CHAPTER V

AUSTRALIA'S DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENCE CAPABILITIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
With the end of the Cold War the whole international strategic environment has changed considerably. Australia and the rest of the world are now relatively free from fear of nuclear war and conventional war between the major powers. Though the fear generated by the Cold War is a thing of the past it is a period of transition of uncertain duration which is described as the "new world disorder". This transitional period is in fact a period of complex diverse and inherently unpredictable events in the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, the post-Cold War Soviet Union has disintegrated. The Soviet forces, once which were widely and actively maintained throughout the Asian-Pacific region, have been taken over by Russia and gradually withdrawn northward. The capabilities which were maintained in Vietnam and Indian Ocean region have been all but removed. Though the Pacific fleet with some three dozen nuclear submarines, some fifty major surface combatants and more than forty naval fighters and bomber aircraft, is still capable of regaining its power, at the moment it is bound to its home base due to severe economic crisis and lack of operational roles.¹ The future of the United States' presence in the region is rather uncertain. The bases, facilities and forces it maintained in the Philippines were closed in November 1992. Some of its forces have been redistributed elsewhere in the region, especially to Hawai and the United States' west coast, and to a lesser extent to Japan and Singapore, but some will soon be withdrawn from the region entirely. Even in the Indian Ocean region US naval forces have been reduced. Overall the United States' capabilities in the region were reduced by about 20 percent in the early 1990s.² One of the main reasons for the U.S. withdrawal from the region is insufficient political attention which it pays to the region. There is a widespread belief in many

Asian capitals that the US does not have the will to maintain its forces and perhaps over
the longer term lose its economic capacity. Some Asian countries believe that an
American withdrawal is inevitable or at least, that the U.S. is losing its ability to balance
the growing Japanese and Chinese capabilities.

In the post-Cold War era, Australia has drawn attention upon three main issues. Firstly, the nature of the post-Cold War international order.³ Australia's focus on the
substance of international strategic competition has broader economic and technological
implications. This factor is increasingly important and this has introduced new
dimensions to the concept of power in international relations. The communist collapse
in the Soviet Union due to the crisis of capitalism and the economic ideology of Marxism
that could not uphold their economy, failing which it meant that they could never catch
up with the West. Russian technological means of production could never catch up with
the Third Industrial Revolution encompassing precision engineering. Examining the two
non-nuclear powers Japan and Germany, as major international actors despite their
limited defence forces and strategic vulnerabilities is a result of their economic strength.
The ability to achieve national goals and national interests has more to do with the
economic and technological strength than military force because military build-up can
harm national interests.

Secondly, the concept of security in this new international environment, Australia
has been considering the factors, that constitute security in the Indian and Pacific Ocean
region. The redefinition of the concept of security emerged from a series of official
reviews of Australia's strategic circumstances that were conducted from the mid-1970s
which culminated in the defence White Paper of 1987 and Senator Evan's Regional

Security Statement of December 1989. Those papers drew together several aspects of security. They provided an overall intellectual framework or philosophy of security that brought together military, diplomatic, economic and other dimensions. The new school of thought argued a strategic, moral and legal case for the restructuring of the strategic doctrine of force posture along demonstrably defensive or non-threatening lines. It was encapsulated in the rather imprecise term "common security". Common security advocates a minimum nuclear deterrence cooperation with the adversary as opposed to unilateral zero-sum thinking, a broader definition of security than the military dimensions, arms control and confidence building measures. It offers a basis for a cooperative model of international security in contrast to a competitive model of power politics. Senator Evans stated at the ASEAN Prime Ministers' Conference's closing session in Manila on 24 July 1992: "This is the central idea of the notion of common security which as I said at a conference in Tokyo last year, 'despite its intellectual origin a few years ago among European Social Democrats, is not a security policy for wimps.' Nothing in the idea implies passivity or appeasement in the face of a security threat. It does not involve emasculating anybody's military forces, nor removing our capability to respond to direct threats to our nations, nor denying the legitimacy of a collective military response as in the Gulf to threats to the international security framework. It does induce the idea that lasting security lies not in an upwards spiral of arms development, fuelled by mutual suspicion, but in a commitment to taking into account the legitimate, security anxieties of the other, to building step by step military confidence between nations and to working in a number of ways to maximise the degree of interdependence between nations. In this manner Australia should concentrate more on
the common security of neighbouring states for their common cause and security in the region.

Thirdly, the regional security policy, owing to unstable and unpredictable states events. Australia’s regional security policy is to protect its physical integrity, that is the protection of the territory, including the maritime territory, from armed attack or the threat of armed attack, and to maintain a positive security and strategic environment in the region. The region encompasses South East Asia, the South Pacific and the eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean.

