IX

Conclusion

The *Nyaya* school of thought, though mainly characterized as *pramanasastra*, shows its interest in ethical discussions as well. But, in no *Nyaya-Vaisesika* text, any separate treatment of morality as an independent subject is available. This does not suggest that the *Nyaya-Vaisesika* philosophers are indifferent towards moral questions. The ethics of the *Nyaya* is grounded on their metaphysics and it was very appropriately observed by Radhakrishnan when he says, ‘Any ethical theory must be grounded in metaphysics, in a philosophical conception of the relation between human conduct and ultimate reality. As we think ultimate reality to be, so we behave, vision and actions go together’.¹ Moreover, it must be noticed that in no Indian philosophical texts, any clear-cut demarcation is maintained in their discussions about various domains of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology or ethics. Since there is no text dealing exclusively with morality in the Indian Vedic tradition, it can not be asserted that there was no ethics at all in this tradition.

In the previous chapters, we have already tried to bring out some of the main observations of the *Nyaya* ethics. The discussion about the contents of *Nyaya* morality may, however, lead to some metaethical questions. In the western ethical tradition, we come across various questions about the nature of any ethical contents. In this concluding chapter; the discussions have been made as to the fact whether the *Nyaya* approach
towards morality is a sort of consequentialist approach. Further, if the approach of this school is not at all teleological in nature, then another question may arise as to whether it has some unique model of its own or not. In the first section of this chapter, the salient features of the western theory of consequentialism are presented and in this connection, whether the Naiyayikas moral theory is a kind of consequentialist approach or not need to be examined. In the second section, moral Realism and the Theological Voluntarism are to be explored from the Western ethical perspective. In the light of these metaethical theoretical questions an overall evaluation of Nyaya thesis are to be examined in the third section.

**The theory of Consequentialism & the question of its applicability in the Nyaya framework**

To confess at the beginning, Consequentialism as a class of general theories in western ethics has different varieties and it is quite difficult to discuss all these under the umbrella of Consequentialism. There is an enormous variety of consequentialist theories, and debates about their plausibility and formulations are astonishingly complex. Any plain and simple characterization of Consequentialism is incomplete without reference to classical hedonistic act utilitarianism which claims that an agent ought to perform that act among available alternatives that is pleasure-producing. Thus, according to classical hedonistic utilitarianism good is conceived in terms of pleasure and identifies an agent’s duty with his enhancing most net pleasure. In this theory, good is taken to be primary and right action is defined in terms of promoting good. The right action has been identified with that action which promotes value. The Consequentialist theory asserts the fact that
the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the goodness of its results. This ethical theory provides individuals with a moral standard in which the end justifies the means. Consequentialism is the view that whatever values an individual or institutional agent adopts, the proper response to those values is to promote them. The agent should honour the values only so far as honouring them is part of promoting them, or is necessary in order to promote them. The Consequentialist holds that the proper way for an agent to respond to any values recognized is, to promote them; that is, in every choice to select the option with prognoses that mean it is the best gamble with those values.

As a moral standard, the theory of Consequentialism, as developed traditionally, can be divided into two varieties: In the first, the desired end is the long term self-interest of the individual. In the second, the desired end is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The first variety is called the theory of ethical egoism and Thomas Hobbes and Ayan Rand are supporters of this view. The second is called Utilitarianism, and it is advocated by Bentham and Mill. Ethical egoism claims that before making a moral decision, one should consider the end of long-term self-interest, and if by using a reasonably moral means the long-term self-interest can be achieved, then that action should be performed. This means that short-term self-interest should be sacrificed for the sake of long-term self interest. Utilitarianism, however, considers the desired end to be the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people; an action that achieves this end by using a reasonably moral means should be performed.

There are, thus, we recapitulate many forms of Consequentialism. The common features of all those forms are that they disagree about the theory of intrinsic good. Among the
Consequentialists, some are hedonists, some accept a desire theory, and some are perfectionists. A hedonist who accepted a simple act-consequentialism would be committed to saying, for example, that a person is morally required to visit a friend in hospital just in case this is the option that would produce the most pleasure overall. Indeed, he would be committed to saying that a person is morally permitted to visit a friend in hospital only if there is no alternative that would produce more pleasure. But a perfectionist might hold that friendship is intrinsically good and, moreover, that the direct expression of friendship, itself has great intrinsic value. Because of this, he might hold that there is always moral good to be gained by expressing friendship through such acts as visiting a friend in hospital. Hence, unless a person with a friend in hospital could do more good in some other way, he is permitted and indeed required to visit his friend.

