II
Psychological Basis for Human Motivation

In the first chapter, the discussion has been made on the nature of a free moral agent. An agent is considered to be morally free only if he can act voluntarily and he is a moral being only through his freedom and not by any type of external compulsion. To explain why a person moves to perform an action and why one refrains from performing an action is to explain the what and the why of voluntary action.

In this context, the nature of voluntary action must be analyzed from the Nyaya-Vaisesika perspective. In this chapter, in discussing the nature of voluntary action, the notion of pravrtti or volition has to be analysed critically and it has to be pointed out that this discussion about the nature of volition also constitutes the psychological basis of Indian ethics. The psychological analysis of the volition is a special feature of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system of Hindu Philosophy. The subject is treated not only by Prasastapada in his commentary on the Vaisesika philosophy but also by Visvanatha and the Neo-Naiyayikas. Prasastapada’s treatment is confined merely to a presentation of the essential differences between voluntary and non-voluntary action. The Neo-Naiyayikas treatment however goes far beyond Prasastapada in its analysis. It not only distinguishes between volition proper and actions which are automatic and reflex but also enters into the most acute analysis of the motive.

In this chapter, in the first section, the distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary action from the stand point of Prasastapada and of the Neo-Naiyayikas has been
emphasized. In the second section, the analysis of volition has been discussed following Visvanatha’s “Siddhantamuktavali” and its bhasya, ’Dinakari’. In the third section, the comparison has been made between the two school of Indian philosophy, i.e. the Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers and the Prabhakara thinkers regarding the analysis of volition. The diverse opinion of these two schools opens the scope to search the right nature of volition from the Indian philosophical perspective.

The Distinction between Voluntary and Non – Voluntary action.

The essential difference between Voluntary and Non – Voluntary action was noticed by the Naiyayikas as early as the time of Prasastapada. Thus, in the Gunagrantha of his commentary on the Vaisesika sutras, Prasastapada classifies prayatna or conation into

(1) Jivanapurvaka prayatna and (2) Icchadvesa purvaka prayatna.

Jivanapurvaka prayatna is that kind of prayatna that designates the organic activities proper, i.e. the reflex and automatic activities of the organism while Iccha-dvesa purvaka prayatna represents voluntary action or action with conscious choice. It is pointed out that each of these kinds of activity has its proper effects. Thus, the organic activities serve certain specific ends (kam arthakriyam karoti), i.e. the ends of the organism. Similarly, voluntary action serves a definite purpose, i.e. selection of the good (hitaprapti) and rejection of the evil (ahitaparighara).

It is to be observed from the above analysis of conation (pravrtti) that organic activities are not only attributed to the life of the organism as their antecedent condition or cause but are also regarded as subserving the ends of the organic life. This teleological conception of activity is extended also to voluntary action where the purpose or end is
regarded as being consciously aimed at and chosen. This distinction is also made in the 
*Dinakari tika*. According to *Dinakari, Krti*, which in the wider sense is identified with 
*prayatna*, includes –

1. *Pravrtti*, i.e. volition in the positive sense as conscious selection of the good,
2. *Nivrtti*, i.e. volition in the negative sense as rejection of the evil, and
3. *Jivanapurvaka prayatna*, i.e. activities arising from the *jivana* or life of the organism.

But, *Krti*, in the narrower sense, stands for *pravrtti* that includes willing in its positive and negative aspects i.e. including *nivrtti*. This also excludes *Jivanapurvaka prayatna*, the organic activities, from volition proper. It also follows from *Dinakara’s* analysis that to constitute volition, it is not sufficient that the action should be determined by conscious choice, in volition proper there being not merely conscious choice, but also the consciousness that the choice has been free (*Svecchadhina*) i.e., determined by the agent’s own will.