I. ASIAN POWER EMERGENCE

Australia has experienced that ever since the withdrawal of US naval forces and the collapse of the Soviet Union the regional security environment has become much more complex and uncertain than what prevailed during the Cold War. There are now major actors on the stage in particular, Japan and China, and over the longer term, India. There are numerous issues of dispute involving competing territorial claims and challenges to government legitimacy some of which could potentially escalate into a major regional conflict. Most countries are determined to enhance their defence and self-reliance to enable them to deal better with regional contingencies on the basis of their own resources. Many countries are engaged in substantial defence build-ups involving the acquisition of advanced maritime and air defence capabilities. Several countries are acquiring particularly new technologies, such as ballistic missiles or weapons of mass
destruction such as nuclear or chemical weapons, which are extremely alarming in the region.  

In fact, Australia foresaw the emerging power of Asian countries such as China, Japan, India and ASEAN countries currently they are becoming more active in the region. China is the largest power in Asia and could well emerge as the world's largest economic power by the second decade of the twenty-first century. According to the IISS's Military Balance 1995-96, "...there is a consensus among independent analysts outside China on two counts: Chinese military expenditure is much higher than revealed by the Chinese defence budget, and its military expenditure has increased sharply in real terms since 1989...." There is no doubt that the Chinese have the most active nuclear weapons programme in the world. China's power projection capabilities into the Western Pacific and Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, the Chinese are concerned by the Japanese and the Indian naval expansion because both have capabilities for power projection in the region.

China too has national interests in the Indian Ocean. A Chinese naval official stated that Beijing did not recognise that the Indian Ocean belonged to India, especially as a significant proportion of China's seaborne trade flows through it. With the recent development and acquisition of modern weapons capabilities by the Chinese which are generating strong apprehensions throughout Asia and the Pacific region it has become

6 MS.Dabbs Higgis, "Asia Pacific is defined as the triangular region stretching from India down New Zealand and up to China to Japan", *Asia Pacific: Its Role in the New World Orders*
clear that China has a powerful nuclear arms. Countries like Taiwan, India, Australia, and the members of ASEAN are compelled to increase their capabilities to counter the Chinese naval power in the region. There is a fair chance that in East Asia there might be an arms race between China and Japan in the first decade of the next century.

Japan has the most capable conventional military forces in Asia. In fact, Japan solidly depends on the Indian Ocean because most of her export and import passes through the Indian Ocean. Japan tries to maintain a cordial relationship with the Indian Ocean littoral states. Regarding maritime operations, Japan's strategic reach is currently increasing and it is already involved in maritime operations up to 1000 nautical miles from the Japanese coast which takes it down almost to the Philippines. Besides this, Japan also has a substantial and very modern naval force, including some 100 maritime combat aircraft, 63 major surface combatants and eighteen submarines. Japan is also building several Yukikaze-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis system; it is modernising its submarine fleet, it is planning to acquire tanker aircraft to extend the range of its air coverage and is also considering the acquisition of defensive aircraft that has attracted the attention of defence planners in China, Australia and some ASEAN countries and has also raised some apprehension. In July 1991 on the occasions of ASEAN's Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) the former Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, said: "Japan sought a role to fulfil our political obligations in the Asia-Pacific region in the future."

8 Times of India (New Delhi), 22 July 1997.
9 ibid, p.5.
India has also made no secret of its desire to engage in power projection with its maritime forces in the Asia-Pacific region. India's naval expansion was rather slow because of budget constraints over the past few years. However, India is committed to plans for the acquisition of another aircraft carrier, more surface combatants, more Dornier-288 long-range maritime patrol aircraft and a modern conventional and nuclear-powered submarine fleet. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are undergoing massive upgraded fleet facilities. There are air and naval facilities under development only 90 nautical miles from the northern coast of Sumatra. There are hindrances to Indian naval expansion in East Asia because China supports the authoritarian regime in Myanmar, where China has reportedly received access to a naval base in Hanggyi and on the Coco Islands just north of India's Andaman Islands. There is the possibility of a nuclear arms race between India and China in the next century in the Indian Ocean.

The ASEAN countries have become the fastest growing arms market in the world. Most of the ASEAN countries are presently engaged in major arms acquisition programmes, involving the modernisation and enhancement of air and maritime capabilities. The ASEAN states had already acquired about 300 new fighters and strike aircraft. All the ASEAN countries except the Philippines are transforming their naval capabilities from essentially surface warfare oriented patrol boat/coastal forces to navies with greater range and a broader spread of capabilities. The regional navies are now all equipped with Harpoon and/or Exocet anti-ship missiles. They are also acquiring maritime surveillance and modern fighter aircraft which can be used in maritime attack

13 Mack, n.2, p.163.
roles. Singapore has eight F-16s, Thailand eighteen, Indonesia twelve while Malaysia possesses eight F-18s and eighteen MiG-29s. Both Malaysia and Brunei have frigates and patrol craft which are fitted with Exocets. Most of the ASEAN countries are seriously considering acquiring submarines.

