the reaction of the Government to the appeal made by the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Tajuddin Ahmed and also the steps taken by the Government about insuring the personal security of Bangabandhu SK. Mijibur Rehman and also for his early release. Will the Government give their reaction to it?"

44. Times of India, August 16, 1970.
See Statesman, July 3, 1971,
Earlier British M.P. Reginald Prentice said he could not conceive of any solution without Sheikh Mijibur Rehman and Awami League being parties to it.
See also Statesman, August 17, 1971. ‘Kennedy calls Trial an Outrage.’ He had no hesitation in describing the mass killing of unarmed civilian by the West
Pakistan army as genocide. The only crime the Snaikh appeared to be guilty of was of winning the elections, the senator said.

45. Ibid.

46. Times of India, August 8, 1971.


49. Similarly, little coherent policy direction was conveyed by Kissinger through the two NSC committees he chaired: SRG and the WSAG (The membership in the SRG and WSAG was essentially the same. State, Defence, JCS ? CIA ? AID and NSC staff. The SRG was converted into the WSAG when there was need for 'crisis management').


51. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.


53. Ibid.

When Deputy AID Administrator Maurice Williams made the modest suggestion that the U.S. recommend to Yahya that he remove the army from civilian type administration in East Pakistan so that relief assistance could go forward, Kissinger shapped back. "Why is it our business how they govern themselves? The first use of the word 'tilt' was made by him that 'the President always says to tilt towards Pakistan but every proposal I get is in the opposite direction."

56. Christopher Van Hollen's assessment of Kissinger's motives are quite convincing.

57. The East European countries attitude was in sharp contrast to a later development when the Ambassador of several East European nations summoned a conference in Delhi to express solidarity with the Soviet action in Afghanistan.

Statements by defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in the Lok Sabha this week were significant in more ways then one. Replying to the discussion on defence demands, Jagjivan Ram devoted some time to the Bangladesh developments and the colonial policies pursued by West Pakistan rulers and the war preparations by Islamabad. Praise for the "people of Bangladesh "_______" our friends in distress and sympathy for their struggle against Pakistan's colonial rule was of course, not new but what was significant was that no Government spokesman had said this in such clear terms in support of the
guerilla fighters of the Mukti Fouj so far. Jagjivan Ram's remarks made after great deliberation indicated current thinking of the Government and a new bases for its hope about the establishment of a democratic and free Bangladesh. In another development, in a motion sponsored by the Jana Sangh members to discuss the reported sale of arms to Pakistan, the members tried to utilise the occasion to indulge in an anti-Soviet tirade. One of the Jana Sangh spokesmen tried to explain away U.S. intervention in Korea and South Vietnam as intended to check the spread of communism. He wondered why a democratic country like the U.S. should help Pakistan to maintain its strangle hold on Bangladesh. It was also suggested by the Jana Sangh leader that the Soviet Union might also have given arms to Pakistan like the U.S. but complained that facts were not known because nobody knew what was happening behind the curtain."

"America's shipment of arms to Pakistan was known because the U.S. was a democratic country, he said. The Jana Sangh leader even tried to justify American arms aid to Pakistan from 1954 onwards. At that time he said U.S. was supplying arms to Pakistan to check communist expansion, but it could not be justified at this moment when Pakistan was indulging in genocide. Swaran Singh, however, took strong exception to the
statement that the U.S. had supplied arms to Pakistan in 1954 to check communist expansion." You might have been taken in by such talk of containing communism. We were never taken in, we knew at that time that the arms supplied to Pakistan were meant to be used against us. The arms that are being supplied now by the U.S. are also meant to be used against us, he added. "Why did the Jana Sangh leader think it necessary to indulge in such excuses to extricate the U.S. from its and harmful policies?" he questioned.

The discussion focussed attention on India's friends and foes and also on the supporters of the national policies of the Government and its opponents.

68. Statesman, July 5, 1971, "Russian Supply of Arms to 'Pindi Reported, (Quarterly Despatch, date not known). The West Pakistani media mounted a big publicity campaign on the point that Soviet experts who left East Bengal on the wake of disturbances were preparing to return to their posts. Though not substantiated the reports of the arms supplies were, however, not being treated lightly in the wake of Pak purchase of arms from France and some other countries as also from supplies from one or two of its West Asian allies.

69. Madhu Limaye. (interview)
Interview with A.K. Damodaran.

71. It was confirmed by the Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Pegov's call upon the Indian Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul. Times of India, July 5, 1971.


75. Chou Enlai had taken six long months to reply to a letter from Nehru on the question of Sino-Indian border in 1959.


77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.

80. Ibid.


83. Statesman, August 7, 1971, 'Gromyko To Visit Delhi Tomorrow': The announcement of Mr. Gromyko's visit was made simultaneously in Moscow and Delhi. Obviously the talks Mr. D.P. Dhar had in Moscow culminated in the Soviet decision to send Mr. Gromyko to New Delhi. Gromyko's visit was viewed in official circles as a demonstration of Indo-Soviet solidarity, a continuation of the process which started in 1965 with collaboration in economic and other fields and manifested itself with the Soviet help to India at the UN and other world forums. But beneath these vague generalisations there were enough evidence to show that Indo-Soviet talks would be real politik. The two countries were face to face with grave situations. Russia, as indicated by press comments saw deeper motives behind the move for Sino-American detente and would like to enlist the support of India. For New Delhi, Bangladesh and the Yahya regime's war thereats were the most important problems and it therefore sought specific Soviet assurances on the subject.


85. Times of India: 'A Timely Visit', August 9, 1971: See also Statesman, August 9, 1971. Gromyko had talks with Swaran Singh and the Pak threat of war
was discussed. Mr. Gromyko was stated to have brought personal letters for Mrs. Gandhi from Soviet President Podgorny and Prime Minister Kosygin. He was expected to initiate the contours of Soviet support to India in the event of Pakistan's threat of war materialising. The Indian delegation included Swaran Singh, Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul, D.P. Chah, Ambassador K. Shelvankar and Venkateswaran, Joint Secretary, East European Affairs, in the Ministry of External Affairs.

86. Times of India, August 7, 1971.


91. Ibid.


93. Times of India, August 8, 1971.
94. Ibid.


98. Ibid.

99. Interview with T.N. Kaul.

100. Ibid.

101. Interview with A.K. Damodaran, T.N. Kaul and Madhu Limaye. Madhu Limaye says that in a sense the treaty was an insurance treaty. He emphasizes that Mrs. Gandhi's Soviet policy during this period was guided purely by strategic geopolitical considerations, for, on the one hand to cope with Pakistan and on the other with pressure from China. Even the C.P.I. was sceptical of the Soviet Union and believed that Moscow wanted India to compromise on Bangladesh. Many socialist leaders and parties having an anti-Soviet bias considered rhetoric of a peaceful settlement to be unrealistic and hence they condemned the treaty for they believed it to be an instrument to put pressure on India to acquiesce in Soviet wishes. But these political parties were unable to appreciate the significance of India's relations with
the Soviet Union from the strategic point of view. Mr. Limaye is further of the opinion that though Mrs. Gandhi was not a learned or a widely read woman, I do feel that no other person of our time, neither Moraji nor Lal Bahadur could have been able to handle the situation as superbly as Mr. Gandhi did.


103. Times of India, August 27, 1971.

For a comparative estimate of several bilateral treaties Moscow signed with different countries, see Roy Allison, Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Allignment (Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Unlike the United States which was bound to its allies through formal military alliances and pacts, the Soviet Union gained access into the third world through a series of bilateral security arrangements in the form of treaties of friendship and co-operation. Such treaties often took the character of military relationships though the nature of military and political commitments contained in these treaties varied from country to country. It is important to note that the cosignatories of Soviet friendship and cooperation treaties were invariably members of the NAM. In most cases the parties agreed
to co-operation in certain aspects of security policies only, rather than a commitment to joint military activity. Care was taken not to dilute the non-aligned status of the said third world country as far as possible.

The Soviet assertion that such treaties bolstered the non-aligned character of the third world states was vehemently challenged by western countries. They insisted that all such treaties were essentially agreements on defence and the provision of military facilities and that some of these treaties had gravely compromised the non-aligned character of the third world state in question, like Cuba. A further western concern was the possibility of these bilateral treaties assuming the character of multilateral, intra-regional alliances in the field of security. This could have enabled Moscow to cost considerable influence on regional issues in the third world. But disunity and rivalry within the third world impeded Moscow's progress in transforming these bilateral pacts into an effective multilateral structure. Nevertheless, the basic objective of the Soviet friendship and cooperation treaties with third world states were intended to counteract the existing assurances between these states and western powers. With the gradual increase in the number of states with whom the Soviet Union was contractually linked, Moscow aimed to establish relations with them on a firm constitutional basis. Thus the Soviet Union strove for the creation of a mutual strategic
support system based on a network of bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation which fitted into the structure of collective security proposed by Brezhnev.

One of the earliest acts of Soviet diplomacy after successfully repelling counter-revolutionary attacks along its borders had been the conclusion of defence treaties in 1921 with Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan. These treaties were specifically intended to insulate the Soviet borders from extended threats. After the second world war, however, the Soviet Union entered into defence pacts with states outside Europe. In 1950 the USSR committed itself to a treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with China, which lapsed in 1979. With North Korea a defence pact was signed in 1961. While the treaty with North Korea was a mutual defence pact, the treaty with China, was a formal alliance aimed to coordinate defence against an attack by Japan. In 1966, a defence pact was signed by the USSR and Mongolia which was specifically aimed against China. It is to be noted that these treaties fell into a different category than the treaties signed by Moscow after 1970, for the former were essentially between mutually complementing communist states, whereas in case of the latter the treaties were signed between states that were ideologically apart.

Of all treaties signed between the Soviet Union and third world non-alligned countries, the Indo-Soviet treaty of
friendship and co-operation of 1971 fell into a category of its own. Unlike the Indo-Soviet treaty, however, the treaties Moscow signed with the United Arab Republic on 28th May 1971 and Iraq on 9th April 1972, contained specific articles on the development of cooperation between the parties to strengthen their defence capacity. Long-term analysis hold that the Soviet-Iraq treaty effectively gave contractual authorisation for the stationing of Soviet forces in Iraq or for Soviet use of naval bases and air bases (AA). The Soviet-Egyptian treaty, too, granted similar concessions to the Soviet Union. In fact, Article 8 of the Egyptian treaty stipulated that Egypt would be assisted in training its military personnel to use the arms and equipment it received from the Soviet Union. The treaty of friendship and co-operation concluded between the USSR and Somalia on 4 July 1974 included a similar article obliging joint co-operation in the field of armed forces. It envisaged Soviet training of Somali military personnel armaments and equipments. The very basis of these Soviet sponsored treaties were to develop and consolidate the defence potential of her treaty partner, for such treaties with contractual obligation of co-operation in the military field proved to be of mutual benefit. In return for such military aid the Soviet Union received bases to its planes and ships.

From the Egyptian point of view, the Soviet provision of military aids were especially advanced technology and Soviet support for Egypt's stand against Israel became the very basis
of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship and co-operation treaty. President Sadat regarded Article 8 of the treaty as the most important factor in his desire to acquire overt Soviet support for his plans to use 'every means' available to liberate the occupied territories. It is significant to observe that unlike the Indo-Soviet treaty, the Soviet Union did not commit itself in the Soviet-Egyptian treaty to direct involvement in a war, invoking the other party. Nevertheless, in both cases the Soviet Union undertook a heavy political commitment. Soviet spokesmen were reluctant to elaborate the military aspects of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty. What was emphasized was that the treaty was a model for other third world countries who wished to go along socialist lines. It appeared that there were efforts by the Soviet Union to create a political alliance between the signatories but clearly the Soviet Union failed to see the contradiction between such a proposition and a policy of non-alignment. The Soviet Union often portrayed its alliances with Egypt and Iraq to be an alliance between the forces of socialism and national liberation which was distinct from an 'allignment with imperialist blocs'.

