CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In order to settle the question of divine personality we must have a precise conception of 'person'. Neither in common usage nor in philosophy has there been a consistent conception of 'person'. In common usage, 'person' refers to any human being in a general way, much as the word 'thing' refers unspecifically to any object whatsoever. Juridically, 'person' is a technical term used to denote status or standing before the law. Dean Pound defines a legal person as an "entity having interests which the law recognises and secures". A juridic person is, therefore, a being possessing rights and obligations in its own name. In theology the term person designates the Members of the Trinity. In morality a person is an end-in-itself and must not be used as means to someone's end.

The term 'personality' is derived from the Latin 'persona'. Persona literally means the mask that is worn over the face by the actor on the Greek or Roman stage; the mask "through" (per) which he "sounds" (sonat) his part. The mask is what bears the features or make-up of the
role, the traits of hero or heroine, servant or messenger, while the actor himself behind it remains anonymous, an unknown being intrinsically aloof from the play, constitutionally unconcerned with the enacted sufferings and passions. Originally, the term 'persona' in the sense of 'personality' must have implied that people are impersonating what they seem to be. The word connotes that the personality is but the mask of one's part in the comedy or tragedy of life and not to be identified with the actor. It is not a manifestation of his real nature but a veil. And yet the Western outlook which originated with the Greeks and was then developed in Christian philosophy annulled the distinction; implied in the term, between the mask and the actor whose face it hides. The two became, as it were, identical. The actor, having wholly identified himself with the enacted personality during his moment on the stage of the world, was unable to take it off when the time came for departure, and so kept it on indefinitely after the play was over. To lose his 'persona' would mean for him to lose his nature. Thus the mask became for him fused with his essence.

In the writings of Cecera (106-43 B.C.) probably long after the word first appeared, are found at least four distinct meanings of the term 'persona': (a) as one appears to others (but not as one really is); (b) the part someone plays in life; (c) an assemblage of personal qualities that fit a man for his work; (d) distinction and dignity. The first

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meaning has the original significance of the mask; the second suggests real status, not the mere pretence; the third signifies the inner psychic qualities of the player himself; and the final meaning connotes importance and prestige which later were conveyed by the derivative term personage.

The first meaning is preserved today in Jung's doctrine of 'personage' and in some popular definitions of personality. The second meaning signifies the character or role which the player assumes in the drama. This meaning is likewise preserved in a current phrase, dramatic personae. In ancient Rome, persona often indicated the player himself, considered as an individual possessed of distinctive personal qualities. This meaning is very significant in the development of psychological definitions of personality. The fourth meaning of the word personality found in Cesário, has assimilated into the Roman caste system wherein persona used to indicate the free-born citizen as distinguished from the slave. In classical Latin the term came to mean a representative (i.e. one who stands for a group or institution) whence the Latin expression 'persona grata'. Thus the different derivative meanings of the term 'persona' suggest its double or rather contradictory characteristics: Personality means, on the one hand, that which is "assumed, non-essential and false"; on the other hand, it signifies that which is "vital, inward and essential".

1. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, p. 29.
When we raise the question of human personality we are confronted with a member of questions. Psychology and philosophy offer numerous explanations of the term 'person'. Fortunately matters are somewhat simplified when we remember that many psychological details about personality are unrelated to philosophy and religion. Experiments on Weber's Law or Pavlov's Conditioned Reflexes are irrelevant to our understanding of man as a moral and spiritual being and a seat of values.

In fact, C.C. Pratt has stated that psychology has shed practically no light on "the determinants of man's higher activities". He would refer us to Shakespeare and Goethe rather than to "literary psychology" for light on our problem.\(^1\) The reasons for relative unimportance of psychology are obvious. The religious or moral interest in personality is not an interest in the sense organs as such, the brain and nervous system, or any isolated conscious process or response to stimulus. It is rather an interest in the personality as a whole, and in an evaluation of the ideals for which it is striving. Accordingly, the religious problem of personality is much closer to philosophy than it is to psychology.

It is concerned with the philosophy of personality.

A distinction is sometimes drawn between personality and individuality. According to some thinkers, individuality is a mere difference from others, while personality is a process of development in which we have parallel processes of individuation and assimilation. As Brown says, "The man of personality gives out to the world around him and also absorbs it in himself, identifying himself as far as possible with

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others and sympathising with their aims. According to this view, personality is more than individuality. It transcends the individuality. Others, however, hold an opposite view. They maintain that personality and individuality belong to two different worlds. Personality belongs to the phenomenal world. It is an appearance, rather than complete reality. Individuality, on the other hand, belongs to the world of reality, and, therefore, transcends personality. Still there is a third view. It emphasises that the relation between personality and individuality is an intimate one, as the latter serves the very basis of the former.

Discussing 'Individual and Personality', Swami Abhedananda writes: "Our personality depends upon the egohood and the sense of 'I' and 'me', which are ... interwoven with one another. We cannot separate the sense of 'I' from the sense of 'me' and that is our personality, there is something like the string in a garland or necklace of pearls. Now the little pearls may be compared to your states of consciousness, units of sensation, and there is a string that goes through each one of them and holds them together and makes a beautiful necklace. That string is not visible from the outside ... If you want to see that chain you will have to go inside the pearls to that golden thread that links them together ... There is that string of our individuality, which is not a thought, not a function of the mind, not a function of our intellect, not a sensation, not a percept or a concept but which is the unifying element of all and which makes each one of them related to us. Now, that is our individuality, that is the background of the personality; that individuality does not change ... That is your pure Self or pure Ego".

