CHAPTER IV

DIPLOMATIC MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIA AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Diplomatic Measures Taken by India against International Terrorism

A distinctive feature of modern day terrorism is the linkage between the various terrorist groups operating all over the world. To counter this problem, it becomes important for the nations of the world to come together and fight it unitedly. Measures to counter international terrorism operate at two levels – bilateral and multilateral. The problem of terrorism is complex and as more such disputes come into being, so have virtual cottage industries proposing solutions to them.¹

Bilateral measures include extradition agreements reached between nations who work out an understanding to stop this menace by cooperating against terrorists working on one’s soil against the other state. In this chapter the focus would primarily be on the study of the Indo British Extradition Treaty of 1992. In certain cases, bilateral agreements have led to multilateral treaties later on. The SAARC Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism will be the focus of study in the multilateral section.

Bilateral measures against international terrorism

(i) Bilateral agreements specifically manifest themselves in the arriving of extradition agreements that generally include the formal handing over of an alleged offender to another state to be dealt with according to the latter’s criminal law. Under customary international law, no nation is under any obligation to extradite, though it may do so either voluntarily or on the basis of reciprocity.

¹ Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution, Rupa and Co., New Delhi, 1994, p.217
Areas of controversies which were generally unincluded in the earlier extradition agreements pertained to 'political offences' and political asylum. As far as the latter is concerned, every state has the discretion to decide whether it should grant asylum to a person or not.

The 'political offences' clause has, at times, been an impediment in the way of states seeking extradition of persons involved in terrorism. This maybe either due to the state, from which extradition is sought, being sympathetic to the terrorists' cause or due to ascribing the cause of such crimes as 'political' by them.

Over the years, extradition law has come to encompass the following principle features: (I) the obligation to extradite or prosecute (ii) the obligation to help in such jurisdictional exercise by another state by rendering evidence in its possession and (iii) limiting, if not eliminating, the political offence exception even in the case of bilateral extradition treaties.

An extradition treaty needs to be backed by domestic legislation meant to lay down the procedure for extradition. An example of bilateral cooperation in tackling terrorism is the Indo-British Extradition Treaty of 1992 and the accompanying Agreement on the Confiscation of Funds used by criminals. This is Great Britain's first separate extradition treaty outside the Commonwealth scheme. This treaty not only seeks to tighten the rule of prosecution or extradition but also expressed assistance in respect of tracking down and seizing sources of financial and material support to transnational terrorism. The third aspect of this treaty is meant to lead both the countries to an agreement on reciprocal seizure of assets of terrorists and drug traffickers.

This extradition treaty was signed in 1992 and ratified on 15 November 1993. This new treaty brings the arrangement with India into line with the 1978 Suppression of Terrorism Act which removes the ‘political offence’ in extradition cases from certain serious offences associated with terrorism. The agreement on the confiscation of proceeds from crime is also vital for India since it is suspected that considerable funds are transferred from Britain for terrorist activities in India.\(^3\) It was easy for both countries to evolve a broad agreement on the subject because both have borne the brunt of acts of terrorism particularly directed against innocent human beings. The Preamble to the treaty gives two reasons for this cooperation: desiring to make more effective the cooperation of the two countries in the suppression of crime by making further provisions for the reciprocal extradition of offenders and recognising that concrete steps are necessary to combat terrorism. Through its twenty three articles, the treaty encompasses a broad gamut of matters some of which are highlighted here.

The first pertains to deciding what offences fall under the ambit of the treaty. Ordinarily, an ‘extradition’ offence under the treaty is one which should carry a sentence of atleast one year’ imprisonment.\(^4\) The offence need not be a criminal offence; it could also relate to taxation or revenue or maybe even of a “purely fiscal character”.\(^5\) This expansion of an extradition offence to include usually non-criminal fiscal offences is an innovation. Also an offence for which extradition is sought need not have been committed in the territory of the requesting state, it might even have been committed in a

\(^3\) *Times of India* (New Delhi), 23 September, 1992

\(^4\) Article 2(1) of the IndoBritish Extradition Treaty, published in the *Gazette of India’s Extraordinary*, No. 458, 30 December, 1993

\(^5\) ibid, Article 2(2)
third state by a national of the requesting state. In this case, extradition will be available if the conduct of the prisoner and its actual or intended effects amounted to the commission of an extradition offence in the territory of the requesting state. Thus under this agreement, it will be the offending conduct and not the place of the occurrence of the act that will determine whether extradition can be carried out or not.