**Analysis of the Nature of Volition**

In the *Upanisads*, volition is considered as a mode of functioning of the *citta* as a whole. There is no evidence of an autonomous principle of volitional energy or will that govern the *citta*. It is significant that the mind (*manas*) is perceived as the centre not only of intention but also of cognition and emotion. Moreover, there is no indication of a dichotomy between cognitive awareness and conative dynamism in the processes of the mind. However, from the *Nyaya-Vaisesika* point of view, the analysis of volition constitutes one of the major psychological bases of theistic Indian Philosophy. To analyze this concept, first, the *Nyaya-Vaisesikas* are going to find out the cause of volition. The mere existence of a desire is the cause of volition. Udayana defines volition
as effort or conscious activity of the self. It springs from desire, which arises from
cognition. The knowledge of a particular object gives rise to a desire, which produces
volition. The knowledge of a desire is not necessary for the production of volition. It
produces volition by its mere existence. Volition or the knowledge of volition is not the
cause of another volition. But the mere existence of a desire is the cause of a volition.

In this context, the analysis of desire in its positive and negative aspect (iccha and dvesa)
in accordance with Visvanatha’s Siddhantamukta avali has been considered. The entire
world desires to have happiness (sukha) and the absence of pain or unhappiness
(dukhabhava). Happiness is yielded by moral merit (dharma) and pain by moral demerit
(adharma). The desire for happiness arises from the knowledge of its object, happiness
and the desire for the absence of pain from the knowledge of its own object which is
nothing but painlessness. There are two kinds of desire (iccha): (1) desire to realize an
end (phaleccha): (2) desire to attain the means of it (upayeccha). The end is pleasure and
the absence of pain. Now, the pleasure or happiness and the absence of pain are the
psychological ends of action (purusartha), which are consciously sought by the self by its
effort or volition. It is clear now that for anyone to make an object a purusartha of his is
to have a desire for it as an act of his free choice and is therefore a voluntary act of his.
On the other hand, the desire for an object as a means (upayeccha), in contrast with that
for the result (phaleccha), says Visvanatha, arises not simply from knowing what its
nature is. Rather, in addition to this sort of knowledge, it is also necessary, for this desire
to arise, to have the knowledge that this object has the capability to lead the knower to the
attainment of the result, the object, aimed at by him, i.e. his purusartha.
Further, this desire for action has as one of its originating conditions, as assumed by the Naiyayikas, the connections of the soul with the mind. This shows that the existence of self and mind are two basic presuppositions to account for volition from the Nyaya-Vaisesika perspective. The desire to perform an action is an extra-ordinary type of desire as it is a desire to perform an act which is cognized or believed to be such as capable of being accomplished by the will. The awareness or belief that a certain act can be performed implies some sort of faith in one’s capability. To desire to perform an act, the act must not be such, which is not in the competency of the agent to accomplish. As an agent, one cannot desire to perform an act for which one’s competency is lacking. The consciousness of the act’s being accomplished by someone is a necessary condition for the desire to act. In other words, the desire to attain the end (cikirsā) is accompanied or caused by the individual’s knowledge or conviction that it is feasible or possible for him to attain what he aims at (kritisadhyatajnana) by the use of the means which he considers a right means to attain it. That is, his desire to act, to actually proceed to undertake the task, as required, for attaining the end in question, is caused jointly by his knowledge that the means chosen by him is capable of yielding the intended result and the knowledge that by his effort he can attain the result. On the other hand, his awareness that doing a particular thing will produce something repugnant, something which is worth not having, or is worthy of being abjured (balavaddvistasadhanatajnana), is an obstructing agent, an obstacle (pratibandhaka) to his having the desire to do it, or rather a cause of his having an aversion (dvesa) to wards doing it.
The Naiyayikas added another special condition of cikirsa and that is a sort of knowledge, which they call, istasadhanatajnana, the knowledge (jnana) of the instrumentality of the object chosen as a means (sadhana) to produce the result aimed at (ista). It is this knowledge which is the cause of, or reason for, considering the object in question a right means and the cause of or reason for using it to attain the end. Just as there are two sorts of desires, a desire for the result, i.e. happiness (sukheccha), and a desire for the means to its attainment (sukhopayeccha), there are also two sorts of aversion (dvesa) according to the Naiyayikas. It is the special merit of this school that they analyse will not only in its positive aspects as cikirsa or desire, but also in its negative aspect as aversion or dvesa. However, the two sorts of aversion are; an aversion towards the result i.e., pains (dukhavisayaka) and an aversion towards that which leads, or is a means, to pain (dukhopayavisayaka). Thus, the process of actually undertaking the task, volition (pravrtti) has the following four components:

