CHAPTER-IV

ARMY RECRUITMENT POLICY AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT

The people of Punjab are known for their martial qualities. The concept of martial races was introduced after the revolt of 1857 and after that the Punjab became a main hub of recruitment for the Indian Army. The term ‘martial race’ was coined during the British rule to classify Indian population on the basis of ‘martial and non-martial’ traits. This was to facilitate the recruitment of martial races to the British army. According to this concept, all natives were not equal in soldiery qualities; some races were superior to others. The British wanted to make it sure that the army remained loyal to them. Martial race theory is an ideology based on the assumption that certain ethnic groups are inherently more martially inclined than others. A ‘martial race’ was typically considered brave and well-built for fighting whereas the ‘non-martial races’ were those whom the British believed to be unfit for battle because of their sedentary lifestyle.\(^1\) The government initiatives were aimed to protect the interests of recruited groups and enhanced their local standing. This led them to pursue a relatively benevolent policy when dealing with militarized men or with militarized region.

The process of militarization of the people of Punjab came to notice during the misal period or the 18\(^{th}\) century as well as during the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. The province of the Punjab was consolidated by Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the military genius of the great Maharaja lies in his firm grasp of the challenge of his times and in theundoubted success of practical measures undertaken to meet it.\(^2\) “The regular army of Maharaja Ranjit Singh was about 75,000 out of which 60,000 comprised the infantry and the remaining belonged to cavalry and artillery.\(^3\) He was the architect of his colossal military machine built up with consummate skill; part of it was modeled on European

\(^1\) P.A.R. 1892-93, pp.117-118.

\(^2\) Foreign Department (Secret Branch), 24 June 1848, Proceeding No. 43, N.A.I., New Delhi; see also W.G. Osborne, The Court and Camp of Ranjit Singh, Heritage Publishers, Delhi, 1973 (Reprint), p.104.

\(^3\) Foreign Department (Secret Branch), 26 December 1846, Proceeding No. 43, N.A.I., New Delhi; see also K.S. Narang and Hari Ram Gupta, History of the Punjab 1469-1857, Uttar Chand Kapur, 1969, Delhi, p.334.
pattern but mostly its traditional Sikh character was retained. It was composed of mixed social elements and commanded by the Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims and European officers. Maharaja Ranjit Singh was the master of this efficient machine and he was his own commander-in-chief.” It is a well-known fact that Maharaja Ranjit Singh employed few European officers in his services to train his army on western lines. Notable among them were General Ventura who held charge of training the infantry; General Allard disciplined the cavalry; Colonel Court held charge of the artillery to train his army popular as Khalsa Army.

The first step of British policy after annexation was cutting down the strength of the Khalsa Army because majority of the Sikh soldiers had participated in the anti-British struggle during Anglo Sikh Wars. They were deprived of all claims for pensions and privileges. The British punished them by throwing them out of employment and making forfeit former claims. “The forts, except those required for military purpose were dismantled and ones that were retained, were repaired or rebuilt. A general muster of the Sikh soldiery and the military retainers of the late Darbar was held at Lahore, when all were paid up and disbanded. The most promising of them being subsequently taken into British service, while the infirm and superannuated obtained pensions and gratuities.”

That part of the army which refrained from joining anti-British actions was summoned to Lahore for being mustered. Under the guidance of Lieutenant Becher, the able-bodied officers and men were selected for new formations while the superannuated were pensioned off. This step of the British Government was not good for economy of the province because the unemployment among the Punjabi youth was a threat to peace in the Punjab. It was difficult for the youth to find suitable economic opportunities in the villages. The people living at North West Frontier were tribal. It was difficult for the British to control them. By realising the actual position of the North West Frontier, the British Government in the Punjab started recruiting Punjabi youth and deployed them on

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6 Dolores Domin, op.cit, p. 99.
the frontier. The British Government thus invested on the recruitment in the Punjab for maintenance of peace on the frontier of the province by eyeing larger gains. This on one hand created a handy armed force that was later organized into regular army and on the other gave them less expensive army to control the frontier. Indirectly it helped their economic policy in the Punjab as these recruits helped their families with their salaries who could now have better living standard.

The strategic location of the province of the Punjab made its stability essential to the security of the Raj in a way. The annexation of the Punjab brought India’s boundaries right up to the Afghan frontier and this had led to regular skirmishes, both small and large in scale, with frontier tribesmen. Before the annexation of Punjab, the British were only advisor with temporary powers of control in an independent kingdom but now they were absolute masters by right of conquest, therefore, it was necessary for them to maintain peace in the province. The British knew it very well that the Sikhs were brave and had recognized the high soldiery qualities of the Sikhs, so after annexation, the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force was formed as local body. “Next to it, a police force was established with a view to strengthen the executive power and suppress internal disturbances.” Better organization no doubt could lead to better control to collect revenue, taxes and to check thefts, decoities etc. It in a way help the British to generate better resources, gave the youth employment that generated resources and they preferred owing to their martial traits.