II. AUSTRALIA IS RETHINKING OF ITS MARITIME STRATEGY

In the post-Cold War period, Australia has seen neighbouring countries massively acquiring maritime capabilities of creating complexity and uncertainty in the region. While acknowledging the danger of nuclear weapons and the new era of instability in the region, Australia too is reconsidering its strategic plan for the twenty-first century. In 1993, Defence Minister Robert Ray informed Parliament that,

predicability in security matters has declined. International relations are now more complex, fluid and uncertain. They are not necessarily unfavourable but they do place new challenges on defence policy making. The Asia-Pacific region is now less predictable than when super power constraint was in evidence and Asian countries are continuing to modernise their defence forces.\(^\text{14}\)

Paul Dibb an analyst of defence issues in Australia argues that 'great Asian powers' are emerging. He also stated that "the strategic situation facing Australia's defence planners over the next ten or fifteen years is likely to be more complex and uncertain than we have experienced for some very considerable time."\(^\text{15}\) He identified China as an ambitious power with the potential to contend with the US for leadership in the twenty-first century. Huntington has also contended that,

a sort of pan-Asian confidence is rapidly emerging that rejects Western values.... China as the next hegemonic challenger and affirms that Asian

\(^{14}\) Australia, 18 October 1993.

\(^{15}\) Addressing a National Maritime Conference in November 1993.
powers, especially China, have demonstrated old-fashion attitudes to nationalism, state sovereignty and the use of force.

Besides China, Japan is also one of the fastest growing military powers in the world today because of its rich economic resources. Australia cannot ignore the capabilities of Japan in view of Australia's experience in the Second World War. Memories of Japanese bombing Darwin are still vivid. The Japanese are re-emerging as a significant political player in the Pacific as well as in the Indian Ocean. Melachlan's defence minister comments that "ADF needs to be more assertive against potential Asian military threats with expanded air power and strike weapons."  

With these factors arising in the region Australia has been re-positioning the ADF for the future as described in a recent official document Definding Australia (Defence White Paper 1994), which looks ahead to the year 2000 and beyond. It notes that the end of the Cold War has brought about new uncertainties about the future strategic situation in the region, and that it may result in a deteriorating security environment for Australia. In these changed circumstances, a new Australian evaluation of the strategic situation and White Paper spelling out a new defence policy would seem clearly necessary. In the 1994 White Paper the main focus of Australian defence priorities have changed little in response to the new external circumstances, in Australia's region of interest, stretching from Australia to Sakhalin Island, and from and India to the Cook Islands. Australia had identified the strategic frontier which is the most sensitive area and near to the ASEAN countries. "Defending Australia" states that Australia could


17 "Australia Unveils New Defence Policy", Times of India

be most easily attacked in the north where sea and air approaches are shortest. Northern Australia is now important as a springboard for Australia's economic enmeshment with Asia in both exports into the region and absorbing Asian immigrants. "Defending Australia 1994" also proposes a two tiered frontier to defend the northern approaches, an outer frontier, covering the air-sea gap between Australia and Asia as an effective barrier against attacks and an inner frontier across northern Australia, including a chain of Scherger on the Cape York Peninsula. This approach entails the forward basing in the north of troops and F/A-18 Hornet fighters planes including the Jindalee OTHR system, eight *ANZAC frigates* and six *Collins* class submarines. This deployment is designed to meet military threats and to check suspected illegal immigrants, fishing vessels and drug smugglers.19 "Strategic Review" (SR) commissioned in August 1996 which stressed upon 'Defence Efficiency Review" (DER). DER focus on major implications for the future management, structure and deployment of the ADF.20 This is in order to maintain balance of power in the region.

Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Torres Strait are a very crucial cordon in Australia's current defence strategy because it has long occupied a pivotal place in strategic thinking. Papua New Guinea stands as a screen against or springboard for a foe. PNG is also regarded as the 'no man's land on our frontier....' Racial and political disintegration of PNG would seemingly expose Australia's northern boundary by creating a vacuum or a turbulent frontier zone with nuclear divided lines. The Strategic Review

19 ibid, pp.26, 54, 138.

mentioned that PNG is vital because it is "located in the strategic approaches, the north cost of Australia and shares a border with Indonesia." 21

The defence planners focussed on a strategic frontier deep in Asia that falls against this backdrop. Since PNG constitutes the inner barrier, the ASEAN stands as a 'strengthened shield against pressures from further afield'. These pressures are from the Korean Peninsula, the Spratly Islands and Taiwan. Indeed, Indonesia is also the most important part of this shield, "Defending Australia" said that "any hostile third power could mount attacks from or through the archipelago across sea and air approaches." It also described Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia as a "strategic triangle that provides stability across the most likely approaches to Australia's north". Southeast Asian nations then become a buffer zone against growing uncertainty. Australia strengthens the ASEAN shield with a renewed thorough policy of forward defence and taking an operational initiative beyond the northern approaches by deployment of the F-111s and F/A-18 Hornets, the new frigates and submarines which provide a capacity to project force in the Asian region. 22

