

## **CHAPTER VII**

# **Police Action and the Surrender of Hyderabad**

September 17, 1948 was a red-letter day not only for the people of erstwhile Hyderabad state but also for the whole nation as it was only on that day that the struggle for a free India was complete. The newly liberated country freed one of its major princely states, Hyderabad, from the clutches of the Nizam, who dreamt of establishing a sovereign nation within India. The Police Action, which was started on 13<sup>th</sup> September 1948 and ended on 17<sup>th</sup> September, was considered one of the momentous weeks in Hyderabad.

The historic struggle to liberate Hyderabad State in which different streams of people participated is remembered even today by historians, social scientists and students of political science, besides the generations which witnessed the gory saga.

The prospects of Partition, seemed to give some chance for the princes to assert themselves and regain what had been lost to the British. But they were reminded too painfully by Jawaharlal Nehru that it might be very dangerous for them to ignore the rapid and rising demands of their peoples for democratic power. The British Labour government had been persuaded to give up paramountcy over the states in the same way as British power was withdrawn from India. It became the special effort of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel and Lord Mountbatten to find a peaceful political solution of integrating these states to the Union. V.P. Menon<sup>1</sup> persuaded Lord Mountbatten to demonstrate his gratitude to Sardar for having agreed to the proposal for Partition, by using his great personal influence over Indian princes in favour of Indian unity. Menon weakened the resistance of princes to integration by putting before

<sup>1</sup> V.P. Menon rose to be the Secretary of Ministry of States in the Government of India from a mere assistant at the bottom rung of officialdom.

them a picture of what might be the dire fate awaiting them, once the leaders of the neighbouring and the Government of India encouraged their people to rise in revolt against not only the ruler's governments but also against their traditional rights, privileges and family security. Lord Mountbatten pleaded with the maharajas to bow heroically and patriotically before the dictates of history, as the powerful British emperor was getting ready to go away and thus win the appreciation of the leaders of the New India and gratitude of their peoples.

Despite the call given some states like Travancore, Mysore, Hyderabad, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Bhopal, Kashmir wanted to declare independence. In Travancore, and Mysore, their Diwans mesmerized the maharajas with fanfare of Independence and proposed to send representatives to the Pakistan government. Sir C.P. Ramaswami Iyer, Dewan of Travancore resisted accession to India but had to bow to popular will in the state that asserted itself in a powerful upsurge that shook his authority.

Some States stored up arms and armaments, recruited and trained soldiers and built Ordnance factories. But thanks to lightning-like diplomacy of Menon, and thunderbolt-like command from Sardar, most of the states decided to accede to India.

Menon was a great help to Sardar in negotiating with thousands of Indian princes and thousands of experienced and traditionally skilled advisers and succeeded in persuading them to preside over the liquidation of their age long constitutional princedom. This is a story that could add luster even to the Arabian Nights<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> N.G.Ranga, *Distinguished Acquaintances*, Volume II, **Hyderabad**.p.242 - 248.

There were two kinds of movements launched in Hyderabad - one was the freedom movement and Hyderabad's integration and the other was the momentum gained for a Telugu identity. The establishment of Krishna Deva Raya Andhra Basha Nilayam in 1901 was a positive step in this direction. As far as the writings of this period are concerned again there were two distinct groups. For example V.K.Bawa and others have written in favour of Nizam .While V.H.Desai and others have reflected the anti-Nizam stand. Organisations like Arya Samaj have taken very strongly the efforts of the Nizam to declare independence.<sup>3</sup>

The people of Hyderabad retired to bed on September 17<sup>th</sup>, 1948 to wake up to a new dawn. But there were so many people who played their part to unfold this drama in history. The events leading up to the most fearful days in Hyderabad's history have spawned their own legends, bristling with drama and irony.

The people of Hyderabad state, 16,000,000 in number, were an integral part of the great communities of India closely connected by social, religious and cultural bonds. 86% of them were Hindus, 12 1/2 % Muslims, 1 1/2 % Christians and others. Of them 7,000,000 spoke Telugu, 4,000,000 Marathi and 2,000,000 Kannada. Urdu was spoken mostly by the ruling Muslim group, till the new policy of the Urdu-ising the state was introduced.<sup>4</sup>

The *Indian Express* in its special supplement, wrote as to how the day when India became free, was felt by the people in Hyderabad.

<sup>3</sup> Professor Radhakrishna Sharma, Retired Professor of History, Osmania University also expressed these views during my interview with him on 27' May 2001. \*

<sup>4</sup> According to K.M.Munshi in his book *End Of An Era*. "It was this Hyderabad which the Nizam hoped to make an independent Islamic state. To him it all seemed so simple." p.xxiii

"We did not understand what Independence Day meant on August 15<sup>th</sup>, 1947. It took us a whole year for that. While the rest of the country was celebrating the attainment of Independence, we were crushed by a tyrant who was dead set against joining India"<sup>5</sup>

Said **Katham** Lakshminarayana, freedom fighter.

The British gave the Nizam three options - one, to join Pakistan, two to remain an independent country and three, to join the Indian Union. Vehemently opposed to India as he was, the Nizam declared on 27<sup>th</sup> August 1947 that Hyderabad was an Independent and Sovereign state. Thus, Hyderabad was still mired in the feudal rule of the Nizam. August 1948 was a period of struggle by all shades of nationalist opinion.

Events had been moving at a breathtaking pace in the subcontinent from 1946 with the British declaring that they would leave India by 1948, and the British Parliament adopting the Indian Independence Act based on the proposals of June 3, 1947 which envisaged British withdrawal and partition of the country into two Sovereign States of India and Pakistan by August 15.

Having embarked upon such a radical redrawing of the map of the subcontinent, the British government. (Either deliberately or out of much trumpeted liberal values of respect for treaties and rights of native rulers) left the choice to the rulers of Princely States to either join India or Pakistan or even to remain Independent. Even before August 15, many native rulers whose states were contiguous to India had signed the Instrument of Accession with the exception of Junagadh and Hyderabad. Kashmir was trying various options.