The British wanted some form of control along a lengthy and extremely difficult mountainous border across which lived fiercely independent tribes accustomed to fighting amongst themselves and striking against the inhabitants of the low land areas. The insistent military threat posed by an estimated 100,000 heavily armed Pathan fighting men to the security of the Punjab meant that the protective measures were

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7 Foreign Department (Political Branch), 12 May 1849, Proceeding No. 165, N.A.I., New Delhi; see also S.S. Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and War, Languages Department, Punjab, 1970 (Reprint) p.139.

8 S.S. Thorburn, op.cit, p.105.

9 Dolores Domin, op.cit, p.102.

10 Foreign Department (Secret Branch), 31 March 1854, Proceeding No. 52, N.A.I. New Delhi.
immediately needed by the British. On 18\textsuperscript{th} May 1849, Henry Lawrence was empowered by the Governor-General Lord Dalhousie to raise a force for the protection of the North West Frontier and to ensure internal security while the strength and deployment of the permanent military garrison of the Punjab was determined. “A special force, the Punjab Frontier Force, under the direct orders of the Board, was raised for the service, normally on the frontier. It consisted at first, of five regiments of cavalry, the corps of guides, five regiments of infantry, three light field batteries, two garrison batteries, two companies of sappers and miners and the Sind camel corps.”\textsuperscript{11} The British Government wanted to encourage trade in the Punjab. The incidents of robberies were common at North West Frontier. So to restore confidence among traders, the maintenance of peace was must.

The 1\textsuperscript{st} Local Sikh Infantry Regiment was recruited by Major (later on Brigadier) John Hodgson, who after 1849 became a leading figure in establishing the Punjab Irregular Force. Initially, it was to consist of Sikhs only, but for the sake of diversity, other recruits were also admitted with Sikhs in the dominant position. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Regiment of the Local Sikh Infantry was mainly recruited from the hillmen of the Jalandhar Doab. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Local Sikh Regiment had a considerable portion of Hindustani soldiers in its ranks while its 4\textsuperscript{th} Regiment had no peculiarities of composition.\textsuperscript{12} The people of the Punjab living in aforesaid areas depended heavily on agriculture. Thus causing a great burden on land as a source of income. They found an outlet of economic opportunities by offering themselves for recruitment in the British Army.

Ten regiments – five infantry (1-5 infantry) and five cavalry (1 to 5 cavalry) were raised at stations throughout the Punjab during the summer and autumn of 1849, collectively designated as the Punjab Irregular Force (PIF), intended for general service in Punjab and the trans-Indus districts. They were placed under the command of Brigadier John Hodgson. “PIF was placed under the direct control of the Board of Administration of the Punjab. Lord Dalhousie thought that excluding the PIF from military control would deliberately secure for the local government the full and complete control of military means sufficient to effect any object which political consideration

\textsuperscript{11} P.A.R. 1892-93, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{12} Foreign Department (Political Branch), 12 May 1849, Proceeding No. 165, N.A.I., New Delhi; see also P.A.R. 1849-50 and 1850-51, (one volume), p. 40.
may, in their judgement, render it expedient to secure on the distant frontier.”

This decision to localize the PIF solely for duty in the Punjab gave the Board of Administration almost complete control of the troops stationed along the border enabling it to quickly respond to raids or other developments without constant recourse to the Central Government for military support. It was sensible for the British Government to recruit natives (the Punjabis) for PIF as it saved large expenditure that could have occurred due to deployment of British troops.

The organization of infantry and cavalry units reflected their different role in the defence of the border. A total of fifteen expeditions were carried out between 1849 and 1855 against the Kohat Pass Afridis, Mohmands, Miranzai tribes, Utmanzai Waziris, Hassanzais, Ranizais, Utman Khel, Bori Afridis, Shiranis, Kasranis, Michni Mohmands, Aka Khels, and Orakzais, as punishment for offences committed in British territory and to demonstrate the ability of imperial troops to penetrate their hills at will. However, the regiments and batteries of the Punjab Irregular Frontier (PIF) quickly adapted to local conditions and devised specialized tactics to conduct an attack in the hills, protect columns on the march, protect columns when halted at night and to govern the conduct of withdrawal in conduct with hostile tribesmen that were dominated by the principles of offensive action and the maintenance of security. The PIF proved an effective means of

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14 Each infantry regiment which shouldered the burden of hill warfare, had an established strength of four European Officers, each regiment was divided into eight companies and each company had 1 subedar, 1 jemadar, 5 havildars, 5 naiks, 2 drummers and 100 sepoys. Each sepoy was paid Rs.7 per month and provided with fuel, arms, ammunition, and equipment by the government. A cavalry regiment was smaller in size than an infantry regiment. Each mounted regiment had a strength of 599 sabres, with each of its six sabre squadrons having 100 men. A very different system was employed in raising and equipping cavalry units. Instead of equipments being provided, each sowar was paid Rs. 20 a month out of which he had to provide his own clothing, equipment and arms. Foreign Department (Political), 9 July 1852, Proceeding No. 47, N.A.I., New Delhi.


