Chapter III

Nyaya and Pramana
Categories of Cognition and Proof

During our anvekshana, while inquiring the various aspects of sadhus and sampradayas we needed a method to test the validity of our observation and evolve a perspective. We have already discussed the importance and necessity of this in the introductory chapter of this prasthana. What we needed was a method which would equally be relevant and be understood by those who/with we were studying. This method was provided to us by the darsanic paksha of the sampradayas, which forms the basis of the distinctions among various sampradayas. The sampradayas always debated over the issue of validity and invalidity of cognition and came out with categories of cognition and proof. These categories of cognition and proof evolved through the darsanic paksha of sampradayas, where easily comprehensible to those sadhus who had some learning of the darsanic paksha of their sampradaya. This made our anvekshana more fruitful and dialogical. We got the capacity to ask the proof of what they are informing. Since these categories have the history of their evolution in inter-sampradaya debates known as sastratha, they had almost universal acceptance among sampradayas. In this chapter we provide and elaboration of the categories of cognition and proof on the basis of darsanic paksha of sampradayas.

During our anvekshana Swami Asangananda at Rishikesh, said that the extinction of the paràmpara of Sastratha (debate) and lack of Sanskrit learning has led to the degeneration of sampradayas. As earlier the sampradayas in order to prove their mata (mainly darsana)
used to prepare for the exercise which had led to their growth. The darsanic content of any sampradaya is important, as it shapes the way of life followed by the sampradaya. In this chapter we provide an elaboration of the categories of cognition and proof on the basis of darsanic paksha of sampradayas and other darsanas. These categories have evolved in inter-sampradaya debates and are still prevalent among the sampradayas.

Vako-Vakya "dialogue" is the name given in the Brahmanas to certain portions of Veda (Sat. Bra.iv.6,9,20; xi, 5,6,8;7,5; Cha.Up.xii,1,2,4; 2,1; 7, 1). The dawn of Brahma, i.e. Brahmodaya is vako-vakya (Sat.Bra.iv.6,9,20). In his Bhashya of Chha. Up.. the term is explained by Sankara as Tarkasastram (i.e. the art of disputation). Vako-Vakya, Katha, Vadvidya (an anusasana dealing with the categories of debate over various "religious, philosophical, moral, doctrinal" issues), Sastratha, etc. are the various ways of dialogue and debate Akshapada Gautam in his Nyaya-sutra presents a comprehensive view of these.

Debates in Akshapada's view, can be of three types: 1) an honest debate called vada) where both sides, proponent and opponent, are seeking the truth, that is wanting to establish the right view; 2) a tricky debate (called jalpa) where the goal is to win by fair means or foul; 3) a destructive debate (called vitanda) where the goal is to defeat or demolish the opponents, no matter how. Apart from developing a theory of evidence (pramana) and argument (tarka) needed for the first type of debate Nyaya-sutra lists twenty two number of situation types, where the debate will be concluded and one side declared "defeated" or nigrathsthana, (the defeat situation or the clinchers). For example a) if the opponent cannot understand the

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1 There were several vada manuals available around the beginning of Christian era. They were meant for students who wanted to learn how to conduct debates successfully. Of these manuals, the one found in the Nyaya sutras of Akshapada Gautam is comparatively more systematic than others (Matilal 1992)
proponents argument or b) is confused or c) cannot reply within a reasonable time limit all these will be cases of defeat (Matilal 1992:2-3).

_Nyaya-sutra_ 1.21 states that _Vada_ is constituted by the following characteristics:

1. Establishment (of the thesis) and refutation (of the counter thesis) should be based upon adequate evidence or means of knowledge (_pramana_) as well as upon (proper) hypothetical or indirect reasoning (_tarka_).
2. The conclusion should not entail contradiction with analytical or "accepted doctrine".
3) Each side should use the well-known five steps of the demonstration explicitly².
4) They should clearly recognize a thesis to be defended and a counter thesis to be repeated.

The categories of cognition and proof employed here are based on _Nyaya_. It is from here that we enter into discussion with other _darsanas_ and their _nyayas_ or their view on _nyaya_. It is essential to mention here that all the early debates on the issue were phono-centric in nature. Even though the textual aspect also creeps in as later development, but the fundamentals are firmly grounded in the oral aspect (Sruti). The basic understanding of it and sensitivity to _Sruti parampara_ is inevitably important³.

_Anvikshiki_

Kautilya enumerates _anvikshiki_ as _vidya_ (of "testing the perceptual and scriptual knowledge" by further scrutiny) among the seven _vidyas_ enumerated by him. The seven _vidyas_ as enumerated by Kautilya are, (trayi the vedas) _varta_ (vidya of agriculture, cattle-keeping etc.) and _dandaniti_ (polity), _Sankhya_, _Yoga_, _Lokayata_ and _Anvikshiki_ (Dasgupta 1963: (1922): 278). _Anvikshiki_ finds mention in - _Manu sanhita_ (7.43); _Gautama-dharma sutra_

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² According to _Nyaya sutra_, there are five "limbs" or "steps" in structural reasoning. They should all be articulated linguistically. These five steps have been enumerated later in this chapter while discussing _anumana_.

³ This has been briefly explained in previous chapter under _Sruti-paksha_.

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Anvikshiki according to Vidyabhushan was also called *Hetu vidya*, *Tarkavidya*, *vadavidya*, etc. *Tarkavidya* or *vadavidya* is referred to in *Manu-sanhitā* (6.50; 8.269; 12.106, 111); *Mahābhārata* (Sanitiparva, 180.47; 246.18); *Skanda-purāṇa* (Kali-khaṇḍa, Adhyāya 17); *Gautama-dharma sūtra* (adhyāya ii): *Rāmāyana* (1-13-23; 7-53-15); *Yajnavalkya-sanhitā* (3-292); etc. (Vidyabhushan 1971(1920): 7-8).

Vidyabhushan considers Medatithi Gautama as the founder of *anvikshiki vidya* and refers to Charaka, Kapila, Dattatreya, Punarvasu Atreya, Sulabha and Ashtavakra, as other *acharyas* of *Anvikshiki*. In the *parishads* (councils of debate) technical terms used for the subject matter of *Anvikshiki*. In *Aitreya arnyaṇa* four such terms are mentioned viz 1) *smṛti*, 2) *pratyakṣa* (perception), 3) *aṅtiḥya* (tradition), and 4) *anumāna* (inference). (1-2). These terms occur in *Rāmāyana* (5:87:23) with little alteration as 1) *aṅtiḥya* (tradition), 2) *anumāna* (inference) and 3) *sastra*. Three of these terms are used in *Manu-sanhitā*, as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *sastra*. Similarly in *Aitreya Brahmaṇa*, *Kathopanishad*, etc, there occur terms as *tarka* (reasoning), *vada* (debate), *yukti* (continuous argument), *jalpa* (wrangling) *vitanda* (cavil), *chhala* (quibble), *niranya* (ascertainment), *prayojana* (purpose), *pramana* (proof), *prameya* (the object of knowledge), etc (ibid: 23).

In the last chapter of the *Arthaśastra*, Kautilya gives a list of thirty two technical terms called *tantra-yukti* or "the forms of scientific argumentation". The *tantra yukti* which literally signifies "scientific argument" was compiled to systematize debates in *parishadas* (or learned councils). In *Susruta sanhitā* (*Uttaratantra*, ch.lxv)*, it is distinctly stated that by

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* The *Uttaratantra* is said to have been added to *Susruta sanhitā* by the redactor Nagarjuna. The *Tantra yukti* as embodied in *Susruta sanhitā* consists of 32 technical terms as per Vatsyayana (*Nyaya-bhashya* 1.1.4). Vide Vidyabhushan, p.24.
means of *tantra-yukti* a debater can establish his own points (ibid: 24).5

*Charaka sanhita* enumerates *dvividha sambhasha* (two kinds of debates). The first is called *anuloma sambhasha* (congenial debate) held peacefully (*sandhaya*) and the second *vyrrha sambhasha* (hostile debate) held in a spirit of opposition. It also enumerates *vadopaya* (expedients of debate), *vada-maryada* (the limits of debate i.e. what not to be said and what to be said) and *vada marga* (the course of debate). There are forty-four categories mentioned for learning *vada-marga* (ibid: 29-35)6.

**Nyaya**

The word *Nyaya* derived from the root *ni* is sometimes explained as that by which sentences and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning and not another, and on the strength of this even *Vedic* accents of words (which indicate the meaning of compound words entered into combination) were called *Nyaya*.7

Vatsyayana on *Nyaya-sutra* 1.1.1 distinctly identifies *Nyaya-vidya* with *Anvikshki*, but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories such as *sansaya* (doubt) etc.

