The discussion on morality by the astika schools of thinkers is primarily concerned with man as a jivatma and as positioned in a social order. In this social order, the individuals are related with one another in course of performing many common duties (sadharana dharmas) as well as by following duties related to four castes and four stages of life (caturvarna and caturasrama). Indian thinkers uphold that all normative, value-seeking, aspirations of an individual are not fulfilled by leading a moral life alone. There is something else which also he seeks to have; there is in him some propensity, aspiration, other than that for being moral, which too he wants to satisfy. This aspiration is not social one, rather it is more personal. It is satisfied by an individual when he accomplishes his full-flourishing, by being what truly he is. This aspiration, is, thus, considered to be towards the highest value, i.e., moksa.

This final quest for moksa, according to the Indian theistic moral thinkers, is personal because moksa itself has its personal value. An ordinary person, who leads a moral life, fulfils the aspirations he has as an individual –in –society, whereas his attainment of moksa fulfils the aspiration he has as the person he is or he will be. We consider ethical theory in the sense of which it is ordinarily understood, i.e. in the sense in which its function is to present a systematic account of the moral values an individual-in-society should pursue, the virtues he should inculcate, the obligations, he should fulfill, the rights
he should claim or allow others to claim etc. It would be incomplete if the discussions about the highest value (*moksa*) is overlooked or ignored in this context. An elaborate description about the Indian concept of *moksa* and the explanation about its nature and role in man’s life are relevant for the proper understanding of the impact of Indian ethics. In this chapter, the nature of liberation and its place in an individual’s life is going to be explicated in the following four sections. In the first section, some objections to the possibility of *moksa* are considered. In the second section, different accounts of *moksa* as presented by different Indian philosophical systems have been incorporated. How the liberation can be attained is a very serious issue that has been analyzed by different philosophical schools and this has been dealt with in the third section of this chapter.

**Is Liberation (*moksa*) at all possible?**

The idea of liberation and for that matter of liberated existence no doubt seems to be fanciful, absurd and meaningless. The *moksa* or liberation proved to be a subject of controversy even in the ancient period among the different schools of Indian philosophy. The debates centered round the questions relating to the possibility of *moksa* and its nature. To explicate the nature of liberation and its place in an individual’s life, it is very important to take into consideration the opponents views. The possible objections and its reply have been elaborately discussed in the *Nyayasutra* of Gautama, in different commentaries and sub-commentaries on the *Nyayasutra* and the *Nyayabhasya*. The argument that has been put forward by the objectors is as follows: since men have inseparable relation (*anubandha*) with debts (*rنا*), afflictions (*klesa*) and activities (*pravrtti*), men can never be liberated. Thus, from this argument, three things come out very clearly, viz, *rنا* or debts, *klesas* or afflictions and *pravrtti* or activities are possible.
hindrances to liberation. Actually, there are three sub-objections to the possibility of moksa or liberation:

1. On account of afflictions, there can be no release.
2. On account of activity, there can be no release.
3. On account of activity, there can be no release.

The concept of rna or debt plays an important role in Indian tradition. It is believed that since birth, an individual is under three sorts of debts, i.e. debts to teachers, to Gods, and to forefathers. The discussions have been made in details. It has been considered to be the most important duty to free oneself from the debts that are incurred since his birth. Each individual is indebted to his parents for his birth. In the Sruti, however, we do not find any mention of any debts to mother. The Sruti mentions, ‘yavat jivam agnihotram juhoti’ or ‘yavat jivam darsapurnamasabhyam yajet’, i.e., through these injunctions Sruti impels the motivated agent to perform sacrificial rites like agnihotra or darsapurnamasa etc to pay back his debts to Gods. Each individual, according to the Vedic tradition, is required to pay back his debts to his father and forefathers by begetting children. After completion of his studies with the preceptor, he is supposed to enter into family life. The duties of the married person (kradara grhastha) are many according to the Vedic viewpoint.

The second objection, as put forward by the skeptical objector to the possibility of moksa, rests on the perception of the embodied self. The embodiment of the self is due to three defects or dosa like raga, dvesa and moha, which are also referred to as klesa. In the Nyayabhasya, it has been clearly stated ‘dosanimittohayam samsara’ etc. In another
context, it has been stated by Gautama \(^1\) that no birth is without raga i.e. is devoid of desires (abhilasasunya). Man as a living being must be affected by hunger, thirst and are attracted towards certain objects. Unless klesas are eradicated, the empirical embodiment of self cannot be prevented. The jivas have inseparable relation with klesas or affliction, at the time of birth, at the time of death and at all times. Hence, the existence of jivas as separated from klesas or affliction is difficult to establish. Klesas are, as we have already seen, are admitted as conditions for worldly existence of the jivas. Thus, without the annihilation of the cause of the worldly existence, the worldly existence cannot be prevented. If the worldly existence of jivas persists, there is no possibility of release from that state of existence.

The third argument is very closely connected with the second argument. Jivas existing as jivas in empirical embodiment have neutral propensity to act; Gautama by the expression, pravrtti, implied, as we have already seen, all sorts of human activities which are classifiable as verbal, mental and physical. Sometimes, consequences of human activity like merits and demerits (dharma and adharma) are also referred to as pravrtti. We have already found out (by the second argument) that the worldly existence cannot be negated. Performance of actions does produce dharma and adharma apart from its natural consequences. Hence, it has been argued that moksa or liberation is said to be a chimera.

Thus, it has been stated in the Dharma literature that an individual becomes free from the debt to the seers by observing celibacy, from that to the Gods by performing sacrifices and from that to the forefathers by producing offspring. Hence, an individual is supposed to remain occupied throughout his life for the performance of different sacrificial actions
to free himself from different rites and actions required of him until his death. Further, the opponents argue that an individual is always in the cycle of birth and death. He may be presumed to be always in ignorance, affections and hatred. Hence, he has no possibility of being released from the phenomenal existence. It has been observed that throughout his existence, from birth to death, the embodied self is never found to be absolutely free from one sort of action or another whether of speech mind or body. In his empirical life, an individual is always bound by his own karma, or action that produces a samskara, i.e. dharma and adhharma in his own self. Guided by these three fold pravrtti-kayika, vacanika and manasika, the individual performs good or bad actions and the quality of righteousness (dharma) and unrighteousness (adharma) arises in the individual’s self, and to enjoy the consequences of those actions, the individual is reborn again and again. Thus, there is no scope of liberation for an individual.

From the perspective of the Nyaya, answers are provided in the Nyayabhasya to the objectors. Referring to the Sruti, ‘jayomano vai brahmanastribhirnarva jayate……’ it has been maintained that the expression, rna, translated roughly as debt needs clarification. In its primary sense, the expression, rna, signifies giving back something (pratyadeya) to a person from whom that thing (pratyadeya) was earlier taken. In the above mentioned srutivakya, the expression ‘rna’ does not occur in its primary sense. In this context, the word ‘rna’ in its secondary sense signifies something that is similar to accepting debt from somebody else. Hence, rna means rnasadrsa (similar to debts) or rnavat (like a debt). If a person takes a loan but does not repay it, then he is criticized. Similarly, a person whose duty or dharma is to maintain celibacy, afterwards to enter into family life to procreate children and finally to perform rituals like agnihotra and others,
but does not perform these, he is criticized. It has been also clarified that when it was said that throughout his life till old age and death all these duties are to be performed, or not.