16 Foreign Department (Political Branch), 9 July 1852, Proceeding No. 47, N.A.I., New Delhi.
control over the unruly trans-border tribes and it continued to do so until it was finally amalgamated with the Bengal Army in 1886. The PIF provided jobs to unemployed Punjabi youth on the one hand and helped the British to develop the resources of the province on the other by protecting the caravans of traders at the North West Frontier border.

The second arm of the colonial executive was named “Military Police” and was to consist of 2700 Sowars (horsemen) and 4800 soldiers on foot. Its main task was to deal with internal disturbances. Concessions were made in case of Military Police which was to serve the Provincial Government as an instrument of speedy actions against any attempt to challenge British supremacy. The Board of Administration recommended a relatively high pay which was to be equal to that of the regular army. The Military Police consisted of 4 Darbar Regiments which had supported the British in 1848 and were promised further employment after annexation. They were therefore, transferred to the Military Police but on better conditions of service such as higher pay and the rights of wearing their old uniforms if desired. After annexation two regiments were formed in addition, dominated by Punjabi Muslims and the scheduled 6 battalions of Military Police (foot) were thus complete. However, in 1853 the 7th battalion was organized and significantly recruited mostly in the Amritsar district.\(^{17}\) The British knew the warlike characteristics of the Sikhs of the Punjab. They never doubted the bravery of the Sikhs. Those who were recruited continued remitting their salaries to their homes in the Punjab. It was often used towards paying the land revenue. Thus it stimulated the economy of the province and added to the convenience of the government.

The Military Police was split in two sections- the infantry and the cavalry. Its final number was ten battalions. The disbanded old soldiers of the Sikh Army who remained faithful to the British during the Second Anglo-Sikh War were enlisted in the first of the four battalions. In addition to escort work for civil officers and treasure, duty at the jails and other places, they also assisted in garrison duty on the frontier at such places as Kohat, Bannu and Hazara. Three of the Battalions were usually absorbed in the Liea Division being stationed in the Derajat. The fifth battalion was raised at Rawalpindi.

\(^{17}\) *P.A.R. 1849-50 and 1850-51*, (one volume), p. 42.
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by Lieutenant Miller and the sixth battalion was raised by Lieutenant Younghusband. In 1850, Captain R. Lawrence raised the seventh battalion at Amritsar.\(^\text{18}\) The manjha area remained the center of recruitment throughout the period of this study. One of the reason for economic prosperity of manjha area was large army recruitment from this particular area.

The Governor General Lord Dalhousie, in his letter dated 4 July 1850, placed before the Court of Directors all arguments which he thought being conclusive and wrote:

"My own opinion has always been very strongly in favour of such a measure. The high soldiery qualities of the Sikh class are too well known to require any illustration here. They have already been enlisted in our service as troops of the line, as local corps by Lord Harding in 1846, as troopers of Irregular Cavalry in the Bengal Army, and as sepoys in the local regiments in the Punjab. In every instance these men have behaved as good soldiers, worthy of trust, and are highly regarded by the officers under whose command they serve."\(^\text{19}\)

The British knew that the Sikhs were already a disciplined community when it comes to their soldiery qualities. They knew they would have to spend less on their training and salaries should be much less as compared to British soldiers. So without compromising on the quality of soldiers they recruited Punjabi Jats into army and police and gained in the long run.

During the war with Burma in 1852, the 3\(^{rd}\) Sikh infantry wrote a letter in April 1852 to the Government of India, showing its willingness to join the expedition.\(^\text{20}\) The 4\(^{th}\) Regiment Sikh Local Infantry also showed its willingness to proceed on service to Burma. Major Armstrong wrote a letter to Major M. Chamberlain, Military Secretary to the Board of Administration, explaining the desire of his soldiers to serve anywhere whether Burma, China or wherever their services could be useful. This company consisted of Sikhs, Gorkhas, Poorbeas, Muslamans and Hindus\(^\text{21}\) and in a letter dated 29\(^{th}\)


\(^{19}\) Dolores Domin, *op.cit*, pp.112-113.

\(^{20}\) *Foreign Department (Political Branch)* 21 May 1852, *Proceeding No. 154*, N.A.I., New Delhi.