The second highlight is the 'political offences exception'. The origin of this practice is traceable to the need to protect the liberal ideas that made a presence in Europe in the eighteenth century. Since this clause has many a times prevented the extradition of dreaded criminals, the Indo-British Treaty removed the sting by clarifying a number of offences which “shall not be regarded as offences of a political character.”. Thus a broad spectrum of terrorist activities are taken care of. Most typical terrorist acts have therefore been saved from the unduly important political offences clause. This provision of the treaty seems to have been influenced by other anti-terrorist international agreements like the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism of 1977.

The third important highlight relates to the “extradite or prosecute” principle. This is to ensure that a terrorist does not go unpunished and this is achieved by imposing a clear-cut obligation to prosecute the culprit should the state decide not to extradite him. The incorporation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute is accomplished in three ways which are mutually reinforcing. Article 8 of the treaty states the central principle that if the requested party refuses to extradite, it shall submit the case to its competent

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6 ibid, Article 1(3)
7 ibid, Article 3
8 n 4, Section 5(2) of the Treaty
authorities to consider prosecution. And if these authorities decide not to prosecute, the extradition request must be reconsidered. This is a novel obligation and a shot in the arm for the Indian government’s position against international terrorism.

Also to facilitate prosecution of an offence in case of a refusal to extradite, the treaty requires both India and Britain to incorporate in their respective domestic laws all the offences enumerated in Article 5 of the treaty, in a way that an offence committed in either country, will simultaneously be considered an offence in the other. This unique feature provides a double advantage to both the signatories firstly by enabling an extradition refusing state to prosecute and secondly the courts of either party will be slow to apply the political offences exception in pursuance of their domestic law.

Though the treaty also mentions certain grounds for refusing extradition, it provides mutual assistance in important areas to assist the prosecution of terrorists. The most pathbreaking one relates to the provisional arrest of the person to be extradited, on the application of request, even as that state intends making a request for extradition. Thus the cooperation of the potentially requested party is ensured in preventing the possible escape of a terrorist from that state, even as the other state considers making a request, though such a request has not actually been made. Alongwith the accompanying Agreement on the Confiscation of Funds of criminals, this Treaty has been a big boost for India’s fight against international terrorism. Considering the number of terrorist outfits based in U.K. that operate against India, this treaty generates a sense of relief for India.

9 ibid, Article 6 of the Treaty

10 ibid Article 12 of the Treaty
Among other bilateral measures against the menace of international terrorism have been the signing of extradition treaty by India in the Canada in October 1987 and the USA in July 1997. The latter is an improvement on the earlier agreement between the two countries and is more contemporary in its sphere of cooperation.

(ii) Multilateral measures against international terrorism

Though there have been many multilateral efforts aimed at curbing international terrorism, most of them have not met with success. The reason for this could be primarily that any action against terrorism can be taken only after reaching a consensual definition on the subject. The fluidity of the concept of terrorism and the lack of a supranational legal enforcement mechanism are the prime culprits behind the near absence of substantial multilateral agreements in the recent years. The equation of the right to self-determination as per Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the reluctance of many states to accept terrorism as a heinous crime aggravate matters still further.¹¹

The first of the series of multilateral efforts against terrorism were started in Europe in the 1930s by the Bureau for the Unification of Criminal Law. A general resolution considering terrorism as a threat to “collective security” was drafted. Subsequently, the League of Nations helped bringing about two conventions – one for the prevention and punishment of terrorism¹² and the other for the establishment of an

¹¹ This confusion is also evident in the UN Resolution on 3034 (XXVIII), November 2, 1972

International Criminal Court (16 November, 1937). Though these conventions were not ratified, they did represent a beginning towards international cooperation in the field of terrorism-curbing. It also helped in the shaping of subsequent accords pertaining to aviation terrorism. Different multilateral agreements reached subsequently emanated from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

In the United Nations, the need for a convention on terrorism was felt after the 1972 Munich killings by the Black September Fedayen of the PLO. Like before, the UN continued to be a hotbed of controversy when it came to defining terrorism. This conflict was evident in the changing of the title of UN Resolution 3034 (XXVIII) of November 2, 1972 from ‘Measures Against International Terrorism’ to ‘Measures to prevent International Terrorism’ which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardises fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical change’.  

