The Humanistic View of Heidegger
4.1 Introduction

Martin Heidegger is widely acknowledged to be one of the most original and important philosophers of the 20th century, while remaining one of the most controversial. Heidegger’s main interest was the study of being. In his fundamental treatise, “Being and Time”, he attempted to access being (Sein) by means of phenomenological analysis of human existence (Dasein) in respect to its temporal and historical character. After the change of his thinking (“the turn”), Heidegger placed an emphasis on language as the vehicle through which the question of being can be unfolded. He turned to the exegesis of historical texts, especially of the Presocratics, but also of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Holderlin, and to poetry, architecture, technology, and other subjects. Instead of looking for a full clarification of the meaning of being, he tried to pursue a kind of thinking which was no longer “metaphysical.” He criticized the tradition of Western philosophy, which he regarded as nihilistic, for, as he claimed, the question of being as such was obliterated in it. He also stressed the nihilism of modern technological culture. By going to the Presocratic beginning of Western thought, he wanted to repeat the early Greek experience of being, so that the West could turn away from the dead end of nihilism and begin anew. His writings are notoriously difficult. “Being and Time” remains his most influential work.
4.2 Life and works

“One cannot fully live unless one confronts one's own morality.” This hallmark of existentialist thought owes much to the works of Martin Heidegger.

Heidegger was born on September 26, 1889 in Messkirch in south-west Germany to a Catholic family. His father worked as sexton in the local church. In his early youth, Heidegger was being prepared for the priesthood. In 1903 he went to the high school in Konstanz, where the church supported him with a scholarship, and then, in 1906, he moved to Freiburg. His interest in philosophy first arose during his high school studies in Freiburg when, at the age of seventeen, he read Franz Brentano’s book entitled *On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle*. By his own account, it was the work that inspired his life-long quest for the meaning of being. In 1909, after completing the high school, he became a Jesuit novice, but was discharged within a month for reasons of health. He then entered Freiburg University, where he studied theology. However, because of health problems and perhaps because of a lack of a strong spiritual vocation, Heidegger left the seminary in 1911 and broke off his training for the priesthood. He took up studies in philosophy, mathematics, and natural sciences. It was the time when he first became influenced by Edmund Husserl. He studied Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. In 1913 he completed doctorate in philosophy with a dissertation on “*The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism*” under the direction of the neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert.

The outbreak of the First World War interrupted Heidegger’s academic career only briefly. He was conscripted into the army, but was discharged after two months because of health reasons. Hoping to take over the chair of Catholic
philosophy at Freiburg, Heidegger now began to work on a *habilitation* thesis, the required qualification for teaching at the university. His thesis, “*Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Categories and Meaning,*” was completed in 1915, and in the same year he was appointed a lecturer. He taught mostly courses in Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy, and regarded himself as standing in the service of the Catholic world-view. Nevertheless, his turn from theology to philosophy was soon to be followed by another turn.

In 1916, Heidegger became a junior colleague of Edmund Husserl when he latter joined the Freiburg faculty. The following year, he married Thea Elfride Petri, a Protestant student who had attended his courses since the fall of 1915. His career was again interrupted by military service in 1918. He served for the last ten months of the war, the last three month of those in a meteorological unit on the western front. Within a few weeks of his return to Freiburg, he announced his break with the “system of Catholicism” (January 9, 1919), got appointed as Husserl’s assistant (January 21, 1919), and began lecturing in a new, insightful way (February 7, 1919). His lectures on phenomenology and his creative interpretations of Aristotle would now earn him a wide acclaim. And yet, Heidegger did not simply become Husserl’s faithful follower. In particular, he was not captivated by the later developments of Husserl’s thought—by his neo-Kantian turn towards transcendental subjectivity and even less by his Cartesianism—but continued to value his earlier work “*Logical Investigations*”. Working over the question of things themselves, Heidegger soon began a radical reinterpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology.

In 1923, with the support of Paul Natorp, Heidegger was appointed Associate Professor at Marburg University. Between 1923 and 1928, he enjoyed there the
most fruitful years of his entire teaching career. His students testified to the originality of his insight and the intensity of his philosophical questioning. Heidegger extended the scope of his lectures, and taught courses on the history of philosophy, time, logic, phenomenology, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Leibniz. However, he had published nothing since 1916, a factor that threatened his future academic career. Finally, in February 1927, partly because of administrative pressure, his fundamental but also unfinished treatise, “Being and Time,” appeared. Within a few years, this book was recognized as a truly monumental work of 20th century philosophy. It earned Heidegger, in the fall of 1927, full professorship at Marburg, and one year later, after Husserl’s retirement from teaching, the chair of philosophy at Freiburg University. Although “Being and Time” is dedicated to Husserl, however upon its publication Heidegger’s departure from Husserl’s phenomenology and the differences between two philosophers became apparent. In 1929, his next published works—“What is Metaphysics?,” “On the Essence of Ground,” and “Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics”—further revealed how far Heidegger had moved from neo-Kantianism and phenomenology of consciousness to his own phenomenological ontology.

Heidegger’s life entered a problematic and controversial stage with Hitler’s rise to power. In September 1930, Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) became the second largest party in Germany, and on January 30, 1933 Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany. Heidegger now became politically involved. On April 21, 1933, he was elected rector of the University of Freiburg by the faculty. He was apparently urged by his colleagues to become a
candidate for this politically sensitive post, as he later claimed in an interview with Der Spiegel, to avoid the danger of a party functionary being appointed. But he also seemed to believe that he could steer the Nazi movement in the right direction. On May 3, 1933, he joined the NSDAP, or Nazi party. On May 27, 1933, he delivered his inaugural rectoral address on “The Self-Assertion of the German University.” The ambiguous text of this speech has often been interpreted as an expression of his support for Hitler’s regime. During his tenure as rector he produced a number of speeches in the Nazi cause, like “Declaration of Support for Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State” delivered in November 1933. There is little doubt that during that time, Heidegger placed the great prestige of his scholarly reputation at the service of National Socialism, and thus, contributed to its legitimization among his fellow Germans. And yet, just one year later, on April 23, 1934, Heidegger resigned from his office and took no further part in politics. His rectoral address was found incompatible with the party line, and its text was eventually banned by the Nazis. Because he was no longer involved in the party’s activities, Heidegger’s membership in the NSDAP became a mere formality. Certain restrictions were put on his freedom to publish and attend conferences. In his lecture courses of the between 1930 and 1940, and especially in the course entitled Holderlin’s Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rein” (“Germania” and “The Rhine”) originally presented at the University of Freiburg during the winter semester of 1934/35, he expressed covert criticism of Nazi ideology. He came under attack of Ernst Krieck, semi-official Nazi philosopher. For some time he was under the surveillance of the Gestapo. His final humiliation came in 1944, when he was declared the most “expendable” member of the faculty and sent to the Rhine to dig trenches. Following Germany’s defeat in the Second World War,
Heidegger was accused of Nazi sympathies. He was forbidden to teach and in 1946 was dismissed from his chair of philosophy. The ban was lifted in 1949.

