Chapter-II

The Demand For India's Partition and The British Policy 1940-42
The democratisation of politics brought into open the stark realities in India. The inadequate protection to Muslims made the proposed federation a redundant proposition. The provincial administration during 1937-39 alarmed the Muslims that Congress wanted to subsume the minorities. Jinnah after 1937 had been developing a twofold strategy. On the one hand, he persuaded the Congress to co-opt the Muslim League in the sharing of power and on the other he was looking for to overcome the permanent minority status. Having a weak position, his first proposition was rebuffed by the Congress while British government driven by war time concern encouraged him to spell out his alternative strategy to overcome the majority rule. It resulted in the Lahore Resolution.

There was nothing strange about the Lahore Resolution as various schemes regarding the demand for partition were propounded as early as 1930s. At the annual session of the Muslim league at Allahabad in December 1930, Mohammad Iqbal advocated the creation of Muslim autonomous state within India. He wanted to see the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state, under self-government within the British empire.

Excerpts from the speech of Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal's concept of Pakistan in December 1930 at Allahabad as the president of annual session of All India Muslim League. Quoted in Durrani M.F Khan : The Making of Pakistan, Lahore 1944, pp 201-202.
But prior to his death in April 1938, Iqbal's opposition to a single Indian federation hardened and he urged Jinnah to demand one or more separate Muslim state. However the idea of "hostage theory" where non-Muslims would remain hostage with the Muslims and vice-versa, since then gained currency.

In 1933, Chaudhry Rahmat Ali coined the term "Pakistan". He emphasized that geographically the land comprising the North-West Provinces of present India forms a separate and distinct unit. In his pamphlet "Now or Never", he proclaimed the freedom of the Muslims from the British domination and the release of "our nation" from the bonds of 'minoritism'.

In 1937, Punjab premier Sikander Hayat Khan outlined a scheme of a loose "All India Federation" of seven zones comprising British provinces and the princely states. His scheme contemplated regional legislature for each zones where one third of the total number were to constitute the central legislature.

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93 Sikander Hayat Khan outlines a scheme of Indian federation on July 30, 1939, Lahore. He spoke on the similar lines in the Punjab Assembly Debates on March 11 1941.
In July 1937, a Bombay Muslim Leaguer, M.H. Gazdar proposed the creation of an independent Muslim state comprising the four North-Western Provinces. The founder of the Sindh United Party, Abdoola Haroon sought the realisation of Muslim state by division of "Hindu India and Muslim India". Syed Abdullah Latif of Hyderabad propounded the zonal theory for India. He envisaged that each zone would form a state with a highly centralized form of government. According to Latif's scheme exchange of population was desired to give Hindus and Muslims freedom to promote the cause of India's Unity. Ahmed Bashir, wanted the recognition of separate homeland by dividing India into autonomous, homogeneous states as one and the only way to India's unity.

In 1939 a scheme known as "a Punjabi" comprising a confédération of India was advocated. It talked about to reshape the map of India into five federations but it did not favour any exchange of population.

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94 Ziring's book on Jinnah cites the scheme of M.H Gazdar dated July 10, 1937.
95 The All India Muslim League session of October 9, 1938 held at Karachi was addressed by Abdoolah Haroon where he proposed his scheme.
96 The details of Syed Abdul Latif's scheme is discussed in The Indian Annual Register 1939, Calcutta, vol I pp 176-78.
population. 98

Then there was Aligarh scheme of August 14, 1939. It aimed division of the country into Hindu India and Muslim India on the basis of a two nation theory. Its underlying theme was that Muslim majority provinces should not be permitted to be dominated by a single "All India federation" with an overwhelmingly Hindu majority at the centre. On the other hand Muslims in the minority provinces should not be deprived of their separate identity and be given effective support by the Muslim majority provinces. This scheme envisaged three states - Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan to enter into an alliance on mutual recognition and reciprocity. 99

It was on March 1939, that the working committee of the Muslim League appointed a committee headed by Jinnah, to examine the drafts of the various schemes and give its report. 100 The Committee examined several schemes but could not evolve a consensus which could protect the interests of the Muslim India. The dilemma was manifest when everyone tried to analyse the idea of Muslims being a nation to suit their own

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98 Sir Mohammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot: A Punjabi Conference of India was published in Lahore 1939, pp 78-79.
100 See The Pioneer, Allahabad, March 28, 1939.
interest. Though all these schemes tried to save Muslims from having a perpetual minority status but they had nothing to offer for the Muslims of the minority provinces. So the committee could neither recommend any scheme of its own nor decided to select one out of those suggested by others as none met the collective aspiration of Muslim India. 101

Then lately a new plan was sent to Delhi by several Muslim authors for constitutional review. This scheme envisaged that two Muslim zones in the North and East to be constituted with 72 per cent of the total Muslim population of India. A Delhi province was to be added to the North zone and whole of Assam should to the East zone. 102

The All India Muslim League working committee which met for ten days, to evolve a consolidated scheme, pondered over the brief of the above scheme. Finally it decided to lay rest to the eighteen months of controversy that dogged for the search for a concrete policy by the Muslim League. It culminated into the famous Lahore Resolution on March 22, 1940.103

101 The Annual Register of 1939 Vol 1 publishes a detail discussion on the various schemes, see pp 175-200.

102 A confidential note for the president of the All India Muslim League, Typescript Document 4V\Q\A\P File 96, India Office Library London.

103 Appendix contains the full text of the Lahore Resolution taken from the pamphlet of the All India Muslim League, published in 1944 from Daryagang, Delhi.
One fact that emerges after going through all the schemes including the Lahore resolution was Muslims wanted to escape from the inherent dilemma of "minoritism". Therefore the demand for Partition as popularly known articulated through the Lahore Resolution should not be accepted on its face value. The real motive of Jinnah was to coordinate Muslim majority and minority provinces to put a united front so that the Congress may be forced to seek terms with the Muslim League. Also what the Lahore Resolution aimed was that the British Government take cognisance of the Muslim League in any future constitutional settlement of India. This could be on the basis of a strong centre or weak provinces or vice-versa. It could either be on the basis of two nation theory with sufficient non-Muslim population as "hostage" for Muslim protection in their minority provinces. It could be an autonomous area in the North and East with a strong centre provided Muslims were accorded parity with the Congress. In simple terms, it could be anything in lieu of adequate protection for the Muslims in the wake of a democratic arrangement which would perpetuate majority rule in India.\footnote{\textsuperscript{104} Pakistan was Jinnah's bottom line of settlement or his bargaining counter is still a puzzle. The trouble of basing an hypothesis entirely on what Jinnah might have thought rather than what actually said lies in the lack of substantial evidence. In its absence one has to accept Ayesha Jalal's thesis that Jinnah framed Lahore Resolution for bargaining purposes. However, one likes to argue with Jalal that if Pakistan remained Jinnah's strategy it was logical that he should have possibly altered the result by lowering his bid. The paradox is still not dispelled. Jinnah openly stood for what he did not want, stated what he did not mean and never divulged what he hoped to bring about. Not understanding the fact it was evident, after seeing Quaid-e- Azam papers at the India Office Library London that Jinnah was not working on a game plan but was moving on day to day basis.}

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Jinnah took some features of the separatist scheme but deliberately remained ambiguous about the future shape of all India arrangement. His immediate concern was to unite the different strands of Muslim community under the banner of the Muslim League. This could only be possible at this juncture of history by sounding as logical and as vague at the same time.