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5 The technical terms constituting the *tantra-yukti* as per Kautilya are the following:
1) *Adhikarana* (a subject); 2) *Vidhana* (arrangement); 3) *yoga* (union of words); 4) *padartha* (category); 5) *hervartha* (implication); 6) *uddesa* (enunciation); 7) *nirdesa* (declaration); 8) *upadesa* (instruction); 9) *apadesa* (specification); 10) *atidesa* (extented application); 11) *pradesa* (determination from a statement to be made); 12) *upamana* (analogy); 13) *arthapatti* (presumption); 14) *sansaya* (doubt); 15) *prasanga* (a connected argument); 16) *vipurayaya* (reversion); 17) *vaikya-sesa* (context); 18) *anumat* (assent); 19) *vyakhyana* (description); 20) *nirvachana* (etymological explanation); 21) *nidarsana* (example); 22) *apavarga* (exception); 23) *uttarapaksha* (reply); 26) *ekanta* (certain); 27) *anagata-vekshana* (anticipation); 28) *atipranta-vekshana* (retrospection); 29) *niyoga* (injunction); 30) *vikalpa* (alternative); 31) *samuchchaya* (aggregation); and 32) *uhya* (ellipsis).

In the *Charuka-sanhit*a which consists of thirty-four terms includes the following:
1) *Prayojana* (purpose); 2) *nirnaya* (ascertainment); 3) *anekanta* (uncertain); 4) *pratyangcha* (repetition); 5) *uddharana* (citation); and 6) *sambhava* (probability) vide Vidyabhushan, p.25.
2) For the list of forty-four categories and their brief explanations of *vada marga* refer to Vidyabhushana, p.31-35.

7 Kalidasa's *Kumarasambhava* "*gahato pranavo yasam nyayais-tribhiru diranam*", and Mallinatha's comments on it. Vide Dasgupta, V.I, p.276-277.
Though these were already contained within the first two-terms pramanās (means of cognition) and prameya (objects of cognition), by holding that unless its special and separate departure (prthaka-prasthana)⁷ were treated. Nyaya-vidya would simply become adhyatmavidya (metaphysics) like the Upanishads. The old meaning of Nyaya as the means of determining the right meaning of the right thing is also agreed upon by Vatsyayana and is sanctioned by Vachaspati Misra in his Nyaya Varttikataotparyatika (I.1.1). He compares the meaning of the word Nyaya (pramanairarthaparikshanam i.e. to scrutinize by means of logical proof) by the etymological meaning of the word anvikshiki (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception and sastra). Vatsyayana points out that so far as this logical side of Nyaya is concerned it has the widest scope for itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the vidyas⁹. He quotes Kautilya to show that in this capacity Nyaya is like light illuminating all sciences and is means of all works. In its capacity as dealing with the truths of adhyatma (metaphysics) it may show the way to moksha. Vatsyayana designates the logical portion as a prthaka-prasthana Nyaya (separate branch) (Dasgupta 1963:(1922): 277-279).

⁷It is in this sense that, we have used the term prasthana in this prasthana.
⁹Yena prayuktah prayartta tat prayajanam (that by which one is led to act is called prayojana); yamartham abhisam jihasan karna karbhatte tenonena sarvopanah sarvani karmani sarvascha prayarttate: all those which one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all beings, all their actions, and all vidya's are included within prayojana, and all this depends on Nyaya. Vatsyayana-bhashya, I.1.1. Vide Dasgupta, Vol.I, p.278.

Dasgupta translates vidya as science, we have retained the original category-vidya. As per the tradition, with the passage of time, the corpus of knowledge were re-classified to incorporate the new developments. Under one such classification is the taxonomy of vidyas which are traditionally held to be eighteen in number. This includes four Vedas viz. Sanhitā (Rg, Yaju, Sama Atharva); Brahmana; Aranyakā; and Upanishad; six Vedangas viz. Sikṣa, Kalpa, Vyakarna, Nirukta and Jyotisha; four Upavedas viz Artha, Dhanur, Gandharva and Ayur (each of them is related to a Vedic sanhitā); Nyaya; Mimansa (Purva and Uttarā); Dharmasāstra and finally Purāna. Ramdas Gaud (1938) reclassifies the last four by merging Nyaya and Mimansa into one as Darsana and adding Tantra within the fold of eighteen Vidyas. Kautilya enumerates seven vidyas; Anvikshiki being one of them..
The Nyaya-model of the Nyaya-sutra became the reference point for nyayas of all other darsanaīs. Dinnaga, Dharmakirti, Jainas, etc made special contribution in this direction giving rise to Baudha nyaya, Jaina, nyaya, etc Udayana and Gangesa considered to be father of Nyaya Nyaya made historic contribution in the field of Nyaya. The literary model followed by Gangesa is a prasthana (departure) from the model of sutra-bhashya-varttika-vrtti-тика-tippani and subsequently prakaranas. His model is followed by the darsana writers after him.

Nyaya sutra deals with sixteen categories very similar to that of enumerated in tantra-yukti as follows:

1) Pramana (the means of cognition); 2) Prameya (the object of cognition); 3) Sansaya (doubt); 4) Prayojana (purpose); 5) Drshnta (example); 6) Sidhanta (tenet); 7) Avayava (syllogism); 8) Tarka (argument); 9) Niranaya (ascertainment); 10) Vada (discussion); 11) Jalpa (wrangling); 12) Vitanda (cavil); 13) Hetvabhasa (fallacy); 14) Chhala (quibble); 15) Jali (analogue) and 16) Nigrahaslahana (the point of defeat).

The Nyaya-sutra treats sixteen categories which comprise all the topics of vada-marga (the course of debate) as enumerated in the Churka-sanhita. While there is no order among the topics of Churka-sanhita, there exists evidently a regular arrangement among the categories of the Nyaya sutra. The categories are according to the commentaries on the Nyaya sutra, supposed to represent stages in the course of a debate.

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10 For brief analysis see Bimal Krishna Matilal, The Character of Indian Logic. Also see Sitish Chandra Vidyabhushana, History of Indian Logic.

11 Battacharya (1958:56) observes: Gangesa’s achievement is quite unique in the history of philosophic literature in India. There is not another scholar in the whole medieval period who had such a spectacular success through one single book. The Taitvachintamani a treatise of about 12000 granthas in extent (one grantha=32 syllables) appeared like a flash to dispel the gloom of centuries succeeding Udayana and laid down the solid foundation of Indian dialectics (As quoted by Matilal, Character of Indian Logic, p.140).

12 Vatsyayana in his Nyaya bhashya and Visvantha in his Nyaya-sutra-vrtti while explaining the sixteen categories, justify the gradual order of their succession. Vide Vidyab- bhushan, pp.54-66.
Nyaya-Prakarana

Prakārāṇa is defined as a book which concerns itself with the topics of a portion of a sastra which may deal even with matter not included in the sastra, e.g. the Nyaya sara and Saptapadarthi two very early prakaranas treat in a very lucid way most topics of the Nyaya-sutra and Vaiseshika-sutra respectively, and at the same time some topics not included in those sutras. Many matters which are elaborately treated in the earlier works on Nyaya have found little attention in the prakaranas, while some subjects which were merely referred in the earlier works on Nyaya have been clearly explained, for instance the topics of chhala (quibble), jati (analogue) and nigrastana (points of defeat) explained elaborately in early works drew little attention in the prakaranas. Whereas, avayava (syllogism) which was briefly treated earlier has been elaborately explained.

These prakaranas may be divided into four classes: 1) the Nyaya works treating only of the pramana to which the remaining fifteen categories where subordinated; 2) the Nyaya works which embody in them the categories of the Vaiseshika darsana; 3) the works which treat six or seven vaiseskha categories assimilating in them the Nyaya category of pramana, and 4) the works which treat certain topics of the Nyaya and certain topics of the Vaiseshika.

Most of the authors on pramanas considered it necessary to combine such subjects of the Nyaya and Vaiseshika as would give us a complete theory of valid knowledge as well as of the objects which would give rise to that knowledge (Vidhyabhusan 1971(1920):356).

The Jaina and Baudha Naiyayikas (Nyayaists) dealt only with one category, viz, pramana, Bha-sarvajna, the author of Nyaya-sara was the first among the prakarana authors, who attempted to explain the sixteen categories of Nyaya-sutra through one i.e. Pramāṇa. The
scheme laid in the Nyaya sara, for the explanation of sixteen categories through one may be exhibited in the tabular form, thus:

From the above it is evident that Bha-sarvajna embodied in his Pramana all the categories of the Nyaya-sutra except prayojana (4) and sidhanta (6) which did not according to him, constitute the integral parts and drshtanta (5) which was included in avayava under the name udaharna (ibid:359).

Varadraja works out a scheme of combination of the Nyaya and Vaishshika categories in his Tarkaraksha. He combines sixteen categories of Nyaya-sutra under Padartha and then within Prameya includes the twelve objects of Nyaya and six categories of the Vaiseshika (ibid:375). There are several other Nyaya-prakarnas embodying vaisehika categories e.g. Tarka-bhasha of Kesava Misra, etc.

Vallabhacharya, the author of Nyaya-lilavati, a Vaiseshika prakarana embodying the Nyaya cartegory of Pramana deals with six categories, viz 1) substance (dravya), 2) quality (guna), 3) action (karma), 4) generality (samanya), 5) particularity (visesha) and 6) inherence (samasvaya). Under the category guna there comes buddhi (intellect or knowledge) which is divided as vidya and avidya. The means for ascertaining vidya are called perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), comparison (upamana), and verbal testimony (sabda).
Presumption (artha-patti), probability (sambhava), tradition (aitihya), are not separate means of right knowledge according to Vallabha.