The 1930s are not only marked by Heidegger’s controversial involvement in politics, but also by a change in his thinking which is known as “the turn” (die Kehre). In his lectures and writings that followed “the turn,” he became less systematic and often more obscure than in his fundamental work, “Being and Time”. He turned to the exegesis of philosophical and literary texts, especially of the Presocratics, but also of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Holderlin, makes this his way of philosophizing. A recurring theme of that time was “the essence of truth.” During the decade between 1931 and 1940, Heidegger offered five courses under this title. His preoccupation with the question of language and his fascination with poetry were expressed in lectures on Holderlin which he gave between 1934 and 1936. Towards the end of 1930s and the beginning of 1940s, he taught five courses on Nietzsche, in which he submitted to criticism the tradition of western metaphysics, described by him as nihilistic and made allusions to the absurdity of war and the bestiality of his contemporaries. Finally, his reflection upon the western philosophical tradition and an endeavor to open a space for philosophizing outside it, brought him to an examination of Pre-socratic thought. In the course of lectures entitled “An Introduction to Metaphysics”, which was originally offered as a course of lectures in 1935, and can be seen as a bridge between earlier and later Heidegger, the Pre-socratics were no longer a subject of mere passing remarks as in Heidegger’s earlier works. The course was not about early Greek thought, yet the Presocratics became there the pivotal center of discussion. It is clear that with the evolution of Heidegger’s thinking in the 1930s, they gained in
importance in his work. During the 1940s, in addition to giving courses on Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, Heidegger lectured extensively on Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus. During the last three decades of his life, from the mid 1940s to the mid 1970s, Heidegger wrote and published much, but in comparison to earlier decades, there was no significant change in his philosophy. His major works include “Being and Time” (1927), “Kant and the problem of Metaphysics” (1929) “On the Essence of Truth” (1931), “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935), “Introduction to Metaphysics” (1935), “Letter on “Humanism” (1947) “What is Called Thinking?” (1954) “The Question of Technology” (1954), “Identity and Difference” (1957), “On the way to Language” (1959) and “On time and Being” (1961). In his insightful essays and lectures, such as “What are Poets for?” (1946), (1953), “The Way to Language” (1959), and “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (1964), he addressed different issues concerning modernity, labored on his original philosophy of history—the history of being—and attempted to clarify his way of thinking after “the turn”. Most of his time was divided between his home in Freiburg, his second study in Messkirch, and his mountain hut in the Black Forest. He lectured on “What is Philosophy?” at Cerisy-la-Salle in 1955, and on “Hegel and the Greeks” at Aix-en-Provence in 1957, and also visited Greece in 1962 and 1967. In 1966, Heidegger attempted to justify his political involvement during the Nazi regime in an interview with Der Spiegel entitled “Only God Can Save Us”. One of his last teaching stints was a seminar on Parmenides that he gave in Zähringen in 1973. Heiddegger died on May 26, 1976, and was buried in the churchyard in Messkirch next to his parents. A Catholic mass was held in his memory. The officiating priest, his nephew Heinrich Heidegger, quoted “But the lord said unto me, Say not, I am a child: for thou shalt
He remained intellectually active up until the very end, working on a number of projects, including the massive *Gesamtausgabe*, the complete edition of his works.

Heidegger's life is an intriguing tale of a wanderer's return, but what makes it more interesting than many other such lives is his status as a thinker. No one would fret over the details of his political activity, let alone his religious beliefs or private life, were he not a significant philosopher. To his philosophy, then, we now turn.

### 4.3 Phenomenological method of Heidegger

Heidegger repudiated the label of existentialism, though it cannot denied that his analysis of human existence initiated the ‘movement’ in the twentieth century. He had been influenced by Husserl, Hegel, Kant and Kierkegaard. But it is not true that he had borrowed ideas from them. On the other hand, his differences with these philosophers are also remarkable. He accepted Husserl’s phenomenological method, but interpreted it in such a way that it could throw light on human existence. He was of the opinion that western philosophy had committed one fundamental mistake since the time of Plato. It was the mistake of disconnecting itself from the notion of Being. But he was unsympathetic in his treatment of philosophers like Kant and Kierkegaard. He thought of Kant as the philosopher who had attempted the construction of metaphysics in the dimension of human existence. Kierkegaard, we have shown, reacted strongly to Hegel’s heavy emphasis on the ‘concept’ and gave a new emphasis on the ‘ethical reality of the individual. Similarly Heidegger denied Husserl’s particular concern with essences. He thought that Husserl’s phenomenology neglects individual Existence. He argued that “conceptual analysis is not sufficient to give us knowledge of what
actually exists and what does not.”\(^2\) Heidegger refused to ‘neglect being’ by bracketing existence, and by concerning himself with essences. There is a great difference between the style of Kierkegaard’s ideas expanded in the heavy academic formulations of “Being and Time” (Sein und Zeit). Both are concerned with individual human existence. Heidegger had assimilated the ideas of the philosophers of the past into his unique and powerful conception of philosophy. He is at the same time a systematic and an ‘individual thinker’. He is concerned with the most abstract, theoretical and practical moral problems at one and the same time. Heidegger accepts a version of philosophy which Solomon thinks is similar yet strange to the conceptual analysis of analytic philosophy. At the same time he both affiliates and distinguishes himself from the ‘speculative’ systematic philosophies of the nineteenth century Germany.

According to Heidegger “philosophy is very much concerned with language and concepts; it is also closely akin to poetry. Philosophy is the study of the most abstract problems, but it is also concerned with the basic problem of how a man should live his life.”\(^3\) It will be shown that Heidegger’s main concern is with Being. But the answer to the question of Being does not come from an analysis of Being. A new philosophical vocabulary is needed to talk about what we have been confusedly and improperly been calling Being. Heidegger thinks, being requires its proper conceptual scheme. According to Heidegger “Philosophy is nothing but a verbal expression of certain pre-verbal or ontical structures. Philosophical mistakes are also expressions of pre-verbal failings.”\(^4\) Heidegger presents a close intimacy between questions about things and of ontical structures. Heidegger wants to establish a new grammar and vocabulary for philosophy. He thinks also that studies of conceptual matters must always be systematic. He denies the
broadest distinctions between philosophical disciplines. The distinctions between the theoretical and the practical are not accepted by him. He does not draw a line of demarcation between ethics and metaphysical sense. In the chapter ‘on the Essence of Truth’ in ‘Existence and Being’ he says, “Philosophy, however, can never refuse commonsense since commonsense is deaf to the language of philosophy. ‘To philosophize is to inquire into the extraordinary….Nor is it a part of everyday life: there is no requirement of regulation that forces us into it.”