However, later developments did expose the fragile character of the treaties Soviet Union had concluded with Egypt, Iraq and Somalia. None of these countries conceived of their treaties with the USSR binding and obligatory charters to bring about a political and ideological
co-ordination with the Soviet Union. In essence they remained primarily interested in using these treaties to bolster their defences by means of Soviet assistance. The Egyptian and Somali treaty with the Soviet Union proved to be a calculated, transitory form of allignment.

President Sadat's frustration over the failure of the Soviet Union to deliver the arms expected gradually led to the undermining of Soviet position in Egypt. After the Yom Kippur war relations soured over the issue of arms deliveries and the Egyptian debt to the USSR. Finally in March 1976, President Sadat unilaterally abrogated the Soviet-Egyptian treaty. A Tass announcement said, the treaty had been paralysed due to Sadat's unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union. The Camp David Accords which Egypt later signed with Israel were severely criticized by the Soviet Union as a blow not only to Egypt's non-aligned status, but a blow against the NAM as a whole. In any case Soviet prestige in the non-aligned world got a severe beating as Egypt had been the first Third world state to sign a treaty with the USSR. This blow to Soviet prestige was compounded further the following year when the Soviet Union refused to render, Somalia the military supplies she demanded for her unjust claims on Ethiopian territory. Somalia reacted by abrogating the friendship treaty with the USSR in November, 1977. As in Egypt, Soviet technicians and advisors were expelled from Somalia and Soviet rights of access to military facilities
were terminated. In both cases failure to reach an understanding over defence provisions of the friendship treaties led to a breakdown in bilateral relations. For a brief period Iraq, too vacillated and a strong section of the Iraqi leadership was in favour of dissolving its Soviet connection and opt for the United States just as Egypt and Somalia had demonstrated. Though Iraq rescinded from such an eventuality, much of the Iraqi treaty lost its elan.

Despite the dissolution of the treaties with Egypt and Somalia, Soviet leaders remained convinced of the potential of such treaties as a means of institutionalising security relations and political consultation with third world states. Interestingly, Indo-Soviet relations remained unaffected by the turmoil in Soviet relations with other third world treaty partners during the mid 1970s. In June 1976 Moscow and New Delhi decided in fact, to further develop the practice of bilateral political consultations making them systematic and substantive and paying special attention to using them in assisting the implementation of agreed measures to strengthen peace, international security and co-operation.

Elsewhere Soviet leaders successfully negotiated friendship and co-operation treaties with radical regimes - in Angola (8 October, 1976), Mozambique (31st March, 1977), Vietnam (3 December, 1978), South Yemen (25 October, 1979)
and Syria (8 October, 1980). Only the treaty with Vietnam followed the exact formula as that of the 1971 Soviet-Indian Treaty, according to which the parties will immediately begin consultation under the conditions specified. However, the other treaties contained clauses obliging the parties immediately to enter contact with each other in the event that their security or international peace is threatened, or to engage in regular bilateral consultations on important international questions.

Frank Anthony hailed the treaty with some qualifications. The Jana Sangh and the Congress Q were cautious though not opposed it, and the CPI (M) extended limited welcome. The PSP was happy about the pact but the Swatantra leader Piloo Mody and the DMK spokesman Manqharan were critical. However, Jyotirmoy Basu of the CPI (M) was happy that it "promotes India's contacts with the socialist camp." Namboodripad sad of the same party maintained that the treaty would be the basis of a new assault on imperialism. Radio Pakistan factually reported the Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Pakistani Government invited Gromyko to visit Pakistan.
Radio Peking made no mention of the Treaty.
Radio Moscow broadcast a summary without comment.
The B.B.C. made the treaty its lead item in some of its bulletins. The VOA said that there had been war threats from both sides and that it was speculated that China would side with Pakistan and Russia might aid India. However, the major assessment was that the treaty was a Soviet-Indian response to the Washington-Peking diplomacy. The State Department deliberately downplayed Gromyko's visit to India. The New York Times wrote that while publicly giving support the Soviet Union was really counselling restraint on India just as the USA was doing. But the signing of the treaty came as a big surprise to American officials. Reporting on the reactions in European capitals, S. Nihal Singh in the Statesman August 19, 1971, said "Europe's reaction to the Indo-Soviet Treaty is a sad commentary. Sad because it shows how far in West Europe's estimation India had already slipped. The very tone of understanding comment and the lack of real surprise implied that to many West European capitals the treaty merely formalised an existing private and mere adhoc understanding between New Delhi and Moscow. This agreement implies that for Russia's strategic interests India is something of a convenient pawn. Yugoslavia did not accept it lightly."

Senator Kennedy was, however clear in stating his belief that the "Indo-Soviet Treaty need not in any
way be disadvantageous to the interests of Indo-U.S. relations". He said he saw no inconsistency in India signing the treaty and continuing to adhere to non-alignment. He saw the treaty in the atmosphere in which it was signed an atmosphere which he noted was marked by great restraint on the part of India. It was quite on the cards that the treaty may strengthen the forces of restraint. Besides it was intimated to him by Swaran Singh India would be proposing United States for the signing of a similar treaty.


L.K. Jha the Indian Ambassador to U.S. interpreted the Treaty 'only as a deterrent'. When asked if Russia would intervene on India's behalf, he said, "my judgement would be that unless any other power joined the fray on Pakistan's side we would be quite prepared to deal with the situation with our own resources."

Ibid.


108. See Statesman supplement, August 15, 1971, S. Viswam. Large sections of the population derived from the
treaty a renewed confidence to cope with aggression and a vindication of official statements made from time to time that 'India is not alone'. To that extent Mrs. Gandhi will be credited with having provided a moral booster to the people of India and Bangladesh.

113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
Gromyko in his speech had remarked that 'the Treaty provides an even stronger political and legal basis for the cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. Soviet publicity at that time underplayed the security provisions of the Treaty. The emphasis was however, reversed in the coming years.

According to a diplomatic analysis, this warning was explicit in Gromyko's speech at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet which ratified the Treaty. Speaking of relevance of the Treaty's commitments in the event of aggression or threat of aggression against either party. Gromyko made particular mention of the situation developing south of the Soviet borders - an obvious allusion to threats of war against India by Pakistan. Gromyko declared that 'from now on no one can make policy in relation to the Soviet Union or in relation to India without taking the Treaty into account.' Gromyko's claim of Asian Security being an objective of the Treaty, quite apart from bilateral commitments induced the belief here that the Soviet Union regarded the treaty as a first step towards the evolution of a system of collective security for Asia.

Times of India, August 17, 1971.

Interview with T.N. Kaul.

Interview with A.K. Damodaran.

Ibid.

Melting Pot: The signing of the treaty had raised the interesting question about the fate of India's non-alignment policy. While official sources believed that the treaty had enhanced the credibility of non-alignment and gave India a bargaining leverage than ever before, there was a section which saw the treaty as the beginning of the end of Non-alignment. Justifying the treaty it was stated that Article IV of the Treaty committed the Soviet Union to the recognition of India's policy of Non-Alignment as an effective instrument in the maintenance of universal peace and international security. Citing this as proof of the evolution of the treaty being within the framework of non-alignment, official sources interpreted it as a forerunner of similar treaties between India and other nations. Regarded neither as a military alliance nor as a regional security pact, the treaty was described more as a convenant of peace and cooperation, the operation of which would act as a deterrent to hostile nations with belligerent postures against India. By implication it assured India military assistance from the Soviet Union if it became the victim of aggression and simultaneously precluded India from providing a base for an attack against the Soviet Union. There was no provision for
induction of Soviet troops or personnel into Indian territory. Nor was India's freedom to obtain its supply of arms from any sources it desired in any way curtailed. Although closer cooperation between India and the Soviet Union was expected to emerge out of the visit of Mr. Gromyko, the conclusion of a security pact was a well kept secret. The evolution of the treaty itself was not attributed to the pressures built by the recent developments in Bangladesh. The terms of the Treaty appeared to have been the subject of negotiations between the two countries off and on during the last two years. The timing of the signing of the treaty was decided by the warlike postures of the Pakistani military junta in the belief that it would lessen tensions. In assessing the nature of aggression or even the threat of aggression, the Soviet Union and India were bound to accept the assessment of each other since the treaty contemplated no veto. There was no restriction on India from seeking to normalise her relations with China should she so desire. Similarly there was also no restraint on India concluding a friendship pact with the United States. In fact, India expected many other countries particularly in South East Asia to be willing to sign similar treaties with her since she believed that the Indo-
Soviet Treaty was a positive move towards greater security in the region.


128. The Statesman in its Editorial of August 10, 1971, cited 'Was it Really Necessary?' questioned the rationale and the wisdom behind signing the Treaty. Making an assessment of the treaty provisions and the context in which it was signed the paper commented that such a treaty of which there was no parallel in the files of the External Affairs Ministry, could only have been the outcome of either a thorough reappraisal of foreign policy in terms of its long term objectives or a rather extravagant response to recent developments on the world scene. Since of the first there was scarcely any evidence, there was every reason to believe that the second had been the dominating factor in New Delhi's calculation. U.S. aid to Pakistan and the Sino-U.S. axis induced New Delhi
into an alarming sense of isolation. Thus the impetuousity with which New Delhi committed itself to what was visibly a military arrangement in the hope that Pakistan would be deterred. It was further stated in the report that New Delhi appeared to be weighed down by the fears of a diabolical plot by Washington, China and Pakistan and had consequently sought refuge in a treaty that gave every sign of being hastily conceived. Nevertheless, a guarantee of the Soviet Union was welcome provided there was no quid pro quo as unfortunately and assuredly there was. Moscow's interest in the treaty was global and not as portrayed for the stability in the subcontinent or in Bangladesh. Mr. Nixon's China gambit was obviously uppermost in its calculations and a treaty with India would be seen as serving Soviet interests in the long run. Clearly Soviet expectations from an arrangement evidently sought on India's eager initiative would not be modest. At the very least the triangular global manoeuvres among Peking, Washington and Moscow would tend directly to involve New Delhi in ways for which obviously it was unprepared. According to the Treaty Moscow "respects" New Delhi's policy of Non-alignment but there was every evidence of alignment in a treaty indistinguishable from a defence Ipart. There was nothing to indicate that Moscow was prepared to go further than U.S. in applying pressure on Islamabad.
or that it did not 'equate' India and Pakistan in the sense of attempting to prevent a war between the two countries. Hence both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had a great deal in common as the major powers could only be expected to have. The Soviet veto in the security council and the Soviet aid in a crisis could surely have been ensured without the cost of so comprehensive a treaty. Mr. D.P. Dhar was described to have "rushed" to Moscow to solicit support. A parallel to this could be found in the extravagant shopping list which New Delhi sent to Washington during the Sino-Indian crisis. In both there were elements of frenzied calculations, hurried conclusions and a superficial reading of what was going on. On the other hand it was unlikely that Mr. Gromyko had any illusions about what the treaty was about or that his interpretation of it coincided with that of Swaran Singh. Keeping all these in view, was the treaty desirable or necessary?

Even so, it was all to the good of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of peace and Security which promised to place relations between the two countries on a new and purposeful footing.

130. Interview with Madhu Limaye.


132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. The triumvirate comprised of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny.

136. Mrs. Gandhi attached great importance to this visit and to her personal status as Prime Minister of the most populous democracy. Hence she would in no way accept an inferior status by initiating a dialogue with Kosygin, who had been relegated to a secondary position at the Kremlin. This, though, had in no way diminished her fondness of Kosygin - Interview with A.K. Damodaran.