Later on, in a bid to override the ideological difference of the UN members, three committees were created. The first sought to define terrorism, the second to examine its cause and the third to propose steps to prevent it. As “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”, Resolution A/9890 was added to the Committee’s Report,

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13 Naomi-Gal-or, n.2, p.89

14 Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, Strategic Digest 16(8), August 1986, p. 1058
preserving the "right of people under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination." 15

The Conventions signed under the auspices of the UN include the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents in 1974; followed by the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages in November 1979. In December 1985, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution asking members to sign the multilateral treaties designed to counter all forms of terrorism. 16 This was followed by the June 14, 1989 UN Security Council Resolution 635 urging the ICAO to intensify its work on devising an international regime for the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of detection. The resolution vests responsibility for action in an identified UN agency with both the expertise and the appropriate mandate to undertake such an effort. 17 Next came the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 638 of 1 August 1989 concerning hostage taking. In December of the same year, the UNGA tried to establish a semblance of international consensus against terrorism by adopting a resolution that stated that terrorism was “not justifiable” in any situation. This was the most important achievement of the Sixth Committee and the most noteworthy development of the 44 General Assembly session.

In spite of all these resolutions, the UN has been largely ineffective in dealing with international terrorism. Hence a number of regional conventions like the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977) and the Organization of American States Convention of 1971 came into being.

15 Donna M. Schlagheck, n.12, p.123
17 US Department of State – Patterns of Global Terrorism – 1989, p. 44
Nearer home, the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism is a regional effort aimed at curbing terrorism in India’s neighbourhood. This is an important development for India and will be discussed here in some detail.

**The SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism**

As a region, South Asia suffers from two major weaknesses – one contributes to the growth of terrorism and the other obstructs the formation of a common strategy to combat it. Social tensions which take the form of religious, ethnic, linguistic and other kinds of conflict are all directly or indirectly related to the unfinished nation building syndrome. What makes the problem even more complex is the fact that the respective nation building strategies are not complementary to one another but tend to thrive at the expense of one another. Given the conflictual relationships that characterise the inter-state relations in the region, the problem gets exacerbated by external dabbling in regional affairs.  

Among other problems these nations face, is that of terrorism and the SAARC has been deeply concerned about this menace.

The Dhaka summit of June 1986 first raised the question of terrorism and a study group was set up to examine the matter. The group met and made suggestions which were largely based on the UN General Assembly Resolution of December 1985. The setting up of an appropriate mechanism was recommend by the group in order to identify

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19 Partha S. Ghosh, “Terrorism and SAARC”, *India Quarterly* 43(2)/April-June 1987, pp121-137

offences that could be regarded as terrorist in nature and hence be eligible for extradition without being shielded under the ‘political offence exception’. Increased intelligence sharing among the South Asian region was also one of the group’s recommendations.

While the draft convention was ready for the November 1987 Kathmandu Summit, it could not be adopted because of India’s objection to a clause suggested by Sri Lanka. The latter maintained that for the convention to be comprehensive, it must include an article on the use of territory for terroristic activity against another state. These differences were however resolved before finalising the enabling document. The Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers came up with the unique idea of formulating a document without a legal binding that can be signed at the ministerial level. Finally the seven SAARC Foreign Ministers signed the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism.21 The Convention was ratified by India at the New Delhi summit of 1988. At around that time, the Pakistani abettment of terrorism in India had escalated and this prompted Indian to ratify this regional convention in the hope that it would help put an end to externally aided terrorist activities on Indian soil.