\(^{21}\) *Foreign Department (Political Branch)* 21 May 1852, *Proceeding No. 155*, N.A.I., New Delhi.
April 1852, Major Merville Chamberlain, intimated C. Allen, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, regarding the desire of 4th Regiment Sikh Local Infantry to be permitted to proceed on service to Burma. All the four regiments volunteered but only the 4th was selected.\(^{22}\) It seems that the British had selected this particular regiment by keeping in consideration the cultural formation of the 4th Sikh Regiment. The British gave representation to all the communities by selecting 4th Sikh Regiment. The native regiments knew that they would get more allowances if they were selected for expedition to Burma.

The British Government wanted to maintain peace in the province; therefore, to accelerate the recruitment of the Sikhs in the British Army, the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepur was empowered to enlist and attest any soldiers or persons desirous of enlisting or re-enlisting into the service of Indian Military by a government notification dated 22 October 1852.\(^{23}\)

The ordinary detective police, called “Rural and City Police” had a strength of some 9500 men in 1853. “The ordinary police was better paid in Punjab than in other provinces getting here Rs.5 per month, whereas in Bengal Presidency they received only Rs.4 per month.”\(^{24}\) The Government knew that by investing money and better salaries into this ‘Rural and City Police’ it would lead to good administration hence better collection of revenue and taxes besides peace in the province. The British knew that the people of Punjab were really brave and deserved to get entry into the army and by keeping it in their consideration, they allowed the recruitment of the Punjabis into the regular corps of the Bengal army and they were convinced that it was safe enough to authorize the recruitment of Sikhs into the Bengal Army. They were quick to add the provision that the Sikhs should not be allowed to exceed 200 per regiment or about twenty percent of the strength of the regiment.\(^{25}\) It seems that the British were taking

\(^{22}\) *Foreign Department (Political Branch)* 21 May 1852, *Proceeding No. 156*, N.A.I., New Delhi.

\(^{23}\) *Foreign Department (Political Branch)* 7 January 1853, *Proceeding No. 279*, N.A.I., New Delhi.

\(^{24}\) Dolores Domin *op.cit*, pp. 111-112.

precautionary measures to prevent Sikhs to become united in any form till the British had full confidence in the Sikhs of the Punjab for having loyalty for the British Government.

The revolt of 1857 completely changed the recruitment scenario. The poorbeas had betrayed the British during the revolt of 1857. As far as the Sikh recruitment was concerned it worried the British the most. It was dangerous to recruit them from military angle. They thought in the given situation that the Sikh loyalty could never be taken for guaranteed but the urgency of the time made it expedient to do so. A middle path was followed and that too, to a limited extent. It was felt that it was less dangerous to recruit the young Sikhs. The Government of India kept pressing the Chief Commissioner right from the beginning to raise bodies of the old Khalsa soldiers but Lord Lawrence did not authorize this. Believing that ‘the measure would be a dangerous one, in the Cis-Sutlej states especially where they formed the most turbulent portion of the Sikh Army and were never well disposed towards the British’. On the other hand, the majha which was the main recruiting ground showed their unwillingness to enlist.26

John Lawrence wrote to the Governor-General Lord Canning and urged the expediency of raising a large body of Sikh Irregulars. He argued that the European force in India was so small that it may gradually be worm down and destroyed. Between May and December 1857, a new force of 34,000 Punjabis was raised which included 18 new Regiments of Infantry, a body of 300 veteran Sikh artillery men re-enlisted after being disbanded in 1849 and a corps of about 1200 low-caste Sikh Pioneers. Irregular levies numbering 7,000 on horses and 9,000 on foot were raised.27 This was almost-equivalent to Hindustanis disarmed. The total number of soldiers reached 60,000 of whom nearly half were Muhammadans, a third Sikh and equal number of Hindus and low-caste Sikhs (mazbis).28

British Government took immediate measures to suppress the mutiny. The British saw everyone with suspicion. A large number of faqirs and sadhus had cropped up in the


27 Tan Tai Yong, op.cit, p. 48.

Punjab. At Amritsar a large number of *bairagee sadhus* were detained and sent to jail.\(^{29}\)

The loyalty of the people of the Punjab towards British Government resulted in a preference for the Punjabis in the army. The Hindustanis of the erstwhile Bengal Army came to be considered untrustworthy by the British.\(^{30}\) "The revolt of 1857 necessitated the raising of a large body of troops from Punjab which a few years ago had been undergoing a process of gradual demilitarization."\(^{31}\) The British preferred yeoman peasants who were supposed to be sturdy, independent, upright, honest and reliable. In the Punjab it was easy to identify the right material for the soldiery from among various sections of agriculturists. Preference for Sikh youth to be recruited in the army provided lucrative incentive for the youth to grab alternatives for employment.