The Nyaya conception of pramana (means of knowledge) is thus included in the categories of the Vaiseshika darsana. The scheme of incorporation is shown below:

Other Vaiseshika-prakaranas embodying the Nyaya category of pramana are Tarkarangraha of Annam Bhatta, Bhasha-parichchheda of Visvanatha, Nyaya-panchanana, Tarkamrita by Jagdisa Tarkalankara, Tarkakaumudi of Laugakshi Bhaskara etc.

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13 Vide Vidyabhushan, p.387. The categories of Vaiseshika darsana are called padartha. Vidyabhushan terms "doctrine of pramana" has been replaced by "conception of pramana" by us.

14 For brief reference to these refer, ibid.
While treating the prakaranas it was found that it is impossible to confine the Nyaya with Vaiseshika, the categories of the two being altogether different. The sixteen categories of the Nyaya cannot assimilate the seven categories of the Vaiseshika nor can the latter assimilate the former (Vidyabhushana 1971(1920): 402).

After a rigorous discourse lasting over a thousand years, the thinkers and darsanikas of the Nyaya parampara started taking up only one topic, i.e., pramana which included the necessary elements required for it and discarded the other. Hence Pramana became a comprehensive conception elaborating over all the important darsanas.

Pramana

Pramana in Sanskrit signifies the means and movement by which knowledge is acquired. Pramata means the subject or the knower who cognizes, prama--the result of pramana i.e., right knowledge, knowledge of reality or valid cognition, prameya--the object of knowledge and pramanya--the validity of knowledge acquired. The verbal root ma of these terms derived with the prefix pra, means also to measure (apart from meaning to cognize.) The analogy based on this ambiguity of ma explains well. What is to be measured is the prameya, and that by which to measure is pramana.

As we have explained earlier, the Nyaya vaiseshika regards all effects as being due to the "assemblage of certain collocations" which unconditionally, invariably and immediately preceded these effects. That collocations (samagri) which produced knowledge" involved certain "non-intelligent as well intelligent elements" and through their conjoint action "uncontradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, this "collocation" is thus called
Pramana or the determining cause of the origin of the knowledge.¹² Dasgupta observes:

None of the separate elements "composing the causal collocation" can be called the primary cause; it is their "joint collocation" that can be said to determine the effect, for some time the absence of a single element "composing the causal collocation" is sufficient to stop the "production of the effect". The "collocation or the combination is not an entity separated from the collocated or combined things, but in any case it is the preceding collocations that combined to produce the effect jointly". This involves not only "intellectual elements" (e.g. indeterminate cognition as qualification (viseshana) in savilapa prayagsha the knowledge of linga in anumana (inference), the seeing of similar things in upamana, the hearing of sound in sabda. Also the "assemblage of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception, capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are also indispensable for the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements all co-operate in the same place, combine together and produce further determinate knowledge". It is this "capacity of the collocations" i.e. samagri that is called pramana (1963[1922]: 330-331).

Vatsyayana in his Bhashya on Nyaya-sutra (1.13) explains pramanas as the instruments of knowledge (i.e. of valid presentative knowledge) is to be understood by the etymological analysis (nirvachchana) of the epithet (samakhyā) (i.e. pramana itself). The word pramana signifies the instrument, because (it is derived as) 'by this is rightly known' (pramiyate anena). Thus, the explanation of the specific epithets (like prayaksha, anumana, etc.), too is to be understood in a similar manner.

Udyotkara defined pramana as uplabdhihethu (cause of knowledge). This view does not go against Jayant's view which Dasgupta follows, but it emphasizes the side of vyapara or movement of the sense etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge is produced¹⁶. Thus it is the action of the sense, a pramana which is the direct

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¹⁶ Vachaspati Misra: Siddhamindriyadi asiiddhanca tatsannikarshadi vyaparyannupadyam karana eva, charitarthah karnam trindriyadi tatsannikarshadi va mayatara charitarthamiti sakshadupaladhavaveva phale vyapriyate. Tatparyatika, vide (ibid).
cause of the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense.\(^{17}\)

Pratyaksha, anumana, upamana and sabda are the four pramanas considered as valid in Nyaya sutra.

Pramana as valid knowledge is defined as the cognition of objects as they are \((tatha bhuta rtha jnanam hi pramanam uchyate)\) and apramanam or invalid knowledge is defined as the cognition of objects as they are not \((atha bhuta rtha jnanam hi apramanam)\). Such a validity it is urged by Meghnadri, is manifested by knowledge itself \((tathatva vadharana tmakam pramanayam atmanai va nischiyate)\).\(^{18}\)

Dharmottara, a commentator of Dharmakirti's Nyaya-bindu (a Sautrantika Baudha work) describes samayag jnana (right knowledge) as an invariable antecedents to the accomplishment of all that a man desired to have \((samayag jnana purvika sarva purshartha sidhi)\). The process of knowledge starts with the perceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it \((arthidhagamat sampatah pramana vyaparah)\) through pramanas. Explaining Pratyaksha Dharmottara comments that there are three moments in the pratyaksha cognition: 1) the presentation, 2) our prompting in accordance with our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Anumana (inference) is also to be called samayag jnana, as it also serves a practical need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections and helping us

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\(^{17}\) *Pramatprameyayoh pramanachitarthatvamacharitarihatvampramanysatanmat tadev phalhetuh. pramatprameyatu phaloddesapraavrittiiti tadhetukathachit.* Vide ibid.

\(^{18}\) This leads to the conception of svatahpramanya (or self validity) of knowledge. Dasgupta observes that this does not expose it to the criticism that knowledge, being passive, cannot at the same moment be also regarded as active, determining its own nature as valid \((nachakarmakuritavirodha)\); for it is of the nature of a faithful representation of the object the manifestation of its own nature as such is an affirmation of its validity.
to realize them. In *pratyaksha* this presentation is direct, while in *anumana* this is thought about indirectly through *linga* (reason) (ibid 1963(1922):151). Bauddhas consider *pratyaksha* and *anumana* as the only valid *pramanas*, either rejecting the rest or including the others into these two.

Pramanas in Madhva's *Dvaita vedanta darsana* is an object of knowledge cognizable as it is in itself (*yathartham pramanam*)\(^{19}\). The function of *pramana* consists both in making an entity object of knowledge through the production of knowledge (*jnana-janada vava sampadaktvena*), either directly (*saksha*) or indirectly (*asaksha*). There are two functions in a *pramana* viz 1) to render an entity an object of knowledge (*jneya vishayikarana*) and 2) to make it cognizable (*jneyata-sampadena*)\(^{20}\). So far as the function of making an object of knowledge is concerned, all *pramanas* directly perform it, it is only with reference to the second function that there is a distinction between the two kinds of *pramana*, *kevala* and *anu*, such that it is only the former that performs it directly and the latter that performs it indirectly (*parmapara krama*). So it is clear that *pramana* is twofold. *Pramana* as true knowledge (*kevala pramana*) and *pramana* as instrument (*sadhana*) of knowledge (once *pramana*). This *kevala pramana* is again twofold, as consciousness (*chaitanya*) and as states (*vrtti*). This consciousness is described by Jayatirtha as superior, middling and inferior (*uttamamadhyamadhamaka*) as right, mixed and wrong, the *vrtti* is also three fold, as *pratyaksha*, *anumana* and *agama*. The *anu pramana* is also threefold, as *pratyaksha*, *anumana* and *agama* (Dasgupta 1966(1949):160,161).This *mata* is followed by Madhva

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\(^{19}\) Madhva's definition of *Pramana* in his *pramana lakshana* is elaborated by Jaya tirtha in his *Pramana padhpati* as *jneyam anatikramy vartamanam yathavashtiham era jneyam yad vishayikaroti nanyatha tal pramanan vide, Dasgupta, V-IV, p.160.

\(^{20}\) Jayatirtha vijaya tippani on the *Pramana padhpati* by Janardan, vide, ibid.
The knowledge as per Vallabha that is associated with the pramanas is the sattvika knowledge: the sattva is associated with prama (or right knowledge), and when it disappears there is error. Prama is defined as uncontradicted knowledge or knowledge that is not liable to contradiction. The increase of the sattva by which knowledge is produced may be due to various causes, e.g. sastras, objects, people, country, time, birth, karma, meditation, mantras, purifications, sanskaras, etc. (ibid:337). This mata on pramana is followed by Vallabha sampradaya.

In the Umasvati's Tattvarthadhigam sutra (Jaina mata) pramana fluctuates between the meaning of valid knowledge and the means of valid knowledge. In its former sense pramana, according to this sutra is of two kinds: 1) Paroksha, indirect knowledge, which is acquired through the external agencies such as the organ of the senses and 2) Pratyaksha, direct knowledge which is acquired without the intervention of external agencies. Paroksha, indirect knowledge includes mati and sruta, for these are acquired by the medium of the sense and the mind. Knowledge which is attained by yoga (concentration) in its three stages of avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala- is a species of pratyaksha, direct knowledge, because it is acquired through the medium of the senses (Vidyabhushan 1971(1920):169).