2 Ibid. p. 175.
3 Bradley, Appearance and Reality. 4 Bosanquet, Individuality and Value
4 Our Relation to the Absolute, Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, Calcutta p. 137.
All our discussions on personality will be meaningless without a precise conception of the term 'person'. So let us first of all try to define personality. Strictly speaking, we cannot define personality, "because it is superior to definition", 1 "The mystery that belongs to it", Green says, "arises from its being the only thing, or a form of the only thing, that is real, in its own right; the only thing of which the reality is not relative and derived. We can only know it by a reflection on it which is its own action; by analysis of the expression it has given to itself in language, literature, and the institutions of human life; and by consideration of what they must be which has thus expressed itself". Looked at analytically, then, the fundamental characteristic of personality is self-consciousness, the quality in a subject of becoming an object to itself, or, in Locke's language, 'considering itself as itself', and saying 'I and I'. But as in the very act of becoming thus self-conscious I discover in myself desires and a will, the quality of self-consciousness immediately involves that of self-determination, the power of making my desires an object of my will. But we must not fall into the common error of regarding thought, desire, and will, as really inseparable in fact although we are obliged for the sake of distinctness to give them separate names. They are three faculties or functions of one individual and though logically separable, interpenetrate each other, and are more or less united in operation. I cannot, for instance, pursue a train of thought, however, abstract, without attention, which is an act of will and involves a desire to attend. I cannot desire without feeling an appetite and thinking of what I desire, and willing to pursue or to abandon it. My willing involves thinking of an object

1 Münzel, Pælogomena. Logica.
or purpose, and desiring its realisation. Therefore, my personality is a synthetic unity of these mental states and processes. That is to say, its unity is not a merely numerical oneness, but a power of unifying different attributes and characteristics. This unity is further emphasised by my sense of personal identity, which compels me to regard myself as one and the same being, through all changes of time and circumstances. I am thus one in the sense of an active unifying principle, which can not only combine a multitude of present experiences in itself, but can also combine its present with its past. At the same time, with all my inclusiveness, I have also an exclusive aspect. "Each self", it has been well said, "is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious to other selves — impervious in a fashion of which the impentrability of matter is a faint analogue". Thus a person has at once an individual and an universal side. He is an unit that excludes all else, and yet a totality or whole with infinite powers of inclusion. As Wallace puts it, "The union of individuality and universality in a single manifestation, with the implication that the individuality is the essential and permanent element to which the universality is almost in the nature of an accident, is what the cardinal point in personality".

Again, our self-consciousness involves freedom, or the power of self-determination. The freedom of will is the nerve of personality. In every act of will there is an essential element of freedom, of which the mind is conscious. The possession of a free will is thus one of the elements which enables man a moral and responsible agent. Enough has been written on

1 *A. Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, p. 216.
2 Wallace, Prolegomena to Hegel, p. 234.
the freedom of the will, and it will be sufficient for our present purpose simply to summarize the situation. The freedom of the will does not mean the ability to act without a motive, as some of its opponents still suppose. But it does mean the ability to create or co-operate in creating our own motives, or to choose our motive, or to transform a weaker motive into a stronger by adding weights to the scale of our own accord, and thus to determine our conduct by our reason. Thus the freedom of the will means the power of self-determination — a phrase to which St. Thomas Aquinas very nearly approaches when he says, "Man is determined by a combination of reason and appetite, that is, by a desire whose object is consciously apprehended by the reason as an end to be attained, as he is therefore self-moved". For instance, I am hungry, and that is simply an appetite; but I am immediately aware of an ability to choose between gratifying my hunger with an unwholesome food because it is pleasant, or with an unpleasant food because it is wholesome, or abstaining from its gratification altogether for self-discipline or because the food before me is not my own. That is to say, I can present to my mind, on the occasion of appetite, pleasure, utility, goodness, as objects to be attained, and I can choose between them.

This is briefly what we mean by free will; and it is a fact of immediate and universal consciousness, that is, of my own consciousness, corroborated by the like experience of all other men. I cannot tear it out. It is at the very root of myself and claims to be something eminently, something unique. Upon this sense of freedom all law and morality depend.
We ground our belief in freedom, then, on two points—its immediate self-evidence in consciousness and its progressive self-justification in morality.

But will acts upon the material supplied be desire; and this desire is an essential element in our personality. "Desire is feeling accompanied with the additional sense of self-hood -- the self extends ideally beyond its limit. The self should be a synthesis of its real organism, and its environment, and desire expresses this." Broadly speaking, desire is of two kinds, desire of acquisition and desire of action. We desire to incorporate or to assimilate with ourselves the various contents of our material, moral and intellectual environment. And we also desire to project ourselves into and modify that environment, by exercising our wealth or power or skill or influence upon it. Though these two processes of reception and action are often regarded as independent functions, it is important to notice that in fact they interpenetrate each other.

Now this twofold process of desire irresistibly impels us into communion with other persons. We require to find in other persons an end in which our entire personality may rest. And this is the relationship of love. It is distinguished from all other affections or desires, by being the outcome of our whole personality. It is our very self that loves. And what we love in others is the personality or self, which makes them what they are. We love them for their own sake. And love may be described

1. W. T. Harris, Hegel's Logic, p. 393.
as the mutual desire of persons for each other as such; the mode in
which the life of desire finds its climax, its adequate and final
satisfaction.

These, then, are the constituent elements of personality
as such — self-consciousness, the power of self-determination and
desires which irresistibly impel us into communion with other persons —
or, in other words, reason, will and love. These three are perfectly
distinct and distinguishable functions, but they are united, by being
the functions of one and the selfsame subject.¹ They are the thoughts
of a being that wills and loves, the will of a being that loves and
thinks, the love of a being that thinks and wills.

