CHAPTER – VII
CONCLUSION
Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the World has witnessed a dramatic change in the nature of conflicts from the traditional inter-state dispute to intra-state conflict. In this intra-states conflict, peacekeeping operations often include multiple and diverse functions such as preventive deployment, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and peace-building. Peacekeeping operation has also expanded from traditional light armed troops to a multi-dimensional mission with well-trained armies equipped with highly sophisticated weapons. However, the change in the nature of the conflict has been characterised by the presence of various splinter groups, the employment of irregular militias and the emergence of smaller factions, which do not respect the peacekeeping tasks such as ceasefires and frequently disagree with the major parties or act independently. In such a situation, there always is an inherent possibility that the peacekeeping mandate could switch toward peace-enforcement, involving military operations against one or more of the parties.

It is in the background of this post Cold War intra-state conflicts that regional organizations have come to play the role of peacekeepers. The Russian Federation as the sole successor of the former Soviet Union also took up the role of a regional peacekeeper in the former Soviet Union; Moldova (1992), Georgia/South Ossetia (1992), Georgia/Abkhazia (1992) and Tajikistan (1992). Most of the conflicts in region, with the exception of the Tajik civil war, were secessionist in nature driven by ethnic nationalism rather than by political differences. The Russian peacekeeping operations in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan (in CIS) have been accused by the Western countries and other CIS member states as peace enforcement as well as a softer form of Russian neo-imperialist plan. It has been further alleged that the Russian peacekeeping operations were conducted without a pure mandate from the UN Security Council. Amidst such allegations, the international community is unlikely to grant Russia the unequivocal mandate it has sought from the UN or CSCE, for Russian-dominated peacekeeping operations on former Soviet territory. In fact, Russia’s
peacekeeping in this region has been conducted in its own unique style, though under the UN charter for regional arrangement.

The Russian concept of peacekeeping has differed from the traditional UN peacekeeping concept in many ways. In Moldova, the Russian peacekeeping operation in Trans Dniestrian was conducted under the bilateral agreement of 21 July 1992. This operation has been considered one of the most controversial peacekeeping due to the lack of adherence to international standards in peacekeeping, even though it began with the consent of both of the warring factions and as mandated by the 1992 agreement. The problem arose during the operation regarding the question of partiality of the Russian peacekeeping forces. The 14th Army, which was the main component of the Russian peacekeeping troops in the region, was alleged for supplying arms and ammunition to one of the warring factions. There is, however, no clear evidence as to whether this was done officially or not. In fact, these troops were also once known for lack of discipline like other troops of Russian armies which were particularly inherited from the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the 14th Army comprised several native people from the Dniestr region. The Moldovan central government wanted the complete withdrawal of Russian troops, in line with what Russia agreed under the CFE Treaty adopted in 1999 and the Istanbul Commitments within that treaty. However, even today the Russian 14th Army continues to be stationed in Trans Dniestria.

In Georgia too, (both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia) the Russian peacekeeping operation were launched with the consent of both warring parties. The operation in South Ossetia was begun with the signing of a ceasefire agreement in June 1992 in Sochi (Macfarlane 1997: 514 and also see Lewis and Marks 1998: 73). Besides Georgia, the representatives of North Ossetia and South Ossetia were also invited during the signing of the ceasefire agreement. The Russian peacekeeping forces had successfully halted most large scale fighting. Over the course of the fighting until June 1992, over 1,000 civilians were killed (Macfarlane 1997: 512), and roughly 60,000 ethnic Ossetes were driven from their homes outside of South Ossetia, while roughly 10,000 ethnic Georgians fled the conflict zone (International Crisis Group 2005; and also see International
Displacement Monitoring Centre 2003). This refugee problem was later to become one of Russia’s major concerns while developing a new policy towards the CIS.

In Abkhazia, the Russian peacekeeping operation was deployed with the consent from both the warring factions (Mackinlay 2003: 89). Russia intervened as a mediator with the protection of ethnic Russians in Abkhazia as its objective. Again, the Russian peacekeeping forces were accused for supporting the Abkhazia through supply of arms and ammunition. On other hand, the Georgian government repeatedly requested for UN peacekeeping forces to be deployed in the conflict (Macfarlane 1997: 513). However, there was no positive or immediate response from the UN Security Council.

The possession of the arms and ammunition by the unrecognised Abkhaz raised questions within the international community over the Russian peacekeeping operation. In fact, Abkhazia began the war with few weapons available to them, and having only one tank available for combat operations. After the eruption of armed conflict, the Abkhaz separatist paramilitary units, along with their political supporters fled to Gudauta from where they obtained significant amount of military and financial aid (Ibid.). In Gudauta, Russian Army base housed and trained Abkhaz paramilitary units and provided protection for the leader of Abkhaz separatists, Vladislav Ardzinba. Perhaps, this was made possible by the lack of discipline of Russian army which were demoralised by the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. Many of this force had been far away from the control of Moscow for a long time.

It was also reported that some weapons stolen in local raids on Russian Army bases in Batumi, Akhalkalaki, Vaziani (near Tbilisi) and Poti by irregular Georgian paramilitary forces (Ibid.). However, these incidents made the Russian foreign policy to Georgia prone to the allegation of pursuing an imperialist ambition hidden behind peacekeeping operations. It was only after the launch of the 1993 Military Doctrine that Moscow could successfully control the former Soviet army, which is now under their jurisdiction.
Dissatisfaction on Russian peacekeeping role in the country was heated up soon after the U.S. came into the region. Moreover, Russia’s decision to stop withdrawal of its troops from the region, which Moscow once agreed during the OSCE meeting in 1999 in Istanbul, has become a point of debate between Russia and Georgia.

On 29 March 2000, despite pressures from Georgia for the withdrawal of its troops, Russia extended its peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia with the support from the UN special representative for Abkhazia, Dieter Boden as well as from the Abkhazian president, Vladislav Ardzinba (http://www.anca.org/resource-centre/transcaucasus.php?transyer=2001). Since then the Georgian government has been trying hard for replacing Russian peacekeeping operation with the International peacekeeping forces. However, the separatists groups of the Abkhazia and Ossetia are neutral to the Russian presence.