A critical examination has been made in the different verses of Nyayasutra and its bhasya to reestablish that liberation (moksa) is possible. In this bhasya, Vatsyayana argues that liberation is possible and he explains the concept of liberation by drawing an analogy with the concept of susupti. In all of the classical Indian philosophical systems, it has been maintained that at the time of deep sleep, i.e. susupti, there is no dream and in this state, there is no question of any kind of attraction or aversion resulting from any actions. In the same way, at the time of liberation, the liberated person will be free from all kinds of attraction and aversion and in that sense, no specific qualities, like pleasure and pain will be produced in his self. The state of liberation has been explained by the example of susupti for no ordinary person can realize the real nature of liberation for only the yogis may reach that stage. However, this analogy is not appropriate. In the stage of susupti and pralaya, as admitted by the Naiyayikas, the traces (samskaras) of attraction and aversion are present. But in the case of liberation, there is no possibility for any attraction and aversion to result in.

However, in both of these stages, the empirical self is devoid of any kind of special qualities like pleasure, pain as maintained by the commentator of Nyayasutra, and his successors. Gautama speaks about the presence of a special kind of eternal bliss in the finite self after its release from the phenomenal existence, though most of the commentators do not agree. The comparison between the concept of susupti and the concept of liberation may be, to some extent, acceptable to some Indian thinkers, but not
to all. Secondly, the opponents point out that the fact that the total annihilation of all sorts of the attractions and aversions is not possible at all for the self of an individual is anadi. The complete abolition of all the characteristics of any object, if accepted, then in another way, it would amount to the acceptance of the total annihilation of the object. If the annihilation of all kinds of pleasures and pains has to be accepted, then the locus of these qualities, i.e., and the embodied self would also be annihilated. But it would never possible from the Nyaya-Vaisesika’s perspective for according to them; the empirical self is eternal by nature. Gautama, in his system, has treated these two objections in his own way. In another verse, 2 Gautama says that though the empirical self is eternal, the qualities of this self is not eternal in nature. Rather, these are non-eternal. From the Nyaya-Vaisesika’s perspective, the occurrence of the right knowledge makes the liberation possible and, the attraction and aversion that had arisen in the empirical self would be abolished. However, Gautama and his commentators have offered a couple of arguments to deal with this issue, but in the present chapter, all of them could not be accommodated. Further, Gautama in the Nyayasutra 3 has reestablished that the qualities of attraction and aversion are present in the individual’s self because of samkalpa and karma. The author of the Nyayabhasya and Tatparyatika, explicates that the word ‘samkalpa’ can not be understood in the sense of prayer (prarthana) rather, the term has to be taken in its secondary sense. The cause of ‘samkalpa’ is the false knowledge or the prior knowledge of the three afflictions of attachment, aversion and ignorance. In the state of liberation, these three afflictions finally cease to exist as the right knowledge occurs. The action (karma) of an individual is also explained by reference to his or her prior birth and the consequences of the actions make the individual enjoy pleasure or
suffer pain and it is due to his own *adrsta*. In other words, all the three afflictions like attachment, aversion and delusion may be destroyed successively. And, after the complete destruction of these three, the individual can attain liberation. Thus, from the *Nyaya-Vaisesika*’s perspective, it has been quite clearly argued that liberation is possible.

**The Nature of Liberation, in general**

*Moksa* or liberation is the return of the self to its original, primal, state according to all the classical Indian Philosophical systems. But to say this, is not to say much about what this state, of *moksa*, is. With the exception of the *Carvaka* School, the only representative of the materialistic viewpoint in the Indian philosophical tradition, almost all the Indian schools of philosophy recognize *moksa* to be the highest good of life. Both the theistic and non-theistic group of philosophers has explained the nature of *moksa* according to their own metaphysical framework. For Buddhism, *Samkhya-yoga* and the *Purva Mimamsa*, it is a state of absolute absence of all kinds of pain or suffering (*sarva dukhabhava*). The other two schools, Jainism and the *Vedanta*, call it a state not only of absolute absence of suffering but also a state of pure, permanent, pleasure or bliss (*ananda*). However, a brief survey of the concept of *moksa* with reference to the Indian systems may pave the way for a detailed idea as to what is understood to be the highest good of life in the Indian tradition.

According to *Samkhya* School, *Moksa* is complete freedom from all sufferings. *Samkhya* recognizes three kinds of sufferings, and it is complete freedom from these three kinds of suffering that is called *moksa*. The *Samkhya* takes consciousness as the very essence of soul and therefore by attaining *moksa* the soul attains its pure conscious nature. It thus
regains its inherent nature which it had, in a way, lost because of its identification of itself with *prakṛti* as a result of ignorance. The moment the discriminative knowledge dawns upon the soul, it regains its original nature of pure consciousness. In this state, there is neither pleasure nor pain, because pleasure and pain are the modes of *prakṛti*. *Purusa* or self in its pure nature is completely above these mundane modes. The opinions of the different *Mimamsaka* Schools regarding the *mokṣa* are very much different from one another. According to one view, the *Mimamsaka* School asserts a purely negative view of *mokṣa* in which the soul after attaining liberation simply gets rid of its accumulated merit – demerit, pleasure – pain etc. Attainment of *mokṣa* is not to be equated with the attainment of any state of bliss, for, if liberation consists in the experience of bliss, then it will be of the nature of heaven which is something transient, and not eternal. But liberation is something eternal and therefore it cannot be of the nature of pleasure or bliss. This view of *mokṣa* is may be attributed to the Kumarila School of *Mimamsa*. In the state of liberation, the soul is restored to its primitive condition and it is the natural state in which the soul’s own potency of cognition, existence, substance hood persist. 6 The *Prabhaκara* School takes *mokṣa* as the final riddance from future births brought in by the extinction of both *dharma* and *adharma* 7. However, Dr. Ganganath Jha makes the following remark regarding Prabhaκara’s view on *mokṣa*, the view of *Prabhaκara* himself we have no direct means of ascertaining as, like Sabara, he does not deal with people who have transcended *karma* or action. His follower’s views on the subject we have from the *Prakaranapancika*. According to these views liberation consists in the disappearance of all merits and demerits accruing to the soul that it is born in the physical body; consequently when all merits and demerits have disappeared, nothing remained
would lead the soul to be born again in the body; the soul ceases to have connection with
the body and hence also with the sense- organs. Thus, all its metempsychoses troubles are
ended and it is free, liberated. From his remark, it seems very clear that Prabhakara
School also holds a negative conception of moksa.

The two Vedanta school, i.e. the Samkara Vedanta and the Ramanuja School of thought
possess a positive perspective of moksa According to them, moksa is not only getting rid
of the cycle of life and death and consequently of all sufferings, but also attainment of a
positive state of bliss. The soul in the liberated state attains its true nature which is pure
consciousness and bliss. However, despite this general agreement, Samkara and
Ramanuja differ significantly between themselves regarding the nature of moksa. This
difference is mainly due to their differences in view regarding the nature of soul itself in
relation to Brahman, the ultimate reality.

According to Samkara, the soul in its true nature is identical with Brahman, while
according to Ramanuja, the former is only a part or a mode of Brahman. According to
Samkara, the realization of the true nature of the self consists in soul’s experience of its
identity with Brahman, while Ramanuja holds that it is the realization of the soul of its
being a real mode or expression of Brahman. In spite of all the differences between these
two views, it is to be noted that according to both of these thinkers, the soul not only gets
rid of certain things in liberation, but also achieves the positive state of pure knowledge
and external bliss.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika school takes this state of moksa as a purely negative state in which
the soul becomes completely free from all the klesas (raga, dvesa and moha), from all the

263
merits and demerits, from the continuous cycle of birth and death, from all experience of pleasure and pain and, as a matter of fact, from all consciousness. Consciousness is not the inherent quality of the soul according to the *Nyaya-Vaisesika*. It is brought into it through its contact with the mind and the sense-organs and as such a contact is absent in the state of *moksa*, so the soul in this state has absolutely no experience, no consciousness. Gautama suggests that ‘Release is the absolute deliverance from pain’.⁹

**Nature of liberation from the *Nyaya-Vaisesika’s* perspective**

It is unanimously accepted by all *Nyaya-Vaisesika* philosophers that, after liberation, there is no further suffering. But, here lies a divergence of opinions as to the exact nature of this absence of suffering –whether such an absence of suffering represents its (i) *pragabhava* (prior non-existence), ii)*dhamsabhava* (non-existence in the form of destruction; iii) *atyantabhava* (absolute non-existence). Again, it has also been debated as to whether this liberated state is the state where there is complete cessation of suffering mixed with the eternal pleasure or *nityasukha*.