(a) Developing Defence Capabilities

In the post-Cold War era, the "Defending Australia" has recognised the changing strategic circumstances in both Australia's region of interests and the rest of the world, new trends emerging in military technology and the changing capabilities of Australia's Asian neighbours. However, with Asia's rapid economic growth and military build-up comes a degree of uncertainty as nations play the power game and foreign (and, thus,


defence) policies change to suit the circumstances. Such uncertainties prompt the
government to accept that Australia's security is not as predictable as some would have
believed and could deteriorate with little or no warning. The use of armed force may,
thus, be necessary in the future. Therefore, the key elements in Australia's defence
policy are to ensure that Australia is capable of defending itself against armed attack and
to maintain the regional and traditional alliances to contribute to a global and regional
environment in which the chance of attack on Australia is lessened. Indeed, Australia
can no longer rely on the UK or the US for military assistance as it did during the World
War II and Cold War period nor can it expect anything from the UN today. It is
essential that self-reliance becomes a major objective which means that Australia must
be able to build, maintain and support forces capable of defeating any credible attack
mounted against Australia.23 This is the primary objective which largely determines
the current and future capabilities within the ADF.

As sophisticated military equipment becomes more widely available and the
capacity of many countries especially in Asian countries which acquire and operate
military systems increases, the level of capability in the region and potential demands of
short-warning conflicts will also increase. The Australian Government is to adapt as
much as possible to these greater demands. The government is continuing to exploit the
latest technology capabilities in naval and air warfare to make it safe for sea and air
approaches, and an effective barrier to military attack. Its first priority is to increase the
ADF combat capabilities (see Annexure II-A).

In broad terms, Australian defence involves guarding the country's extensive sea
and air across and defeating incursions into Australian territory. Australia is relatively

well equipped to take full advantage of its air and sea approaches to deny passage to hostile ships and aircraft. Long-range strike and interdiction assets are available to locate and neutralise approaching hostile platforms before they come within range of the mainland. Besides the strength of maritime and air capabilities, Australia has a vast landmass in order to improve its capacity to operate, and additional regular infantry battalions will be raised over the next three years. Recently three battalions had introduced Ready Reserves (R Res) based in Queensland and later this brigade would be deployed in support of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) operations on the mainland in northern Australia. The Army vehicles’ capabilities have been improved by the project Bushranger, Perentle and Mulgara. Soon the M-113A\textsuperscript{24} will be replaced. The AFVs are already in service, a number of the 790 M-11 3A1 APCs and variants will undergo a limited upgrade to extend service-life at 2005. The 103-strong Leopard I or II force has already undergone limited upgrade with improvements made to the vehicle's sighting system during 1994. Recently the army acquired the Sikorsky 570A-9 Blackhawk (utility/air assault) and the CH-47D Chinook (heavy lift) helicopters. The Australian Army Aviation Corps (AAAC) remaining 43 Bell 206B-1 Kiowa\textsuperscript{25} light observation helicopters which entered service during the early 1970s will be replaced by a new aerial surveillance, reconnaissance and fire support helicopter toward the end of the decade.

Effective and efficient air operations are essential for defending Australia and there are massive development capabilities in both RAN and RAAF. The RAAF's recently acquired capability equipments and system upgrades continues to field a highly effective, professional force capable of responding to air threats within a coordinated air

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\item 25 "Defending Australia", \textit{Indian Defence Review}, vol.1, January/March 1995, p.86.
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defence network and of long-range strategic strike. The RAAF's three squadrons of F/A-18 Hornets will be the subject of a major upgrade to ensure their competitiveness well into the next century. The twenty F-111 C/A strike aircraft are currently undergoing an Avionics Update Programme (AUP) aimed at extending their lifespan to 2020. The 15 ex-USAF F-111Gs have the same AUP and will be on 'rotating rosters' with the F-111s C/A to provide a more effective around the clock strike capability. The RAAF's Aermacchi MB-326H will end their service time by about 2000 and will be replaced by new aircraft which may fulfil the roles of training prospective crews of F/A-18 and F-111 aircraft.

Acquisition of an AEWAC platform is expected by 2000. The long awaited AEWACs programme will add significantly to the RAAF's command and control capabilities and surveillance of Australia's vulnerable northern approaches. A P-3C Orion update will also soon take place and this will enable ADF to provide effective surveillance of the country's maritime environment as well as ASW and ASUW missions. As far as transport aircraft are concerned, 12 C-130J Hercules aircraft have been replaced by the CARIBOU short-hand transport.