In Central Asia, the Russian peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan initially started with the request from Tajik government. Tajikistan’s location made it vulnerable to Islamic fundamentalism, a situation which has worried both the Central Asian states as well as Moscow (Vasilyev 1996:96). The most distinctive features of the Russian peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan was its more multinational dimension and presence of a CIS mandate. In 1993 the heads of the CIS agreed to send a multidimensional peacekeeping force, consisting of military contingents from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajiks themselves (Nikitin 1996: 91). The Tajik opposition forces apparently accused Russia and the CIS peacekeepers of supplying the pro-communist fighters with weapons during the conflict. However, it was reported that some commanders of the 201st division sold their weapons to pro-communist forces, but others were simply surrounded and forced to give up their equipment. Given the state of the Russian military at the time, it is difficult to know whether the Russian forces gave up their weapons out of sympathy, greed or fear. Either way, the case of the 201st MRD in Tajikistan is clearly the only case where the Russian forces maintained a semblance of neutrality in a conflict zone.
Theoretically, Russian peacemaking operations in Tajikistan were more or less the same with those actions taken by a third party (or a coalition of forces) to resolve a conflict between two or more opposing sides. Practically, Russian peacekeeping operations had a mixed role: it had both the third party and primary party elements. Since it had no elements of reoccupation or reestablishment of Russian empire, there was no question of a neo-imperialist plan in the Russian peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan. However, there is no doubt that Russian peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan was successful only up to a certain extent in stopping bloodshed but it turned out to be very expensive both in term of financial considerations and casualties.

The case studies in the present work demonstrate that the Russian peacekeeping operations in CIS had the same purpose as those of general international peacekeeping missions as it attempted to bring a diplomatic solution by bringing the warring factions to the negotiable table. However, in practice, Russian peacekeeping in CIS differed considerably from classical UN peacekeeping. The operations were not mandated by an international organization, nor were these operations impartial in the strict meaning of the term. So far a separate mandate tied to a specific Russian/CIS operation has been offered by the United Nations only in the case of Georgia/Abkhazia (Moscow Ostankino Television first channel network, 2 July 1994). These operations, however, come under the regional organisation arrangement for the peaceful settlement of conflicts under Article 52 of chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Moreover, it may also be argued that the Russian intention was impartial with the sole objective to make possible a negotiation between the warring factions in order to ensure peace in the region. Further, there is no strong evidence to prove that Russia is embarking on a deliberately expansionist policy.

The case studies further demonstrate that Russia’s peacekeeping role in the CIS is neither that of a third party nor that of a primary party as envisaged in the traditional concept of international peacekeeping: it is rather a mixed party (combination of third parties and primary parties) role in the conflicts. From 1992 to early mid 1990’s, some units of the Russian forces were alleged to be involved in the conflicts by supplying arms and weapons to selected warring faction. This
characterised the primary role of the peacekeeper where they extended support to one of the warring factions. However, after re-correction of its policy as well as after the launch of the new military doctrine of 1993, Russia's peacekeepers exhibited a characteristic of the third party from time to time. But the complexity of the conflicts compelled a constant switch from one role to the other. Therefore, the peacekeeping role of the Russian Federation carried both primary and third party characteristics.

Moreover, Russia's peacekeeping operation in the CIS conflicts also contained some characteristic features of peace-enforcement which are alien to classical peacekeeping. Boutros Boutros Ghali opines in *An Agenda for Peace* that peace enforcement operations do not require the consent of the warring factions nor is it necessary to be impartial, and even the use of force is allowed. From this perspective, the Russian peacekeeping operations in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan carry a characteristic of peace enforcement since many of its troops such as 201st MRD in Tajikistan, 14th Army in Moldova and its peacekeepers in Georgia were known to be partial. However, even as the peacekeepers were partial, the point to be considered, for the purposes of evaluating whether the Russian mission is a peace enforcement or not, is that this partiality was not the result of Russian government's intention. As to the question relating to the use of force, even though the Russian peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan were equipped with heavy arms including tank and helicopter, these were not meant for a confrontation with any of the warring factions. Considering that it was from a conflict zone that refugees and displaced persons were to be evacuated, the possession of heavy arms by the Russian forces may be appreciated as necessary. Moreover, when force was used in Tajikistan, this was aimed at stopping the infiltration of Afghan Mujahadeens in the country. Despite possessing some characteristic features of peace enforcement, the Russian peacekeeping operations in CIS are more appropriately understood as peacekeeping operations.

Again, as regards the allegation that Russia has been pursuing a neo-imperialist plan behind its peacekeeping operations, the case studies in present work reveal otherwise, as the following points underscore. Firstly, at the outbreak of the ethnic conflicts in Trans-Caucasus and the Central Asia in early 1990,
Russia's approach to its neighbouring states seemed more concerned with guarding its own borders and preserving its security. Refusing to allow Tajikistan to become an Islamic fundamentalist state represents a prudent, rather than expansionist foreign policy, especially when considering the large level of non Russian Muslims in the Central Asian states and the destabilising effects this would have on Russia proper.

Secondly, the criticism arising out of Russia's alleged unilateralism that it is nurturing imperialist ambitions does not stand closer scrutiny. It is important to be pointed out here that exactly on those occasions when there was urgent need of the supranational bodies to stabilise or to bring peace in the region, Russia had to act unilaterally. Such a situation arose mainly due to the refusal of the CIS states to send troops needed for peacekeeping operations for fear of internal repercussions in their own countries marked by complex ethnic relations. In fact, all post Soviet republic societies have complex ethnic compositions (see the table 3 and 4 of chapter 2) with weak armies to defend themselves from any kind of social unrest both within and without. It is worth pointing out that Ukraine refused to participate in the Russian led peacekeeping operation in Georgia while Turkmenistan refused to send troops to assist Russian forces in Tajikistan (Brown 1996:237). In the case of Ukraine, it was because of the fear that their participation in peacekeeping operation might hurt the sentiments of the Georgian minority in Ukraine as well as because of their belief that it would be of no benefit to their state. At that juncture, the refusal of the UN to become involved in the conflict in Abkhazia in particular forced Russia to step in and provide the framework and troops for peacekeeping on its own.

Thirdly, as is often the case with peacekeeping operations, there exists a controversy on the question of neutrality of Russian peacekeepers. Initially, lack of neutrality was one of the characteristics of the Russian peacekeepers in CIS and it was under serious scrutiny of the Western and neighbouring countries. The failure to be neutral on the part of the Russian peacekeepers could be mainly attributed to the fact that the major characteristic of the Russian peacekeeping operations in CIS until 1999 was its sole emphasis on the military measure rather than on the much emphasised civilian structure. It will not however be correct to conclude from this
that Russia's peacekeeping has been imperialist in nature as such a view equates
the flaws and imperfections in the planning of a peacekeeping force with the
deliberate aims and objectives of a foreign policy.