137. Ibid. The Indian Ambassador Shelvankar and A.K. Damodaran were asked by her to arrange this meeting since that evening went empty and Mrs. Gandhi said this would be the best opportunity to meet the Indians in Moscow.


140. Pran Chopra: India's Second Liberation (Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1974) P. 90. The Indians were particularly disappointed that Brezhnev sided with Kosygin who as the initiator of the Tashkent agreement, had been seen as committed to a balanced policy between India and Pakistan.


143. Times of India, October 13, 1971.

144. Ibid.


146. Ibid.

147. R.C. Horn, op.cit. P. 70. According to Horn, although still not anxious for war Moscow fully supported New Delhi. The reference to the lacks of "sincere friendship, mutual trust and mutual understanding" and the reference to Mutual Trust, which had been partially lacking during the year was particularly significant.

148. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.
149. Times of India, November 2, 1971.

150. Extracts of the interview, see Ibid.

151. See also Statesman, November 1, 1971: While Mrs. Gandhi said after the talks that she was 'on the whole' satisfied it was understood that basic differences remained between the two sides on the modalities of achieving a political solution in East Bengal. In another related report in the Statesman, November 2, 1971 it was stated that Mrs. Gandhi was cool to both Sir Alec Douglas Home's and Mr. Heath's offer of probing for a solution within the broad framework of Pakistan. According to India it was too late in the day to think in terms of a one-Pakistan solution for the problem. Sir Alec's second suggestion on whether it would not be in India's interest to buy peace was also not acceptable to the Indian side. Mrs. Gandhi was understood to have remarked that a patchwork solution could lead to greater complications. Commenting upon an earlier statement made by Mrs. Gandhi on the refugee issue that 'the sources of the Indian Government were limited and as such we alone cannot bear the great economic burden that has been forced on us' (See Statesman, July 4, 1971), it was suggested to Mrs. Gandhi that India ought to consider the heavy refugee burden and the unlikelihood that international assistance would be adequate. Mrs. Gandhi's answer was
that India would rather bear the refugee burden than accept a patchwork solution. On a question at the Foreign Press Association on the possibility of her meeting Yahya Khan she said "we are tired of this equation between India and Pakistan. We are not equal and we are not going to stand for this". However, it was one thing to be sympathetic with India's troubles foisted upon her from across the border and seek to alleviate the sufferings of the refugees, and quite another problem altogether to help India to undertake a new balance of power on the subcontinent. Though nothing very tangible was achieved in Great Britain, its popularity rating as a public relations exercise was high.

152. See also Statesman, November 10, 1971.

Having rounded off her political discussions with the French Prime Minister, M. Chaban-Delmas, Mrs. Gandhi could count on two small gains flowing from her visit. One was the French assurance that they were not selling any arms to Pakistan and the second was President Pompidou's reference to his belief that East Pakistan's problems had to be solved politically with the full consent of the peoples concerned. On both these points this was the farthest the French had ever gone.

153. Ibid.
The German Chancellor supported India on the release of Shaikh Mujibur Rahman and on the idea of a political solution, refugees and the consequent burden to India. It was also stated that West Germany had stopped supply of arms to Pakistan for quite some time both on commercial and Government accounts. The Chancellor also told Mrs. Gandhi that "within our limited influence we will always be at our friend's disposal for any help. At a Press Conference in Bonn, See Statesman, November 13, 1971, Mrs. Gandhi flatly rejected a solution of the Bangladesh crisis on the basis of the Tashkent agreement. She declared "I don't think a Tashkent type of agreement will work." She was cautious to the suggestions of Brandt saying she would accept his good offices if the military rulers of Pakistan could be convinced that only a political settlement in accordance with the wishes of the people of East Bengal was the answer.
In Washington Mrs. Gandhi made her intentions clear at the very first meeting when she said, "I come here looking for a deeper understanding". Cancelling her earlier plans to deliver her greeting in Hindi she said this in clear English so that there could be no misconstruing. What the U.S. wanted was no unpleasantness in the subcontinent and this commitment India could not give.

160. Ibid. When asked for her reaction to US Senate vote on foreign aid she said that if the rejection by the US senate was final, "we just have to adapt ourselves to it".


162. Henry Kissinger: White House Years - op. cit. P. 878. Christopher Van Hollen attests to the fact that Nixon often referred to Mrs. Gandhi with the most unprintable epithets.

163. Times of India, November 6, 1971, P. 1 'India fails to move Nixon on Bengal issue'.

164. Times of India, November 5, 1971. Nixon Greets Indira warmly, Washington, November 4. President Nixon addressed Mrs. Gandhi with sugar-coated words of praise - "May the sun always shine in our relations as
it did today*. He also praised Mrs. Gandhi as representing the world's largest free nation and the world's largest democracy.

165. Times of India, November 9, 1971, P. 10. 'Talking at cross-purposes - Mrs. Gandhi's Meeting with Mr. Nixon. In his book Kissinger gives the impression that the President did most of the talking in one of Nixon's better presentations. Mrs. Gandhi, however, reports otherwise - 'it was not so much Mr. Nixon talking as Mr. Kissinger, because Mr. Nixon would talk a few minutes and would then say, "Isn't that right, Henry"? and from then on 'I would talk with Henry rather than Nixon'. Mrs. Gandhi's interview with Jonathan Power of the International Herald Tribune reprinted in the Washington Post, December 30, 1979.

166. For full text Mrs. Gandhi's speech see Times of India November 5, 1971.

167. Observers could detect a hint of annoyance when Mrs. Gandhi made this remark to Mr. Nixon. Times, November, 1971.


Mrs. Gandhi's tour of six western capitals had understandably been a great personal success. From Brussels and Vienna no more tangible gain would be expected, even London's ability to influence events were limited. What mattered most was Washington's response and it could not have satisfied Indian expectations. Even then the Indian stand was perhaps a little better understood by the Nixon administration than it was before Mrs. Gandhi's visit. Both Paris and Bonn had also urged a political solution in East Bengal.


Henry Kissinger op. cit.

C.V. Hollen op. cit. P. 349.

Congressional Record, cited C.V. Hollen op. cit.

Nixon's Diary - She (Mrs. Gandhi) earnestly assured me that India was not motivated in any way by anti-Pakistan attitudes. "India has never wished the destruction of Pakistan or its permanent crippling', she said "Above all India seeks the restoration of stability. We want to eliminate chaos at all costs." Though Nixon writes that "we know that Yahya Khan eventually would have to take a moderate and conciliatory line', but his actions throughout the period of the crisis do not suggest any such thinking on his part. The outbreak of the war in the subcontinent convinced him that India and the Soviet Union had been preparing for war for quite some time, 'Battle plans of such dimensions are not formulated in less than a month and I could not help thinking that Mrs. Gandhi had purposely deceived me in our meeting. The Soviets had ignored several clear signals from us that we would react very unfavourably if they supported India in an invasion of Pakistan. I felt that one of the primary Soviet motives was to show the world that despite the much heralded Sino-American
reapproachment, the USSR was still the premier Communist Power. In fact the Soviets moved troops to the Chinese border in an unsubtle attempt to tie up Chinese forces and prevent them from going to the aid of Pakistan. I felt it was important to discourage both Indian aggression and Soviet adventurism." Nixon disagreed with WSAG decision to do nothing and he justifies the sending of the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise from Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal to show to our other allies of our dependability. Nixon's embrace of China became firmer, after the war and he writes, "It is the U.S. view that recent events in South Asia involve sobering conclusions. The Governments of the People's Republic of China and the U.S. should not again find themselves in a position where hostile global aims can be furthered through the use of proxy countries." "As a result of the Indo-Pakistan crisis my respect and regard for Mrs. Gandhi diminished—her duplicitous attitude toward us when she actually had made up her mind to attack Pakistan at the time she saw me in Washington and assured me she would not. Those who resort to force without making excuses are bad enough, but those who resort to force while preaching to others about their use of force deserve no sympathy whatsoever."

Despite the complain by the Soviet Ambassador Vorontsov that 'the Indians were proving very
resistant to Soviet pressure, Nixon was convinced that without the prospect of Soviet support and aid the Indians were almost certain to agree to a (American brokered) settlement.

182. See Statesman, November 10, 1971 Swaran Singh in a statement in Chandigarh declared that Sino-Indian relations had improved. He said, "Either of the two countries can inform the other that it wants to port an Ambassador in her mission in the other country." Relations between India and China had improved over the past few years and there were no hurdles in the way of their exchanging Ambassadors.


184. See also Statesman, November 10, 1971, 'China and Pakistan': The announcement of the U.S. State Department of its decision to stop further shipment of arms to Pakistan - 'it would serve no useful purpose' made Bhutto dash post-haste to Peking with a military shopping list. The move implied that Pakistan no longer regarded the prospect of American arms supplies as wholly reassuring and this could well have been the result of a slight shift in Washington's policies. Bhutto said he was "more then satisfied" with his talks with Chinese leaders and there was no reason to believe that Pakistan had not in fact been assured of
continued and generous supplies of Chinese arms. But the more important question was whether it had been promised with anything more. An American News Magazine quoted Yahya Khan as saying that in the event of an Indo-Pak War China would help Islamabad in every way "short of intervention", but soon Radio Pakistan quoted him saying that China would intervene. Though Pakistan's capacity for bluff was not unknown, yet one could not dismiss the Pak claim of Chinese help as baseless. In the circumstances, however, New Delhi was reluctant to admit that Chinese statements were aimed against India. Though no Sino-Pak Joint communique was produced, it was nevertheless significant that Mr. Chung Peng Fei, China's acting Foreign Minister harped again on the need for maintaining Pakistan's integrity and specifically approved President Yahya's reasonable proposal "for troops withdrawal. According to Radio Pakistan, Mr. Chung also accused India of interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs 'while none of these committed China to intervene on Pakistan's behalf, there was no evidence either of a change of attitude that India could consider favourable.

185. See also Statesman, November 23, 1971, 'Bhutto's visit to Peking: Chinese view of Bangladesh Uncharged,' Suman Dubey in Hong Kong. Peking continued to adopt a cautious attitude towards Bangladesh and would not
underwrite any adventure on the part of Pakistan. Sources maintained that during the previous war in 1965 China had no intention of actively supporting Pakistan, but Bhutto, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan then had manoeuvred the Chinese into doing so. Peking's credibility was strained a little when it had extended its ultimatum to India but it was nevertheless sent to convince the people of Pakistan that it had interceded on their behalf and restrained India. These sources maintained that China had no intention of getting caught again in the event of another war. Bhutto who always liked to grab headlines was sedate and said, "if Pakistan is subject to aggression then I can confidently assure the world that as a people prizing freedom above else, we shall not be found wanting in defending our honour and our homes". The theme of Bhutto's statement was essentially self-reliance, a key element in China's advice to all its friends. \textit{Hsinhua}'s report of Bhutto's speech of November 7, 1971 contained no reference to possible assistance from China in the event of war.

186. Times of India, November 14, 1971.


188. Nicholas and Oldenburg: "Bangladesh : The Birth of a Nation" P. 128.
The CIA report came in as if to give substance to the Nixon-Kissinger suspicion of India's grand design to dismember West Pakistan and convert it into a vassal State. But in the December 8, 1971, WSAG meeting, Assistant Secretary Sisco expressed doubts that India planned to convert West Pakistan into a "Client State".


190. This presumption was on the basis of the earlier hard line remarks by Huang Hua, the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations.

191. Secretary of State William Rogers, however, had stated, "obviously, if war breaks out, we will do everything we can to stop. We have no intention of getting into any other war." Statesman (Washington) November 13, 1971.