Gautama devotes a section to the critical examination of *apavarga*, but he does not provide any direct proof for establishing its reality. According to Gautama, liberation is the summum bonum of human life. Liberation is the absence of all sufferings for all time to come. As the self is eternal, it survives bodily death. By being liberated, one escapes the cycle of birth and death, by being free from all defects. Thus, from the true knowledge of the causes of defects follows the cessation of the notion of ‘I’. Gautama has given a list of five objects of knowledge which known in their true nature lead to the state
of release. These five objects of knowledge are connected causally in the following way:

1. Birth leading to pain or suffering
2. Activity leading to birth
3. Defects leading to activity
4. False belief leading to defects.

Gautama points out that by destroying the cause, the effect also is destroyed. Knowledge of the real nature of reality destroys false belief. Destruction of false belief leads to the removal of defects. Destruction of defects leads to the destruction of activity. Destruction of activity leads to the destruction of the cycle of birth and rebirths. Destruction of birth leads to the removal of sorrow. The absence of sorrow for all time to come is release. However, it is found from the above analysis that Gautama, in his Nyayasutra, does not provide any direct proof or any kind of argument to settle the discussion about the nature of liberation.

Vatsyayana, the commentator of Nyayasutra, in his Nyayasutrabhasya, explains the distinction between absolute dissolution of the universe and final release. He elaborates that at the time of universal dissolution, there is cessation of pain of the individual self. But, this is not a final release from pain, because after final dissolution of the universe, the process of creation starts again. In this new creation of the universe, the individual self starts suffering again. But after attaining final release (apavarga), there is cessation of all pain for all time to come. This involves the rejection of the birth and not having any rebirth. According to Vatsyayana, this eternal state of the self is final release. It is
characterized by fearlessness, immortality and condition of imperishability. In Uddyotakara’s time, it seems that the Buddhists were very prominent opponents of Nyaya. This is why Uddyotakara had to constantly refute different forms of Buddhist theories. Regarding the nature of final release, the Buddhists hold that it is the manas, not the soul, that is released. There are a couple of arguments and counter arguments provided by the Buddhists on the one head and Uddyotakara, on the other, which are not included in the present discussion.

However, this much can be asserted that Uddyotakara’s reasoning seems to be cogent and persuasive. It is found from his analysis that under no circumstances he would concede that the state of final release relates to the mind. Uddyotakara as a naiyayika strongly reiterates the Nyaya position through his realization that it is the soul that is released. The state of final release is the absence of suffering and pain for all time to come. Of all the Nyaya-Vaisesikas authors, Udayana is probably the most revered by followers of the school, for demolishing finally the claims of the Buddhist logicians. Ganganath Jha has mentioned that Udayana was the pioneer of NavyaNyaya trend, which, properly speaking, is held to begin with Gangesa, in the mid-fourteenth century. According to Udayana, final release consists in the final cessation of the self’s miseries. The Nyaya method of attaining liberation or final release is through Knowledge. In this context, it must be noticed that both the Nyaya School, i.e. the pracina as well as the Navya, admit Sruti as the pramana, in the case of liberation. Udayanacarya, in his kiranaabali, with critical examination establishes the view that ‘Nihsreyasam punardukhanivrtiratryantiki atraca vadinama vivadaeva.'

11
Now, the nature of the complete absence of sufferings should be analysed as to whether such an absence of suffering represents its i) Pragabhava (prior non-existence), dhamsabhava (non-existence in the form of destruction, iii)atyantabhava (absolute non-existence). The absence of suffering may be supposed by some as the pragabhava or the prior non-existence of sufferings. The philosophers, who defend this view, may argue that when a person wants to become liberated, he desires ‘let me have no further sufferings’. It follows that he longs for the cessation of future sufferings, which in fact, represents nothing but the pragabhava of sufferings. Thus, the absence of future sufferings is the prior non-existence (pragabhava) of the sufferings. This view propounded by the prabhakara mimamsakas. The prabhakara mimamsakas have argued the fact that the cause of all sufferings is the false knowledge of things and this kind of false knowledge will be removed by the right knowledge (tattvajnana). When the right knowledge will arise, then no sufferings will exist. In that case, in the absence of sufferings, the prior non-existence of sufferings remains. It may be said that since pragabhava is anadi, it cannot be an effect. Thus, as all kinds sufferings or pain can be removed by the right knowledge, so the pragabhava of pain may also be removed by the right knowledge. The technical term that has been used by the prabhakara mimamsakas in this case, is ‘ksaimik sadhyata’. The Prabhakara Mimamsakas have argued that after getting the right knowledge, the liberated person has no prarabdha karma and in that situation, there remains the pragabhava of pain and this, according to them, is ‘ksema’. This pragabhava may be treated as the complete cessation of all kinds of sufferings, according to the Prabhakara Mimamsakas.
But from the Nyaya-Vaisesikas side, Gangesa, the Navya Naiyayika has rejected this fact. Gangesa has pointed out that it may be admitted that \textit{pragabhava} can also be removed by the right knowledge (\textit{tattvajnana}). Moreover, the counter positive (\textit{pratiyogin}) of \textit{pragabhava} has to be admitted according to the \textit{nyaya} School. In the Nyaya-Vaisesika framework, there is a general rule to the effect that the counter positive (\textit{pratiyogin}) of a fact must come into being at least once at some future period. The counter- positive of the \textit{pragabhava} of pain is none other than the pain itself. In that case, if it is admitted that liberation or the state of complete cessation of all sufferings is the \textit{pragabhava} of sufferings, one would also be forced to admit the production of sufferings, at some future period, even after one has attained liberation. Further, if the liberated person has any kind suffering, then he will not be admitted as a ‘liberated person’ at all. Thus, Gangesa, has described that the state of complete cessation of all sufferings is nothing but the \textit{dhamasabhava} or the non-existence in the form of destruction of all kinds of sufferings. Suffering and the destruction of suffering is not same for these two do not happen at one moment. Gangesa, has said that the state of complete cessation of suffering of a liberated person entail the fact that at that time there is no pain as well as no pain in the form of destruction in the self of a liberated person. On the contrary, the self of an ordinary person, who is not yet liberated, is also a locus of the \textit{dhamasabhava} of suffering, for various kinds of suffering appear and disappear at various moments in it. Still. The ordinary person’s self can not be said to be liberated, for the \textit{dhamasabhava} of suffering therein is immediately followed by the production of some new sufferings. In this case, the suffering and the destruction of suffering happen at the same time and this kind of destruction can not pave the way for any kind of liberation. Thus, the self of a liberated
person is free from all kinds of sufferings and if the sufferings is not be produced, then there is no claim to produce the destruction of sufferings again. In that case, the last destruction of sufferings is called the ultimate destruction of sufferings and this state may be supposed as the state of liberation. The complete cessation of suffering can also be removed by the right knowledge (tattvajnana). If the right knowledge could not be attained, then the case of rebirth is an indispensable fact and simultaneously, the pain also could not be removed. However, the Nyaya-Vaisesikas have concluded that the complete cessation of sufferings is the ultimate goal of life and this is the real nature of liberation. In the state of liberation, the liberated person has no prior non-existence of present pain as well as future pain. However, the Naiyayikas have said that the complete cessation of all kinds of sufferings is nothing but the cessation of pain which is characterized by the negation of the prior non-existence of future pain and this is the real nature of the state of liberation. In this context, one may argue that if the physical bodies as well as the cause of sufferings are not present at the time of liberation then the liberated person has no pain or suffering at all. Thus, the absence of his suffering will be treated as beginning less (anadi) as well as endless (ananta) and it would become actually a case of atyantabhava or the absolute non-existence of all sufferings. Gadadhara, one of the exponents of Navya Nyaya, has also claimed that the desire ‘let me have no further sufferings’ is related with that kind of suffering which is nothing but the absolute non-existence of all sufferings. Moreover, Gadadhara, has also added that there is no contradiction in accepting the absolute non-existence of all sufferings (atyantabhava) instead of accepting the prior non-existence (pragabhava) or the non-existence in the form of destruction (dhamsabhava) in describing the state of complete cessation of pain or sufferings.
Gadadhara, further has mentioned the fact that the absence of the prior non-existence can be treated as the absolute non-existence *(atyantabhava)* of all sufferings and this may be accepted as the complete cessation of all suffering and this is supposed to be the state of liberation, according to him.