The SAARC Convention is considered a historic step towards the prevention, and elimination of terrorism from the region. The Convention specifies the offences that could be considered terrorist and not political for the purpose of extradition. It recognizes the importance of the UN Resolution 2625 which requires that “each state should refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state.” It also provides a safeguard against its misuse for suppressing

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21 *Times of India* (New Delhi), October 31, 1987
legitimate political dissent in the name of terrorism – curbing. 22 Under the Convention, the contracting states also undertook to include the offences listed by the Convention in any future extradition treaty to be concluded between them.23 The contracting states are called upon to cooperate among themselves to the extent permitted by their national law, through consultations between appropriate agencies, exchange of information, intelligence and expertise and such other cooperative measures as maybe appropriate, with a view to preventing terrorist activities through precautionary measures.24

Geneva diplomacy, 1994

Another important part of India’s diplomatic response to the related problem of grappling with allegations of human rights violations in Kashmir pertains to its Geneva diplomacy at the UN Human Rights Commission in 1994. Pakistan sought to internationalise the Kashmir issue again by trying to table a resolution on human rights violations in the Valley, but was ultimately stopped from doing so.

What went into India’s approach that clicked with the other UNHRC member was summarised by Salman Khurshid, the then Minister of State for External Affairs and a part of the delegation to Geneva.25 The Indian team, cutting across party lines brought together Salman Khurshid, Dr.Farooq Abdullah and a host of contemporary outstanding

22 Times of India (New Delhi), August 6, 1988

23 Article 3(a), SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu.

24 Ibid., Art. 8(2)

25 Salman Khurshid, Beyond Terrorism: New Hope for Kashmir, UBSPD, New Delhi, 1994, p.110
Indian diplomats namely, Hamid Ansari (Permanent Representative at the UN), Satish Chandra, Permanent Representative at Geneva, Ambassador Prakash Shah from Tokyo, Ministry of External Affairs Secretary (West) V.K.Grover and others, all of whom were ably led by Atal Behari Vajpayee.

As the voting day drew close, many traditional ‘allies’ of Pakistan, like Iran and the OIC, decided to look at the matter in a framework of enlightened self-interest and saw this attempt on Pakistan’s part as a case of bad intrusive diplomacy that could backfire on their societies too.

Apart from this what worked in India’s favour was the perception of the changing international environment by the OIC and its corresponding response to it. Earlier, Pakistan had always successfully used the prestige of the OIC in the Muslim world for its self-serving political interest in the subcontinent. 26 In the foreign policy area, Pakistan had also sought to use the card of Islamic solidarity in its confrontation with India. 27 Until 1993 this tactic succeeded as the OIC in its resolution of that year spoke of human rights atrocities in Kashmir and also called the Pak-inspired militancy a struggle for self-determination. 28 This was followed by the OIC invitation to the leaders of the All Party Hurriyat Conference to its Casablanca summit and this raised some issues of the sovereign rights of states. Since only sovereign states are members of the OIC, citizens of nonmembers cannot be invited without the consent of the governments concerned.


27 Sisir Gupta, “Islam as a factor in Pakistan’s foreign policy”, India Quarterly, Vol.18, p.240

28 The Hindu, 29 April, 1993
India took a moderate view of this attitude throughout 1993 mainly because it recognised that not all members of the OIC agreed with the Pakistani view. The respect that India’s growing economic and political relations with most of the OIC members was too important for them to jeopardize it merely because some of its nations had to toe the Pakistani line due to political compulsions.29

Even in the International Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, Pakistan could not table its resolution on the human rights situation in the Kashmir valley. On the other hand, India could successfully table its paper on anti-terrorism and this was a significant breakthrough for her.30 At this session the OIC kept a low profile as some its important members were themselves on the defensive due to their domestic human rights situation and also due to the growing realization of India’s economic might. Thus India could successfully come out with its resolution on terrorism without being hindered by the usual saber-rattling indulged in by Pakistan.

These developments had laid the groundwork for the 1994 session of the UNHRC at Geneva. India in the meanwhile adopted a policy of ‘transparency on transparency’ by inviting some OIC members and the Troika Ambassadors of the European Union to visit the Kashmir valley. Thus the ambassadors of Brazil, Germany, Greece and European Community paid a four day visit to the Valley. They met government officials, secessionist leaders, human rights groups, All Party Hurriyat Conference leaders, Hindus, Muslims and migrants.31 This was followed by the March 1994 visit by a team of ten