1) The desire to undertake the task of attaining the end (cikirsa);
2) The knowledge that this task can be performed (krtisadhyatajnana),
3) The knowledge that the means chosen is capable of yielding the result aimed at (istasadhanatajnana) and
4) The perception of the materials, relevant to, or required for, undertaking the task (samavayi karana) of attaining the end in question.
It is pointed out that since all of the four are the conditions of volition, so if any one of them is absent, volition will not follow. However, it is worth noting to mention those places where the volition will not present.

(1) Where krtisadhyatajnana or the confidence in one’s power is lacking, there is no volition. This is why we cannot produce rain by our own will (vrsti karana) or bring down the moon to serve the purpose of a lamp (candramandatanayana). There is no volition for such things for they are recognized to be beyond the agent’s power. While however the consciousness of power is thus a necessary condition of willing, this consciousness must exist at the time of the willing as otherwise there will be no volition. Thus, the krtisadhyatajnana, having the adjective, tadanim, i.e. tadanimkrtisadhyatajnana, must exist at the occasion of the willing. That is why the sexually immature boy does not care for the future pleasures of youth: (bhaviyauvarajye balasya na pravrtti.)³ This implies the fact that our powers and capacities unfold themselves in a certain order, which appear not all at once but each in its proper time and circumstances, and as our freedom is itself dependent on the exercise of these powers and capacities it is also a thing that grows with ourselves and explains and deepens with the broadening and deepening of our lives.

(2) Similarly, where istasadhanatajnana is lacking, there is no volition. Further, this consciousness of good must be tadanim-istasadhanata, i.e., it must be relative to the time and circumstances. Thus, what is good in one condition of life may not be good in another condition and thus may cause to be desired in the altered conditions. This is why the meal which is greedily desired by the hungry man only disgusts him after
appeasement: (tripto bhojane na parvartate) The reason is that the condition of the desire, i.e., hunger, having ceased in the changed circumstances, the meal (bhojana) is no longer felt as a good. Thus, it follows from the above fact that good and evil as depending on subjective conditions like raga and dvesa, in the individual, must always be relative and conditional. But this contradicts the Nyaya doctrine of an absolute and unconditioned good as being the highest end. The Naiyayika solves the difficulty by conceiving the highest good not as positive happiness but as the absolute cessation of suffering.

Further, if there is thus consciousness of good in all cases, the question arises, how is moral evil possible? The essence of moral evil lies in the conscious choice of the evil course in preference to the good. The Nyaya School answers that under the influence of strong passion, there is a temporary suspension of the consciousness of the penalty. Thus the seductions of the pleasure sometimes succeed in driving out the consciousness of punishment in hell and volition takes place as a consequence in spite of the presence of the counteracting motives as a rule. (utkarataragadina narakasadhanata tirodhanat)