192. This was a brilliant stroke of diplomacy. India had been well served by her agents who had prior information of Pakistani intentions of attacking India on 3 December 1971. Deliberately, the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister were away from the capital to present before international public opinion the image of an aggrieved party attacked without warning, for if Pakistan would have given a prior warning certainly
the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister wouldn't have been away from New Delhi. Later, in her letter to President Nixon, Mrs. Gandhi alleged that Pakistan bombed airfields in Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipur, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra in broad daylight of December 3, 1971 at a time when 'I was away in Calcutta, the Defence Minister was in Patna - due to leave for Bangalore in the south and another senior colleague of mine, the Finance Minister was in Bombay' (For The Text of the letter see the Years of Endeavour, Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, August 1969.- August 1972, by the Director of Publications Division, Ministry of I & B, Govt. of India. P. 612-613.


194. Mrs. Gandhi had already stated in Parliament that 'India could not depend on the international community to solve her problems'. See Statesman, November 16, 1971.


196. Ibid.

See also Nixon's interview with Time Magazine. Time, January 3, 1972, P. 14.
Indian investors, industrialists and manufacturers hoped that a Bangladesh separated from Pakistan would, under a friendly Awami League be transferred into a haven for their profits and investments. It could not be overstated that the Private Sector of India and particularly West Bengal had a vested interest in the ultimate independence of Bangladesh. Of special significance was the fact that in the world's jute market India had been confronting severe competition from the Jute industry of East Bengal. Apart from this, however, was the strong motivating factor that east and west Bengali culture had a symbiotic relationship which could hardly be dissected.

204. General Yahya Khan had deliberately ignored warnings from the United States when it declared that U.S. no longer had any bilateral agreement with Pakistan under SEATO or CENTO. It was also observed that under SEATO the USA agreed only to "consult" when there was threat to the common danger. State Department officials said they knew of no bilateral agreements between USA and Pakistan since the US had withdrawn its missile detection facilities from Peshawar in 1969. Thus technically USA was not a loyal and a trusted ally. See Statesman, November 24, 1971, U.S. No Longer Pak's Ally : Warren Unna. Yahya had also ignored Moscow's warning that "Pakistan must find a way to establish good neighbourly relations with India, in the interests of international peace and in its own interest. Statesman November 16, 1971 reported in Moscow, Izvestia.

205. Madhu Limaye, The Hindu, Sunday, December 27, 1992,


206. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.

207. Ibid.
208. Ibid.

209. Ibid.

210. Chester Bowles was very categorical in stating the implications of a South Asia dominated by the Soviet Union and criticised the American Policy of giving the area a very low priority which was strategically significant. "It would be a mistake to exaggerate the political implications of the Soviet role as principal military supplier to the Indian Defence Force. But I believe that a major opportunity to use our own military assistance to promote greater political stability in Asia was missed, he said. Further he stated that, 'because of the Soviet Unions greater awareness of India's potential role in Asia, Soviet operations in India are much more clearly directed by the foreign office in Moscow than U.S. operations are directed by the State Department in Washington. Soviet propaganda machinery - Soviet effort to break Indo-American relations which were relatively smooth - to turn the Indian people and Government against the U.S. involves blistering attacks and accusations by Soviet financed newspapers such as Blitz, Patriot, Link and Radio Peace and Progress which is specially beamed into from Moscow." See Chester Bowles, 'America and Russia in India', Foreign Affairs - An American Quarterly Review, Vol.49, Nos.1-4, October 1970 - July 1971, P. 642.
CHAPTER 4

1. Indira Gandhi. India and Bangladesh. (New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1972) p.138.
2. India and Foreign Review, New Delhi, April 15, 1972 p.17
3. M.A. Zafar Shah. 'India and the Super powers' (New Delhi, 1976)p.73.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
7. Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1971
8. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.

Mrs.Gandhi Stated, "Our own national interests compel us to build up our own economic and defence strength with the help of whoever is prepared to give it".

11. The Years of Endeavour. Publications Division Published by the Director, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, p.612-613. The letter was addressed to
President Nixon of the USA, dated December 15, 1971. The humble but the firm language of the letter was significant. According to A.K. Damodaran, the letter was drafted by P.N. Haksar.


16. While welcoming President Bhutto, Premier Chou Enlai attacked the Indian Government for relying on the support of social imperialism and for having grossly interfered in Pakistan's internal affairs. The joint communique condemned India's naked aggression against Pakistan and the occupation of Pakistan's territory by her in blatant defiance of international law. It went on to call for the withdrawal of all Indian forces from East Pakistan and Kashmir and continued to endorse Islamabad's position on the Kashmir issue, supporting the just
struggle there for the right of self-determination
Peking Review, No.5, February 9, 1972, the
communique is on pp 5, cited R.C. Horn, Soviet-
Indian Relations p.80.
17. Indira Gandhi, "India and the World", Foreign
Affairs, Vol:51 No.1 (New York October, 1972) pp 65-
77.
18. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "South Asia and the Great
Powers" in William E. Griffith ed. 'The World and
the Great Power Triangles (Cambridge : Mass: MIT
19. R.C. Horn: Soviet-Indian Relations p.103
21. R.C. Horn, op'cit.
said that in lifting the ten year old embargo on
arms sales to the subcontinent, the State
Department in March 1975 did not ask Pakistan for
any assurance that arms bought from U.S. would not
be used against India. The lifting of the embargo
was more helpful to Pakistan than India sicne
Pakistan was in a position to obtain hard currency
loans from Iran and its oil rich Arab allies, to buy
American arms. Pakistan was reported to be seeking
such military loans.
See also Times of India (Bombay), March 11, 1975.
23. It is probable, that for propaganda purposes, the Soviets may have distorted the Pakistani position somewhat. See Izvestia, March 4, 1972, p.3 cited Richard B. Remnek, Soviet Policy Towards India. (New Delhi Oxford & IBH Publishing co, 1975) p.310.


25. The Third World were more awed than thrilled by the Indian intervention in the Bangladesh liberation struggle.

26. Indira Gandhi, as reported to Surjit Mansingh, India's Search For Power. (Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1984)

27. Over the issue of emergency, T.N.Kaul had personal differences with Mrs.Gandhi. He mentioned to Mrs.Gandhi that the administration had become flabby and the party had lost its direction. Kaul recalls that Mrs. Gandhi said, 'Well I know, but what can I do? 'Kaul advised, 'why don't you scrap the emergency' and hold elections by the end of December 1975. Mrs.Gandhi smiled and said 'Yes I will hold'. But the prolongation of the emergency affected the results of the elections. T.N.Kaul.

28. A.K. Damodaran. He, however, believes that in the circumstances, had there been a Swatantra Party
Prime Minister, he would have also been talking all the time of a 'foreign hand' which would have obviously meant the Soviet Union.

29. Interview with Madhu Limaye.
30. Surjit Mansingh op cit. p.94.
32. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.
33. The agreement was in accord with an earlier Agreement on Cultural cooperation signed in Cuttack on November 6, 1966, and this agreement actually provided the framework for all such future agreements, including the one signed in 1971. Aruna Asaf Ali, Vice President and Litto Ghosh, Gen. Secy. signed on behalf of the National Council of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society and Nina Papova, Chairman of Presidum & N. Goldin, President signed on behalf of the Union of Soviet Society for friendship and Cultural Relation with Eoreign Countrys and the Executive Committee of the Society of the Soviet-Indian Cultural Relation. See Doesti: Vob.I No.4, April 1971.
34. R.C. Horn op cit p.81
35. The CPI had vastly improved its position in the Lok Sabha riding on the popularity of Mrs.Gandhi. It sought to improve its position further in the Northern Hindi belt which was obviously being resented by the Congress.
38. M.A. Zafar Shah, op cit. p.1

From India's point of view the Soviet Union was not to be allowed another 'Tashkent' between India and Pakistan.

41. Ibid.
42. A.K. Damodaran states that when he was in Moscow in 1971, he found some Ministers had been in their posts since 1952.
43. Interview with T.N. Kaul.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.

46. Unfortunately, during the Nixon-Kissinger period, despite differences with the bureaucracy, the former prevailed since President Nixon's personal animosity and rancour towards Mrs. Gandhi was too overbearing. The famous 'tilt' towards Pakistan was in clear contradiction to the warnings of the bureaucracy, the congress and the press. The American media deserved credit for having precisely pointed out the President's folly.

49. Ibid.
51. Kuldip Nayar, 'Distant Neighbours-A Tale of the Subcontinent' (Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1972) p.213. Nayar reported that whenever he mentioned Pakistan's close relations with China during his talks with Bhutto, the Pakistan President, responded by saying, 'You have a treaty with Russia'.
52. Soviet apprehensions regarding Bangladesh turned out to be correct. Not only did Bangladesh switch over to a Presidential form of government, moving away from the Indian-type parliamentary democracy, there was a great reaction in Bangladesh against the so-called subservience to India. With the Islamic conference in Lahore finally prevailing upon Pakistan to recognise Bangladesh, it considered itself safer within the Islamic fold rather than receive patronage of an overwhelmingly large neighbour whose economic interests clashed with its own. In the long run, Chinese influence, as the Soviets had figured, became preponderant in Bangladesh.
53. The Pakistan peoples party of Bhutto projected itself a left of centre party. Bhutto himself posed as fiercely anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist, inorder to appease the leftists. His pro-radical agricultural reforms were aimed at attracting agrarian have-notes and his call for civil liberty and democracy were aimed at pleasing the liberals.


56. Ibid.


59. CDSP op. cit.

60. CDSP, Vol.XXIV, No.13, April 26, 1972, p.23.


63. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op. cit.

Brezhnev's major theme was the need for a thorough and comprehensive discussion of the idea of collective security in Asia. But India was still apprehensive of the scheme to be an anti-Chinese move and wanted to keep open the option of better relations with China. Hence India resisted Brezhnev's pleas and the phrase 'Asian collective Security" was not found in the final declaration at all. The maximum that India could offer was to turn the Asian continent into a "continent of lasting peace, stability and good cooperation".

The proposal on the Indian Ocean being turned into a zone of peace indicated a Soviet climb down and a concession to accommodate the Indian stance on the issue. The joint statement, essentially represented a compromise. It read, 'The two sides reaffirm their readiness to take part together with all interested states on an equal basis in the search for the favourable solution to the question of turning the Indian Ocean region into a zone of peace".
Apart from inducting more regular patrols of American carrier forces into the area, the Defence Department announced plans for a 29 million expansion of Anglo-American naval communications station at Diego Garcia into a naval air base—a move anticipated by the Soviets long in advance. See New York Times, January 21, 1974, p.3.

Though India was self-sufficient in many small arms and was producing many of her own tanks and aircraft, she was still dependent upon the delivery of more complex weapons parts and military technology from supplier nations. It was reported that the Soviets still exercised much control over
the production of their aircraft in India through their exclusive possession of detailed designs and deliveries of more sophisticated components. At this point of time India was specifically interested in MIG 23's and SAM 6 and 7's which proved so effective during the October 1973 Middle East war. For details see Stockholm Peace Research Institute. The Arms Trade with the Third World (New York and Stockholm, 1971), pp. 749-53.

See also CDSP op. cit.

82. Times of India, March 31, 1972, p.11.

See also G.V. Matveev's article in the Soviet academic journal, Problems Dal'nego Vostoka, No.4(1972), 40, where he alleges that the Chinese had been the first to attack Indian border patrols in 1959. At the time of the border clashes, however, blame had not been affixed to either of the combatant.


90. For details see R.C.Horn Op cit. pp. 98-99


91. Interview with A.K.Damodaran

92. Ibid.

93. FEER, June 24, 1974, p.5. The Kremlin's distinctly unenthusiastic response revealed Moscow's dilemma in the face of India becoming a nuclear power.