RAN capabilities for maritime operations are based around a mix of surface ships-aircraft and submarines, each fitted with the relevant weapons and sensors to counter the increasing availability of advanced and short, medium and long-range weapon systems. RAN's six ADELAIDE class FFG-7 guided missile frigates (US Oliver Hazard Perry type), which currently are the backbone of the RAN surface fleet, are expected to undergo an upgrade programme involving an improvement of the ships' air defence.

27 ibid.
ASW, ASUN and mine avoidance capabilities. Eight ANZAC frigates and six coastal minehunters\textsuperscript{28} are undergoing construction are expected to be in service in the beginning of the twenty-first century. To enhance RAN's surveillance and patrol capabilities a new class of patrol vessels will be acquired towards the end of the decade. The new vessels classified as OPC will replace the existing 220t Fremantle class patrol boats with better sea-keeping qualities and more advanced weaponry and sensor suites. There are six Collins class submarines being constructed but it is already one of the most capable conventional submarine fleets in the Asia Pacific. Collins class submarines are claimed to be the world's quietest and most advanced conventional SSK.\textsuperscript{29}

In addition to the 16570B-2 Seahawk helicopters operating as ASW platforms from the FFG-7s, more naval helicopters will be acquired for the eight ANZAC frigates. The new helicopters will be equipped to undertake surface surveillance/reconnaissance tasks and to relay information through over-the-horizon contacts back to the parent ship. The navy is also continuing to use the AGM-84 Harpoon ASM by naval and air platforms. This version of the Harpoon is not the latest in the ADF.

The RANs has set up its ten key goals for the next ten years. RAN's priorities are listed below:\textsuperscript{30}

1. To have influenced force structure development to rectify inadequacies and thus to have acquired a powerful maritime force capable of securing the nation's interests at sea.

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  \item 28 Indian Defence Review, n.22, p.86.
  \item 30 Peter Lewis Young, "The Royal Australia Navy - An Update", \textit{Asian Defence Journal}, May 1995, p.32.
\end{itemize}
2. To have developed the capacity to maintain a technological edge and operational proficiency when conducting maritime operations, particularly in a joint (with Army and Air Force) environment and combined with Australia's allies if required.

3. To be recognised nationally as offering challenging and rewarding careers for all navy personnel.

4. To have recruited, educated, trained, motivated and sustained personnel capable of operating and supporting the forces structure effectively and professionally.

5. To have further refined the navy's organisations to care for its people and families.

6. To be recognised worldwide for the excellence of the navy's leadership and management skills and higher professional standards.

7. To have educated the Australian public in maritime issues so that it is supportive and proud of the Navy's efforts and recognises the vital importance of the nation's maritime strategy and forces.

8. To have earned a reputation for best practice in relation to management of the natural environment.

9. To have improved, collaborative arrangements with the industry to support and sustain maritime operations.

10. To have developed through agreed inter-operability standards, an improved ability to cooperate with Australia's global and regional allies.

Besides the ten key goals, the RAN is considering plans to maintain the strength of its surface fleet through a combination of newly built and modernized programmes (see Annexure-IV-B).

(b) Medium Power

Australia's role in international affairs and her strategic position can be categorised as those of a 'middle power'. Although being a middle power in global terms, Australia is much more significant relative to her region. Despite a population of 18 million, Australia's modern free market economy produces over twice the amount of goods and services of its largest neighbour. Furthermore, Australia relies on
sophisticated technology, extensive transportation and communications infrastructure and a well developed public education system to maintain its economic competitiveness. Additionally, Australia's regional preponderance of military power and relatively high diplomatic profile, which includes special access to the only current super power, suggest that Australia is in a position to substantially affect regional security and economic cooperation. Recent budget trends indicate that any increase in Australia's regional security role is unlikely to be accompanied by greater defence spending.\(^{31}\)

Apart from public welfare development, Australia has already acquired two essential qualities of a middle power. As first and foremost, Australia's strategy protected the national objectives and maintained ownership of its territory. The DA-94 identifies the significance of Australia's sea-air approaches and the vital role the ADF plays in securing these approaches, Australia and her interests. Secondly, Australia has sufficient military capabilities to protect its own vital interests and capacity to operate in the different levels of conflict such as normal conditions, low intensity operations, higher level operations and general war. DA 94 states that Australia's defence posture gives primacy to three key tasks; the capacity to provide timely warning of significant changes in Australia's strategic environment, maintaining a force capable of defeating current or planned capabilities which could be credibly used against Australia and maintaining the adaptability to expand or redirect defence and national efforts in response to developments in regional capabilities and higher levels of conflicts which could emerge in the longer term.\(^{32}\)

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Indeed, Australia's security is heavily dependent on her economic viability, which in turn requires unhindered access to markets and security assets and territories. Further, Australia's strategic situation indicates that it can bring substantial political, economic and military resources to bear on threats to their interests.