In this context, the Naiyayikas provide arguments to account for the motive of an abnormal action, like suicide. They say that on account of abnormal mental conditions, there is lapse of judgment for the time being and the individual resolves on taking poison under the erroneous consciousness that suicide is not a great evil: (rogadusitacittah visadibhaksane pravaratate tadanimbalavadanista nanubandhivajnanat). According to another view, the abnormal conditions induce the act of suicide not through any positive consciousness of the act being not an evil but only through the absence of the consciousness of its being an evil, i.e., by suppressing the consciousness of evil which
would be present in normal conditions – *(rogadusitacittah visadibhaksane pravartate
dadanimalava danistanubandhitvajnanat)*. The difference between the two interpretations are: while some recognize a mere negative operation in the nature of a temporary suspension of the counteracting considerations as being sufficient, others think that there is a positive judgment that such considerations are unavailing. It will be seen that in the actual conditions of life the negative as well as the positive forms operate. Thus, in the case of ordinary suicides, there being in these cases nothing but a temporary suppression of the deterring motives. But in the case of martyrs, the act of suicide is from deliberation or morbid self-consciousness and this is the positive form that holds well. The third condition as mentioned by the *Naiyayikas* in accounting for volition is a very complicated and difficult notion. The *Naiyayikas* themselves are divided into two camps in interpreting this complex condition. According to one interpretation as offered by some leading *Naiyayikas* including *Dinakara*, it is the consciousness of the absence of evil or undesirable consequences. No negative condition will be required as a motivating factor for performing any kind of moral action and therefore *Dinakara* has accepted the meaning; the knowledge of the absence of stronger evil. On the other hand, according to others including *Visvanath*, the author of *Siddhantamuktavali*, this condition is a negative one as it implies the absence of consciousness about an act being productive of evil consequences. In defense of negative interpretation, *Visvanath* brings in certain empirical considerations in favor of it. He cites instances of actual experiences when an actor has volition in spite of his not having this sort of positive consciousness of the absence of evil. However, *Visvanath* has nothing that tends to deny that in other cases there may be positive consciousness of the absence of evil immediately preceding volition as a
condition. The Naiyayikas, who do not favor negative interpretations, maintain that the admission of the absence of consciousness of evil as a condition is to make it psychological rather unintelligible condition of willing.

In this way, according to Visvanath’s interpretation Balavadanistananubandhitvajnana is something considered to be a negative condition and means anistajanakatvajnanabhava, i.e., the absence of the knowledge of its being anistajanaka or producer of evil. In his Siddhanta muktavali, Visvanath has rejected Dinakara's interpretation. His objection to this view is that if desire (cikirsa) follows immediately without any interval (vilamba), where there is consciousness of good (istasadhanatajnana) together with the absence of the deterring consciousness of evil (balavadanistajanakatva jnanabhava), then an intervening consciousness of the absence (anista-ajanakatva jnana) is not necessary.

The Naiyayikas did not stop their discussion only about that which actually deters or counteracts a volitional process. A thorough discussion is required of the nature of the deterrent that counteracts the occurrence of an effect in spite of all causal conditions being there. Two alternative explanations are possible in this case: according to one view, the consciousness of evil consequences that acts counter-productively, is the subjective feeling of aversion of the agent; in another view, it may be said that there is some object which is of evil nature that inspires the subjective feeling of aversion of these two possible interpretations, the Naiyayikas favour the first one, according to which it is the subjective feeling of aversion that acts as the deterrent. In that case, for the Naiyayikas it is the subjective state of the agent that is important. The feeling that deters volition is relative to the person, time and circumstances; hence it can never be held to be absolute.
This can explain adequately the difference in our attitude regarding various acts. In this way, it is found that the Nyaya account of volition presupposes as its condition of certain complex entities comprising cognitive, conative and affective aspects.

A more detailed analysis of the nature of the deterrent is available in the writings of the later Naiyayikas. At least five alternative accounts about the nature of the deterrent are possible. Two very simple accounts are as follows; Firstly, it may be taken plainly that the cognition of the absence of any evil consequence is sufficient and along with the cognition of the action as producing good consequences plus resulting desire etc. is the cause of volition. In this account more emphasis is laid on the intellectual side of the mind and the positive account of the nature of volition. Secondly, there is the possibility that, that which deters volition is cognition. An agent may have some positive awareness of an act as leading to harmful consequences. Hence, this consciousness of an act as producing evil consequences deters the agent from the performance of that act. In this case, the absence of consciousness of an act as producing evil consequences may motivate an agent to perform that act.

These two very straight forwardly accounts to the nature of human volition and these may be replaced or supplemented by an account that projects the deterrent as a compound made up of two components, i.e., one of feeling of aversion and the other is the cognition of evil consequences. In this view, neither mere cognition of evil consequences nor mere feeling of aversion may be considered to be effective in deterring volition. If there is only a feeling of aversion but no cognition of evil consequences with regard to the performance of an act, then also volition may occur. This third view considers the
deterrent to be a compound condition consisting of both cognition of a consequence as evil and also the feeling of aversion towards such an act. This sort of deterrent is very effective in arresting volition. This may be considered as the necessary condition for the non-occurrence of volition. In the earlier mentioned two cases the occurrence of the volition and for that matter its non-occurrence is a possibility for it may occur or may not occur.