Heidegger’s opinion, it is the very nature of philosophy never to make things easier but only more difficult. It is not to be supposed that philosophy and commonsense will ever reside together peacefully. It is the attempt to create new, more pure or ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ perspectives by creating a new language in which man is able to think truly. Philosophy needs a new way of thinking against reason and logic. If philosophy is the creation and restructuring of language, even against the rules of reason and logic, then the philosopher has a friend in his work. Poetry, he thinks, is a kind of ‘primitive’, ‘original’ and ‘innocent’ kind of seeing. He states that writing of poetry is the most innocent of all occupations. The poet, Heidegger tells us, is ‘present, and ‘earthy’. He sees things without prejudice. He sees things as they really are. Thus the poet will show us the way in philosophy. Heidegger’s main preoccupation has been to lay a foundation for metaphysics. Franz Brentano’s dissertation ‘On the manifold Sense of Being according to Aristotle’ opened Heidegger’s eyes to the problem of Being and it introduced him also to the philosophical world of the Greeks. The problem of Being arose as soon as Heidegger started mediating with Brentano on the meaning of the word ‘being’ for Aristotle. If according to Aristotle, the function of metaphysics is to ask ‘what are beings as beings?’ then Being giving beings their ‘is’, we have to ask first about Being itself. This is the beginning of Heidegger’s way. Aristotle’s question
was a metaphysical one. The process of transcendence. It means metaphysics means the transcendence of beings to their ‘being’ in such a way that beings are thereby considered as beings. If metaphysics is understood in this sense, then it had emerged initially with Plato when he made the distinction between the beings of experience as a world of shadows and the Being of these beings as a world of ideas. In the metaphor of the cave he speaks of ‘going beyond’ the shadows and ‘over to’ the ideas.

It is not God, nor ground of the world. Being is broader than all beings and yet is nearer to man than all beings, whether they be rocks, animals, works of art, machines, angels or God. Being is what is nearest to man. In Heidegger’s opinion, “Being is not a being, because it is that which makes beings present to man, and men to each other. It is nearest to man, because it makes man what he is. It allows him to enter into comportment with other beings.” Being encompasses all beings, just as a domain of openness encompasses everything found in it. It is the dimension out of which space and time come to presence. It is the domain of openness, as it is the lighting process, by which beings are lit up. If beings are ‘subjects’ or ‘objects’, then the light itself is neither one nor the other, but it is between them. It is from being, metaphysics derives all its vigour.

Existence is involved in the being of man, man who has a privileged being, the ‘There-being’ or Dasein. There-being which actually means man in his existence is a being who is there in the world. Dasein, as Richardson thinks, must always be understood as the Being there among beings, Being has a primacy over its there, which is thrown out and dominated all the time. According to the necessity of its own nature. At the same time the being there is needed, for the coming-to-pass of
non-concealment does not come to pass in a there, that is seen among beings, it does not come-to-pass at all. Being is disclosed in its there, but Being has the primacy and it is conceived as sending itself into its there. It conceals itself even in revealment. Being reveals itself in revealing beings, but it can never be seized for itself and by itself. Therefore, Being conceals itself in the very beings to which it gives rise. To think being will be to think of it as that which emits, not only in its positivity, but in its negativity as well. It is language through which he says, ‘is’ If the fulfillment is considered in terms of the there, though is the process by which existence assumes and achieves itself as the Being-there.\(^7\)

Heidegger would say that Foundational thought, is the process by which human existence responds to beings, not only in its positivity but also in its negativity. Philosophy is the authentic response to the appeal of being. Heidegger has tried to show that philosophers forgot the distinction between Being and beings and thus unable to capture the real sense of Being, they gradually fall away from Being.

Against the ‘fallen’ historical positions Heidegger asserts that “understanding of Being is the basic problem not only of philosophy, but of all human enterprises and human beings in general.”\(^8\) Philosophy cannot claim to have completed its search for foundation, so long as the most basic concept Being remains the darkest concept of all. Heidegger thinks that the tensions of modern culture are themselves based on our failure to apprehend the problem of Being. Heidegger says, “The world is darkening. The essential episodes of the darkening are the light of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the standardization of man, the pre-eminence of the mediocre…. Darkening the world means emasculation of the spirit, the disintegration, wasting away , repression and misinterpretation of spirit.”\(^9\) There
are many presuppositions and prejudices about Being. But these should not make us think that the problem as set forth by Heidegger does not make sense. Being may not be a class or genus name and it may not be the name of an entity or refer to any particular property and thus not be a normal predicate. But all this does not mean that we cannot describe the difference between that which exists and that which does not. It is a fact that we discern the existing from the non-existing and we do have a concept of existence which can be subject to illuminating philosophical analysis. But the failure to provide such an analysis and the refusal to attempt to provide how one constitutes our ‘fallenness from Being’. It is one thing to be able to recognize things as existing, but it is something very different to understand what it is for something to exist. Heidegger states, “Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not firstly clarified the meaning of Being and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.”

Heidegger says that the term ‘phenomenology’ express a formula which we can formulate as ‘the things themselves’. In his words, “it is opposed to free-floating constructions and accidental feelings; it is opposed to thinking over a conception which only seems to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as “problems”, for generations at a time.”

Accordingly, the phenomena are the totality of what can be brought to light. An understanding of the concept of phenomenon depends on our seeing how and what is designated in the first significance is interconnected with the second significance. Only when the meaning of something is such that it has a pretension
of showing itself, can it show itself as something which it is not. When ‘phenomenon’ signifies semblance, the ‘phenomenon’ as the manifest is included as that upon which the second significance is founded. Heidegger assigns the term phenomenon to this positive and primordial signification and distinguishes it from the ‘semblance’, which is the privative modification of ‘phenomenon’ defined in this way. ‘Phenomenon’ cannot be defined with the help of the conception of ‘appearance’, as this notion itself is unclear. Again, the expression ‘appearance’ itself can have a double signification. It may mean first, appearing in the sense of announcing-itsel, as something not showing itself. In the second sense, that which it its showing-itsel indicates something which does not show itself.

We can say that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the ‘phenomenon’ shows itself unreflectingly. When it becomes a matter for consideration or as Heidegger understands, when it is considered mathetically, it shows itself in itself. It becomes a phenomenon of ‘phenomenology’. Space and time must be able to show themselves in this way. Heidegger thinks that the phenomenological conception of phenomenon requires an insight into the meaning of the formal conception of phenomenon. But before that he wants to understand the significance of Logos and would like to make it clear in what sense phenomenology can be a ‘science of’ phenomena at all. In his opinion logos as discourse means the same as making manifest what is talking about in discourse. So discursive communication makes manifest what is being talked about.