According to the Pasupata mata, it is the individual perceiver to whom things are proved by means of the pramanas. The object of the pramana is five fold, viz, karya, karana, yoga, vidhi and the dissolution of sorrow. Awareness or thought product is called samvid, samchintanà or sambhodha. It is through these the knowledge is revealed. The process of knowledge continues from the first moment of inception to the completion of knowledge.
Chitta and Pramana

Patanjali explains five states of vrttis (modification or form) of Chitta\(^2\) in Yoga-sutra (1.2). These vrttis are five viz. Pramana, Viparyaya, Vikalpa, Nidra and Smriti (1.6). The pramanas are three viz. pratyaksha, anumana and agama (1.7). Viparyaya is illusory knowledge i.e. knowledge of a thing not in its real state (1.8). The knowledge through sabda without the existence of the thing is vikalpa. Nidra is the vrtti taking the support of non-existence (abhava) (1.10). The manifestation of the knowledge gained through experience is smriti (1.11). The vrttis are said to be of two types klishta and aklishta. The former is the one which strengthens the false knowledge where as the latter helps in the removal of the false knowledge (1.5). As explained earlier Jayatirtha explained chitta as superior, middling and inferior (uttama-madhyamadhama) and vrtti as three fold pramanas. Kevala pramana is said to be two fold as Chaitanya (consciousness) and its vrtti (states).

Vachaspati Misra takes the chitta of yoga to be same as the Buddhi of sankhya (chitta sasabdena antahkarana buddhim upalakshayati). Buddhi or chitta signifies an act, the mental act of apprehension (Buddhi grahana rupa). According to the Bhasvati, this act of apprehension or knowing is blended with the content apprehended, the object known of which it is a constituent. But the act of apprehension can by itself, separately grasped. It further points out that such apprehension or knowing leaves behind its traces called sanskara (grahanam cha pradhanyat agrihatsya upadanam/tasya upadansya api asti anubhavah sanskarah). These traces or impression of previous experience, these sanskaras constitute an element in the consciousness of objects, in being indirectly in the objects that are

\(^2\)Chitta can be understood as consciousness. It has to be understood as modes, manifestations and modifications of consciousness also. Hence chitta is consciousness, its mode, manifestation and modification. Patanjala Yoga-sutra, Gita (3.30; 4.2.21, 23), Vachaspati Misra, Jayatirtha, Bhasvati, etc. use chitta in the sense of consciousness itself. Chitta is in no way static conception.
remembered, they also colour the ways of knowing or sources of cognition, and they thus influence the operation of chitta (buddhi), (tadrisa sanskaranam smritih gaunabhavena upadanarupe anadhigata vishaye pramane buddhau va tishthati). Sanskaras, therefore, complete knowledge and give it a form.

All these acts of knowing, pramana, anumana, and the like, on the part of the chitta are called its vrittis, because by these the chitta lives, just as the twice born jatis live by performing yajna (yaih pramanadi lakshana vyaparaih chittam jivati te tad vrittaya uchyante dvijadinam yajanadivat).

The basis of all means of valid cognition (pramanas), of all evidencing is consciousness. While the pramanas serve both as originating causes of true cognition and means of critical appraisal of cognitive claims, for almost all darsanas the ultimate ground for all evidence, the source of all establishment (siddhi) is consciousness (Chitta), without which no being or non-being could be asserted ordained and there would be a universal darkness (jagadanadhya prasanga). However, this consciousness is neutral as against true (prama) and falsity (aprama), it establishes both (Mohanty 1992: 232). Cognition issues in practical, actional response (pravritta) and ultimate guarantee of truth of cognition is practical success. According to the Advaita mata as held by Dasnami sampradaya consciousness expresses itself through different modifications of antahkarana.

22 vide, Mookerji, p.301.
23 The antahkarana is situated within body, which it thoroughly pervades. It is made up of the sattva parts of the five rudimentary elements, and being thoroughly transparent, comes into touch with the sense objects through the specific senses and assumes their forms. It being a material stuff, there is one part inside the body, another part in touch with the sense objects and a third part between the two and connected with them both as one whole. The interior part of the antahkarana is the ego or the agent. The intervening part has the action of knowledge, called also Vritti jnana. The third part, which at the time of cognition is transformed into the form of sense objects, has the function of making them manifested in knowledge as its objects. The antahkarana of three parts being transparent, pure consciousness can well be manifested in it. Though pure consciousness is one, yet it manifests the three different parts of the antahkarana in three different ways, as the cognizer (pramair), cognitive operation (pramana) and the cognition of percept (pramiti). In each of the cases the reality is part of the pure consciousness, as it express itself through the three different modifications of the antahkarana. The sense objects in themselves are but the veiled pure consciousness, Brahma, as forming their substance. The difference between individual consciousness (jiva chaitanya) and the Brahma consciousness (Brahma chaitnya) is that the former represents pure consciousness, as conditioned by or reflected through the antahkarana while the latter is the unentangled infinite consciousness, on the basis of which all the cosmic creations of maya are made (Dasgupta 1975(1922):76-77). Dasgupta refers to Madhusudana Saraswati-Siddhanta-bindu and Brahma Saraswati Nyaya ratnavali. Aniahkarana, chitta and manas are similar concepts.
None of the pramanas can work without consciousness. In fact because of this various darsanas regard pramana itself as a modality of consciousness. How could that which is to produce true cognition be other than, in its nature, cognition itself i.e. other than consciousness? The best example of such a theory is to be met within Advaita Vedanta theory of knowledge as explained by Daharamadvajarindra in his Vedanta-paribhasha. Nyaya vaiseshika would consider the pramana for perceptual knowledge, in the casual sense, to consist in appropriate mode of contact (sannikarsha) of approximate sense organ (indriya) with the object perceived. The Vedanta-paribhasha defines pratyaksha pramana to be none other than consciousness itself (Mohanty 1992:236).

The word pramana is used in two senses. Firstly it means valid knowledge, secondly it means instruments by which valid knowledge is produced. Pramana as valid knowledge is defined by Venkat as the knowledge which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are (yatha vasthitavyavahara nughtam). The definition includes behaviour as an indispensable condition of pramana such that, even though in a particular case a behaviour may not actually be induced, it may yet be pramana if knowledge be such that it has the capacity of producing a behaviour which would tally with things as they are (Dasgupta 1968(1940):237). Secondly as instrument or means of valid knowledge pramanas are many (to be enumerated later).

24 The fundamental nature of consciousness (Chitta) which almost every darsana (except the Charvaka) recognizes its evidential role, but not its alleged constitutive role. The point should be correctly understood, for otherwise a streak of realism that in various degree, runs through the thought (except Buddhist Vijnanavada) would be lost sight of (Mohanty 1992:236).


26 anugun apadam vyavahara jnana svarupa yogya param tena 'janita vyavahare yatha-rtha jnana-viseshe na vyaptih. Srinivasa's Nyaya sara on Nyaya parisuddhi, vide. ibid.
Pramana Vihetana (Deconstructing Pramanas)

Nagarjuna raises some basic issues regarding pramanas. He argues that if we claim that we have means of knowing (pramana) the way the world is; or if we believe that we have such means available to us, it stands to reason to ask further: How do we know those means of knowing? In the words of Nagarjuna: If the proof of the pramanas were by means of other pramanas, then there would be anavastha dosha (infinite regress). There would be no proof of the first, nor of the middle, nor of the last (Matilal 1986:50).

We find in Nagarjuna, a Madhyamika Baudha a full fledged and systematic sceptical challenge to a theory of knowledge that tries to articulate a notion of 'knowledge' and 'knowables' by referring to various accredited ways or means of knowing i.e. pramana. Nagarjuna was followed by, in this regard by Jayarasi and Sriharsha. There were also Advaitis who were always critical of pramanas (Matilal 1986:27). Matilal recognizes two distinct streams in the "philosophic tradition of India". One is illustrated by "pramana-prameya doctrine" and the other by total scepticism about the adequacy or validity of it.

Sriharsha after showing that it is impossible to define prama (right cognition) tries to demonstrate that it is impossible to define the idea of instruments (karana) or their operative action (vyapara) as involved in the idea of instruments of cognition (pramana). Sriharsha

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27 Nagarjuna had raised serious doubts over the efficacy of the pramana. To Nagarjuna is attributed the composition of a logical treatise called pramana-vihetana or pramana vidhvansana, which literally means "the quelling of pramana" and which is review of the definitions of the sixteen categories as given in Akshapada's Nyaya-sutra. Vide Vidyabhushan, p.257.

28 Anavastha dosha in context of anumana has been explained in Sarvadarsana-sangraha (1.2): In order to prove an anumana, we will need another anumana and then again and again causing anavastha dosha.