Following the revolt of 1857, the administration of the Punjab came under the Crown as anywhere else in India. In February 1858, a major administrative change was made when Delhi was transferred from North-Western Provinces and placed under the Punjab Administration. In November 1858, Queen Victoria assumed the direct control over the Government of India. The East India Company practically ceased to exist.\(^{32}\) Army recruitment from the Punjab increased largely from rural areas under the Crown. An understanding of the relationship between the colonial state and the new army is crucial not only in understanding the nature of imperial rule but also the economic aspect of the army recruitment. There was certain and fixed salary in the British army so almost every Jat village used to send recruits in the British Army. The proportion of Sikhs increased in Bengal and the Sikhs used to send money to their families in the Punjab that helped raise their living standard and which was utilized for paying the land revenue that was in cash.

At the commencement of 1859, the Punjab together with the Delhi territory was placed under a separate Lieutenant Governor. Sir John Lawrence was the first to hold the office. After a brief internal, he resigned and left the province and was succeeded by Sir

\(^{29}\) *P.A.R. 1892-93*, p.30.


Robert Montgomery.\textsuperscript{33} A local European Army was proposed by Lord Canning, the Governor-General and by others because they considered it would be more fully at the disposal of the Government of India and more economical; and that officers and men would identify themselves with the country and its inhabitants, providing a source from which officers could be drawn for various civil employments. On the other hand, it was urged with equal strength that the British Army should be truly imperial serving different masters; that the spirit and traditions of the British army could be preserved only by the return of regiment to England; and finally that a local army was worse disciplined and more liable to disaffection than one which was relieved by units.\textsuperscript{34}

It was accordingly decided that the European Army of the East India Company should be transferred to the Crown. The infantry became regiments of the line; and the Bangal, Madras, and Bombay artillery, and the corresponding corps of Indian Engineers were amalgamated with the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. A Royal Commission, appointed to advise on these changes, laid down that British forces should be 80,000 strong, and that the native troops should not exceed it by more than two to one in the Bengal Army and three to one in Madras and Bombay; they also recommended that native regiments should be formed by a general mixture of all classes and castes.\textsuperscript{35}

“The revolt of 1857 put heavy burden on the economy of Government of India and the annual expenditure for the army, military police, new levies, police and public works went up from Rs. 13.2 Crores in 1856-1857 to Rs. 17.2 Crores in 1857-1858 and Rs. 24.7 Crores in 1858-59, and in the same period the debts of the Government of India increased by 36 percent. From the year of revolt, for five years accounts of each financial year showed a deficit.”\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{33} P.A.R.\textit{1892-93}, p. 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} \textit{The Imperial Gazetteer of India}, Vol. IV, \textit{op.cit}, p. 342.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}, p.343.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, \textit{Financial Foundations of the British Raj: Ideas and Interests in the Reconstruction of Indian Public Finance 1858-1872}, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 2005, p. 86.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Table 5.1 : Annual Army Expenditure 1856-57 to 1858-59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Expenditure for Army (in crores)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1856-57</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1857-58</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1858-59</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After the revolt, the Budget system was introduced in India to ensure a complete review of income and expenditure of the coming financial year and a full scrutiny of the past year. The Financial Department was recognized and the Government of India Act 1858 concentrated the power of financial control and scrutiny in the hands of the Secretary of State in Council. The military expenditure remain static in the neighborhood of sixteen crore during the period 1864-65 to 1870-71. Military charges showed a slight tendency to rise during the viceroyalty of John Lawrence but he found it difficult to control the expenditure in the army.

The net military expenditure was never below 46 percent during the period of this study (1849-1901). The following table shows figures of net military expenditure and net total expenditure from 1884-85 to 1899-1900.

Table 5.2 : Military Expenditure and Total Expenditure 1884-85 to 1899-1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Military Expenditure (£)</th>
<th>Net Total Expenditure (£)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1884-85</td>
<td>12,207,681</td>
<td>23,407,591</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889-90</td>
<td>14,486,643</td>
<td>27,824,517</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894-95</td>
<td>15,263,147</td>
<td>32,949,446</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-1900</td>
<td>15,485,147</td>
<td>30,715,625</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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37 Ibid., p. 94.
38 Ibid., p. 167.
The uprising of 1857 forced the British administration to shift the base of military recruitment to more loyal and effective races for the consolidation of their rule. Therefore, a new ideology of ‘martial’ and ‘non-martial races’ was formulated by Lord Roberts (the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army during 1885-1893). The theory of martial races was a colonial construct that was produced and propagated by the British who recruited a large number of soldiers of the communities referred as martial races for services in British army.