The interpretation of the words ‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos’ show an inner relationship between the things meant by these terms. So ‘phenomenology’ means ‘to let that which shows itself for itself, this is the formal meaning. But Heidegger is expressing the maxim as formulated, ‘To the things themselves’.
Phenomenology, Heidegger thinks, does not designate the object of its researches, nor does it characterize the subject matter thus taken into consideration. It merely indicates the how and what is to be treated in this subject gets exhibited and handled. In Heidegger’s language “To have a science of phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly.”

The significance of ‘phenomenon’ conceived formally and in the ordinary sense is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself may be called ‘phenomenology’. Phenomenology in this way has taken into its grasp as its subject matter an object which demands that it become a phenomenon. It is demanded in a distinctive sense and in terms of its own most content as a thing.

A phenomenological concept derived from a primordial source may have the possibility that it may degenerate, if it is communicated in the form of an assertion. It gets understood in an empty way and thus loses its indigenous character. It then becomes a free-floating thesis. Even in the concrete analysis of phenomenology there is the possibility that what has been originally within our grasp may become hardened.

Heidegger thinks that the terms phenomenal and ‘phenomenological’ can now be forced in their signification. A phenomenon is that which given and explicated in the way in which it is encountered. This is what has to be kept in mind with reference to ‘phenomenal structures’. Whatever belongs to the kind of exhibiting and explicating and whatever prepares the way of conceiving demanded by this research is called ‘phenomenology’.
4.4 Problem of Being

The philosophical problem of being is a paramount concern of Heidegger’s philosophy. For Heidegger there is only one basic question in philosophy: the question of being. His philosophy thus held that the nature of human existence involve active participation in the world, regardless of what that participation entailed. This he termed as ‘being there,’ in German ‘Dasein’. Dasein is being or ‘being there’. It expresses only existence. Only Dasein can be said to have or not to have meaning; hence Being is meaningful solely in terms of human existence. Man exists through his choices and his being, therefore is entirely indeterminate. Other things like trees, rocks and animals and angels and God are also there but they do not exist. It is man alone who can be said to exist because man has conscious awareness about his existence. To exist, to have authentic being, is to reflect on oneself, to be concerned about oneself. True being is self being, involving not only consciousness, but responsibility and free decision as well.

Heidegger thinks that phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities. It is ontology. He argues that “there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologically distinctive. It is Dasein and the analysis of Dasein is necessary to confront the most important problem which is the question of the meaning of Being in general.”13 Heidegger wants to show that his investigations will demonstrate that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. The language of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of interpretation. Through it the authentic meaning of Being and the structures of being which Dasein itself possesses are made known to Dasein’s own understanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in
the original sense of the word. In this sense it means the task of interpretation. But
the interpretation holds to the extent of uncovering the meaning of Being and the
basic structures of Dasein in general. Lastly, Dasein is an entity which has the
possibility of existence and as such it has an ontological priority over any other
entity. ‘Hermeneutic’ in this sense becomes the analytic of the existentiality of
existence. Being as the basic theme of philosophy is not a class or genus of
entities. But it applies to every entity. Being and the structure of Being are beyond
every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is
pure and simple transcendences. The transcendence is distinctive in the sense that
it implies the radical individuation of Dasein. Every disclosure of Being as the
transcendensis transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth is
transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth is transcendental truth.
Heidegger observes that ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct
disciplines. These terms characterize the nature of philosophy with reference to its
object and its way of treating the object. Philosophy is universal
phenomenological ontology and starts its investigation from the hermeneutic of
Dasein. This analytic of existence has set up the guiding line of philosophical
point where it begins and to which it returns. According to Heidegger what is
essential in phenomenology does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical
movement. It is possibility which stands higher than actuality. Phenomenology can
be understood only by seizing upon it as a possibility. Heidegger’s
phenomenological examination is not an examination of individual objects, but the
examination of the phenomenon of Being as such. The world, in the opinion of
Heidegger, is not simply a totality of objects, but a peculiarly independent object
for examination apart from any and all entities in it.
In Heidegger’s opinion, there is no ego, this is simply what he calls ‘Being-in-the world’. The world is not ‘bracketable’, nor is the concept of ego necessary. Once the concept of ego is removed, we are free from the threat of philosophical scepticism. In this context the ‘phenomenological movement’ is divided into two branches. He establishes what is called “existential phenomenology”. So Heidegger says, “What we seek when we inquire into Being is not something entirely unfamiliar, even if proximally we cannot grasp it all.”

It is also said in this connection that the Being of entities is not an entity. So, Being, as something which is asked about, must be exhibited in a way of its own. It is essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered. The meaning of being also demands that it will be conceived in a way of its own. The question that is asked now is, in which entities is the meaning of being to be discerned? Heidegger thinks that such an entity is Dasein – human being in its existence in the world. The very asking of the question is the mode of the being of entity. It gets its essential character from what is inquired about namely Being. This is an entity which each of us is himself and this includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of being. The explicit formulation of the question of Being requires a proper explication of an entity with regard to its being. It is true that being has been presupposed in all ontology till now, but not as a concept at its disposal. The ‘presupposing of Being’ actually works as a guiding threat. It shows that being arises from the average understanding of being in which we always operate and which in the end belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein.

Ontologically, existence is the characteristic of objects which are called Heidegger Being-present-at-hand. It is a kind of Being which is especially inappropriate to entities of Dasein character. Secondly, that Being which is an issue for this entity
is in each case mine. That entity which in its Being has this Being as an issue relates itself towards its Being as its own most possibility.

Heidegger indicates that in its interpretation, Dasein should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein is its everyday ‘averageness’. This is what Heidegger calls the ontical nature of Dasein. The ontological significance is consultancy overlooked. It applies not only to the ontical and pre-ontological unclarity of Dasein, but even more to the ontological task which lies ahead. This entity must not missed in that kind of Being in which it is phenomenally closest. The explication of Dasein in its average everydayness does not give us just average structures in the sense of a hazy indefiniteness. Anything which is taken in an ontical way can also be grasped ontologically in relation to important structures. Such structures may be structures Being of Dasein. The different characteristics of Dasein can be obtained by considering the existence-structures.

Heidegger wants to say that the existence of Dasein is distinguished by the very fact that in its Being, that Being is an issue for it. He says, “It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it.” Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Daisen’s Being. There is an essential relationship of Dasein to Being and so the problem of Being must be approached through an investigation of Dasein. It is pointed out by him that the question ‘who is Dasein’? is not so simple.