29 Kalim Bahadur, n.26, p.24
30 S.K.Singh, “India, Pakistan and the OIC” in Riyaz Punjabi and A.K.Pasha (eds.), n.26, p.27
31 The Times of India (New Delhi), 9 Feb, 1994
ambassadors – from Bulgaria, Canada, Hungary, Turkey, Nigeria, Indonesia, Columbia, Venezuela, Senegal and Mexico to Kashmir. The team spent ten days studying the situation there. An OIC team of eleven envoys also visited the Valley in April 1994. Thus, over the year 1993-94, India projected a policy of transparency that became the buzzword of its Kashmir policy. The fact that India adopted transparency not because things were improving in Kashmir but because the state of affairs was distressing, became a source of strength that buttressed India at Geneva. The access given to ambassadors had changed the game cynics played with India, it was part of an acceptance of a process of transparency, which has since continued beyond Geneva. These visits reiterated: (I) India’s bonafides about Kashmir, (ii) that the fact that actual situation was different from what was described by Pakistan, and (iii) the Indian stand that whatever maybe the reason for unrest in Kashmir, it was exacerbated and constantly fuelled by the flow of lethal weapons, money and trained personnel from across the border. This formidable case, now established by irrefutable testimony, knocked the bottom out of Pakistan’s carefully planned strategy.

The role of Iran in the UNHRC session of 1994 deserves a special reference. Pre-resolution Iran had traditionally given diplomatic support to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir and this was the most crucial test of a nations’s friendship in the eyes of Pakistan. The Iran before the Islamic Revolution of February 1979 had also offered itself for mediation, an offer that India rejected and Pakistan accepted. Earlier, Iran had also called for a “plebiscite in Kashmir under the auspices of the UN”. 32

32 The Dawn (Karachi), 22 Dec, 1955
But the Islamic Resolution of 1979 changed the complexion of the Iranian foreign policy as Iran severed its links with the CENTO, abrogated its bilateral deference treaty with the US and joined the NAM.\(^{33}\) The Kashmir issue went largely unnoticed by Iran in the eighties due to its preoccupation with Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. The nineties saw Iran gauging Indian sensitivities on Kashmir and ruling out any interference in any nations internal affairs.\(^{34}\) Its pro-Pak utterance sometime later on should be seen in the light of its overall perception of Muslims in India. Hence, while refraining from any intervention in the internal affairs of any nation, Iran said it would support “any rightful struggle of the weak against the strong on the face of the globe”.\(^{35}\)

Any Indian doubts emanating from this position were put to rest in May 1993 when the Iranian National Assembly speaker Ali Akbar Nategh Noori told the Press Trust of India (PTI) that Iran was against external interference in Kashmir and favoured a bilateral approach to the solution of the issue.

The breakthrough in Indo-Iranian relations on Kashmir came in September 1993 when the PM PV Narasimha Rao utilised his Teheran visit to clear any misunderstanding whatsoever on Kashmir and expressed strong objections to cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.\(^{36}\) The Joint Communique of 22 September 1993 had Iran expressing full support to India in its fight against terrorism. Iran also praised India for its sensitive handling of the Hazratbal crisis of 1993. All this built up the prelude to

\(^{33}\) Javad Moinaddini, “Iran and the Kashmir Issue”, *Strategic Analysis*, 17 (8), Nov. 1994, p. 1053

\(^{34}\) Bansidhar Pradhan, “The Pakistani Factor in Indo-Iranian Relations”, *Link* (New Delhi), 20 September, 1992, p.11

\(^{35}\) Embassy of Islamic Republic of Iran, *Constitutional Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (New Delhi), 1992, p.55
Iranian cooperation in UNHRC Geneva session of 1994. When the Indian Foreign Minister met the Iranian President and Foreign Minister as also the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Teheran on 6 March, 1994, a visit that coincided with the UNHRC session, both Iran and China emphasised that Kashmir was a bilateral matter that could be solved only within the framework of Indo-Pak dialogue. China and Iran thus put gentle pressure on Pakistan to abstain from tabling its resolution and under such circumstances Pakistan was forced to do so. The Indian stand on Kashmir was thus aptly vindicated.

To sum up, the UNHRC experience of 1994 should serve as an opportunity for India to realize the benefits of a coherent, strong policy as against its earlier ad-hoc and piecemeal approaches on the question of tackling adverse international attention on Kashmir. This Geneva policy can form a longstanding base for an effective international counterterrorist strategy for India. These alongwith bilateral and multilateral understanding on the matter, as evidenced in the reaching of extradition agreements etc. can go a long way in formulating a fitting diplomatic response to the problem of international terrorism.