Apart from the questions of lack of neutrality and clear mandate, other
points under which the Western countries and other NATO allies in Europe have
accused Russia relate to the following issues:

A. The continuing presence of former Soviet forces, now under
Russian jurisdiction, in the territories of former Soviet republics.
B. Involvement of some of these forces in local conflicts.
C. Russian leaders are seen as trying to reintegrate the former Soviet
republics, the so called Near Abroad, in its foreign policy language
under the rubric of the CIS.
D. Pledge by the Russian leadership to defend the rights of 28 million
ethnic Russians and Russian speaking peoples who are scattered
across the CIS

In fact, at the end of Cold War, the Russian military command clearly
identified certain military-strategic state interests outside Russian borders for
which a system of forward basing and military agreements with many of the
erstwhile Soviet republics would be desirable. This was implied, for example, by
Defence Minister Grachev's admission that 'the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus
and the area where our troops are stationed [in Batumi and Gudauta] is a
strategically important area for the Russian army', and that Russia 'must take every
measure to ensure that our troops remain there, otherwise we will lose the Black
Sea.' (As cited in SU/1622 C1/6, 25 February 1993 09) This kind of thinking forms
the background to the Russian-Georgian agreement for Russian military bases to
remain in Georgia, at a time when Russian 'peacekeepers' were vitally needed to
bolster Georgia militarily.\(^1\) The secondary bases linked to the Batumi base, which
would be located in Sukhumi, Poti and Gudauta, would enable Russia to control
the whole of the Georgian Black Sea coast.

\(^1\) The agreement was negotiated in autumn 1993 but was finally concluded in February 1994. It
also provides for Russian border troops to be deployed as border guards on the Georgian frontier
with Turkey (Krasnaya zvezda, 4 February 1994.)
However, despite the fact that Russian still understands the strategic importance of the region, the end of the Cold War along with the collapse of USSR led Russia to withdraw its troops from the German Democratic Republic and from the Baltic States. It ran into complications when it had no place to house the returning troops and no financial resources to build new barracks (as of December 1992, over 120,000 returned officers were without proper housing) (Izvestia February 11 1993: Translated in CDPSP XLV (7): 31; RFE/RL Research Report, 1993). Meanwhile, the Russian economy was in crisis. Under these circumstances, it was quite natural that it delayed the withdrawal of its troops from other CIS states.

While Russia had signed several agreements with other CIS states for the withdrawal of its troops in late 1992 and late 1993, troop withdrawal could not be undertaken due to a set of complex reasons. First, the emergence of the ethnic conflicts in Tajikistan, Georgia and Moldova as well as the flow of refugees toward the Russian borders threatened not only its national security but also its multi-ethnic society. It was feared that a large number of people rendered refugees by those ethnic conflicts would disturb the pre-existing ethnic relations. This consideration played a major role in the delaying of troop withdrawal by Russia. Paradoxically though, it simultaneously used the troops in its pursuit of the goal of making themselves a regional power in post Cold War politics. Seen in this light, the continuing presence of former Soviet forces, now under Russian jurisdiction, in the territories of former Soviet’s republics was not due to imperialist motives. It was because of compulsion arising from within the Russia federation viz. economic problems and instability and the spread of violence in the region outside Russia, which not only threatened Russia but also the former Soviet space.

Secondly, regarding the accusation that Russian forces were involved in supplying arms to ‘favourable’ warring factions and thereby amounting to a direct involvement into the conflicts (Naumkin, 1997: 86), it would be crucial to appreciate its origin and nature in the politico-economic contexts. Till the end of 1992, the Russian economy did not allow paying properly even for heating and food for its soldiers, even more so for those stationed outside the Russian federation. Thus soldiers had been forced to fend for themselves by working in the
fields or renting out their trucks. The budget no longer allowed for the upkeep of operative armed forces. It is not surprising therefore that the main concern of the officers at the time of the events being examined was to provide for themselves and their families.

A survey carried out among soldiers at the end of 1992 showed that over 80 percent of the soldiers had another job on the side, even though this was prohibited. In order to boost their salaries above the poverty threshold, soldiers and officers also turned to sale or trade of weapons, munitions, military equipment and even military plans. According to an enquiry carried out by military authorities, over 4000 cases of arms theft were reported in 1992 (Izvestia 1992) Lack of discipline became common to Russian troops staying in former Soviet republics. In this situation, many of the Russian troops, e.g. 14th Army in Moldova and 201 mobile forces in Tajikistan were found involving directly and indirectly in conflicts just by helping and giving training to separatists (who are mostly close to ethnic Russians and who like to join the Russian Federation). Because of all these factors, lack of discipline and lack of morality became a common feature of the Russian army during first few years of its peacekeeping operation.

Despite the above mentioned hindrances, the presence of the Russian troops under the peacekeeping operation with the mandate from the parties involved in the conflicts brought the momentum of the conflicts under control and Russia could shift its army from time to time to areas where it was needed. In this background, it would not be correct to maintain that Russian peacekeeping operations in FSU are a softer form of imperialist plan, for such a line of argument fails to distinguish lack professionalism (due to whichever reasons) in the army from the larger strategic pursuits of a sovereign state.

It is a little immature to conclude that the Russian peacekeeping operations in FSU are part of a neo-imperialist policy. At the same time it is also true that Russian Federation has been trying to regain the status of a regional power in this post Cold War period. Furthermore, Russia has also been using the ethnic Russian diaspora in the former Soviet Union as a tool in pursuing this status. Accordingly, since the early 1990's, Russian peacekeeping operations became part of its foreign
policy towards the CIS. However, despite the complex nature of the rationale and ambitions behind Russian peacekeeping operations, it would be crucial that Russia and the international community join hands to maintain peace and stability in the world, particularly given the problem of increasing threats from international terrorism.

In mean time, the situation in Abkhazia continues to remain unstable and any small conflict has the potential to provoke a larger one. Hence, in days to come, the UN and Russia must coordinate to make sure all required areas are watched and adequate patrol are performed so that they do not miss a build up of troops or any minor altercation that may lead to a larger conflict. The UN cannot perform all these missions without Russian protections and Russian forces are unlikely to perform many of these on their own.

From the present work one thing is clear that when a great power involves its military in a neighbouring country, which has until recently been a part of the same state formation, the chances are very high for both the international community to raise allegations, and for the power in question, of taking sides. The Russian peacekeeping operations in CIS are no exception but rather a clear example of this.
APPENDIX-1

RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE
1993

The Russian Federation Military Doctrine (hereinafter, the Military Doctrine) constitutes the sum total of the official views (precepts) determining the military-political, military-strategic, and military-economic foundations for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security. The Military Doctrine is a document for a transitional period—the period of the formation of democratic statehood and a mixed economy, the transformation of the state’s military organization, and the dynamic transformation of the system of international relations.

The Military Doctrine develops the Basic Guidelines for the Russian Federation’s Military Doctrine of 1993 and fleshes out in respect of the military sphere the precepts of the Russian Federation National Security Concept. The provisions of the Military Doctrine are based on a comprehensive evaluation of the state of the military-political situation and a strategic forecast of its development, on a scientifically justified definition of the current and longer-term missions, objective requirements, and real potential for safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security, and also on a systematic analysis of the content and nature of modern wars and armed conflicts, and Russian and foreign experience of military organizational development and the art of war.