These are other doshas as well, e.g. Anyonyasraya dosha: when two things are proved on the basis of one another (Sarvadarsana sangraha, p.14). Almasraya dosha: when anything is proved on the basis of itself (ibid). Chakraka dosha: circular argument moving within two or more things. (ibid).
attempts to show that intrumentality as an agent cannot be seperately concieved as having an independent existence, since it is different to determine its seperate existence\(^2^9\). (Dasgupta 1975(1922):137).

Jayatirtha, of Madhva sampradaya (dvaita mata) in context of debate with Dasnami sampradaya (Advaita mata) tries to overcome the deconstruction of pramana making all knowledge impossible. Negation of pramana means negation of knowledge itself, negation of dialogue and debate. Jayatirtha says, it remains an undeniable fact that, if the proofs do not exist, nothing at all can be proved by such non-existing entities. Either the pramanas exist or they do not; there is no middle course. If they are not admitted to be existent, they cannot prove anything. One cannot say that one will be indifferent with regard to existence or non-existence of pramanas and still carry on a discussion merely as a passive debator; for our very form of thought is such that they have either to be admitted as existent or not. One cannot continue to suspend one's judgement regarding their existence or non-existence and still deal with them in carrying a discussion\(^3^0\). One may not have thought of it before entering a discussion; but once carrying a discussion, the position is such that it is easy to raise the point and then one is bound to admit it or to give up the discussion (ibid : 1966(1949): 116).

The Dasnami sampradaya following the Advaita mata propounds that the functions of pramanas, which too are mere processes of ignorance, ajnana or avidya, consist only in the removal of obstructions vieling the illumination of the self-luminous consciousness, just as the digging of a well means the removal of all earth that was obstructing the omnipresent...
akasa or space; the pramanas have thus no function of manifesting the self luminous consciousness, and only remove the veiling ajnana

Pramanayavada

Pramanavāda, literally is theory of validity i.e. the capacity of pramanas to prove, their validity or invalidity in determining the true meaning of pramana (the means of valid cognition) one must understand the true meaning of word prama (valid knowledge). Prama or valid knowledge is the knowledge of a thing as it is, it is the knowledge of the "generic nature" as abiding in its own subject, that is, abiding in every one of its individual embodiments. For instance to know a piece of silver, to be as such is valid knowledge is as much as "silverness", which is a generic nature really abides in the individual silver which is its subject (Vidyabhushan 1976 (1920):408)

Two questions arise here: 1) From where is the validity of knowledge derived? and 2) How are we conscious of the validity? To the first question mimansakas (Prabhakaras) reply by saying that knowledge derives its validity from its own general grounds (or causes). As to the second question they say that knowledge is self evident, that is the very grounds, out of which arises consciousness of knowledge, produce, also the consciousness of its validity, and this consciousness of validity prompts us to activity

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31 Dasgupta, V-II, p.204. Dasgupta refers to Vimukta man. Vimukta man, not later than the early years of thirteenth century wrote Ishita-siddhi, Mudhusudana Saraswati in his Advata-siddhi and Ramadvaya in his Vedanta Kaumudi of the 14th century quote from it. It was commented upon by Jnanottama, the teacher of Chitsukha, and this commentary was called Ishita-siddhi Vyakhyā or Ishita-siddhi-vivaranā, later than the later half of the thirteenth century. Vimukta man wrote also another work called Pramana-vrtti-nirnaya to which he refers in his Ishita-siddhi. Dasgupta writes through the manuscript from the Adyar library.

32 Gangesa opposes the first reply by saying that if the validity of knowledge were derived from the general grounds of knowledge itself, then invalid knowledge would have been identical with valid knowledge. The second reply is also opposed on the ground that if we were conscious of the validity of knowledge along with our consciousness of knowledge itself, there could not have arisen in us doubt with regard to the validity of any kind of knowledge specially in the unhabitual condition. Vide Vidyabhushan, pp.408-409.
Pramanya with mimansa meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to practical action in accordance with it, but with Vedanta it meant correctness of facts and want of contradictions. The absence of dosha being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the correctness of knowledge (Dasgupta 1963 (1922):485).

Parthasarathi distinguishes between the terms satyatva and pramanya. Suppose there are two persons, one asserting "there is Indra" and the other asserting "there is no Indra". These two propositions are contradictory to each other, so that according to the law of included middle, only one of them must be true. Parthasarathi says that one of them must be satya, but, as there is no certitude (nirnayakatva) as to which of them is true, there can be no pramanya. Thus satyatva is not identical with pramanya. The latter term implies the former, but the former does not imply the latter. We take the term truth as a substitute for satyatva and validity for pramanya. But validity does not here stand for formal consistency in which sense it is used in logic.

Kumarila defines valid knowledge in following verse: Tasmat drdhmyadut pannamnapisamvadamruhati jnantarena vijnanam tatpramanam pratiyalam (Sv, 2.80). The question of pramannya gave rise to two matas, the Nyaya mata of paralah-pramanya and the Mimansa mata of svatah-pramanya. The paralah-pramanya mata declares that truth is an extrinsic property of knowledge, since it depends on the presence of excellences in the causes of knowledge, and that it is known through certain extraneous tests (Bhatt 1989 (1962):415).

Primarily concerned in interpreting the vedic texts, the Mimansa is led on to questions of "Reality and knowledge" in support of its contentions. It formulated the "doctrine of self validity (Svatah-pramanya) of all knowledge including Sabda (verbal testimony) because any other position according to it is not plausible, and is even unreasonable". The factors which
engender knowledge are the only necessary and sufficient conditions which also constitute its validity. No extra or external considerations such as correspondence, coherence or successful activity are required. Each knowledge is also known as valid the moment the knowledge occurs (jnapta pramanyam svatah)\textsuperscript{33}.

According to the Jaina mala the mimansa view that the pramanya of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself (savitahiramanya) is wrong. Both "logically" and "psychologically" the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence (samvada) with facts. But in those cases where by previous knowledge of correspondence "a right belief has been produced there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity" without reference to objective facts (pramanyamut pattave parata eva jnaptau svakarya paratascha abhyasanabhyasapekshena)\textsuperscript{34}. Sankhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any cognition depends upon the cognitive state itself and not on correspondence with external facts or objects (svatah pramanyam svatah apramanyam)\textsuperscript{35}.

Baudha objection to svatapramanya is that when the mimansakas admits the self luminous character of cognition, why it should at the same time be held to be inferred. Salikanatha, a Baudha, further points out that because pramana and phala\textsuperscript{36} i.e. means and the result are identical, it is wrong to hold that, pramana is inferred and phala is self revealed\textsuperscript{37}.

According to the Madhva mata svatah pramanya means the consideration of any knowledge as valid by "the intuitive agent (sakshi) which experience that knowledge without

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Prameyakamalamartanda}, vide Dasgupta, HIP Vol. VI, p.188.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. p.268.
\textsuperscript{36} Prama is called pramana phala among Baudhas.
\textsuperscript{37} Vide Govardhan P. Bhat, \textit{The Basic Ways of Knowing}, p.58. The view is criticised by Kumarila in Sloka-varttika.
being kinder by any defects or any other sources of obstruction\(^\text{38}\). *Nimbarka maha* admits *svatah pramanya* in *Advaiti* manner. It is defined as the fact that in the absence of any defect and assemblage forming *samagri* of cognition produces a cognition that represents its nature as it is (*dosha bhavatve yavatsva sraya bhuta pramagrahaka samagri matra grahyatvam*)\(^\text{39}\).

Just as the eye when it perceives a coloured object perceives also the colours and forms associated with it, so it takes with the cognization of an object also the validity of such a cognition (Dasgupta 1968 (1940):428). This *mata* is followed by *Sanak* or *Nimbarka sampradaya*.

Ganges a concludes that *pramanya* of knowledge is not derived from its general grounds (or causes). It is according to him derived through its special cause called instrument. Our consciousness of the validity of a particular knowledge arises therefore from our consciousness of the fruitful correspondence or harmony between the particular knowledge (idea) and the activity which it leads to (Vidyabhushana 1971(1920):409).

**Different Pramanas**

The different *pramanas* as discussed in various *darsanas* are as following:

**Pratyaksha Pramana**

*Akshapada* defines *pratyaksha* as a non erroneous cognition produced by the sannikarsha (intercourse) of the sense organs with objects, which is definite and independent of verbal expression\(^\text{40}\). *Vatsyayana* in *Bhashya* (on i.1.3) define *pratyaksha* as the *vrtti* i.e.


\[^{40}\] *indriyartha sannikarshopanna jnanam aavyapadesyama vyabhillari vyavatmakam pratyaksham* (Nyay-sutra, 1.1.4)

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vyapara (function) of each aksha, i.e. indriya (sense organ) in respect of appropriate object. Such a function is the nature of either contact or cognition, when the function is of the nature of contact, the result is the valid cognition in the form of pratyaksha.

The term avyapadesyam in the definition of Askhapada (i.1.4) has been interpreted in diverse ways. Vatsyayana and Uddyotkara take it to mean "non-verbal" while Vachaspati Misra interprets it as meaning "non-inferential". Jayanta takes indriyarthasannikarshotpannam jnanam avyabhichari pratyaksham as containing the definition of pratyaksha and avyapadesyam vyarasayatmakam as stating the two kinds of pratyaksha, i.e. nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate) (Bhatt 1989(1962):252).