At the ground level inspite of India having reached many bilateral and some multilateral agreements against terrorism, the problem has not really been solved. Some experts feel that this is because India has never specifically spelt out a policy against international terrorism. They contend that terrorism will continue to flourish in India till we take an uncompromising postion against it, or assert that it can never be

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36 Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, Sept. 23, 1993
legitimised whatever the political aspiration. Thus what is needed is to spell out a policy statement on the larger issues of political and economic fallout of global terrorism. These experts also warn against the degenerating of the terrorist debate to Pakistan-bashing, as this may make the international community lose interest in the problem.\textsuperscript{38} They also suggest that India should work in close association with several Western and Arab countries that have recently put renewed pressure on Pakistan to curb the activities of Afghan or Arab terrorists operating from Pakistan. Thus most experts stress the need of India gaining professional expertise in conflict management on one hand and the ability to sustain negotiations at both official and non-official levels by integrating theoretical and practical skills.\textsuperscript{39} They also believe that in the absence of a new diplomatic technique in the changed political climate of the post Cold War Era, India will find it difficult to go beyond "positional discussions" at international forums like the UN.\textsuperscript{40} Hence according to them India needs to shed negative stereotypes and enemy images and have a proper training in negotiating skills to solve longstanding disputes.

These lacunae in the foreign-policy making, according to these experts, is the reason why India's official dialogue with Pakistan has not yielded any concrete friendly results. However to make up for official non-results, non-official dialogue has been encouraged and this forms what is called Track Two Diplomacy. After Operation Brasstacks of 1986-87, the US put forward many proposals for dialogue and enhanced Indo-Pak Confidence Building Measures. One of these, triggered off by a visit from

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., p.294.

\textsuperscript{39} M.L. Sondhi and Shrikant Paranjpe, \textit{A Peace Agenda for Indian Foreign Policy}, Har-Anand Publications New Delhi, 1995, p.2
former Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, led to the Nimrana dialogue which was initially funded by the United States Information Service and is now in its seventh year. Nimrana is only one of the thirty five non official dialogues, forums or settings where regional and strategic issues are discussed.41 Most of these forums strive towards better cooperation by trying out the following steps: sharing of Indian satellite facilities by India and Pakistan on an equitable basis; co-production of movies and release of selected films in each other’s cinemas; participation in each other’s film festivals; evolving low rates for two-way communication of media via telex, postal and satellite facilities and broadcasting each other’s radio and TV programmes with greater frequency.42 The aim is to enhance people-to-people contact and generate goodwill that will help resolve contentious issues.

Another behind the scenes activity to garner diplomatic support is lobbying. Lobbying is an essential part of American democracy and this technique has been made full use of by certain Pakistani, ‘Khalistani’ and Kashmir militant groups to embarrass India in the US Congress on issues like human rights. Hence India felt the need to hire a lobbying firm to protect its interest. Thus, India entered into a contract with the law firm McAuliffe, Kelly and Rafaelli on 12 January, 1994. This firm, with its good contacts on Capitol Hill with both the Republicans and the Democrats, was selected to present a better image of India, including the emerging economic opportunities; facilitate a more

40 ibid., p.12
41 Kanti P. Bajpai, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia, Manohar, New Delhi, 1995, p.84

42 South Asia Watch, South Asian Center for Strategic Studies 1(2 and 3), New Delhi, Jan. and Feb 1997, p.21
balanced assessment of India democracy and human rights practices, and gain better access to policy makers, media and business leaders. The purpose was not to substitute the work of the Indian Embassy but to compliment it and make it more effective.

Apart from these diplomatic exercises, what India really needs is to develop a new focus for its foreign policy. Unilateral decision-making by certain groups would only lead to the search for quick-fix “solutions” to problems. Also required is a close linkage between domestic and international policies to enhance the efficacy of non-confrontational elements in both the spheres and a broadening of the traditional assumptions of strategic studies in India to accommodate the complexity of internal and external forces. Only then would India be able to make use of the various cooperation extended by friendly countries and regional forums like the SAARC in dealing with problems like international terrorism.

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43 M.L.Sondhi and Shrikant Paranjpe, n.27, p.58
44 ibid., p.28