The Military Doctrine is defensive in nature, which is predetermined by the organic combination within its provisions of a consistent adherence to peace with a firm resolve to defend national interests and guarantee the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

The legal basis for the Military Doctrine is provided by the Russian Federation Constitution, Russian Federation federal laws and other normative legal acts, and the Russian Federation’s international treaties in the sphere of the safeguarding of military security.
The Military Doctrine's provisions may be clarified and supplemented taking account of changes in the military-political situation, the nature and makeup of military threats, and the conditions underlying the organizational development, development, and utilization of the state's military organization, as well as being fleshed out in the Russian Federation president's annual messages to the Federal Assembly, in directives on planning for the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, military formations, and organs, and in other documents on questions of safeguarding the Russian Federation's military security.

Implementation of the Military Doctrine is achieved through the centralization of state and military command and control and the implementation of a range of political, diplomatic, economic, social, information, legal, military, and other measures aimed at safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

I. Military-Political Principles

Military-Political Situation

1. The state of and prospects for the development of the present-day military-political situation are determined by the qualitative improvement in the means, forms, and methods of military conflict, by the increase in its reach [prostranstvenny razmak] and the severity of its consequences, and by its spread to new spheres. The possibility of achieving military-political goals through indirect, non-close-quarter operations predetermines the particular danger of modern wars and armed conflicts for peoples and states and for preserving international stability and peace, and makes it vitally necessary to take exhaustive measures to prevent them and to achieve a peaceful settlement of differences at early stages of their emergence and development.

2. The military-political situation is determined by the following main factors:
   - a decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war;
the shaping and strengthening of regional power centers; the strengthening of national, ethnic, and religious extremism; the rise in separatism;
• the spread of local wars and armed conflicts; an increase in the regional arms race;
• the spread of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems; the exacerbation of information confrontation.

3. A destabilizing impact on the military-political situation is exerted by:
• attempts to weaken (ignore) the existing mechanism for safeguarding international security (primarily the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]);
• the utilization of military-force actions as a means of “humanitarian intervention” without the sanction of the UN Security Council, in circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of international law;
• the violation by certain states of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament;
• the utilization by entities in international relations of information and other (including nontraditional) means and technologies for aggressive (expansionist) purposes;
• the activities of extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations, and structures;
• the expansion of the scale of organized crime, terrorism, and weapons and drug trafficking, and the multinational nature of these activities.

The Main Threats to Military Security
4. Under present-day conditions the threat of direct military aggression in traditional forms against the Russian Federation and its allies has declined thanks to positive changes in the international situation, the implementation of an active peace-loving foreign-policy course by our country, and the
maintenance of Russia’s military potential-primarily its nuclear deterrent potential-at an adequate level. At the same time, external and internal threats to the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies persist and in certain areas are increasing.

5. The main external threats are:

- territorial claims against the Russian Federation; interference in the Russian Federation’s internal affairs;
- attempts to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation’s interests in resolving international security problems, and to oppose its strengthening as one influential center in a multipolar world;
- the existence of seats of armed conflict, primarily close to the Russian Federation’s state border and the borders of its allies;
- the creation (buildup) of groups of troops (forces) leading to the violation of the existing balance of forces, close to the Russian Federation’s state border and the borders of its allies or on the seas adjoining their territories;
- the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation’s military security;
- the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter on the territory of friendly states adjoining the Russian Federation;
- the creation, equipping, and training on other states’ territories of armed formations and groups with a view to transferring them for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies;
- attacks (armed provocations) on Russian Federation military installations located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on installations and facilities on the Russian Federation’s state border, the borders of its allies, or the high seas;
- actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability, not least by hampering the work of Russian systems of state and military rule, or at disrupting the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, missile-attack early warning, antimissile defense, and space monitoring systems and systems for ensuring their combat stability, nuclear munition storage facilities, nuclear power generation, the
nuclear and chemical industries, and other potentially dangerous installations;
• hostile information (information-technical, information-psychological) operations that damage the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies;
• discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states;
• international terrorism.

6. The main internal threats are:
• an attempted violent overthrow of the constitutional order;
• illegal activities by extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations, and structures aimed at violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and destabilizing the domestic political situation in the country;
• the planning, preparation, and implementation of operations aimed at disrupting the functioning of federal organs of state power and attacking state, economic, or military facilities, or facilities related to vital services or the information infrastructure;
• the creation, equipping, training, and functioning of illegal armed formations;
• the illegal dissemination (circulation) on Russian Federation territory of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other means which could be used to carry out sabotage, acts of terrorism, or other illegal operations;
• organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, and other illegal activities on a scale threatening the Russian Federation’s military security.

7. Safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security is the most important area of the state’s activity.
The main goals of safeguarding military security are to prevent, localize, and neutralize military threats to the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation views the safeguarding of its military security within the context of building a democratic rule-of-law state, implementing socioeconomic reform, asserting the principles of equal partnership, mutually advantageous cooperation, and good-neighborliness in international relations, consistently shaping an overall and comprehensive international security system, and preserving and strengthening universal peace.

The Russian Federation:

- proceeds on the basis of the abiding importance of the fundamental principles and norms of international law, which are organically intertwined and supplement each other;
- maintains the status of nuclear power to deter (prevent) aggression against it and (or) its allies;
- implements a joint defense policy together with the Republic of Belarus, coordinates with it activities in the sphere of military organizational development, the development of the armed forces of the Union State’s member states, and the utilization of military infrastructure, and takes other measures to maintain the Union State’s defense capability;
- attaches priority importance to strengthening the collective security system within the CIS framework on the basis of developing and strengthening the Collective Security Treaty;
- views as partners all states whose policies do not damage its national interests and security and do not contravene the UN Charter;
- gives preference to political, diplomatic, and other nonmilitary means of preventing, localizing, and neutralizing military threats at regional and global levels;
- strictly observes the Russian Federation’s international treaties in the sphere of arms limitation, reduction, and elimination, and promotes their implementation and the safeguarding of the arrangements they define;
• punctiliously implements the Russian Federation's international treaties as regards strategic offensive arms and antimissile defense, and is ready for further reductions in its nuclear weapons, on a bilateral basis with the United States as well as on a multilateral basis with other nuclear states, to minimal levels meeting the requirements of strategic stability;
• advocates making universal the regime covering the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, resolutely enhancing the effectiveness of that regime through a combination of prohibitive, monitoring, and technological measures, and ending and comprehensively banning nuclear testing;
• promotes the expansion of confidence-building measures between states in the military sphere, including reciprocal exchanges of information of a military nature and the coordination of military doctrines, plans, military organizational development measures, and military activity.

8. The Russian Federation's military security is safeguarded by the sum total of the forces, means, and resources at its disposal. Under present-day conditions the Russian Federation proceeds on the basis of the need to have a nuclear potential capable of guaranteeing a set level of damage to any aggressor (state or coalition of states) under any circumstances.

The nuclear weapons with which the Russian Federation Armed Forces are equipped are seen by the Russian Federation as a factor in deterring aggression, safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, and maintaining international stability and peace.