A historical study of what we mean by personality reveals
that the present fulness of its meaning has been acquired by degrees.
Uneducated races, as we know, tend to personify or animate external
nature. Though this implies some consciousness of their own personality
it is obviously an incomplete and unreflective consciousness; for it has
not yet reached that essential stage in definition which consists in
separating a thing from what it is not. This distinction of the personal
from the impersonal, or, in other words, of persons from things, would
appear to have been a gradual process. And even when we reach the climax
of ancient civilization, in Greece and Rome, there is no adequate sense of
human personality as such. This is obvious from its two characteristics.

¹ "This unity of consciousness", according to Lotze, is "the sufficient
*ground for assuming an individual soul" —
Metaphysics, BK iii, c.1.
Personality, as we understand it, is universal in its extension or scope; that is to say, it must pertain to every human being as such, making him man. Secondly, it is one in its intention or meaning; that is to say, it is the unifying principle in which all the attributes and functions of a man meet, making him an individual self. On both these points, however, the ancient world was deficient. In Plato’s Republic, people were organized, not with any adequate apprehension of man’s freedom and natural rights, but rather according to the needs of the political society. Aristotle regards some men as born to be savages, and others as destined by nature to be slaves, whom he further regards as living machines and women as nature’s failure in the attempt to produce men. In his psychology and ethics Aristotle fails to unify human nature. In the former he leaves an unsolved dualism between the soul and its organism, the active and receptive faculties; while in the latter he has no clear conception of the will, and hardly any of the conscience — the two faculties or functions which alone identify our various scattered emotions and activities with our real self.

Thus we find that neither the universality nor the unity of human personality, its most essential features, were adequately recognized in pre-Christian ages, though stoicism was beginning to pave the way for their recognition. But the advent of Christianity created a new epoch both in the development and recognition of human personality. Jesus Christ, founder of Christianity lived a life and exercised a personal attraction over his followers. He is reported to have told his followers that the full
meaning of that life and its attraction would not be understood till he was gone: "when He, the Spirit of Truth, is come, ... He shall glorify me, for He shall take of mine and shall show it unto you". The fact of the unique life, the new personality thus came first; and then the gradual explanation of the fact in the doctrine of the person of Christ.

It is, however, impossible to trace in detail the historical development of the concept of personality in this introductory chapter. We may briefly describe the main stages of the evolution of the concept from its formulation by Böethius to its various refinements by later scholastics and modern philosophers.

The classical definition of personality as given by Böethius runs thus: *Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia* --- "an individual substance of a rational nature". Böethius used the term substance in the definition primarily to exclude accidents. As he remarked, "We see that accidents cannot constitute person". The term substance, as Böethius understood it, can be used in two senses, one referring to the concrete substance as existing in the individual and called first substance (substantia prima), the other referring to substance conceived abstractly as existing in the genus and species and called second substance (substantia secunda). He nevertheless used the term 'individual' to make his meaning equivalent to that of first substance. Individual, in turn, refers simply to what is undivided in itself. Unlike the higher branches of the Porphyrian

1  *De persona et duabus naturis*, Ch. 3; PL 64: 1345.
tree, viz., genus and species, it cannot be further subdivided. Böethius
did not seem to attach any further signification to the term, but makes it
a mere synonym for singular. The most important part of his definition is
the expression "of a rational nature". This serves to indicate that person
is predicted only of intellectual beings. The genuine term that includes
all individual existing substances is supposit; supposit may be applied
equally to rational and irrational, to living and non-living individuals.
The sense of Böethius's definition is that a person is a particular type
of supposit, viz. one with a rational nature.

Thomas Aquinas accepted the definition of personality proposed
by Böethius, possibly because by his time it became the traditional defini-
tion. 'Individual substance' is, for him, a substance that is complete,
subsists by itself, and is separated from others. When the remainder
of Böethius's definition is added to this there are five characteristics
that go to make up a person: (1) Substance - this excludes accident;
(2) Complete - the person must have a complete nature, and thus that which
is but part of a nature, either actually or aptitudinally, does not satisfy the
definition; (3) subsistent by itself - the person exists in himself and for
himself, and therefore is the ultimate subject of predication of all
attributes; (4) separated from others - this excludes the universal notion
of second substance, which can have no existence apart from the individual;
and (5) of a rational nature --- this excludes all supposit that lack

1 Supposit and subsistence correctly considered differ only etymologically.
2 Summa Theologiae 3a, 16,12 ad 2
rationality. To the person, therefore, there properly belongs a threefold incommunicability expressed in the second, third and fourth characteristics of a person.

It thus appears that person, for Thomas, has a special dignity. It represents what is most perfect in all of nature; and its special excellence consists in having dominion over its own activity. Although in explaining this dignity he did not refer to the special mode of subsistence, there can be no doubt that for him the special excellence of the person derives from its ontological sufficiency for independent existence. The person is thus superior to the thing, which, although something in the order of substance, has a substantial form that is limited in its existential capabilities. For example, the substantial form of a material thing, although itself a formal principle of substance, has no immediate aptitude to existence, because of its essential dependence on matter for both its becoming and its being. To this extent its ability to subsist is minimal, since the union of matter and form can be disrupted at any time under the influence of external agents. The human soul, on the other hand, although the substantial form of a body, by reason of its spirituality has a special aptitude for existence that it actually communicates to the body. Because of this, it has a more perfect type of subsistence than a material thing; at least on the part of the soul, existence is independent of any extrinsic causal influences. Thus the significant point that distinguishes human persons from the lower types of beings is the perfection of their spiritual forms, which confers on them a more perfect and enduring manner of existing.
Hence the ontological foundation of personality is traceable to a special mode of subsistence that is rooted in the spirituality of man.