The contradiction of Muslim heterogeneity could only be addressed by asserting that Muslims were a nation. Henceforth, ambiguity and communal plank became the main plank in Jinnah's speeches. He deployed the invented tool of "two nation" to unite the divided Muslim house. He was convinced that the Congress and British government would be forced to take cognisance of the Muslim demand. For this, Jinnah faced the herculean task of bringing all the Muslim majority provinces under the banner of the Muslim League. That was the reason why he left the Lahore Resolution as vague and as flexible as possible. It was open for negotiations and interpretation as the situation develops. Muslim majority provinces were hopeful for their autonomy, the minority provinces saw the promise of safeguards. As for as Congress was concerned, Jinnah was sure Muslim League would only matter to them provided it produced overwhelming evidence of Muslim support, while British would not reject the concept because of war-time crisis. The very idea of the existence of Pakistan would help them repudiate the Congress claim to represent whole of India.
Linlithgow wrote to the Secretary of State, Zetland that "after the adoption of the Lahore Resolution, my first reaction was, I consider the Muslim scheme for partition as silly, but it would be a pity to throw much cold water on it at this stage though clearly we cannot accept or associate ourselves with it".  

Pakistan scheme in his judgement was objectionable not only in principle but fraught with practical difficulties. He felt it to be a "prelude to contentious internal strife in the country." Linlithgow could discern that the fundamental difference between Hindus and Muslims comes in the way of the smooth working of the democratic system. He was surprised to find Lahore Resolution to be very vague as nothing had been said about the form of government that would take shape in the units which were to be created where Muslims dominated and what will happen to the units that may lie outside the Muslim sphere of influence. Linlithgow judged that the Lahore Resolution was only for bargaining purposes.

The Viceroy felt that Muslim grievances really stemmed from their opposition to the unitary form of government and stressed that in making

105 Linlithgow to Zetland April 5 1940 EMB 125/19. Linlithgow Papers, NML, Micro Film, New Delhi.
106 Linlithgow to Zetland April 6 1940 MSS\URF125\19\94, Linlithgow Papers NML, Micro Film, New Delhi.
107 Linlithgow to Zetland April 25, 1940, Ibid.
provincial or central legislature no measure would be valid if it did not secure the consent of both Hindus and Muslims voting separately. He was convinced that this would definitely stop any legislation having a communal bias and would automatically make it necessary for the government to include minority representation.\footnote{1}{108}

The Secretary of State Zetland on the other hand also felt that the Lahore Resolution was a 'council of despair'. He would not believe that the Muslim League was really contemplating to establish a number of sovereign states outside the British Government. The root cause of Muslims disillusionment, according to the Secretary was in the seven provinces where the Congress gained the ascendancy, Muslim League adherents could not find a place in various council of ministries unless they merged their political faith and individuality with the Congress party. Zetland was convinced that the Congress objective was to take control of whole of India from the British which was not acceptable to the British government. He said "we can not hand over the entire government machinery to the Congress and assist them in keeping their opponents under effective control."\footnote{2}{107}

\footnote{1}{Linlithgow to the King Emperor on June 4, 1940, Linlithgow Papers, NML, Micro Film, New Delhi.}

\footnote{2}{Secretary of State to the Viceroy March 10, 1942 LAP&J, India Office Library, London.}

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The Secretary, though recognized fully well that the Congress continues to hold the center of the platform and was the most organised political force in the country, but British government also recognises the Muslim League and guarantee to safeguard their interest in full possible terms.108

The Secretary clarified that the status of Muslims in India depended less on their numerical strength and more on their historical credentials. He added, "if we remove the counting of the heads, Muslims' apprehension could considerably be reduced and more concrete demands put forward by Mr Jinnah could be discussed". Zetland pointed out the British recognised that the all-India Muslim League was the only organization that represented the true view of the Muslims in India.109

The Viceroy Linlithgow wrote back to Zetland appraising him of the growing realisation of the stiffness of the Muslim attitude and the real risk of the community proposing to dig itself in the claim for equality. Linlithgow felt that the premier of Bengal Fazlul Haq and Sikander Hayat Khan of Punjab represented the true trend of Muslim opinion who had strongly urged Jinnah to have constructive approach. Jinnah, however indicated that

108 Zetland to Viceroy L\PO&J \629\7\12\40\Zetland Collections, NML , New Delhi.
109 Secretary of State Zetland wrote to the Viceroy about the continuing perception of the Muslims, Ibid.
now he was for full autonomy to the majority princes with safeguards for the Muslims in the minority provinces. If safeguards did not work, Viceroy discerned, Jinnah was to fall back on Bengal and Punjab to press upon his demand. The Muslim League press indicated that Pakistan scheme with safeguards for Muslims outside Pakistan had been strongly urged by the Muslim League working Committee. The Viceroy wanted that Muslims should be warned that so far as their plan for division of India was concerned, they were riding for a fall. They should be advised to secure for themselves adequate security from the Congress and the princes who alone were to deliver them goods after the British departure. L Linlithgow said that it has to be made clear that the British cannot support the Muslim League's claim of 50 per cent representation. He proposed to stand aside and warn the Muslims to reach an agreement with the Congress, who alone would be in a position to give them what they wanted and British government was expected to come in only if there was some obvious injustice. L

However, the complexity of the war situation saw the British to accept the Lahore Resolution on its face value and not expose the absurdity of the idea. It satisfied the Viceroy as long as the Muslim

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'' Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State LP&J, India Office and Library London.

''' Telegram from the Viceroy to Zetland about the complexity of the partition plan LP&J, India Office Library London.
League had little influence in their majority province which mattered to them for the war purposes. He was satisfied by the Punjab Governor's comment that responsible Muslim opinion did not think it to be more than a bargaining point.\textsuperscript{112} It also had the strength to counter the Congress pretension to represent whole of India. The Congress was now brought down to seek terms with the Muslims and the composition of the new cabinet was not limited to monopoly by any single party. Linlithgow was able to keep things as they were by giving Jinnah a vague assurance that he recognised the importance of giving adequate representation to Muslim interest in any constitutional change that might be made.

According to reform commissioner H.V. Hodson most Muslims, with whom he spoke, including orthodox supporters of Pakistan were thinking in terms of the British staying for an undefined transitional period with defence in their hands. Every Muslim Leaguer interpreted Pakistan as a confederation with India. Hodson realised that Pakistan was a ploy to overcome minority status with safeguards and seek parity vis-a-vis the Congress. The Muslim dilemma was, there was no one to denounce the Lahore Resolution despite being ambiguous and unclear on many counts as it was an expression of Muslim solidarity.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{112} Craik to Linlithgow L1 P&J\5\243, April 30 1940. Linlithgow Papers NML, Micro Film, New Delhi.