Now, another relevant issue is discussed. The issue is; if liberation means only the absolute cessation of pain, then this state would somehow be like the unconscious state. In that state, there is no sensation of pleasure as well as the cessation of pain in the self of the individual. In that case, someone may argue, that why does an intelligible person desire for liberation if liberation is nothing but being in a state like an unconscious state? How does it become the highest value at all? Two alternative arguments have been provided to reject this kind of objection. One may put forward an argument that only the absolute cessation of pain is a value in itself. The persons have the desire only to refrain from all kinds of sufferings and they have no desire of attaining pleasure at all. Rather, if the goal of life or purusartha is the complete cessation of pain, then the desire of the person, who is not yet liberated, will also be engaged for the same purpose. In this way, it may be said that only for the absolute cessation of pain, the persons who are in the path of liberation are engaged in different karmas. Gangesa and some other *Naiyayikas* have opined this view.

The second alternative argument is: In the state of liberation, the sensation of eternal pleasure is present. Bhasarvijna, another naiyayika of the sect, strongly supports the view that liberation is a state of eternal bliss. Now these two alternative arguments have to be examined. Firstly, the second argument has been critically analyzed in the following way.
To expound the exact nature of the state of liberation, Bhasarvajna, in his famous book, *Nyayasara*, has pointed out that liberation is the complete cessation of all kinds of sufferings and it is characterized by the sensation of eternal pleasure. He also has given reference to the same from the *smrti* literature to prove the fact that there is a kind of eternal bliss in the state of liberation. Excluding him, the other *Nyaya-vaisesika* philosophers do not accept this view. There is history of a long controversy regarding the exact nature of liberation. In this brief space, all the arguments and their answers could not be dealt with. Only a few of them has been mentioned to reveal the actual nature of liberation according to *Naiyayikas*.

The well-known *Navya-Naiyayika* philosopher, Gadadhara also, in his *Muktivada*, refers to this view as the “view of the Bhatta”. But, one raises the question: who is the philosopher referred to by the name Bhatta: It may reasonably be taken to stand for the famous *Mimamsaka* Kumarila Bhatta who has indeed been often referred to in various philosophical works by this abbreviated name. While examining the different theories on the nature of liberation, Udayana in his *Kiranavali*, remarks that liberation is a state of pleasure is upheld by the followers of *Tautatita*. There is good reason to believe that *Tautatita* was none other than the great Kumarila himself, for the *Visvakosa*, though not assigning any ground says that Tutata and *Tautatita* are the synonyms of Kumarila. A verse quoted by Madhavacarya, under the *Paninidarsana* section of the *Sarvadarsanasamgraha*, with the preliminary remark “as it has been said by the followers of *Tautatita*” is actually found in Kumarila’s *Slokavartika*. Thirdly, the remark of Krsnamisra in the *Probodha candrodaya* (ii, 3) which mentions the doctrine of Tutata along with the view of Guru *Prabhakara* seems to indicate that Tutata and Kumarila refer
to the same person. Fourthly, Samkaracarya in his Sarvadarsanasiddhantasamgraha and the later mimamsaka, Narayana Bhatta in his Manameyodaya also ascribe such a view of liberation to Kumarila. In this context, one may argue that the doctrine of sensation of pleasure in liberation is actually the doctrine advocated by Kumarila.

In answer, to the above, it must be pointed out that the admission of the experience of pleasure in liberation cannot be unquestionably ascribed to Kumarila because Parthasarathi Misra, the celebrated commentator of Kumarila, rejects the doctrine of sensation of pleasure in liberation and critically established that liberation is only a total annihilation of all suffering. He, however, notes that, even in earlier times, there had been controversy as to the real position of Kumarila on the nature of liberation. Besides, the verse which Madhavacarya quotes under the Arhata darsana section of the Sarvadarsanasamgraha and ascribes to Tautatita, and agreeing in spirit with the words of Kumarila, are not found in the Slokavartika. Phanibhusana, in his Nyayadarsana, therefore, suggests an alternative possibility that Tutata was perhaps the name of some earlier Mimamsaka whose views were very much in agreement with those of the later Kumarila.

In this context, it must be mentioned that there are a number of arguments by which the Naiyayikas have opposed this position. Before that, it must be pointed out that the propounders of this view have defended their position by mentioning the lines from the Sruti literature. From the lines “Naha vai sasarirasya satah priyapriyayorapahatirasti Asariram vyava santam na priyapriye sprsatah”\(^{13}\), it is clear to us that as long as the self is related with the physical body, the concept of pleasure and pain could not be abolished.
totally. If the self is devoid of the physical body, then there will be no pleasure as well as pain. Thus, it may be said that the bound self feels as well as pain, but the liberated self is free from all these qualities. It is supported from the Sruti that the word “sasarira” denotes the bound self and the word “asarira” suggests to mean the liberated self. Persons, who are the supporters of the view that there is a sensation of pleasure in the state of liberation, hold that the word “priya” mentioned in the “Sruti” is supported as worldly pleasure or janya sukha and the word ‘apriya’ denotes the pain. The philosophers (especially the Bhatta school of thought) have defended their position in a very tricky way. It must be mentioned that in the state of liberation, there is no kind of worldly pleasure for in the absence of physical body; no liberated self will feel that kind of worldly pleasure. Though the worldly pleasure is absent at the time of liberation, the eternal pleasure must be present and the liberated self must feel this kind of eternal pleasure. Rather, the sentences of Sruti, like “Anandam brahmano rupam tatca mokse pratisthitam” and “raso vai sah, rasam jhevayam labdhanandi bhavati” establishes the fact that a kind of eternal bliss is also present in the state of liberation, only the worldly pleasure is absent in that state.