Further scholastic discussions of the notions of person have been largely disputes over the ultimate foundation of personality, i.e., to ascertain the precise determination of a nature that, if present, will make it subsistent and a person, and, if absent, will not. According to Duns Scotus, as he is usually understood, the ultimate foundation of personality is a mere negation. An individual intellectual nature is a person if, in its nature, it is neither destined to be communicated, as is the human soul, nor actually communicated, as is the humanity of Christ.

The Scotus's position it is commonly objected that the person possesses the nature and all its attributes, and it is difficult to regard this possessor, as distinct from the objects possessed, as constituted only by a negative. Consequently, traditional Thomists, following Tommaso de Vio, Cajetan hold that personality must be based on a positive determination, which they call it the mode of subsistence. It is the function of this mode to make the nature incommunicable, terminated in itself, and capable of receiving its own esse, or existence.

F. Suarez also insists that the ultimate foundation of personality cannot be a mere negation but must be a positive perfection. Since he holds that there is no real distinction between nature (esse) and existence, he does not regard personality as something that prepares the nature to receive its own proper existence. In his view, personality
is something added to a nature conceived as already existing. Subsistence can be added to a substance actually existing because, according to his own teaching, existence itself is quasi-potential. The sense in which personality or subsistence consists in incommunicability is that it excludes only communication to another as to the ultimate term of existence. Thus personality, for Suarez, is the final term or complement not of a substantial essence but of existence itself.

Other medieval thinkers have attempted to define the formal constitutive elements of personality without employing Catejan's mode or Suarez's conception of a positive determination. Some hold that a substance is a suport, and an intelligent substance a person from the mere fact of its being a whole, a totum in se. This totality, it is contended, is a positive note that adds no reality, just as the whole adds nothing to the parts that compose it. Still others consider personality to be ultimately constituted by the esse, the actual existence of an intelligent substance. That which subsists with its own esse is by that very fact incommunicable. This theory finds some support in the writings of the early Greek Fathers. But it has not been regarded as completely satisfactory by many philosophers and theologians.

The emphasis on consciousness and personality as the central objects of philosophical inquiry is the great contribution of Western Philosophy starting from the sixteenth century to Contemporary times.

1 De incarn., 11.3; Disp. meta. 34.
Descartes with his 'Cogito' showed that the subject of thought is the focal point of the objective world. As Schopenhauer very aptly puts it: "When Descartes took his cogito ergo sum as alone certain, and provisionally regarded the existence of the world as problematical, he really discovered the essential and only right starting-point of all philosophy, and at the same time its true foundation. This foundation is essentially and inevitably the subjective, the individual consciousness. For this alone is and remains immediate; everything else, whatever it may be, is mediated and conditioned through it, and is therefore dependent upon it." The rejection of consciousness, as the primary constituent of substantive existence, constitutes Spinoza's point of departure from the principles of Descartes, and at the same time, the fundamental error of his system.

Leibniz emphasized the notions of consciousness and responsibility as the fundamental characteristics of a person. He defined a person as that which conserves "Consciousness, or the reflective inward feeling of what it is. Thus it is rendered liable to reward and punishment". If I am to be responsible for my actions, I must continue to exist and to be capable of acknowledging that I am the same individual who performed them; otherwise I would be punished for acts that are not mine. But it is common usage to insist that rationality is a precondition for responsible action. Responsible agents must know what they are doing and must be able to give reasons for their having chosen to act so. It is responsible agents, executing their own purposes, who are regarded as persons. This notion of personality, as we shall see later, brings us to the Kantian notion of person as ends-in-themselves.

1 Schopenhauer, World as Will and Indea, BK. i. Chap. 1.
Christian Wolff, a follower of Leibniz, maintained that the chief criteria of person are "self-consciousness and memory". According to him, animals are not person while human beings are so; the latter have, as the former do not, "a consciousness of having been the same thing previously in this or that state."

The empirical philosopher Locke laid much emphasis on self-consciousness and rationality as main elements of personality. Locke defined a person as "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider self as itself, the same thinking being, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and seems to be essential to it". For Locke, accordingly, 'person' and 'self' mean much the same thing. Locke, however, believed that the terms 'person' and 'man' stand for quite distinct ideas, 'person' having to do with a rational self and 'man' having to do simply with a certain physical shape. A rational parrot, he argued, would not be called a man, nor would a non-rational human be called anything but a man. The former, however, might be a person, while the latter, failing in rationality, might not be. A person, therefore, is not a rational man since 'man' has reference to corporeal form, and this is not the meaning of the person at all. Locke then inferred that 'person' must denote something incorporeal and indivisible.

It is thus obvious that Locke's conception of person is quite different from the ordinary conception of it. According to common usage, person means the bodily form of a human being. This idea is not conveyed in Locke's definition.