Heidgger says that the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein is just not the ‘I myself’. The real self, according to Heidegger’ is Dasein, but it is neither subject nor natural object and between ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’ and the former means that which has to do
with everyday existence. Ontological refers to the aspect of Dasein in which it asks the question of Being. Heidegger tells us that Dasein is essentially ontological, which means that Dasein necessarily asks about Being. He states, “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological”. There is also a related distinction; it is between ‘existentielle’ and ‘existential.”16 ‘Existentielle’ is related to ‘onticla’ and is its specific application. When applied to Dasein, it refers to the non-essential characteristics. ‘Existential’ on the other hand, refers to ‘ontological, as applied specifically to Dasein. An existential structure of Dasein is an essential structure and gives rise to such statements as ‘Dasein is a being-in-the-world’.

4.5 Dasein and the world

Dasein is not a subject but it removes the distinction between ‘subject’ and ‘object’ as it is defined as ‘being-in-the-world’. It cannot be distinguished from its existence in the world. So it is not sensible to suppose that we know ourselves better than we know the world. It is not also possible to suggest that we know about the world. We know ourselves and the world, Heidegger thinks, identically, for ourselves and the world build up. It is the view of Heidegger that the world cannot be bracketed or doubted, and to think of such is a philosophical illusion. It is not therefore intelligible to ask how Dasein could reach beyond itself to grasp the world. Nor can we suppose that Dasein is dreaming of a world, but is not part of it. ‘Dasein, and ‘Being-in-the-world’ are inseparable, they are the same phenomenon.

We have to understand that Heidegger is doing phenomenology and the justification for his concepts must be in the accurate description of ‘primitive’ experience’. The rejection of the subject-object distinction and the use of the term
Dasein in place of the traditional concepts of ‘ego’, ‘consciousness’ and subject have to be defended phenomenology. He thinks first that the concept of ego as the basis of everything is not supported by phenomenological evidence. Secondly, in his opinion there is a distinction between the world and the objects of the world.

‘The word “I” is to be understood only in the sense of a non committal formal indicator’. There is, therefore, no ‘I’ which can be substantially distinguished from the world in general and no bracketing or doubting of things ‘outside’ of consciousness is possible. Once the notion of an indoubtable primitive ego is given up, the traditional metaphysical problems do not arise. When Heidegger says that Dasein is a being-in-the-world, it is the profound intimacy of Dasein with the world. It is by reason of this intimacy that other beings which are within the world may be encountered, that is, reveal themselves for what they are when they come in contact with Dasein. The contact of the objects with Dasein is not, however, in the order of ‘knowledge’, but in the nature of practical relations.

The world constitutes an essential structure of Dasein, but particular entities are not essential structures or existentialia of Dasein. There is a necessary connection between Dasein and the world, It is with reference to entities and not to the world, that we can start to speak of a distinction between the subject and the object. But it is necessary to examine the primitive relationship between Dasein and particular entities. Traditional philosophy has understood this relationship as one of knowing, and the entities known are things or objects.

The analysis shows that Heidegger wants to give emphasis to the entities encountered as equipments. He calls them ready to hand. We are not aware of the things of the world in our practical concerns. But when something goes wrong in
the world of practical life, we come to notice them as things. This mode in which the entities are regarded as things is called by Heidegger Presence-at-hand. It does not mean that there are two kinds of objects in the world—entities and things. Rather, they are the same, but appear differently in different contexts. The pen with which I write is a ready-to-hand equipment which I need for my practical concern. But at that stage I do not notice the characteristics which the pen has as an object. But the characteristics become noticeable and the entity assumes the character of a thing, when the equipment character becomes disturbed either through its misplacement or loss or obstructive character. The entity character and thing character of what we encounter in the world become understood by us through different kinds of knowing—practical circumspection and theoretical understanding. This is how Heidegger presents the world in which Dasein continues to exist.

4.6 Concept of Dasein

Dasein is Heidegger’s way of referring both to the human being and to the type of being that humans have. It comes from the verb Dasein, which means ‘to exist’ or ‘to be there, to be here.’ The noun Dasein is used by other philosophers, by Kant for example, for the existence of any entity. But Heidegger restricts it to human being. 'Da-sein', to stress the sense of 'being (t)here'.

Dasein is a real self which is neither subject nor natural object. It is neither transcendental nor empirical ego. The being of human is strikingly different from that of other entities in the world. 'Dasein is an entity for which, in its being, that being is an issue'. Unlike other entities, it has no definite essence: “the essence of Dasein lies in its existence. accordingly those characteristics which can be
exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which
'looks' so and so and itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for
it to be, and no more than that.....So when we designate this entity with the term
‘Dasein’, we are expressing not its ‘what’ (as if it were a table, house or tree) but it
is being.” 17

In “Being and Time” Heidegger characterizes Dasein as care. It may be called a
generalized structure of concern. Dasein’s character as care is parallel to Husserl’s
thesis that the structure of consciousness is intentionality. The very nature of
Dasein is such that it finds itself confronting an object. But the object does not
enjoy the same philosophical status in the philosophy of Husserl and that of
Heidegger. Care may also be designated as intentionality, but with more emphasis
on the practical and the non-cognitive acts which were neglected by Husserl. An
influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger is noticed here. In Concluding Unscientific
Postscript Kierkegaard says, “The real subject is not the cognitive subject....the
real subject is the ethically existing subject. The only reality that exists for the
existing individual is his own ethical reality.” 18 Dasein is the neighbour of Being.
It is said that Man is not the master of beings, Man is the shephered of Being.”

We regard the world as the totality of equipments. But man’s concerns are not
limited to his concerns to get something done practically. Man is ultimately
concerned about himself. This ultimate concern about himself. This ultimate
concern is care. The concern for himself is basically the concern to find out who
he is. It is the search for self identity.

In trying to answer the question ‘who am I?’ man recognizes in himself three
existential structures. These are ‘Existence’, ‘Facticity’, and ‘Fallenness’. Heidegger calls these structures existential or existential structures. They are a
priori structure, they are not to be confused with categories which in Heidegger’s opinion apply to objects or entities within the world other than Dasein. These structures are not the characteristics of Dasein like the characteristics a human being can have. They are rather the modes, the existential modes through which Dasein has its existence. There are other structures of Dasein such as Being – in-the-world, death, freedom and many more. But Heidegger thinks that all these structures are derivative of the central characterization of Dasein as care due to his Being in-the-world. We can understand the existential structures of Dasein by Heidegger’s analysis in “Being and Time”.