95. Ibid. Moscow appeared to have regarded the issue from the perspective of promoting Indo-Soviet ties, in a similar way that Washington appeared to perceive it in the context of Indo-U.S. relations.


97. R.C.Horn op. cit. p. 98.

Relations between India and China were further strained after India's incorporation of Sikkim into the Union. A report from China said China's brief ping-pong diplomacy had long been set aside by India's incorporation of Sikkim into India. Chinese Vice Prime Minister Hisien Nien's statements on Sikkim and Kashmir during his visit to Pakistan were regarded in Indian official circles as constituting "interference" India's internal affairs. The Chinese report said India's armed forces were reportedly strengthened in adjoining areas (International Herald Tribune 24 November 1976) and Mrs. Gandhi visited Sikim, the strength of which area she stressed was important and where she also accused China by implication of carrying out hostile activities on India's borders. In another report on 4 May 1976 a Chinese diplomat was stated to have told the official Bangladesh news agency in Bonn "What we thought about Bangladesh two years ago is no longer true.... We now believe that Bangladesh cannot be dominated by any foreign power". Other reports claimed that because of fears of possible Soviet influence China urged coordination among breakaway minded tribes in the Indian states of Nagaland and Mizoram. It is significant note that in April President's rule had been declared in Nagaland because of the State

100. Statesman, September 7, 1974
Keeping India on the tenterhooks on the Kashmir issue, was the only way of reminding India of the importance and the necessity of the Soviet alliance.


102. Sino-Indian relations continued to be marked by suspicion and hostility and their relations remained sour. The proclamation of the state of emergency in India was attacked in the People's Daily of 29 June 1975 in a signed article entitled "Indira Gandhi's Government's ferocious features fully exposed". The tenor of the article was not so much that India's democracy had come to an end but that its true features were finally exposed. The Government under Indira Gandhi was accused of having done its utmost "to defend the interests of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie of India and pursued a reactionary domestic foreign policy". The article went on to attack the Indian premier personally and maintained that the Indian economy was in a mess and that internationally the Government had thrown 'itself' into the lap of Soviet revisionist social imperialism which has
brought about increasing colonisation of Indian economy. The Indian Government was said to have brought not only instability to its neighbours but also misfortune to the country and the people. The article went on to argue that the Soviet Union was doing its best to prop up "Indira Gandhi". That was because the Soviet leaders' want to continue their control of India so as to scramble for hegemony with the other super powers in South Asia and because of Indira Gandhi's desire to become the junior hegemonic power in this area under the patronage of Soviet revisionism (NCNA June 30, 1975) See China Quarterly, July 1, 1975, Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation.

103. Interview with A.K. Damodaran
106. Interview with A.K.Damodaran.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.


112. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.

113. Ibid.


117. Ibid.

118. India, however, had been persisting with its efforts to improve relations with China. This was evident from the fact that the Deputy External Affairs Minister Bipin Pal Das, in a written answer in the Lok Sabha on 8 January 1976 stated that recent Government initiatives to normalise relations with China included on agreement to instal a general telex link with the Chinese Embassy on a reciprocal basis, an invitation to China to participate in the Sixth Regional Conference of UNESCO National Commission for Asia
and Oceania and support for Chinese candidature for the Asian Development Bank.

The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called at the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to sign the book of condolences after the death of Primer Chou En Lai and this was reported to have prompted a large contingent of Chinese Officials led by Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Han Nien Lung to attend the Republic Day reception at the Indian Embassy at Peking in February at which overtures were made to Indian officials about improving relations. See China Quarterly, June 1976, No.66 p.440.


In September 1976 Chen Chao YeÅE (an experienced diplomat who had served as counsellor at the embassy in New Delhi from 1963 to 1970) said that "full normalisation of Sino − Indian relations through joint efforts" was in the interests of the people of both countries and that China hoped that their friendship and relations would improve.

120. Bhutto had insisted on inserting the phrase "just struggle" For the text of speech see Peking Review, No.23, June 4, 1976, pp.7-8, cited R.C.Horn Op cit p.131.
122. Text of Brezhnev's address can be found in Pravda, February 24, 1976.
123. See Victor Sidenko, 'From the Indian Point of View' New Times, No.11, March 1976 pp 6-7.
124. Mrs. Gandhi had not been to the Soviet Union since the pre-1971 war visit. Moscow had been pressing her to make a return visit after Brezhnev's 1973 trip to India. Firyubin's trip was aimed at extracting this commitment from her.
125. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.
129. Statesman, June 1, 1976.
131. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. The word 'detente', which the Soviets wanted incorporated in the final draft of the Colombo Summit was not used. The Soviet Union viewed the use of 'relaxation of tension...' as 'limited in
scope' and as one that implied outworn ideas such as 'balance of power', 'spheres of influence and rivalry between power blocs.'


137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. Sanjay was enamoured of everything Western. His aversion for the left and his uninhibited preference for private enterprise were enough indications to American officials who saw possible openings to counteract the perceived Soviet influence in New Delhi. See Surjit Mansingh Op cit 94.
CHAPTER 5


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.

10. Remnek, Richard B. 'Soviet Policy Towards India (New Delhi, 1975) p 299-302

11. The Times of India, May 20, 1972 p. 1, reported that this plan seemed a way in which the Soviets hoped to resuscitate some of their less successful projects in India. For example, the Soviet aided surgical instruments plant near Madras which was a poorly planned project that had been exporting most of its production to the Soviet Union was now expected to be adapted to the production of steel cutlery for the Soviet market.
13. Ibid.
15. Times of India, December 28, 1973, p.1
16. Times of India, December 8, 1973 p.6 Soviet credits for India's forthcoming five-year plan were estimated at around $80 million.
17. Richard B. Remnek, op cit p.301
18. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
26. Ibid. Also see India News, Feb.8, 1974.
It was also reported that the Soviets intended building up a pulp factory in Siberia to meet India's acute need for newsprint. Times of India, December,6,1973, p.5.
A Soviet loan of 2 million tons in mid-1973 had helped set the stage for Brezhnev's enthusiastic welcome in New Delhi.

27. Asha Datar op cit p.258.
28. Ibid.
29. R.B. Remnek. op cit
30. A.L. Datar op cit.
32. For details see R.B. Remnek p. 303. An indication of this controversy was the resignation of the noted economist Dr. B.S. Minhas from the Planning Commission over what he and other economists believed to be highly unrealistic and over optimistic annual growth rate target of 5.5% during the forthcoming five-year plan. In this instance, however, the Indian Planning Commission intervened to work out an arrangement for the importation of two complete Soviet Turbosets and other components. But one could not be sure that such successful negotiated outcomes would result in future.

34. R.B. Remnek op cit p. 304.


36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.


39. Manmohan Singh commenting after her death said he was struck by the courage with which Mrs. Gandhi tied up an anti inflationary policy package in 1973-74, cited V.P. Malhotra: 'Indira Gandhi' p. 150.

40. Madhu Limaye.


42. Interview with Pran Nevile.

43. Statesman: Rupee Rouble Rate Talks Begin March 18, 1975.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.
46. Pran Nevile. (Interview) See also Economic Times: Revaluation of Rouble Unjustified March 17, 1975.


49. Statesman, April 12, 14, 16, 1976.

50. Tribune April 14, 1976.
The 1976-80 agreement was an extension of Indo-Soviet Collaboration in Coal and Oil in 1975. See Tribune, February 1, 1975. During the 20th year of Indo-Soviet Economic Cooperation the two countries paid special attention to collaboration in coal and oil industries. A spokesman of the department of Economic Affairs in the Soviet Embassy told newsmen that the most important project in the field of coal would be the development of the Singrauli coal field in Madhya Pradesh. The protocol signed in January 23 envisaged the construction of nine new opencasts in Singrauli for a total annual output of 72 million tonnes.
Mr. Kuznetsov, Counsellor for Economic Affairs said also the Raniganj colliery in West Bengal would be developed to produce 2.3 million tonnes of coal a year. Among the possible projects of Indo-Soviet Cooperation was construction of a quarry and washery with annual capacity of three million tonnes of coal at Ramgarh in Bihar. Besides the proposed expansion of the Bhilai steel plant to seven million tonne capacity and Bokaro to ten million tonne capacity, a detailed project report on the Mathura refinery had also been prepared by Soviet experts.

In 1975 there were 80 industrial and other enterprises in India involving economic and technical cooperation from the USSR of which about 55 were already complete. A majority of the Soviet aided enterprises were making profit. According to official figures the net profit of nine such projects reached a total of Rs.35.5 crores in 1973-74. Mr. Kuznetsov said no political terms and
and conditions were put forward in undertaking any of the projects which were based on 'mutual self respect and benefit'.

See also Hindustan Times, February 3, 1975. 'Indo Soviet Amity Historic Gain'. Moscow, February 2. A newspaper of the CPSU Central committee Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya hailed the Indo Soviet friendship as a great historic gain. In an article marking the 20th anniversary of bilateral economic cooperation it said "Friendship and trust between USSR and India are a great historic gain of the peoples who are fully determined to proceed along the lines of cooperation, peace and progress". Reviewing the fast strides made by Indo Soviet Economic and technical cooperation it said, "Enterprises build in India with Soviet assistance produce 80% of India's entire metallurgical equipment, half of the amount of Indian oil, process one third of the produced amount of oil, smelt more than 30% of steel, generate more than 20% of electric power".

51. Ibid.


53. 'The plateau theory' prodounded by the West.

It was alleged that Indo-Soviet trade had reached its apojee and must now decline. New Times No.23.1976,p.9.
54. For details see Annexure II in V.B. Singh ed Indo Soviet Relations, 1947-77 (New Delhi, Sterling publishers 1978)
55. Statesman, June 1, 1976.
58. Ibid.
59. R.C. Horn. Soviet-Indian Relations (New Delhi,1982)
60. Ibid 139.
65. Surjit Mansingh, 'India's Search for Power' (New Delhi, 1984) p.162.
66. S. Nihal Singh. 'Yogi and the Bear' (New Delhi, 1986)
67. Surjit Mansingh op cit p. 162.
68. Vinod Mehta. 'Soviet Union and India's Industrial Development' (Manas, New Delhi, 1975) p.70
70. S. Nihal Singh op cit p.111.
73. Indian Express, January 28, 1970.
74. Nihal Singh op cit. p. 112
76. Nihal Singh op cit p.112
77. Nihal Singh op cit p. 112
78. S. Mansingh op cit p. 163.
79. Ibid p 165
80. Ibid.
81. Ashok Kapur op cit p. 52
82. Ibid.
83. S.Mansingh op cit 163.
84. R.C. Horn op cit p.110
Note: India had previously rejected the Soviet ASW aircraft, see FEER, October, 18, 1974, p.31.

89. R.C. Horn, op cit p.110


91. Donaldson. 'Soviet-Indian Alignment—Quest For Influence (Denver, 1979) p.10. The fact that repayment could be made through Indian exports rather than by scarce foreign exchange, made the Soviet offer for military aid attractive to India. See also FEER, May 7, 1979, p.39 'India is getting the best bargain out of the Soviets and the Indian negotiators have been shrewd bargainers'.

