12 Human Beings, the Phenomenological World, and Environmental Ethics

In the previous chapter, I elaborated on the relationship between the creation of the phenomenological world and the meaningful presence of environmental change. To recapitulate, the creation of the phenomenological world is a process through which an individual encounters things meaningfully. We are always-already existing in the world of meaningfulness and that in turn disposes us to be present in the realm of meaningfulness in the midst of meaningfully present things. This creation of the phenomenological world, as we have seen, has a very specific structure as already-aheadness and return. Sheehan expounds, the existence is always ahead as possibility and subsequently we are “away from ourselves-as-actual”.

This thrown-aheadness creates a realm where we always press into one possibility from another and thus, get disposed in midst of needs and purposes. The second moment is return, where we come back from the possible to actual in order to make sense of meaningfully present things. This very bivalent structure of the existence is the primordial one which is always-already operating. This indicates the fundamental finitude of the human existence. This finitude actually demarcates the groundlessness of the realm of intelligibility without the existence. It also points out that human beings owing to their very existence, are compelled to “be a hermeneutical space, but without a reason why”.

This hermeneutical space creates the phenomenological world which is the ground of the realm of meaningfulness. Although we can experience the thrownness of our existence by realizing the way we shift from pressing into one possibility to another, we can never possibly be able to know the reason or cause of this thrownness. The intrinsic hidden character of the human existence as the clearing is completely ungraspable. That is why, no one has a choice but to live within this structure. The realization of the groundlessness of the phenomenological world without the human existence, as I understand, would be nothing more than a choice-less awareness.

This very primordial structure of the human existence or the process of creation of the phenomenological world, I see, is the core of Heidegger’s phenomenology. In this dissertation, I made an attempt to highlight the influence of the phenomenological world for the human—environment relationship. In this regard, from a methodological point of view, I posit that the process of narrative analysis that I employed, could offer some novel insights to IPRM by duly

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2Ibid.
3Ibid., 159.
incorporating the concept of the phenomenological world. I will also try to delineate the imports of this concept for conceptualizing environmental change, ecophenomenology, and environmental ethics.

i. Conceptualizing Environmental Change and the Phenomenological World

Nowadays, various worldwide environmental changes though are justified through scientifically proven facts, we can observe that these changes do not get recognized universally with the same certainty. This non-acceptance of some forms of environmental change, and at the same time, over-emphasizing on the others, have been marked primarily as a problem of awareness. The common notion is that less exposure and awareness create the ambiguity in acknowledgement and subsequently, can induce milder responses from individuals towards an environmental change. However, I would like to claim that the extension of the theory of the phenomenological world could possibly be able to clarify the above highlighted inconsistency in the acceptance of various types of environmental changes. I have already argued in the previous chapter, that an individual becomes responsive to certain environmental change when that change meaningfully appears in her phenomenological world. And I have also established that it is one of the crucial factors to make sense of the human—environment relationship. According to me, the meaningful presence is a vital element to recognize changes in the environment, otherwise, environmental changes generally fail to attain the significance and thus, hardly be able to make the necessary impact on individuals. To reaffirm this claim, in the following, I will attempt to elaborate on the mutual dependence between the notion of occurrence of land as obtained from the narratives, and the concept of the phenomenological world.

The alternative conception of land, which I have captured in the ‘Phenomenology of land’ chapter (chapter 6), provides an implicit account of how the narrators’ understanding of land is being influenced by the very existential structure, and here, I am going to elaborate more on this for firmly establishing it. To recapitulate, in ‘phenomenology of land’ chapter, I explain that what kind of conception of land is prevalent in socioeconomic-developmental initiatives and in ecological conservation programs. Borrowing from Leopold, I mark this kind of perception of land is nothing but an ‘Abrahamic conception’. Along with it, the in-depth analysis of the phenomenological narratives also demonstrates that the dwellers’ conceptions of land are entirely grounded in their everyday encountering of land, and are distinctly different from the ‘Abrahamic’ notion. The conclusion of that chapter suggests that the true phenomenological accounts of the Sundarbans’s dwellers bring forth the notion of occurrence of land. What
actually this occurrence of land points to? One needs to ask this question to comprehend further nuances of this phenomenon. I see, this occurrence of land has nothing to do with romantic notions of environment or a mystical idealization of environmental phenomena. Rather, the occurrence of land offers us a glimpse of the underlying process through which this occurrence is possible at all. Here, we can see the influence of the phenomenological world in recognizing this phenomenon—the occurrence of land.