<sup>5</sup> **Kantham** Lakshminarayana, freedom fighter expressed his opinion in the paper, *Indian Express*, special supplement Sept 12<sup>th</sup> 1998, p.1

Lord Mountbatten had also written to the Nizam that in view of the special position and peculiar problems of Hyderabad. Both Nehru and Sardar Patel felt that Lord Mountbatten should continue to negotiate with the Nizam even after August 15<sup>th</sup>. Accordingly on August 12<sup>th</sup>, Lord Mountbatten informed the Nizam that an offer of accession would remain open in the case of Hyderabad for a further period of two months. But the Hyderabad problem remained intractable for over a year after August 15, 1947.

In 1947, when the British handed over power to India in New Delhi, the Nizam actually declared himself independent. The idea of acceding to India or even to Pakistan was contrary to his concept of his State's power and dignity, and the state was, in his view, inseparable from himself. Osman Ali Khan even rejected the advice of his own constitutional advisors, including Walter Monckton, a close friend of Lord Louis Mountbatten who hoped to ensure that Hyderabad enjoyed a high status in the Indian Union. Thus he asserted an Independence, which was not justified by historical evidence or by his actual position. The Nizam declared through a *firman* that Hyderabad would remain independent and not join the Constituent Assembly. Kasim Razvi unfurled the Asafia Flag and declared the flag was the emblem of the suzerainty of God on earth and exhorted the Muslims to defend it to the last drop of their blood. Even the *Deccan Chronicle* of June 24, 1947 reported,

"His Exalted Highness will assume Sovereign status and powers on or about August 15, 1947, by which time it is expected that the Indian and Pakistan areas would have assumed the status of Dominions of the British Common Wealth it is learnt"<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The article published on on 15<sup>th</sup> August, 1947 was reprinted in *Deccan Chronicle* on 15<sup>th</sup> August 1997. p2.

By August 15, 1947, the fate of Hyderabad remained uncertain. Kasim Razvi in his speeches and statements asserted that Hyderabad was always independent and never subject to British paramountcy and therefore it had no obligation to join the Indian Union. Any number of proposals made by the Government of India were rejected by the Nizam, Razvi and Laik Ali, the Prime Minister. Negotiations continued for months till a Standstill Agreement was signed in November 1947<sup>7</sup>. The Government of India made it clear that this was only an interim government that must eventually lead to accession and a responsible government. But this transitory arrangement was misused and abused by the Nizam and Razvi to gain time to strengthen the state armed forces and Razakkars with modern weapons. Even a proposal for an Assembly with 40% representation to Muslims who were only 13% of the population was not acceptable.

Ever since the Standstill Agreement was signed a number of delegations had visited Delhi for negotiations. One such delegation arrived in Delhi on 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1948, and after discussions with the State's Ministry left for Hyderabad on 26<sup>th</sup> May. Laik Ali, the Prime Minister of Nizam accepted the principle of overriding legislation by the Government of India and proposed to increase the strength of the Hyderabad army although he denied it later. He also carried with him an invitation from the Nizam to Nehru to visit Hyderabad. Nehru sent a telegram to the Nizam in reply to that. It read

"I greatly appreciate your invitation to visit Hyderabad. As I told your Prime Minister, my many preoccupations make it practically impossible for me to leave New Delhi. However, if the negotiations now in progress, between the Government of India and Your Exalted Highness' government result in the certainty of a mutually satisfactory settlement, I shall be happy to give priority to a visit to your capital over other matters."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Details of Standstill Agreement are mentioned in the earlier chapter

<sup>8</sup> S.Gopal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Volume VI, New Delhi, 1972.p.p.223-224.

Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a series of letter to several prominent persons connected with the security of Independent India and the latest political developments. Writing to Sardar Patel on 11<sup>th</sup> April 1948, he mentions about the visit of Nawab Ismail Khan, prominent leader of Muslim League in Uttar Pradesh, and the Nawab of Chattari. According to Nehru, they were very perturbed about the developments in Hyderabad. Sarojini Naidu suggested to them to go to Hyderabad and tell the Nizam how much his policy and specially the activities of Razakkars were injuring the Muslims of India as well as the Nizam himself. The attitude of prominent Indian Muslims including Mohamed Ismail of Madras who was the President of the Muslim League in India was that the Indian Union must take strong action in the situation, that Razvi should be brought to trial and that a democratic government should be established in Hyderabad State.<sup>9</sup>

In a letter to Sardar Patel, Nehru wrote,

" We do not want to impose our will on any state and it is our earnest desire to avoid conflicts and quarrels... We therefore concluded the Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad last year with the hope that in the course of year, the people's desires would be fulfilled. But no sooner the ink in which the agreement was signed was dry, the Hyderabad government violated the agreement. Hyderabad is the only state where so far there has been no change in the nature of the government... The Ittehad Muslemeen and its volunteers are committing violence on the people, trying to overawe and coerce them with bullets. The present state of affairs definitely cannot be allowed to go on." <sup>10</sup>

In a speech at a secret session of the AICC, Bombay, on 16 April 1948, speaking of the policy on Hyderabad Nehru said,

<sup>9</sup> Ibid pp213-214.

<sup>10</sup> S.Gopal.ed. *Selected Works of J.Nehru*, Vol VI, Delhi 1972, p.p 214, 215

"I would like to assure the AICC that the Government of India are fully alive to the seriousness of the situation developing in Hyderabad State.... If the Nizam's government or the Razakkars take any aggressive action, the Government of India will certainly takes steps to safeguard the interest of the people concerned."

Again speaking at a public meeting, in UthagaMandalam in the far south on 2<sup>nd</sup> June, 1948 Nehru stated,

"We have made it perfectly clear to Hyderabad that there will have to be a solution to this problem and that ultimately there must be accession. There is no other way, and it is not possible for Hyderabad to walk out of the Indian . Union. Responsible government is inevitable because in the modern world we cannot allow a feudal government as in Hyderabad to continue." <sup>12</sup>

Writing to Vallabhai Patel on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1948 Nehru had stated a similar view:

"To come back to Hyderabad we have to view Military Action from the point of view of our present capacity as well as from the other consequences flowing from it. These consequences may well be far reaching to various parts of India as well as Pakistan.... I arrived at the conclusion therefore that Military Action should only be indulged in Hyderabad when the Hyderabad government or their Razakkars etc make it impossible for us to desist from it. Of course in such circumstances we have to take action because in action may produce worse results"

Jawaharlal Nehru also took certain Interim Defence measures. There were instructions to Army commanders round about Hyderabad and to the local government concerned. The instructions were as follows,

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p.p 217-218.

