CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION.
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New World Order and India's Foreign Policy

International political scene has undergone tremendous change during the last few years. The cold war politics, which dominated international relations for four decades has come to an end. The defining principles of the international environment during all these years was imbued with the great East-West power conflict. With the destruction of Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the final collapse of U.S.S.R the broad configuration of international forces that prevailed for so many years has suddenly ceased to exist.

The post-cold war world is witnessing an unprecedented restructuring of international relations in a fast changing environment. The end of ideological rivalry, which had sharpened conflict across the world, seemed to open the way for a new cooperative framework relationships, generating hope of building a better security environment.¹

Undoubtedly, the end of cold war (and its harmful impact on international relations) has brought in a different world order – not

altogether a better or a wholesome one. Post-Cold War era has spawned a dichotomy within the international system. There is great deal of uncertainty in the emerging global situation. New conflicts are surfacing in some parts of the world while many old conflicts remain unresolved.

All history, said Toynbee, is challenges and response. One might say the same of the foreign policy of a nation. Like all else in nature, the international environment constantly changes imposing the need for adjustments in the domain of foreign policy. A regulated and measured response to the challenges a nation faces in the international arena is the hallmark of the success of its foreign policy. Our foreign policy, therefore rests, on two pillars: one, our national ethos and temper that is responsible for continuity in the midst of change. The other, the perception of national interest in the immediate context which may dictate changes of style, or emphasis in the midst of a continuum. The task of foreign policy is to strike a balance between these two.

Present-day Challenges

The fundamental shift in the international political economy and the strategic powers balances have vastly changed the circumstances in which India has to function. The challenges that the Indian policy makers face

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today are similar to what Jawaharlal Nehru faced in 1947 when the dawn of independence coincided with the beginning of the cold war.

Nehru succeeded in evolving a policy which gave Indian diplomatic space in which it was able to retain autonomy of decision as to pursue its national interests. Once again, India today faces a new world with its own risks and opportunities. The challenges is how to minimise the risks and make the best use of opportunities. For this to happen, the first step is to assess the emerging situation in a realistic manner.

There are certain other features of the international situation which are clearer and of a more enduring nature. India has to take note of these in formulating its policies. The first and the most important development of the post-cold-war world is the emergence of a coalition of major powers to maintain world order. The United States is the politically and military leader of the coalition; in economic matters its leadership has weakened to that of being first among several equals. The coalition members have no internal ideological differences; they are all function domestical within the same framework of liberal democracy and market-friendly economies.

Under the political aegis of the coalition, the emerging economic order is dominated by three regional economic blocs: North America (which includes Mexico), the European Economic Community, and the Asian Pacific Rim. The interrelationship between these emerging blocs will
determine the dynamics of the world economic system in the nineties. They will cover trades, financial flows and technological advanced and thus set the pace and pattern of new international economic relations. The basis of these new relationship will be a new type of multilateralism that will sustain the hegemony of the industrial world, but it will, at the sometime, offer scope of manoeuvre to the developing countries. The main characteristic of the emerging global economy can be described as "competitive interdependence."³ In these circumstances common sense and national interest demand that India should accept the world as it is and explore opportunities to strengthen its economy and gradually outgrow the league of minor players rather than isolate itself by harping on economic sovereignty.

India, under Narasimha Rao government appears, at last, to have arrived at a sensible level of pragmatism in foreign policy-after having traversed, for many years, a doctrinaire or idealistic stance. The most spectacular evidence for this new policy or stance is the decision to established diplomatic relation with Israel almost 40 years after reconginising it. At last, India has come to realise (the changed international context apart) that non-establishment of diplomatic relations

with Israel has not served India's foreign policy in West Asian affairs, and otherwise too.

India's recent policy of economic liberalisation and of integrating Indian economy with that of global economy is a new phase of pragmatism. The earlier Indian policy of self-reliance was not wrong; it ensured a fairly high level of industrialisation and economic well-being. However, it had tended, in recent years, to make for India's economic isolation from the rest of the world, and perhaps also preventing India from drawing upon the technological developments in the advanced states. Economic interdependence is a fact of life in present day global affairs; while India was perfectly conscious of this, it tended to follow (and made too much of the virtue of) a somewhat doctrinaire and self-obsessed from of self-reliance. This new policy of integrating Indian economy with the global one has some obvious implications for India's foreign policy or relations - in particular, potential erosion of India's ability to take freely and independently political or economic decisions. One hopes the government would carefully monitor such potential dangers to India's policy of non-alignment-balancing the benefits of independence, sovereignty and equality among nations.