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against states party to the Nonproliferation Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons except in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, the
Russian Federation Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or a state to which it has security commitments that is carried out or supported by a state without nuclear weapons jointly or in the context of allied commitments with a state with nuclear weapons.

The main principles for safeguarding military security are:
- the combination of firm centralized leadership of the state's military organization with civilian control over its activities;
- effective forecasting, the timely identification and classification of military threats, and appropriate responses to them;
- sufficient forces, means, and resources to safeguard military security, and their rational utilization;
- the correspondence of the level of readiness, training, and provision of the state's military organization to the requirements of military security;
- the refusal to damage international security and the national security of other countries.

10. [number as published; no number 9] Main content of safeguarding military security:

a) in peacetime:
- formation and implementation of a single state policy in the sphere of safeguarding military security;
- maintenance of domestic political stability and protection of the constitutional system, integrity, and inviolability of the territory of the Russian Federation;
- development and strengthening of friendly (allied) relations with neighboring and other states;
- creation and improvement of the system of defense of the Russian Federation and its allies;
- all-around support for and qualitative improvement of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, military formations, and organs (hereinafter the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops) and maintenance of their readiness for coordinated actions to avert, localize, and neutralize external and internal threats;
• preparation of a system of measures to transfer the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops to a war time footing (including their mobilization deployment);
• improvement of the economic, technological, and defense industry base; enhancement of the mobilization readiness of the economy; creation of conditions ensuring the timely switching of industrial enterprises stipulated in the plan to the production of military output; organization of the preparation of the organs of state power, enterprises, institutions: and organizations, and the country’s population for performing missions in safeguarding military security and conducting territorial and civil defense;
• protection of the Russian Federation’s facilities and installations on the high seas, in space, and on the territory of foreign states; protection of shipping, fishing, and other types of activities in the adjacent maritime zone and in distant regions of the ocean;
• protection and defense of the state border of the Russian Federation within the limits of border territory, airspace, and the underwater environment and of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation and their natural resources;
• support (where necessary) for political acts of the Russian Federation by means of the implementation of corresponding measures of a military nature and [by means of] a naval presence;
• preparation for territorial and civil defense;
• development of the necessary military infrastructure;
• safeguarding the security of Russian Federation citizens and protecting them from military threats;
• development of a conscious attitude among the population toward safeguarding the country’s military security;
• monitoring of the mutual fulfillment of treaties in the sphere of arms limitation, reduction, and elimination and the strengthening of confidence-building measures;
• ensuring readiness to participate (participating) in peacekeeping activities;
b) in a period of threat and on the commencement of a war (armed
conflict):
• the timely declaration of a state of war; imposition of martial law or a state of emergency in the country or in particular localities within it; full or partial strategic deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, or units thereof; bringing them into readiness to perform their missions;
• coordination, in line with federal legislation, of the activities of the federal organs of state power, the organs of state power of Russian Federation components, local self-government organs, public organizations, and citizens in the interests of repulsing aggression;
• organization and coordinated implementation of armed, political, diplomatic, information, economic, and other forms of struggle;
• adoption and implementation of decisions on the preparation for and pursuit of military operations;
• the switching of the country’s economy and of individual sectors of it, enterprises and organizations, transportation, and communications onto a footing of work in the conditions of a state of war;
• organization and implementation of territorial and civil defense measures;
• provision of aid to allies of the Russian Federation; enlistment and realization of their potential for achieving joint objectives in a war (armed conflict);
• prevention of the enlistment of other states in the war (armed conflict) on the side of the aggressor;
• utilization of the potential of the United Nations and other international organizations to prevent aggression, force the aggressor to end the war (armed conflict) at an early stage, and restore international security and peace.

The State’s Military Organization
11. The objectives of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation are served by the state’s military organization
12. The state’s military organization includes the Russian Federation Armed Forces, which constitute its nucleus and the basis of safeguarding military security;
other troops, military formations, and organs designed for the performance of military security missions by military methods; and their command and control organs. The state’s military organization also includes that part of the country’s industrial and scientific complexes that is intended for performing missions relating to military security.

13. The main aim of the development of the state’s military organization is to ensure guaranteed protection of the national interests and military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

14. Basic principles of development of the state’s military organization:
• appropriate consideration of conclusions drawn from the analysis of the state of and prospects for the development of the military-political situation;
  • centralization of leadership;
  • sole command [yedinonachaliye] on a legal basis;
  • attainable correspondence, within the limits of the country’s economic potential, between, on the one hand, the level of combat and mobilization training, the preparedness of organs of military command and control and of the troops (forces), their structures, fighting strength and strength of the reserve, and reserves of material means and resources, and, on the other hand, the missions of safeguarding military security;
  • unity of training and education;
  • implementation of servicemen’s rights and freedoms and safeguarding of their social protection and appropriate social status and living standard. The development of all components of the state’s military organization takes place in accordance with normative labor acts governing their activity and on the basis of agreed and coordinated programs and plans.

15. Main priorities of development of the state’s military organization:
• creation of an integrated system of command and control of the state’s military organization and the ensuring of its effective functioning;
• development and improvement of the troops (forces) ensuring strategic deterrence (including nuclear deterrence);

• creation and maintenance in necessary readiness of structures for preparing mobilization resources and for ensuring the mobilization deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops;

• manning, equipping, all-around support, and preparation of combined units and troop units for a state of permanent combat readiness of general-purpose forces for performing missions of deterrence and the conduct of combat operations in local wars and armed conflicts.

16. Basic principles of development of the state’s military organization:

• bringing the structure, composition, and strength of components of the state’s military organization into line with the missions of safeguarding military security taking into account the country’s economic potential;

• increasing the qualitative level, effectiveness, and security of functioning of the technological basis of the system of state and military command and control;

• improving military-economic support for the state’s military organization on the basis of the concentration and rational utilization of financial and material resources;

• improving strategic planning on the principle of unity of use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops;

• increasing the effectiveness of functioning of systems of personnel training, military education, operational and combat training, education of servicemen, all types of support, and military science;

• improving the system of manning (on the basis of the contract and draft principle, with a gradual increase as the necessary socioeconomic conditions are created in the proportion of servicemen carrying out military service under contract, first and foremost in the posts of junior commanding officers and specialists in the leading combat specialties);
• increasing the effectiveness of the system of operation and maintenance of arms and military equipment;
• improving special information support for the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and their command and control organs;
• strengthening the rule of law, order, and military discipline;
• implementing state policy in strengthening the prestige of military service and preparing Russian Federation citizens for it;
• developing international military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation;
• improving the normative legal base for the organizational development and the development and utilization of the state's military organization and its system of relations with society.