The Consequentialists disagree about other matters as well. Most important, they disagree about the way of the formulation of the criterion of the right action- about the precise relation between goodness and rightness. A modest amendment of act- consequentialism would take into account the fact that the consequences of an action can be uncertain or unfixed. It would say that the rightness of an action depends on the expected value of its consequences rather than the actual value of its consequences- the expected value of an action is a measure constructed by taking the value of its consequences in different possible scenarios, weighing these values by the probability of the scenarios, and it also aggregates the weighted values into a measure of the overall value of the action.

It is to be noted that with the Naiyayikas also nothing is istsa, desirable or good except in relation to the subject. It is the subject of volition that determines his own values, and
therefore there is no question of mere mechanical determination as may appear at first
view. The Carvakas believe only in mechanical attraction or repulsion of pleasure and
pain. The Carvakas propose a sort of mechanical hedonism.

The next task is to examine the views of the Nyaya – Vaisesika School, whether they
belong to the consequentialist group or not. The concept of ista or good that has been
introduced in the Nyaya literature, points to a kind consequentialist trend. The discussion
about ista has been incorporated in the second chapter of the present dissertation. It is to
be noted that the Nyaya – Vaisesika ethics is also a kind of teleological or goal – oriented
ethics as it clearly talks about the highest value, i.e. moksa. The Nyaya – Vaisesika’s
ethical viewpoint is comparable with the agent – relative form of consequentialism,
according to which the right action is the action that would have the best consequences
for the agent. David O. Brink opted the theory that is very closer to that type of
consequentialism. In other words, the agent- relative consequentialism can hold that
consequences of an action that determine its moral status are consequences for the good
of those who are psychologically connected with the agent. Thus, the Nyaya ethics
contends that the moral end operates psychologically through the agent’s desire. Prof.
S.K. Maitra says, ‘The psychological Ethics of the Hindus is therefore essentially a
scheme of practical ethics which has in view the realization of the transcendental ideal of
the spirit. It is, however, a scheme which is not metaphysically deduced or merely
assumed as a first principle, but is also expounded on a positive basis of psychological
observation and analysis of the conditions of volition and the springs of action.’ 4
In the first chapter, ‘The Notion of a Motivated Agent’, it is observed that the agent is none but the embodied self who has the volition to perform the different types of action and in this connection, the springs of action and classification of different actions has also been mentioned. Further, in the second chapter, the psychological basis for human motivation has also been discussed. The distinction between volition proper and the organic activities and the analysis of the motive with special reference to the consciousness of good or the absence thereof are in line with the modern treatment of these questions. The distinction between the cognition of an act as distinguished from the passive cognition of a fact, between prudential (Kamya) actions and moral actions proper in their psychological aspects, and between the positive and the negative forms of volition, are all specifically fit with the Naiyayikas ethical thought. The analysis of the deterrent and of the suspension of the deterrent with reference to the psychology of temptation and suicide, and particularly of the operation of the deterrent in the negative as well as the positive forms of willing, is also another feature of the Nyaya-Vaisesika’s treatment. The Nyaya Conception of a specific order in pains and pleasures as an operative factor in choice may also do credit even to a modern psychologist. Of modern significance is also the relativistic conception of willing as dependent on the agent’s condition and capacity relatively to the time and the circumstance of the willing. According to the Naiyayikas, there is a difference in kind between empirical attractions prompted by attraction (raga) and aversion (dvesa) and the non-empirical impulse towards the highest good which is moksa. In empirical actions the object of volition is either sukhaprapati, attainment of happiness, or duhkhaparihara, the avoidance of suffering. The absolute freedom from suffering which it aims at is not anything positive
as to be *anukula* or positively favorable to the self. S. K. Maitra writes that “Even the Naiyayika recognizes disinterested morality from his utilitarian, consequential standpoint by admitting a non-pathological motive which is neither attraction nor aversion. It works for the highest end through the unconditional duties – the end, i.e. of absolute freedom from suffering. This end, being negative, does not imply pathological feelings such as attraction or aversion. There is thus a non-utilitarian motive for the end of freedom from suffering which operates through the unconditional duties. Hence, there is disinterested morality even for the Naiyayikas who aspects ethical as well as psychological Consequentialism”.