1 An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chap. xxvii, Sec. 9.
It was Kant who made an ethical approach to the problem of personality. In the first place he analysed self-consciousness, the power of separating oneself as a subject from oneself as an object. And he showed how all knowledge is due to the activity of the subject, or ego, or self, in bringing the multiplicity of external facts or internal feelings into relation with its own central unity, and thereby into correlation with one another. Thus in the moral region Kant showed how the ego or self has not only the power of making objects for its own understanding, but also the power of making objects for its own pursuit, motives for its own conduct; it is thus self-determining, or able to become a law to itself, and in this sense free. Kant viewed these two aspects of personality as united by the inherent primacy of the practical over the speculative reason. According to Kant, we are free in our actions when our will is determined by itself or, which is the same thing, by the law proceeding from reason functioning in our practical life. This law Kant calls the categorical imperative. As reason is the essence of man and as human beings are free in moral life in virtue of the fact that in it they realise themselves as ends, Kant regarded human beings as persons in the sense that they were objective ends and were never to be used as means.¹ He pointed out that as all persons are ends-in-themselves and never merely means to other ends, their power of self-determination is inalienable; it irresistibly compels them to regard themselves as ends, ultimate objects of endeavour or development, and entitling them to such consideration from others. However much, therefore, they may sacrifice

¹ "So act as to treat humanity whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end, never as a means only". — *Kant's Metaphysic or Morals*, Translated by Abbott, Longmans, London, p. 67.
themselves for others or their own free will, they may never be degraded into passive instruments of another's power or pleasure as if they were impersonal things. For Kant, a person is then a self-conscious and self-determining individual and as such an end-in-himself — the source from which thought and conduct radiate, and the end whose realization thought and conduct seek.

Subsequent thinkers have thrown more light upon personality. Though they differ widely from each other, they have in their procedure started from Kant. They have developed his position both critically and constructively.

In the 19th century there began a movement of thought which placed great stress on personality, both human and divine. It is commonly designated as Personalism. It developed as a reaction to materialism, evolutionism and absolute idealism, and has assumed various forms both in Europe and America. It is usually theistic in orientation, and regards personality as a key notion that gives meaning to human life and existence.

During the 19th century there was considerable reaction to the materialism of the 18th century as propounded by thinkers such as C.A. Helvetius and P.H.B. Holbach. The reaction was accompanied by a growing and firm opposition on the part of many philosophers to the determinism and reductionism of some followers of Isaac Newton. Such personalists protested against reductionist systems that did not recognise a real distinction between men and the rest of nature. Again, while some
of the followers of Charles Darwin tended to integrate man into the rest of nature so completely that he ultimately lost his distinctive spiritual character, personalists laid emphasis on the value of men as persons, a moral self with freedom, dignity and responsibility. In stressing man's dignity some of these thinkers tended to designate material things and treat them as mere appearances or flux without any substantial character. The personalists protested too against the absolutism inherent in the philosophy of Hegel.

In opposition to the Absolutism, personalists have developed a form of idealism that shows that human being is a person in the sense that he is unique and autonomous in his nature. In this, the British personalist, A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, wrote: "Each self is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious ... to other selves .... I have a center of my own, a will of my own, which no one shares with me or can share — a center which I maintain even in my dealings with God Himself."

Prominent personalists of Europe and America include C.B. Renouvier, Maurice Blondel, E. Moulier, B.P. Bowe, R. T. Flewelling, A.C. Patchen, E.S. Brightman, and more recently P.A. Bertocci. Personalistic philosophers agree (a) that the personality is of supreme value, (b) that persons are to be distinguished metaphysically from things, and (c) that subjective experience is the final court of appeal. According to Bowe, "personality can never be construed as a product or compound; it can only

1 cf. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation.
be expressed as a fact". The essential meaning of personality, he continues, "is self-hood, self-consciousness, self-control, and the power to know. These elements have no corporeal significance." On the other hand, William Stern, though a personalist, does not deny corporeal significance to personality. He declares that a person is "psychologically neutral", "a multiform of dynamic unity".

The personalistic position has importance for psychology in so far as it focusses attention upon the organisation of the individual mental life. But its significance is meta-psychological, when it treats personality as the fundamental category of religion. As Brightman says, "The goal of religion is the development of worthy consciousness", for "religion is concerned with man's conscious experience of values, with man's spirit and with religious experience". According to him, "A person is a self that is potentially self-conscious and ideal. That is to say, when a self is able at times to reflect on itself as a self, to reason and acknowledge ideal goals by which it can judge its actual achievements, then we call it a person." Brightman lays emphasis on "the unity and identity of personality", as these two characteristics are of special importance to religion. As he puts it: "If a person is not a true identical unity through all the changes in his experience, then spiritual development is impossible. Moral growth, for example, rests on the postulate that I am responsible to myself for my past purposes and contracts; yet if I am not the one who entertained those purposes and made those contracts, I experience neither responsibility nor continuous growth. Unless I am one person identical through change, all hope for immortality becomes irrational".

Among other prominent thinkers who have discussed the concept of personality in considerable detail we may mention the name of Clement C. J. Webb. He has revived the position of the medieval philosopher Boethius regarding the nature of a person. In his celebrated Gifford Lectures, God and Personality he has profitably used the definition of Boethius and considered it "the best that we have". He has pointed out that the three aspects of personality as mentioned by Boethius, namely, incommunicability, self-consciousness and will, are successively emphasised by the schoolmen, Descartes and Kant in the history of philosophy. He has discussed at length the relation between personality and individuality and come to the conclusion that "all persons are individuals, but only rational individuals are persons". Thus an inanimate object such as a stone, or a lower animal such as a dog is not a person, because, though it is an individual in a loose sense, it lacks rational nature. Here the phrase 'rational nature' is meant a nature capable of thought, judgment, reflection, will and choice. Webb has considered it a very important element in personality and rightly maintained that Green's "spiritual principle" in man, which proceeds from the eternal self-consciousness making itself organic to a physical nature is nothing else than reason in which it is universal in all reasoning beings. 