For instance, when a honey gatherer acknowledges that in the darkness of a night, she ‘feels like home in a boat on the river than being in the forest’, it clearly shows that the particular individual as a honey-gatherer perceives the forest as a place where one collects honey and in the course of doing so the individual faces challenges and hindrances. Here, one might argue that the individual finds it peaceful to be on boats just because at night in the forest there could be a threat of encountering wild animal, however, the same is applicable for the rivers as well, as the number of crocodiles is much more than the number of tigers in the Sundarbans. Rather, I posit, as a honey-gatherer, the meaningful presence of forests comes into her phenomenological world as a place with lots of hostility, where one needs to overcome multiple challenges to be alive. Thus, for her a feeling of anxiety and stress is always associated with forests. Due to this, perhaps, in comparison to forest, she finds more peace at the sea. Hence, instead of the forest land, the individual finds a boat on the rivers or sea safer and a more peaceful place to be. Subsequently, ‘sea-land’ presents itself as a possible place to dwell for the honey-gatherers.

Similarly, when a boatman talks about his feeling of ‘being on the sea as a feeling of being in mother’s womb’, we can evidently see that the individual in his given role of boatman explores the possibility of life on the sea. In his phenomenological world, the meaningful presence of the sea is much more than just being a waterbody. Rather, his dwelling on the sea gives him a sense of belonging and thus he acknowledges that staying in a boat on the sea is as peaceful as staying in one’s mother’s womb. His very being as a boatman entails a comfortable and peaceful association with the sea, and thus to accomplish the role of boatman, the sea as sea-land becomes meaningfully present, where one can dwell on, and can feel the same sense of contentment like being at home. Similarly, if we take a householder’s account, she anticipates with certainty that there will be some land to build houses, as the sea could never be able to grasp the entire island. She also narrates an example of how the southern portion of the island is getting submerged over time, but a new seashore is coming up on the other side of the island. Once more, this close observation of the changing course of the river, the formation of seashores

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as well as the submergence of land, are inherently connected to her pressing into the possibility of a householder. As a householder, she is very much aware of the vulnerability of her house and land, moreover, she also recognizes certain changes in the island, like the formation of new seashores as being meaningfully present in her world. She sees those newly forming areas as the potential places to build houses.

I would also emphasize further on the variation between the insider’s and outsider’s perspective of land. Outsiders like developmental workers, ecological conservationists, or people like me as a researcher with our respective phenomenological worlds, encounter different meaningful presences of the Sundarbans. An individual as being an ecologist or a conservationist, possesses a meaningful presence of the Sundarbans as a climate change affected region that demands protection and conservation initiatives to safeguard its biodiversity. On the other hand, similarly an individual while pressing into the role of a developmental worker, encounters the meaningful presence of the Sundarbans where the land is being acknowledged as an underdeveloped area that needs protection from the sea to sustain human habitation.

Therefore, this entire investigation shows that Sheehan’s interpretation of Heidegger’s phenomenology and the existential structure can offer us a novel way to approach the human—environment relationship in the backdrop of environmental change. The importance of the meaningful presence of an environmental phenomenon in one’s phenomenological world is the ground for making the individual receptive towards it so that she accepts it as a significant phenomenon. Hence, I shall propose that any attempt to moderate or guide the human—environment relationship for curbing environmental changes, should bring this factor into consideration for gaining wider acceptance and efficacy.