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The end of cold war has regrettably not led to a concomitant emphasis on development co-operation. If anything, the developmental aspirations of developing countries are being given even less attention today. The new multilateral agenda consists of demands for action at the national level for democracy, political pluralism, human rights etc. We have a proud track record in all these areas. We would, however, like to ensure that the new multilateral agenda is not set at the expense of development co-operation. There is an urgent need to restore the centrality and criticality of development co-operation of the multilateral agenda.

Relations with USA, EEC, Japan, China

India’s record in domestic and foreign policy since the launch of its economic liberalisation program and the end of the cold-war has been far from exemplary but not bereft of achievement. India has improved relations with the United States, although differences remain on issues of nuclear proliferation and ballistic missile development. India has however, dramatically improved its relations with China by tackling the long-standing border dispute, agreeing on a variety of confidence - and security - building measures and expanding crossborder trade. The visit of the Chinese premier Mr Li Peng, to India in December 1991 had led to further improvement in our relations. India is also keen to evolve a close relationship with the European Community as an economic as well as a
political entity to sub-serve mutual interest. Our ties with Japan have been traditionally friendly and our new economic policy provides countries like Japan, South Korea and Singapore as well other developed countries of the world fresh incentives for increased involvement in the process of India's development.

India's Foreign Policy and Non-alignment

The end of Cold War, as a goal for which the nonaligned movement had relentlessly struggled for three decades, marks the triumph of this hope. It also marks the triumph of the policy of non-alignment. The transformation of East-West relations has changed the context but not the relevance of non-alignment. There is no question but that the Policy/Movement of nonalignment continue to be relevant and valid in the post-Cold War era and this, despite many seemingly radical changes, including the end of bipolar world. While it is true that non-alignment arose at the end of the Second Cold War, when there came into existence a bipolar world and the Cold War, the policy was merely coincidental with that context and did not arise because of it. Hence, the end of these two international phenomena did not mean the end of continuing need for the policy. While the Cold War and bipolar world have disappeared, the

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capability of the Great Powers to exercise hegemony over the small/weak nations, and the aspirations to do so, have not.

However, with the Super Power detente and the end of the Cold War, the non-aligned movement is facing an identity crisis: there is no country to be non-aligned with. This is reflected in the final declaration of Belgrade which recognises the need for the non-aligned movement to modernise the approach "in the face or fundamental changes on the international scene since the last summit at Harare." To keep the movement inspired by a sense of purpose, the emphasis has shifted from the East-West conflict to the New International Economic Order, underdevelopment, debt, money, finance and ecological issues.

The shift in emphasising not withstanding, the basic assumption of non-alignment still remains the same. These are "peace at home, peace with neighbours and the pursuit of peace in the rest of the world. Peace is desired for its own sake and because it is conducive to the economic growth of non-aligned countries individually and collectively. One basic principle of non-alignment also remains as valid today as it was when originally propounded by the three founding fathers, Nehru, Nasser and Tito: the essence of non-alignment is national independence.

The successive governments in India has rightly continued the policy of non-alignment and this despite widespread scepticism in India and
abroad about its relevance and validity in the present altered international context. This is probably the most basic source of pragmatism in India’s role in world affairs - for it ensures India’s continuing ability to take decisions on the merits of issues, without being pulled and pushed around by the Big Powers or group of States. This policy or attitude also ensures - as, in fact, it presently has - India’s balanced relationship with the Great Powers, with no ‘tilt’ towards one or the other.

Indian Government, under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao, has decided to follow the “Nehru line” in foreign policy and reaffirmed the continuing relevance of the Non-aligned Movement and the policy. In party politics, while the traditional national consensus on many foreign policy issues appears to have been broken, the old consensus on India’s continued adherence to the policy of nonalignment seems to be as solid as ever. In this connection, it is good to read that India’s External Affairs Ministers, Madhavsinh Solanki, made on January 16 at Cairo an admirable reaffirmation of India’s stand in the policy and Nonaligned Movement to an August gathering.