Heidegger, as we see afterwards, distinguishes between the authentic and inauthentic existence of Dasein. He would say that authentic living is the recognition of the three existential structures, while inauthentic existence is a total neglect of such understanding. The first structure Existenz is defined in terms of possibility and understanding. Dasein as understanding, Heidegger thinks, is the projection of possibilities with the help of understanding. Understanding of Heidegger is something like kant’s concept of reason in practical employment.

By Dasein’s facticity Heidegger means that finds itself in the world. As he says, ‘the concept of facticity’ implies that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has ‘Being – in- its destiny with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.”19 Facticity is the actual condition that Dasein exists, and exists in a particular world. ‘Fallenness from Being’ is failure to ask the question of Being and inability to question nature, as it implies all three structures including possibilities and given ‘facts’ and the loss of all perspectives and the involvement of oneself with the petty tasks of the present as they present themselves. This
structure of Dasein manifests itself in authenticity. We are always threatened by the
tendency to fallenness and most of us surrender to it, average everydayness is a
state of fallenness. Heidegger’s definition of care is a restatement of these three
structures. It is the ‘unity’ of these structures. According to definition, “Care is,
ahead – of – itself – already – being – in (the world) as being – near – to being
encountered within the word.” The words ‘ ahead of itself’ indicate Dasein’s
Existenz or projection of possibilities, the second part of the definition refers to
facticity and the last part refers to the tendency of man to fullness, the state of ‘
falling captive to the world’.

By Existenz Heidegger means that a priori or existential structure of Dasein which
means a ‘projection of possibilities’. This idea of Existenz has its origin in
Kierkegaard where he makes distinction between ‘truly existing human beings’
who recognize their possibilities from those men existing human being’s with so
called existence who do not exist . Like Kierkergaard, Heidegger insists that
freedom of choice and recognition of this freedom constitute the essence of
Existenz. In his words, “The ‘essence’ of Dasein consists of its Existenz. Also
Dasein is mine to be in one way or another.” Dasein has always made some sort
of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine. That entity which is in
its Being as its own most possibility’. As Existenz is the projection of possibilities,
we have to inquire into the nature of these possibilities and the character of this
projection . Heidegger says that in each case Dasein is its possibility and it has this
possibility . But it is not a property as something present at hand would be. Again,
as Dasein is in each case essentially has its own possibility, it can in its very being
‘choose’ itself and win itself . It can also lose itself and never win itself. Or, it can
only seen to do so. When it is said that Dasein is in each case its own possibility, it
means that we do not expect to find a general set of potentialities or capacities for all human beings. It means that we should not desire a priori characterization of human nature and so there is no given endeavour. Dasein in each case having its own possibilities’ is to insist that while Dasein always has possibilities, these possibilities may be different, as human being are different.

Heidegger stresses the point that every lifestyle is not based upon rational justification, but is always based on personal decision or choice. In analyzing the nature of possibility Heidegger does not say that a possibility will always give us a choice. He speaks, for example, of ‘possible’ and ‘impossible possibilities’, as well as of ‘necessary possibilities’. In case of a necessary possibility we cannot have a choice as to whether we are going to adopt it or not. Death is such a necessary possibility. It is Dasein ultimate and ‘ownmost’ possibility. But it is also necessary. We cannot choose whether to die or not. We can say therefore that possibility does not simply mean ‘something which can be chosen or not by Dasein’. There are also ‘impossible possibilities’, for example, the impossibility of immorality or the impossibility of our wish to be God. We cannot choose to be immortal or to be God. Yet it is one of our possibilities in the required sense.

A possibility for the Heidegger is any structure of the world. It is also a kind of horizon. But his possibility is not just possibility of experience or possibilities for knowing. There are possibilities for action, possibilities for moods, attitudes, and feelings. Possibilities are simply possible structures of Being-in-the-world. These are possibilities as they can be conceived by Dasein. As Dasein is Being –in-the-world, any structure of Being-in-the-world is a structure of Dasein itself. In Heidegger’s language, “Understanding of the world is at the same time an
understanding of oneself are inseparable. These conceptions are the possibilities of Dasein.” Heidegger thinks that a projection of a possibility is not a prediction about a future state of affairs.

If we think in this way, it will be neglecting the practical or ‘concerned’ nature of Dasein. Projection of possibilities is the project or design of a structure of the world. ‘Existenz as possibility’ means that a human being is essentially a ‘forward projecting’ creature. He does not just know the world, nor does he unknowingly act in the world. Dasein’s characteristic is that he makes plans to change the world and attempts to carry them out. He takes the strictly cognitive notions of Kant and Husserl to include practical concerns. It is also the same with the concept of understanding. It is through understanding that Dasein project its possibilities. Understanding deal with the possibilities. It is the projection of fundamental possibilities into the world in terms of one’s structuring and restructuring of it. It is also a thinking of Heidegger is not always a self – conscious or reflective study. But this does not mean that this understating is not always self-understanding in an explicit sense, on the basis of a projection of future possibilities. It only means that understanding is not always articulated or conceptualized.

The existential structure of Dasein referred by Heidegger as ‘facticity’ is an elaboration of the definition of Dasein as ‘Being-in-the-world’. Dasein lives in a particular world at a particular time. In Heidegger’s opinion we cannot recognize our existence without recognizing at the same time that we exist in a particular world.

Dasein finds himself in a particular, irreducible, unbracketable world of real objects. Facticity is not simply finding oneself in the world, but finding oneself in
a particular world, for example the twentieth century India or Europe, born of particular parents with a particular body or social environment. These facts are not part of Dasein’s Existenz, as they are not chosen by it. Finding oneself in a particular world is characterized by Dasein as being in a state of ‘thrownness’. I find myself living in a middle class Indian family with traits inherited from my parents, with a personality partially determined by my early childhood, with responsibilities and expectations imposed on me by my ‘station in life’. My entire past is my facticity, for it is a collection of facts which I have not chosen. My bodily structure is also a part of my facticity. I can leave this place, this country, for even this planet, but I am the prisoner of my body. Facticity, for Heidegger, is the set of all these givens which I encounter in my existence. But I am determined by these ‘givens’. My Existenz always directs me to choose particular attitudes and projects concerning these given facts. I am with this particular body, but I may choose to worship it, to look down upon it or mould it for spiritual purposes. I may also treat it as a ‘curious thing’. I may find myself in a particular environment, but I may choose to remain a middle class individual or try to improve my condition or to come to an inferior standard of living. My circumstances, my facticity are always determined, given to me. I am ‘thrown’ into them, but the particular ways in which I shall confront these circumstances are always undetermined. My Existenz is always a range of possibilities in relation to facticity. To show that there is a priority of facticity Heidegger gives a phenomenological demonstration of certain ‘intuitions’ which yield ‘essential insights’. These are to be found in ‘moods’ which we experience in finding ourselves in the world.