92. Interview with Madhu Limaye.
It is said that on taking office Morarji Desai demanded to see what he suspected were 'secret clauses' to the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. He was persuaded there were none. He also quickly came to realise that India's links with the Soviet Union were too complex to be easily displaced. New Delhi's objective, therefore, was to widen its horizons without sacrificing Soviet friendship. Besides, it is pertinent to bear in mind that the conceptualisation of India's national interest made by Jawaharlal Nehru moulded the thinking of his daughter Indira Gandhi, his erstwhile colleague Morarji Desai, as well as the officials responsible for the actual conduct of foreign relations. Thus, overall changes in Indian foreign policy would be effected only when perceptions of national interest among decision makers changed, domestic demands and capabilities changed, and the international environment changed. But such transformations were unlikely to be either simultaneous or quick. Hence it would have been unrealistic to have expected any drastic changes in the Indian foreign policy without the accompaniment of any concurrent revolutionary changes in the government and the bureaucratic set up. Eventually no significant changes could be discerned in Indian foreign policy in 1977, 1979 and 1980. See Surijit Mansingh : Challenge and


According to Morarji Desai during his visit to Moscow in 1960, Khrushchev lightheartedly remarked, "Mr. Desai, you are an enemy of communism and as such it will be better if you see what the devils of communism are doing here", cited Ibid.


5. Rajan Menon: Op cit 736

6. V.Sofyin 'Foreign Policy Contours, New Times No.16, April 1977. See also Robert C.Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations P.148.


8. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 25, 1877 P.1.

9. Pravda, April '26, 1977

This theme has been repeated almost endlessly by the entire Soviet Propaganda machinery.

The Times, April 17, 1977.

For the first time Moscow made an effort to emphasize upon the significance of Indo-Soviet relations on a country to country basis.


15. Ibid.


17. R.C.Horn Soviet-Indian Relations, P.150.


20. In 1977 the Carter Administration proposed to the Soviet Union a Plan for the complete demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean. India welcomed this initiative, which effectively called the Soviet bluff. Negotiations began but since the Soviet side was not really interested in withdrawing from the Indian Ocean, the agenda shifted towards freezing naval arms levels. The talks finally collapsed, however in 1978. Thereafter a number of factors - establishment of Carter's Rapid Deployment Force, the invasion of Afghanistan, which was seen by Washington as among
other things, a step towards Soviet acquisition of warm water ports and finally the creation of Reagan's CENTCOM all hoped to increase the militarisation of the Indian Ocean. See Peter J.S.Duncan. The Soviet Union and India (London 1989) p.60.


The new Soviet purchase was worthwhile for it came in handy at a time when India was trying to replace its British based "Vijayanta" tanks. Apart from the Indian Navy it was a significant step forward for the Indian Army, which could now shop for new battle tanks in the Soviet Union.


24. Vajpayee summed up the position later when he said, "Government has followed the principle of continuity in foreign policy where it was desirable and based on national consensus. Where the national perception was in favour of readjustment, we have not hesitated to bring that about". Foreign Affairs Record (FAR) (New Delhi), August 1978 p.283.

25. For the text of Desai's speech See Pravda, October 22, 1977 p.2.


27. In 1977 the Minister for Steel, Biju Patnaik opened negotiation with Wean United and Armco Steel of the US on projected expansion of the Soviet built Indian
steel plant at Bokaro. Soviet Technology in the desired field was not sufficiently advanced, he explained. However, in 1979 India accepted Soviet credits and technical assistance for expansion of Bokaro. See Surjit Mansingh, IDSA Journal, op cit p.331 - 332.


29. Ibid.


30. Though much has been made of the use of terms "spirit" and 'basis' in actual point of fact the joint communiques produced on these occasions were hardly any different from those of previous years. Existing economic ties were consolidated and new areas of cooperation opened in science, space research, drug manufacture and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

31. CDSP. op cit p.6.

32. Rajan Menon op cit p.739.


34. Ibid.

Later in greeting the Soviet delegation headed by Deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I.V. Arkhipov, that participated in the Delhi session of
the inter-Governmental Soviet-Indian Committee on economic, scientific and technical cooperation, Vajpayee stated that the friendship between India and the Soviet Union is as strong and durable as the steel from the metallurgical plant in Bakaro which was built in India with Soviet aid. See CDSP-Foreign Affairs, News of the week vol XXX, No.12, April 19, 1978.

35. SWB. SU/W970/A/1, March 3, 1978 (Moscow 11 0800 gmt Feb. 21, 1978 and Delhi 151 in English 0833 gmt, Feb. 21, 1978)

36. SU/W988/A/1, July, 7, 1978 (Moscow 11 0700 gmt July 3, 1978)

37. SU/W1003/A/1, October 20, 1978 (New Delhi in English for Abroad 1800 gmt. October 10, 1978).

On October 10, Biju Patnaik had a meeting with the Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, Skachkov.

38. SU/W1005/A/1, November 3, 1978 (151 in English 0844 gmt. October 25, 1978)

39. SU/W970/A/1, March 3, 1978 (Moscow in English for South and South East Asia, 1600 gmt. February 21, 1978)

40. SU/W973/A/1, March 24, 1978 (Moscow 11, 1432 gmt. March 20, 1978) The Pakistani trade delegation was headed by Masud, Secretary of the Pakistan Ministry of Trade. He met Patolichev, USSR Minister of Foreign Trade for discussion on trade and economic cooperation
between the two countries.

41. SU/W979/A/1 May 5, 1978 (Moscow 11 1600 gmt. April 29, 1978)

42. SU/W/W992/A/1 (Moscow in English 1000 gmt. July 24, 1978). In January 1978, in an interview granted to a Soviet Journal, Mohan Dharia Indian Minister of Trade & Civil supplies and cooperation said that Indian-Soviet Trade in 1977 had reached a value of almost Rs.10,000 million (Moscow in English for South and South East Asia, 1500 gmt. December 22, 1977). Another report stated that in just over 20 years 50 industrial enterprises and other projects had been built in India with Soviet assistance. Soviet experts had trained more than 60,000 Indian workers and technicians. About 3,500 Indian specialists had been trained in the USSR. SU/W965/A/2, January 27, 1978 (Moscow for Abroad 0900 gmt. January 20, 1978).


'The Pentagon has been using the American Navy for many years as the tool of open interference in the internal affairs of the developing countries'. 'Each time that Washington has shown concern over the development of events in any part of the world' the
report added, 'American naval squadrons were inevitably sent there to remind one and all of America's military might and the possible effects of its utilisation. The strategy of using warships as strike forces, in the opinion of its supporters also has the advantage of appearing as a direct military intervention. Besides that as the pentagon considers squadrons of warships frequently exert more effective means of implementing speedily so-called surgical operations, that is, of taking action to crush any force that Washington opposes'.


45. SWB : SU/5820/A3/A, May 23, 1978. U.S. Plan for Nagaland as 'First Christian State in SE Asia'. (Moscow in English for South and South-East Asia 1500 gmt May 20, 1978). The report stated that 'Peking's Policy over recent years has been characterised by attempts to impose its hegemony and disunite the national liberation movement of the peoples of Indochina and interfere in their internal affairs on a growing scale. Peking is assigning a special role to the contacts with Left-wing extremist groups in South-East Asia. As regards India, the report stated that despite all the manoeuvres of Peking and the US secret
services seeking to create in the region a source of permanent tension, the Government of India succeeded in concluding a peace agreement with a clandestine Naga movement in Shillong on 11th November 1975. 'True', according to press reports, Peking and the U.S. special services oppose the agreement. The Indian weekly 'Blitz' says that Peking has been supplying the Naga nationalist groups with more and more arms, deals for subversive operations in the north-eastern regions of India. It is also a known fact the weekly underlines, that China is generously financing a certain group of persons to cause riots in the Indian State of Sikkim. The ultimate aim of the provocation is to exert pressure on India and make her accept Peking's concept of the border problem. Foreign news agencies and papers in India, Nepal and Pakistan report that China is massing troops in many of the strategic points of its borders with India and in different regions of Tibet.

46. The rapport was more a result of the concomitant changes of leadership in countries bearing directly on India. Jimmy Carter became President of the USA in November 1976. Zia usurped power in Pakistan in July 1977 and in China, Deng Xiao Ping, the chief advocate of liberalisation and moderation came to the forefront of Chinese politics in the post-Mao era. In each of these cases the change was conducive to an improvement
of relations between India and the country concerned.

47. President Carter had made an unusual gesture of goodwill by sending a special delegation led by his mother to the funeral of India's President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed in February 1977.

48. The Indo-US Joint commission discussed expanding the scope of educational and cultural exchanges. Cooperative ventures including high technology areas of satellite communication systems, monsoon research and solar energy were initiated. Indian purchases of sophisticated electronics for some defence equipment became possible. Official U.S. economic assistance cut off in 1971 was restored in 1978, though with a modest 60 million for the construction of medium size irrigation schemes and the import of anti-material insecticides by India. In 1979, a new agricultural subcommission was set up to over-see collaborative research and projects in rural development. See Surjit Mansingh IDSA Journal, Op cit P.327.

49. Surjit Mansingh : India's Search for Power, P.69-117.


52. Statesman, January 4, 1978, Excerpts from the joint declaration are contained in this issue. See also Nancy Jetly : Major Developments in India Foreign Policy and Relations, January-June 1978, "International Studies, July-September 1979, PP 359-72.

An excellent analysis is also made by R.C. Horn Op Cit p.156.

53. Morarji Desai stated in Parliament "We could not be asked to accept full scope safeguards by countries who themselves have nuclear weapons and who do not accept safeguards on their own military establishment". Foreign Affairs Record, July 1978, P.249.

54. Mr.Desai's adamancy on the nuclear, issue was quite unexpected by Mr.Carter, given Mr. Desai's inclination towards improvement of Indo-U.S. relations. Mr. Carter while briefing Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was caught on the microphone when he remarked that he would write a cold and very blunt letter' to Desai when he got back to the United States, See A. Hari haran, "Accord Survives Carter's Aside," FEER, January 13, 1978. pp. 28-29.


58. Brzezinski in conversation with James Reston of the New York Times

60. SWB. SU/5803/A3/1, May 3, 1978 (Moscow in English for South and South East Asia 1000 gmt., April 30, 1978), Excerpts from the commentary by Ella Zhoukova.


64. Times of India, March 12, 1978


66. Interview with Madhu Limaye.

67. Hindustan Times, October 26, 1977 P.7


69. Interview with Madhu Limaye.

He is of the opinion that Mrs. Gandhi too, succumbed to the euphoria that was building up in India.

70. Ibid.

71. SWB. SU/5948/A3/2, October 21, 1978. 'China's Attempts to undermine Soviet-Indian Relations (Moscow home service 0230 gmt October 15, 1978)- Excerpts from Delhi dispatch by Edward Sorokhin - The report stated
that China is still occupying 14,000 square miles of Indian territory. It has been giving every encouragement to separatist elements to demand the setting up of a so called "Federation of Himalayan States of India". Finally, the Chinese have been suspiciously active in Kashmir. They have built a strategically important road connecting Sinkiang with Kashmir. And recently reports have been received about the construction not far from it of two air strips whose military purpose is not in doubt. In Delhi, attention is being drawn to another fact.

The Chinese leaders are doing their utmost to undermine Sino India relations and the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Corporation concluded by the two countries in 1971. Yet, another report from Moscow was more detailed and analytical which tried to convince India of the futility of its efforts to improve bilateral relations with China. The report 'Indian-Chinese Relations: Doubts over China's Sincerity, "SU/5964/A3/1, November 9, 1978, (Moscow in Standard Chinese for South-East Asia 1230 gmt October 28, 1978) Excerpts from commentary by "Station observers" read as follows - During his visit to India last March, Wang Ping-nan, Chairman of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, repeatedly referred to the longstanding friendship between the peoples of the two
countries and called for the development of relations between them based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. However, in view of the general line pursued by China in its foreign policy affairs and of past practices and lessons, the Indian public has reason to doubt the sincerity of this sort of statement...

The Indian news agency has asserted that on a number of issues the two countries have conflicting interests. These are the frontier issue, China's general policy on the South Asian subcontinent, and its interference in India's internal affairs. According to Indian press reports, China has increased its military strength in areas along India's northern border, has supported secret activities of insurgent groups in India's north-eastern regions, and has incited anti-India sentiments in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal.