ii. **IPRM and the Phenomenological World**

IPRM, as already indicated, generally offers two levels of conclusion, the first level indicates the proximate outcome from the narratives which reveals the everyday modes of being of narrators. Here, ‘Phenomenology of land in the Sundarbans’ (chapter 6) and ‘Finding an appropriate term for the Environment’ (chapter 7), these two chapters actually deal with the proximate outcomes of the narrative analysis. From the very beginning, the lens through which I read these narratives, is to see how individuals in their daily engagement connect with their environment and subsequently, describe it. This, in a way, has helped me to trace the proximate insights quite easily.
Following the existentialist-informed hermeneutic methodology, the difficult task was to go beyond the proximate insights to be able to tease out the in-depth ones from these narratives that can transcend the specificity and contextual boundaries, and thus, can be applied universally. Generally, we have seen from the literature that proximate outcomes eventually indicates the possible in-depth outcomes. In this case, the two proximate insights have indicated how intentionality plays a major role to enable an individual to acknowledge various alteration in the environment. These insights inspired me to inquire further about the philosophical bedrock of interpretive phenomenology. This inquiry highlights the hermeneutical structure of the human existence and the role of the phenomenological world in creating meaningful appearance of the external world. Finally, the previous chapter reveals how this philosophical concept and the subsequent interpretation of the narratives, reveal a universal trait about the human—environment relationship and enable one to understand the transcendent mode of being of the narrators. This core philosophy of phenomenology, specifies the necessity of finding out the ‘intentionality’ that leads one to hermatically interpret the external world to encounter it in a meaningful manner. This outcome also offers a methodological insight pertaining to the narrative analysis process. By acknowledging the creation of ‘phenomenological world’, it is possible to interpret narratives collected by employing IPRM, and I posit without any doubt, that analyzing narratives in this process would definitely lead to a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon or issue at stake. Let me try to provide an outline of the process of analysis that I have followed for this second level. This comprises of four steps:

1. Finding out the possibilities or roles, the concerned narrator is pressing into or aspire to accomplish in the shared experiential narrative.
2. How those identified possibility (ies) get defined in the narrator’s socio-cultural context.
3. The manner in which the narrator’s phenomenological world gets shaped in the light of the identified possibility (ies).
4. And finally, how that influences the phenomenon under consideration.

No doubt, there is a need for further exploration to determine whether this core philosophy of interpretive phenomenology really has the capacity to provide novel insights into diverse issues. However, I would like to emphasize that this methodology and the explicated process of analysis, certainly, can offer some critical insights into understanding the human—

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4I have mentioned how James Hatley, “The Uncanny Goodness of Being Edible to Bears,” in Rethinking Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, and Patrick Howard, “‘Everywhere you go always take the weather with you’: Phenomenology and the pedagogy of climate change education,” have succinctly captured the process.
environment relationship and eventually, to the discipline of environmental ethics, at large. As experiences of environmental phenomena are quite difficult to grasp and single out—being entangled with other experiences and life events, I see, IPRM, especially after incorporating the concept of the phenomenological world, offers a unique as well as apposite opportunity to capture those experiences. IPRM not only focuses on the phenomenon at stake, but also provides equal importance to unfold individuals’ encountering of a phenomenon and the structure of experiences, and most importantly, deeper nuances of the narrators’ lives as a dynamic assemblage of events, steered by intentionality. In this manner, I accentuate, IPRM offers us a more nuanced way for holistically understanding any environmental phenomenon.

### iii. Ecophenomenology and the Phenomenological World

Ecophenomenology, as I already depicted, possesses substantial amount of potential to explicate the complexity of the human—environment relationship in a very fundamental way. Before going into a more in-depth analysis of the significance of the concept of the phenomenological world in ecophenomenology, I think, it would be worthy to reassert some of the key premises that ecophenomenology or per se transcendental ethical realism sets for itself. The first and foremost, ecophenomenology is not a theoretical movement. While addressing the real world environmental problems, ecophenomenology dismisses the theory/practice division. The second premise is, ecophenomenology rules out the classical mind/world as well as the fact/value dualism. As per the third one, it elucidates and replaces some of our ethical and metaphysical presumptions which are deeply entrenched in our perspectives and play an important role in causing the current environmental devastation. By replacing these presumptions and pointing out the classical dualities, ecophenomenology promises to bring a new paradigm for understanding ourselves and our place in nature. It focuses on the pre-theoretical level of experiences where we do not detach ourselves from the world. Depending on these basic principles, Thomson (2004) elaborates transcendental ethical realism as that, when we are appropriately open towards the environment we discover what really matters and thus we discover neither facts nor values about the environment, rather a transcendental source of meaning which is beyond mere facts or value.⁵

I elaborated in the earlier chapters that the stream of ecophenomenology that borrows extensively from Heidegger or transcendental ethical realism, hardly pays any attention to the existential structure and its plausible import for the human—environment relationship. Here, I