<sup>12</sup> From the *Hindu*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June, 1948 p.2

<sup>13</sup> S. Gopal. Ed., *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru* vol. VI, New Delhi, 1972 p.227

"With the exception of articles of food, salt, medical stores and chlorine for purifying the water supply, all other articles should be denied entry into Hyderabad state and strict blockade should be maintained in regard to these other articles. In the case of any doubtful article, reference should be made to the Government of India." <sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, Hyderabad was making frantic effort to purchase arms. For this purpose Major General El Edroos was sent to London and his mission was to get automatic weapons and anti tank guns. Major General El Edroos was the commander of the Hyderabad army. He makes his views very clear in the book he authored, *Hyderabad Of The Seven Loaves*. Even regarding the position of the Hyderabad army he writes,

"I realized the hopeless situation which we were in and any clash by our troops with the advancing Indian army would have only led to ill feelings and probably harder terms of surrender. A copy of my plan was submitted to the Hyderabad Government. But the Government under the influence of the Prime Minister Mir Laiq Ali returned the copy with the remarks that he was the best authority in this vital matter and he was to hold the Indian army at bay for about three months and by that time, help from Pakistan would come. He found it almost impossible for Hyderabad to purchase arms and ammunition from abroad as Hyderabad was not recognized as an independent country. Even if arms and ammunition were purchased from Europe or Middle East, it would be impossible to import them into Hyderabad. Bombay, Madras and other seaports were all closed to Hyderabad traffic. And it was next to impossible to get them through Goa due to the land route between Goa and Hyderabad being watched by the Indian authorities. But

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p.243

the Hyderabad Government totally ignored the clauses in the Standstill Agreement.”<sup>15</sup>

The task of K.M.Munshi who was appointed the Agent General of the Government of India in Hyderabad was no bed of roses. He had to contend with the Trinity who were ruling the destinies of Hyderabad at that time - Mir Laik Ali, Nawab Moin Nawab Jung and Kasim Razvi who made no secret of their hostility to Munshi<sup>16</sup>.

The leaders of Ittehad were delivering speeches that there would be a bloodbath in the whole of South India if accession to the Union were effected. Kasim Razvi also made many irresponsible speeches. He threatened,

"If the Indian Union venture to enter Hyderabad, the invaders will see the burning everywhere of the bodies of one crore and sixty-five lakhs. The Muslims will not spare others when we ourselves are not allowed to exist.”<sup>17</sup>

With the atrocities continuing unabated, the Government of India issued a White Paper on Hyderabad on 26 July 1948. Sardar Patel declared in the Constituent Assembly that Hyderabad had become an ulcer in the heart of India and this ulcer had to be operated. The White Paper made it unequivocally clear and without mincing words that

"The Government of India cannot afford to be a helpless spectator of orgies of misrule in Hyderabad. If the law and

<sup>15</sup> E.I. Edroos, *Hyderabad Of Seven Loaves* P.P. 134-135. The major sounded quite prophetic during the days of discussion on Standstill Agreement with the Nizam. When asked how long the Nizam's army could hold out against an attack by the Indian army he replied "Not more than four days". Narendra Luther, *Memories Of A City*, 1995 p. 324

<sup>16</sup> K.M. Munshi born in 1887 was a leading lawyer in Bombay and later at the Supreme Court. He founded the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan with branches all over the country. According to N.G. Ranga he had a hard task with a Nizam who never bent his knee before any but a Viceroy.

From the article titled "*Unholy Terror*" by K.M. Munshi, which appeared in *Deccan Chronicle*, Aug 15, 1997 p.3

order situation there, which already shows signs of collapse, further deteriorates and thereby imperils peace and good order in India, the Government of India would unquestionably be involved." <sup>18</sup>

It is quite clear that Jawaharlal Nehru was keeping Lord Mountbatten informed of the developments regarding the Hyderabad issue. In his letter dated, August 29<sup>th</sup> 1948, he wrote,

"...We have been having a very difficult time here and I have felt more than ever the weight of responsibility that has been cast upon me. Grave decisions have to be made by us and the alternatives between which we have to choose are equally undesirable. Also as often in life, we search frantically for the lesser evil... Hyderabad has been a running sore for a long time, but now it has become an intolerable nuisance or something much worse ...All this leads to the conclusion that some military action must be taken fairly soon and fairly swiftly against Hyderabad, if we are to save a deteriorating situation ...Please rest assured that whatever the provocation, we are not going to declare war against anybody. But we may well have to take what we call Police Action against Hyderabad State in the near future... we miss you here."<sup>19</sup>

On 10<sup>th</sup> September 1948, the Nizam appealed to the UNO to intervene. The Government of India was prepared for this move of the Nizam as it is indicated in a letter of Nehru to Vallabhai Patel on 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1948. He says

"You are aware of the fact that there is every chance of Hyderabad State Government referring their dispute with us to the United Nations. We should not wait for this reference and then think about it. We should therefore take immediate steps to prepare our answer and to clear up our own minds

<sup>18</sup> V. H. Desai, *Vandemataramto Janaganmana Saga of Hyderabad's Freedom Struggle*, Bombay, 1990 p. 167

<sup>19</sup> S.Gopal, *Selected Works of J.Nehru*, Vol. VI New Delhi, 1972.p.p.221-222.

as to the attitude we should take. I hope therefore the States Ministry is thinking about this and preparing for it."<sup>20</sup>

In September 1948, the Nizam sent a delegation to the Security Council with a complaint that the situation between Hyderabad and India had become grave and constituted a threat to peace. The delegation left via Karachi. It was now time for decisive action by the Indian Government. On September 10, 1948 Nehru issued an ultimatum, "With great regret we intend to occupy Secunderabad." The same day England evacuated British subjects from Hyderabad to return and ordered all British officers to resign from the Hyderabad Army, so that they will not be forced to fight against an erstwhile British dominion (**India**).<sup>21</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru in his letter to V.K.Krishna Menon dated, 29<sup>th</sup> August, 1948, clearly pointed out that a military action against Hyderabad was becoming a must. He stated thus:

"I am convinced that it is impossible to arrive at any solution of the Hyderabad problem by settlement or peaceful negotiation. Military action becomes essential, we call it as you have called it Police Action...The reported reference of the Hyderabad issue to the U.N. produces a certain complication, but that is hardly reason for our holding up any action that would otherwise be justified. There is no point in holding it up because, if the U.N. goes into this matter, it will be a somewhat prolonged affair as it usually is. A prolonged postponement would certainly have very bad results in many ways."<sup>22</sup>

S. Gopal, ed., "Letters to Premiers of Provinces" in *Selected works of J.Nehru* Volume VII, New Delhi 1972, p. 195

Ian Austin, *City of Legends, The Story of Hyderabad*, Calcutta, 1992 p. 188

<sup>22</sup> S. Gopal, *op.cit* p.223.