Although the traditional foreign policy choice - imperialism, balance of power, alliances, nationalistic universalism, neutrality or isolationism are no longer relevant or available for states, especially for countries like

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India (most other members of the NAM too). India has no choice, even in the present altered context of the international relations, by to lead the opposition to the hegemonism of any powerful state, which happens to be, at present, only the United States. It is against the "Super Powerism" of any state, which ever happens to be (or seeks to be) dominating the state system and against the potential multi-polarism of the world by the emergence of the EC, Germany, or Japan.

India also took some initiative which were seen as departure from the earlier practice of the policy of non-alignment, specially in adjustment of relations, viz., recognition of Israel, joint military exercise with the US, persistent efforts to enter in to ASEAN as a full time partner, stiff resistance to the US efforts to pressurise India to accept South Asia as a nuclear free zone, to sign NPT, to enter into MTCR and to accept CTBT, relations with China were normalised and fresh enroutes were made in trade relations with Central Asian countries, African and Latin American countries.

One significant, departure by India from the Nehru heritage is that we no longer play an active role - not as active as it once did- in world affairs. India was a major actor on the world stage in the 1950s, but no longer. It seems, now a days, we are either altogether silent on many current international issues or speak up only occasionally and in whispers.
on them. The end of the Cold War has not at all rendered irrelevant non-alignment in world affairs. While officially and formally, we uphold this view we rarely and/or persistently maintain this policy even officially - with the result that in news media, in party politics and intellectually, there is widespread scepticism which hardly reflects the official position. Indeed, many of them might well perceive (wrongly) that India is ambiguous in its stand. Even while India's priorities have (perhaps rightly) changed from the old preoccupation with political issues to the current economic development and cooperations, it is possible for India to play a distinctive role in the matter of world peace and peaceful settlement of disputes through multilateral fora as India once used to India should reorient its policy of non-alignment to 'active' or 'optimum' alignment so far economy is concerned focus should be on basic problems of humanity: disparities within and across countries, unemployment environment, preservation of biodiversity and social diversity, disarmament, general and complete, international terrorism, human rights, gender issue etc, and lay more emphasis on alternate world development agenda and pursuing it with all countries that are afflicted with problems of the present path of development. Non alignment is not a dogma but is only a policy which has gone under change even during Bi-polar era from equidistance to closer proximity and India should reorient it in order to meet option and choices

open in an inter-connected net-work of nations which requires a pro-active alignment with the net work and not with a sub-set of Non-aligned nations.

India’s Security Concern and Nuclear Issues

The immediate post Cold War years were marked by a fervent expectation for a new world order and for the so called “peace divided.” While this did not really materialism, there was, nonetheless a general feeling of optimism and hope that the end of Cold War hostilities might lead to a global nuclear disarmament. But if anything, post-cold war nuclear doctrine has become even more irresponsible than was the case before. On the one hand, the great towers have declared that their relations are no longer hostile, that their missiles are no longer aimed at each other, and that the general level of animosity has been scaled down. But on the other hand, they continue to refine their military doctrines that would justify their retention of nuclear weapons.

Since Jawaharlal Nehru’s days, India has been vociferous in its opposition to nuclear weapons (and other weapons of main destruction). At various international forums also India advocated the elimination and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. India also expressed concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons and highlighted the danger of proliferation. But India has refused to sign the NPT because it does not eliminate weapons discriminates in favour of nuclear powers and does not
provide for an effective verification. The arguments advanced by the Indian Ambassador, V.C. Trivedi, to the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1965-67, that the Treaty was not a non-proliferation treaty but a license to legitimise proliferation of nuclear weapons by five proliferations.

The nuclear debate within India has acquired momentum since the indefinite and an conditional extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. In May 1995 when a global conference on extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was held in New York and the general consensus was in favour of permanent extension of NPT, India refused to support the extension of NPT on account of its discriminatory nature because the treaty permitted only five countries the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China and France, to legally, possess nuclear weapon capability.

India is now emphasizing practical steps to deal with the danger of nuclear weapons, without giving up its larger quest for their worldwide abolition. In its past diplomatic efforts at the U.N, India’s sole emphasis was on purposeful negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons in a time bound framework.

The great powers and their allies, of course, have never been in favour negotiations. India’s emphasis on a time bound framework for
nuclear abolition became a convenient excuse for the five nuclear weapon powers - recognised by the NPT - to argue that it was demanding the impossible, and hence not really interested in any interim, meaningful arms control measures.