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will elaborate how the incorporation of the concept of the phenomenological world actually is able to fulfil the objectives set by ecophenomenology. Firstly, the careful consideration of the above mentioned objectives, I see, opens up the scope for appropriating the concept of the phenomenological world. The phrase ‘appropriately open towards environment’ essentially denotes a state of pre-theoretical engagement of human beings with the environment. In our everydayness or mundane activities, we usually engage with the rest of the world without any pre-theoretical framework. Hence, I argue, the phenomenological world could possibly capture the sense of being ‘appropriately open towards environment’ as our phenomenological world consists of the meaningful presence of things without any pre-theoretical framework. Secondly, we have seen that our everyday ontic experiences lead us to an ontological understanding about the human existence and subsequently, reveals the process of creation of the phenomenological world. The meaningful presence of environment in one’s phenomenological world determines what change in environment will really matter to that individual. In this way, we can see that being appropriately open towards the environment, discloses neither facts nor value, indeed, it opens up how environmental entities become meaningfully present to us or, in other words, it illuminates the creation of the realm of meaningfulness. Here, I posit that posing due importance to the realm of meaningfulness will eventually lead us to acknowledge and uphold a relational conception of the environment, which, as I have argued, is what environmental ethics should strive for in the Anthropocene. For me this relational conception entails that the human existence is at the centre of the realm of meaningfulness and based on intentionality of individuals, environmental phenomena appear meaningfully and this meaningfulness shapes individuals’ relationship with the environment. Thirdly, by its very nature, the concept of the phenomenological world can easily rule out the theory/practice division. Hence, it can be rightly concluded that ecophenomenology should incorporate and focus more on the concept of the phenomenological world and its bearings on understanding the human—environment relationship.

iv. Environmental Ethics and the Phenomenological World

The ways in which environmental ethics deals with the human—environment relationship neither poses emphasis on human beings as an active stakeholder of this relationship, nor does it attempt to understand how human beings behave in the context of this relationship. However, in this dissertation, I argue that to construct a robust and effective environmental ethic, both of these understandings are of paramount importance. On one hand, anthropocentric ethics
conceptualizes environmental problem as a problem of resource scarcity, on the other hand, ecocentric ethics denotes this as a problem of consciousness which arises out of a lack of experiencing a true sense of nature. The detachment from nature is denoted as the primary cause of this lack and so, all the ecocentric schools (may it be traditional holistic ecocentric school or the radical ones based on ecocentric outlook) recurrently emphasize on experiencing life in the midst of nature to realize the awe of nature and the interconnectedness of all beings.

Broadly schools of environmental ethics, irrespective of whether anthropocentric or ecocentric or radical, conceptualizes environmental problem as a problem of lack of awareness about environmental systems. Their utmost focus on realizing the functioning of the environment and ecosystem, also suggests that all of these schools primarily believe that gathering information for generating an understanding about the functioning of environment is the best way to go forward. In a way, this kind of approach of focusing solely on the environment, leads to think that either disseminating knowledge about the valuation of environmental cost and resources, or making people aware about the interconnectedness of the ecosystems, and subsequently, making them conscious about the importance of maintaining this balanced state of the ecosystems, could be the most appropriate as well as the sufficient approach to solve numerous environmental problems. Hence, it can be said that according to various schools, the solution to environmental problems can be obtained through inducing an epistemological shift in the way human beings relate to the environment. Therefore, the ethical guidelines in environmental ethics also tend to address the issue as if the root problem is an epistemological one. Here, it is worth reiterating that though all of these schools identify environmental problems as an epistemological one, the approach each of them advocates to transcend the epistemological barrier is quite different as discussed in the first part of the dissertation.

However, my exploration of the human—environment relationship negates both the presumptions of environmental ethics: environmental problem is ultimately an epistemological issue, and the utmost requirement is to understand the functioning of the environment for establishing guidelines of any environmental ethics. The phenomenological narratives of the islanders point out that the very relationship of human and the environment is entirely entangled in the way human beings function in their everyday activities. This very ontic mundane everydayness certainly reveals the ontological structure of human beings as explained by

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Heidegger in his phenomenological analysis. Without incorporating this facticity of the human existence, any kind of attempt to grasp the nuances of the human—environment relationship, I argue, cannot be inclusive enough and thus, would remain far from being effective. The discussed ontological structure unveils the manner in which environmental entities and environmental change appear meaningfully in one’s phenomenological world. According to me, the approaches to resolve ethical dilemmas regarding environmental problems as being solely based on an epistemological point of view, perhaps, will fall short, if the importance of the concept of the phenomenological world in understanding the human—environment relationship, is ignored. As against the guidelines put forth by the prominent schools of environmental ethics, this phenomenological exploration of the human—environment relationship shows that rather than focusing on epistemology: what one knows about the environment and how that knowledge gets created, it is far more important to incorporate how does a certain environmental change meaningfully appear in one’s phenomenological world. The Dasein structure as care structure explicates how the meaningful appearance of environment can be the decisive factor to resolve diverse ethical issues concerning our relationship with the environment. The beauty of this structure is, the knowledge about its presence can only make an individual be open to accept its presence, and that would enable the individual to accept the mortal finitude of the human existence.