It is interesting to note that Nehru for a long time was reluctant to solve the Hyderabad Problem at one go by Police Action in September 1948. Durga Das, a former editor of the *Hindustan Times*, narrates in his memoirs titled '*India - from Curzon to Nehru*',

"There were days of tenseness and high drama in New Delhi particularly in the Cabinet. Pt. Nehru still wanted a peaceful solution, for fear of Pakistan's reaction while Patel was pressing for Police Action soon after Mountbatten left. The hurdle for Patel was removed when Mountbatten who was trying for special status for Hyderabad left on June 22, 1948. After Mountbatten left when Nizam still talked of further agreement, Patel publicly declared, "Agreement has gone to England". Twice Sardar Patel had fixed the Zero Hour for action against Hyderabad and on each occasion he was compelled to cancel it. When the Zero Hour was fixed for the third time (13<sup>th</sup> Sept) he was determined to see it through and he announced that the army had already moved into Hyderabad and nothing could be done to halt it. Nehru was worried whether it would provoke retaliation by Pakistan." <sup>23</sup>

On September 12<sup>th</sup>, Jinnah died and Nehru was sure that there would be no interference from Pakistan.

Since the Nizam and his government refused to disband the Razakkars and other private armies and to facilitate the return of Indian troops to Secunderabad, where they used to be stationed before, in order to restore law and order Indian troops entered the Hyderabad Territory at 4:00 am on 13<sup>th</sup> September from three sides, West , South and North.

23 How Hyderabad Escaped the Fate of Kashmir" in *Hyderabad Watch* at [www.Hyderabad.com](http://www.Hyderabad.com)" p.p 1 & 2

Nehru held a question-answer session at the press conference in New Delhi on 10<sup>th</sup> September 1948, Three days before the Police action. He followed it with his own statements. One of the most important aspects he stressed was the Razakkar menace.

"There is no doubt that the state of affairs in Hyderabad has been very bad and progressively worsening. Any person who does not openly submit to any demands from the Razakkars plays with his life. You might have in mind at least two cases - that of a young Muslim editor of a paper who was shot down; of another young Muslim, you may have noticed, his hands were cut off. So you see the state of affairs in Hyderabad is sinking into a state of barbarity."<sup>24</sup>

In his speech in Bombay on 15<sup>th</sup> September 1948, Nehru explained that Police Action was initiated to end terror.

"Our first year of freedom has seen much sorrow and suffering through out the country. During the critical period, the Father of our Nation was snatched away from our midst leaving us in deep anguish and sorrow....In Hyderabad our army is doing a magnificent job. They are rapidly advancing on all fronts. This is an indication of our strength. I hope the operation will end soon..."<sup>25</sup>

The invasion of Hyderabad by the Indian army was called by different names. Popularly it was called Police Action and the operation was named "Operation Polo".

Hyderabad had a large army with a tradition of hiring mercenary force. It comprised of the manager of Sarf - I - Khas lands, the Paigah Nobles, Arabs, Guards and Razakkars who were themselves about 200,000. They were commanded by Major

<sup>24</sup> S. Gopal, *op.cit* P.p.234-235.

<sup>25</sup> S. Gopal, ed., "Hyderabad H-Police Action in Hyderabad" in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* , Vol. 7, New Delhi, 1972, p. 244.

General El Edroos. Though the authorized strength of the Hyderabad forces under the state forces scheme was 7,000, it was raised to 13,000 in 1947. By April 1948, the strength of the regulars was 22,393 while 7,000 more men were under training and an additional force of 4,870 men was undergoing training under different names such as customs and constabulary. The strength of the Police Force had also been raised to 38,000. There were 15,000 Home and Civil Guards.<sup>26</sup>In the face of the concentration of troops, the invasion on Hyderabad by the Indian Union was inevitable<sup>27</sup>.

The final plan for the Operation Polo was based on the "Goddard Plan". There were two major thrusts - a Western thrust through Sholapur - Hyderabad axis and the Eastern thrust along the Vijayawada - Hyderabad axis. Thrusts were also to be made from the South to protect the Railway Communications and from the North in the Jalna area. The Indian Task Force commanded by Major General J.N.Chaudhari led the thrust from Sholapur. The first obstacle to overcome was the Naldrug Fort, which stood on the Sholapur Secunderabad Road, about 19 kilometers from the state border. City by city was captured; all Razakkars who resisted were quickly overpowered. The unit heading northward met no resistance of any kind. They safely entered the town of Osmanabad after intense bombardment and continued northwards with the objective of turning east towards Latur.

While varying reports were pouring in from different fronts, the worst fate appeared to be that of the airfields and landing strips all over the country. The airfields of Warangal, Bidar, Raichur, Adilabad, and Aurangabad were being incessantly showered

<sup>26</sup>Ibid,p.241

<sup>27</sup> Ian Austin in her book *City of Legends* says the invasion was code named "Operation Polo" possibly to assuage world criticism of the violent act of aggression. It was known, euphemistically, as a simple "Police Action"; small raps over the knuckles to get the Nizam back in to line P. 189

with heavy bombs by the Indian Air Force. They were all so defenseless and yet the bombing was so frenzied.

On day two of the operation by the afternoon Aurangabad was captured. The only link the Hyderabad Government had with the outside world was through the wireless and that was with Mushtaq Ahmed, the Agent General of Hyderabad at Karachi.

Meanwhile, the Hyderabad Government was pinning great hope and faith in the U.N.O to stand by right against brute force.

The complaint of Hyderabad was presented in a cablegram dated August 21, 1948, addressed to the President of the Security Council. A summary of it read as follows.