The officer commanding a division was ordinarily a Major General, while the brigades were commanded according to their importance by Major-Generals, Brigadier-Generals, or Colonels on the staff. The Divisional Commanders had been entrusted with wide powers, thus relieving the Lieutenant-Generals of commands of much routine work and setting them free for a more thorough inspection of their troops.

It was must for the officers in Punjab (throughout India) to have obtained a staff college certificate or have qualified for promotion to field rank and passed the higher standard examination in Hindustani, in order to attain to the staff. The general tactical training of the army was carried on by means of annual field training, and by maneuvers on varying scales. Every unit of the British Army had an establishment of native followers, including a quarter master's establishment of lascars for the care of tents, pakhalis (water-carriers with bullocks), sweepers and a 'conservancy' establishment of bhistis (water-carriers), sweeper carts. Every unit had camp equipage in its charge, and could usually move at a few hours’ notice. Native officers, termed risaldars and ressaidars in the cavalry and subedars in the infantry, command each half squadron or company, and all orders to the native ranks were issued through them. The senior of them had the title of risaldar major or subedar major. They were assisted by a junior native officer, called a jemadar and a jemadar was also allowed to assist the British adjutant.

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43 *Foreign Department (Political Branch)*, 9 July 1852, *Proceeding No.47*, N.A.I., New Delhi.
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The following table shows that the number of the Punjabi recruits in the Indian Infantry increased steadily throughout the period of this study (1849-1901)\footnote{Tan Tai Yong, \textit{op.cit}, p. 71.} :-

**Table 5.3 : Indian Infantry Units for the following years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gurkhas</th>
<th>North-Central</th>
<th>North-West (Punjab and NWF)</th>
<th>Bombay</th>
<th>Madras</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The regularly increasing number of the Punjabi recruits boosted the economy of the province. The people became disciplined and they started investing surplus money in the agricultural land and other assets that would generate income for them. The economic stability of the people who started paying land revenue in time also turned the Punjab into disciplined and profitable possession for the British.

**THE PAY IN THE INDIAN ARMY AND SERVICE RULES**

The pay of the officers of the army was on two lines, pay of rank plus pay of appointment. The pay of rank rose from Rs. 225 monthly as Lieutenant to Rs. 827 as Lieutenant Colonel. The pay of appointment in native regiments rose from Rs. 150 to Rs. 700 in cavalry and from Rs. 100 to Rs. 600 in infantry regiments. Thus the total pay of Cavalry and Squadron Officer was Rs. 375 and of a Lieutenant and Double-Company Officer of infantry Rs. 325 monthly. The staff pay attached to non-regimental appointments rose Rs. 1,000 monthly, but the pay of higher staff appointments and commands were consolidated. The promotion of officers of the Indian Army was to be regulated by a time scale which was nine years as Lieutenant, nine years as Captains and eight years as Major, promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel being thus attained after twenty-six years of service. Promotion was in all cases subject to the required professional examination being passed satisfactorily. Accelerated promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel was however, allowed in the case of a Major selected for the
Army Recruitment Policy and its Economic Impact

command of a regiment or battalion, or for certain prescribed staff or administrative appointments.\textsuperscript{45} The powers of Commanding Officers of native regiments were considerable. They could make promotions in the non-commissioned ranks but the appointment or promotion in the commissioned grade was to be recommended to superior authority.

The Rajputs of Kangra, the Dhunds and Sattis of Rawalpindi, the Awans of the Salt Range, the Gakkhars of Jhelum and Jats of Rohtak generally joined military service because the soil was of poor quality or the rain precarious. The Jat Sikhs of Central Punjab were an exception to this but even among them the poor people usually offer themselves for recruitment. The normal term of military service was 15 years of which a minimum of 7 years were with the colours and remaining 8 years in the reserve. If the authorized quota of reserve was full, a soldier could extend his colour service for one or two years at a time to complete the full period of combined colour and reserve service. On completion of such service if he had not applied for his discharge he might be allowed to continue to serve with the colours at the discretion of the Commanding Officer.\textsuperscript{46}

The following table shows the regular increase in the number of people of the Punjab in the Indian army\textsuperscript{47} :-

\textbf{Table 5.4 : Recruitment of People of the Punjab in the Indian Army}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Native Army</th>
<th>Total from Punjab</th>
<th>Percentage from Punjab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>1,37,299</td>
<td>25,810</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1,47,852</td>
<td>30,548</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1,44,095</td>
<td>50,952</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Apart from a fixed salary, the soldiers used to receive clothing allowance, rations (Wheat flour, Dal, Ghee, Sugar and Fuel) and messing allowance at a flat rate, except proficiency pay which was determined in each individual case by the Commanding

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 370.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{P.A.R. 1892-93}, p.24.
\textsuperscript{47} Rajit K. Mazumder, \textit{op.cit}, p.18.
Officer.\textsuperscript{48} The surplus money if not wasted in litigation, social ceremonies and drinks was invested in land, buildings, cattle, well sinking, agricultural implements and jewellery etc.