Further, Raghunatha Siromoni, another naiyayika, supports the view that there is a kind of eternal pleasure in the bound self, but in that case, there is no sensation or feelings of that pleasure. When one attains the right knowledge, then only he has the sensation of that eternal bliss. Thus only the right knowledge is the cause of the sensation of eternal pleasure. The sentence of the Sruti like “Anandam brahmano rupam tatca mokse partisthitam” also proves that in the jivatma, the eternal bliss is present from the times immemorial. But there is no feeling of this kind of eternal pleasure before the state of
liberation. Gadadhara Bhattacharya in his book *Muktivada* has mentioned this view, but he did not accept the view. For rejecting the above view, he simply shows that there is a gaurava dosa in this case. According to Gadadhar, the original nature of liberation is the complete cessation of all kinds of sufferings and nothing other than that. The phrase ‘*Anandam*’ that has been used in the Sruti literature, actually means to say ‘the absence of pain’ (*dukhabhava*), instead of ‘eternal pleasure’. For understanding the proper sense of this phrase ‘*Anandam*’, he has used the power of ‘*laksana*’ that has been admitted by all the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers. It seems that it is a case of *jahat-ajahat laksana*. Vatsyayana, in his *bhasya*, has added that if the desire of eternal pleasure should be admitted, then it will not entail the state of liberation. For, the desire of anything contradicts the notion of liberation. Only the bound self has desire, but the liberated self is free from all kinds of desires. He has said that if it is considered that the eternal pleasure is present in the bound self from the beginning and the feeling of this pleasure is also eternal, then in the state of its bounded ness, there presents the other qualities like *adharma* and pain. In that case, no distinction can be draw between the bound and the liberated self.

However, it must be noticed that all the *Nyaya- Vaisesika* philosophers have accepted the position that liberation is the absolute cessation of all kinds of sufferings, and as there is no possibility of rebirth, so there is no possibility of any kind of sufferings at all, and this view is admitted by all the Naiyayikas. Gautama in his *Nyayasutra* (1/1/12) has explained the nature of liberation in this way. Gangesa, has explained that the complete cessation of all kind of sufferings is the intrinsic value of itself. If an individual has no desire to attain any kind of pleasure, he may also try to remove all kinds of sufferings as well. Although
he has not the knowledge of the complete cessation of sufferings, yet it may be treated as
his goal of life which he tries to achieve. Gangesa further said that the worldly pleasure
can be considered as nothing but one of the replica of a violently enraged hooded serpent
and the person who tries to attain liberation has the endeavor to remove all sorts of
worldly pleasures and gradually he become a liberated person.15 Thus, if the liberation
can be attained in this way, then the feelings of any kind of pleasure is absent in the
liberated person because in that state, in the absence of physical body , no knowledge will
arise in the self as well as no feelings of pleasure has been admitted. However, according
to all the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers from Gautama to Gangesa, it must be admitted
that the state of liberation is like a stone which is devoid of all kinds of pleasure and pain
and it seems to be a matter (jada) as the self is completely removed from all kinds of
sufferings. After considering the various conceptions of moksa, Dr. Radhakrishnan says,
“All views argue that eternal life is an absolute fulfillment of what we are, the final
affirmation of our progressive self-finding”16.

During the survey of the Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of liberation, it is worth nothing
that there is a tendency to formulate increasingly technical definitions of the key term.
The highest freedom is described in the Vaisesika system as the negation of all empirical
content in the self. Sridhara, in his Nyayakandalitika, has described the state of liberation
as the absolute destruction of the nine specific qualities of the self. These nine specific
qualities are: Intelligence (buddhi), pleasure(sukha), pain(duhkha), desire (iccha),
Aversion(dvesa),conation(prayatna), righteousness(dharma), unrighteousness(adharma),
and predisposition due to past experiences(samskara) . All these become extinct,
according to the Vaisesika, in the state of transcendental freedom. Hence, it is a state of
freedom not only from pleasures and pains, but also from intelligence or consciousness, a state therefore of unconsciousness or absolute cessation of all experience in the self. It is, therefore, not even a state of self-knowledge, though according to the *Vaisesikas*, it is produced by self-knowledge, and the accomplishment of the unconditional duties. The *Vaisesika* contend that though it is a state of negation of all experiences, yet it is a state of felicity, i.e. of the felicity or satisfaction that belongs by nature to the self. This is how the *Vaisesika* meet the objection of the critics who say that *Vaisesika’s moksa* is indistinguishable from the unconsciousness of material bodies such as that of a pebble or a piece of wood. The *Vaisesikasutras* present liberation as a state where the two necessary conditions for the arising of another body are absent. These two conditions are said to be the conjunction of the internal organ with the self, and a certain ‘unseen force’ (*adrsta*) which is instrumental in producing transmigration. It is probable that Kanada equates this unseen force with the accumulation of *karma* which he mentions in the *Sutra*. If so, a person may be held to be liberated either when his karma becomes inoperative or when his internal organ is disjoined from his self. The later condition is achieved through *samadhi*.

In this context, it is worth nothing that whereas the sutrakaras accounts were compatible with the conception of liberation as a state, perhaps of *samadhi*, achieved through yoga while the body lives, Vatsyayana’s discussion clearly suggests that he conceives of liberation as setting in when the last embodiment of the freed self has died. Prasastapada’s view is the same. Uddyotakara explicitly distinguishes two kinds of perfection: lower, when one is still working off old *karma*, and the higher, when all the old *karma* has been worked off. Thus it seems that there has been nothing to suggest a
divergence between the *Nyaya* and *Vaisesika* conceptions. Again, Sridhara’s list of current theories is not extensive as well as suggestive. He evidently believes in *jivanmukti*, liberation while living, since he cites the Vedas. Udayana defines liberation as the final cessation of sorrow, but his way with other conception is original. He asserts that one must pass through various stages of realization corresponding to the freedoms held by other classical Indian philosophical systems before finally reaching the highest state of indifference (*Kaivalya*). On Udayana’s view, such an experience is not enough; one must have a Naiyayikas discursive knowledge of reality as well as a truly devotional attitude.

Udayana, also expressed the fact that liberation for all (*sarvamukti*) is possible and a legitimate end to strive for, reminds us of the Buddhist notion of the “*Bodhisattva*” who delays liberation in order to work for the salvation of all. Sridhara, on the other hand, denies this view. However, it must be pointed out that the analysis of the nature of liberation according to the *Nyaya* School is very much different from that of the *Vaisesika* School. Though these two schools are considered to ‘*samanatantra*’, it must be mentioned that the concept of these two schools do not totally agree with the doctrine of another. Dr. Umesh Misra points out that there appears to be no doubt that even in the earliest literature of the schools known to us we recognize distinct and unmistakable points of affinity between them, not only in the general metaphysical position, but even in several minor details. The differences to are ‘equally marked’, Like almost all other schools of Indian thought, *Nyaya* and *Vaisesika* aim at the realization of *moksa* as their summum bonum. But they differ in their method of treatment. *Nyaya*, as represented by Gautama, begins mainly as a logical system emphasizing the means of right knowledge.
According to this system, true knowledge depends upon the critical examination of objects by means of right knowledge. Hence, the entire importance is laid on the various means of right knowledge themselves. But, on the other hand, the standpoint of Vaisesika, is entirely different. It lays stress on the ontological aspect of the cosmic order. According to it, the critical examination of the six categories into which the entire field of existence is divided leads to the realization of the summum bonum. The treatment of the means of right knowledge is only subsidiary.

**The path to attain liberation**

The question of the right means or the right path of realizing spiritual freedom has been very earnestly treated by the different classical Indian philosophical systems. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that there is a controversy regarding the attainment of liberation. The controversy centers round the question of the relative importance and efficacy of the works (karma), knowledge (jnana) and faith (bhakti) as the path to the realization of the absolute life. The main issue in this controversy is, as to whether one of these courses can be held sufficient for the spiritual life or whether an organization of different courses is necessary. This is really the question of the organization of the personal life, i.e., as to whether one of these courses can be held sufficient for the spiritual life or whether an organization of different courses is necessary, in other words, as to whether one ideal is to be the supreme or absolute ideal in terms of which all other ideals are to be valid, or whether there is to be a balancing and equilibration and harmonious cultivation of the different ideals. In the classical Indian system, this latter is known as samuccayavada or doctrine of co-ordination as distinguished from the doctrine of a single and exclusive ideal.
In this context, the possible logical alternatives are given and these are:

The liberation can be attained only through work (*karma*), or through knowledge (*jnana*), or through mere faith (*bhakti*). The liberation may be attained with the help of two paths, i.e. through work and knowledge, or through work and faith or through knowledge and faith.