(c) Alliances

The *Defending Australia Defence White Paper 1994* stated that Australia's defence alliance with the United States, under the ANZUS Treaty, continues to be a key element of its defence policy and will remain so over the foreseeable future. The alliance serves the interests of both countries. The United States will benefit from Australia's support because Australia is closely engaged in regional affairs and sympathetic to most American values and interests. The United States is important to Australia in that the US will remain the strongest military power in the world with the most sophisticated military technology, it will be a key influence on the security of Asia and the Pacific and it will emerge to play a major role in negotiations and implementation of arms control and disarmament measures. Therefore, Australia strongly supports the continued US strategic presence in the Western Pacific, which is of major strategic interest both for the US and for Australia as well as for other countries in the region. For Australia's part, while in the past it valued the alliance primarily because of the contribution it made to its own defence, it will value it increasingly for its broader contribution to regional security. However, with the changing priorities and security contexts the alliances and the defence capabilities, it may become even more important to meet more demanding

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circumstances. Therefore, with the passing of the Cold War, Australia needs to work hard to make sure that the alliance continues to meet the needs of both parties.

Australia will continue to support New Zealand in time of external threat because of the strong population, economic, cultural and historical ties between them and their shared strategic interests in the region. Under the ANZUS treaty both the countries are found to support and consult each other in times of external attack or threat, and both are also concerned about stability in the region, particularly in South East Asia and the South West Pacific. Even in the FPDA, New Zealand contributes significantly to the stability and well-being of the South-West Pacific as a partner of Australia. Currently, Australia and New Zealand increased their cooperation in defence and sustain modern maritime capabilities. Australia continued its commitment to the NZDF and promoting of economic and common interests under the banner of APEC.

Australia's international defence extends beyond its alliance and regional relationships because of historical ties and defence industry links with the United Kingdom, Canada and a number of European countries. The government will continue to promote defence links with countries beyond Asia and the Pacific and particularly with the U.K., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden because these countries have an increasingly challenging strategic environment, and Australia broadened and diversified its sources of high technology and support.34 Australia's defence relationship with the U.K. is deeply historical. Australia cooperates, with the U.K. through the FPDA through which UK makes a valuable contribution to defence. Australia has long-standing links with Canada with which it shares an interest in aircraft and other equipment.

III. REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

The Australian maritime security interests in the eastern Indian Ocean is to protect its land territories, proximate ocean areas and focal points and offshore interests. Concurrently, Australia's international trade is about 25 percent across the Indian Ocean. Australia foresees there is no threat from India and intends to maintain cordial relationship with all Indian Ocean states. The RAN focus the Indian Ocean towards the twenty-first century which is not for naval capability development but seeking opportunities for cooperation, economic and the development of sound relationship.35

In the future, the RAN could ensure that its limited capability to influence regional dynamics support the drive for a more stable region is the development of maritime confidence and security building measures. In fact the RAN is prepared to engage in such measures with South Asian just as it is with Southeast Asia. Australia's navy and the Indian navy have held naval exercises in 1991 and both have pressed a willingness to hold similar exercises in the future. Australia's contribution could include sharing surveillance information with the South Asian littoral states primary from the regular RAAF P-3C flight in the north east Indian Ocean. There are possibilities in tackling other problems such as smuggling, piracy, pollution and search and rescue work. The RAN perceives that there is a limited naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the RAN will be a position to make a useful contribution to regional strategic cohesion as Australia approaches the twenty-first century.

35 Cox, n.25, p.116.
(a) South Asia

Since the end of the Cold War Australia would like to maintain the security of trade and communication routes in the Indian Ocean. India is the predominant power in South Asia and among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. It has the second largest population in the world, next to China. It has a substantial land mass, a highly developed manufacturing and industrial sector and advanced nuclear capability and substantial resources of professional, scientific and technological talent. The Indian economy is rapidly developing. It has an impressive military power, which is the fourth largest in the world, after China, Russia and United States. India's location gives it a commanding central position in the Indian Ocean, merging with South-East Asia to the east and with Middle East and the Horn of Africa to the west. The recent build-up of navy has been to protect a 7500 kilometres coastline, together with ports off-shore installations, island territories and EEZ maritime resources. In the post-Cold War era India has moved to improve relations with China, United States and neighbour countries.

During the Cold War era the Australia-India relationship was not so good because India was a non-aligned member and developed close relations with the Soviet Union for its own security reasons which was a threat to Australia in the Indian Ocean. However, in the post-Cold War the two countries have similar views and a mutual understanding whether in economic, politics and security in the region. Australia wants that India survives and prospers as a democratic country in the years to come and is prepared to be as supportive as it can, both materially and politically.