Existenz or possibility is one of the existential structures of Dasein. But Dasein may fail to recognize this Existenz. He may thus fail to recognize this various
possibilities. The third existential structure of Dasein is the tendency to neglect one’s Existence. Existence and Fallenness are both apriori capabilities of Dasein. Men very seldom move towards the realization of Existence, but most of the time they fall to the temptation of fallenness. Man is so preoccupied with the petty tasks and problems of everyday life that he has no time for reflection on his Existence.

Our first encounter with another is very much like our primitive encounter with the world as equipment. We want to employ others to serve purposes. But it is not possible to manipulate another person as a tool. Our initial relation to another person is through soliciting. Heidegger wants to stress that Being – with others is another existential structure of Dasein which does not consist of the fact that we dwell in a world with other people. According to Heidegger, Being – with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when facticity no other is present at hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s Being – alone is Being–with in the world. The other can be missing only in an for a being – With. Thus our conception of ourselves depends on the conception of ourselves as Being – in- the – world – with- others. Heidegger says, ‘they are what they do’. Dasein, he means to say, is a part of the public. He has his identity in social roles. The social roles are defined, not by the individual, but by the public. As Existence, Dasein has possibilities, but in the character of Being – with, he has resigned his right to project these possibilities for himself. These possibilities are disposed of by the public instead of by oneself. These do not become one’s own responsibility. The power to determine Dasein’s being does not belong to oneself and thus the self of Dasein is not a personal self. It is the self of the anonymous public. In this way the ‘who’ of Dasein is not this one. Not that one oneself, not some people, and no the sum of them all. ‘The who’ is the neither das mann.
Das Mann, the understanding of Dasein is restricted by the current standards of success and failures. The standards are imposed by das Mann and as a result, the differences are reduced. The goal of das Mann is the average standard. In Heidegger’s words “Das Mann maintains itself factically in the averages of that which belongs to it, of that which it regards as value and that which it does not and of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies. In the state of averageness, all things sank to the same level, a surface resembling a blind mirror that no longer reflects.”

Dasein, as das Mann, is relieved of the responsibility of establishing its own standards of success. The standards of das Mann are directed towards averageness and as das Mann, it takes things in an easy manner. Heidegger expresses this situation; Everyone is the other and no one is himself. The self of everyday is das Mann-self, which we distinguish from the authentic. Self-that is, from the self which has been taken hold of in its own way. As das Mann self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into das Mann and must first find itself. This dispersal characterized the “subject” of that kind of Being which we know as concernful absorption in the world we encounter as closest to us.’

4.7 Dasein and its Temporality

Dasein has another important essential structure; it is temporality. Actually, it is not another separate important structure, but it is the being of Dasein. It may be said that Being itself is temporal. Heidegger points out that Dasein is temporality. There cannot be any time except for Dasein and conversely, there can be no Dasein except for there being time. Dasein is not only essentially in space but it is also essentially in time. Dasein constitutes or projects temporality. Time is
primordially with Dasein. It is the preoccupation with the everyday concerns of the present. Authenticity is characterized by its preoccupation with the present and authenticity is characterized by the united view of past, present and future.

It is on the basis of our concern with the future, our anxiety for lack of time. It is on the basis of our experiences of waiting, expecting, striving, not having enough time, and such things that we get a notion of time. According to Heidegger, in the public view of time, time is infinite. But Heidegger thinks that time is finite and not infinite. Dasein’s projection of possibilities has its end, and that end is death. Heidegger proceeds to give an analysis of the possibility of Dasein as Being a whole and an understanding of the structure of dasein as Being towards-Death.

The potentiality of Dasein is to achieve totality and there is something in its structure which is constantly something to be settled. As long as Dasein is an entity, Heidegger says, it can never reach its wholeness. He wants to draw a preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological nature of death, Being towards death and the every dayness of Dasein, everyday Being-towards death, the full existential conception of death and an existential projection of an authentic Being towards-death.

Dying is something that every Dasein has to take upon itself at the time. When, for example, a fruit is unripe, it moves towards its ripeness. The fruit brings itself to ripeness and such a ripening is a characteristic of its Being as a fruit. Ripening Heidegger thinks that the specific Being of the fruit. As a kind of Being it is formally analogous to Dasein. But ripeness as an end and death as an end do not coincide with regard to their ontological character with ripeness, there is a fulfilment of the fruit. But, can death be called fulfilment in this sense? With
death, Dasein has surely fulfilled its course, though it might not have exhausted its possibilities. Even unfulfilled Dasein comes to an end. It is in rare cases that Dasein comes to ripeness only with death. It might have reached its ripeness before the end. In most cases, Dasein end with unfulfillment. Ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself. So we have to ask, in what sense death must be conceived as the ending of Dasein.

But ending which they mean finished does not include fulfilment. On the contrary, whatever has to be fulfilled must reach the state of getting finished. Fulfilling is a mode of finishedness and is based upon it. As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old to die’. Heidegger says that “Being at an end implies existentially Being towards which Dasein comports itself.” The death is something impending for Dasein. It is something not yet present at hand nor it is something which is still outstanding. Death is something that stands before us something impending. But the interpretation of death as an impending event is not satisfactory, for there may be impending events like a storm, the remodelling of a house or the arrival of a friend coming from the environment. In the case of death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost possibility. This is a possibility, as Heidegger says, in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. In Heidegger’s words, “Death is the possibility of no-longer being able to be there.”

It is not possible for Dasein to outstrip the possibility of death which is its potentiality for Being. Death, Heidegger says, is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. In this way, death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational and which is not to be outstripped. As such, death is something distinctively impending. Being –towards-the –end is thus Being towards that distinctive possibility which we can characterize as death.
Heidegger clarifies this state as thrownness into the death. It reveals itself to Dasein in more primordial and impressive manner in that condition of mind called ‘anxiety’. Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety in the face of that potentiality-for-Being, which is the ownmost of Dasein, non-relational and not to be outstripped. It is as Being-in-the-world that Dasein faces anxiety. Anxiety in the face of death is a basic state-of-mind of Dasein. It amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as a thrown Being towards its end. The existential conception of death is thus established, that it is a thrown Being towards its own most potentiality –for-Being which is non-relational and not to be outstripped.

Dasein is dying as long as it exists, but most of the time, it does so by way of falling. Factual existing is not only a thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, but it has likewise been absorbed in the world of concern. Heidegger expresses this situation in this way, “In this falling Being alongside, fleeing from uncanniness announces itself and this means now a fleeing in the face of one’s ownmost Being towards-death.” Existence, facticity and falling characterize Being-towards-death, Dasein may not have any acquaintance. There is produced an indifferent tranquillity.