17. An integral part and a priority task of the present stage of military organizational development is the implementation of comprehensive military reform determined by the radical changes in the military-political situation and the missions and conditions of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation. Within the framework of military reform, an interconnected, coordinated reform of all components of the state's military organization takes place. Leadership of the State's Military Organization

18. Leadership of the organizational development, preparation, and utilization of the state's military organization and of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation is exercised by the president of the Russian Federation, who is supreme commander in chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

19. The Russian Federation Government organizes the equipping of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops with arms and military and special equipment and their furnishing with material means, resources, and services; exercises overall leadership of the operational equipping of the territory of the Russian Federation in the interests of defense; and carries out other functions established by federal legislation to ensure military security.

20. The federal organs of state power, organs of state power of the Russian
Federation components, and local self-government organs exercise the powers vested in them by federal legislation in safeguarding military security. Enterprises, institutions, organizations, public associations, and citizens of the Russian Federation participate in safeguarding military security according to the procedure laid down by federal legislation.

21. Command and control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops is exercised by the leaders of the corresponding federal organs of executive power.

22. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry coordinates the activity of federal organs of executive power and organs of executive power of the Russian Federation components on questions of defense, the formulation of concepts for the organizational development and the development of other troops, and orders for arms and military equipment for them, and formulates—with the participation of the corresponding federal organs of executive power—the concept of development of arms and military and special equipment and the federal state armaments program and proposals on the state defense order.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff is the main organ of operational command and control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, coordinating the activity and organizing the collaboration of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops in performing missions in the defense sphere.

The directorates of the commanders in chief (commanders) of branches (arms) of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (troops) carry out the formulation and implementation of plans for the organizational development and utilization of branches (arms) of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (troops) and their operational and mobilization training, technical equipment, and personnel training, and carry out command and control of the troops (forces) and their day-to-day activities and the development of the basing system and infrastructure.

The directorates of military districts (operational-strategic commands) carry out
command and control of inter-branch groups of general-purpose troops (forces) and the planning and organization of measures relating to joint training with other troops, military formations, and organs for safeguarding military security within the established limits of responsibility taking into account their missions and the integrated system of military-administrative division of the territory of the Russian Federation.

23. In order to carry out command and control of coalition groupings of troops (forces) the corresponding joint organs of military command and control are set up by a coordinated decision of the organs of state power of the countries participating in the coalition.

24. With a view to centralized leadership in safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation, integrated strategic and operational planning takes place in relation to the utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops in the interests of defense, as well as program-targeted planning of military organizational development envisaging the formulation of long-term (10-15 years), medium-term (4-5 years) and short-term (1-2 years) documents.

25. Organization of the leadership of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation in a period of threat and the creation and functioning of the corresponding organs of state power and organs of military command and control are regulated by corresponding legislative and other normative legal acts of the Russian Federation.

II. Military-Strategic Principles

Nature of Wars and Armed Conflicts

1. The Russian Federation maintains a readiness to wage war and take part in armed conflicts exclusively with a view to preventing and repulsing aggression, protecting the integrity and inviolability of its territory, and safeguarding the Russian Federation’s military security as well as that of its allies in accordance with international treaties.
2. The nature of modern wars (armed conflicts) is determined by their military-political goals, the means of achieving those goals, and the scale of the military operations. In accordance with this a modern war (armed conflict) may be:

- in terms of military-political goals-just (not contravening the UN Charter and the fundamental norms and principles of international law, and waged as self-defense by the party subject to aggression); unjust (contravening the UN Charter and the fundamental norms and principles of international law, falling within the definition of aggression, and waged by the party undertaking the armed attack);
- in terms of means utilized-using nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction; using only conventional weapons;
- in terms of scale-local, regional, or large-scale.

3. The main general features of modern war are:

- its impact on all spheres of human activity;
- its coalition nature;
- the extensive use of indirect, non-close-quarter, and other (including nontraditional) forms and means of operation, and long-range effective engagement and electronic engagement [dalnego ognevogo i elektronnogo porazheniya];
- a desire on the part of the sides to disrupt the system of state and military command and control;
- the use of highly efficient state-of-the-art systems of arms and military hardware (including those based on new physical principles);
- highly maneuverable operations by troops (forces) in disparate areas with the extensive utilization of air-mobile forces, airborne troops and special-purpose forces;
- attacks against troops (forces), rear-service and economic facilities, and means of communication [kommunkatsii] throughout the territory of each of the warring parties;
- the implementation of air campaigns and operations; the catastrophic consequences of hitting (destroying) power-generation enterprises (above all nuclear), chemical and other dangerous production facilities,
infrastructure, means of communication [kommunikatsii], and vital installations;
• a high likelihood of new states being drawn into the war, the escalation of warfare, and the expansion of the scale and range of the means employed, including weapons of mass destruction;
• the participation in the war of irregular armed formations alongside regular units.

4. Armed conflict can arise in the form of an armed incident, an armed action, and other armed clashes on a limited scale and be the consequence of an attempt to resolve national, ethnic, religious, or other differences with the help of the means of military conflict.

Border conflict is a special form of armed conflict.

Armed conflict can be international in nature (involving two or several states) or international [as published] and internal in nature (with armed confrontation being conducted within the territory of a single state).

5. Armed conflict is characterized by:
• a high degree of involvement and vulnerability of the local population;
• the use of irregular armed formations;
• the extensive utilization of sabotage and terrorist methods;
• the complex moral and psychological atmosphere in which the troops operate;
• the enforced diversion of considerable forces and assets to safeguard the security of transportation routes or areas and locations where troops (forces) are sited;
• the threat that it may be transformed into a local ([in the case of an] international armed conflict) or civil ([in the case of an] internal armed conflict) war.

6. Unified (multidepartmental) groups of troops (forces) and command and control units may be set up to perform missions in an internal armed conflict.

7. A local war may be waged by groups of troops (forces) deployed in a conflict zone, being reinforced if necessary by transfers of troops, forces, and assets from
other areas and the implementation of the partial strategic deployment of armed forces.

In a local war the sides will operate within the borders of the warring states and pursue limited military-political goals.

8. A regional war may result from the escalation of a local war or armed conflict and be waged with the involvement of two or several states (groups of states) in a single region, by national or coalition armed forces utilizing both conventional and nuclear weapons. In a regional war the sides will pursue important military-political goals.

9. A large-scale war may result from an escalation of an armed conflict, local or regional war, or from the involvement in them of a significant number of states from different parts of the world.

A large-scale war utilizing only conventional weapons will be characterized by a high likelihood of escalating into a nuclear war with catastrophic consequences for civilization and the foundations of human life and existence.

In a large-scale war the sides will set radical military-political goals. It requires the total mobilization of all the material and spiritual resources of the states involved.

10. A large-scale (regional) war may be preceded by a period of threat.

11. A large-scale (regional) war may have an initial period, the main component of which is an intense armed struggle to gain the strategic initiative, preserve stable state and military command and control, achieve supremacy in the information sphere, and win (maintain) air superiority. In the event of a prolonged large-scale (regional) war its goals will be achieved in the subsequent and final periods.