India is also one of the original sponsors of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT). Even until 1993, India had been a sponsor of all United Nation’s resolutions that demanded a CTBT and an FMCT. But in 1996 when the CTBT appeared imminent, it refused of accept the treaty and declared, in the words of the redoubtable Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, that India would not sign: not now, nor later. After the Pokhran II nuclear tests, India was offered to accept the CTBT conditionally.

The Indian stand on the CTBT and the FMCT during negotiations derives from its traditional nuclear diplomacy. Even since independence, India has tried to harmonise its security with disarmament. It has view nuclear weapons as instruments of power and coercion and argued that their anywhere in effect, threatens other’s security. India therefore, has been demanding their complete elimination.

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9 Manis, "India’s Policy Towards the CTBT and the FMC", in Amitabh Matoo (ed), India’s Nuclear Deterent, Pokhran II and Beyond (Har-Anand Publication Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 1999).
But India rejected the Treaty on three grounds.

First, the nuclear weapon states failed to give a commitment to elimination their nuclear weapons in a reasonable and negotiated finite span of time. India felt that in the absence of such a commitment, the Treaty would become an unequal treaty retaining the present discriminatory nuclear regime and sanctioning, in effect, the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries for their security, while ignoring the security concerns of other states.¹⁰

Second, the CTBT failed to effectively contribute nuclear non-proliferation in all aspects. It banned only explosive testing.¹¹

Third, the Treaty included the EIF (Entry-into-force) clause: Article XIV. This made the Indian rectification of the Treaty essential for its implementation. This provision contradicted the fundamental forms of international law and was thus unacceptable to India.¹²

Some critics, believe that India needs nuclear weapons to fend off potential challenges from China and Pakistan. India’s security concerns was driven by the China factor and Pakistan came in later.¹³ One-third of India’s land boarder (much of which is in dispute) is shared with China

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¹¹ Ibid.
¹² Ibid.
¹³ Hindustan Times, June 25 1998
which is outside South Asia. China factor will affect India’s national security interests. The direct concerns will be due to the programmes of modernisation of Chinese military and strategic forces.

The indirect effects of the Chinese action, however, are likely to pose more serious challenges to India’s security interest. In particular, the continuing Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes will have a more immediate impact on our security. Infact, India’s strategic and security concerns range over a much larger neighbourhood covering a vast area all the way from Central Asia down the Gulf through Burma, Thailand, China down to the straits of Malacca.

India carried out its first underground nuclear experiment for “peaceful purposes” in the Pokhran range of Rajasthan desert in May 1974. For almost exactly twenty four years, the military aspects of India’s nuclear policy and programme remained shrouded in a veil of ambiguity and opaqueness. There had been little reliable information available about the exact state of India’s nuclear programme since 18 May 1974: the day India conducted its first nuclear test and termed it a peaceful nuclear explosion. On 11 May 1998, the veil was finally lifted. After conducting three underground tests of Pokhran, at 1545 hours, the government of India was unusually candid in its statements. It was declared officially:
“The people of India have a very credible nuclear deterrent.” India conducted two more tests on 13 May, and shortly thereafter, Vajpayee was equally explicit.” You will have noted that neither my statement of 11 May nor the longer official text released later that day has characterised the nuclear tests as “peaceful nuclear tests”, he said. In addition, added even more forth rightly, “our intentions were are, and will always be peaceful but we donot want to cover out action with a veil of needless ambiguity. India is now a nuclear weapons state…”

There is one major strategic rationale for the construction of a credible and effective Indian nuclear weapon posture: to provide a hedge - an insurance policy - against the possibility of a belligerent China in an uncertain anarchic world. The nuclear test by India and Pakistan seem to have polarised much of the debate on the security of South Asia. One the one hand, nuclear non-proliferation fanatics and some peace activists consider the region to be “teetering on the brink of disaster” and even on the verge of nuclear conflict. On the other hand, a few deterrence enthusiasts believe that was is now no longer possible in South Asia and we can look forward to an era of perpetual peace.

In contrast to these views, it is argued here that nuclear weapons can became instruments of durable peace and sustained stability, but the

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14 The Hindu, 12 May 1998.
possibility or war, particularly an accidental or unauthorised war, needs to be reduced. The intuitive nuclear deterrence that seems to prevail today needs to be stabilised through a series of measures that can be operationalised most effectively within a co-operative framework.