"The Government of Hyderabad in reliance on Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the U.N requests you to bring to the attention of the Security Council the grave dispute which has arisen between Hyderabad and India, and which unless settled in accordance with International law and justice, is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Hyderabad has been exposed in recent months to violent intimidation, to threats of invasion and to crippling economic blockade which has inflicted cruel hardship upon the people of Hyderabad... The action of India threatens the existence of Hyderabad, the peace of the Indian and entire Asiatic continent, and the principles of the U.N. Hyderabad, a state not a member of the U.N. accepts for the purposes of the dispute, obligations of the Pacific Settlement provided in the Charter of the United Nations."<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Clyde Eagleton, *The Case of Hyderabad before the Security Council*, in Omar **Khalidi**'s ed *Hyderabad After the Fall*, Kansas 1988 pp64-65

This was followed by a cablegram dated, September 12, 1948, in which the Government of Hyderabad in view of the "officially proclaimed intention of India as announced by its Prime Minister to invade Hyderabad" asked that the complaint be put upon the agenda at "the earliest possible date such as Wednesday, 15<sup>th</sup> September. On the following day a cablegram informed the Secretary General that Hyderabad had been invaded.

The Hyderabad delegation filed all the requisite documents and concluded all formalities hurriedly. The earliest that the meeting of Security Council could be convened was on the afternoon of the 16<sup>th</sup> September. With the exception of the delegate of Nationalist China, who was in favor of India and Russia, which appeared noncommittal, the attitude of all other delegates was solidly against "the aggression committed by India". The Indian delegation also arrived under A. Ramaswamy Mudaliar and they put forth their defense strongly. The representatives of UK, USA, France, Syria, Argentina and Canada had made no attempt to conceal their disapproval of the "aggression" committed by India.

A. Ramaswamy Mudaliar, the leader of the delegation to UN was a man of great reputation. He was an advocate in Madras, was a member of Legislative Council, had attended the Round Table Conference, was a member of the War Cabinet, Pacific Council (1942-43) and leader of the Indian delegation to the UN. His brother, A. Lakshmanaswamy Mudaliar and he were called the Mudaliar twins and were the idols of non-Brahmin youths of the Justice party of the 1920's. Even the British knew the worth of Ramaswamy Mudaliar and he was asked to join the Viceroy's Council first as member and later on as Vice-Chairman, next in honour only to the Viceroy. Having gained his place in the Central Cabinet of the Viceroy he displayed his latent sense of

national selfrespect. Genuine patriot that he essentially was in the many wartime international conferences in which he represented India and pleaded with all the sweetness of his supreme eloquence for an honourable place for India and human rights. Lakshmanaswamy on the other concentrated on medical studies and educational cause. His services were used for the development of education in India, particularly Madras. He was Vice Chancellor of Madras University for over two decades.

On day 3, many Razakkars were killed and many were taken prisoners. The Indian Army occupied Latur and Moinabad. Suryapet was captured. The Musi Bridge was also partially destroyed by the retreating Hyderabad army. On day 4, Sept 16<sup>th</sup> they passed through Zahirabad to reach Bidar.

All though the period of operation the Nizam was in constant touch with Mir Laiq Ali and the army headquarters. When they began to take stock of the situation, the Nizam realized that Pakistan remained a silent spectator. The Hyderabad army put up a hopeless show and the Security Council was yet to meet and the Indian armies were racing towards the capital from all directions. The Nizam felt that his own person and his family were in serious danger.

By the morning of 17<sup>th</sup> September, it was reported through Railway sources that the Indian troops had reached Bibinagar and were well on their way to the capital.<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, they received the news of the issue of Hyderabad being taken up in the Security Council. Moin Nawaz Jung, the leader of the Hyderabad delegation was invited and he very forcefully presented the case of Hyderabad at length and appealed

<sup>29</sup> N.G.Ranga, *op.dt* p.p.253-257.

<sup>30</sup> This message was apparently wrong which was realized much later says Mir Laiq Ali in "The Five Day War" in Raza Ali Khan's *Hyderabad - 400 Years*, p.58

to the Security Council to intervene at once and put a stop to the bloodshed and make it possible to achieve lasting peace<sup>31</sup>.

Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung, urged that time was limited and every hour counted. He went on to say,

"The situation demands immediate action by the Security Council not only under Chapter VI of the Charter relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes, but also under Chapter VII which bears on the action of the Security Council for enforcing its decision for safeguarding the peace of the world. In that chapter, Article 39, of the Charter enjoins the Security Council the duty to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and that it shall take appropriate action. Who can doubt that these conditions are now present?"<sup>32</sup>

When it was the turn of Ramaswamy Mudaliar to speak, he furnished documentary evidence to prove that Hyderabad was never an independent state and as such had no status to approach the Security Council.<sup>33</sup>

Sir Benegal Rau the then representative of India, taking the same position at a Security Council meeting later in May, 1949, said, "Hyderabad was not a state in the international sense before the Indian Independence act. She is not now by virtue of the Standstill Agreement and the arrangements which followed it; and she cannot be one at any time in the future if India is to live. We cannot defy or ignore geography. It follows that any dispute with Hyderabad is not an international dispute. All matters relating to Hyderabad are now dealt regularly by the government of India as matters of domestic concern. see for details Clyde Eagerton, *opcit* p.p.67,68

<sup>32</sup> Clyde Eagleton, *Ibid.*, p.67.

<sup>33</sup> A.R. Mudaliar said, "In my Government's view, Hyderabad is not competent to bring any question before the Security Council, that it is not a state; that it is not independent; that never in all its history did it have the status of independence; that neither in remote past nor before August 1947, nor under any declaration made by the United Kingdom, nor under any act passed by the British Parliament, has it acquired the status of independence which would entitle it to come in its own right to present a case before the Security Council" In Clyde Eagleton's, *"The Case of Hyderabad before the Security Council"* in Omar Khalidi's *Hyderabad After The Fall, Kansas, 1988*, p. 67

The President after hearing both sides said that the next meeting of the Council could be convened at the earliest only on 18<sup>th</sup> September. But the most serious question was that, Would Hyderabad hold the situation on the battlefield till that time? <sup>34</sup>

On day 5 With the Hyderabad forces being routed from all directions, the Hyderabad government under the Prime Minister Laik Ali resigned. The Nizam went on air and asked his remaining forces to withdraw. He banned the Razakkars and allowed the Union troops to occupy Secunderabad and Bolarum. The police action ended.