12. The Russian Federation consistently and firmly strives for the creation of
an effective system of political, legal, organizational, technical, and other international guarantees to prevent armed conflicts and wars.

Principles Governing the Use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Other Troops

13. The Russian Federation considers it lawful to utilize the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops to repulse aggression directed against it. The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops can also be used for protection against unconstitutional actions or illegal armed violence threatening the integrity and inviolability of Russian Federation territory, to perform missions in accordance with the Russian Federation’s international treaties, and to perform other missions in accordance with federal legislation.

14. The goals of the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are:

- in a large-scale (regional) war in the event that it is unleashed by a state (group or coalition of states)-to protect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, to repulse aggression, to effectively engage the enemy, and to force it to end its military operations on terms according with the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies;
- in local wars and international armed conflicts-to localize the seat of tension, to create the prerequisites for ending the war or armed conflict or for bringing it to an end at an early stage; to neutralize the aggressor and achieve a settlement on terms according with the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies;
- in internal armed conflicts-to rout and liquidate illegal armed formations, to create the conditions for a full settlement of the conflict on the basis of the Russian Federation Constitution and federal legislation;
- in peacekeeping and peace restoration operations-to disengage the warring factions, to stabilize the situation, and to ensure the conditions for a just peace settlement.
15. The main ways of utilizing the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are:

• strategic operations, operations, and combat operations-in large-scale and regional wars;
• operations and combat operations-in local wars and international armed conflicts;
• joint special operations-in internal armed conflicts;
• counterterrorist operations-in the fight against terrorism in accordance with federal legislation;
• peacekeeping operations.

16. The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops should be prepared to repulse aggression, effectively engage an aggressor, and conduct active operations (both defense and offensive) under any scenario for the unleashing and waging of wars and armed conflicts, under conditions of the massive use by the enemy of modern and advanced combat weapons, including weapons of mass destruction of all types. At the same time, the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure the implementation of peacekeeping activities by the Russian Federation both independently and as part of international organizations.

17. The main missions of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are:

a) in safeguarding military security:
• the timely disclosure of a threatening development in the military-political situation or of preparations for an armed attack against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
• maintenance of the composition, condition, combat and mobilization readiness, and training of the strategic nuclear forces, and of the forces and assets ensuring their functioning and utilization, as well as of command and control systems, at a level guaranteeing a set level of damage for an aggressor under any circumstances;
• maintenance of combat potential, combat and mobilization readiness, and preparation of peacetime general-purpose groups of troops (forces) at a level ensuring the repulsing of aggression on a local scale;
• maintenance of arms and military (special) equipment and reserves of material resources in readiness for combat use;
• carrying out of alert duty (combat service) by assigned (appointed) troops, forces, and resources;
• high-quality and complete fulfillment of plans and programs for operational, combat, and mobilization training and education of personnel of the troops (forces);
• maintenance of readiness for strategic deployment within the framework of state measures to put the country onto a wartime footing;
• protection and defense of the Russian Federation state border;
• development of the air defense of the Russian Federation as an integrated system based on centralized command and control of all air defense forces and resources;
• creation of the conditions for the security of economic activity and protection of the Russian Federation’s national interests in the territorial seas, on the continental shelf, and in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation as well as on the high seas;
• protection of important state facilities;
• prevention and termination of acts of sabotage and terrorism;
• prevention of ecological and other emergencies and elimination of their consequences;
• organization of civil and territorial defense;
• safeguarding of technical cover and restoration of means of communication [kommunikatsii];
• safe guarding of information security.

The performance of missions in defense of the Russian Federation’s national interests on the high seas takes place in accordance with the Fundamentals of
Russian Federation Policy in the Sphere of Naval Activity. All missions in safeguarding military security are carried out by the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops in coordination, in close collaboration, and in accordance with their functions as stipulated by federal legislation, (punctuation as published) (b) in rebuffing an armed attack (aggression) on the Russian Federation and (or) its allies:

- partial or full strategic deployment;
- conduct of strategic operations, operations, and combat operations (including jointly with allied states) to rout the invaders and eliminate groups of troops (forces) that have been (are being) created by the aggressor in regions where they are based or concentrated and on communication routes;
- maintenance of readiness for utilization, and utilization (in cases envisaged by the Military Doctrine and in accordance with the stipulated procedure) of the nuclear deterrent potential;
- localization and neutralization of border armed conflicts;
- maintenance of the regime of martial law (state of emergency);
- protection of the population, economic facilities, and the infrastructure against the enemy’s weapons;
- fulfillment of the Russian Federation’s allied commitments in accordance with international treaties.

The performance of missions in repulsing an armed attack (aggression) is organized and implemented in accordance with the Plan for Utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Mobilization Plan of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, edicts of the Russian Federation president on military security issues, orders and directives of the supreme commander in chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and other normative legal acts, plans, and directive documents;

(c) in domestic armed conflicts:

- the routing and liquidation of illegal armed formations and bandit and terrorist groups and organizations and the destruction of their bases, training centers, depots, and communications;
- restoration of the rule of law, and of law and order;
- safeguarding of public security and stability;
• maintenance of the legal regime of a state of emergency in the conflict zone;
• localization and blockading of the conflict zone;
• termination of armed clashes and disengagement of the warring parties;
• confiscation of weapons from the population in the conflict zone;
• strengthening of protection of public order and security in regions adjacent to the conflict zone.

The performance of missions in the prevention and termination of domestic armed conflicts, the localization and blockading of conflict zones, and the elimination of illegal armed formations, bands, and terrorist groups is entrusted to joint (multidepartmental) groups of troops (forces) created on an ad hoc basis and their organs of command and control;

d) in operations to maintain and restore peace:
• disengagement of the conflicting parties’ armed groups;
• safeguarding of the conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population and their evacuation from the conflict zone;
• blockading of the conflict zone with a view to ensuring the implementation of sanctions adopted by the international community;
• creation of the preconditions for a political settlement.

The performance of missions in operations to maintain and restore peace is entrusted to the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In order to prepare for these missions, specially appointed combined units and troop units are identified. Alongside their preparation for utilization for their immediate purpose, they are trained according to a special program. The Russian Federation carries out rear and technical support, training, and preparation of Russian contingents, the planning of their utilization, and operational command and control in line with the standards and procedures of the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS].
18. Forces and resources of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops may be enlisted to provide assistance to the organs of state power, organs of local self-government, and the population in eliminating the consequences of accidents, disasters, and natural disasters.