Cavalry regiments and infantry battalions were organized in four squadrons or double companies, each commanded by a British officer who was responsible to the Commandant for the training and efficiency and everything connected with his squadron or double company. A junior British officer was also, as a rule attached to each squadron or double company. An adjutant and a quartermaster were allowed for each unit.

In early days, the pay of the sepoy was Rs. 5 per month but the \textit{batta} or allowances varied in different parts of the country. At the end of the eighteenth century, the general monthly pay was Rs. 7 per month which was increased to Rs. 9 per month in 1895. A non \textit{silladar} cavalry sowar received Rs. 2 and a native gunner Rs. 1 more than the infantry sepoy. A \textit{silladar} sowar received Rs. 31 a month, out of which he had to provide and maintain everything except his rifle, including transport and camp equipage. Pay was supplemented by compensation for dearness of provisions. This varied in detail in the different presidencies but general principle was that when the chief article of what was supposed to be a sufficient ration rise in price above a total of Rs. 3½ per mensem for combatants or Rs. 2½ for followers, the government stepped in and paid the excess. Hindustani was regarded as the common language of the Indian army but the officers had to pass not only the higher standard examination in this, but also an examination in the language mostly used by the men of their corps, e.g., Hindi, Marathi, Parbattia, Punjabi, Pashtu, Persian or Tamil.\textsuperscript{49}

**FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR SERVING IN THE ARMY**

The British Army became the largest source of employment in the Punjab at that time. The army helped the British to conquer, subjugate and control the empire, it simultaneously provided a regular and significant source of income to its soldiers. The impact of colonialism through the benefits of military service on those recruited seems to be less exploitative than on the rest of Indian society.\textsuperscript{50} Many Punjabis went overseas to

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 5 & 11.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{The Imperial Gazetteer of India}, Vol. IV, \textit{op.cit}, p. 371.

\textsuperscript{50} R.K. Mazumdar, \textit{op.cit}, p. 3.
serve in the military and police. Most of these men were drawn to such employment by pay scales substantially in advance of those available in the Indian Army. These men clearly benefited from India’s central position in the imperial system and from the construction of Muslim and Sikh Punjabis as favoured martial races. The Indians frequently stayed on in Singapore and Malaya after their retirement from the force. The service in the Indian Army secured for its soldiers benefits back in India, as pay of the soldiers was invested in land and jewels and many retired soldiers took up their residence in canal colonies because they received land grants in the canal colonies and one source of the Punjab’s enduring prosperity throughout the late nineteenth century is surely to be found in its situation as a vast recruiting ground for the Indian Army. 51 (See appendix VI and VIII for more details). A huge portion of military salaries was spent on Punjabis, with a considerable share of it actually going into province. Therefore, both in terms of large percentage of serving troops and recruits and in terms of military expenditure, Punjab was the subject of an abnormally high level of resource input. 52

Those who received injuries during performing their duty and disabled from further service or those who were demobilized were usually given pensions. Further, the reservists on completing the full term of service (15 years) had the option of either a life pension or a single payment. Some units had established the practice of advancing pay (or pension) up to a maximum of six months to the men proceeding on leave preparatory to retirement. Sometimes, the salary to home was used for repayment of debt. The most of the soldiers from the Punjab were landowners and their income from service was over and above what their farms yield. Their families need not to borrow for recurring domestic expenditure and most of their debts, other than uchapat (small credit purchases settled at the harvest time) were incurred on marriages and house building. 53

The uniform of the native army was serge for the cold weather and parade, with khaki drill for ordinary work or active service. The colour of the uniform varied. The artillery wore blue and the sappers red, assimilated to the Royal Engineer Colours

52 R.K. Mazumdar, op. cit, p. 23.
respectively. The infantry wore serge tunics or jackets (red, dark green, blue or drab) with knicker-bockers and putties or gaiters, and ankle boots. The native infantry was armed with the Lee-Enfield Rifle and the cavalry with this rifle and with swords and lances.\(^{54}\)

In 1861, the reorganization of the cavalry and infantry was announced. Many regiments of irregular horse were disbanded or incorporated with others. All native artillery was abolished, except the batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force, the Bombay mountain batteries and the field batteries of the Hyderabad contingent.\(^{55}\)

The change in the lifestyle was evident. The things which usually marked an ex-military man from others in the village were neater dress, a better type of house, the use of chairs, crockery and a wristwatch.\(^{56}\) It would not be wrong to say that the British Government adopted paternalistic and benevolent attitude towards the people of Punjab because of their increasing number in the British Indian Army.