The Hyderabad Army represented by Major General El Edroos surrendered and Major General G.N. Chaudhary took over as military governor. On 24<sup>th</sup> November, he took over as civilian governor following the Nizam's accession to the Indian Union.

All the dreams of the Nizam, which even included buying Goa from Portuguese, which could open a naval front, had come to an end. His desire to make India accept a "Second Partition" after the birth of Pakistan remained a dream.

It saw also the end of the reign of Asaf Jahi dynasty. It signaled the end of the last resistance of Princely States against merger with the Indian Union. Thus the prophecy concerning the seven loaves had been fulfilled when the Indian Army entered the domain of the last surviving vestige of the Mughal rule in India.

The events that followed the Police Action were very quick leading to a total change in the political scenario. After the surrender of Hyderabad army, Mir Laik Ali, the

<sup>34</sup> Raza Ali Khan, Op.cit.p 55

Prime Minister and Kasim Razvi were arrested. On September 23<sup>rd</sup> 1948, the Nizam withdrew his complaint in the Security Council. The merger of Hyderabad dominions into the Indian Union was announced. Major General Chaudhari took over as Military Governor of Hyderabad and stayed in that position till the end of 1949. In January 1950, M. K. Vellodi, a senior civil servant was made the Chief Minister of the state. The Nizam Mir Osman Ali Khan was designated 'Raj Pramukh'. After the 1952 General Elections, the first popular ministry headed by B. Rama Krishna Rao took charge of the state.

The Nizam in his *firman* of 24 November 1949, declared and directed that the constitution of India should be the constitution for the state of Hyderabad. A formula agreement was signed on 25<sup>th</sup> January 1950, between the Governor General of India, representing the Indian Government and the Nizam. The agreement had four articles. As per Article 1 The Nizam with effect from 1<sup>st</sup> April, 1950 is entitled to receive his privy purse of Rs.5,000,000 annually free of all taxes, this payable only to the present Nizam for his life time. For his successors, provision will be made subsequently by the Government of India. Article 2, provided that the Nizam will be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all the funds, shares, securities and other private properties movable as well as immovable. Article 3, provided, the Nizam and the members of his family shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and titles enjoyed by them whether within or outside the territories of the state immediately before the 15<sup>th</sup> day of August 1947. According to Article 4 The Government of India guarantees the succession according to law and customs to the *gaddi* of the state and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of HEH, the Nizam of Hyderabad. The Hyderabad Legislative Assembly consisting of elected representatives on the basis

of adult franchise was inaugurated by the Nizam on March 23<sup>rd</sup> 1952. The Nizam had no influence on the composition of the ministers that governed Hyderabad until 1956.

In 1956, Hyderabad was merged in the new linguistic province of Andhra Pradesh. Although Nehru offered to appoint the Nizam as governor of the new province, the Nizam refused and retired from all public life.

Osman Ali Khan died on 24<sup>th</sup> February 1967 at his King Kothi Palace. His body was kept in one of the verandahs of the palace for the public to pay their last homage to him. The people of Hyderabad who had heard much about the last of the Nizams and had not seen him, rushed to have a look at him. His body was taken to Macca Masjid for funeral prayers and he was finally buried in Masjid Joodi near his mother's tomb.<sup>35</sup>

According to an anonymous army officer of the last Nizam's days, though the autocracy of the Nizam had undoubtedly a pro-Muslim, anti-Hindu aspect to it, what is not emphasized is the fact that many Hindu Deshmukhs and Jagirdars formed a part of the support base of the Nizam. A section of Dalits joined the Razakkar forces and a number of Hindu religious *maths* lent support to the Nizam's regime. There was a great backlash against innocent Muslims after the Police Action. Thousands of Muslims were massacred by Hindu communal elements in Gulbarga, Raicur, Latur and Osmanabad. The Muslims had also participated in large numbers in the struggle against the Nizam. The CPI had Muslim leaders who fought in the struggle in Gulbarga, like Makhdoom Mohinuddin who came from Hyderabad.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.p.p.93-94.

According to Akthar Hasan, a member of Progressive Writers Association and editor of the Urdu daily, *Payam* has this to point out,

"No doubt the Razakkars indulged in a lot of goondaism and had oppressed other communities but I have to say this that in comparison to whatever Razakkars did, the wrongs perpetuated on the community in the course of Police Action and thereafter was ten times graver for which documentary proof is available. After a few months Nehru sent Sunderlalji and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar to Hyderabad. They particularly toured Osmanabad and other areas where indescribable crimes were committed. The report that Sunderlalji submitted about the situation here never saw the light of the day. I read a few excerpts of it. It is a terrible heart rendering report. When Sarojini Naidu who was the Governor of UP heard of the tragedy of her Hyderabad after Police Action, it is said she wept."<sup>36</sup>

After the Police Action, K.M.Munshi asked the Nizam to make a broadcast welcoming the Police Action and withdrawing his complaint to the Security Council. It was the Nizam's first visit to the Radio station. There was no red carpet spread for him. No music or anthem was played before or after the broadcast. The speech was in English. He had signed many letters earlier indicating his intractability but now he had to retrack his words. The glory of defiance had belonged to others; the humiliation of public apology was his. After the broadcast he drove back to King Kothi to brood, but the crowds gathered on the streets were jubilant shouting without any fear for the first time, national slogans. The tricolor was fluttering joyously. There was clapping and cheering, shouting and shrieking. People threw flowers at soldiers sitting on top of armored cars and waving to crowds. Then slowly the lights began to fade. Vans were going up and down announcing the imposition of curfew from 7 pm to 6 am. Soon

<sup>36</sup> These are excerpts from taped interviews of Akthar Hassan done before his death translated from Urdu to English by M.O. Faruqi which appeared in *Deccan Chronicle*, dated 15 August; 1997 p. 6

there was a quiet everywhere. The city slid into a sleep, exhausted and retrieved. Tomorrow would be a new dawn.<sup>37</sup>

Thus, practically speaking the case of Hyderabad in the Security Council was also finished. Under the new Indian Constitution, Hyderabad was incorporated into the State of India. The item remains upon the agenda of the Security Council but there is no indication of interest in that body. The Security Council has been condemned at the way it dealt with the case of Hyderabad. It was felt that legal rights were embarrassingly clear and a satisfactory political settlement could have been agreed upon with little difficulty. In all other cases, the Council had tried and had frequently achieved a solution, in this case it did not even try.