At this juncture, it is quite clear that bestowing utmost importance on gathering knowledge about the environment and its functioning, as well as extending ethical guidelines on the basis of that knowledge, is only a one sided story on which environmental ethics entirely relies upon. To make environmental ethics more effective and acceptable in the pragmatic realm, it is imperative to turn the inquiry from obtaining knowledge about the functioning of the environment to a careful consideration of the human behavior. The analysis of the creation of the phenomenological world and its bearing on the meaningful occurrence of environmental change clearly establish that any information about environmental change and subsequent, ethical guidelines towards it, cannot be acknowledged by an individual unless and until that information meaningfully appears to one’s phenomenological world. I have already shown, information related to the environment can only be significant and an individual will be registering and be responsive to this kind of information iff that information intelligibly appears in her phenomenological world. As per the analysis, we can see that an individual’s pressing into possibilities is the decisive factor for the meaningful presence of information in one’s phenomenological world as well. If the information is meaningfully present in one’s
phenomenological world in the first place, then only it is possible to induce the desired epistemological shift what anthropocentric ethics vouches for. Hence, it can be said that, understanding the role of the phenomenological world is far more important than mere dissemination of information. Without this understanding, information and ethical guidelines both might have only limited acceptance in our everyday lives.

On the other hand, ecocentric ethics advocates for a land-based ethic to generate a harmonious relation between dwellers and the other biotic and abiotic components. Here, I would like to accentuate that not only land-based ethic rather we need a community based ethic to make environmental ethics more effective. By community-based ethic I mean, firstly, it is required to identify a possibility or an assemblage of possibilities that a group of people would be pressing into. And then we need to see how the possibility (ies) urges to make sense of other things and thereby shapes one’s relation to the environment while one is pressing into that. By identifying these details, I propose, we need to formulate an ethic for that community, which will offer an opportunity to ethically engage with various meaningfully present entities for that community. Here, we should keep in mind that this ethical guideline could might very well be entirely meaningless for some other communities. It is quite evident that here I just present a scaffolding of the idea of community-based ethics, which obviously needs further development.

Moreover, schools of ecocentric ethics also attempt to accomplish an alteration in consciousness. These schools argue that a true experience of the environment could induce changes at the level of consciousness. This change in consciousness gives rise to an ecological self who is aware of and sensitive to her relationship with the environment. The literature of environmental ethics generally poses a higher value on this ecological self. It holds that if once there is a shift in one’s consciousness, then that individual’s entire perspective towards the environment, gets altered. Through this change in the consciousness and subsequently, through the creation of ecological self, an individual is thought to become more considerate of and eventually would be able to create a different level of relationship with other beings. This attitude is the essence of ecological self which is as per this literature is missing in our ‘egoic self’. However, in the backdrop of the existential structure and the phenomenological world, if I deconstruct the idea of ecological self, it can be seen that the ecological self is just a new possibility in the Heideggerian sense. The possibility of ecological self, demarcates a deep-experience of nature that can induce changes in our consciousness. And when an individual is pressing into that possibility, the perspective of the person towards the environment gets radically altered. This possibility of ecological self, nonetheless, I posit, is similar to thousands
of other possibilities that exist in our lives and in that sense, it does not or should not be bestowed with any superior value in itself. The significance of ecological self as a possibility entirely rests on one’s phenomenological world, as we have seen in the previous chapter that the significance of a possibility gets decided by the priority of various possibilities in one’s phenomenological world. Similarly, ecological self as a possibility gets a higher significance iff it manages to obtain a higher position in one’s priority list. But no doubt ecological self as a possibility is also part of the list of different possibilities one presses into like to be a mother or father, teacher or a doctor or a carpenter, artist, or poet, etc. Therefore, ecological self does not possess a supreme value in itself. May be, a society which is in the midst of an environmental crisis, perhaps perceive ecological self as an aspirable possibility to strive for and thus, this could attain a greater significance than any other mundane possibilities.