According to *Nyaya*, bondage is a condition of the *atman* or self, the condition of its being subject to experiences including feelings of attraction and aversion which lead to unhappiness. This condition of self originates through its contact with the mind, which is its organ of experience. The result of this *atmanosamyoga*, i.e. contact between self and mind not merely specific experiences in the self, but also certain tendencies or dispositions (*samskaras*) in the self as a consequence of its experiences. The self’s true freedom consists not merely in the cessation of its experiences but also in the destruction of these latent tendencies which mature into future experiences through the self’s connection with the mind. What is required is something more than severances of connection between self and mind, for in death or in sleep such severance of connection between self and mind is possible, but it does not produce real freedom of the self. Because the latent dispositions that were consequences of experiences remain in the self in spite of the severance and because of such dispositions there is new connection with the mind after an interval of rest. Therefore, these *samskaras* or dispositions in the self
need to be annihilated by self knowledge and by self purification through the performance of unconditional duties or dharmas.

Further, in the chapter, ‘Dharma and its Different Interpretations’, it is worth noting that in the Nyaya thought the subjective and the objective morality coincides under one head and it is dharma. In this chapter, it is noticed that the Vaisesikas discussed about the nature of the common duties (sadharana dharmas) and the special duties (Visesa dharmas) and have drawn a comparison between these two duties. In the case of common duties, it may be understood that the coordination has been made between the virtue theoretical aspects and the de-ontological aspects. The common duties suggested meaning those duties that are common to all asramas or stage of life and all varnas and social classes and community such as reverence to the dharma, seeking the good of all creatures (Bhutahitatva) etc according to the Nyaya – Vaisesika philosophy. By maintaining these types of sadharana dharmas, an individual is trying to strengthen his moral character. In other words, it may be said that the maintenance of these general duties lead someone to perform those duties necessarily. However, there is a kind of intrinsic value in those duties and these duties are unconditional in the sense that they have been maintained without any condition. In the light of this type of discussion, it may be said that these duties supported the deontological aspect of ethics.

However, it is worth noting that there is no clear-cut division between the teleological and deontological aspects in the Indian ethical tradition. But it does not mean that these two aspects are overlapping. Actually from the Nyaya – Vaisesika’s perspective, the discussion of the samanya dharmas entails the fact that there is a kind of ista or end and
every individual are trying to achieve this goal or end in his life. On the contrary, the
Visesa dharmas or special duties are duties relative to the Varna or class to which one
belongs to the society and to the asrama or stage of life through which one is passing at a
particular time. The varnadharma of an individual is the set of obligation one is obligated
to fulfill on account of his belonging to or being a member of, the class or varna he is in
fact a member of. A detailed account of the varnasrama dharma of the Nyaya- Vaisesika
system has been explained in the chapter ‘Dharma and its different Interpretations’. Thus
it may be said that by means of doing the dharmas or duties led by the pravritti of an
individual, one becomes the virtuous man. By maintaining these common or universal
duties and the special duties of one’s Varna or social class and of one’s asrama or
specific state in spiritual growth, one realizes the special quality of the self that
constitutes dharma, virtue and righteousness. This is a unique synthesis of ethical
necessity with ethical freedom that based on a purely psychological interpretation of
moral motivation.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika system presents many alternative arguments which involve belief in
rebirth, belief in freedom and the possibility of liberation from future rebirth. Karma
d Doctrine is supposedly the one which differentiates this system from the other. In addition
to this, in the chapter, Karma Doctrine in Medical Literature reconciles the principle of
karmic casualty with empirical facts. From the Ayurvedic literature, it is found that the
therapeutic measures can be explained in the nature of purusakara and the daivas are
specially the past Karmas done in the previous life. Thus, both of these concepts are
necessary as well as important in the context of Ayurveda. The Ayurveda has claimed that
these two in unbalanced way cause diseases while in balanced way one will prevent from those diseases.