One sad event that occurred during this period was the death of Salar Jung III. He was a passive observer in this drama. He had been it is believed threatened by Razakkars with death if he expressed his views too much in public.

The gradual disbandment of the Hyderabad armed force also had begun.<sup>38</sup>

Summing up the efforts of India in the Police Action, Jawaharlal Nehru concluded that

"The Muslims of India deserve every congratulation for the part they took in this business. As for the Nizam we have no desire to be unjust or ungenerous to him personally. The

<sup>37</sup> Narendra Luther's article titled, "*Hyderabad's Longest Week*" which was published in *Express Week* dated September 12, 1998 P.p.1 and 3

<sup>38</sup> According to El Edroos in his book, *Hyderabad Of Seven Loaves*, the Pathans were sent back to Pakistan, the Arabs to Arabia, the Moplas to Malabar coast. The Muslim refugees who came from Berar were sent back. The few British officers in Hyderabad were sent to U.K. with all their assets, p.p. 144-145.

situation, however is full of revolutionary possibilities and we have to proceed cautiously anyhow<sup>39</sup>"

Many felt that the last years of the Nizam overshadowed his previous years. It is also necessary to know all the good that the Nizam had done. According to them the very purpose of partition of India would have been defeated if Hyderabad had also to secede. Many of the residents saw blood shot eyes in the people of Hyderabad.

"It was the firm action of Sardar Patel that saved Hyderabad otherwise it would have been another Kashmir. As Indian troops were marching into Hyderabad many people had no idea as to what was happening. That is what frightened them. I saw bloodshot eyes in people whose families were involved. Their anger was so great that they were not even willing to answer questions on Razakkars."<sup>40</sup>

An interesting account is given by Austin in her book about the last days of a few people who played an important role in the drama of Police Action.

=> El. Edroos it is believed died in Bangalore, a lonely bitter man and was buried a pauper.

=> Laiq Ali, the last Prime Minister of Hyderabad disappeared to Pakistan after a thrilling escape from house custody. His escape was greeted with silent toasts all over Hyderabad and Secunderabad.

<sup>39</sup> S.Gopal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, New Delhi, 1972 p.266

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Professor Radha Krishna Sharma, Retire Professor of History, Osmania University on 27<sup>th</sup> May 2001

=> Kasim Razvi died unhonoured and unwept in Pakistan, after serving his sentence in Hyderabad goals.

=> Major General Chaudhary, who rose to be the Chief of Army staff passed away many years after he had retired, mourned by the whole army, and by all those who had come to know him<sup>41</sup>.

Though the Operation Polo lasted a very short time, the debates and discussion on it and its nomenclature are very wide and interesting. While Jawaharlal Nehru decided to call the Indian army's march into Hyderabad a mere "Police Action" many of the people, prominent among them being, D.F. Karaka, a leading Bombay journalist wonders, why a

"Lieutenant general, three major generals and a whole armored division had to be called out to effect a mere police action. A police inspector and a handful of sepoy's armed with the familiar *lathis* were usually enough for Police Action in the days of the British."<sup>42</sup>

One also gets an idea of the ethnic composition of the Indian army during Operation Polo. An interesting comment made by an unidentified Indian military expert claimed that about 700 Muslims left the army after it invaded the Muslim state of Hyderabad in 1948. This report was published nearly 40 years later by the *New York Times*, 14<sup>th</sup> June 1984. But none of the Indian army officers have confirmed it.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Ian Austin, "*City of Legends, The Story of Hyderabad*" Calcutta, 1992, p.p 196-197

<sup>42</sup> Omar Khalidi's, "*The 1948 Military Operations and its Aftermath, A Bibliographic essay*" in Omar Khalidi's ed *Hyderabad After the Fall*, Kansas 1988 p200

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid* p.201

The reaction of the International community also needs to be noted. Most of the British newspapers roundly condemned the Indian invasion. They were shocked at the blatant use of force in the land of Mahatma, the apostle of ahimsa. It was quite inevitable that it would eventually become an integral part of India. But when the figure of 800 killed was mentioned by no less a person than V.P.Menon in his book, "Story of Integration of Indian States" it left many astonished.

Some of the Britishers felt that Britain did not stand by Hyderabad in its hour of need. Arthur C. Lothian, one of the last British residents at Hyderabad said

"I felt ashamed at the tacit British abandonment of the premier princely state."<sup>44</sup>

The reaction to the Hyderabad issue was quite unexpectedly harsh in Pakistan. An angry crowd gathered at the Indian High Commission in Karachi to protest the attack on Hyderabad.

Another fact to note is the migration on large scale the Hyderabad Muslims overseas. Shortly after the military operations, cabinet ministers, top civil servants and others associated with the previous government left for Pakistan. It is estimated that about 250,000 came from across the Hyderabad State.<sup>45</sup> Number of Muslims who remained in Hyderabad during the post Police Action period had a very rough time. Number of officers and clerks were dismissed, compulsorily retired, asked to leave unofficially, demoted or suspended from active duty. Some of the officials voluntarily resigned under psychological pressure.<sup>46</sup> The language of the civil administration was

<sup>44</sup> Ibid p203

<sup>45</sup> Ibid p208

<sup>46</sup> Ibid p209

also switched from Urdu to English giving the new regime yet another pretext to reduce the Muslim staff of the state secretariat stating lack of proficiency in English.

With regard to the position of the Nizam, Osman Ali Khan, though he was designated Raj Pramukh, he steadily withdrew more and more into the recesses of his palace at King Kothi. He took minimal interest since he was reduced to a figurehead. Before he died in February 1967, the Nizam had nominated his grandson Mukaram Jah to succeed him, since he was quite disgusted with his two sons, Azam Jah and Muazzam Jah who only squandered money on drink and debauchery. Mukaram Jah is the son of Muazzam Jah.