China has also actively aided the so-called "movement for the independence of Sikkim", in an attempt to create confusion in this recently-founded Indian state. The Indian people have not forgotten that quite recently the Sikkimese people clearly expressed their desire to integrate with a friendly India, with which it had close historical, cultural, political and economic ties. Yet Peking has vilified Sikkim's integration with India as an example of
India's aggression and colonialist expansion.

China has also truculently interfered in relations between India and Bhutan and attempted to promote a revision of the 1949 India-Bhutan treaty; which could lead to the collapse of India's defences in the Himalayan areas. China's stand on Kashmir is also extremely ambiguous. While visiting Pakistan, Keng Piao, Vice-Premier of the PRC State Council, attended the opening ceremony of the Karakoram range highway, built with Chinese aid. This new highway, commented the Indian paper 'Patriot', has given China many political and strategic advantages. It is primarily intendend for the transport of military supplies.

There has been evidence of Chinese forces being strengthened at a series of strategic points and in isolated areas in Tibet. Speaking at a conference of supreme army commanders, the Indian Defence Minister, Ram, said: India cannot be blind to the fact that China has intensified activities preparing for war in Tibet and has continued to arm itself frantically.

Through the fault of the Chinese side, a major issue of principle the frontier issue in Indian-Chinese relations has not yet been solved. As is known, from 1959 to 1962 China carried out armed aggression against India and seized approximately
40,000 sq.km. from India. China still occupies this land. China has insisted on postponing the solution of this problem indefinitely. The Indian Prime Minister, Desai, has repeatedly pointed out, however, that if the border issue is not solved satisfactorily, normalization of Indian-Chinese relations will not be possible.


73. SWB. SU/5825/A3/1, May 30, 1978 (Moscow 11 08000 gmt May 26, 1978) visit by Indian Defence Minister. Text of report : Jagjivan Ram, Indian Minister of Defence, was in the USSR on an official visit from 22nd to 26th May. He was invited by Marshal Dmitry Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defence. Jagjivan Ram was received by Aleksej Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. They had a conversation on matters of mutual interest.

The Indian Minister of Defence visited military units and ships, met and conversed with Soviet Servicemen, and visited the city of Sevastopol on the Black Seacoast.

Dmitriy Ustinov and Jagjivan Ram had
conversations during which they pointed out with satisfaction that relations of traditional friendship and fruitful co-operation between the USSR and India continue to develop in the spirit of the treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation of 1971. The relations are based on the principles of equality and mutual respect, strict observance of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, for the good of the people of the interests of universal peace.

A positive appraisal of Soviet-Indian co-operation along the military line was given. The sides agreed to continue regular contacts between the Defence Ministries of the two countries.

During the consideration of the international situation, the Indian Minister of Defence emphasized India's allegiance to the cause of peace, international co-operation, policy of non-alignment and good-neighbourly relations. The two sides note a broad identity of views between India and the USSR on modern international problems and expressed their determination to continue efforts to strengthen international peace and disarmament.

75. Pravda, September, 13, 1973, 'India's Foreign Minister in the USSR, Gromyko, Vajpayee Speak at Luncheon. See


77. CDSP Op cit P.10.

Overseas Hindustan Times, March 1, 1979.


83. The Statesman in its editorial of March 16, 1979 asserted that Deng's behaviour in the United States had been questionable, but that compared to the Soviet Leader's performance on Indian soil, Mr. Deng's was almost a model of rectitude.

In his address to Parliament he gave fullest vent to his pelutence on the subject of China. Referring to China's aggression against Vietnam, the Soviet Prime Minister said, "should an armed robber or murderer
attack somebody, all the rigours of law are applied to him in any country. And it cannot be otherwise. But one would like to know what punishment deserves a criminal who has encroached on the life of an entire nation and who seeks to assume the right to use arms against other peoples and decide their fate as he pleases?" On behalf of the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet I can assure with full responsibility that any initiative by the Parliament of India serving that goal (of cooperation in the Struggle against aggression, blackmail, diktat etc) will find our most active support. It is the stated policy of the Government of India to normalise and improve relations with China. In a major initiative towards that end the Indian External Affairs Minister recently visited China. And despite the China-Vietnam border issue the Indian Government has reiterated that it proposes to pursue the objectives of normalisation of India-China relations. The Soviet Union has for long made known its opposition to any steps by India to improve India-China relations and the China-Vietnam border war has only come as a convenient excuse for pressing this opposition more openly and firmly. Thus in March 1978 after the Chinese goodwill visit to India the Soviet Ambassador in Nepal made a veiled threat in Kathamandu - Whatever may be the intention of Peking in improving relations with India and other neighbours
the logic of national interest of these countries will prevent the Chinese from achieving their main foreign policy objective of drawing them into the anti-Soviet orbit. He further added "everyone knows that the friendship of these countries (India and the other neighbours of China) with the Soviet Union accords with their national interests. Therefore he who goes against national interest cannot remain in power for a long time." It has always been the self-appropriated privilege of the powerful nations of the world to decide on behalf of other countries what is in their national interest. The U.S. has exercised this privilege in relation to countries in far-flung corners of the world, so now does the Soviet Union as the other super power in the world.

85. Pravda, March 16, 1979, The News of the Week (Foreign Affairs), CDSP, Vol. XXXI, No.11, April 11, 1979, p.27.
89. Christian Science Monitor, April 10, 1979
Desai's statement came in for sharp criticism in India.


92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid p.15.


97. Ibid.


100. Significant differences continued to persist between India and the Soviet Union. Despite several requests by Moscow to recognize the new regime in Kampuchea, New Delhi remained firm in not doing so. It was presumed that the influence of the United States was at work on the Desai Government. Desai had no intention of compromising India's non-aligned status by accepting the Soviet Union as the movements 'natural ally', nor was he inclined to deviate from the traditional Indian Policy on the Indian Ocean.

The significance of this deal lay mainly in the demonstration of the fact that Indo-Soviet military ties were hardly dead after the Jaguar deal.


105. Menon in his article emphasizes on the idea of a 'linkage' theory which sounds quite convincing. Not only was this linkage in Indo-Soviet Relations - in military security, economic aid and trade- quite relevant, but throughout the decade of the seventies it was almost inevitable. India's dependence on the Soviet Union in these critical areas could hardly have made India's severe its links with the latter.

106. In terms of India's security concerns, the Soviet Union plays a dual role of being a direct supplier of arms and as a licenser of certain classes of military hardware produced in India. This explains New Delhi's apparent disinclination to resort to any fundamental shifts in foreign policy that could have in any way weakened India's relations with the Soviet Union.

107. The Table demonstrates that the USSR was by far India's most important source of military hardware.

Table: Arms Transferred to India from 1965 to 1974.
Country: United States, Soviet Union, France, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, All others, Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Million Current US Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Vijayanta, a medium battle tank (the British Vickers BMT MK1) was being produced at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi (Tamil Nadu) under license from the U.K. In addition to other types of aircraft MIGs were
being manufactured at three MIG factories - built with Soviet assistance - located at Nasik, Hyderabad and Koraput, under license from the USSR. These three MIG factories are divisions of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., the public sector undertaking which manufactures aircraft for the whole country - See Rajan Menon op cit. p.741.


112. Interview with Pran Nevile, Senior Consultant UNCTAD, Geneva.


114. Ibid p.171.

115. Interview with Pren Nevile.

See also Pran Nevile: New Opportunities In Soviet Trade, The Times of India, July 20, 1989; Trading with Moscow, The Business & Political Observer, New Delhi, September 6, 1991.

116. Ibid.

117. Interview with Pran Nevile.
118. The Times of India; Rupee-rouble parity issue


119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.


122. Rajan Menon, Op cit p. 748.

123. Menon justified the rationale of the Janata's foreign policy and as events turned out it was the only alternative that the Janata could have opted for in the circumstances.

124. Ibid.


In the case of arms produced under foreign license France and the United Kingdom also played a role. Note is to be made of the offer by the British Prime Minister Callaghan to sell the Jaguar deep penetration aircraft to India and during the same period it was reported that a group of visiting U.S. Senators responded favourably to Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram's inquiry about the possibility of U.S. arms sales to India.

126. Surjit Mansingh, Op cit.
1. Mrs. Gandhi was expelled from the Lok Sabha by the Janata Government on the pretext of violating privilege of the House.


4. A.K. Damodaran. Obviously, the Soviet State being a one-party State, the ruling CPSU had scant regards for any opposition in the Soviet Union. Measuring by that yardstick, it was not surprising for the Soviet leaders to ignore and disregard opposition leaders in friendly countries.


6. T.N. Kaul sounds very convincing when he says, "I don't think relations between countries are based on personal equations. Relations between Mrs. Gandhi and Brezhnev had always been cordial, but I don't think this personal equation in anyway influenced their policies towards each other's countries."

7. On the shabby treatment by the Soviet Union to Mrs. Gandhi during her period of exile A.K. Damodaran says 'Diplomatically, it was a foolish thing to do.'

8. A.K. Damodaran - Interview.
A.K. Damodaran rejects this view saying these may have been "only breakfast conversations".
T.N. Kaul is more forthright when he asserts that Mrs. Gandhi was not influenced by any of her close advisers like either P.N. Haksar, D.P. Dhar or himself on matters pertaining to foreign policy, though she always listened to their views, the views of the Foreign Minister and even the Cabinet. 'But as of now, I can say without any hesitation that Mrs. Gandhi had a mind of her own. She listened to everybody, made up her mind and then implemented it strongly and forcefully. We were only agents to implement the policies decided upon by her'. He further states 'To what extent Haksar or Dhar or I influenced her will be a matter for future historians to tell'.

T.N. Kaul and G. Parthasarathi were consulted by Mrs Gandhi and all three were unanimous that India should act in defence of its own national interest.

Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1980.

Time, January 21, 1980.


Overseas Hindustan Times January 24, 1980, cited Ibid.


21. Ibid.

22. James L. Buckley in statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, 'U.S. cooperation with Pakistan', November 12, 1981,


29. A.K. Damodaran: One of Mrs. Gandhi's traits had been to talk to people with differing perceptions and to try to convince them of India's viewpoint. She never denied herself the opportunity of talking to such people in the course of which she tried to know their views as well. In 1981 a comparatively Junior American Official came to India who was well known to the Indian Embassy in the United States as the only man who knew India in the Reagan establishment. Mrs. Gandhi received him. From the point of view of protocol it was far below his level and a Junior Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs could have done the job. But Mrs. Gandhi's reception and her exposition of the Indian point of view on Afghanistan made him go back absolutely convinced of the soundness of India's Afghan Policy.


32. Ibid.

34. The Soviet Union had no desire to stay in Afghanistan. It was there by invitation of the Afghan Government (Intervention by invitation was recognised by international law) - It would withdraw when matters were normalised and when the Afghan Government would call for its withdrawal, and specifically when all forms of foreign interference was stopped in Afghanistan.


38. Ibid.


41. Ibid. Reports from Kabul spoke of pressure within Afghanistan for a time frame, but said, Karmal was opposed to it.
Pakistan-Trade Talks: The existing protocol signed in 1979 provided for the exchange of goods worth 26,000,000 Roubles each way.

Pakistan-Trade Agreement.


Based on an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Data, the major recipients of Soviet arms (through 1980) in descending order were Libya, Syria, Iraq, India, Ethiopia, Algeria, Peru, North Yemen and Angola. The

51. For the Third World States, the choice of arms supplier had in many respects become a political statement. King Hussain of Jordan Publicly announced his willingness to purchase arms from Moscow if the United States were not willing to provide him with the types of weapons he wanted.


53. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1987,P. 146. C.I.A. estimates were based on the dollar costs which would be incurred in producing equipment in the USA and may have been completely unrelated to the price charged by the Soviet Union. See Peter J.S. Duncan. The Soviet Union and India (London, 1989).

54. Ibid.

55. Mohan Ram : FEER, "Racing for supremacy", Vol.106, No.24, June 6, 1980. India had been opposing inputs of arms into the subcontinent as a result of big power
rivalry holding that it would upset the region's strategic balance and promote an arms race—objections which proved self-fulfilling. Defence Ministry Officials noted with apparent satisfaction the Soviets' favourable response to India's needs in the context of regional developments. India entered into military agreements for a total volume of Rs.25 billion with various countries, including the deal with the Soviet Union on very favourable terms.

A new replacement cycle was beginning in India. Even in the mid-1970s India had been thinking of a deep strike aircraft to replace its obsolete Hunters and Canberras. The Jaguar was chosen in 1979 by which time India had built up comfortable foreign exchange reserves and the West was no longer reluctant to sell arms to New Delhi. India could choose the best and insist on production rights and buy-back terms and was no longer a captive market for the Soviet hardware. Although India had been making MIG 21 under licence and had a complement of SU-7 fighters, the Soviets were sidelined in the race for the deep strike aircraft. India had to choose between the Jaguar, the Swedish Viggen and the French Mirage. The Jaguar deal was clinched when the Janata Party was in power though the search for a deep strike aircraft began before Mrs. Gandhi's defeat in March 1977. The Janata Government pledged to undo the pro-Soviet tilt of the Congress and was also committed to diversifying sources of
military supplies. The West was competing for two other big Indian orders. One was for submarines. After evaluating about half-a-dozen offers India had to decide from among Swedish, West German and French offers. Another was for a tank to replace the Vijayanta. Although it was earlier thought that India would like to build a tank under licence it was likely that it would buy tanks until its own main battle tank for the 1980s (already designed) was produced. The choice was between the Soviet T-72 and the British Chieftain. The West German Leopard was in the Race but was subsequently dropped. India also decided to buy the British Sea Harrier fighter bomber for its navy and was thinking of buying more advanced MIG fighters to give its airforce a degree of variability and operational flexibility between the MIG-25 it was building and the Jaguars.


It is generally recognised that the previous visit of President Brezhnev to India seven years ago was a powerful stimulus for extending and deepening cooperation. Soviet-Indian contacts cover practically all important spheres of economic and cultural life in the two countries - from training scientists and technical specialists for India to the coming joint flight of Soviet and Indian cosmonauts. The present visit of the Head of the Soviet State to India is all the more important since it takes place in conditions when the situation in the world has on the whole been aggravated and when as never before there is the urgent need to solve many pressing political problems in Asia where the imperialists have stepped up their activity. There can be no doubt that the visit of President Brezhnev to India will be a landmark not only in further developing fruitfully
Soviet-India relations but also strengthening peace in Asia and consolidating universal security.

67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
72. The Context in which these topics came up were not far to seek, for though President Carter had signed the SALT II agreements, (it had yet to be ratified by the Congress), and the world had hoped for a respite in the arms race, he had suddenly stepped up US naval presence in the Indian Ocean and had taken steps to strengthen the Diego Garcia base. The developments in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan were taken up as pretexts by the United States to justify its substantial build up in the region.
74. Ibid. While Moscow had the satisfaction that Diego Garcia was specifically mentioned, the latter part of the statement was included at India's insistence,
implying that 'foreign military presence' also included the Soviet Union.

75. Ibid. P.6.
78. Ibid.
80. Reaction to Brezhnev's Persian Gulf Plan : Excerpts from commentary by Aleksandr Timoshkin : (Moscow in Arabic 1500 gmt. and for Algeria and the Maghrib 1830 gmt. December 12, 1980).

"This positive programme could only find the widest echo in the Arab world, especially in the Gulf. The Kuwaiti Minister of State Abd-al-Aziz-Hussayn called on all Gulf countries to support the Soviet proposals. He said that his country had always opposed foreign military presence in the Gulf. The Soviet proposals were received with satisfaction in Syrian official circles. Brezhnev's statement to the effect that he did not want to encroach on Middle East oil or on its transport routes were received with special satisfaction. In their commentaries on the Soviet President's statement many of the information media of the Arab world and Islamic countries said
that these were not mere words, rather they represented the actual policy of the USSR which had never any bases or military objectives in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Washington, however, has rejected the new Soviet peace proposals because, for example it has announced its intention to continue to maintain its strategic military presence in the Gulf". In actual point of fact the Brezhnev proposal on the Gulf received only lukewarm support of a few Gulf states just as his Asian Collective Security Scheme had received vague support in Asia.


The visit of Leonid Brezhnev Gen. Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to India has brought about a great international response, has enriched the practice of international relations and was a significant continuation to the cause of improving the situation on our planet. During the negotiations in Delhi both sides expressed satisfaction with the
development of Soviet-Indian relations, based on the treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. New targets of mutually beneficial cooperation and new prospects were set forth. The precise, concrete proposals which were put forward by Brezhnev in his speech in the Indian Parliament have been broadly commented upon in Indian political circles. These proposals are addressed to the USA, other Western Powers, China and Japan and all States which show interest to agree on mutual obligations concerning a normalization of the situation in the area of the Persian Gulf. The wise and constructive proposals of the Soviet Union in relaxing tension in the Persian Gulf area were not expressed accidentally in India which invariably stands for a political settlement of acute international problems. Their concrete and realistic character lend the new Soviet proposals a particular importance and topicality. The meetings on Indian Soil, the cordial atmosphere in which the visit was held and the joint Soviet-Indian documents once more have provided striking testimony to show that the friendship between the USSR and India is a common asset of the two great peoples.

It was intriguing as to why Brezhnev made the oil offer when the Soviets had refused it only in the recent past during President Reddy's visit to Moscow, and more significantly when India did not endorse the Soviet view on Afghanistan. In all probability it seemed that the oil supply was an instrument that reinforced or sustained India's position on Afghanistan and kept it from turning further against the Soviet position.

The phrase acquired significance since the term 'trust' had never been used by the Soviets during the Janata period. By all means the Soviet leadership had made it abundantly clear that it was more comfortable in dealing with Mrs. Gandhi than with any other Indian leader.


89. Statesman, December 10, 1980.
90. Indira Gandhi - Selected Speeches and writings January 1980 - December 1981, Volume IV, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
Govt. of India. (Address at the Civic Reception to L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, New Delhi, December 9, 1980).

"We value the understanding which the Soviet Union has shown through the years in our problems. Indo-Soviet friendship is not aimed at any other country. Neither country ever sought to impose its perceptions on the other. Yet our agreement on vital issues outweighs divergences.... Many have been the attempts to create misunderstanding between us and to misrepresent our association. But we have withstood all such attempts and striven constantly to strengthen mutual trust. The second phase of this unfinished revolution that is the process of combating inequality and social injustice upsets powerful elements and invites reaction. Understandably we face onslaught from the 'right', and not so understandably from the so-called 'left' as well.


The references to the Soviet economy were not accidental, the econometric model constructed by the CDA for India, took as its model the existing Soviet
economy as the ultimate objective of the 40 years plan 'Transition from the Indian economy today to an economy of the State of development of the Soviet economy requires a sustained growth rate of almost 10% per annum, a 25-fold increase in per capita personal consumption and a vast expansion in capital investment; the document said. But such an ambitious and optimistic programme to be sustained for 40 years seemed highly unrealistic, given the prevailing stagnation in all sectors of the Indian economy.

95. Statesman, January 10, 1981.
97. TASS, April 30, 1981.
102. The Hindu, March 14, 1981.
103. Ibid.
This probably explains Mrs. Gandhi's matter-of-fact dealing with the Soviets whereas the Soviets seemed to be over-enthusiastic in placating India by providing lavish economic and military aid. Clearly, Mrs. Gandhi's China option had increased her bargaining capacity with the Soviets.


A Correspondent, 'Zhao's Tick-Tick Tactic', FEER, Vol. 112, No. 25, June 12, 1981, p.21. At the end of the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang's tour to Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh last week, expectations of a move by Peking to try to befriend, New Delhi were no longer a matter for speculation.

Izvestia - M. Rostarchuk, May 7, 1981.

118. China Quarterly. June 1982, No.90, p.558. Talks between India and China on bilateral relations including the border issue, opened in New Delhi on 17 May. Special Envoy Fu Hao headed the Chinese delegation. Although the talks embraced matters relating to economic and cultural cooperation both sides recognized that the resolution of the border question was central to the normalization and extension of relations between the two countries.


120. The Soviet Union had supported India during the liberation of Goa, on Kashmir it had consistently sided with India in the United Nations. During the Bangladesh crisis Soviet support had emboldened India to stand up to the Washington-Peking-Islamabad axis. Besides, Soviet economic and military aid to India were too obvious to need any recounting.


122. The earlier part of the statement was close to Pakistan's call for a Soviet withdrawal and the latter
part was close to what India and the Soviet Union wanted—non-interference by the United States and Pakistan.

123. The Times, February 14, 1981.
126. Pravda August 9, 1981.
127. Red Star March 5, 1983.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid. As per the New International Economic Order (NIEO) propounded by the Group of 77 during the mid-70s, it had been stipulated that a continuous dialogue and a working between the developed North and the developing and under-developed South was an imperative for smooth functioning of international trade and commerce. The NIEO aimed at economic stability and upliftment of all third world developing countries. One of NIEO's basic objectives had been the breaking of protective tariff barriers. Despite initial
support for the idea the developed, protectionist states of the North had become, lukewarm to the move.


137. Testimony of Selig Harrison before the Asian and Pacific Affairs subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1983.

138. P.B. Sinha - Pakistan's Role and its implications in the Second cold war p.75.


140. There were doubts about whether Moscow exposed its choicest systems to India particularly when there was the fear of its secrets landing in the hands of the
Western allies. There may have been a possibility that there were subtle differences between what Moscow offered India and what it kept for itself. Interview with MJ. Gen. Dilip Banerjee.

141. TASS. December 9, 1983. See CDSP. Vol.XXXV No. 4, p. 22.


1. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.
3. India refused the Soviet Union any facility that
   would have made it appear a Soviet surrogate.'
4. The rupee-rouble controversy continued to linger
   into the '90s.
5. 'The Soviets In the Third World.' Carol R. Saivetz,
   Colorado, U.S. 1990
6. Ibid.
7. Melvin A. Goodman. 'Foreign Policy and Decision
   Making Process in the Soviet Union,' in Hafeez (ed)
   Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy
   Towards South Asia and the Middle East [Macmillan]
   1990
8. Interview with A.K. Damodaran.
9. Thomas P. Thorton. 'Gorbachev's Courtship with
   India: 'India and the Soviet Union,' The Round
   Mansingh. 'Is There A Soviet Indian Strategic
   Partnership'. p.146 in Hafeez (ed) Domestic
   Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy Towards South
10. Shashi Tharoor, Reasons of State: Political
    Development and India's Foreign Policy under Indira Gandhi
11. Interview with Madhu Limaye
12. Ibid.
13. William L. Richter, (Kansas State University Manhattan, Kansas U.S.A.,) 'Mrs. Gandhi's Neighbourhood : Indian Foreign Policy towards Neighbouring Countries - (Extracts from a paper produced at the Kansas state University Manhattan, Kansas, USA, 1984) p 116-130


17. Lawrence Ziring: Soviet Strategic Interests in South Asia, op cit.

18. Ibid.


22. George Perkovich 'The Soviet Union: 'Moscow Turns East'. The Atlantic Vol. 280, No. 6, December 1987,

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Lawrence Ziring Soviet Strategic Interests in South Asia p. 118 119 in Hafeez (ed) op cit