There is also another fourth alternative account of the nature of the deterrent. Like the preceding one, this alternative may also consider both the feeling of aversion and the cognition of evil consequences as the deterrent. Unlike the third alternative, here it has not been assumed that it is a compound of these two that deters. This view gives priority to the cognition of evil consequences with regard to an act in its origin. This primary epistemic state of mind in its turn gives rise to the feeling of aversion towards the act which is cognized to produce evil consequences. In this account a causal relationship is assumed to exist between these two different aspects of mind which together leads to volition. The cognition of evil consequences alone without being followed by the feeling of aversion is ineffective in counteracting volition. Again, the mere felling of aversion unless preceded by the cognition of evil consequences remains ineffective. In the opinion of Dinakara, one of the ablest exponents of the Nyaya position, the cognition of evil consequences is the primary factor in causally determining volition. But that does not mean that the deterrent is the mere cognition of evil consequences. In some cases the cognition itself is sufficient, again in some others cases the mere cognition of evil is not sufficient. This may vary according to circumstances. But as primacy is accorded to the cognition of evil consequences the negative condition of volition is
always the cognition of the absence of evil consequences and not only the absence of the feeling of aversion. This view thus denies the interpretation of the third condition as provided by Visvanath. This view categorically asserts that the cognition of the absence of evil consequences has to be present to cause volition for merely the absence of a feeling of aversion is not sufficient. From the analysis of all of these five alternatives, it may be stated that the Naiyayikas appeal to the perspective of a person who is supposed to express what passes in his mind when he has volition towards an act.

It is worth noting that the Naiyayikas here do not like to postulate two psychoses, one conditioning the other but only one psychic compound with two aspects, one of consciousness of good and the other, cognition of duty with reference to it. The Naiyayikas do not refer to any niyamaka or the conditioning relation between the two psychoses. From the above discussion it also emerges that nothing is good or beneficial, except in relation to a subject. In this analysis, proper significance is attached to the subject of volition that determines his own values. This account in no way gives any support to mechanical determination. It may be said that here the Naiyayikas give an account of volition from the agent’s perspective.

**Analysis of Volition – A Comparative Study**

An analysis of the Prabhakara Mimamsakas account of volition is also considered in this context. It is found that they agree with the Naiyayikas in this respect by giving an account of motivation in this direction. In their writings an elaborate account of the human volition has been given. But there is one major point of difference between the Naiyayikas and the Prabhakara Mimamsakas in the way of developing their theory. The
Prabhakaras, unlike the Naiyayikas, do not consider the knowledge of the act that is conducive to good as one of the essential conditions of volition. Rejecting the idea that the real cause for volition is anything external, the Prabhakaras rather project self itself as identified with or specified by some act to be done as causing volition. Thus, according to them, the agent, before he is actually motivated to act, must have knowledge of himself as one who is qualified by the capability to perform that particular act. It is found that there are four conditions of volitions according to Prabhakara Mimamsakas. These conditions are as follows:

In the first place, there is ‘svavisesanavatta pratisandhana’, i.e. the representation of a certain act as visesana or specific determination of the acting agent or pravartamana purusa.

Secondly, there is karyatijnana or the cognition of something to be performed.

Thirdly, there is cikirsa or desire that is itself characterized by the consciousness of power.

Lastly, there is pravrtti or volition.  

Here, it is found that although the Nyaya thinkers have provided a strong emphasis on the knowledge of the conduciveness of good, the Prabhakaras do not admit this condition as one of the necessary factors of volition. Rather they have given emphasis on the knowledge of the self who is also qualified or specified by the capability to perform the particular act. Criticizing the Nyaya approach, the Prabhakaras claim that their theory of inducement to action is superior to the Nyaya model. They have also agreed that with the
non-consequentialist outlook, their theory can account for all instances of motive for action whether it has some end or consequence or not.