Since Muslim League's demand for Pakistan was wrapped up in ambiguities, it was unacceptable to the Congress as a pre-condition for the cooperation. Gandhi wrote in April 1940, "unless the rest of India wishes to engage in internal fratricide... or they would have to submit to the Muslim dictates, I know no violent method of compelling the obedience of eight crores of Muslim to the will of the rest of India, however powerful a majority the rest may represent. The Muslims must have the same right of self-determination as that the rest of India has", he said. He further added "we are at present a joint family and any member may claim division."\textsuperscript{114} Again in the same month he wrote "as a man of non-violence, I cannot forcibly resist the proposed partition of the Muslims of India if they really insist upon it, but I never can be a willing party to be vivisection of India.\textsuperscript{115} Partition means patent untruth, Muslim mind can only be known by a referendum made on the issue and the contemplated constituent assembly which can easily decide this question."\textsuperscript{116} On the question of Pakistan, Gandhi's article in Harijan on May 14, 1940 says; "if it is not a threat but a desirable goal why should it be prevented."\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{115} See Harijan March 30 1940.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid April 13 1940.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid May 14 1940.
For Nehru, the Muslim League demand for Pakistan was "a naive suggestion which very much simplified the problem." According to him Congress was now able to get rid of the problem about proportionate representation in the legislature, services and the cabinet. Nehru asserted that "if Muslims wanted such things as suggested by the Muslim League at Lahore, then one thing was clear that they and the people like him cannot live together."  

When Linlithgow gauged the mood of the Indian political leaders on the issue of Pakistan he was surprised with his meeting with G.D. Birla. The industrialist suggested that the best course would be to separate Hindu and Muslim nations with appropriate population movement followed by a loose federation holding the minimum power necessary. Linlithgow was shocked that the encouragement was coming from the Hindus.  

There were many Muslims politicians, who were unhappy about the Lahore Resolution. No Muslim minister in Sindh favoured it. Allah Baksh of Sindh described it as 'harmful and fantastic'. It was not discussed in the report of North West Frontier Province by Governor Cunningham. In Bengal

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118 See Leader dated April 15-16 1940. Nehru's remark is reported : Many knots of the Hindu Muslim problem has been merged into one knot which could not be unraveled by ordinary method but would need an operation.

119 Note of an interview between Linlithgow and G.D Birla in Delhi on April 1-2,1940 Linlithgow Papers, NMML Micro film, New Delhi.
Fazlul Haq, who moved the resolution at Lahore, was talking of working for a United India. This suggests that Lahore Resolution was not the aspiration of a common Muslims but those of Jinnah and his all-India Committee. At this juncture, Muslim politics was nebulous and Muslim League was in trouble. From Jinnah's point of view it was a strategy to gain firm control over the Muslim provinces and use it as an effective defence to put pressure on the Congress.

However, in the Muslim majority provinces the call for Pakistan seemed to have done little to strengthen his control over provincial Muslim leaguers. A detailed report suggests: When Linlithgow discussed with Sikander Hayat Khan about the Lahore Resolution in Punjab, the premier was not happy with Muslim position articulated by Jinnah. The so-called Muslim League in the province consisted mainly of Unionists who owed allegiance from first to the last to Sikander Hayat. When Muslim League tried to call the shots in Punjab by declaring that Muslim members should stand aloof from the war committee, no one paid any attention. Their speculation was, if Jinnah pressed more, Sikander Hayat would simply break away with the League. Jinnah's appeal that the Punjab held a "key position" in the scheme for the realization of Pakistan was falling on deaf ears. In the Punjab legislative assembly Sikander Hayat

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120 See Tribune of April 29 1940 for detail report on Lahore Resolution.
121 Note of conversation between Linlithgow and Sikander Hayat, Delhi, March 1940, Linlithgow Papers, NMML, Micro film, New Delhi.
denounced the Lahore Resolution and suggested complete autonomy for the provinces. He stressed Punjabis to stand united and brook no interference, then only we may be able to tell the meddling busybodies from outside, hands off from Punjab."\(^{122}\)

When Pandreal Moon discussed the subject with Sikander, the Premier declared "it was absurd and the establishment of Pakistan would be the signal for a massacre of every Hindu moneylender in Punjab". After forming the defence council Sikander called upon all Punjabis to rise above communalism. He attacked the idea of Pakistan and all similar scheme and demanded a government of the Punjab by the Punjabis.\(^{123}\)

However, the Governor of the Punjab Henry Craik informed the Viceroy about Lahore Resolution that only an exceptionally courageous Muslim leader would openly criticize this decision. If Sikander Hayat was to make an attempt, it would mean split in the League and possible serious repercussion among his own supporters in the state. The governor added that although he thought Muslim would accept something less than partition, as the shadow lengthened the present support for Pakistan would grow without a concrete alter-

\[^{122}\] For Punjab see Governor Craik's dispatch to Linlithgow, June 20·1940,LP&J 243. AIML resolution of June 1940 and Jinnah's speeches. Conversation between Linlithgow and Sikander Hayat in May - June 1940 and Sikander's speeches in the Punjab Legislative assembly.

Sikander Hayat hoped that Gandhi and Jinnah would reconsider the Viceroy's suggestion as to how the provincial ministries should be reconstituted and the executive council enlarged. This would pave the way for an agreement on larger issues. It would also lead to the formation of a small representative body to discuss and formulate the future plan of constitutional structure of India.\(^{125}\)

Sikander Hayat contention was that no community should dominate the other. Hindus should accept the Muslims majority in four or five provinces and Muslims should accept Hindu's majority in the rest, let there be full autonomy in the provinces and a central agency to administer common subjects. 'If Pakistan means Muslim Raj in the Punjab, he would have nothing to do with it,' he wanted a free Punjab in which all communities would share self-government.\(^{126}\)

The Punjab governor Henry Craik reported that Sikander Hayat thinks Jinnah was deliberately pressing the Pakistan issue in order to embarrass him, he added that the latter's formula had a good chance of relegating the Pakistan issue to the background until the war was over as it would

\(\)\(^{124}\) Henry Craik to Linlithgow, April 30 1940, Correspondence to the Governors (Punjab) Linlithgow Papers, NMML, Micro Film, New Delhi.

\(^{125}\) Sikander Hayat's speeches in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, March- June 1940.

\(^{126}\) Ibid
expose the weakness of the idea. The Governor also informed the Viceroy that whether Jinnah generally believes in Pakistan as a practical proposition may be doubtful but he appeared to be consistently reluctant to explain its detailed working.127

In 1941, Governor further informed the Viceroy that "Sikander Hayat Khan had defied Jinnah's ban on forming 'War Committees' and embarrassed by continued advocacy of Pakistan, proposes to resign from the Muslim League Working Committee." Viceroy told the Governor Henry Craik to persuade Sikander Hayat not to resign because of his successful organisation of the war effort. The Viceroy did not want any other group to take over or have a split in the Muslim League at this moment.128

The Lahore session of Muslim League held on 22nd March 1940 was attended by 400 delegates from Bengal. Its credit goes to Fazlul-Haq as Jinnah made him introduce the resolution. It was merely a tactical move for Jinnah as this did not indicate the real nature of relationship between the two leaders which soon became clear when differences came into the open. In Bengal Fazlul Haq and his followers were caught up with the choice between provincial priorities and the commitment