Thus, it is found from the above analysis that the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy, in general, includes within its scope the ascertainment of the nature of the final goal of life, i.e. liberation which consists in overcoming the worldliness of the self. The ethics which deals with moral principles governing ideal human character and ideal human action has a significant bearing upon it. The highest ethics, according to them, is therefore the ethics of knowledge and the purification of desire, i.e. the ethics of the negation of empirical life, but the lower ethics of the practical life is also recognized as a preparatory training to the higher discipline of the spirit. It may be said that the Nyaya analysis of liberation, is of the nature of consequentialism or a certain kind of consequentialist approach. It constitutes the link as it were between the empirical life of the individual and the non-empirical goal which the individual is trying to reach. And in that sense, it may be supposed as the goal-oriented ethics.

**A Comparative Account: Some Western Moral Theories and Nyaya Moral Theories**

Philosophical study of morality is quite different from the sociological or anthropological study, or the study from the perspective of biology or psychology. One important difference is that in moral philosophy, the rightness or wrongness of moral claims, convictions, and attitudes are among the things at issue. Normative ethics makes moral claims in its own right. It aims to provide answers to the general moral questions. Discussions about different kind of moral issues can be divided into two categories. First
kinds are general moral issues or the first-order moral issues. The discussion about the normative ethics can be expressed as the first-order ethical theories. These are only concerned with general moral issues. What kinds of actions are right or wrong? What kind of persons should one be? What are the moral virtues? What kinds of things make a person’s life go well? What does justice require? On the contrary, the second-order moral theories include issues or questions about morality and moral judgments. Are there moral truths? Do we simply have a variety of feeling and attitudes about moral issues, with there being nothing in virtue of which one side of a disagreement is correct and the other incorrect? Are there moral ‘properties’? Further, when a person makes a moral claim, is he expressing a belief or is he merely expressing a feeling or an attitude, such as approval or disapproval? Is it possible to have moral knowledge? Would it be rational to commit oneself to morality? It is worth noting that answering such questions does not require making a moral claim. It requires making a claim about moral claims or about morality. This explains why the issues in this category are called ‘second-order’ or ‘metaethical’.

The discussion about moral realism falls to the second category. The moral realists hold that there are moral facts, that it is in light of these facts that people’s moral judgments are true or false, and that the facts being what they are (and so the judgments are being true, when they are) is not merely a reflection of our thinking that the facts are one way or another. That is, moral facts are what they are even when we see them incorrectly or not at all.

In the article, ‘Moral Realism’ Geoffrey Sayre-McCord asserts moral realism as the position that (1) There are moral facts; (2) People’s moral judgments are made true or false by the moral facts; (3) the mere fact that we have the moral beliefs. Furthermore,
being a realist is compatible with holding a truly radical view of the moral facts. As much as realism tries to conserve the appearances when it comes to accounting for the nature of moral thought and its commitment to moral facts, there is nothing morally conservative about its implications. One might be a moral realist while holding that the vast majority of mankind has misunderstood the demands of justice or the nature of virtue. Indeed, according to moral realist, holding that justice or virtue have been misunderstood only makes sense if one thinks there is a fact of the matter about what justice and virtue are, a fact that others have failed to get right.

However, among realists there is serious disagreement even about what sort of thing a moral fact is. Thus, some realists hold that moral facts are just a kind of natural fact, while others hold they are non natural or even supernatural. Some realists hold that moral facts are discoverable by empirical inquiry, while others accept rational intuition or divine inspiration as essential to moral knowledge.

Theological Voluntarism may be understood as a metaethical theory according to which ethics depends, at least in part, on God’s will. Recent discussions of this conception have focused on the particular form it takes in divine command metaethics. According to divine command conception, ethics depends, at least in part, on God’s commands. This divine command theory is a species of theological voluntarism. If divine commands are expressions of some aspect of God’s will, divine command theory is a specific kind of theological voluntarism. Many people find it plausible that the requirements of morality are determined by God’s commands. This idea is a useful starting place because most people understand it immediately, and because it points the way to the divine command
theory, which is generally regarded as a kind of moral realism. In the chapter, “Theological Voluntarism”, Philip L. Quinn shows that the Christian theistic philosophers have opted a couple of arguments, and in his essay, the formulations has also been made to defend the Christian theism.