According to a report of the post Operation Polo massacres, unlike the city of Hyderabad, the districts of Hyderabad state witnessed large-scale massacres, rape and destruction and seizure of Muslim property during post Police Action days. Deeply moved by the grim stories related to him, Mohamed Yunis Salim, a young state attorney, persuaded Nehru to appoint a team to investigate and report on the killings and the destruction of property. According to Salim, Nehru in "his personal capacity" and not as the Prime Minister of the country appointed Pandit Sunderlal, Qazi Abdul Gaffar and Yunus Salim to tour the affected areas of the state with the reluctant consent of Vallabhai Patel, head of Home ministry responsible for provincial and internal security.<sup>47</sup>

During November and December 1948, the teams made an extensive tour of the state and compiled a comprehensive report on the large scale killings, rape and

<sup>47</sup> *A Report on the post Operation Polo massacres, rape and destruction or seizure of property in the Hyderabad State* by Pandit Sunderlal and Qazi Mohammed Abdul Gaffar in Omar Khalidi's *Hyderabad After The Fall* USA 1988 pp95-97

destruction and seizure of Muslim property. It is believed that Sardar Patel was incensed when he read the report. Also some portions of it was smuggled to Karachi in early 1949 and broadcast over Radio Pakistan to India's great embarrassment. The report was suppressed and never allowed to be made public. According to the report, at least 200,000 Muslims were in fact slaughtered in the aftermath of military operations. Fragments of the report were obtained from owners who wished to remain anonymous. The English report states that it was extremely dangerous for Muslims to travel in railways or buses. Any Muslim passenger discovered was dragged out of the train and arrested in a humiliating manner. To mention a few incidents following Police Action,

"In Jalna upon the arrival of army, the residents were assembled in the maidan. The Muslim residents were divided into alleged Razakkars and non-Razakkars. The alleged Razakkars were to be summarily shot to death, merely upon the accusation of someone that they were Razakkars. In Ganjyoti paygah, there were 500 homes belonging to the Muslims. Two hundred Muslims were murdered by the goondas. The army had seized weapons from Muslims. Muslim women were raped by the troops. According to Pasha Bi, a resident of Ganjoti, "All the young Muslim women here were raped." In Gogi Shahpur taluq, the residents were put to similar torture by the goondas. The Sikh troops armed with guns were watching the murder although they separated the children from the men about to be killed by pickaxe or sword, yet they forced the children to watch the ghastly scene of their elders bloody death. The walls and the pulpit of the Gogi mosque had been pulled down. Amina Bi, a resident of Gogi jumped into a well with her infant daughter Shahzadi. Some of the burned down Muslim homes were inspected and it was found that skulls and bones of those murdered

were strewn about the houses The troops neither stopped the killing nor participated in it."<sup>48</sup>

There were lot of women who lamented for the loss of male members' who were their bread winners. It was a great loss for the mothers, sisters and daughters. The following lists shows some of these women and their relation to the victims of the communal riots

Garwar Bi	Son,	Rasul Sahib
Imam Bi	Husband	Guru Sahib
Sultan Bi	Son	Mehboob
Zahra Bi	Sons	Muhammed Usman and Nazir Ahmed
	Sons of Husband's brother	Abdul Rahman, Abdur Rahim, Rasul, Ibrahim and Bashir Ahmed
Halim Bi	Three Sons	Ghuru Bhai, Nazir Ahmed and Ahmed Husain
Karim Bi	Son-in-law	Mohammed Umar
Karim Bi's sister	Son	Abdullah
Kulsum Bi	Husband	Chanda Sahib
Chanda Bi	Husband	Chanda Miyan
Mahasil Bi	Husband	Ahmed Sahib
Chanda Bi	Husband	Abdur Rahman
Sultan Bi	Son	Ghulam Rasul
Ayesha Bi	Sons	Mohaamed and Basheer
Chanda Bi	Husband	Hussain Sahib
Mahbub Bi	Son	Ismail Sahib
Aman Bi	Husband	Nanhe

<sup>48</sup> *Ibidp* 101-109

Hussain Bi	Husband	Qasim
Fatima Bi	Husband	Maqbul

Many women had fled to the jungle and therefore the names of many Muslim men murdered were not known.

The following is the list of atrocities committed in brief

**Killed:**

1. 2,000 belonging to Shapur alone
2. 2, 300 belonging to Sagar who had come to Shapur
3. 500 in Gogi
4. 1,000 in different villages around Shapur.
5. 125 at Gogi proper
6. 1,000 women committed suicide by falling into wells as a result of maltreatment.
7. 500 children killed and thrown into wells.
8. Most of the houses belonging to Muslims at Shapur were either looted or burnt or destroyed
9. The value of movable property destroyed is estimated to be Rs.5 crores.
10. Most of the lands and other immovable property belonging to Muslims have been occupied by the members of other communities.
11. More than 2/3rds of the houses at Sagar and Gogi have been burnt or destroyed.
12. Most of the mosques have been demolished.
13. Copies of the Holy Koran were either burnt or were torn into pieces and thrown into streets for being trampled over.

14. At Gogi houses were set on fire and Muslims were thrown into flames.

The only effort made to stop the carnage and effect damage control was initiated by the Hyderabad State Congress Committee. They entrusted the village Panchayats the work of collecting goods looted. But efforts in this direction were not very successful as the members of the Panchayats were those who were themselves the ring leaders and goondas and responsible for the atrocities committed by them.<sup>49</sup>

Thus the Hyderabad state did not add a happy episode in the transformation of India into a free and united nation. While most of the princely states made the decision to join India, Hyderabad took a different stand. This posed a great challenge to the Indian government. Even the Stand Still Agreement was violated by the Nizam, he began to work on mobilizing support from outside India. By appealing to the UNO, the Nizam caused great anxiety and embarrassment for India. Thus the Indian Government had no choice but to prepare for a military action on Hyderabad for integration. The accession became imperative, keeping in mind the defence and internal security of India.

Thus the "Good Old Days" had gone. The amazing life style of the Nizams of Hyderabad had passed into legend.

The last chapter is a summary and conclusion of the Thesis.

<sup>49</sup> Appendix to the report on condition of Muslim residents of Shapur, Gogi, Sagar and other villages around **Shapur Taluka** after 17<sup>th</sup> September, 1948 in O.K.p.p.1 13-115.