127 Henry Craik to Linlithgow, Correspondence to the Governors(Punjab) Linlithgow Papers,NMML, Micro Film, New Delhi.

128 Craik to Linlithgow April,30,1940, LP&J\5\343\FF\198.
to the all-India politics articulated by the Muslim league. 129

Within a few months of his introducing the Lahore Resolution, Fazlul Haq was speaking in terms of harmonious growth of different communities in Bengal. He pleaded that Bengal as constituent unit cannot form an autonomous state with geographical adjacent provinces. For this Bengal has to be divided into two, the result would be Muslim majority area will be surrounded by areas where Hindus are in a majority. When Linlithgow prodded Bengal's premier Fazlul Haq, he showed his inclination to work with the Congress. 130 Viceroy's letter to Zetland gives an account of the above meeting as Haq reported to have said that, Muslims case has not been fully understood in India or Britain. Fazlul Haq suggested that a coalition or some common programme might be the only solution to their agreement with the Congress. The premier impressed upon the Viceroy the seriousness with which Muslims view British giving concessions to the Congress without acknowledging the legitimate demand of the Muslims. Linlithgow assured Fazlul Haq that Congress would not be allowed to return to the offices in the province or make an advance at the

130 Note of Conversation between Linlithgow and Fazlul Haq, April 14-15 1940, Linlithgow Papers NMML, Micro Film, New Delhi.
centre till it had satisfied the minorities. The Manzilgah issue complicated the situation in Sindh. The activities of the Congress compelled the Muslim leaders there to take a number of steps at the Karachi session in 1938 to form a separate federation of Muslim provinces. In order to cease the initiative that came from Sindhi Muslims Jinnah articulated their aspirations through Lahore resolution. However, in Sindh no one could discern any enthusiasm for Pakistan, whether among those who were in office or those who were trying to get them out, there loyalties were guided by the self interest.

In the North West Frontier Provinces, Jinnah's desire of getting a Muslim League ministry remained a mere dream. This was because of the factionalism amongst the Khans and the self seeking interest of the handful local Leaguers. Here Governor Cunningham was not able to resolve their differences and was content to run the province under section 93 or Governer's rule. The frontier politicians were not interested in the all India politics and wanted to be left alone with their own affairs.

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131 Note of conversation between Linlithgow and Fazlul Haq 14-15 May 1940 Linlithgow Papers, NMML, Micro Film, New Delhi.
132 See Statesman October 11, 1938.
133 See for details Annual Register volume 2 published from Calcutta, pp 264.
134 Cunningham to Linlithgow November 2 1940 L\PO&J\5\215, India Office Library London.
In the Muslim minority province of Bihar, the Lahore resolution had very little support. Congress leader Anugrah Narian Sinha informed the Muslims that according to the proportion of the population they would be only entitled to 12 per cent seats in the government where as they were now getting 25 per cent. Sir Sultan Ahmed the leading lawyer off the Patna high court poured a good deal of water on the Pakistan idea in his convocation address at Aligarh. He was in touch with Tej Bahadur Sapru to form a team of men of good will who can lead India. Even the president of the Muslim League in Bihar, Khan Bahadur Mohammad Ismail sought an interview with the governor Stewart and hinted of breaking away as he blamed Jinnah for all the troubles. However, he recognised that Jinnah had tremendous hold over the masses and it was not possible to defy him.

Not withstanding the fact the leaders of the United Provinces supported the Lahore resolution, though some expressed their concern over the prospects of the Muslims in the minority provinces. Muslim League leader Khaliquzaman gave this question only a secondary thought, perhaps he was convinced of adequate safeguards.

The reports from the provinces suggest that the

135 Home Political File(Bihar)November 15,1940, India Office Library, London.
136 Ibid April, 4, 1941.
137 Ibid April, 7, 1941.
demand for Pakistan hardly evoked any genuine response. The situation in the Muslim majority and minority provinces were different, local and regional issues dominated the politics in these states. The future shape of all India arrangement and the prospects of the Muslims was not really the pressing agenda in these provinces.

The differences between Jinnah and the provincial Muslim Leaguers were illustrated in June 1941, when Viceroy invited the premiers of Punjab, Assam and Bengal, Sikander Hayat Khan, Sadullah Fazlul Haq besides others to secure their seats in the National Defence Council. Jinnah drew attention of the Viceroy to the Muslim League's circular of June 1940 which banned Muslims from joining the war committee. Jinnah argued that since he was the sole spokesman of the Muslims, the recommendation should have come through him. The Assam premier Sadullah tried to stand up to Jinnah and the Governor of Assam reported that Sadullah had sent his explanation and made it clear to Jinnah that if he was to choose to resign from the National Defence Council or the Muslim League, he would end up resigning from the latter. This would be the end of Muslim League ministry in Assam, he added.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Linlithgow to the Home Secretary Reid, June 19. 1941, Linlithgow Papers NMML, Micro Film, New Delhi.
¹⁴⁰ Home Political File ( Assam) June 14 1941, India Office Library London.
However, later when Sikander Hayat Khan submitted his resignation on the grounds best known to him, Sadullah also tendered his resignation fearing embarrassment. Bengal premier Fazlul Haq accused Jinnah of dictatorship. He then went on to form a ministry with the break away group of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha in Bengal.

In the ultimate analysis Jinnah still had a very hollow base in the all India set up. In the Muslim majority province of Sindh there was a pro-Congress government under Allah Baksh. In Bengal Muslim League lost control. A new coalition was headed by Shayama Prasad Mukherjee of the Hindu Mahasabha and Fazlul Haq of the Krishak Proja Party ruled there. The "corner stone" of Pakistan, Punjab was going its own way. The North West Frontier Province was under section 93. The aspirations of the Muslim majority provinces on whose backing Jinnah was contesting the case of Pakistan was for a strong and powerful province rather than secession from India.

Commenting on the event, industrialist Isphani said gloomily "neither Sikander or Fazlul Haq, care two brass buttons whether the Muslim's of

Fazlul Haq complained to Liaquat Ali Khan on September 1941, Home political file (Bengal) IOL.

\[142\] See Linlithgow Papers; correspondence with Sindh governor Dow, December 2, 1941, L\P&J\5\257 and Cunningham 24 December 1941, L\P&J\5\218, NMML, Micro Film, New Delhi
minority provinces go over any ones head or were being thrown to the wolves."\(^{143}\) Pakistan till this time was a chimera.

After the Congress demand of complete independence and the threat of non-cooperation, there was a categorical statement made by the Viceroy that British government cannot transfer their present responsibility for the peace and welfare of India to anyone who do not safeguard the Muslims interest who were very large in number and powerful element in the country. He also added that British government saw no reason to alter its policy when it was engaged in a battle of their existence.\(^{144}\)

On 8 August, 1940 British government came up with the "August offer." Its salient features were "the 1935 Act may be discussed after the war and full consideration would be given to all interest. In Indianization of the executive council, Britain would neither coerce the minorities into the Indian dominion nor allow them to prevent them from emerging. Dominion status would be conferred within a year after the conclusion of the war. It would set up a constituent body with the approval of the concerned party to adopt the new constitution of India. HMG would abide by the consensus agreed by the various political parties. Not with

\(^{143}\) Isphani to Jinnah on June 21st 1941, See Zaidi correspondence pp 142-3.

\(^{144}\) Linlithgow letters to all the Governors, See Linlithgow Papers August 8, 1940, PO&J 5/567/ NMML, Micro Film, New Delhi.
standing the fact Britain's continuing interest in India would prevail, clarified the offer.\textsuperscript{145}

The Congress rejected the August offer while majority of the Muslim League Working Committee wanted to accept it particularly the premier of Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah, however prevailed upon them on the ground that it did not offer equal partnership at the centre or the provinces for the return of cooperation to the war effort. According to Jinnah its acceptance would mean the onus would be thrown on the Muslim League which at the moment was not able to take up responsibility and would stand discredited.\textsuperscript{146} In Jinnah's judgement August offer was a step forward by the British government but he wanted to extract still more concessions for the Muslims. It was the Cripps offer that provided him the necessary lever to bargain for Pakistan, a concept which he still was not able to define.

According to Sir Reginald Copland while claiming dominion status for Pakistan, Jinnah had more than once intimated that it need not be full dominion status and that he would like foreign affairs

\textsuperscript{145} Linlithgow speech on August 1940 is given in Transfer of Power Series (TOP) Vol, 2, PP 388-40. Also see Gowher Rizvi: Linlithgow and India; A study in British Policy and the political Impasse in India- 1936-40- London chopped and changed after Viceroy's proposal.

\textsuperscript{146} Jinnah's address to the Pakistan Conference, Civil and Military Gazette, March, 2,1941 Lahore.
and defence to remain at least for the time being in the British hands. He never asked that HMG should accept Pakistan but only wanted that it should not be prejudiced by the formation of an interim government or be ruled out in future discussion. Copland believed that "Pakistan nevertheless might triumph as a counsel of despair." 147

As the world War was mostly fought in Europe, India assumed little focus as late as till September 1941. By the end of that year, war radically altered the Indian situation. The British reverses on its eastern flank required war cabinet to be reconstituted and war effort to be intensified. The Atlantic charter had lifted India and Burma out of the colonial status to the strategic importance for pax Britannica. The shift in theater of war to Asia created the necessity for a change in British policy. 148

The policy of the ruling conservative party was to lie back while the opposition labour party wanted conciliatory measures to be taken to ease domestic tension in India. They pressurised the conservative government to give India the rightful place in the emerging new world order. 149

Atlee, the new leader of the labour party was sincere in initiating a fresh approach to resolve India’s constitutional problem. Cripps, a minor figure then, endorsed Atlee's concern. Atlee traces

148 The Times, December 24, 1940, London.
149 War Cabinet Minutes from Dec 10-April 12 1940 memorandum by lord privy seal, February 2, 1942. Transfer of Power Series vol 2.
the genesis of the Cripps offer to the weekend party at the Flinkens in England where Nehru and Krishna Menon were also present to discuss the means by which the next labour government would transfer power to India.\textsuperscript{150} There emerged a consensus that after the war British government would stand by its pledge to provide a body representing all the parties and communities of India to devise a new constitution.\textsuperscript{151} It would ensure that full power would be transferred to such a government under which different races, communities and interest had the prospects of living and developing their cultural, religious and economic life without fear in India.\textsuperscript{152}

Cripps had visited India in as an opposition member of the parliament in 1939. His impression after arriving was Indians were anxious to be led by the Congress, but found that British government reluctant to transfer power till Congress and the Muslim League sorted out their differences. He proposed to the Secretary of State, Zetland to explore the possibility of a constituent assembly and advised that if the scheme seemed feasible, then the British government should allow such

\textsuperscript{150} C R Atlee: As it Happened, Atlee Papers India Office Library London.
\textsuperscript{151} House of Commons Parliament Debate Vol 5, pp 359. Also see TOP, Vol 1 where Amery has observed that India has reached the stage of deserving independence.
\textsuperscript{152} War Cabinet papers July 28-30 and also see \texttt{L\textbackslash{}APO\&V\textbackslash{}J\textbackslash{}77} of TOP Vol 1.
a body to frame a constitution. He felt that Britain should deal with all standing obligation and interest in India bonded by a treaty for a minimum term of fifteen years. Cripps felt that the negotiations between the two parties would never take place unless British government brought them together.\(^{153}\)

This first private initiative of Cripps could not make much headway due to the disagreement with Viceroy Linlithgow, whose perception did not extend beyond the imperialist line of thinking to withhold the Indian dominion. However, the debate initiated in 1939 was a step forward for the proposal made in 1942.\(^{154}\)

Later, Cripps after returning from Russia after a successful stint as an ambassder, turned his attention to India. He felt that the time had come to give a fresh thought to the future of India. Even Atlee, the leader of the Labour party was of the same opinion that British government should commit itself to resolve India's problem by bringing political groups together into active cooperation. He was clear, that there was no question of losing control over executive or defence while some gain could be made by associating Indians at the centre.

\(^{153}\) Towards the end of 1939 Cripps prepared a scheme of Constituent Assembly; cited in E. Estroick autobiography on Stanford Cripps, London 1949, PP 198-200.

\(^{154}\) Enclosure Cripps to Stewart November 29 1939 TOP Vol I,Cripps Mission January - April 1942.
With war changing its course into Asia, pressure inside the British cabinet was building by February 1942. The labour party was adamant that to mark time was to lose India. Therefore, Prime Minister Churchill was forced to set up a special Indian committee. He informed the Viceroy Linlithgow that it was indispensable to prove our honesty of purpose and gain time for necessary consultation. The British Prime Minister mooted the idea of a nominated defence council to be set up in India.\[155\]

Churchill on 4th March 1942, sounded president Roosevelt of the United States that his government was earnestly considering granting India the Dominion status after the war. His exact expression was "His Majesty's Government had decided to lay down in precise terms the steps which shall be taken for the earliest possible realization of self government in India. HMG objective was to create a new Indian Union which would constitute a dominion associated with the United Kingdom and other dominions by a common allegiance to the crown; equal to them in every respect and in no way subordinate either to its domestic or external affairs. However this was to be only after the cessation of hostilities." In his declaration he also made it clear that "any province that was not prepared to accept the new constitution had the right to opt-out but they would be given full status in the Indian Union as a non acceding provinces."\[156\]

\[155\] Churchill to Linlithgow March 10 1942, TOP Vol 1, pp 394-5
It was in this backdrop on March 22nd 1942 Churchill announced the future India policy of the British government. It contained the essential features of the Cripps proposal of November 1939 and the language of the Balfour declaration of 1916.\textsuperscript{157} There were following provisions: "once the treaty between Indian Dominion and Britain was signed, India was free to stay or leave the commonwealth. HMG's government would undertake the implementation of the so framed constitution 'only' if it was accepted that it was the right of any province or provinces to retain for the time being its present constitutional position. If it was not prepared to accept the new constitution, then HMG would prepare a new constitution on the similar lines where a provision shall be made for its accession if so desired with such non-joining provinces. The constitution making body was to be elected through a system of proportional representation by the members of the lower house of the provincial legislature. There was provision for the participation of the princely states of India. Churchill specifically mentioned that British government shall retain the responsibility of the defence of India."\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{157} Arthur James, first Earl of Balfour was Foreign Secretary in 1916. He was Prime Minister of England 1902-5, President of Privy Council 1919-22 and also in 1925-29.

\textsuperscript{158} Note by Adviser to the Secretary of State, March, 6, 1942 Command Papers(CMD) 259.
Churchill ended by an appeal to invite immediately effective participation of the principal section of the Indian opinion in the "Defence Council", so that there constructive help could ease the process of India's freedom. He went on to say that it was necessary to negotiate the signing of the treaty concerning all necessary matters relating to the complete transfer of responsibility to the Indian hands.\textsuperscript{159}

Churchill's India's policy defined British objective as creation of a new Indian union which shall constitute dominion status associated with other dominions by a common allegiance to the United Kingdom. The declaration made it clear that if the Indian parties could form a constituent body which could agree to provide adequate safeguards to the Muslims and terms of accession by the princes then India could achieve dominion hood. It made it clear that in the federal character of Indian polity the leading political party the Congress, had to realise that the way to freedom lay through their accommodation with the Muslims and the princes.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{159} See Command Papers(CMD) 6350, India , Lord Privy Seal, February - March 1942.
\textsuperscript{160} Draft declaration and discussion with Indian leaders March 20 1942 ; Maurice and Gwyer and Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian constitution1921-47, Bombay 1957,Vol 2 PP 520-21.

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It was with the draft of this declaration that Cripps was sent on a mission to secure from the Indian parties a broad agreement to enter the executive body on consultative basis which shall be consistent with good government and sound defence. Cripps, on arrival stated that Prime Minister's declaration allows self-government as well as self-determination to India. He pointed out that the scheme was prepared primarily to preserve India's unity but argued that separatism could be countered by entering into the proposed 'defence council' and work together for the defence of India. Cripps emphasised that agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League could be possible only when Muslims were not coerced into the Indian dominion. He proposed that the Congress would offer acceptable terms to the Muslims in order to dissuade their majority provinces from opting out and facilitate other provinces to also join the union. 

Cripps was convinced that Pakistan propaganda was purely a political pressure and Jinnah was ready to take Muslims into the reformed executive council by accepting the provision of local option. He had reports from Firoz Khan Noon of Punjab that Jinnah would be delighted to come into the expanded council even in the absence of the Congress. This could be on following terms; a

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161 See Transfer of Power Vol- 1, 380, CBI Secret Report March 28 1942, also see Home political file no 221\40\NAG-1 pp 54.
council of 15, with eight representatives from Hindu Mahasabha to be selected by the British in addition to depressed class and Sikh representatives to be approved by Jinnah. This would give Muslim League a minimum two third majority in the council. Cripps observed that Muslims were unwilling for collective responsibility unless they were in a majority or the British government retained control.\(^{163}\)

Cripps discerned that in the wake of Muslim Leagues opposition to the democratic constitution making body, there emerges a picture of loose federation of provinces with few reserved subjects. Therefore, he felt the necessity of an agreement on the basis of the outcome of constituent assembly with the right of the provinces to secede and if they wished, new boundaries to be drawn either predominantly Muslims or Hindus provinces. Cripps emphasised that Britain intended to create one Indian union but in the event of disagreement about the constituent making body, alternatives could not to be ruled out.\(^{164}\)

Cripps thought that his offer would force Congress and the Muslim League to reach a compromise on an entirely new basis. If the option given to the Muslim provinces forces the Congress to come to terms, Muslims themselves would be forced to realise what Pakistan would mean with

\(^{163}\) Note by S Cripps L\PO&J10\4\FF\178 Government House Lahore, July 10, 1942.

regard to the Muslim minorities elsewhere. It would have to take into cognisance the difficulties faced by the Sikhs in Punjab, the more prosperous Hindu Bengalis in Bengal and above all their own dislocation.\textsuperscript{165}

However, Cripps meeting with the Indian political leaders suggests that his declaration hardly brought any change in their stance. Mahatma Gandhi raised the question of the list of the subjects to be held by the Indians. He objected to the retention of the defence in the British hands. Nehru and Azad raised objections about dominion status and the conditions of the accession of the princely states. The Congress working committee eventually rejected the Cripps offer and in Gandhi's words it was "a post dated cheque of a crushing bank."\textsuperscript{166} Cripps was let down and felt that Congress had lost an opportunity to advance at the centre.

On the other hand Cripps meeting with Jinnah reflected that he was concerned about the efficacy of the proposal and had long discussion about its effect on the Muslim majority provinces of Bengal and Punjab.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{165} Proceeding of the press conference held by Cripps on March 29, 1942 Transfer of Power series, vol-l pp 538.
\textsuperscript{166} Note by S.Cripps on his interview with Indian Leaders, Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru and M.A.K Azad. Transfer of Power series Vol-1, L\PO&J 10 \4\ FF 17-18 pp 493-500.
\textsuperscript{167} Note of Cripps interview with Jinnah, Ibid.
Jinnah asked Cripps whether he would have effective right to opt of the constituent making body in the event of so desiring. Cripps suggested that all the members of the provincial legislative assembly would first formally vote for the accession to the new constitution and in case there was three fifth in favour of accession, then two fifth minority should have right to demand plebiscite of the total male population of the provinces. He said that the plebiscite taken should then determine the question of accession or non-accession. Jinnah was uncomfortable about the plebiscite issue and wanted that Muslim alone should decide their future. He asked whether 40 per cent would be right figure to apply to the Muslims.  

The Muslim League Working Committee expressed its concern over the inadequacy of the Cripps proposal which only recognised "Pakistan" by implication and objected to the system of election by single electoral college on the basis of a proportional representation for the setting up of the constituent making body. According to Muslim League's resolution it was a departure from their right to elect representatives through separate electorate. The resolution expressed its

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168 Initially Jinnah thought that Cripps suggestion of a plebiscite was better than voting in provincial Assemblies but he did not like the 40 per cent requirement and demanded Muslims alone should decide the issue.
inability to participate in any form of the proposed body where the decision was to be taken by a bare majority.\textsuperscript{169}

The Working Committee criticised the continuation of the Indian provinces with their existing boundaries. It pleaded that the frontiers formed from time to time were only for administrative purposes and were illogical from ethno-religious point of view. The committee also resented that there was no definite procedure to ascertain the verdict of the provinces in favour or against the accession to the union.\textsuperscript{170}

The committee was not satisfied about the weightage in the electoral arrangement to the Muslims in their majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. In Punjab Legislature, Muslim representation was 50.9 per cent as against their population of 57.1 per cent while in Bengal it was 49.2 per cent as against 54.7 percent of the population. \textsuperscript{171}

Cripps clarified his stand by suggesting that if the votes for the accession to the proposed union was less than 60 per cent, the minority should have the right to demand plebiscite of the adult male population of the provinces. The Muslim League working Committee expressed its reservation about the plebiscite and viewed that it was the right of the Muslims alone. It felt that in case of Indianization

\textsuperscript{169} Resolution of the All India Muslim League Working Committee, April 11 cited in Pirzada's Foundation of Pakistan Vol- pp 356 -62.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid
of the Cabinet; Muslims would become vulnerable as safeguards had proved to be useless to protect the Muslims and other minorities interest in the provinces.\(^{172}\)

The Working Committee felt that the real objective of the Congress was to force the British government to trapado the Pakistan demand. It pleaded to the British government, that it would be a breach of pledge which many a times had been reaffirmed by His Majesty's Government to the Muslims. It ended with an appeal that HMG should make an immediate declaration of creating an Indian dominion where Muslim's demand for Pakistan should be conceded in the first instance.\(^{173}\)

The Working Committee objected that other clauses of the Cripps proposal to be very vague and creation of more than one Union to be in the realm of remote possibility. It therefore rejected the proposal because it was not open to modifications and there was no scope to deal with the problem with immediate effect.\(^{174}\)

Not with standing the fact, Congress and the Muslim League had reservation about the Cripps proposal, the difference in outlook between Viceroy Linlithgow and Cripps about the Indian problem was also manifest. As opposed to the conservative policy, Cripps was anxious to reach an agreement as he thought that constitutional changes would not affect the course of the war.

\(^{172}\) Ibid
\(^{173}\) Ibid
\(^{174}\) Ibid
But, Linlithgow wanted to safeguard the British rule in future India. He had reports from the Governors of the Muslim majority provinces that Cripps' proposal may lead to communal tension and violence there. The Governors expressed their fear that local option was not enough to please the minority communities. It would be resisted by the Hindus in Bengal, displease the Sikhs in Punjab and may also not placate the Muslims and other minorities of these states. Linlithgow was opposed to give the proposed "Defence Council" any constitution making power. He argued that the communal rivalries would interfere with the conduct of the war, gravely damaging the power of resistance against the Japanese invasion. 175

Linlithgow also saw to it that the Congress do not get an upper hand. He advocated that further concession to the Congress would not only exacerbate the communal problem but also alienate important Muslim supporters. Linlithgow was highly skeptical of the prospects of the post-war communal agreement between Hindus and the Muslims and believed that British must stay for many years. 176

Since Congress was threatening for total rebellion by announcing "Quit India", Linlithgow had no desire to antagonise Jinnah.177 In the course of

175 See Command papers of Lord Privy Seal, file no 6350 also see Home Political file no 18\4\42.
176 Ibid.
177 Linlithgow to Amery, MSS\ Tel\ EURF 1012\125\22 New Delhi, April 9, 1942.
negotiation, Cripps also did not appreciate the Congress demand to establish central government with full powers conferred on them. He was of the opinion that it was inconsistent with the British government's pledge to entrust full constituent government to the absolute dictatorship of the majority. Cripps felt that since Muslim League was afraid of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha getting into permanent majority; Pakistan was a mere bargaining device to overcome their inferior status. Cripps assured Jinnah that he had full sympathy with the apprehension of the Muslims and at this Jinnah was rather surprised that British position did not rule out Pakistan but deliberately kept quite from further probing.\textsuperscript{178}

Cripps recognised that Jinnah was the man who counted most when coming to decision. It enhanced Jinnah's belief that as long as British held power, they would either confer or transfer it to either of the Indian parties and as such there was no need to reach a settlement with the Congress. It was clear, Jinnah deliberately had pitched his terms high claiming to be ready for cooperation but actually not doing so.\textsuperscript{179}

The Viceroy confessed that since the strength of the Muslim League had not been tested therefore he had no idea what the demand for Pakistan actually means. He saw no justification.

\textsuperscript{178} Note by Cripps in interview with Jinnah on March 25 1942, Transfer of Power Series Vol I pp480-81.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
in terms of Muslim League's allegation against the Congress ministries in 1937-39 for the demand for Pakistan. Linlithgow was sure that when it would come to define Pakistan, Jinnah would come up with something "pretty wooly and general."

However, at the surface, the demand for Pakistan was gripping the rank and file of the Muslim league without actually knowing its meaning. Liaquat Ali Khan sketched the possible constitutional solution by suggesting Hindu Muslim federation or confederation with dominion status for each provinces with the right to opt -out in the federal government. Other Muslim League leaders, including Nazimuddin, Ismail Khan and Abdul Matin, interpreted Pakistan as a constituent within a federation of India for a common purpose like defence and foreign affairs, currency, provided Hindu and Muslims stood on equal terms. Abdul Hamid Khan who chaired the Muslim League's session at Madras in April 1941, defined "Pakistan as an independent state with a confederating outlook. " In February 1942, the UP leader Chaudhry Khaliquzaman sent a proposal that after the war Britain by the act of Parliament should establish a zonal system before considering further constitutional arrangements. He advocated that Britain's control should still be required at the centre with defence and foreign portfolio remaining

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180 Linlithgow to Amery, MSS EURF\No 1012\125\22, April 10, 1942, Transfer of Power series vol-1 381-382.
in their hands for an indefinite period.  

A Bombay leaguer, I.H. Chundrigar, said that the object of the Lahore resolution was to achieve two nations, welded into united India on the basis of equality, this would be the alternative to the majority rule, without seeking to destroy the unity of the country. 

In Muslim majority provinces like NWFP, reports by Governor Cunningham says that it is difficulty to ascertain any constructive idea except that educated Muslims wanted safeguards for their community. 

From Sindh Governor Dow reported that most of the people who called themselves Muslim Leaguers knew or cared little about the parties policy or affairs. They were mainly attracted to Muslim League in opposition to the Chief Minister Allah Baksh and his supporters. He informed that there were hardly more than half a dozen Muslim League members in Sindh who had any contact with the Muslim League outside the province. 

181 Pakistan was perceived by different Muslim leaders differently, see Pirzada's Foundation of Pakistan Vol- 2 pp 356.


183 Cunningham to Linlithgow, MSS EURF LPO&J 125\27 \ Government House Peshawar March 22 1942.

184 Dow (Sindh) to Linlithgow March 22, Transfer of Power Series Vol 1 pp 459.
The view of many educated Muslims in Punjab were similar. The two communities under a single umbrella had an emotional appeal for the Muslims of Punjab.\textsuperscript{185}

However, in his presidential address of the Muslim League, Jinnah made it clear that Pakistan will have a sovereign and independent status. He said that the sovereignty of Pakistan must be recognised prior to the creation of any constituent assembly. Jinnah added that Muslim League should be represented in the provincial governments and no legislation to be passed if objected by two third Muslim member of the legislature. Throughout the war, Jinnah made public statements for the emergence of Pakistan and Hindustan with princely states subordinate to British defence and foreign affairs in the Indian dominion. When asked to define Pakistan, Jinnah preferred a co-national government than a national government. Jinnah himself had stated that Pakistan with the connotation of partition of India was not the Muslim League's idea but a caricature thrust upon us by the Hindu press.\textsuperscript{186}

In 1942, Jinnah told Kanji Dwarka Das, "Congress right since the beginning had tried to set its own agenda which was very unreal, it has

\textsuperscript{185} Craik (Punjab) to Linlithgow, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{186} Jinnah retreated his position expressed in his presidential address at the various AIML session since 1940 cited in speeches of Mr Jinnah, cited in Jamiluddin Ahmed, Lahore 1960, pp75-85.
failed to take cognisance to safeguard Muslims interests and refuses to negotiate with the Muslim League. He added that the failure of the Congress leadership to understand the parameters of Indian politics was giving the British the best pretext to delay independence.187

Discussion

Since the federal provision of the 1935 Act did not suit the Muslims interest and the provincial administration of the Congress brought open the stark realities of the Indian politics, there was a growing concern among the the Muslims to specify their agenda of politics. It was after one and half years of deliberations that Muslim League on 22nd March 1940 made its intention clear through the Lahore Resolution. An amorphous draft, Lahore Resolution contemplated the secession of Northwest and the Northeast of India. Its vague provision for territorial adjustment was meant to maintain its hold over the Muslim majority and minority provinces. Its basic purpose on one hand was to keep the faction ridden Muslim League party united, on the other wanted the Congress and the British to take cognizance of the Muslim interest.

Though it is very difficult to ascertain the real motive of Jinnah, through the Lahore resolution he emphatically rejected the minority status of the

187 Kanji Dawarka Das: Ten Years of Freedom, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1968 pp 339
Indian Muslims. Parity with the Congress on the basis that Muslims constituted a separate cultural and religious nation and were thus to be treated as equal to the majority community was sought. Having a blurred vision of the Pakistan demand Jinnah succeeded in outflanking the other Muslim parties and at least put a pretense of nationalising the Muslim politics. Jinnah contemplated, having in principle the right of self determination fully recognised, Muslim would gain an equal say as to how an Independent India was to be constitutionally arranged where adequate protection of the Muslims at the centre and the provinces could be ensured. For this he had to level all the regional and local dichotomies and with the backing of the entire Muslim community he wanted to bargain in the ultimate power politics.

The Muslim majority provinces were satisfied with the promise of autonomy while minority provinces were hopeful that they would gain adequate safeguards articulated through Lahore Resolution. To make a strong case, Jinnah invented the two nation theory to win an equal share of power for the Indian Muslims in an united India on the basis of two sovereign states bounded by treaty in lieu for the adequate protection for both the Muslims provinces. Actually it was the case for Muslim minority provinces Jinnah was pleading with the backing of Muslim majority provinces.

As far as Congress was concerned, Muslim League did not matter to them as long as they do
not produce the evidence of overwhelmingly Muslim support. But so far British were concerned. Jinnah was convinced that due to war time exigencies they would take them into confidence while shaping an all-India arrangement.

At this moment everyone seem to agree that British presence could not be dispensed with until India had developed an independent defence capability. The conservative who effectively controlled the government during the war were sure for most part framing answer to the Indian question that British hands were firmly needed on the gears of India.

This was reflected in the August offer whose nuances placed upon the Indian themselves the responsibility of resolving the obstacles of the post war predicaments. If Indian parties could agree upon the form of constitution making body where Muslims interest were safeguarded and the terms of the accession of the princes agreed, then dominion hood could be achieved.

Inspired by the secretary of state of India, Leo Amery, the August offer invested in Jinnah a virtual power of veto on the future political progress of India. It immeasurably strengthened Muslim Leaders hand and ever since Jinnah seemed to bargain from the position of strength.

Cripps spelling out the new British policy approved the idea that Muslim representatives in the constituent assembly under the existing system would never agree to the Congress line of thought. So he made the provision that only through adult franchise the leaders representing Muslim masses
could be brought into the assembly. That was the reason his proposed solution gave provinces and not the communities the right to secede from the union. The grouping of the British provinces and the princely states under a common centre was an attempt to come to terms with both the movement for Pakistan and princely states internal autonomy. It was also to put pressure on the Congress to seek compromise with the Muslims whose majority provinces would stand out if the proposed constitution did not satisfy them. Cripps felt that once this realization dawns upon the Congress there was more likely hood of the unity of India.

Cripps proposal was also meant to bring open the inherent constraints of the Muslim Leagues unspecific demand for Pakistan; expose its consequence and make them realise where power actually lay between the provinces or the centre. However, by incorporating the principal of opting out for the provinces, the Cripps proposal created more confusion as there was no provision to link the acceding provinces with the central government. Since Cripps failed to mention how to reconcile with the Muslim confederation, the Congress was unhappy because the new constitution would include only Hindu provinces and still be tied up with Pakistan and the princely states. As a whole, Cripps Mission was too late and desperate bid to ease the delicate situation in India.

In the ultimate analysis, Lahore Resolution which was framed to forge a pan-Indian identity of the Muslims, was bolstered by the August offer made by the British government. The offer pledged the
right of the minorities should be retained as an integral part of the British policy and they were to be given due consideration in any future constitutional settlement of the Indian dominion. The Cripps offer toed the same line of the British commitment. The provision for opting out gave Muslim majority provinces, the option to de-link from the Congress dominated centre. The proposal was not only constructive but a genius way out. It avoided laying down precisely the post war plan and did not exclude Pakistan. It gave a strong bargaining counter to Jinnah to mow down the Congress and seek rapprochement with the Muslim League. The sequence of event was working in favour of him. As a result of Quit India movement the arrest of the Congress leaders created a void in the political arena, Muslim League utilised this opportunity to consolidate its position during the war. Was Pakistan, Jinnah's bottom line of settlement or was his bargaining counter all along, requires to be debated. If Pakistan remained Jinnah's strategy, it was logical that he should have altered its result by lowering his bid which he did not do. Paradoxes like what Jinnah openly stood for what he did not want, stated what he did not meant and never divulged what he hoped to bring about is yet to be resolved. His strategy and the hidden goal remain nebulous. Since parity was really the short hand for Muslim power and the severance could only guarantee sovereignty in their majority provinces the mix up of strategy and goal is apparent.
One can argue how Muslims right of self determination that was claimed after 1940 could have been satisfied within a united India. As without parity there was neither guarantee of constitutional arrangement nor autonomy to the geographical grouping of the provinces. Even if granted parity and autonomy to the provinces, could Jinnah have stayed long enough in the united India. What was the guarantee of his not breaking away or becoming troublesome.

The trouble in basing a hypothesis entirely on what Jinnah thought and what he actually did seems to lie in the absence of any substantial proof. However, as far as the scope of the present work is concerned during the course of the war, Lahore resolution remains a bargaining counter all along for Jinnah to deal with the British on one hand and the Congress on the other.

As far as Cripps proposal is concerned, Muslim League rejected it on the ground that Muslims right of national self determination was not unequivically recognised. Had Congress accepted the offer, not only it would have found an important place in the national government at the centre, but it would also have been able to regain its ministries in the provinces as well. By rejecting the Cripps offer and launching the Quit India movement, Congress left the political field open for the Muslim League for the next three years.

It is possible that some difficulties might have arisen over the composition of the national government but seeing Congress entering in the national government might have induced caution and
compromise by Muslim League. The national government in 1942 though constitutionally would have been subordinate to the Viceory, in practice it would have functioned as the probable cabinet. The friction and bickering between the two parties were far less in 1942 then what it was to develop in 1945 and thereafter. The failure of Cripps mission made any Hindu - Muslim settlement further difficult indeed.

The third chapter discusses the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan and British responses and contains the Sapru proposal, Rajagopalcharya plan and the Gāndhi- Jinnah talks. It goes on to discuss the provincial politics and the various responses to the demand for Pakistan. In the end the chapter is summarised by a usual discussion.