India has ensured continuing ‘good neighborly’ policy with all countries, including Pakistan which suffers from some paranoia regarding India. With Bangladesh, we have reached and understanding regarding the sharing of the Ganga Waters. India also concluded Mahakali Treaty with Nepal. With Sri Lanka it had extended maximum co-operation to restore peace and stability in its northern and eastern provinces.

A major source of differences among the states of the Indian Sub-continent seem to be due to the fact that India is far bigger and stronger (economically and military) than the other six of its neighbours. Most of India’s South Asian neighbours seem to be unduly obsessed with India’s pre-eminence and power potentiality in the region, to the neglect of its positive elements. And this, despite India’s persistent proclaimed policy of “good neighbourliness” and of respect for the independence, sovereignty and equality of other states.

The problem of disputed border with China and the Kashmir problem with Pakistan are, in essential, very different - the former is concerned with the formal delineation of the traditional border between India and
China, the latter involves the illegal occupation by Pakistan of about one-third of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, an integral part of India. But there is certain common element between them namely, the basis and principles of settlement of the dispute.

In respect of both, India has taken in recent years, the position that the territorial disputes need to be settled only by peaceful means, and second, that they need to be settled in the interest and perceptive of establishing friendly and normal relations.

India has had a large number of problems with its neighbours. And so far as India is concerned, it needs to be always conscious of its positive international obligations towards its smaller and weaker neighbours, arising out of its predominant size and strength. Also, India needs to remember that as and where it seems to misuse its military and economic capabilities vis-a-vis its neighbours, it can not rule out the undue interest, involvement, of the extra-sub-continental states (to which it is opposed in principle).

India has completed Fifty Years at the United Nations. But it has so far not been able to grasp the significance of the UN system as an integral part of international politics. India does not yet know how to make effective use of instrumentality of the United Nations in the conduct of its foreign policy strategy. There are broadly two reasons: Unlike other major powers, India has, in some details, not followed a systematic pattern of
personal representation at the United Nations so essential to the task. It has also not set up the much-needed institutionalised mechanism so far the conduct of its foreign policy in general and through the United Nations in particular.

As a veteran British UN diplomat, Lord Caradon, succinctly put it, those who ignore the reality of the United Nations as an integral part of international politics and fail to make use of the mechanism that the United Nations provides for the furtherance of their own interest and the larger interests of mankind, do so “to their own detriment.”

If, therefore, India wishes to make its contribution to the United Nations effective and give a worthy lead in international affairs, it should not only be needy to make use of the diplomatic instrument that the world body is but also understand it and acquire the necessary skill in handling it. It is high time India equipped itself with the necessary apparatus to play its rightful role. The current critical phase demands that it play a leading role.

As is common knowledge, the international community is standing today at the crossroads with the end of the Cold War, which had thwarted progress for decades in international co-operation, it could now make use of the United Nations to unravel regional and global issues and push towards constructive international co-operation in meeting humanity’s social and economic needs. The alternative is for one power on group of
power to impose its own values on world view on the vast majority of nations which are at this stage is an extremely vulnerable state. This would undo all that the UN system has done so far.

India owes it to itself and the larger international community to play, in collaboration with other medium powers a leading role in preventing the United Nations from turning subservient to any power or group of powers.

To play this role India must first set its own house in order for greater political stability and a reliant, viable and self reliant economy. It is time it acquired an appropriate institutional mechanism with which to pursue its foreign policy strategy in a well co-ordinated manner; it cannot continue to provide adhoc response to situation as they emerge. It should be well prepared to play a leading role, in collaboration with other developing countries and like mined states, in building up international political safeguards that would give the principles enthused in the UN Charter a fighting chance of success in meeting the challenge of money and military power.

India supports the view that the Security Council should be expanded and democratised further to respond to fresh challenges facing the UN. India’s attitude in the matter was succinctly put by Prime Minister Shri Narasimha Rao at the Security Council Summit in January 1992 when he said: “As the composition of the General Assembly has trebled since its
inconception, the size of the Security Council cannot remain constant any longer. Wides representation in the Security Council is a must, it is to ensure it its moral sanction and political effectiveness.” Obviously decisions of the Security Council will have a greater moral authority and effectiveness if it is more representative of the UN membership.

To sum up the basic principle of India’s foreign policy one should but they need to be applied with case the vision to concentrate problems in the radically changing world situation. India has a role to play as a bridge of friendship and understanding between the East and the West and between North and South.