19. In order to perform the missions facing the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, groups of troops (forces) are created on the territory of the Russian Federation taking into account:

- the degree of the potential military danger in specific strategic sectors;
- the nature of the Russian Federation’s relations with contiguous states;
- the location of the Russian Federation’s vitally important industrial regions and regions of strategic resources and specially important facilities;
- the potential for strategic deployment in the threatened sectors in conjunction with the lowest possible volume of transport movements, and also interregional maneuvering;
- the potential for the timely withdrawal of troops (forces) and material and technical reserves out of range of probable missile and air strikes;
- the conditions for the billeting and provision of essential services for troops and for resolving social and living problems;
- the presence and status of the mobilization deployment base;
- the sociopolitical situation in specific regions.

20. With a view to forming and maintaining stability and ensuring an appropriate response to the emergence of external threats at an early stage, limited contingents of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops may be deployed in strategically important regions outside the territory of the Russian Federation, in the form of joint or national groups and individual bases (facilities).
The conditions for such deployment are defined by the appropriate international legal documents.

21. When mixed military formations of the CIS are created, they are manned by servicemen of the member states in accordance with their national legislation and the interstate agreements adopted. Servicemen who are citizens of the Russian Federation serve in such formations, as a rule, under contract. Russian troop formations located on the territory of foreign states, irrespective of the conditions of deployment, form part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and operate in accordance with the procedure there established, taking into account the requirements of the UN Charter, UN Security Council resolutions, and the Russian Federation’s bilateral and multilateral treaties.

22. In order to create and develop the state’s military infrastructure so as to support the strategic deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and their pursuit of military operations, the operational equipping of the Russian Federation’s territory with a view to defense is carried out under the leadership of the Russian Federation Government and on the basis of a federal state program.

23. The stockpiling and maintenance of reserves of material resources is organized by the Russian Federation Government in accordance with plans for the creation of state and mobilization reserves approved by the Russian Federation president. The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and organs of executive power, in accordance with federal legislation, carry out in peacetime the stockpiling, echelonment, disposition, and maintenance of reserves of material resources to support the mobilization deployment of troops (forces) and their conduct of combat operations in the initial period of a war (for certain types of material resources also for a longer period, based on the time scale for switching the economy of the country and its individual sectors and enterprises onto working according to the established plan), and the formation, preparation, regrouping, and utilization of strategic reserves. The planning of the stockpiling, echelonment, and disposition of operational reserves of material resources and their maintenance for other troops that are made operationally subordinate to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry during a special period are carried out by the said ministry.
24. The planning of citizens’ preparation for military service, military registration, and registration of means of transport made available to the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops are carried out under the overall leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff.

25. In both peacetime and wartime, preparation of the country for territorial and civil defense is carried out and a range of measures are implemented to ensure the stable functioning of economic facilities, transportation, and communications and ensure readiness for emergency rescue and other work in stricken [contaminated] areas [ochagi porazheniya] and zones of accidents, disasters, and natural disasters.

III. Military-Economic Principles

Military-Economic Provision for Military Security

1. The main aim of military-economic provision is to meet the needs of the state’s military organization for financial and material resources.

2. The main missions of military-economic provision are:
   • to ensure timely and full financial provision for the missions being performed by the state’s military organization;
   • to optimize expenditure of the material resources and funds channeled into safeguarding military security, and to enhance the efficiency of their use on the basis of the interlinked and coordinated reform of all components of the states’ [as published] military organization;
   • to develop the scientific, technical, technological, and production base of the country of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, and of the military infrastructure in the interest of safeguarding military security;
   • to ensure legal protection for the intellectual property contained in military products and in the techniques used to develop and produce them;
• to integrate the civil and military sectors of the country’s economy and to coordinate the state’s military-economic activity in the interest of safeguarding military security;
• to create the state’s infrastructure taking account of the performance of missions to safeguard military security;

To enhance the level of social provision for servicemen and civilian personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, as well as citizens working in the defense-industry complex;
• to ensure the functioning of and improve systems of mobilization readiness and mobilization preparation of the country’s economy and population;
• to build up and maintain stockpiles of material resources;
• to implement mutually advantageous international military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation;
• to implement the Russian Federation’s international treaties in the military-economic sphere.

3. The priority missions of military-economic provision are: to ensure timely and full (within the limits of the state’s existing financial resources) financial provision for plans for the organizational development, development, and combat and mobilization training of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, and of the requirements for all components of the state’s military organization;
• to ensure economic and financial provision for upgrading strategic and conventional arms and military and specialized equipment;
• to create the economic and financial conditions for the development and production of highly efficient standardized command and control of troops and control of weapon assets, communications, intelligence-gathering, strategic-early warning, and electronic warfare systems, and precision mobile non-nuclear weapons and the information support systems for them;
• to enhance living standards and implement the social guarantees laid down by federal legislation for servicemen and their family members;

4. The main principles of military-economic provision are:
• to bring the level of financial and material provision for the state's military organization into line with the requirements of military security and the state's resource potential;
• to focus financial, material, technical, and intellectual resources on resolving the key tasks of safeguarding military security;
• to provide state support for enterprises (production facilities) and institutions (organizations) determining the military-technical and technological stability of the defense-industry complex, factory-town enterprises, and closed administrative territorial entities;
• to ensure scientific, technical, technological, information, and resource independence in the development and production of the main types of military output.

5. The basic guidelines for the mobilization preparation of the economy are: the preparation of an economic management system to ensure stable functioning during the period of transition to work under martial law conditions and during wartime;
• the creation, improvement, and effective functioning of a system of mobilization preparation for organs of state power, as well as organizations and enterprises with mobilization missions;
• the optimization and development of the requisite mobilization capacity and facilities;
• the creation, accumulation, preservation, and renewal of stockpiles of material resources in mobilization and state reserves;
• the creation and preservation of fallback stocks of design and technical documentation for wartime;
• the preservation and development of the economic facilities required for the stable functioning of the economy and the population's survival during wartime;
• the preparation of the financial, credit, and tax systems and the money-supply system for a special system of functioning under martial law conditions;
• the development and improvement of the normative-legal base for mobilization preparation and the transition of the Russian Federation economy, Russian Federation components, and municipal formations to work in accordance with the established plans.

International Military (Military-Political) and Military-Technical Cooperation

6. The Russian Federation implements international military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation on the basis of its own national interests and the need to ensure the balanced performance of the missions of safeguarding military security. International military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation is the state’s prerogative.

7. The Russian Federation implements international military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation on the basis of foreign-policy and economic expediency and the missions of safeguarding the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, in accordance with federal legislation and the Russian Federation’s international treaties, on the basis of the principles of equal rights, mutual advantage, and good-neighborliness, and observing the interests of international stability and national, regional, and global security.

8. The Russian Federation attaches priority importance to the development of military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation with CIS Collective Security Treaty states on the basis of the need to consolidate the efforts to create a single defense area and safeguard collective military security.
The Russian Federation, reaffirming its fundamental adherence to the ideas of deterring aggression, preventing wars and armed conflicts, and maintaining international security and universal peace, guarantees the consistent and firm implementation of the Military Doctrine.

Source: http://www.india.mid.ru/mil.html