Now, let us consider whether these four conditions are different from each other or they are interrelated. In this connection, two major points of difference must be noted to settle this issue. It will be seen that only the two conditions given by the Prabhakara Mimamsakas are similar with the Nyaya view and these are cikirsa or desire and the pravrtti or krti or motive. But on the contrary, the first condition given by the Prabhakaras, however shows an essential departure from the Nyaya view. The notion of a specified self has been emphasized by the Prabhakaras which in the Naiyayikas discussion is not found.

On the contrary, it is found that the consciousness of good is not a necessary condition of volition according to the Prabhakaras. The Prabhakaras do not bother about this condition for this condition is present only in some actions that are called as kamyakarma or empirical action. These actions are preformed from the material motives of personal profit or gain. It is not present however in the performance of the unconditional duties, i.e., the nitya nainmittka karmas. Thus it is shown from the above fact that the volition may happen without any reference of the knowledge of the consciousness of good. In fact, from the Prabhakaras perspective, the so-called knowledge of the consciousness of good in empirical actions is not itself the real determining factor in the process of willing, it may also determine will as being a mode of the representation of the act as svavisesana, i.e., as specifying the self. But this is not the only point in respect of which the Prabhakaras differ from the Naiyayikas. They also differ materially from the latter in
their conception of the relation between the first step and the second step in the process. Thus, according to the *Prabhakaras*, the relation between the first step and the second step is causal, i.e., the representation of the act as a *visesana* or specific determinant of the self is the cause which generates the *karyatajnana*, i.e., the consciousness that is to be done. The *Naiyayikas*, on the contrary, do not recognize any causal relationship between the consciousness of good and the cognition that it is to be done. According to them, the relation is only a bare relation of the sameness of object, the *visaya*, i.e. the object of the consciousness of good, being also the *visaya*, the object of the consciousness of duty with reference to it. For them, the two types of cognitions, i.e., the cognition of good and the cognition of duty are held together in one and only one psychic compound.

On the contrary, the *Prabhakaras* have maintained that in all cases of volition, they have two distinct psychoses, one leading to the other, and thus also have a kind of determining relation between the two. As presented by Visvanatha, to put it very briefly, the *Prakhakara Mimamsaka* do not consider necessary for doing an action the knowledge of the capability of the means chosen to produce the result aimed at (*istasadhanata jnana*). According to him, for actually undertaking the task (*pravrtti*) of attaining it, the desire to undertake the task (*cikirsa*) is required. For it to arise only the knowledge that the task can be performed (*karyata jnana* or *krtisadhyatajnana*) is sufficient. There is no need to proceed further to ascertain that the means chosen can produce the result for which the action is to be done. Thus, for the *Prabhakaras*, *karyata jnana* is the main thing. It alone produces *cikirsa* and *cikirsa* leads to *pravrtti*. So, the root concept in the analysis of volition is that of the knowledge of the doability of the task of attaining it. This knowledge produces the desire to undertake the task and this desire moves the individual
to actually undertake the task. Here, one may agree that if krtisadhyatajnana is the cause of pravrtti or volition, then in the case of caittavandana, all persons do not desire to do this, so only this cause could not be the cause of volition. To reply to this type of objection, the Prabhakaras may say that if krtisadhyatajnana is qualified by the cognition of the act as a specific determinant of the self, then it will become the cause of pravrtti.