Dinnaga defines pratyaksha as a cognition that is free from nama (name)\(^{41}\), (generic property jati, etc. Dharmakirti sees pratyaksha to be free from kalpna (conception) and error, meaning by kalpna cognition of whatever is "capable of acquiring as related to linguistic expression". Free from all that can be named, pratyaksha according to Dharmakirti presents only the bare particular which is 'its own nature' (svalakshana) and which is radically different from that which possesses a nature common to many (samanyalakshana) (Mohanty 1992:239).

Pratyaksha is defined by Venkatanatha as direct intuitive knowledge (sakshatkari prama). This may be regarded either as a special class of cognition (jati rupa) or knowledge under special conditions (upadhi rupa). It is indefinable in its own nature, which can only be felt by special self consciousness as pratyaksha (jnana svabhava viseshah sva/ma sakshikah

\(^{41}\) Vide Dasgupta, HIP, V-III, pp.220-221.
Meghnadri also defines pratyaksha as direct knowledge of objects (artha-parichhedaka sakshai jnanam). The directness (sakshnattva) consists in the fact that the production of this knowledge does not depend on any other pramanas (ibid:217).

Ramanuja defines pratyaksha as knowledge directly and indirectly experienced (sakshat karini prama pratyaksham). The special distinguishing feature of pratyaksha is that it is not cognition mediated by other cognition (jnana karnaka jnatvam). Pratyaksha is of three kinds: Deva pratyaksha, pratyaksha of Yogis, and the pratyaksha of ordinary persons.

Yogi Pratyaksha includes manas pratyaksha (intuitive perception of mind), arsha pratyaksha (pratyaksha of Rishis). Yogi Pratyaksha is due to the special enlightenment of the yoga sadhana. During anvekshana, it was mentioned by a sadhu, that sadhus acquire a vision due to sadhana, which enables to realize certain experiences which ordinary persons cannot. A case of Yogi pratyaksha.

Ordinary pratyaksha is said to be of two kinds, savikalpa or determinate and nirvikalpa or indeterminate. Savikalpa pratyaksha is the determinate perception which involves a spatial and temporal reference to part time and different places where the object was experienced before. When we see jug, we think of it as having seen at other times and in other places, and it is this reference of the jug to other times and other places, and the associations connected with it as involved in such reference, that constitutes the deterministic character of such pratyaksha by virtue of which they are called savikalpa. A pratyaksha, however which reveals the specific character of its objects, say jug as a jug, without involving any direct reference to its past associations, is called nirvikalpa jnana. Ramanuja’s conception

\[\text{Ramanuja-siddhanta-sangraha, vide ibid.}\]
of nirvikalpa jnana distinguishes from nirvikalpa pratyaksha of the other darsanas (Dasgupta 1968(1940):220-221). This mata is followed by Sri or Ramanuja sampradaya.

Prabhakara defines pratyaksha as sakshit pratitih direct apprehension pertaining to the apprehended object, to the apprehending person and to the apprehension itself; that is to say, in each act of pratyaksha, the ideas of each of these three enters as its constituent factor. This distinctive feature of the Prabhakara is called the Triputiprathyakshavada (Jha 1978).

Gangesa in Tattva chintamani distinguishes between laukika pratyaksha and alaukika pratyaksha. In laukiska pratyaksha, pratyaksha ordinarily signifies perceptual knowledge or rather the means by which we derive perceptual knowledge does sometimes stand for the whole process in which senses in intercourse (sannikarsha) with its object produces knowledge. The senses are six viz. 1) the eye, 2) the ear, 3) the nose, 4) the tongue, 5) the tactual surface, and 6) the mind. Their objects are respectively the following 1) colour, 2) sound, 3) odour, 4) savour, 5) touch (of warmth, coldness, hardness, softness, etc), and 6) feeling of pleasure, pain etc. Correspondent with the senses there are six kinds of knowledge (perception) viz. the visual, auditory olfactory, gustatory, tactual and mental (internal)43.

Alaukika pratyaksha is produced through an intercourse (sannikarsha) which is transcendent. The alaukika sannikarsha is of three kinds viz 1) the sannikarsha whose character is general (samanya lakshana); 2) the sannikarsha whose intercourse is knowledge (jnana lakshana); and 3) the sannikarsha which is produced by mediation (yogaja) (Vidyaabhisheana 1971(1920):412).

43 Vidyabushan, p.411. In connection with sense organs, Prabhakara in Prakarana-panchika raises some interesting questions. How do you prove the existence of these organs? What reasons are there for postulating the number as six only? In course of the enquiry, we have a closely reasoned analytical proof of existence of sense organs. Jha. p.33.

Sarva darsana sanigraha mentions of two types of pratyaksha, Bahya (external) and Antara (internal). Former can be quantified and measured while the latter is empirical.
Anumana

Vatsyayana says that anumana inference is the after knowledge (anu=after, mana=knowledge) of an object as the probandum (lingi-artha) through a probans (linga) rightly ascertained (mita). Akshpada in Nyaya sutra (1.1.5) says:

Next (is discussed) anumana (inference) which is preceded by it (tat-purvaka) i.e. by pratyaksha, and is of three kinds namely purvavat (i.e. having the antecedent as the probans), seshavata (i.e. having the consequent as the probans), and samayatodrshta (i.e. where the vyapti is ascertained by general observation).

Vatsyayana bhashya on the above sutra says:

By the expression 'preceded' by it is meant the perception of the (invariable) relation between the probans and the probandum (linga linginoth sambandha darsanam) as well as 'the perception of the invariably related probans and the probandum is meant the recollection of the probans (linga-smrli). Though this recollection and the perception of the probans is inferred the object which at that time is not directly cognized (a-pratyaksha).

Now purvavat: when the effects inferred from its cause, e.g. from the rising cloud (it is inferred that) it will rain. Seshavat: when the cause is inferred from its effect. On percieving the water of the river as different from what it was before (and further pursuing) the fullness of the river and the swiftness of the current, it is inferred that there was rain. Samanyatodrshta: the perception of an object at some place which was previously seen somewhere else due to its movement; so also that of the sun. Therefore (it is inferred that), though imperceptible the sun has movement⁴⁴.

From the definition of inference it follows that there cannot be less than three terms and three propositions in it. The three terms are: the paksha, the vyapya and the vyapaka. These correspond respectively to the minor, middle and major terms of syllogism. The paksha is the substratum possessing the vyapya and vyapaka, the former being a thing already known and the latter one which is yet to be known. The hill for instance in which smoke is perceived

⁴⁴ According to Pasupata mala anumana is of two kinds, drshta (perceived) and samanyodrshta (perceived through universals).-The first again is of two kinds purvavat and seshvata. Dasgupta, HIP, Vol.V, P.135.
and fire is inferred is the *paksha*. The *vyapya* is also called *gamaka*, *linga*, *hetu*, *sadhana* and *niyama*. In the common example of inference smoke is *vyapya*. It is also called *gamaka* because it leads to the knowledge of something because it is a sign of indicator of that thing and hence it is called *vinga*. Smoke is the sign of the presence of fire so that whenever we observe smoke we know the presence of fire. Smoke is the ratio cognoscendi, i.e., the reason of our knowledge of fire. Therefore, it is called *hetu* or reason. Smoke is not ratio ascendii or the cause of the existence of fire, because actually fire is the cause of the existence of smoke. The middle term is called *sadhana* because it is the means of proving the major term. The major term is called 'vyapaka', 'gamaya', 'lingin', 'sadhya' and 'niyamaka'. It is called *gamaya* because it is known with the help of the middle term which is its *gamaka*. It is the *lingin* or the possessor of the *linga* or sign. It is *sadhya* because it is sought to be proved by means of *sadhana*. The words 'sadhana' and 'sadhya' are generally translated as 'probans' and 'probandum' (Bhatt 1989(1962):210).

At the beginning of the chapter we had mentioned the five steps of the *Nyāya sutra* while elaborating the constituents of *vāda*. The first step is the statement of thesis, the second statement of reason or evidence, the third citation of an example (a particular case, well recognised and acceptable to both sides) that illustrates the underlying (general) principle and thereby supports the reason or evidence. The fourth is the showing of the present thesis as a case that belongs to the general case, for reason or evidence is essentially similar to example cited. The fifth is the assertion of the thesis again as proven or established ⁴⁵(Matilal 1992:4).

We illustrate the five steps:

Step 1. There is fire on the hill.
Step 2. For there is smoke

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⁴⁵. The *Mimansakas* rejects the *Nyāyika*’s five membered *anumana* on the basis that it involves unnecessary repetition. Restatement is a dosha (fault). To state too much is as to state too little. In *anumana* only three propositions are needed, neither more nor less. Bhatt, Goverdhan P., *The Basic Ways of Knowing*, p.213.
Step 3. (wherever there is smoke there is fire), as in the kitchen.
Step 4. This is such a case (smoke on the hill)
Step 5. Therefore it is so, i.e. there is fire on the hill.