So far we have been considering the concept of human personality as analysed by Western thinkers. Let us now consider briefly the views of Indian philosophers. In Indian philosophy we come across

1 C. C. J. Webb, God and Personality, George Allen and Unwin, London, pp. 55-60
2 Ibid. p. 11, 91.
3 Ibid. p. 47
4 Ibid. p. 114
different views of personality. To begin with, the Indian Materialists must say that a human being, according to them, is the product of four elements, earth, water, fire and air, just as the red colour is the product of betel, arecanut and lime. All knowledge is derived from sense perception and perceptual knowledge is the only test of truth. The sole end of conduct is the enjoyment of the pleasures of sensibility, and expediency is the only rule of conduct. Matter alone is real and it exists in its own right. Personality is an aggregate or collection of atoms and they alone have the promise and potency of life and consciousness. Naturalism as a more refined form of materialism explains the higher by the lower and describes personality in terms of sensation, cellular process and physico-chemical changes. Personality, according to this theory, is a by-product of natural changes and is only an epi-phenomenon; it does not involve self-consciousness, rationality, freedom of will etc.

The materialistic view of personality is a challenge to the subjective idealism of the Yogacara Buddhists and the asceticism of the extreme Advaitins who deny the reality of matter and the physical and tangible universe. Materialism lays emphasis on the universe of matter and the physical well-being of man. Thus it is a closed system which excludes the reality of moral and spiritual values. In its zeal for objectivity, it forgets the subject and it is like the play of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Naturalism, on the other hand, traces human nature to inanimate nature and thus neutralizes personality. In explaining the higher by the lower, it puts the cart before the horse.
The inadequacy of the category of matter for the purpose of explaining personality prepares the way for its interpretation in terms of life. Personality is defined as 'prāṇamaya' or a living unity and not a mechanical addition of bits of matter. It is self-creative and self-sustaining and is not something determined from without. Biology is more competent to explain personality than materialism.

Buddhism employs empirical psychology to deny personality and trace the self to sensation and perception. The self is only a fleeting flux of atomic sensations without any stability and is made of the five Skandhas, levels of being. What is called personality is a causal series or succession of cause and effect without any substantiality. But the view of empirical psychology that the self is only a psychic process cuts at the very root of personality; no sensation can transcend itself and know itself. Succession in experience is different from the experience of succession and experience presupposes an experiencing subject. The empirical psychologist who relies so much on the evidence of sense-perception ignores the perceiving self which is more than perception.

Hence many Indian thinkers reject empirical interpretation of personality. They hold that personality is 'vijnānamaya'. Vijnāna or reason is more than matter, life and consciousness and it is reason that distinguishes man from plants and animals. Personality may therefore be defined as a

1 cf. Hume: "when I enter intimately upon what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself, at any time, without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception." (Thilly, History of Philosophy, p. 322).
rational entity. It is thinking on things and reflecting on what is thought. Personality is the thinking principle that operates on sensations and energy. A person has a notion of himself which is different from perception. It is rationally posited in the experience as 'I think, therefore, I am'. While the Gārvāka materialist traces all knowledge to the evidence of sense-perception, the rationalist accepts anumāṇa or reasoning as a pramāṇa and argues that personality is established by buddhi and not by mere pratysāka. Buddhi is not an emergence from space-time, nor an evolution from the animal stage but it exists in its own right. There is a conceptual theory of personality different from the perceptual kind, which says that it is a monad which is independent of other monads.

Vijñāna or intelligence again is not the ultimate principle. The categories of matter, life, mind and intelligence take us higher and higher and each is more comprehensive than the preceding. Intelligence is successful in controlling the tangible world. As a rational instrument in the sphere of positive sciences, its validity is justified. But truths are not revealed by intellect. In the intellectual life there is only seeking. Until we transcend it, there can be no ultimate finding. Hence the thinkers of the Upanisads seek to raise personality above intellect, vijñāna, and identify it with bliss, ānanda. Personality is ānandamaya. A person is the deep delight of freedom. As Taittirīya Upaniṣad puts it:

"Verily, different from and within that which consists of understanding is the self consisting of bliss. By that this is filled. This, verily has the form of a person. According to that one's personal form is this one with the form of a person."¹

The Advaita Vedanta explains the concept of personality from the point of view of consciousness. The Advaitin starts with the I-thou and subject-object distinction and fixes on the 'I' as the true and unmixed reality. In fact, the whole Advaita philosophy is a search for the Ultimate Self. It conceives that the empirical personality or self-hood is merely a construction of maya or avidya. The approach to the Ultimate Self consists in self-denial and transcendence: Aham Brahmasmi. My real aham, personality is not this individual ego, which is a mere maya or illusion, but is Brahman itself who is Self of all selves.

The Advaita theory of personality appears to be defective as it fails to do proper justice to morality and religion. The concept of personality, we know, is bound up with the sense of moral obligation and duty. But the Advaitins explain away all actions as modifications of the gunas falsely superimposed on the Self. Hence Ramanuja rightly points out that this will make the very idea of liberation contradictory. There is someone to be liberated, he has to strive for it. It is not a passive role, but a constant effort and activity. As Ramanuja clearly explains, this sense of obligation places the human person in a sort of dialogue with the world of beings and the Supreme Person. Obligation is not a blind necessity, but an appeal to free action. This means that there is someone who commands, someone who is commanded, and something commanded about. Here Ramanuja draws upon the etymology of the word 'Sastra', which is derived from the root 'as' meaning command. According to him, moral freedom and
responsibility are two basic elements of personality. Rāmānuja lays special stress on the ethical aspect of personality.