In this situation, Dinakara, in his tika has explained this position and it may also help to make the Nyaya position clear. Let us analyze this situation with the help of an example. Suppose, the act of cooking one's meal (pakah), that is an empirical action (kamyakarma) implied the desire (kamana) for some good to be attained. For the Prabhakaras, such an act involves inference like this. The act of cooking is to be accomplished by one's will or krti, i.e., pakah mat krtisadhyah. Dinakara, in the favor of Naiyayikas has explained the fact that when someone is aware that the act of cooking is done by himself, then he has also the knowledge that this act is conducive to his own good. However, it is this subjective appropriation of the act which presents itself as conducive to the agent's good. Thus, it might be said that any krtisadhyatajnana is not the cause of pravrtti, only this particular inferential cognition of krtisadhyatajnana is responsible for volition. In the cause of caittavandana, that kind of inferential knowledge is not available and as there is no cikirsa, so there is no pravrtti. According to the Prabhakaras, there is another ground for not admitting the cognition of the consciousness of good. The Prabhakaras have provided the objection that this cognition is present only in the case of kamya karma.
However, in the case of nityanaimittika karma, there is no such cognition. They have maintained that in the case of kamya karma, the kamana or desire of an individual is the svavisesana and mere istasadhanatva is the counter-active cause (vyabhicari hetu). In this way, the Prabhakaras have shown in their theory that istasadhanatajnana is not the cause of volition although it may be required to infer karyata, when we have this inferential cognition of this kind (pakah mat krtisadhya) and this cognition leads to the cause of cikirsa, i.e., the desire to do the action and through this cikirsa, the volition or pravrtti takes place. So, in the case of Prabhakaras, the awareness of 'mat krtim Vina asattve sati', is related with the cognition of istasadhanatva and the volition takes place. In this case, the act is self appropriated not merely as being conducive to the agent's good but also as one which is incapable of being realized except through the agent's will. This later qualification is added to exclude performance beyond the agent's power such as vrsti or production of a rainfall and results compassed by the volition of other persons such as parakrtapaka or cooking done by others. In both of these cases, there is no subjective self appropriation though there is present the cognition of the consciousness of good. It is also to be pointed that the qualification of madistasadhanatva or the conduciveness to one’s own good is negatively significant as excluding srama, i.e. the fatigue of the muscles, etc, that is involved in the act of cooking. These are not subjectively appropriated as objects of volition. The reason is that they lack the quality of being conducive to the agent’s good – a quality which distinguishes the act of cooking and thereby makes it to be subjectively appropriated.

Further in this case of a nitya or unconditional duty such as the daily prayer (sandhya), it must be examined whether there is any cognition that is related to the
consciousness of good. In this case, the inferential cognition may be like this: ‘dvijatite sati vihita sandhya kalina saucadimattvat, i.e., the ‘sauca’ is the svavisesana or the qualification of the self who performs sandhya vandana. It is observed that the command in this particular instance is related to a particular time. Hence, the resulting cognition of duty or krtisadhyatajnana is also related to this particular time. Against this view, the Naiyayikas may argue that the time can not be a qualifier of the purusa or individual. The Prabhakaras may answer that the mental continuum of the individual is in time and the individual is related to time through his mental continuum. Thus, although the time that is considered to be the objective condition, may not be a qualification of the individual, it certainly determines the individual in so far as the later endures in time. Actually, while the Prabhakaras discuss about the self qualification, they intended to mean either the cognition of the act as a qualification of the self or the cognition of it as being connected with such a qualification. In both of the cases, the Prabhakaras have the intention to project the self as identified with or specified by some act to be done as causing volition.

However, it is found that the essential difference between the two schools regarding the analysis of volition arises from the Prabhakara insistence on the element of self reference in all motives which the Naiyayika does not consider to be necessary. The Prabhakaras contend that what is anugata, present in all cases of volition, is karyatajnana, the consciousness of a thing to be done and it is the consciousness which is produced by the representation of the act as specifying the self. Hence, the consciousness is present in all cases, while istasadhanatajnana may or may not present. The former is the true cause of volition and it has the merit of simplicity (laghava). This concept may
also have the capability of being expanded or elucidated in such a manner that it is shown to include within its range while all the others factors which the Nyaya analysis has mentioned are separate items. But the Nyaya account, because of its clear distinction between the various components of the process of doing a voluntary action and thereby of the process of attaining a purusartha, is more articulate. Therefore. It is more likely to stop the occurrence of confusion in understanding and assessing the logic of the concept of voluntary action and consequently in that of the concept of attaining a purusartha, or rather in that of the concept of purusartha as such. Even if it does not completely stop the occurrence, it will certainly very greatly minimize it. This itself is a great philosophical advantage which the Nyaya analysis has over the Mimamsa’s.