According to Quinn, action is morally obligatory just in case God has commanded that actions of that kind be performed, and he also holds, God’s commands to perform those actions make those actions obligatory. Moreover, according to the Christian theism, morality signifies the will power of someone and this will power is the will of God. It can be said that what is morally good, according to the Christian morality, is that which conforms to God’s will and what is morally bad, is that which does not conform to God’s will. The divine command theory, i.e. one of the major versions of the Theological Voluntarism, has expressed the fact that whatever is right, is conformable to the will of God. God’s will is very much attached to the command of God. God’s will motivate an individual to follow the path of righteousness and in that sense, one is eager to achieve righteousness to have a morally good life. The idea is, for example, that lying is morally wrong. (If it is wrong) due simply and exactly to the fact that God has commanded that we should not lie. On the contrary, “We speak the truths”, for God has directed us to speak the truth.

The divine command theory is a kind of moral realism for the moral facts are nothing but the directive of God. According to the Christian theology, the act of the individual that are directed by God, are obligatory to us and the acts that are not directed by God, are prohibitory. And, what is right and what is wrong has been maintained by the divine
command. Now, the views of this kind have been discussed by philosophers for centuries, and indeed the standard objection to them is derived from a discussion in Plato’s dialogue “Euthyphro”. The objection takes the form of a dilemma. Either actions are commanded by God because they are obligatory, or they are obligatory because they are commanded by God. It seems that both horns of the dilemma have consequences that are unacceptable to the divine command moralist. That divine command theorist must reject the dilemma’s first horn. If actions are commanded by God because they are obligatory, then such actions are obligatory, prior to and independent of being divinely commanded. But, divine command theorists can not accept the view that actions are obligatory independent of being divinely commanded, because it is inconsistent with their position that divine commands cannot also be obligatory independent of those commands. In addition, this view undercuts one of the arguments in the cumulative case for a divine command conception of morality, since actions that are obligatory independent of God’s commands are not actions over whose moral status God has sovereignty or voluntary control. The first objection is often described as the arbitrariness objection. If actions are obligatory because they are commanded by God, then it seems that obligation is completely arbitrary, because God could, just by commanding it, make any action whatsoever obligatory, and no matter how horrendous an action might be, it would be obligatory if God were to command it. William P. Alston offers this objection in the following way, ‘(a) anything that God should decide to command would thereby be obligatory. If God should command us to inflict pain on each other gratuitously, we would thereby be obliged to do so’ ⁶. The other objection to which the second horn of the dilemma gives rise is that it does not allow us to frame an adequate conception of God’s goodness.
Alston puts the objection in the following way: “For since the standards of moral goodness are set by divine commands, to say that God is morally good is just to say that He obeys his own commands. And even if it makes sense to think of God as obeying commands that he has given himself, that is not at all what we have in mind in thinking of God as morally good. We aren’t just thinking that God practices what he preaches, whatever that may be’. If moral goodness consists in obedience to divine commands, then to say that God is morally good is just to say that God always obeys self-addressed commands. But, since there is no moral value in always being obedient to self-addressed commands, the divine command theorist is unable to maintain that God is morally good.

To sum up, it may be asserted that the first alternative is incompatible with Divine command theory, since the theory holds that what makes an action obligatory is God’s commanding that it be performed. On this view, actions are not obligatory independently of God’s command, so God could not take an action’s being obligatory as a reason to command it. In that case, there exists some extraordinary power, that is injected from outside and it is not given by God. So, another distinguishing criterion has to be accepted except God to separate the two kinds of actions, i.e., the obligatory and the prohibitory acts. Indeed, the second alternative seems unacceptable. For it seems to allow the possibility of God’s command to observe the obligatory and the prohibitory acts. In that case, the question may arise, whether God’s command is arbitrary or not. It can not be ascertained whether God’s command entails to the morally right actions. If it is so, then an individual may become only the blind follower of God. The divine command theorist lacks the resources to frame an adequate conception of God’s ethical goodness or
deprives God of ethical goodness, where ethical goodness is the sort of goodness that falls within the axiological domain of ethics.

Quinn, in his essay, has placed this theory as the strongest form according to which it is only a theory of morality and is not also a theory of axiological domain. Alston also suggests that the divine command theorist should “fence in the area the moral status of which is constituted by divine commands so that the divine nature and activity fall outside that area”. 8 If this is done, the divine command theorist will be free to understand divine ethical goodness in some other way than obedience to self-addressed divine Commands and to hold that divine goodness thus understood provides a constraint on what god can command, rooted in the divine nature. This suggestion seems to show promise of yielding a strategy for response to the two objections that derive from the second horn of our updated Euthyphro dilemma. But, how are we then to understand God’s ethical goodness is a big question.