Further, the liberation may be attained through the co-ordination (*samuccaya*) of works (*karma*), knowledge (*jnana*) and faith (*bhakti*), all the three. However, it is noticed that mere works without knowledge or faith are of no use. Therefore, the alternatives of only works and the works with knowledge and faith as preparatory are not considered.

In this context, the consideration has been made regarding the path of liberation from the perspective of the different Indian philosophical schools. The school of *Samkhya-yoga*, the school of *Purva Mimamsa* and the school of *Advaita-vedanta* and the *Visistadvaita vedanta* has been considered as the opponents (*purvapaksa*) of the *Nyaya-Vaisesikas* school and all of these views have been discussed in this section, through not in details.

It is noticed, that the *Samkhya* School insist on the course of mere knowledge as the proper means of *moksa* or liberation. The *Samkhya-yoga*, like the other schools of Indian thought emphasizes that man must first rise above the life of sensual impulse and act as a fully moral being before entering to the path of liberation. This means that liberation can be attained only by a morally elevated person, and thus implies that leading a moral life is a necessary condition for attaining liberation. Actually, from the various supportive documents of the *Samkhya-yoga* philosophy, it is observed that the *Samkhya* is silent
regarding the method of attaining the direct knowledge that results in liberation. The 
yoga, on the other hand, is mainly concerned with its elaboration.

The philosophy of the two schools expounded the fact that the jiva falsely identifies itself 
with the psycho-physical organism, and performs deeds – righteous and unrighteous- and 
experiences their fruits by undergoing an unending cycle of births and deaths. This 
process of cyclic existence involves suffering caused by the disorders of the body or 
mental unrest (adhyatmika), by men, beasts, and birds (adhibhautika), and by the 
influence of planets and the elemental agencies (adhidaivika) and it is oppressive in 
nature. The jiva can hope to find permanent freedom from this suffering only by 
completely getting rid of avidya, i.e. by attaining non- discrimination (aviveka) between 
the purusa and prakrti and its evolutes which has resulted in the confounding of the two. 
The extinction of avidya is possible only through the direct knowledge that the purusa is 
absolutely distinct from prakrti and its evolutes (viveka-khyati). This discriminative 
knowledge (Vivekakhyati) of purusa and prakrti leads to freedom of the self by 
destroying purusa’s attachment to prakrti. According to the Samkhya School the secular 
as well as the spiritual work are perishable and both involve the impurities of destruction 
of life and the like and therefore, can not lead to any lasting fruition, or to any satisfaction 
which is pure and unmixed. This holds good also of the conditional (Kamya) as well as 
the unconditional (Akamya) scriptural duties. But, the yoga philosophy, however, 
recognizes some other forms of works as necessary for purification and for destruction of 
the subtle tendencies and dispositions which disturb the practice of meditation. These are 
the works of self-restraint (yamas) and of self-regulation (niyamas). Certain physical aids 
such as postures (asanas) are also useful for meditation. Besides these, Patanjali says,
“God (Isvara) bestows the direct knowledge which results in release to those aspirants who are worthy of receiving it. Thus, according to Patanjali, works are not to be abjured altogether, but the Sattvika works as conducive to true knowledge must be performed duly till knowledge is attained.

The Purva- Mimamsa School is of the view that souls are beginning less and indestructible. The association, with the three fold world, namely, the body through which they experience pleasure and pain, the sense organs which are instrumental in getting the experiences and the objects such as sound, is bondage for them. The souls are associated with the three fold world due to their acts. The acts are of four kinds, i.e., nitya, naimittika, kamya and nisiddha. The non-performance of the nitya acts such as sandhya vandana and the naimittika acts like the sraddha ceremony which are obligatory following the death of father or mother, do produce adharma the accumulation of which is the main cause of pain. Similarly, the performance of the nisiddha acts such as causing injury to others, etc., also produces adharma and through that causes pain. The kamya acts, which are performed with the desire to get some result, generate dharma, and through that, pleasure. Thus, mimamsaka believes that it is the non-performance of certain acts and also the performance of certain other acts that make a person suffer in bondage.

In order to get absolute emancipation from bondage, the school advises that a person, desirous of this should, without fail, perform the nitya and naimittika acts. The performance of such acts does not produce any dharma but will prevent the generation of adharma which would have been produced by their non-performance. Similarly, the
mumukṣu should also desist from doing the prohibited acts and also the kāmya acts. While the non-performance of the prohibited acts prevents the generation of adharma, the non-performance of the kāmya acts would prevent the production of dharma. Thus, by performing the nitya and naimittika acts regularly, and by not performing the kāmya and nisiddha acts, the mumukṣu would reach a stage at which no new dharma or adharma, the root causes of bondage, is produced, but only the past-deeds accumulated in the previous births would remain. The past deeds also will be exhausted as soon as the mumukṣu has experienced the fruits of those deeds. Thus, he will attain a state where he does not have any dharma or adharma. Since, dharma and the adharma are the causes of all the pleasures and pains, in the absence of the cause; he will not have any pleasure or pain, the effects of dharma and adharma. Since, the body through which the soul has to experience pleasures and pain is a result of the deeds, after the annihilation of all dharma and adharma, the soul will not get a new body. This state of the soul without having any body and without having any experience of pleasure and pain is according to the mimamsaka, the state of salvation.

The Advaita Vedanta philosophy, specially. Samkara, has recognized a certain efficacy in works for cittasuddhi or purification of mind, but works are not absolutely necessary in every case. Thus, men may be born pure of mind or may attain purification independently of works. In such cases, works are not necessary, and knowledge of Brahman leads to moksa, without the aid of works. In all cases, works cease with the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman, through in some cases works may prepare for such knowledge through purification of mind. In the Bhamati tika on Samkara bhasya on the Vedanta Sutra, four different views of works as being conducive to knowledge are considered.
Thus, according to one view, works have only a negative efficacy in conducing to *moksa*. The second view shows that the efficacy of works is not merely negative but also positive. Thus, works become conducive to *moksa* through an intervening merit (*samskara*) which it generates in the agent. Thus moralized and righteously disposed through the accomplishment of the works enjoined, the individual turns to unceasing and earnest meditation on the nature of reality.

According to a third view, the efficacy of works consists in the cancellation of the debts or obligations that stand in the way of *moksa*. Thus, an individual is under a three fold obligations in the empirical life. He has obligations to the Gods, to the forefathers and to the religious teachers or sages. All these obligations are sources of bondage and effect of works is to ensure freedom through the fulfillment of these obligations. According to a fourth view, it is not merely the unconditional works or duties that are efficacious in conducing to *moksa* in the ways explained above but also the prudential works or duties enjoined for the satisfaction of empirical wants. It is true they lead to no other than empirical ends. But, in the case of those who aim at *moksa*, they also are useful as being conducive to the meditation which leads at last to *moksa*.