It is the ethical personality ( sthitaprajña ) that brings out the inner worth and dignity of men more than any other quality. To every man, his mind consisting of subjective inclinations is a kingdom and he can attain self-sovereignty or svārājya. Personality is different from the self of sensibility and reason. The pleasures of sensibility have no stability and universality. They are trivial and transitory; they make man the slave of sensibility or animal instincts. In the same way, a rational man who seeks to derive by prudence the advantages of life like power and position does not necessarily secure success. Success and failure are inseparable in empirical life and if there is attachment to a thing due to Kāma, it is followed by aversion to it and Krodha if the attempt is futile. But the man has will and is morally free. He can acquire mastery over his inclinations and empirical desires. By viveka or discrimination, he knows that he is not the animal or empirical self and that he should not be a victim of viśaya rūga or sexual desire. When he conquers his animal self, he attains svārājya, and is called a true victor or jñātāmā. He is superior to a man who has conquered the world and yet a victim to his Kāma. He is, to use the language of Plato, the spectator of all time and existence.

Most of the Indian philosophers are never tried in repeating that the personality of a man is eternal in contrast to the body which is subject to the sixfold changes of birth, youth, manhood, age, decay and death.

1 Bhagavadgītā, ii.62.
It is not dehātmā, but prayagātmā. It is different from the aggregate or sāṁghāta of the five elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether. It is not the vital principle or entelechy made of the five breaths nāme, prāna, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna. It is not due to the association or cluster of sensations as it is a fleeting psycho-physical process without self-consciousness and reason. It is not ahāskāra or the principle of egoism which causes the inclusive feeling of 'I' and 'mine', ahāskāra and māyākāra. It is not even buddhi, as it is the product of Prakṛti. 'It is, in short, eternal, immutable, beyond Prakṛti and its modifications.

Now the question is: Can we legitimately apply the predicate 'personality' to God, or in other words, can we call God a Person? In dealing with this problem, we face the objection that to think of God as a Person is anthropomorphism. This criticism is an old one and to it nothing of importance has been added in more than two thousand years. It has been revived, however, in the writings of some philosophers and scientists of the twentieth century. Albert Einstein in his religious writings attacks the conception that God is a Divine Person. As he puts it:

"During the youthful period of mankind's spiritual evolution human fantasy created gods in man's own image, who, by the operations of their will were supposed to determine, or at any rate to influence, the phenomenal world. Man sought to alter the disposition of these gods in his own favour by means of magic and prayer. The idea of God in the religious taught at present is a sublimation of that old concept of the gods. Its
anthropomorphic character is shown, for instance, by the fact that men appeal to the Divine Being in prayers and plead for fulfilment of their wishes.

"No body, certainly will deny that the idea of the existence of an omnipotent personal God is able to accord man solace, help and guidance; also, by virtue of its simplicity it is accessible to the most undeveloped mind. But, on the other hand, there are decisive weaknesses attached to this idea in itself, which have been painfully felt since the beginning of history. That is, if this being is omnipotent, then every occurrence, including every human action, every human thought, and every human feeling and aspiration is also His work; how is it possible to think of holding men responsible for their deeds and thoughts before such an Almighty Being? In giving out punishments and rewards He would, to a certain extent, be passing judgment on Himself. How can this be combined with the goodness and righteousness ascribed to Him?

"The main source of the present-day conflicts between the sphere of religion and science lies in this concept of a personal God." ¹

A man may be a great mathematician without being a careful thinker in other fields. Einstein repeats the argument of Xenophanes, the Greek thinker, that man has made the gods in his own image, but is not aware of the prophetic teaching that warns us against this very danger while keeping

¹ Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, pp. 46, 47.
the sense of personal immediacy. Einstein takes omnipotence as though he has not heard of the fact of freedom, which means that God is not directly responsible for the acts of men which go against His will. In short, the whole position is naive and gets its apparent strength from naivette. Of course, it would be quite wrong and inadequate to represent God as limited to the imperfect character of man, but this is not meant by those who believe in divine personality. There is a position between anthropomorphism and impersonalism.

It may be noted in this connection that all theism is in a sense anthropomorphic for the ideas of God are largely derived from our consciousness of ourselves. There is a pronouncement of Goethe: "Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is". It may even be maintained that in its highest and most transcendental effort religion can never escape from anthropomorphism. For we can only conceive of God in terms of our own human faculties, and in the light of our human emotions and our moral, intellectual and spiritual experience. And the imputed attributes of the Highest Good are the glorified reflex of the attributes of the ideal man, though in straining to reach the highest concept we transcend our limitations of space and time. It is then no rebuke to religion to describe it as anthropomorphic; but we may condemn any particular form of anthropomorphism as narrow or degrading.

It is easy to meet Einstein's objection. But it is hard to refute the argument advanced by Paul Tillich. Tillich does not directly deny personal characteristics in the divine, but attempts such a radical
reinterpretation of divine personality as to break with what believers in generally normally mean. This approach, more damaging to theism than the objection raised by Einstein. Tillich speaks of the personal character of God as a 'myth' and says, "Where the myth is taken literally, God is less than the ultimate, he is less than the object of ultimate concern, he is not God in the infinite and unconditional sense of the great commandment." 1

Such a statement calls for analysis. What is the meaning of 'taken literally'? By it Tillich cannot mean that God has a physical form like man's form or appetites and temptations. The inadequacy of this conception is obvious to every thinking person and is not worth Tillich's attention. If divine personality is a myth, religion should be dismissed as a matter of fantasy for without a Personal God, worship which is the essence of religion is meaningless. Religion demands that God must be a Personal God. It is also true to say that a Personal God involving, as it does the conception of limitation, must be a finite God. We then face two opposites without a synthesis of which religion dwindles into nothingness. There is nothing in Tillich to help us solve this riddle.