Furthermore, to recapitulate, I have already substantiated that the primary objective of ecocentric school falls into the trope of teleological explanation. Also, I pointed out that the implementation of instruments that this school suggests, do get limited as the underneath conceptualization of the problem is an epistemological one. Along with these, the claim, put forth initially by Burns (1991) and emphasized later by Drenthen, that “Our value statements can never be anything other than an expression of what we consider to be valuable”, could be re-interpreted in the light of the concept of the phenomenological world. A phenomenological understanding of the process of assigning pre-reflective judgement on environmental change, on one hand, shows the futility of objective value without taking account the role of an individual’s pre-reflective judgement in value imposition. On the other hand, it also negates the possibility of intrinsic valuation. As we have seen in the literature, intrinsic valuation is being defined in three ways: a) nature has intrinsically good components in it, b) it can be valued without the presence of human, c) intrinsic value is attached to nature irrespective of how it may satisfy human needs. The first definition, no doubt, is an outcome of the teleological idea of

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8Here, I am going to equate pre-reflective judgement with value as defined by Burms. As I have established, pre-reflective judgement gets imposed on a change on the basis of one’s phenomenological world and I see, although this pre-reflective judgement is fundamentally individual-centred, over time, this gives rise to values at the societal level as well. Thus, in the rest of the dissertation I am going to equate value with pre-reflective judgement and going to use the former in place of the latter. Here, however, I completely acknowledge the fact that Heideggerian scholars might find it unacceptable to link Heidegger’s theory with the word ‘value’, precisely because Heidegger himself strongly critiques this term in his philosophical works like *Letter on Humanism* (1949). Keeping aside that debate, here, my intention is not to establish that Heidegger himself demonstrates the process of value imposition, rather I am just borrowing hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger to explicate the process of value imposition. Moreover, this modest attempt to extend Heidegger’s theory should also be taken as an initial one and I entirely agree that more elaboration is required in this regard.
nature and thus can be refuted on the same ground, as highlighted in the first chapter. The second and third definitions of intrinsic value, if we accept the concept of the phenomenological world, then seem problematic. As I have established, valuing something is entirely contingent upon human beings, hence without the presence of human beings there would be no value as such. Only human beings possess the ability of imposing as well as upholding any value. Without the presence of humans, the natural world is going to be value neutral. Moreover, the third definition of intrinsic value denotes that intrinsic value cannot be conceptualized as against utilitarian value. However, if one accepts the role of the existential structure through which the phenomenological world gets created, then it cannot be denied that things occur meaningfully only due to one’s pressing into certain possibilities. Due to this intentionality, things appear to us as meaningful or in other words, intentionality helps to formulate the intelligible nexus of things. Now the question is, whether this meaningful presence of things, or the intelligible nexus, can be designated as revealing a particular thing in a utilitarian way or not? We have seen that to ascribe any value, revealing of things in a meaningful way or the presence of things in an intelligible nexus, is indispensable. In this regard, I would like to emphasize that disclosing things in a meaningful manner cannot be termed as a utilitarian mode of revealing, precisely because it is not a reflective act, indeed, encountering things in a meaningful manner is human facticity. It can be further argued that as without human intention there is no meaningful presence of things, then without the presence of the realm of meaningfulness, there would no pre-reflective judgement or value associated with things as well.

From the above discussion, it can be summarized that the three definitions of intrinsic value do not hold, if we accept the concept of the phenomenological world. This negation of intrinsic value also proves that along with its sole purpose and the strategy for implementing its guidelines, ecocentric school also falls short in its proposed instrument of value judgement. Therefore, ecocentric ethics can be considered as a futile attempt to transcend the anthropocentric biases for creating a superior ground for environmental ethics. This in turn indicates why in the Anthropocene, environmental ethics has to take account of anthropocentric approaches, where these approaches may not only be based on a shallow idea of fulfilling human needs by using environmental resources, rather would be grounded in the realization that the very acknowledgement of the human existential structure can provide a nuanced way of explicating the human—environment relationship for upholding the discussed conceptual schemas apposite for this era and thereby, can promise to offer novel instruments to implement ethical guidelines, effectively. Hence, it is indispensable to consider the import of the concept
of the phenomenological world for refabricating the human—environment relationship to create a sustainable world.