However, it is observed that the position of the Naiyayikas is simpler than that of the Prabhakaras. Following the Prabhakaras perspective, it may be said that the kritisadhyatajnana always requires an inferential cognition and this position is guru, i.e. complex. On the contrary, from the Nyaya point of view, only the istasadhanatajnana is admitted for the cause of volition and this position is laghu. Indeed there is a long history of debate between the Naiyayikas and the Prabhakaras on this issue which is being left out of this discussion. The Naiyayikas and the Prabhakaras, however, in spite of their differences in details, agree in spirit in projecting a psychological account of human volition. This account of volition in terms of the psychology of the human mind has some significant metaphysical presuppositions. In Gautama's Nyayasutra, it has been categorically asserted that desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition are the marks of the finite self. In this case, desire which is one of the factors conditioning volition is accepted as the characteristic feature of the self and nothing else can have it.
Further, the *Naiyayikas* argue that desire etc. also prove the existence of an immaterial substance. This view goes against the views of the materialist *Carvakas*. Again, this view of desire is also go against the views of the Buddhists who believe in the doctrine of universal flux. Buddhists metaphysical doctrine of the self also depends upon its ethical presupposition. They have also maintained that will or volition is the distinctive endowment of humans by virtue of which they are moral beings. The *Naiyayikas* urge that the Buddhists doctrine of universal flux leaves no room for voluntary activity. The main argument here is that since all voluntary activities are inspired by some conscious end which the agent seeks to attain, the admission of the doctrine of universal flux fails to account for any active endeavor of a conscious being the result of which will not accrue to himself but to another person. For that reason, the *Naiyayikas* have proposed to establish the existence of a permanent self as a distinct category. Further, it may be said that the *Naiyayikas* account of volition may also establish consciousness as something unique.

Thus, it is observed from the *Naiyayikas* literature that any kind of moral action must be directed by one's volition and the motivation of performing any moral action has definitely some causes, for without the admission of any causes, no individual is to be motivated for any action. In this chapter, some of the causes of human motivation is being discussed. But it may be the case that there are some other causes of human motivation, though these are not discussed in this chapter. Actually, the discussion is mainly concerned with the Indian philosophical perspective, especially from the point of view of the *Nyaya –Vaisesikas*. In this context, the fact is such that the human desire
is involved in the total experience of subject-object, i.e., there is desire and there is the object of desire. Desire needs to be satisfied and the satisfaction of desires is a psychological necessity. The existence through the satisfaction of desires is a value. Now, one may raise the question; do we desire things because they have a value or Things have value because we desire them. In this connection, the nature of the good (ista) has been discussed according to the Nyaya School. According to them, there are two kinds of objects of desire or ista and these are: 1) those that are relative and empirical implying attraction (raga) and aversion (dvesa) in the agent, 2) that which is absolute and non-empirical and the desire for which is pure. In the present section, mainly the first sort of object of desire has been considered.
Notes and references


4. ibid, p-42

5. ibid, p-41

6. ibid, p-41

7. ibid, p-28

8. *pakah mat krti sadhyamat istasadhanatvat*, ibid, p-69

9. The clarification of different karmas has been presented by the *Mimamsakas* which basically is a classification of actions considered doable by the scriptures and held to possess differing degrees of stringency. This is a four-fold classification into *nitya, naimittika, kamya* and *pratisiddha*. According to the
Mimamsakas, a nitya action can be taken to denote the normal duty of an individual which he himself acknowledges to be his normal, usual duty, for example, the duty of a teacher to teach the subject assigned to him with his consent. A namittika action may be taken to denote a seasonal, circumstantial one and these are performed when some special things happened, like the birth of child in the doer’s family. Generally, these actions are ritualistic. The third kind of actions is called kamyag. These are performed when an individual wants to achieve some objective, for example, to have a son etc. Under the fourth, the pratisiddha, class we have actions the doing of which is prohibited by a scripture, like a brahmana’s associating himself with a sudra at the time of caste system.

10. evam cestasadhanatva balavadanistananubandhitva suci tatkalajivitvajnanajanyanam karyatajnatanam karyajnanatvena anugatanam parvrttau hetutvamiti lagham, Bhatacintamani, the Translation has been presented in The Ethics of the Hindus, Prof. S.K Maitra, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1963, p-34