Many philosophers have in the recent past failed to conceive divine personality in clear terms. Whitehead is one of them. He says much about God, particularly in the concluding pages of Process and Reality. 2 He does not accept the conceptions of God involved in some different religions.

2 Process and Reality pp. 481-497.
According to most religions, God is the primordial being and becomes the creator of the world. The notion of God as the unmoved mover is derived from Aristotle. In Christian theology God is eminently real. According to Mohammadanism, God is the creator of the world. But according to Whitehead, there is no line between the primordial nature of God and creativity. The former is bound up with the latter. That is to say, God exists as creating. It is not that God first exists and then creates.

There is, however, another side to the primordial nature of God. It is the principle of connection by which something comes out of a situation. God is both primordial and consequent. He is the beginning and the end. He is not the beginning in the sense that He existed in the past before all things. He is the beginning because He is presupposed by the creative world every element of which is objectified in Him. God's conceptual nature is indeed unchanged because of the fact that it is finally complete. But there is a derivative element in His nature which is consequent upon the advance of the creative world. The nature of God is bipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. The consequent nature of God is conscious; it consists in the realisation of the actual world in the unity of His nature. The primordial nature of God is constituted by his conceptual experience who is presupposed by actuality. It is, therefore, infinite, free, complete, primordial, eternal, actual, deficient and unconscious. The other side originates with physical experience from the temporal world and is integrated with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, everlasting and conscious.

1 Process and Reality p. 488.
2 Ibid. p. 488.
3 Ibid. p. 489.
4 Ibid. p. 489.
This is we believe, Whitehead's view of God. But we do not know whether we have understood his view. If we have grasped what he means by God being bi-polar we may make some observations about his theory of God. What does Whitehead mean by conceptual nature? Does he mean that God has a mind which thinks of a vast number of concepts or ideas which pre-figure things and beings to be created? Then we see that God must be a supremely conscious being, otherwise, he could not have a vast plan or design before creation. Further, we may ask Whitehead: Does God become conscious through creation? Or, does He create because He is conscious? If He is not conscious how does He create? Creation then has to be conceived mechanically. If creation presupposes consciousness on the part of God it appears that God is the Supreme Person. As we see Whitehead speaks of two aspects of the nature of God, but he does not quite reconcile these two aspects and consequently leaves the problem of divine personality unsolved.

Paul Tillich, however, goes much further than Whitehead in another context. He speaks of God as 'Personal' but refuses to take Him as 'Person'. Having said that "personal God" is a symbol which is "absolutely fundamental because an existential relation is a person-to-person relation" and that "Man cannot be ultimately concerned about anything that is less than the personal", he makes his qualifications in the following words:

"'Personal God' does not mean that God is a person. It means that God is the ground of everything personal and that He carries within himself the ontological power of personality. He is not a person but he is not less than the personal. It should not be forgotten that classical theology employed the term persona for trinitarian hypostases, but not for
God himself. God became 'a person' only in the nineteenth century, in connection with the Kantian separation of nature ruled by physical law from personality ruled by moral law.¹

We can challenge this view on several grounds. In the first place, we are unable to understand the distinction Tillich makes between 'personal' and 'person', since the adjective is strictly meaningless without reference to the noun. The only reality that is personal is a person. Otherwise, it is a smile without a face. Secondly, it is not true that God became a 'person' in the nineteenth century. Christianity itself started with the conception of God as the Father in heaven, that is, as the creator of the heavens and the earth meaning that God is the divine Person. Furthermore, if we take the Trinitarian formula seriously, we find that the language referring to each part of the Trinity refers to the whole of the Living God, for these three are the one. It is of course true that according to the doctrine of the Trinity each of the three elements, Father, Son and Holy Ghost is a person. But we cannot deduce from this that God is the divine Person. In the discussion on the personality of God we need not be drawn into the dispute about the doctrine of the Trinity. This doctrine itself was much discussed in the early Christian Church, and different Christian leaders interpreted it differently. But the question is whether the conception of person was first found around the doctrine of the Trinity. We can say without fear of contradiction that the conception of God as the divine Person preceded the origin of aforesaid doctrine. As we have just stated the conception of God as the divine Person was the main plank upon which the Christian religion was founded.

The personality of God is a fundamental postulate of religion. Our religious consciousness demands that God must be a person. Religion is primarily an attitude of love and reverence towards the Deity. In prayer and worship we feel that we are in communion with a supreme personality who responds sympathetically to our prayer. If God be not a person, if He is not akin to us, not responsive to our prayer, worship which is an integral part of our religious consciousness loses its meaning and value for us. As Prof. Pringle Pattison so nicely puts it. "If God be an extra-mundane deity who is entirely indifferent to human weal and woe, to those aspects of our will and character which seem to us indubitably the highest and the best we know, then the existence or non-existence of such a deity is hardly a matter of human concern." But the logic of Absolutism pays no heed to the demands of our heart. Monistic thought in India as well as in Europe rejects personality as the highest principle inasmuch as personality involves duality and duality can never be the last word of any synthetic philosophy. We must, therefore, glance at the controversy and consider the conception of God as the divine Person. We shall discuss only the concept of divine personality developed in Indian philosophy. The problem of divine personality in Western philosophy lies outside the scope of the present discussion.