Thus, according to some Indian schools, only unconditional works are conducive to *moksa*, and according to others, the efficacy of unconditional as well as conditional works consists in conducing to the meditation which leads to *moksa* either (1) by removing the accumulated sins, or (2) by generating a merit which removes the taint of sin by leading to earnest meditation, or (3) by canceling the bonds of the obligations. It will be observed that according to this view the lines of works and knowledge do not run
concurrently as in the doctrine of samuccaya or co-ordination. In the samuccaya doctrine, works (karma) and knowledge (jnana) are equally contributory to, i.e., co-ordinate causes of moksa. Here, works are made subordinate to knowledge as conducive to the latter. Hence, in this view works are conducive to knowledge and knowledge is conducive to moksa while in the samuccaya doctrine works and knowledge are jointly conducive to moksa. According to the samuccaya view, the unconditional duties are obligatory for the purpose of self purification and cultivation of dispassion or ethical disinterestedness. Hence, these duties are to be performed duly in all stages till moksa is attained, i.e., their performance should continue even when knowledge has resulted from self purification.

The Visistadaita Vedantins, like, Ramanuja explain their view of Karma as a means to the realization of moksa. The unconditional duties are to be performed without desire for the consequence even after the attainment of knowledge. This school has emphasized on the necessity of bhakti, faith, in addition to karma and knowledge. Thus, according to them, karma and knowledge must culminate in faith (bhakti) and love (prema) before there can be release in the true sense. Moreover, according to this school, the discipline of karma and the discipline of knowledge are not in themselves sufficient, it is only as they culminate in the discipline of bhakti or faith, that they attain their true end by being conducive to moksa.

According to Ramanuja, the steps in the realization of moksa are:-

1. The abjuration of jnanotpattiwirodhi Karma: i.e., of actions which are obstacles to divine knowledge? These are the unrighteous actions (papa) as well as the prudential actions (kamyakarma) prompted by desire.
2. The proper accomplishment of the unconditional duties without desire for the consequence. These duties are the auxiliaries of divine knowledge. These auxiliaries of absolute knowledge and faith which is the transfiguration of such knowledge are purification, dispassion, etc. Hence, karmas are binding in all stages of life, only for moksa they must be done without desire for the consequence.

3. Knowledge (jnana) which is meant only for Brahmajnana or knowledge of the absolute.

4. Faith (bhakti) which is defined as the true representation of the ultimate reality which is continued and intense meditation becomes transformed into a presentation or intuition.

It will be observed that with exception of the Bhakti school of Theism and the atheistic school of the Purva mimamsa, there is general agreement among the Indian school as to the negative conception of the ideal life as essentially a state of quiescence.

However, explaining and analyzing the views of the different Indian philosophical systems, it is worth mentioning that the Nyaya-Vaisesika’s view is somehow similar to the Ramanuja’s view, though, to some extent, the later view goes beyond the Nyaya-Vaisesika’s view.

In this connection, the Nyaya-Vaisesika’s conception of liberation has been explained elaborately. It will be observed that the cycle of life and its miseries, according to the
Nyaya framework is wrong knowledge (mithyajnana), passion (dosa), activities (pravrtti) with merit and demerit (dharm-adharma), birth into life (janma), misery and suffering (duhkha). In the second sutra 19 of Nyaya sutra, Gautama explicitly presents the chain of causal conditions leading to Bondage. The chain begins with wrong knowledge, which is the necessary condition for faults (dosa), which are in turn productive of activity, which results in rebirth, which is the cause of sorrow. It is clear from what Gautama suggests to say that are seeking liberation from sorrow is to break into this condition for faults being lacking, they in turn will not arise, and activity as a result will not either, nor will birth nor sorrow. And absence of sorrow is liberation. This true knowledge, Gautama explains, is to be achieved by the classical methods of concentration, meditation and Yoga, but he significantly adds that one may get it by discussion with others.

On the contrary, it is noticed from the analysis of the concept of liberation of the Vaisesika system, that how does Kanada exclude knowledge in his account of liberation? The Vaisesika sutra presents the following picture of the path to be followed in seeking freedom: One should behave according to Vedic precepts, this produces merit (dharma) and eventually exaltation (abhyudaya), whereas impure behavior produces demerit (adharma). Bondage (samsara) however, is caused by both merit and demerit. It is because of our attitudes of desire and aversions that one should act in ways which produce more Karma and these attitudes have as a necessary organ (manas) and the self of the individual person. It becomes clear that the method of liberation involving gaining control over one’s internal organ. Yoga is the control of that organ so that it does not come into contact with the external sense organs, when such contact causes, there is no

286
more feeling of pleasure and pain for the individual and this in turn stifles any desires or aversions.

Now, the attempts have been made by both of these schools and these two schools proceed to the details of precisely how wrong knowledge is produced and the methods by which it is to be eradicated. The more traditional view is that one must treat a combined path of knowledge and action (jnanakarmasamuccayavada). The author of the Nyayakandali, has defined the fact that one must still perform the actions prescribed in the Vedas even after he has embarked on a discipline leading to liberation.

By comparisons, Naiyayikas tend to be surprisingly conservative. Udayana, in his Kiranavali, may perhaps constitute an exception to this general assessment. He points out that activity prescribed by the Vedas is intended to gain advantage for the agent, and that in so far as that is the case one cannot, explain the actions of ascetics as enjoined, since they do not act purposively. Hence, according to Nyaya, meditation, on the nature of things is the cause of Moksa.

In the sutra, Gautama has explained that the co-ordination of Karma and jnana is necessary for attaining the highest value of life. The right knowledge of the self is needed to eradicate the false knowledge as well as the Naiyayikas, especially Gautama and his commentator, Vatsyayana, has expressed the fact that the practice of the internal discipline like yama, niyama that has been accepted by the Yoga school, should also be learnt. The self will become purified by the means of these internal disciplines. By these two words, “yama” and “niyama”, it may be suggested to mean the obligatory deeds (nitya karmas) and the occasional deeds (naimittika karma). However, the internal
discipline consists of penance, controlling of the breath, abstraction of the mind, contemplation and concentration of the mind. The practice of the renouncing of objects of sense serves to remove attachment and hatred. The other methods consists of the details of conduct laid down for yoga, such as concentrating of the mind, eating only particular kinds of food, not staying at one place for any length of time and so forth. In this stage, the seeker of liberation must desist from performance of optional deeds, and indulgence in the forbidden ones. He must pursue the obligatory and occasional deeds without a desire for gaining thereby any fruit. This is the same as the Gita discipline of disinterested duty. Thus, by practicing the “yama” and “niyama”, the “merit” (dharma) arises in one’s self, which, according to Gautama, and “Sridhara, leads to self-purification (atmasamskara). Visvanath, in his Nyayasutravrtti, interprets it as “fitness of the self to attain liberation”.

This qualification acquired through the ethical training and it enables the aspirant to enter upon the second stage of the discipline which is predominantly intellectual and which comprises three factors, i.e., sravana or formal study, manana or reflection and nididhyasana or meditation. The virtuous person first learns from a proper preceptor that the true nature of the self is distinct from the body-mind-sense complex and also from the features like knowledge, happiness, misery etc., which are adventitious to it and with which it has falsely identified it self. This stage of training is called “sravana”. After the stage of sravana, the aspirant must argue himself based on reasoning and convince himself that what he has learnt through sravana is true. This stage of training is called manana. This secures intellectual conviction about the truth of this self. The knowledge of the self that is derived through sravana and manana is mediate in nature.
Hence, what is needed is that this mediate knowledge must transform into direct experience. This can be done by the method of dhyana or nididhyasana which Gautama says yoga or samadhi. It consists in focusing the mind upon the self to the exclusion of everything else by with drawing the senses from their respective objects. When practiced successfully, it results in a direct knowledge of the self as distinct from objects, beginning with the physical body and ending in misery, the objects with which it entertained earlier the false notion of identification owing to mithyajñana. The later is removed by tattvajñana or the direct experience of the true nature of the self.