In this connection, Alston makes a radical proposal. He has developed the proposal in the following way:-

“God plays the role in evaluation that is more usually assigned, by objectivists about value, to Platonic Ideas or principles. Lovingness is good (a good making feature, that on which goodness supervenes) not because of the platonic existence of a general principle, but because God, the supreme standard of goodness is loving. Goodness supervenes on every feature of God, not because some general principles are but just because they are features of God”.9. A point in favour of Alston’s proposal is that it does not undermine divine sovereignty. On his view, though goodness is independent of divine commands
and so of what God wills in the way relevant to commanding, it is not independent of God or other aspects of God’s nature and activities. However, if divine goodness thus understood is to certain divine commands so that they are not arbitrary, the aspects of God’s nature and activities on which it depends must not vary without restriction across possible worlds in such a way that anything goes with respect to what God can be or can do. Such limits are part of traditional theistic conceptions of God. It is usually assumed that the divine nature contains essential properties that God could not lack and that there are divine activities that God could not fail to engage in. Further, Alston’s proposal has recently been developed into a comprehensive account of ethical goodness by Adams. On his view, which he describes as a kind of theistic Platonism, God is the good itself, the paradigm or standard of goodness. Creatures, their characters, their motives, and their deeds are good in virtue of bearing relations of resemblance to God. Adams has constructed a divine command theory of obligation that is set within the context of, and is thus constrained by, this theistic axiology. Within this context, God’s character or nature serves as a constraint on what God could command. The morality generated by divine commands cannot be utterly opposed to the beliefs about morality we bring to theology from ordinary life. Henceforth, one should not believe that God could command just anything. Yet the framework Adams endorses allow us to ascribe to God a set of commands that is somewhat at odds with the ethical outlook we bring to theology because its standard of goodness, being transcendent, is to some extent, beyond our cognitive group and is also fearful and in some ways dangerous to us.

The relation between God and man from the Nyaya perspective and its influence in the context of morality has already been elaborately discussed in this chapter. The Nyaya-
*Vaisesika* philosophy is a theistic philosophy, as it believes in the existence of God. The most important modification of the traditional view about the path to liberation has been introduced by the *Nyaya-Vaisesika* by their introduction of the notion of God that must at least permit, if not be operative in, the process. Prasastapada clearly includes God in the description of the path to liberation and specifies that merit together with God’s injunction produce the knowledge about reality which is necessary for liberation. Uddyotkara brings in God as the creator of merit and demerit, but nothing he says implies any interruption of the machinery by which the self earns good or bad *karma* by his actions. It is probably with Bhasarvajna that God begins to play a more positive role, although from the *Nyaysutra* all we can know is that knowledge of God is the touchstone to the removal of wrong attitudes.

The *Nyaysutra* and its commentaries, have tried to examine the theory that God is the cause of the Universe. In the *sutra* 10, Gautama has raised the question, whether God is the cause of the universe or not. Besides this, the intention is to examine from a purely philosophical and ethical point of view, the specific type of relationship between the God and morality.

In the preceding chapter, ‘God & Morality’, it has been observed that Gautama, in *his Nyayasutra*, 4/1/19, has represented the Vedanta view as a purvapaksa, and in the *sutra* 4/1/20, has shown the untenability of that opposition and finally, in the *sutra* 4/1/21, puts forward the conclusion that God is the creator, the efficient cause, not the constituent cause of the universe. The *purvapaksins*, i.e. the Vedantins have explained the fact that God is the material cause (*Upadanakarana*) of the world. To defend their argument, they
may argue that an individual, being in this physical world, does not always obtain the consequences of his actions that have been performed in his present life. As a matter of fact, the acquisition of the consequences of one’s actions is dependent upon some other person and he is none other than God himself. However, it follows that God is the material cause of the world. According to Tatparyatika, this sutra presents the Vedanta view that God is the Constituent cause of the world. But, in the sutra, 4/1/20, the Naiyayikas have provided the objection against the Vedanta doctrine. This sutra puts forth arguments against the Vedanta theory of things evolving or modifying out of Brahman, and concludes with the assertion that it is not right to hold that Brahman evolves or modifies into the endless phenomenal substances; and as such is the constituent cause of things. It will be more accepted if the God has been considered as the efficient cause of things and then it goes on to say that in connection with the view that God is the efficient cause of things, it might be held that in creating the world, God is not influenced by any other force. This view does not go against the view that God is influenced by the actions of men. Uddyotkara, in his Nyaya-Varttika, and Vacaspati Misra, in his Tatparyatika, have explicated the fact in the following way. If God was the cause of things, then there could be experiencing of pleasures and pain even without any act of Man; and the result of this would be that all activity of men would disappear and there would be no possibility of release. If the God has been considered as one and uniform, then all his acts would be of one and the same kind. In that case, no choice or option is open to an individual and God may be supposed to be tyrannical in nature.