The life of army was thoroughly regulated in terms of uniforms and dress codes. Those going directly into regiments with the casual approach of a villager would have been affected by the army’s strict rules and regulations. Indian soldiers were required to wear pantaloons, shirts and combination suits. The other influence of military dress was in terms of the material used for clothes. The young recruits used to rough village khaddar, were now exposed to fine cotton and silk manufactured in mills.\(^{57}\) The Sind Sagar Doab demonstrated the role of army in improving life, i.e. the general impact of pay and pensions, the expenditure on food, clothing and housing.\(^{58}\) The army recruitment put an impact on the habits and daily routine life of the Indian soldiers. The direct military influence may be seen in the habit of drinking tea. The import of tea doubled from nearly 11,000 maunds in 1890 to over 21,000 maunds in 1920. The tea habit also led to the consumption of bread and little piles of white loaves, three or four inches square became available in the markets.\(^{59}\)

\(^{54}\) The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. IV, *op.cit*, p. 372.


\(^{57}\) R.K. Mazumdar, *op.cit*, p. 36.


Army Recruitment Policy and its Economic Impact

The large number of recruitment in the British army put an impact on the people of the Punjab. The change was clearly seen in the Tarn Tarn area of central manjha. The military incomes enabled the Tarn Taran’s recruited peasantry to generate a surplus that permitted them a higher standard of living. The only reason for the higher price of land in central manjha was the greater presence of military men whose desire for the land pushed prices up and their additional incomes enabled them to purchase it at inflated rates. The impact of military incomes on sales was clearest in Tarn Taran. The selling price of land was highest in central manjha. The aggregate price over the period was Rs. 20 per acre higher than in upper manjha and nearly Rs. 70 per acre dearer than in Bet Bangar. The lack of canals in Bet Bangar may have had an effect on its lower prices but canals were equally distributed in the two manjha circles which could not be differentiated in terms of agricultural conditions. The sales to money lenders by the Jats of central manjha accounted for only 22.13 percent of total cultivated areas sold, while it was 36.26 percent in upper manjha and 42.13 percent in Bet Bangar. Retired native officers were eager to invest their savings in land and in the central manjha, the tract which furnished most recruits to the army, the proportion of alienations to village traders was little over one fourth. It becomes evident that though land alienations and debt was there in central manjha, yet the impact of the military incomes cannot be denied which made it a prosperous part of the province and the large scale recruitment also continued from this part of the region.

The traditions of the Tarn Taran tahsil were intimately connected with military service, and it was still a very favourite recruiting ground. The most of the recruits come from the lower part of the central manjha, especially from among the Sandhus. One third of the pay by money orders was sent home by sepoys and men serving in the Burma Military Police. There is no doubt that service under government afforded a valuable outlet in a tract with small holdings and an increasing population. The pensions earned by retired sepoys also add largely to the total income.

60 Assessment Report of the Tarn Taran Tahsil of the Amritsar District, Revenue and Agricultural Department, Nos. 25-30, Punjab, November 1912, p. 20.
61 Ibid., pp. 1-3.
62 Ibid., p. 16.
IMPACT OF ARMY RECRUITMENT ON THE ECONOMY OF THE PUNJAB

With the increasing number of the Punjabi recruits in the British Army and their dreams for more lucrative opportunities, the deployment overseas had become a regular feature of Indian military life. Those who rallied to the British cause for whatever reasons of their own, such as Punjabis and Nepali Gurkhas, won favourable commendation at the time and subsequently secured a preferential entry into the reorganized Indian Army. The use of Indian troops carried with it the further substantial advantage that the Indian Army’s deployment was not a subject to parliamentary vote before hand, so that the government possessed a free hand in sending contingents abroad on short notice. This proved an added advantage which pushed the economy of the province.

The recruited peasantry of the Punjab benefited directly from the army recruitment policy of the British because the pay and pensions bolstered economic capability, close interaction with the British raised social standing and the policies of the government strengthened the political and economic position of the people of the Punjab. The greatest help by the peasantry was in supplying men. They fought bravely and many were rewarded with military decorations.

The Government of India invested in the Punjab for the building of strategic railways, roads and cantonment towns during the period under review (1849-1901). The construction of railways, and cantonment towns put an impact on the economy of the Punjab. The province of Punjab provided manpower to the British empire in India and the British used to call it the ‘sword arm and shield of India’. The British Army recruitment policy in the Punjab during the period under review (1849-1901) put an impact on the economy of the province because the prosperity of the province increased with the increased proposition of the Punjabis in the Indian Army. The living standard of the people raised a lot and they were exposed to a more disciplined and educated set-up. Many people who served in the Indian Army, settled abroad and all that gave stimulus to the economy of the province.