Heidegger now defines the full existential conception of death; death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is the end of Dasein. We have to characterize Being-towards-death as a Being towards a possibility. It is the possibility of authentic existence. Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility reveals to Dasein its own most potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue.
Anticipation does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped. Rather, it frees itself for accepting this. By it one becomes free one’s own death. The certain possibility of death discloses Dasein as a possibility. This possibility is made by Dasein as its most potentiality. For Being the certainty is by no means that which maintains itself in the truth of the present-at-hand. When some-thing present-at-hand is uncovered, we just look at it and allow the entity to be encountered itself. The Being certain in relation to death does not have this character. But this does not mean that it is of a lower grade. Rather, it does not belong at all to the graded order of the kinds of evidence we can have about the present-at-hand. Regarding death as true it gives another kind of certainty. It is more primordial than any certainty which relates to entities encountered with the world, for it is certain of Being-in-the world. Because of this, holding death for true does not demand just one definite kind of behaviour in Dasein, but demands Dasein in the full authenticity of existence. In the anticipation of death which is indefinitely certain Dasein opens itself to a constant threat which arises out of its environment of existence.

It is Dasein’s mood which brings it face to face with the thrownness of its being there. Heidegger says, “But the state of mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being is anxiety.”

These modes refer to man’s relationship to himself, The authentic man has an adequate understanding of himself, of ‘who’ he is. The inauthenticity and man refuses to see himself as he is and acts blindly. But authenticity and inauthenticity are every Dasein’s possibilities. Authenticity depends on an adequate ontological
recognition of one’s Existing, facticity and fallenness. Inauthenticity ignores Existenz and lives in fallenness. Authenticity is something for which one has to strive. Heidegger says that authenticity is an ideal for everyone of us.

The inauthentic existence is man’s forgotten Being. In the authentic mode Dasein is supposed to recognize and act in accordance with the notion of its self an ideal for everyone of us. The inauthentic existence is man’ forgotten Being.

Authentic existence is characterized by three modes of orientation to the world; discovery of oneself as already in the world as the recognition of facticity, understanding which is the projection of possibilities in which Dasein can discover himself and discourse. Discourse is the capacity to articulate what ‘turning – in’ and the understanding disclose to us. The inauthentic man does not discover himself already in the world, but finds himself in as state of ambiguity. He is ‘caught up in a whirlpool of daily activity’. In inauthentic existence the understanding cannot function, as the inauthentic man cannot distinguish between what he understands and what he is given from das Mann. The speech in inauthentic existence is prattle or chatter. But if speech becomes preoccupied with trivial tasks it prevents our ontological thinking. This is why Heidegger places so much importance on poetry, which makes as conscientious. He would be interpreted very much like Chomsky. The public would has a seductivity and it is reassuring. Dread comes about in the period of a trauma. The question of Being in Heidegger rises through Dasein and in his opinion the world cannot be distinguished from Dasein. It is thus clear that Heidegger is going to reject the oldest and he commonsense interpretation of Being. In traditional philosophy, Being is simply supposed to be there. This being in itself is supposed to be the
Truth and in a derivative way we say that our ideas or judgements are true, if they correspond to the truth or Being. That the traditional thought take a false start, as seen in Descartes, which we find in the case of the sharp distinction is also present in the writings of Plato and has secured its position in the very grammar we use to talk about Being. He says further, Being has been disclosed in a preliminary way, though non-conceptually, this makes it possible for Dasein as existent Being – in the – world to comport itself entities- towards those which it encounters within-the- world as well as towards itself as existent'. Objects – in-themselves on which the correspondence is supposed to based. Heidegger says, “We call ‘true’ not only genuine coin and all actualities of that sort, we also principally call ‘true’ or ‘False’ our statements concerning such actualities as are themselves true or false in their reality.”

Being true and truth mean correspondence and that in a double sense.

Heidegger wants to say that the correspondence theory of truth is not an adequate theory. This does not mean that the theory is false, but only that it can not adequately account for all truth. This theory works well in most everyday contexts. It has been shown already that ‘thing’ is not a primitive notion and thus an account to ‘truth’ which depends on the notion or ‘thing’ will not give us a primitive notion of truth. Heidegger’s theory of truth, it can be seen, presents us primarily with a practical conception of truth, which is inseparably bound up with human behaviour and not only to human speech and conceptual knowledge. It is behaviour which gives us a criterion of possibility and not speech. The behaviour is grounded in the Being of Dasein, specially in freedom. Thus, according to Heidegger, the essence of truth is freedom. Heidegger stressed the fact that truth does not refer to something beyond human subjectivity. Truth remains human in
its subjectivity and subject to human control. Heidegger says, “Freedom is a participation in the disclosure of what – is- as- such. Freedom reveals itself as the ‘letting–be’ of what is analyzed in the following way. To let what – is overtness, in which everything and which entails such overtness.” To participate in something overt. Truth is disclosure in the sense that it is primarily our overt behaviour towards the world, not our asserting correct propositions about things in the world. According to Heidegger, The basic truth, is truth about ourselves- what we are . It is this truth which is the special concern of philosophy. This is ‘original truth, the basis of all truth. What is then Being, accepting that truth is the disclosure of Being. It is not beyond Dasein, but is a structure of Dasein as ‘Being – in – the – world’. Being is whatever exists for Dasein. It cannot be what corresponds to Dasein’s ideas, experiences or ideas. Being is whatever is encountered by Dasein. Our verbal description is but one way in which Dasein encounters his world. Being is always essentially Being – for- Dasein’. Being and dessein are inseparable, just as we maintain that Dasein and ‘the world’ are inseparable. Being itself is not distinguished from nothing. The traditional notion of ‘Being is rather delineated in four different ways. Being is distinguished form (a) becoming. (b) appearance, (c) thinking, and (d) the ought. Distinctions b and c are important and these distinction give rise to the correspondence theory of truth which manifests the ‘fallenness’ of western man. We have to distinguish between being and appearance, because we think that there must be something behind the appearance. Philosophers from the time of Plato have come to distinguish thinking from Being. The former death with universals, while the latter pertained only to particular beings. Philosophy in this way comes to distinguish objects of thought from true Being.
Notes and References


3. Source: *Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy*


7. Ibid, p.62

8. Ibid, p.65

9. Ibid, p.102


12. Ibid, p.67

15. Ibid, p.49
16. Ibid, p.58
17. Ibid, p.65
19. Ibid, p.315
20. Ibid, p.322
22. Ibid, p.74
23. Ibid, p.84
24. Ibid, p.91
25. Ibid, p.102
27. Source: Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy