Chapter I

The Background to the demand for India’s Partition and British Policy 1935-40
INTRODUCTION

The partition of India assumes a significant place in the history of South Asia. Since it is woven in a complex net of historical forces it remains an enigma to the present generation. The Lahore Resolution passed by the All India Muslim League on 22nd March, 1940 is generally regarded as the demand made for India's partition.

Why was such a demand made at all? Was this resolution intended to really divide India or was it a bargaining point for the Muslims to have a better position in an all-India arrangement. What role did the British government play in making the Muslim League enunciate such a demand? Can Indian National Congress exonerate itself from the charges of driving the Muslim League to make such a radical demand?

The present study is undertaken to answer some of the above questions and analyse the complexity of the subject which continues to haunt today. Its multi-faceted dimension can be understood by reviewing some of the major works that has appeared since independence-partition of India.

The growth of Muslim separatism can be explained as a consequence of the reality faced by the Muslims in their minority provinces (UP, Bihar, Bombay) not only among the educated classes towards the available job opportunities but more among the landlord class to the reality of losing their privileged position once British rule comes to an end. On the other, in the provinces where Muslims were in majority (Bengal, Punjab and Sindh) it was a reaction to the unitary form of
government that would jeopardise their dominant position after the British departure.¹

There is an another view which says that when colonial masters doled out the benefits of office, Muslims lagged behind in terms of education and employment. As a result, they feared associating themselves with the mainstream nationalism spearheaded by the Indian National Congress. The resultant isolation fomented separatist tendencies amongst Muslims.²

Muslim separatism is viewed as a product of group mobilization to defend its dwindling position. Muslims, as a result, wanted to move into their own distinct way. They tried to forge inter-regional alliances which could satisfy them alone.³

The uneven economic development, imperial interest and constraints of electoral politics widened the gulf between the communities. Notwithstanding the fact, within each community the divisions were quite wide and deep. This was concealed through highlighting the symbols of communal solidarity. Muslim separatism developed,

³ Paul Brass; Language Religion and Politics in North India; Muslim Separatism and United Provinces, ( Delhi, Vikas, 1974).
as a result this artificial sense of "Islamic brotherhood".  

The colonial rule had set into motion two parallel forces; one of regionalism and other of particularism. They were in the form of religion, ethnic communities, caste and kinship group. On the top of this social diversity, British rule created an over all administrative system in India. It helped in solidifying the in-group cohesion of different nationalities which crystallised into the demand for partition.  

When coercion could no more remain the instrument of colonial policy, British government introduced quasi-parliamentary institution in order to extend the existing system of control. In the process of constitutional reforms, there was politics of union, association and collaboration. This led to the growth of client-patron relationship between the Indians and the Raj. Its climax was gripped by suspicion and mistrust; Congress against the British, Muslim League against the Congress. This culminated into partition of India.  

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6 Anil Seal: The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge 1968).
Another view says that gradual devolution of power by the British government opened the way to struggle for office. It intensified the rivalry among the groups competing. The poisoned social relationship resulted into partition of the sub-continent.

B.R. Tomilson thinks that the origin of the partition of India must be sought in the events of 1934-39 and not those between 1945-47. The elections for provincial legislative assembly in 1936-37 was the real turning point. Since then, social and economic changes contributed in a big way to the political mobilization in the country. British government thereafter found it difficult to maintain its dominant position in India.

According to R. J. Moore, British policy from 1917 to 1940 sought social stability by aligning themselves with the Muslim landed magnates of the North India. Muslims were given communal distinctiveness in electoral arrangements and major share of power through communally divided provinces. British government encouraged the princes with similar promises to strengthen their sphere of control. However the devolution of power through the Act of 1919 and 1935 exacerbated the dualities in the India political system.

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7 EWR Lumby : Nationalism, Communalism and Partition: The British in India, Imperialism or Trusteeship (Liton Massachusetts, 1962).
which led to the partition of India.\(^9\)

The British Government's self interest was economic and strategic. It's policy progressed to the point of offering Indian National Congress independence under the influence of three broad premises. One was the development of public opinion not only in England but also in America which was apathetic to the continuance of the Raj. Second was the growth of Indian political consciousness and the third was the natural evolution of imperialism itself.\(^10\)

There is a significant study which suggest that democracy and imperialism are incompatible to each other. The commitment to devolution of power in 1919 helped the British government maintain its hegemony through constitutional manipulation. Rural areas were favoured, an alliance with the Muslims of Punjab where they formed the majority was struck. The depressed classes were given the communal award. When even the combined support of these groups were insufficient then the princes were brought into the forefront. The Government of India Act of 1935 gave the provinces more power. However further recession of British control was combated by an All-India Federation which collapsed in 1939. After this, when British Government opened the


question of devolution of power (in 1945) it became victim of its own game. They were left with no option then to divide India.\textsuperscript{11}

R.J Moore in another exposition says that India's independence after the war was resisted by the Linlithgow as Viceroy's political thinking could not go beyond Indianising the Executive Council with no real responsibility for the administration. He wanted to constitute a similar kind of central government like Britain but nursed the ambition that British posture shall be anti-democratic after the war.\textsuperscript{12}

About the Cripps proposal, Moore says that its long term plan was to balance the forces of India's unity against those of division. However its short term provision gave incentive for opening the floodgate of partition. After the failure of the Cripps Mission the issue of transfer of power went into the background as there was a consensus between Prime Minister Churchill, Viceroy Linlithgow, and Secretary of State L.S Amery to settle down for authoritarian rule. They wanted to commit to some vague assurances that would imply a constitutional scheme in order to attract India collaborators. The British government's short term tactics fructified the idea of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} David Page: \textit{Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and Imperial System of Control 1920-32} (New York, 1982).

\textsuperscript{12} R.J Moore: \textit{The Crisis of India's Unity 1917-1945} (Oxford University Press, Delhi).

\textsuperscript{13} R.J Moore: \textit{Churchill, Cripps and India 1939-45} (Oxford University Press, Delhi 1979).
The regional dynamics in the Muslim majority and minority provinces suggest that the objective differences between the two communities were not so marked to fuel separatist tendencies. It was competition from the increasingly assertive Hindu revivalism, imperial system of control and the fear of the Muslim elite of the United provinces to protect their dominant position led to forge a distinct identity of the Muslims. They manipulated divisive historical and cultural symbols which appealed to a large section of the community. This was the main cause of distinct identity formation amongst the Muslims.\textsuperscript{14}

Airing similar view about the Muslims of the United Provinces, Aparna Basu says that Muslims in UP were more advanced then their Hindu counterpart in many aspects of life like education, employment and wealth. It is they who assertively wanted to defend their dominant position. This resulted in the growth of Muslim separatism.\textsuperscript{15}

The situation in Muslim majority provinces has its own story. In Punjab the colonial impact on the different communities and its distinct relation vis-à-vis the British government led to the growth of the movement for Pakistan. The squabbling within the local power potent and the political realignment

\textsuperscript{14} Francis Robinson : Separatism Among Muslims; The Politics of United Provinces Muslims 1870-1920( Vikas, New Delhi 1975).
\textsuperscript{15} Aparna Basu : Growth of Education and Muslim Separatism 1919 - 1939 in B.R Nanda's Essays in Modern Indian History ( Delhi 1980).
of the elite led to the growth of Muslim League's influence in Punjab. The regional power dynamics exacerbated by the war time difficulties transcended the provincial politics above urban and rural interest. This resulted in the collapse of the inter-communal alliances in Punjab. Thereafter the triumph of Muslim League in the 1946 elections vindicated the case for Pakistan.16

It was between 1938-42 that the Muslim League was able to strike ground in Sindh. The catalyst being the mosque-temple issue called Manzilgah there. After this it was a contest between Sindhi nationalism and the all-India politics of the Muslim League. The services of the indigenous religious elite was effectively utilised by the Muslim League to wean away support of the Sindh nationalist to lay claim for Pakistan.17

The period from 1917 to the Government of India Act of 1935 created genuine hope for Bengali Muslims to come to power. Their prospects of becoming rulers of the state was kindled when the Bengali peasantry were enfranchised. Since, the interests of the peasants and the feudal lords ran counter to each other, the politics in the state got polarised. In a series of political somersaults Muslim League could hold sway


under the Fazlul Haq ministry. It was between the period of 1937-1947 that they entrenched themselves in the province which was to have an important bearing on the formation of Pakistan. 18

"Whig" approach of historiography extols the achievements of British policy in India. It goes on to say that when faced with the prospect of total administrative collapse, British decided to leave India. The responsibility was handed over then through hasty settlement. It was at a high price of bloodied and divided secession. Suspicion lingering that literally British washed their hands through cut and run from Indian. 19

Some historian see British policy as short term self-serving constitutionalism. The Act of 1919 and 1935 as well as other reform process were not geared to bring some predetermined end but to preserve the substance of the British rule in India. When ever Raj was threatened of withdrawal it struck new collaborative arrangement. Though India demands were not accepted in totality but they were definitely accommodated to ensure

18 Sheila Sen: Muslim Politics in Bengal 1937-47 (New Delhi 1976)
a working relationship.  

The Cambridge school of historiography see the subject as group of competing elite prepared to collaborate in return of increased opportunities of exercising patronage and power. Successive attempts were made by the British government to maintain the basis of their control through means of constitutional deals. There developed some kind of working relationship between nationalism and imperialism in the Indian subcontinent.

The exponent of the orthodox Indian school see communalism deriving considerable millage when British changed their policy to rule by consent rather than by collusion. The recognition of the Muslim League as a counterpart or possibly as counterpoise to the India National Congress, installation of separate electorate, recognition of


21 The Cambridge School is represented by J A Gallagher, G Johnson and Anil Seal. This cynical analysis has been dubbed as "Animal Politics" by T. Raychaudhuri; The Historical Journal, 22, 3 (1979).
Jinnah after 1937 as the sole spokesman are frequently cited as examples of divide and rule policy of the British government. The exponents portray Pakistan as culmination of British-Muslim intrigue.\(^{22}\)

The historiographer from Pakistan, view partition as an assertion of Muslim nationality unable to reconcile in the role of a religious minority due to fear cultural death and religious apostasy. They go on to say that the two communities were two nations, distinguishable ever since the time of Muslim invasion and separatable at the time of British departure from India.\(^{23}\)

The issue of partition is diagnosed in terms of environmental tension, trends of synthesis and antithesis in various political, cultural and religious fields by a Pakistani historian. It says in this subcontinent co-existed together two civilizations, two ways of life which underwent mutual attraction and repulsion. The colonial rule aggravated these tensions and each community

\(^{22}\) The orthodox Indian opinion is represented by R C Majumdar: *History of Freedom Movement of India* B N Pandey: *The Break-up of British India*, Bipan Chandra: *Communalism in Modern India* and B R Nanda: *Essays in Modern Indian History*.

\(^{23}\) I H Quereshi: *The Muslim Community of Indo-Pak Subcontinent* (Renaissance Publishing House, Delhi, Reprinted 1985).
then found it difficult to adjust itself not only to the new ruling power but to its language, values and norms. The net result was mutual competition for economic and political advancement under foreign rule.²⁴

The seeds of Muslim separatism is highlighted to be inherent in the social economic changes set into motion by the British rule in the nineteenth century India. The great rebellion of 1857 was one answer to this, the more complex one was the events leading to 1947.²⁵

In India, the idea of Muslim nationalism started with a relatively small group which reflected a coherent intellectual life. The ideals of a cultural united community and of a socially consistent society was perceived by this nucleus. In this ideal Muslims were goaded by their historical and cultural background. This laid the foundation of separate nationalism which was more subjective than territorial, more psychological than political.²⁶

Within Pakistani historiography there are some critical writings which suggest that the demand for partition was an elusive concept because it preceded the designation and and demarcation of the

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²⁵ S M Ikram: Muslim Civilization in India (Columbia University Press, 1965)
territory of Pakistan. It is probably the only example of an instant nationalism created by the magic-wand of religion disregarding the tradition, geography local custom and even the common colonial bondage. It was an elitist nationalism whose failure to compromise with the popular nationalism compelled to take recourse to mass mobilization. The overwhelming Muslim masses did not share any different characteristic of race, language and culture. The ideology of Pakistan was a product of political frustration of the Muslim elite. It had no intellectual content and was just a tool of political expediency.27

An alternative paradigm suggests that partition was a movement in which diverse Muslim groups from different regions, representing different social strata and interests allied in pursuit of a material objective. At the centre of this was a coalition of Muslim salariat whose overriding interest lay in the creation of Pakistan.28

Modern researches undermine the separatist ideology inherent in the march of history. They try to highlight the subject as a more recent phenomenon. The treatment of the theme is now being done with a view to see the interplay of British, Congress and Muslim strategies during the last decade of the British rule in India.

27 Saleem M M Quereshi : Pakistan Nationalism Reconsidered( Pacific Affairs 1972)
The first work in this direction suggest that the British and the Congress drove the Muslims on the question of sharing power to make the demand for partition of India. This demand crystallised in the Congress ruled provinces from 1937-39. All through the thirties, British government gave tacit support to the Muslim league. This is borne by then Viceroy, Willingdon's eagerness to tilt the balance in favour of the Muslims. British government was pleased with the Muslim League's draft of Lahore Resolution as they wanted to use Jinnah, as an effective barrier against the Congress.  

Another view point supports the same line of argument. British rule deliberately built up Jinnah's prestige at an all India level for the war purposes. Secretary of State LS Amery and Linlithgow decided after March 1940, that there shall be no return to the Act of 1935. At the beginning of 1942 Linlithgow could not find any enthusiasm for Pakistan among the Muslim League leaders. It was only after the assurances given through Cripps Mission that Muslim League strengthened the popular base in its majority provinces. Since then, the Muslim League consistently built the movement to lay claim for the establishment of Pakistan.  

29 Uma Kaura: Muslims and Indian Nationalism 1928-40( Manohar Publication New Delhi 1976)  
Ayesha Jalal argues that Lahore Resolution was a new strategy adopted by the Muslim League to deny its permanent minority status and seek parity with the Congress. The vague wording was deliberately done so that some constitutional settlement can be made later on. Jinnah, the Muslim League's sole spokesman, acted as a mediator between provinces and the centre to win safeguards for Muslims in the central legislature. His basic aim was to unite the autonomous Muslim majority provinces under a federating centre and seek safeguards for the Muslims in the minority provinces. Jalal argues that Lahore Resolution should not be accepted on the face value as it was only a bargaining point. 31

It has been argued that in order to understand Muslim League's demand for parity vis-à-vis the Congress one has to delve deep into Islamic ideology which saw political societies as a mosaic of fixed representation in an evenly balanced political assembly. The notion of League-Congress parity actually emerged much more vividly in the course of constitutional negotiations. It transcended to political parity between Muslim League and the Congress and then to communal parity between Muslims and the Hindus. It was further raised to an ideological parity between Muslims and the non-Muslims. 32

31 Ayesha Jalal: The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah; Muslim League and the Demand of Pakistan (Cambridge 1985)
There was a tacit understanding in United Provinces (which extended to other provinces) that a coalition ministry should be formed with Congress and the Muslim League joining together. When the Congress won absolute majority in the elections of 1937, this understanding was ignored and the condition put forward was Muslim League should merge itself with the Congress. Henceforth, Congress under Nehru, adopted an "imperious attitude". It went beyond "contemptuous words" and Muslim Leagues offer was treated with disdain. Nehru, in his correspondence with Jinnah, used language which Jinnah described as "arrogant and militant". Even after the rebuttal by the Congress Jinnah did not made demand for partition of India. He appealed to Gandhi for the nationalist solution to the problem faced by the country. Gandhi, to this, "cried to God for help." Henceforth, Jinnah braved himself to organise the "inherent power of the Muslims." The next opportunity came with the Liaquat-Desai pact. Perhaps, the communal impasse might have been broken if this was implemented in good faith. The repudiation by Bhulabhai Desai of any such pact put an end to the hope of repairing the damage done in 1937. 33

A monograph points out the lapses of the Congress. Obsessed by a strong desire to impose nothing short of one party rule, Congress refused to acknowledge India's plurality, attempted to side track the communal problem, rejected the act of

1935 without attempting to delve into its merit, the refusal to form coalition ministry compounded the problem. In tune with its overall behavior was the rejection of the proposal brought by Sir Stanford Cripps in 1942. The Quit India resolution was ill judged. These offered sufficient excuse for Jinnah to muster support for Pakistan. In the final count, Congress took several erroneous decisions which paved the way for partition of India.34

The unsealing in 1988 of thirty pages or so of Abul Kalam Azad's autobiography, "India Wins Freedom", has added a certain poignancy to the speculation that it was Congress rather than the Muslim League which divided India.

The present day research seems to have widened its horizon to include within its fold not only the study of popular attitude and actions but to also question the very concept of what constitute a "community" and a "nation." The emphasis is now more on how actually the two has been perceived by the masses.35

34 B.B Mishra, The Unification and Division of India (Oxford University Press. New Delhi, 1990).
The above review of literature throw sufficient light on the complex political equation of India's partition. Works by Hunter, Hodson, Lumby provide a deep insight of the topic but in the light of the new sources, have now aged. The study by David Page covers the period till 1932, while that of B.R. Tomilson deals with the period 1934-39. R J Moore's "End Games of an Empire" and AK Gupta's "Myth and Reality; The Struggle For Freedom of India", covers the last two years of British rule. Uma Kaura's book stops at 1940 but along with Ayesha Jalal and Anita Inder Singh's works, narrates the interplay of divergent political forces at work.

Seervai and B. P Mishra's book head-long attacks Congress lapses on the partition of India. It fails to take cognizance of the fact that as a representative of Indian nationalism, Congress had its own limitation to project its secular and national character.

Not all of the numerous work on the subject provide a full understanding of the historical development preceding the partition of India.

Farzana Sheikh's contention that the Muslim League saw political grouping as a mosaic of fixed representation disregards the importance of social and political forces which determined the political aspirations among the Muslims.

Paul Brass thesis fails to highlight the inadequacies of the Muslim League's success in different social and economic conditions. Within the Muslim majority provinces, the response to the
demand for Pakistan differed. There the nature of provincial politics largely made it depend on the local factors. It had little in common with the all-India strategy of the Muslim League.

It is equally difficult to explain Francis Robinson's view that religious ideology was not just the manipulation of Islamic symbols but a genuine influences of Muslim leadership. He does not explain the existence and influence of the diverge range of Muslim opinion on the process of identity formation. It suffers from the inadequacies that much depended on the nature of the colonial rule which shaped the socio-economic condition of the country.

Pakistan's histography is, by and large, a cut and paste art of writing history. In order to prove the aspiration of Muslim nationalism as different from those of the Hindu's, Pakistan's historiographer propounds historical, cultural and civilizational divide. However, there are some exceptions.

Ayesha Jalal's thesis is unable to resolve the ambiguities displayed by Jinnah stand on Lahore Resolution. She calls it as a bargaining point. However, Jinnah made no effort to refute the idea that he did not imply a separate homeland for the Muslims. While there remains a considerable disagreement whether Jinnah was ever fully committed to Pakistan or he was reluctantly forced to embrace it at the end, there has been no dispute that his advocacy of the Muslim cause not only complicated the 'India Question', it also changed it.

So far, historical writings on the subject have concentrated on parleys of high politics and the
factious struggle for power and political leverage by the top leadership. The explanations put forward are divide and rule policy pursued by British government - Congress inability to conciliate with Jinnah and the Muslim League in the emerging power structure - historical roots of Muslim nationalism - interplay of various factors etc. But there is an increasing need to re-evaluate some of these premises and refute those stereotypes which have blocked our mental makeup.

This dissertation "The Demand for Partition and British Policy: 1940-45" confines itself to the study of political development in the background of World War II and stops at the failure of the Simla conference. However, it was during this period that Muslim League transformed itself from ignominy to a formidable force in the Indian politics. The growth of Muslim League's influence at the provincial level and the dichotomy of the all-India politics is highlighted in this dissertation. The composition of Muslim population all over India and the advantage they had by virtue of their being in a majority was not uniform in all the Muslim provinces. Regional grouping consequently appeared more advantageous to the provincial Muslim elite. The Muslim League's ability to undermine the provincial parties and the process of the eventual breakdown of cross communal alliance in Punjab and Bengal acquires a special attention. Also, the role of British policy in the emergence and consolidation of Muslim League at provincial as well as all-India level has acquired main focus. Congress
attitude vis-a-vis the Muslim League has also been subjected to a very careful examination.

Lastly, in the debate between separatist or bargainist, this dissertation vouches for the bargaining theory. It is because Pakistan demand was very nebulous during the period of our study (1940-45), so it cannot be castigated as a separatist demand at its outset. It is expected that the proposed study shall throw some fresh light on subject of partition of India between 1940-45.

The thrust of this study is on party politics, strategies and counter strategies that were being built up at the national and regional levels in Indian Politics. This dissertation avoids any conjectural premises. It is a backgrounder to the Cabinet Mission and Mountbatten plan, the penultimate phase in the struggle for power in India.

The following pages discuss the Government of India Act of 1935 and lay focus on the British proposal of an "All India Federation". It highlights, how British government reluctantly strove to make the Federation work and after two years of gingerly activity, the idea of Federation was dropped.

The election of 1937 and the resultant coalition controversy and Muslim grievances report are by now well-known. It was during 1937-39 that the Muslim League transformed itself into a force to be reckoned with. The following pages recapitulate the British, Congress and Muslim strategy as a background to the Lahore Resolution of 1940.
The decentralization of the state structure and gradual devolution of power led to the development of autonomous provinces within a federal structure in India. This emerging trend was given constitutional legitimacy by introducing provincial autonomy through the promulgation of Government of India Act of 1935. 36

The democratisation of Indian politics brought a decisive change in the struggle for power. Muslims became aware of their position under the new framework initiated by the Government of India Act, of 1919 and 1935. The steady devolution of power came to weigh overwhelmingly against the Indian Muslims. It is precisely because of this, the Government of India Act, of 1935 is taken as the focal point to the emergence of the demand for India's partition. 37

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36 For the above exposition see David Page: Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-32, New Delhi, 1982, PP 32. Also see, Anil Seal: Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Competition and Collaboration in the Late Nineteenth Century; Cambridge 1968, PP 268. 37 RJ Moore's premise in Crisis of India's Unity is partition was as a result of politics from 1917-40. Uma Kaura in Muslim and Indian Nationalism: The Emergence of Demand of India's Partition presumes partition as politics between 1928-30. Anita Inder Singh in The Origins of Partition of India begins her argument since 1935.
After the deliberations at the three Round Table Conferences held in Britain, the Government of India Act of 1935 was prepared by a select committee. The whole document consisted of four thousand pages. It laid emphasis on the nature of provincial autonomy and the character of all-India centre. The British government reserved the central power, while provinces were given the right of self-government through widening of the electorate.38

By the Act of 1935, the objective of the British government was to keep firm grip over India through inter-connected system of government control. British policy as seen by Linlithgow,1 was to keep a long view to hold India to the empire, not to expedite constitutional changes or hurry to hand over control to the Indians. As a chairman of the joint parliamentary committee, Linlithgow described the Act of 1935 as the best way of maintaining British influences in India.39

The Act of 1935 made provisions for the establishment of responsible government in the eleven provinces of the British India. It made provisions for the creation of a Federation of India, comprising both the British provinces and the princely states. The federal provisions of the Act was to operate on all subjects except foreign affairs and

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defence. However this was subject to ratification by the Princely states and the Muslims of India. The representatives of British India were to be elected while that of the Princely states were to be nominated by the rulers. The Princely states had 40 per cent representation in the Upper House and 33.3 per cent in the Lower House. The Muslim representatives were to be chosen by the Muslim members of the provincial legislature.\(^{40}\)

The Act of 1935 elevated Sindh and the North West Frontier to the status of full fledged provinces. The Muslim position in the Punjab and Bengal was protected by the separate electorate. In Punjab 53 per cent of the Muslim majority had secured 50 per cent of the seats, while in Bengal 56 per cent of Muslims got 52 per cent seats. On the other hand, Muslims in their minority provinces received weightages. As a whole Muslim predominance in their majority provinces was emphasised, while in provinces where they were in minority, they got importance according to their number. Another redeeming feature of the Act was, for the first time electorates were extended to 36 million (as compared to 7 million in 1920) representing 50 per cent the adult population of India. \(^{41}\)

The 1935 Act clearly spelled British determination to hold India within the imperial system of control. Though it was committed to provincial...

\(^{40}\) See the schedule 1 of the Government of India Act of 1935.

\(^{41}\) See Report of the Indian Franchise Committee, 1932 Calcutta, PP 33.
autonomy and the creation of all-India Federation, there was no mention of dominion status in the Act.

The various provisions of the Act were seriously criticised both by the Congress and the Muslim League. As a nationalist, Mohammad Ali Jinnah protested against the Act and said "Indian's have just two per cent say in the formation of the provincial or Central government while Viceroy through the Governors control held 98 per cent control over the affairs of the government. Jinnah warned, since the voice of the Indian's would oscillate between the province and the centre it is likely to be stifled by the British government." On the other hand, Congress also demanded the annulment of the Act of 1935.

In March 1936, the conservative government appointed Lord Linlithgow as the new Viceroy of India. Since then it was left to him to take initiative in effecting the constitutional changes under the Act of 1935.42

Linlithgow after assuming office toyed with the idea of forming an all-India Federation comprising British Indian Dominion and the princely states. The Federal Legislative council was to consist of 156 representatives from the British India and 109 from the princely states. The council was suppose to have 75 general seats, 6 seats for the schedule caste, 4 seats for the Sikhs, 6 for the

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42 Rizvi Gowher: Linlithgow and India; A Study of British Policy and political Impasse in India, London 1978.pp26-28
women and 29 for the Muslims. Among the Muslim majority provinces there were seven seats for Bengal, Punjab had 14, North West Provinces 4, while Sindh had 3 and Baluchistan one. Linlithgow recognised the complexities of the Indian situation and thought that the first step towards the working of Federation could be taken only when half of the princely states, the Muslim majority provinces and the Indian Dominion volunteered to accede. He wanted the princely states and the Indian provinces to federate on their own terms. While the Indian Dominions were automatically would join the Federation, each of the princely states were to negotiate their own terms.

It was not an easy task for the new Viceroy to wield the heterogeneity of India into the proposed all-India Federation. By the end of 1938, Muslim League's executive body could discern the implications of the Congress campaign against the prince's nomination of the candidates. It was detrimental to the Muslims position in all-India framework. If the candidates were to be elected in the princely states than it was apparent that Muslims would not get the support in the central legislature which they required to balance the Congress votes. In such case the the federal legislature would be dominated by the Congress and

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Muslims would be in permanent minority. Hence, Jinnah openly denounced the idea of the all-India Federation as detrimental to the Muslims interest.\textsuperscript{45}

In the Patna session of the Muslim League in 1938, Jinnah said "once Congress is sure of their majority, they would tumble into the Federation as they had tumbled into the wrecking of the present constitution." He showed his resentment and expected neither fair play or justice from the Congress. Jinnah advocated for the total abandonment of the mooted federation as he felt was bound to crack under the stress of competitive politics.\textsuperscript{46}

Viceroy Linlithgow, however felt that making the Federation a viable proposition is in the best interest of the country. He held the view that promulgation of the Federation would lead to economic unity, while constitutional relationship between the princely states and the British administered provinces would lead to political unity of the country. Linlithgow announced that British policy towards constitutional advancement and establishment of Federation remains unchanged.\textsuperscript{47}

However, Muslim League from 1938 began to demand from the British, a constitutional review de-novo. Jinnah elaborated that" the events of the


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{47} opcit 42 pp 56- 62
past two years had established a permanent domination of Hindus over the Muslims. Not only their life property, and honour were in danger but even their religious rights and culture were assailed every day under Congress ruled provinces." He attacked the Congress that it neither represented the upper class or lower class Muslims and was not a national party but only representative of upper caste Hindus.48

Jinnah opened up negotiation with Mahatma Gandhi but latter went into a saintly trance and cried to "God to show him the divine light to see in darkness". In his negotiation with Nehru, Jinnah realised that the latter was entirely divorced from the realities which faced India.49 He was dismayed as no Congress leader wanted to talk to him.

It was at this moment, Jinnah contradicted Nehru's contention that there existed two forces; Congress and British, and the rest had to line up. On the contrary, he pronounced that there were four forces; British, Hindus, Muslims and the Princes in India.50

48 On September 1939 the working committee of the AIML passed the resolution for the constitutional review; Jinnah since then started his tirade against the Congress. Indian Annual Register, Vol 2, 1939, pp 35-36.
49 Jinnah to Nehru, April 1938, Nehru Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.
50 Indian Annual Register, Vol 2, 1939, opcit 48.
In 1938, Jinnah told Kanji Dwarka Das that Congress leaders had very poor understanding about the political forces at work, by alienating the Muslims they were doing more harm than any service to the country.\(^{51}\)

Jinnah, then turned to the British and met the acting Viceroy Lord Brabourne to strike a deal. He proposed that Muslim League would support the British at the centre, if, in turn, the British accepted the League as the only representative organisation of the Muslims. According to Lord Brabourne "Jinnah ended up with the suggestion that we (British) should keep the centre as it is and make friends with the Muslims by protecting them in Congress ruled provinces. If this was done, Muslims would protect the British at the centre.\(^{52}\)

Later, Jinnah told the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, that Muslims rights and interest could not be safeguarded in a truly federal scheme. The British government therefore should ensure an adequate equipoise between Hindu and Muslim votes to maintain balance between the two communities. The Viceroy asked him how he wanted to go by; Jinnah for this had in mind manipulation of votes and territorial adjustments. The Viceroy then asked Jinnah whether this equipoise could be maintained if the British had left India; to this, Jinnah answered that it might be very difficult. He

\(^{52}\) Lord Brabourne to Zetland in John L Dundos (ed) Essays, The Memories of Ian, 1965 pp 140.
asked the Viceroy to strengthen his hand as he wanted something positive to take back to his followers, probably a complete reshaping of the constitution. Linlithgow showed his resentment and said "at this stage you want me to tell the British Parliament to undo all those achievement for which we had been striving all these years. Further, Linlithgow asked Jinnah "if he wanted to turn the Congress ministries out", "yes, turn them out at once, nothing else will bring to their senses, their object though you may not believe, is nothing else then to destroy both you (British) and us (Muslims). They will never stand by you, he said". Linlithgow gathered the impression that he had upset Jinnah who planned to offer cooperation of the Muslim League in return of the abandonment of the federal scheme.\textsuperscript{53}

British policy at this stage, however was committed to the establishment of the Federation. The Secretary of State, Zetland wrote to the Viceroy that as far as the Muslims were concerned "we should stand aside and tell them that they can get full justice from His Majesty's Government, but the fact remains that they can only get concessions from Hindus who alone in future were to deliver goods."\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{53} Note of an interview between Jinnah and Linlithgow, October 5 1939, Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.

\textsuperscript{54} Zetland to Linlithgow, November 22, 1939, Zetland Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.
Zetland’s impression was Jinnah’s intrigues were merely a window dressing, a tactical move to keep hold on the militant section of the Muslim League. Zetland felt that Jinnah's demand for a federal government with the largest possible measure of autonomy for the federating units was contrary to the British policy. Zetland believed that no solution to the communal problem was possible till discussion amongst Indians themselves takes place and some agreement reached. He was of the opinion that India's freedom must be based on the principle of democracy and unity. Britain should be prepared to accept the responsibility of forming a constitution making body.55

Zetland, in a letter to Linlithgow, elaborated that Britain should call upon the major parties in India to agree to the composition to an all-India body that would draft the constitution that should be promulgated after the war. Zetland proposed that he would extract from Jinnah minimum terms of accommodation for the Muslims and then appeal to Gandhi to agree on them. Thereupon he would call a dozen or so Indian leaders to agree for safeguards of the minorities and expansion of the Viceroy's executive council. He would then announce the promulgation of the Federation and grant India the dominion status before the conclusion of the war.56

55 Zetland to Linlithgow, November 26 1939, Zetland Collections, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library; Micro Film, New Delhi.
56 Ibid., November 29 1939.
The Viceroy Linlithgow had no doubt that Muslims were becoming uneasy at what Jinnah described as "Hindu arrogance". He was more and more apprehensive of the fate of the minorities as large as of 90 million people. According to the Viceroy, the grievances of the Muslims were not essentially religious though it assumes communal colour due to the fact a community was in opposition. Linlithgow felt that it would have ceased to exist if the power sharing was was done with the Muslim League in 1937. Though investigation had not borne out to be true, the Viceroy felt that there was some justification in Jinnah's allegation of unfair treatment to the Muslims in particular Congress governed provinces.  

Linlithgow viewed Muslim apprehension to the proposed Federation as they saw future course of Indian politics as unending communal contest. However, he was convinced that Muslims can not sabotage the Federation unless they dissuaded sufficient number of princely states from acceding. The Viceroy was nevertheless convinced that an all-India federation was the only practical line of constitutional advancement in India.  

However, as the time progressed there was little doubt that Muslims would accept the Federation as imposed upon them. Even Sadrulddin Agha Khan who was active during the...

57 Linlithgow to Zetland December 4, 1939, Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.

58 Ibid, December 16, 1939.
round table conferences and supported the federal proposal, reported to Linlithgow that "the sugar had come out of the pill; if candidates from the princely states were to be elected rather than nominated by the rulers, then Muslims would not get the support which they require to balance the Congress votes in the central legislature." 59

The growing probability of a Congress dominated centre generated a corresponding increase in Muslim opposition to the all-India Federation. A private letter by the Viceroy Linlithgow suggest that "I could not possibly realise how greatly the gulf between Hindus and Muslims had widened since 1937. It is since then any common action, based on the government of India Act of 1935 was essentially undermined." 60

Meeting Jinnah, Linlithgow assured that he would not support any scheme that would produce Hindu majority in the central structure. Also, Viceroy's meeting with Sikandar Hayat Khan of Punjab convinced him that Congress majority at the centre would restrict the British control over defence and external affairs. 61

After the outbreak of the War, Linlithgow was not very keen about the idea of the Federation. He thought that acceptance of the Congress demand would involve a very substantial break with their

59 Linlithgow to Zetland February, 4, 1940, Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.
60 Ibid, February, 14, 1940.
61 Ibid, February, 16, 1940.
accepted policy affecting the princes and the Muslim minority who look at His Majesty's Government for the protection of their legitimate interest. Though for two years Linlithgow had striven hard to make the Federation work, but war-time exigencies and conviction about its failure, led to him to suspended it on September 11, 1939.62

After the suspension of the federal scheme, the working committee of the all-India Muslim League showed its appreciation by passing a resolution. It urged that, His Majesty's Government should revise the entire problem of India's future constitution in the light of the development that has taken place since 1935. The committee asked for an assurance that no declaration regarding the constitutional advance of India should be made without the consent of the All-India Muslim League. It pleaded that His Majesty Government must create a sense of security amongst the Muslims and take the consent of All India Muslim League which is the sole representative of Muslim India.63

From now onwards, the whole thrust of the Muslim Leagues campaign was to deny Congress claim to speak on behalf of the Muslims of India. Jinnah expressed with conviction that, "I have got as much right to share the government as any

62 War Cabinet: India and the War, Secret War Papers, Memorandum by the Secretary of State: Sep-Dec 1939.
63 App Resolution passed by the Working Committee of the All Indian Muslim League: September, 18, 1939.
Hindu and I must have an equal and effective share in power."  

Jinnah launched a massive propaganda campaign against the Congress in order to seek the unity of the divided Muslim house. Judging the swing of the Muslim masses into the Leagues camp and the enhancement of its standing in the all-India framework, Congress was compelled to open up negotiation with the Muslim League. 

Jinnah now put forward the condition to recognise Muslim League as the only authoritative organisation of the Muslims. He held discussions with Nehru between October 16-18 in 1939. It was obvious that the real difference between the two leaders lay towards their perception of British rule and the communal problem facing India.


Since the victory at Bundalekhand by elections in 1937, Muslim Leagues Campaign started on these lines.


A spate of correspondence with Jinnah started, Nehru, Bose and Prasad addressed him in conciliatory tone; Quid-e- Azam Papers 1939, India Office Library, London

Nehru-Jinnah talks November 1939, AICC, File No 104, Nehru Memorial and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.
After this, Jinnah told the Viceroy that he had failed to move the young Congress leader. Later in October 1939, Jinnah saw Gandhi and told him "as long as Congress was not prepared to accept Muslim League as the only authentic organisation of the Muslims, any settlement of communal issue was unlikely. He said that Muslim League would not endorse the Congress demand for the declaration of Britain's war aims till the solution of the communal problem was reached.

Jinnah then turned to the Viceroy and offered support for the War effort if Muslim Leagues leaders were taken into confidence. He wanted an assurance that no declaration on constitutional advancement should be made without the consent of the all-India Muslim League.

The Congress Working Committee (CWC), on September 14, 1939, demanded from Britain declaration of the war aims with regard to democracy and imperialism. The CWC sought the right of Indians to frame the constitution through a constituent assembly and participate in the war efforts through representatives in the Viceroy's executive council.

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69 Note of conversation between Jinnah and Linlithgow January 13, 1940, Linlithgow Papers.
70 Jinnah - Gandhi correspondence, November 1939, Quaid-e-Azam Papers, India Office Library London.
71 Note of conversation between Linlithgow and Jinnah, January 2, 1940, Linlithgow Papers.
72 Congress and the War Crisis, AICC Files 104 & 5, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.
The Viceroy Linlithgow issued a statement that dominion status would be given after the war and Britain would modify the Act of 1935 giving full weight to the opinion and interest of the minorities. This proposal was rejected by the Congress and it called upon the resignation of its provincial ministries.

December 22, 1939, the day of the resignation of the Congress ministries was observed by the Muslim League as 'Deliverance Day' from the tyranny and oppression of the Congress ruler. In Muslim minority provinces the day was celebrated like festival, special prayers were offered, sweets were distributed, houses were illuminated. However, it went off on a low key in Muslim majority provinces where many educated Muslims thought it to be another political stunt. On that day even the schedule caste and the Parses rejoiced with the Muslim League.

By now, Jinnah stopped characterising Muslims as a minority and advocated that Hinduism and Islam represented two civilizations, distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as were various nations of Europe. Jinnah said

73 Speeches and Statements of Linlithgow 1936-43, Linlithgow Papers.
74 This description on deliverance day is found in NWFP Governor Cunninghams Diary, dated December 1939 at India Office Library, London.
Muslims had always occupied a special position in the history and now it aspires for an honourable place in the national life, government and administration in future India. He rebuked the imposition of the provincial constitution based on so-called parliamentary system of government and said, the experience of the past two years had established beyond doubt that it had resulted in the communal majority of the Hindus where Muslims economic, cultural and economic rights were being trampled."76

Jinnah, at this moment, did not insist on the partition of India and wanted that a constitution must be evolved which recognises the existence of two nations, both must share the governance of their common motherland. In evolving such a constitution, Jinnah said that Muslim League was ready to cooperate with the British, the Congress or any other party for the cession of the present enmities and would strive for India to take its rightful place amongst the great countries of the world.77

Till January, 1940, Jinnah was committed to be an Indian nationalist and extolled India as a common motherland of both Muslims and the Hindus.78

77 App Resolution passed by the All India Muslim League Working Committee, 15-17 January 1940.
78 Times and Tide, London, published an article on January 19, 1940, quoting Jinnah to be a nationalist.
The contradiction in Jinnah's statement was obvious as he was not sure of his ground. It was not only difficult but impossible to wield the whole range of Muslims diversity under one banner. Therefore to rally around the Muslim heterogeneity, Jinnah harped on two nation theory, which though, not synonym with partition had an electrifying appeal amongst the Muslim masses.

Demanding from the British government, a resolution of the all India Muslim League said that during the war if the central and the provincial governments were reconstituted, Muslim League must seek half of the seats or even more if the Congress was not cooperating. Any British statement about India's constitutional future should seek prior consultation of the Muslim League and demanded the right to veto any scheme. Further it added that, Jinnah alone would negotiate with the Congress and the British. The resolution said that without the consent of the Muslim League no Muslim member would serve the war committee.79

In an interview with the Viceroy Linlithgow, Jinnah enumerated the terms for an understanding with the Congress. "Congress to withdraw all opposition to the communal award, Muslim representation in the local bodies to be based on the principles of communal award; separate electorate on population strength to be retained; share of

79 Note of talk between Linlithgow and Jinnah, January 13-16 1940, Enclosure 2, Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.
Muslims in the services, elected bodies and cabinet to be fixed by a statue; no measure to be forced, if two third of the Muslim member of the assembly objected; Muslim majorities in the provinces should not be disturbed by any territorial readjustment, complete autonomy to the provinces, a weak centre for minimum common purposes, Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by a statutory provision. Congress flag should not be flown on public places; Urdu should be made as the national language of India; Vande Matram to be abandoned; Congress should stop wrecking Muslim League and formation of coalition ministries in the provinces. Jinnah insisted that any agreement with the Congress should be based on the clear understanding of the history and position of the Muslim India. On 25th February, 1940, Jinnah publically proclaimed that any future constitutional settlement should recognise Muslim League to be the only authoritative organisation of the Muslims.

After the outbreak of the war, British objective was to placate Indian parties to muster support for the war effort. Somehow, Linlithgow, by now was

80 Jinnah enumerated the App Resolution passed by the working Committee of the All India Muslim League on September 1939 to the Viceroy in January 1940.

81 Jamiluddin Ahmed Speeches of Mohmmad Ali Jinnah Lahore, 1960; pp 123
convinced that in any scheme of India, full weight should be given to the minorities. Since Congress showed its intransigence, Linlithgow tried to raise the status of the Muslim League as counterpoise to the Congress. The Viceroy invited Gandhi, Jinnah, and the president of the chamber of princes for consultation and to seek their cooperation in the war effort. Linlithgow's decision confirmed the basic contention of Jinnah that there were four parties in India and not two as claimed by Nehru in 1937.

In his letter to the Secretary of State, Zetland, Linlithgow said; "we may have to go a good deal further than we have done before in giving full weight to the minorities not only due to their size but also due to the deep cultural division and religious differences". The Viceroy elaborated that the issue raised by Jinnah were fundamental and "we shall have to be extremely careful with its dealings." He was impressed by the tenacity of the Muslims determination, and wished they had an efficient publicity organisation as that of the Congress.

Linlithgow believed that as long as the Congress failed to strike a compromise with the Muslims, it was impossible to meet their demand for self-government. In his speech on January 10, 1940, Linlithgow reasserted Britain's intention

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82 British War Aims: Anexure A, Telegraphic Summary of the War Cabinet Meeting, Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.
83 Linlithgow to Zetland, January 20, 1940, Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.
to introduce dominion status; promised to expand the executive council with Hindus and Muslims as its members, and introduction of a federal constitution provided princely states agreed to abide. The Viceroy's presumption was "the main difficulty in considering constitutional progress was finding shoulders broad enough to carry the burden when British were to relinquish power."  

The constitutional question now put aside, Linlithgow admitted that "had Jinnah supported the Congress and jointly confronted, the strain upon His Majesty's Government would have been great indeed. By standing against the Congress claim to represent whole of India, Jinnah had given him the valuable help, he added. Therefore I may claim to have vested interest in his position." When London policy makers directed the Viceroy to reach an accord with the Indians, Linlithgow argued that "so long Congress failed to meet Muslim's demand it was a mistake to try 'swapping horses' or do anything which might loose us Muslim support."  

In a letter to the Secretary of State Zetland, Linlithgow said that "Britain should refrain from action, stop running after the Congress and wait upon the events". As Congress threatened for launching a civil disobedience movement in case  

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84 Linlithgow to Zetland on January 28, 1940. Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film New Delhi.  
85 Linlithgow Speeches and Statements 1936-43, Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.  
86 Linlithgow to Zetland, January 30, 1940, opcit 84.
their demand for complete independence was not met. Linlithgow encouraged Jinnah to come out with some positive scheme. He told him it was useless to seek the support of His Majesty's Government for a party whose policies carries sheer negative connotations.\textsuperscript{88} Even before the outbreak of the war, Secretary of State, Zetland in 1939 had given the same advice to the UP leaders Khaliquzaman and Abdur Rehman Siddiqui at London.\textsuperscript{89}

The Muslim League, by now, had been considering to evolve some alternative strategy independently. However, it deliberately avoided associating itself with the numerous schemes being floated since one and half years in the country. Now Linlithgow's prodding after the outbreak of the war, necessitated the spelling of Muslims aspirations. These events had promised the Muslim League to adopt the famous Lahore Resolution on 22nd March 1940.

\textbf{Discussion}

The Government of India Act of 1935 promised introduction of provincial autonomy before the creation of the Federation of Indian states. As a result, when elections were held in 1937, Congress was able to form ministries in eight out of eleven British India provinces of which in five its majority was absolute.

\textsuperscript{88} Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah February, 6, 1940, Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Micro Film, New Delhi.

\textsuperscript{89} Khaliquzaman: Pathway to Pakistan mentions about the event pp 205-6
On the contrary it was the regional parties and not the Muslim League that gained upper hand in Punjab, Bengal and Sindh.

Before the provincial elections of 1937, Muslim League was a moribund organisation. It had never contested any elections and had very little appeal in the Muslim majority provinces. The issues there were more local and regional in nature. The Congress victory and its subsequent denial of any share in power to the Muslim League, through coalition ministries led to the polarization of politics in India. Further the social, educational and cultural schemes of the Congress alienated a large section of the Muslims. Through its mass-contact programme, Congress tried to estrange the Muslim masses from their accredited leaders.

The message was clear, either Muslim League should fold itself or merge with the Congress, otherwise accept a permanent inferior position and exclusion from power in the Hindu majority provinces and also in the proposed all-India Federation. The other way was to develop an alternative strategy to overcome the dilemma of permanent minority status.

The problem was compounded when Congress tried to balance the federal constitution, first by democratization of the princely states and then seeking uniform policies in Congress ruled provinces. The Muslim League's executive body could discern permanent domination of Congress in future India. It felt that the idea of responsible self-government based on democratic principals was unsuitable to the Muslim interest and aspiration.
Jinnah often reported to have quoted "the fur coat of Canada will not do for the extremly tropical climate of India."

Jinah's mind was groping towards the concept of Hindu Muslim India, where they would wield parity of power. The only way to seek equal rights for the Indian Muslims was through showing the pan-Indian solidarity and fight for a dignified settlement in an all India set-up through the backing of Muslim majority provinces.

Henceforth, Jinnah set before himself the task of reorganising the Muslim League on the inherent power of the Muslims in India. But he had great difficulty making inroads into the domain of the Muslim dominated satraps. The Unionist party in Punjab, Krishak Proja Party in Bengal, United Party of Sindh represented the regional identities. The only way how Muslim League could seek entry was through evoking the solidarity of the Muslim brotherhood. From then onwards, ambiguity and communal plank became the main weapon in Jinnah's armour. He launched a fierce propaganda campaign against the Congress by raising the slogan of "Islam in danger". His whole thrust was to deny Congress an all India representative character and make them recognise Muslim League as the only authoritative organisation of the Muslims.

Seeing a large swing of the Muslim masses into the Muslim Leagues camp, Congress tried to address the communal question, but Jinnah insisted on recognising Muslim League as the only representative organisation of the Muslims. It was an impossible demand for the Congress as it would tantamount to surrender its national character.
By translating democracy in terms of mere majority. Congress side stepped the fact India's plural composition whose participation was so vital for the smooth working of the representative government. If Congress had given the due share to the Muslim League, a settlement was possible within united India.

The withdrawal of the Congress from the office was also one of its biggest mistake. It put itself in a disadvantage vis a vis the Muslim League which could not maneuver more freely and lost the influence on the British government which it derived being in the office.

The outbreak of the war turned the tables in favour of Muslim League. Jinnah made Musllim Leagues support dependent on justice for Muslims in Congress provinces and a guarantee that no constitution advance to be made without his approval.

Meanwhile Jinnah had been trying two fold strategy to enhance the dwindling Muslims position in India. One was to put pressure on the Congress through communal propaganda and second was to develop alternative strategy to repudiate the permanent minority status in India. Jinnah had been relentlessly brooding towards a congeries of autonomous sovereign states with a federated India. He was of the opinion that Indian sub-continent houses a confederation of three federation. Muslims, Hindus and Princes. Though after the outbreak of the war, the idea of federation was ruled out by Jinnah but he was still angling for some sort of confederation within a united India. His calculation might have been with the
princes he would hold the balance with Hindustan having common arrangement for customs, communication, defence, foreign relations and the minorities.

After the outbreak of the war when Linlithgow asked Jinnah to come up with some constructive policy, Jinnah drafted the Lahore Resolution from the numerous schemes whose deliberations were going on since eighteen months in the country. Though it evoked no response amongst the Congress circles, Muslim Leagues importance since then grew vis-a-vis the British. This was the turning point in the Indian history.

The following pages in the chapter two highlights the various schemes and analyses the complexities of the Lahore Resolution. It discusses the Congress, British and the provincial reaction to the resolution and highlights the August offer. This chapter lay focus on the Cripps offer, interaction of Cripps with various political leaders of India and his own differences with the Viceroy Linlithgow. Finally, it gauges the reaction on Pakistan demand from different leaders of the Muslim League.