On the contrary, if the actions of the individual are responsible for producing the consequences, then it would mean that God does not produce anything and if he produces
something, then it will happen so under the influence of the individual’s actions. In that case, God would not be considered as the all-powerful God at all. Thus, it has been observed from the above fact that it is mostly a controversial issue whether God is the material cause of the world or not.

In connection with the Nyaya school of thought, it may be said that God is the cause of the world and in this context, the word ‘cause’ has to be accepted in the sense of ‘efficient cause’ not in the sense of ‘material cause’. Vacaspati Misra, in his Tatparyatika, has expounded the fact that God helps the individual to achieve the consequences of his own according to his actions. However, God alone could not be the cause of the world, it is the individual’s (jiva) action that supports him to create this universe and in that sense, God become the efficient cause of this world. The question may be raised as to whether the Nyaya conception of God can be linked with the God of Christian theology or more especially with the divine command theory. The Divine command theory, one of the major version of the Theological voluntarism, maintains the fact that the requirements of morality are determined by God’s commands. This theory enunciated the fact that whatever is right, is conformable to the will of God and whatever is wrong, is not conformable to the will of God. Thus, the moral properties like ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ depend on God’s will. In the case of goodness, the Divine Command theory implies that actions have the property of being good when God has commanded that they should be performed. Further, in the case of ‘wrongness’, the divine command theory states that actions have the property of being wrong when God has commanded that they should not be performed.
The theological voluntarism affirms that action is morally obligatory just in case God has commanded that actions be performed, and the individual is not held responsible for the action to be morally obligatory. The Nyaya view is quite different from that of the divine command theory, for the Nyaya School has also admitted the role of individual’s action for the creation of this universe. The agency of God has been admitted in relation to the individual’s actions and the consequences of these actions. One may argue that the power of God will be diminished if individual’s actions are accepted. Uddyotkara, in his NyayaVarttika, maintained that God is the organizer of the consequences of what the individuals will attain in his or her life. Thus, neither God, nor the individuals alone is responsible for the creation of this universe, rather both of the two are complementary to one another for the creation. According to Nyaya School, God is the efficient cause for the creation. The Indian view about the relation between God and individuals and their participation in the creation of this universe is not the same with the western view. In Indian ethics in general and Nyaya ethics in particular the more importance is given to the individual’s actions, instead of only concentrating on God’s divine power.

The fact is, that “among the beliefs concerning man which is essential in the old Nyaya is a belief in the efficacy of human effort….. Any statement which involves karma vaiphalya prasanga….or akrtabhyagama prasanga…..is ipso facto wrong. This belief…is common in India” 11. In short, the Indians generally believed in freedom of the will at least to the extent that men were not conceived to be pawns in the hand of a superior power. According to Nyaya philosophy, if one performs good action in the present life, then he has the intention to perform the good action in the succeeding lives, for he acquires the quality ‘samskara’ in his own self and invariably this samskara compels him
to act in a good way in the future life. However, he has no intention to perform any kind of bad actions in the succeeding lives. However, with the concept of, *samskara (adrsta)*\(^\text{12}\), the *Nyaya* School has reconciled very well God’s power with freedom of individual. The *Nyaya* ethical thought is neither a typical form of consequentialist ethics, nor like the type of the western metaethical theories about the divine command or theological voluntarism. To conclude, the *Nyaya* model of ethics is a unique model and has its own metaphysical presuppositions.
Notes and References


3. ibid, p- 233


5. ibid, p- 212


7. ibid,p-305

8. ibid, p-306

9. ibid,p-319

10. 4.1.19, *Nyayasutra* of Gautama, Part-IV, edited by Phanibhusana Tarkabagish, Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak Parsad, Calcutta,1988, p-


12. See in chapter ‘What is karma?’