**Upamana**

Upamana as an independent *pramana* has been recognised by *Mimansa*, *Nyaya* and *Advaita Vedanta*. According to *Nyaya sutra* (1.1.6): *Upamana* is the instrument of valid knowledge of an object derived through its similarity with another well known (*prasiddha*) object. Vatsyayana providing the etymological meaning says (on *Nyaya-sutra* 1.1.3):

*Upamana* (*upa*=contiguous, *mana*=knowledge) the knowledge of contiguity (*samipya*). e.g. the *gavaya* is just like the cow. Contiguity means the possession of common characteristics (*samanya yoga*).

Vatsyana's Bhashya (on 1.1.6) says:

*Upamana* is 'definitie knowledge' (*prajnapana*) of the `object sought to be definitely known' (*prajnapaniya*) through its similarity with an object already well known:

**Sabda**

*Aptopdesah sabdah* (*Nyaya-sutra* 1.1.7) i.e. *Sabda* is the communication (*upadesa*) from a trustworthy person (*apta*). 1.1.8 says: That (*sabda as pramana*) of two kinds are *drshtartha* (perceptible) and *adrshtartha* (imperceptible).

Vatsyana in his *bhashya* on these two sutras says:

A trustworthy person is the speaker who has the direct knowledge of an object and is motivated by the desire of communicating the object as directly known by him. *Apti* means the direct knowledge of an object; an apta is one who employs it. This definition (of a trustworthy person) is equally applicable to *rshi, arya* and *mlechha*. The object of which is attainable in this world is the one 'having perceptible objects' (*drshtartha*) and the object of which is attainable in the other world is the one having imperceptible objects (*adrshtartha*).
In his *varttika* on *Nyaya bhashya* on *Nyaya-sutra* (2.1.48) Uddyotkara anticipates three objections against the view that *Sabda* is *pramana*. These three are: that *sabda* does not always (e.g. if it is not heard) produce knowledge; that it does not have an object (*vishaya-bhavat*) which is not presented by either *pratyaksha* or *anumana*; and that, not being of the nature of cognition, it does not inhere in the *aima* (*utmani asmavayat*). To these three objections Udyotkara gives the following reply: *sabda* produces knowledge when experienced or heard; there is no rule that there is no object other than what is known by *pratyaksha* and *anumana*; it is also not necessary that to be a *pramana* something must inhere in *aima*.

*Sabda pramana* is referred as *'Sruti pramana* also. Sankracharya observes:

Na dharmajijnasaymya srutiyadayo eva pramanam brahma-jijnasayam kintu srutiyadayo nubhavadayaseha yathasambhavamiha pramanam; anubhavavanatvat bhutavastuvish ayatvachha brahma-jijnasa (Sankara-bhashya 1.1.2).

*Sruti* as well as *anubhava* (direct realisation) is *pramana*, in as much as the knowledge of Brahma culminates in realisation, and has, as its object, an accomplished fact. The authority of the *Sruti* is, again, not foreign imposition having no relation to experience of the guru, which the *sishya* is expected to realise in due course when he attains considerable progress in *sadhana*.

**Arthapati**

Sabara defines *arthapatti* as:

the presumption of something not seen on the ground that as fact already perceived or heard would not be possible without that presumption; for instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house. and this non-existence in the house leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house.

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66 Commenting on this Mohanty (1992) write:
The first and the last are acceptable. It is to the second that we need to attend. What are those objects which are neither possible objects of perception nor possible objects of inference?
Let us not forget that the *Nyaya* as also the other schools of philosophy who are committed to *sabda pramana*, do not believe in the thesis that there is a fixed arrangement of *pramanas* (*pramanasvastha*). In other words, they believe that one and the same thing can be known by one or more of the *pramanas*. In order to prove that there is some object or some type of object which is known by *sabda* but not by other *pramanas*. But should there be some such object, the case for *sabda pramana* gets an additional support. (p.250).

Cf. *Nirvikalpa PratyalicSha* and *Aloakika Pratyaksha*. For the *sadhana* aspect refer, Nalini Kant Brahma, *The Philosophy of Hindu Sadhana*.

Arthapatti  

drshthah sruto varthanyakathopapadyate ityarthakalpana; yatha jivato devadattasya grha bhavadasa anena bahirbhavyadrshitasya parikalpana. Sabara bhashya, Dasgupta, HIP, Vol.II, p.384; defines *arthapatti* as implication, "when on making a statement some other thing which was not said becomes also stated; it is a "case of implication"."
Kumarila elaborates on the difference of *arthapati* from other *pramānas* in the presence of inexplicability in some observed or well ascertained fact. Parthasarthi says that when one observes that a well ascertained fact cannot be explained without any other fact, one presumes the latter in order to account for the former and this presumption is *arthapatti* (Bhatt 1989(1962):305). Sabara enumerates two types of *arthapati*, viz. 1) *drstarthapati* and 2) *svarthapati*. Kumarila enumerates five types of *drshtarhapatti*, viz 1) *pratyaksha*, 2) *anumana* 3) *upamana*, 4) *arthapati* and 5) *abhava* (non apprehension or negation)\(^49\).

*Abhava or Anupalabdhi*

That from which there is communication of the negation or non-existence of anything is regarded as the *pramana* of *abhava* or *anupalabdhi*. Kumarila classifies four groups of *abhava*: viz. 1) *pragbhava* (prior negation), 2) *pradhvanabhava* (posterior negation), 3) *anyonyabhava* (mutual negation) and 4) *atyantabhava* (absolute negation).

The negation of an effect, e.g. curds, in its cause, viz. milk prior to its birth is an instance of *pragabhava*. In *pradhvanabhava*, there is negation of a cause in its effect after the production of the latter. The non-existence of a thing after its destruction is a negative fact. The non existence of a man after his death is a fact of second kind. A cow is not a horse and horse is not a cow. The paper which is blue in colour is not at the same time green, and another which is green is not blue. These are the cases of *anyonyabhava*. The non-existence of a sky flower, the absence of horns on a donkey's skull etc. are instances of *atyantabhava* i.e. negation of the entity in all times\(^50\).

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\(^49\) For a brief description, refer, Bhatt, Govardhan P., *Basic Ways of Knowing.*

\(^50\) For a brief description, refer, ibid.
Aithiya

*Aithiya* is considered as being traditional or long standing popular belief, different from *uptodesa*. It literally means *parampara* in several usages.

Smrti

Challari-seshacharya quotes an unidentified text in support of the inclusion of *smrti* in pramana. Jayatirtha says that when an object appears in consciousness to have definite character in a particular time and a particular place, then this knowledge is true or *yathartha*. *Smrti* is directly produced by *manas*, and the *sanskaras* represent its mode of contact with specific objects (*sanskara tu manasa tada artha sannikarsa rupa eva*). It may be objected that, the object referred to by *smrti* having undergone many changes and ceased in the internal to exist in its old state, the present memory cannot take hold of its object; the answer is that the objection would have some force if *manas* unaided by any other instrument, were expected to do it; but this is not so. Just as the sense organs, which are operative only in the present, may yet perform the operation of recognition through the help of *sanskaras*, so that *manas* also may be admitted to refer by the help of the *sanskaras* to an object which has changed its previous state.

Meghnadri observes that *smrti* satisfies the indispensable condition of *pramana* that

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51 Here Jayatirtha refers to the definitions of the *Mimansa as anadhigatarthagantu pramanam and as anubhutiin pramanam*. The first refers to Kumarila’s definition and the second to that of Prabhakara. Kumarila defines *pramana* (as found in Chodna sutra 80, *Sloka-varttika*) as firm knowledge (*drdham vijnanam*) produced (*uapnanam*) and unassociated with other knowledge (*napi jnananirana samvadam-rchchaiti*). The second definition is that of Prabhakara as quoted in Salikanatha’s *Prakarana panchika: pramana anubhutiḥ*. Vide Dasgupta, HIP, Vol.IV, p.165.

52 Salikanatha’s rejection of *smrti* from *pramana* in his *Prakarana panchika* is on the basis that *smrti* is knowledge produced only by the *sanskaras* of the previous knowledge (*purva vijnana sanskara matrajam jnanam*); as such, it depends only on previous knowledge and necessarily refers to past experience and cannot therefore refer independently to the ascertaining of the nature of objects. He excludes recognition (*pratya bhijna*) from *smrti*, as recognition includes in its *samagri* of origin direct sense contact. (Dasgupta 1975 (1922) : 162).

53 *Pramana paddhati*, vide ibid, p.165.
it must not depend upon anything else for its manifestation. It is true that the revelation of objects in smr\text{t}i depend on the fact of their having been perceived before, but the functions of smr\text{t}i are spontaneous\textsuperscript{34}.

\textit{Yukti}

\textit{Yukti} is coming to on a conclusion through a series of syllogisms or probablity (\textit{Charaka- sanhita} I.II.17). According to Charaka things are either existent (\textit{sat}) or non-existent (\textit{asat}) and they can be investigated by four \textit{pramanas}\textsuperscript{35}, viz. \textit{aprtdesa}, \textit{pratyaksha}, \textit{anumana} and \textit{yukti}.