In security concerns Australia has an interest in creating with others an international security system which can accommodate India's interest too, in which India
plays a strong and effective role and to reduce military capabilities in the region. In 1990 the Senate Committee Report concluded that,

India had the capability, to defend its borders and contain any surprise attack from Pakistan and any incursions involving less than full-scale attack by China, to patrol its EEZ to launch small-scale rapid deployment operations in the northern Indian Ocean, as with its action in the Maldives, to deploy substantial numbers of group troops overseas in collaboration with host governments, as shown in Sri Lanka, and, if it wished, to use the Andaman or Nicobar Islands as a staging point for deployment of Indian military power to South-East Asia.

Indeed, India was the predominant military power in South Asia, with powerful capability and significant further expansion, this might implicate South Asian countries lead into build-ups of their own military power. The foreign minister acknowledged the Indian military capability but it does not constitute a threat to the security of Australia or South-East Asia. The Foreign Minister more emphasized the need for openness and dialogue to allay any regional concern that may arise from time to time and referred to the range of visits and defence staff exchange were occurring with India together with the re-establishment of the Defence Advisor’s position in New Delhi.

Australia’s relations with Pakistan are still somewhat in the cricket, hockey, squash and Commonwealth mould. Australia’s dealings with Pakistan is on a bilateral basis or within the Commonwealth because the main concern of Australia is the relationship between India and Pakistan, which they have three wars and still unresolved Kashmir issue. The Kashmir issue still remains a fundamental obstacle to improved Indo-Pakistan relations. One of the main Australian concern is the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Australia had been pursuing India and Pakistan to sign on


37 Pakistan rejoined the Commonwealth in 1989, having left in 1992 over the question of Bangladesh’s membership.
NPT but both had refused in 1994 and this was a setback to the international community on the NPT issue. Most of the international community is concerned that both India and Pakistan are seriously developing ballistic missile options. India had developed Agni missile with a range of 2500 kilometres and tested in early 1994.

Australia was one of the first countries to recognise Bangladesh and goodwill has been sustained by an aid programme which is the main element of their relationship. Australia is contributing around $10 million over four years to a population and family health project of the International Development Association.

The main Australian interest for Bangladesh lies not just in its enormous humanitarian problems, but in its occupancy of a key position in a volatile region. After the Bangladesh independence development there was a series of coups, military governments, martial law periods and states of emergency. However, in 1991 the country turned into a democratic state, where parliament was elected and formed the government, will continue to have a significantly more stable political future.

Since Sri Lanka gained its independence in 1948, she has been plagued by conflict between the Tamil and Sinhalese communities over the issues of a separate state for Tamils in the north of the island. The tragic situation in Sri Lanka has been of particular concern for Australia as a member of the Commonwealth. In 1990 Foreign Minister Evan discussed with President Premadasa the possibility of the Commonwealth to negotiate political settlement between the government and the LTTE,38 but this has not materialised. Again in 1994 Senator Evans reaffirmed Australia's continuing readiness

38 A Commonwealth role along lines had also been strongly associated publicly by opposition Foreign Affairs Spokesman Senator Robert Hill.
to play a facilitating role such as that envisaged in the Commonwealth offer but this time could not do it due to the scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections in 1994.

(b) **Ocean Island States**

Australia’s relationship with Mauritius, the major country in the South-West Indian Ocean, is significant not just because of the growing Mauritian community in Australia but also because of the Commonwealth connection. The establishment of a mission in Port Louis in 1984 with oversight responsibilities for other Indian Ocean island states reflected Australian growing interest in the region. Relations with other island states in the Indian Ocean are Seychelles and the Maldives, both member of the Commonwealth. Both countries receive Australian aid but Madagascar has failed to capitalise on its potential.

The Indian Ocean Commission development has proved something of a disappointment but there are signs that it may seek to adopt a more practical approach to development assistance and greater involvement from Australia. All the island states face common problems of land degradation and marine resource conservation and some of them potentially from sea level rise. There is also lack of experience in environment management and there will be clear opportunities for Australia to assist in that field particularly through training. Relations with the Indian Ocean island states are not of significant importance as those with Australia's Pacific island neighbours, but they should certainly not be neglected in the future.
Middle East

Australia is concerned with the Middle East states because of their defence budget and the costs of post-War reconstruction. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the realignment of hard-line Arab states such as Syria are two principal factors allowing movement to occur in this area. While other outstanding problems of the region remain, the progress achieved to date in the Middle East peace process suggest the wider regional cooperation on both the economic and security issues, may not be impossible to achieve in the foreseeable future.