The knower of the truth would continue to live till the portion of the merits and demerits accumulated by the self in its previous lives (sancitakarma) is exhausted the portion which is known as prarabdha karma in a live force and it must exhaust itself out, as nothing could prevent it from functioning in the intervening period. The sancita karma, according to Jayanta, will be rendered ineffective by the lower of tattvajñana. According to Vacaspati Misra, the realized soul will take many bodies and experience the fruits of the entire sancita karma at a stretch. Further notion of “I” in respect of the body-mind-sense complex. As such, he cannot engage himself in any activity with the sense of agency of the form “I am the agent of this action”. Consequently, no merit or demerit would taint him in the least. Such a one who is free from sancita karma that has not yet fructified, and who is living out only his prarabdha karma which has fructified is called a jivan-mukti- one who is liberated and yet alive. This state of jivan-mukti is admitted by Uddyotakara, Vacaspati Misra, Visvanath, Udayana and Jayanta Bhatta. When the prarabdha karma is exhausted after giving forth its fruit, the body of the jivan mukti would fall off, and he would remain as the self free from the mine qualities which
were adventitiously foisted upon it. The self would become free from worldliness and would remain in its intrinsic nature. The mind, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, is eternal, and being so it would exist along with the self. But, its presence is quite inoperative then, and is inefficacious in giving forth knowledge and other qualities.

Moreover, in the Vaisesika Sutra, Kanada has explained that moksa or liberation can take place when there exists the actions of the soul.\textsuperscript{28} In this connection, Prasastapada, in his bhasya, has explained the necessity of nivartaka dharma. The Vaisesika have argued that the ordinary person should perform the pravartaka dharma. For him, ‘the ordinary persons’ signifies the person who has the false notion of ‘I’ in respect of the body-mind-sense complex and in this stage, his tendency will be to do actions more of the nature of virtuous actions. But this does not preclude his absolute non-performance of vicious actions. In this stage, the ordinary person, though become virtuous, is not liberated. After this stage, the seeker of liberation (mumuksu) will perform certain kind of action without any desire. Prasastapada says that while performing the nivarttaka dharma, the atmajnana must be present and it is coherent with the dharma. At the time of getting this type of atmajnana regarding the difference of the self and the not-self, the virtuous person becomes the person ‘virakta’\textsuperscript{29} in the sense that he has no desire or attraction and aversion towards any worldly beings. Thus, in performing the nivrtti laksana dharma, the virtuous person feels a special kind of pleasure and that is total self-satisfaction, which the Vaisesikas have called ‘santosa sukham’.\textsuperscript{30} This pleasure is present in all over his body and bodily moments. After attaining the nivrttilaksana dharma, the virtuous person attains the right knowledge of the self and in this state, all of his attractions and aversion cease to exist and the physical body of the person will also be abolished. After the
abolition of the physical body, the person attains liberation (Videha mukti). Thus, it is worth-mentioning that the ethics of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school has emphasized upon the self’s struggle to overcome its worldliness by the cultivation of moral goodness.

At the culminating part of this chapter, this issue can be exemplified that when an absolutely ethical individual strives to achieve the ultimate goal of life, then what would be the exact relationship between morality and the ultimate goal of life? In this connection, this would be necessarily to juxtapose both the concept of immortality and side by side the image of spiritual goal along with the moral process of attaining it. The immortality of the individual man which is not only a mere continuance of existence, but an experience of the spiritual nature of man, has not been considered as a further projection of life in society. Though the karma theory implies such a continuation of human life, yet everywhere in Indian thought this repetition of man’s struggle in society and in him as that of good against evil is supposed to end completely with the realization of the spiritual nature of man.

Actually, morality is a conflict of human nature in which the two opposites, good and the evil, right or wrong can be easily interfused. Therefore, the oscillation between the dual aspects of the true nature of man, truly exists- the contradiction between the higher and the lower. A man is proved to be a moral when the right perspective and the good emotion are intermingled to each other in the appropriate sense along with a perfect avoidance of evil in him. On the other hand, the man has been renounced as spiritual only when his goodness is afflicted with a tinge of spontaneity and the evil has been totally repudiated. Though moral values and the spiritual nature of man are utterly distinct, but
they are not to be necessarily found in their separation while the latter extends and transfers the former. The wisdom which is achieved by men in their mystical status, defies all attempts to express it, ultimately forms the core of their existence. Actually, this wisdom without demolishing their personality makes it richer, intermingling with it the virtue of kindness, love and compassion. On the other hand, it may be enunciated from this perspective that this mystical status can hardly be correlated with the worldly experiences but their effect on men is of tremendous significance. But, wisdom is not sufficient to attain the ultimate goal of life. The individual’s action is an indispensable fact to attain the ultimate goal of life. The Nyāya school of thought is not an exception to it. Their philosophy, not only explicates the ethical discipline as a pre-requisite of acquiring knowledge, but also affirms the two to be mutually complementary.
Notes and References


2. *Nyayasutra* of Gautama, 4.1.65, ibid

3. 4.1.67, *Nyayasutra*, ibid

4. See Chapter, *What is Karma?* in this dissertation


7. Ibid, Introduction

8. Dr. Ganganath Jha, *Purva Mimamsa in its Sources*, Benaras Hindu University, Benaras, 1942, p-31


10. 1.1.2, *Nyayasutra*, ibid

293

12. “*Tatsiddhametannitya samvedyamanena sukhena visista atyantiki dukkhanivrtti purusasya moksaḥ*” conclusion, *Nyayasara*, by Bhasarvajna, with the commentaries *Nyayamuktavali* of Aparakadeva and *Nyayakalanidhi* of Ananadanubhava, edited by S. Subrahmanya Sastri and V.Subrahmanya Sastri, Govt. Oriental Manuscripts library, Madras, 1961


14. *Laksana* or the ‘Indirect signifying power’ exists in a term. It is the relation (of a term) to what is ‘directly signified’ (*sakya*) of it. *Lasana* is of three kinds: i) *jahat – laksana*, ii) *ajahat laksana*, iii) *jahat – ajahat laksana*. I) where there is absence of logical connection (*anvaya*) of the ‘direct significate’, it is an instance of *jahat laksana*, e.g. ‘the platforms (*mancaḥ*) are shouting (*krosanti*)’, ii) where there is a logical connection not merely of the indirect significate , but also of the direct significate of a term with other significates, it is an instance of *ajahat laksana*. iii) where there is a logical connection of one part of the ‘direct significate’ (with other significate) after the leaving out of another part, it is an instance of *jahat-ajahat laksana*. E.g. ‘that art Thu’ (*Tattvamasi*), *Tarkasamgraha –Dipika* on *Tarkasamgraha*, by Annambhatta, translated and elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Progressive publishers, Calcutta, 1976


17. *Yoga sutra*, 1.24-29, 2.45, with the commentaries, *Yoga Bhasya of Vyasa*, edited and translated into Bengali with editor’s Bengali commentary by Purnachandra Vedanta chunchu, Calcutta, 1898

18. *Nitya karmas* - the actions which are to be done simply because a scripture requires that they be done and no reason to be asked to justify why they should be done. *Naimittika Karmas* – the actions which are to be performed when some special things happen. *Kamya karmas* – these are to be performed when an individual wants to achieve some objective, *Nisiddha karma* – these are actions the doing of which is prohibited by a scripture.


20. *Tadarthansyama niyamabhyatma- samskaro yogacca dhyatma vidhyupaaigh, 4.2.46, Nyayasutra* of Gautama, ibid.
21. *Sarieasadhanapeksam nityam karma tadyamah niyamastu sa yat Karmanitya magantusadhanam- Amarkosa, Brahmavargov, 48/49*

22. *Atmanah apavargaksmata, Nyayasutravrtti, by Visvanath, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 2003, p-1096*


24. 4.2.38, and 4.2.46, ibid


30. ibid, p-448-469