\textit{Yukti} is not counted as separate \textit{pramana} by any other \textit{darsana}. When our intellgence judges a fact by complex wieghing in mind of a number of reasons, causes or considerations, through which one practically attains all that is desirable in life, as virtue, wealth or fruition of desires, we have what may be called \textit{yukti}\textsuperscript{36}. As Chakrapani points out, this is not in reality of nature of a separate \textit{pramana} but since it helps \textit{pramanas} it is counted as a \textit{pramana}. As an example of \textit{yukti} Charaka mentions the forecasting of a good or bad harvest from the condition of the ground, the estimated amount of rains, climatic conditions and like. Chakrapani says that a case like this, where a conclusion is reached as the combined

\textsuperscript{34} Sva sphurane pramanantara sa peksa\textit{va bhavat vishaya sphurana eva hi smrteh purva nubhuta bhava peksha. Meghnadri's \textit{Nyaya dyu mani}.

Venkatnatha (\textit{Nyaya-parisuddhi} holds that it should not be classed as an independent source of knowledge, but is to be included within the \textit{pramana} which is responsible for \textit{smr\text{t}i} (e.g.) \textit{pratyaksha}. This view has been supported by Bhattacharakaguru in his \textit{Tattva-ratnakara}. Varadhishnu Misra, in his \textit{Prayna-pari\textit{trana} includes divya (i.e. intuitive knowledge through the grace of God) and svayam \textit{siddha} (natural omniscience) as separate sources of knowledge, but they are also but modes of \textit{pratyaksha}. vide, ibid, Vol.III, pp.214-15.

\textsuperscript{35} These are collectively called as \textit{pariksha} (examination), \textit{hetu} (reason), or \textit{pramana} (instruments of valid cognition). vide Vidyabhushana, p.28 (Charaka defines \textit{hetu} as "the cause of knowledge" \textit{hetur \textit{nama upalabdhi karnam}). vide Dasgupta, Vol.II, p.379.

\textsuperscript{36} buddhih pasyati ya bhavan bahu karana yogajan yukits trikala sa jneya tri var\textit{gah sadhayati yaya. Charaka- sanhita, I.II.25. vide ibid. p.375-376. As given earlier in this chapter, Charaka under \textit{Tantra \textit{yukti} enumerates 34 categories, whereas Kautilya enumerates 32.
application of number of reasonings, is properly called *uha* and is current among people by
this name. *Uha* is counted as a separate *pramana*. It is in reality an inference of an effect from
causes and, as such cannot be used at the present time, and hence it cannot be called *trikala*.
valid in all the times, past, present and future, as *Charaka* says (Dasgupta 1975(1922):375-376).

Santarkshita says that, when from the fact that in all cases when A is absent B is also
absent one thinks A to be the cause of B, this is regarded by Charaka as the new *pramana*
yukti. To this Chakrapani points out that Charaka's idea of *yukti* is the "logic of probability"
i.e. when from a number of events, circumstances, or observations one comes to regard a
particular judgement as probable, it is called *yukti*, and, as it is different from *anumana* or any
other accepted *pramanas*, it is to be counted as a separate *pramana* (ibid).

*Tarka*

The determining oscillation constituent in mental process leading to *anumana* is called
tarka (ratiocination). Vatsyayana says that tarka is neither included within the accepted
pramanas nor is it a separate *pramana*, but is a process which helps the *pramanas* to the
determination of true knowledge. Kesava Misra, in his *Tarka-bhasha*, is inclined to include
it under *sansaya* (doubt). But Annam Bhatt, in his *Tarka-dipika*, says that, though tarka

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37 *Uha* (in the sense of probability such as "that must be a man") does not involve any oscillation of mind
between two poles but sets forth the attitude of mind in which the possibility of one side, being for stranger,
renders that alternative of an object of the most probable affirmation and so cannot be classed as doubt. Where
such a probable affirmation is brought about through *pratyaksha*, it is included under *pratyaksha*, and when
through *anumana*, it is included under *anumana*.

38 Kamalsila finds *anavastha dosha*, (regressive ad infinitum) in *yukti*: *drshrta pra evatada bhava bhavitat
karyata pratipatih, tatpradhrshthato nya’ nveshantiyath tatrapy aparita ity anavastha* Kamalsila as quoted by
Chakrapani on *Charaka-sanhita*, I.II.25. Chakrapani however points out that these criticisms are all beside the
point, since *yukti* according to Charaka is not *karya karmata* from *tad bhava bhavitat*, it is arriving at conclusion
should properly be counted under \textit{viparyaya} (illusiory knowledge), yet since it helps the \textit{pramanas}, it should be separately counted (Dasgupta 1966(1949): 189).

\textit{Tarka} is used in the sense of \textit{uha} by Jayanta in \textit{Nyaya manjari}\textsuperscript{59}. The function of \textit{tarka} as \textit{uha} consists in weakening the chances of the weak alternative, thereby strengthening the probability of the stronger alternative and so helping the generation of valid knowledge of the certainty of the latter alternative\textsuperscript{60}.

\textit{Uha} is with \textit{sankhya} a quality of \textit{buddhi} and with the \textit{Mimansakas} it is a process of application of recognised linguistic maxims for the determination of the sense of words or of sentences (\textit{yukta prayoganiru-panam uha}).

\textit{Sambhava}

The \textit{pramana} of \textit{sambhava} may well be regarded as a deductive piece of reasoning\textsuperscript{61}. The inclusion of the lower within the higher as often within a hundred is called \textit{sambhava}\textsuperscript{62}.

\textit{Pratibha}

\textit{Pratibha}, according to Bhartrhari is different from \textit{Pratyaksha} and \textit{anumana} and is a means by which we understand the undifferentiated meaning of sentences as a whole. It is a separate \textit{anyaiwa} (awareness), not one which is generated by piecing together the fragments of meaning of different words and other constituents of the sentence like an intuition. Matilal observes:

\begin{quote}
It is regarded as a flash of understanding which arises spontaneously in all sentient being. It is natural and comparable to the power of intoxication that naturally develops in some liquids when they become mature. This notion in
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{59} Vide Dasgupta, HIP, V-IV, p.189.
\textsuperscript{60} The meaning of \textit{tarka} here must be distinguished from \textit{anumana}, which it has in \textit{Brahma sutra} II.1.12 (\textit{tarkapratishthanat}...), and also from its use as \textit{anvikshiki}, one of the fourteen subjects of learning (\textit{Vidyasthana}). \textit{Yajvalkya smrti}, I.3; also \textit{Nyaya manjari}. Vide Dasgupta, HIP-IV, p.189.
\textsuperscript{61} Dasgupta, Vol.III, p. 428.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p.426. 
Bhartrhari's discription is comprehensive enough to include matters ranging from the instincts of birds and animals, the spontaneous capacities of newly born babies, and the infants capacity to learn a language, to the intelligence of higher order. Bhartrhari claims that this intuitive knowledge is far more reliable than any other kind of knowledge because it comes from within. It can arise in all sentient beings, for its root cause is the word-principle which is an integral part of sentience and hence present (potentially) in all such beings. It is because of this principle that newly born babies are able to make the first movement of their vocal chords to utter words and to breathe. This is also how they learn a language (1986:34).

Whether pratibha can be taken as a pramana, when to mean as means of knowledge and not as proof of knowledge (1986:34) is debatable. During our anvekshena, we found that certain sadhus emphasizing that laukika (ordinary) pratyaksha need to be verified in the light of alaukika pratyaksha, whose source is pratibha.

In this chapter we have dealt with categories of cognition and proof which form the cognitive process of ther darsanic paksha of sampradaya. The cognitive process here emerges and shapes the way of life of the sadhus according to the mata of their sampradaya. As we have seen that pramana are merely means to remove the veil on true cognition for Dasnami sampradaya, whereas for Ramanuj sampradaya it culminates in Bhakti.

Nyaya provides a method of argumentation and presentation of the subject under scrutiny, in this case being sampradaya, hence following that in the next chapter we have tried to follow the uddesa, lakshana and pariksha, model of litrary unfoldment beginning with sansaya of what sampradaya is ? and finally reaching at nirnaya (certitude) that what sampradaya is through pramanas. Similarly it is applied to subsequent subject of this prasthana. The pramanas most of time acts as a grammar of language. They are invisible yet one follows them. The statements made are generally on the basis of one pramana or the other. Since we referred to sadhus, they accepted some of the pramanas, while rejected other
as per their *darsanic mata* of the *sampradaya* they followed.

*Anviksha* (i.e. study based on *anvekshana*) makes use of all the *pramanas*, which have been discussed here with emphasis on *savikalpa pratyaksha* or we can say that all the *pramanas* mentioned here are subject to the *pariksha* of *savikalpa pratyaksha*.

Thus the *pramanas* which do not stand the test of *savikalpa pratyaksha* lose their *pramanya* or validity. It is on the basis this that knowledge grows. *Anvekshana* being the criteria of knowing *sampradayas*, in this study, itself becomes a *pramana* in the sense of instrument of knowledge. It becomes a proof of knowledge, where it verifies and tests the *purvapaksha*. 