In the post-Gulf war era Australia had set three trade strategies in the Middle East States, such as, to resume its traditional commodities trade, to diversify and expand its exports into new products and new regional market and to contribute to the reconstruction and restocking of Kuwait. The first two objective have been met in Jordan and third objective was not successful. UAE has become a growing market for Australian vehicles and machinery and it has successful supply services to the region especially to the Arabian Peninsula, where Australia has been a competitive bidder for several substantial contracts in tele-communication, health services management and transport information systems. The promotion of Australia's international education sector is developing as another promising focus of its trade relationship with the region. Australian firms which are serious about doing business in the Middle East need to establish a long-term presence in the region and develop close relationship with local firms and personalities.

With regard to the security relationship with the Middle East, Australia has not yet explored them due to the long distance and also Australia has no military strategic interest. Australia was also concerned about the problems after the Gulf War such as
Kurdish protection, destruction of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and to establish an effective longer-term disarmament and arms control regime. The Gulf crisis showed up in stark relief almost everyone of the world's fears about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological - the extension of missile technology and the alarming implications of the build-up of massive amount of conventional weaponry. However, for controlling certain arms, disarmament and non-proliferation objectives in the Middle East there is a special team called UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in the region especially in Iraq. UNSCOM is confident that it has accounted for and eliminated Iraq's declared stocks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but important work remains to be done to ensure that Iraq is not able to rebuild its weapons programmes. In all these areas Australia is an active diplomatic player.

(d) Eastern Part of Africa

Australia is mainly interested in the estern part of Africa, which comprises of countries like Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa. As neighbours in the Indian Ocean, Australia and the countries of East Africa have a common interest in strategic development in the region while Kenya's position as most of the United Nations Environment Programme reflects the close involvement of East African states in the environment issues which are of growing concern to Australia and the international community.

Australia has undertaken massive development in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia have all experienced major civil unrest. Australian government relief food and aid to Ethiopia and Somalia alone amounted to nearly $96 million between 1985
and 1994. In addition to food and emergency aid, Australia provided movement control assistance from 1992 and an Army battalion in early 1993 to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which contributed effectively to food distribution and the restoration of civil order in the Baidoa region. Australia also provided advice to UNOSOM on the re-establishment of a Somali police force.

The main principal of Australia's focus on South Africa has been with regard to development assistance over the last twenty five years. Under the association of ten member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been the major beneficiaries of AIDAD's and the Special Assistance Programme for South African (SAPSA) which was established in 1986 in order to directly help those disadvantaged by apartheid, as well as to provide a means for increasing Australian awareness and involvement, particularly through the work of Australian non-government aid organisation. In implementing Commonwealth trade and investment sanctions the Australian government closed the Australian Trade Commission in Johannesburg in 1985 and ceased all facilitation of trade and investment with South Africa. Despite these restrictions, South Africa remained Australia's largest trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1993 lifting sanctions and re-opening of the Trade Commission normal business link have been restored, trade prospects are good and the post-apartheid investment climate also positive.

Australia played an active role in assisting the transition to democracy (under the co-chairman, Professor Duncan Chappell) of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to

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39 SADC, Comprises of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nambia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe SADS was established by the Wondhock Treaty in 1972, replacing SADCC (Southern Africa Development Cooperation Conference).

South Africa (COMSA) which was tasked to observe the violence and encourage the work of the South African Peace Accord machinery, a multi-party grouping dedicated to defusing violence throughout the country. In addition Australia provided members of the Commonwealth Observer Group to the South African Elections (COGSA) and the UN Observer Mission, technical advice to the Independence Electoral Commission and supporter for the reorganisation of the South African Broadcasting cooperation. Australia also committed itself to a $30 million programme of assistance from 1974 to 1997 to help with infrastructure and human resource development.

In the post-Cold War era Australia foresees that the Asia-Pacific region is changing very rapidly and this is making it particularly hazardous to predict the future in this part of the world. The ASEAN countries are engaged in major arms acquisition programme both air and maritime capabilities, this is due to the uncertainty in the future. On the other hand the major countries like China, Japan and India are also emerging in the region. The Chinese maritime capabilities operating in the Western Pacific are growing significantly and claimed Spratly islands in South China Sea, which caused a dispute with the ASEAN countries. Japanese navy has been operating up to 1000 nautical miles in the Pacific Ocean comprising of modern aircrafts, submarines etc. India also engaged in power projection in the Asia-Pacific region but due to the budget constraint in the past, it could not be successful. However all these three nations have capabilities in power projection in both Indian and Pacific Oceans. In fact, Australia has seen the development in the neighbouring countries, and recovers the danger of nuclear and new era instability in the region.

The Australian Defence planners rethinking for the twenty-first century defence capabilities to equip with effective and efficient air and naval operation to defend its
territories from external attack. Therefore, Army, RAAF and RAN are massively undergoing upgrading with modern technology equipment. As a middle power, Australia indeed has the capacity to play a major role in the region, her intention is not military conflict but to maintain stability in the region. After the end of the Cold War, Australia had improved regional engagement maintaining cordial relationship with South Asia, Eastern Africa and Middle East countries.